Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured” the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.  

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?   Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.  

Study Guide Various cases are examined involving combinations of “outside of time” and “outside of location” thoughts, with the central question being whether they incur the punishment of karet. The Mishna’s statement, that a thought about eating and burning does not combine, is analyzed to address questions raised by Rav Ashi and Rava, and to highlight an apparent contradiction within the Mishna itself. That contradiction is ultimately resolved. Slaughtering may be performed by non-kohanim, including women, slaves, and even someone who is ritually impure, as long as the ritually impure person does not physically touch the animal. Consequently, a pigul-intent during slaughtering by such individuals can invalidate the offering and render it pigul.

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

  Study Guide In discussing various cases of improper intent that render a sacrifice pigul, the Mishna presents a scenario in which one intends to eat the skin under the tail either outside the azara or beyond the designated time. Since the skin of the tail of the sheep is generally not eaten, but burned on the altar, this case is difficult to interpret. Shmuel, Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda each offer distinct explanations. Rabba, Abaye, and Rava explore the Torah sources for the prohibition against improper intent that invalidates sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” An intent of “outside its time” renders the offering pigul and subjects one who eats it to the punishment of karet, whereas “outside its location” does not carry that penalty. These laws are derived from Chapters 7 and 19 of Vayikra, though there is disagreement over the precise derivation. Challenges are raised against the interpretations of Rabba and Abaye, and their views are ultimately rejected.  

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

Study Guide If one leg of the animal was outside the azara at the time of slaughter or blood collection, does that disqualify the animal and on what does the ruling depend? If the meat of an animal with a lower level of sanctity leaves the azara before the blood is sprinkled, is the sacrifice disqualified? Shmuel’s father poses several questions to Shmuel about whether the animal, the slaughterer, or the kohen who received blood that was suspended in the air would invalidate the sacrifice. When the blood was placed in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar, the Mishna rules that it is disqualified. Shmuel reads this to mean the blood is accepted and the owner receives atonement, while the meat itself is disqualified. A Mishna in Zevachim 32 is cited to raise an apparent contradiction with Shmuel, which is subsequently resolved.

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Several difficulties are raised against the conclusion that the elders of the South must hold that the Paschal sacrifice may be brought on behalf of someone who is impure from contact with the dead. After presenting a challenge based on a question posed by Rami bar Hama, the Gemara concludes that Rami bar Hama clearly disagrees with the elders of the South. He maintains that the Paschal sacrifice cannot be brought for someone who is impure, and if it is, the offering is disqualified. A baraita is cited as a challenge to Rami bar Hama’s position, but the difficulty is ultimately resolved. Notably, there are two different versions of this challenge. Additionally, the Gemara discusses the case of a kohen who sits while performing the sacrificial rites. In such a case, the sacrifice is disqualified. The source for this ruling is examined, and two textual proofs are brought to support it.

Even though the basin in the Temple must be large enough for four people to simultaneously wash their hands and feet from it, a kohen may also perform this washing using a smaller utensil - provided the water originates from the basin and the utensil is sanctified (a kli sharet). Reish Lakish ruled that a liquid suitable for completing the required volume of a mikveh may also be used to complete the volume of water in the Temple basin. However, such a liquid is not valid for the quarter-log amount required for netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing). The Gemara explores what types of liquids are excluded from use in netilat yadayim. Initially, it suggests excluding liquefied clay or aquatic organisms like red gnats, which are considered water-like. Both suggestions are ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara concludes that the exclusion applies to a case where one adds a se’ah of liquid to a mikveh that contains exactly forty se’ah, then removes a se’ah, repeating this process until half the mikveh consists of the added liquid. This method is acceptable for a mikveh and the Temple basin, but not for the quarter-log required for handwashing. Rav Papa introduces a unique case where such a liquid would be valid for tevilah (immersion) of very small items. Rabbi Yirmia, quoting Reish Lakish, stated that water from a mikveh may be used in the Temple basin. This raises a question: perhaps the basin requires flowing water rather than stagnant water. Although a tannaitic source seems to support this requirement, the Gemara resolves the issue by showing that it is a matter of dispute among the tannaim. The Mishna teaches that if an uncircumcised kohen performs sacrificial service in the Temple, the sacrifices are disqualified. This ruling is derived from Yechezkel 44:7,9. Similarly, a kohen who is impure disqualifies the sacrifices he offers. The elders of the South limit this disqualification to impurity from a sheretz (creeping creature), but not to impurity from contact with the dead, which is permitted when the majority of the community is impure. The Gemara challenges this view, noting that impurity from the dead is more severe as it lasts seven days and requires purification through the ashes of the red heifer. However, the elders argue that since communal sacrifices are accepted when the majority are impure from the dead but not from a sheretz, the same distinction applies to kohanim: a kohen’s sacrifice is not disqualified if he is impure from the dead. To better understand the elders’ position, the Gemara concludes that they must hold that someone impure from a sheretz on the 14th of Nissan may have the Paschal sacrifice offered on their behalf and eat it on the night of the 15th in a state of purity. Ulla explained that Reish Lakish strongly disagreed with the elders of the South. He argued that the laws governing the community are more lenient than those governing the kohanim. While the people may have their Paschal offering brought on their behalf when impure, a kohen’s offering is disqualified if he is impure from a sheretz. Therefore, if the Paschal offering cannot be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead, then certainly a kohen who is impure from the dead should disqualify the sacrifice he offers. To resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty, the Gemara suggests that the elders of the South may have held that even the Paschal offering could be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead. This raises a question: how does this view align with the laws of Pesach Sheni?  

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Four distinct verses are cited to teach that a kohen who performs a service in the Temple without wearing the prescribed priestly garments renders the sacrifice invalid. Each verse contributes a unique aspect to this halakha, clarifying different scenarios. A braita further analyzes various garment-related issues—such as garments that are too long or too short, worn out, duplicated (e.g., wearing two pairs of pants), or missing one garment. It distinguishes between cases that invalidate the service and those that do not. However, statements by Shmuel and Rav regarding overly long or short garments appear to contradict the braita, which does not disqualify those cases. These apparent contradictions are addressed and resolved through deeper analysis. Additionally, several drashot are derived from the Torah’s use of the word "bad" in describing the kohen’s clothing. The term is interpreted to mean fine linen, and the derivation of this meaning is explored through textual and linguistic analysis.

A verse from Vayikra 21:6 is cited to demonstrate that if a tvul yom - someone who has immersed in a mikveh but must wait until sunset to complete their purification - performs one of the essential sacrificial rites, the sacrifice is invalidated. The discussion explores how this verse specifically refers to a tvul yom and not another form of impurity. The Mishna lists three distinct categories: an impure person, a tvul yom, and a mechusar kaparah - someone who has completed immersion and sunset but still needs to bring a sacrificial offering (e.g., a zav on the eighth day of his purification). The necessity of listing all three is examined, highlighting the unique halachic implications of each status. Sources are brought to prove that if a kohen performs sacrificial rites without wearing all the required priestly garments, the sacrifice is disqualified.

Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest (zar) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial (onen), in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

The Mishna teaches that improper intent (lo lishma) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul, while the Mishna discusses lo lishma. However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul. The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen’s act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.

A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering. After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved. The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved. Later, a statement from Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog’s position than the one initially assumed.

Study Guide Zevachim 8 If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering - slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it - are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner. The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations - nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering - but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency. Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev). The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously. The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified. To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.  

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.  

Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.  

Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?  

What is the source for the Mishna’s ruling that if one intends a different sacrifice than the one designated, the offering is no longer valid to fulfill the obligation of the original owner? The Gemara investigates the derivation of this principle across each of the four sacrificial rites: slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar. Why is it not sufficient to derive the law from just one of these rites? The Gemara then poses a similar question regarding a change in ownership—specifically, if the sacrifice was offered on behalf of someone other than its designated owner. Again, it seeks a source for each of the four rites. If these requirements are mandated by Torah law, why do they not render the sacrifice invalid?

Study Guide Zevachim 3 This week's learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her father, Mr. Mike Senders, A"H, Yitzchak Meir ben HaRav Tzvi Aryeh v'Esther Bayla, on his shloshim. "Reaching the age of 101 was not only a personal milestone for my father, but also a testament to the fullness of his life. He used those years well - building Torah institutions, nurturing family and living in intimacy with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Today’s daf is sponsored by Lisa Malik & Adi Wyner in loving memory of Lisa’s grandmother, Regina Post z”l. "Babi Gina was the one who insisted on her grandchildren going to the Yeshivah Flatbush and who was especially proud of her 2 granddaughters who were Hebrew valedictorians. She would also be so proud to know that one of her namesakes, Rivkah Gottlieb, made aliyah and that she now has 6 Israeli grandchildren and 3 Israeli great-grandchildren. May the memory of Rivkah bat Shmuel v’Chavah be for a blessing." From where do we know for certain that a get that is written without any specific intent for the woman is disqualified (the basis of a contradiction in Zevachim 2)? After four failed attempts, they eventually find a fifth case in the Mishna in Gittin that clearly proves this. Four contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified when offered for a similar but different intent or for a completely different intent. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and laws within the topic itself (various cases where wrong intentions disqualify/don't disqualify the sacrifices). Each contradiction is resolved. How do we know with certainty that a get (divorce document) written without specific intent for the woman is invalid? This question arises as part of a contradiction discussed in Zevachim 2. After four unsuccessful attempts to find the source, the Gemara ultimately finds a definitive proof in a Mishna in Gittin, which clearly establishes that a get must be written lishmah—with specific intent for the woman receiving it. The sugya presents four challenges to statements attributed to Rav regarding when sacrificial offerings are disqualified due to improper intent. These challenges explore cases where the intent is slightly off (e.g., for a different type of offering) or entirely unrelated. The contradictions are from: The laws of gittin (divorce documents) The laws of tumah in utensils (what constitutes a barrier to impurity) Internal comparisons within the sacrificial laws themselves Each contradiction is carefully analyzed and ultimately resolved, reinforcing the nuanced understanding of how intent affects the validity of offerings—and by extension, other halachic domains.

Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life." Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit. If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions: Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case? After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.  

Introduction to Masechet Zevachim

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tova and David Kestenbaum in loving memory of Tova's father, Rabbi Dr. Israel Rivkin z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. "My father was a pillar of strength and love for our family, a passionate learner of Torah, and a man whose chessed for his community and Klal Yisrael knew no bounds. He was deeply grateful to be living in Israel, together with my mother, surrounded by generations of descendants — a dream he cherished and fulfilled with joy and pride. יהי זכרו ברוך" Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in memory of her mother Deera Tychman, Tzvia Bracha bat Mordechai v'Chaya Tova, on her 12th yahrzeit. "My mother was a lover of Israel and the Hebrew language. May her memory be a blessing." Today’s daf is dedicated to my brother Jonathan Cohen on his 50th birthday! He has been learning daf yomi with me since Masechet Nidda of the last cycle. The bull offering of the kohen gadol precedes the bull offering of the community. This is derived both from a verse in the Torah and a logical argument. The bull offering of the community (sin offering) precedes the bull offering of the community in a case of idol worship (burnt offering), as a sin offering precedes a burnt offering, as is derived from a verse regarding the sliding scale offering when two birds are offered - one as a sin offering and one as burnt offering. The Gemara brings several other rulings regarding which sacrifice precedes another and the source for it in the Torah. Only in one case is there a tannaitic debate.  If there are two lives to save or two people to feed or two people taken hostage, on what basis do we decide who to save, feed, or redeem first? The Mishnayot list who comes first, and a braita explands on this list.  Lineage plays a key role in determining precedence, but a Torah scholar overrides this and comes before even a mamzer, as is derived from a verse in Mishlei 3:15. What things cause one to forget one’s Torah, and what can one do to restore forgotten Torah? What are ten things that are detrimental to Torah study? A braita delineates the rules for showing respect for the Nasi, Av Beit Din and Chacham – each in a different manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the nasi) on a day that Rabbi Natan, the Av Beit Din, and Rabbi Meir, the Chacham were not in the Beit Midrash.

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?  

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers. 

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about the case in which a kohen gadol becomes obligated to bring a sacrifice for idol worship. According to one view, it involves a situation where he unknowingly worshipped idols. According to the other, it refers to a case where he unknowingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and then acted upon it. Despite this disagreement, both Rebbi and the rabbis agree that the sacrifice he brings is the same as that brought by an individual—a female goat. They also concur that the kohen gadol does not bring a provisional guilt offering (asham talui), though each derives this conclusion through a different method. The communal sin offering—whether for general commandments or for idol worship—is only brought for transgressions where intentional violation incurs karet, and unintentional violation requires a sin offering. This same criterion applies to the unique sin offering of the kohen gadol, the king and the individual. Rebbi derives this from a gezera shava based on the word עליה  (“upon her”), which appears both in the verse about the communal offering and in the verse prohibiting a man from sleeping with his wife’s sister. The rabbis, however, interpret the verse about the sister differently for another law, and instead derive the principle from Bamidbar (Numbers) 15:29–30. What does Rebbi derive from that verse? How do we know that the section in Bamidbar 15 refers specifically to the sin of idol worship? Three suggestions are offered, though the third is ultimately rejected. The communal sin offering is not brought for transgressions that are punishable by a sliding scale offering (korban oleh ve’yored). The source for this exclusion is also examined. Does the king bring his unique sin offering for a transgression that is punishable by a sliding scale offering? The Mishnah presents two differing opinions on this matter.

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm’s children in memory of their grandfather, Mike Senders z”l, from Cleveland, Ohio, and later Boca Raton, Florida.  "He dedicated much of his life to growing strong Jewish institutions, and his passion for Judaism, Torah, and Tefilla serves as a constant inspiration for us. May his neshama have an aliya and his memory be for a blessing." A braita is brought to raise a difficulty on Rabbi Meir’s position. The braita mentions two specific sin offerings whose meat is not eaten – the Levites' miluim offering and the offerings brought in the time of Ezra by those who returned to Zion. The latter offering consisted of twelve bulls and twelve goats. The Gemara assumes they were a communal sin offering for idol worship by the people during the time of Zedekiah. This number of sacrifices accords with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that each tribe brings a bull and goat, and Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that both the tribes and the court bring (in a case where eleven tribes sinned), but it does not accord with Rabbi Meir’s opinion that only the court brings the sacrifice, as there should be only one bull and one goat. This difficulty is resolved by the suggestion that they sinned on twelve separate occasions.  Two other difficulties are raised on the braita. One, if the people of that time were already dead, how could the sin offering be brought, as an animal designated for a sin offering whose owners died is left to die, as the sacrifice can no longer be offered? Rav Papa suggests that the sin offering is left to die only for an individual offering, but not for one brought by the community. Three potential explanations are brought as a source for Rav Papa’s view, but all are rejected, and Rav Papa’s answer is rejected as well. The Gemara then answers that the people were still alive and proves it from a verse in Ezra 3:12. The second question is, didn’t they sin intentionally, in which case a sacrifice would not be able to be offered? They answer that it was a horaat sha’ah, unique circumstances, under which this was permitted. This answer can also resolve the previous difficulties. A braita teaches that if one of the community died, the communal sin offering would still be brought, but if one of the judges who issued the ruling died, the community is exempt from bringing the offering. Which tanna is the author of this braita? Rav Chisda attributes it to Rabbi Meir, while Rav Yosef questions why it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Shimon as well. Abaye disagrees with Rav Yosef’s suggestion, and there is a back-and-forth discussion between them. Ultimately, the Gemara sides with Abaye, based on a different source. In what cases does a kohen gadol bring a bull sin offering?

There are multiple opinions regarding who is responsible for bringing the communal sin offering. Is it the Sanhedrin that offers it? Do individual tribes that sinned each bring their own offering? Could it be both? If only some tribes transgressed, are the others still obligated to bring a bull offering? And is a communal offering required only when the Sanhedrin haGadol issues a mistaken ruling? What are the Torah sources and rabbinic interpretations that support these different views?

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.      

This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. "My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. "Happy birthday to Hadran’s newest wonderful addition to the team. I’m excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!” The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual. If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering. If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called ‘the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin (par he’elem davar shel tzibur). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered “an erroneous ruling of the court.” Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi’s position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi. The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words “shogeg al pihem, unwitting by their words.” In two different versions of Rava’s explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava’s explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous. The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case? How is a “teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings" defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge? The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis' dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis' position.  

Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and “do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem.” A contradiction arises between the Mishna and a Mishna in Zevachim regarding the proper method for kashering a spit. Several sages present different approaches, prompting five proposed resolutions—though many are ultimately rejected. When it comes to kashering knives, the Mishna recommends polishing as the preferred method. However, Rav Ukva offers an alternative: inserting the knife into the ground ten times. The Masechet concludes with an intriguing anecdote involving the Persian king Shabur Malka, Mar Yehuda, and a Canaanite slave named Bati bar Tuvi. Before serving Mar Yehuda, the king inserts the knife into the ground, adhering to Rav Ukva’s method. Yet he omitted this step before serving Bati previously. When Bati questions the discrepancy, the king responds with a dismissive remark, implying that Bati lacks the same level of halachic stringency. In an alternate version of the story, the king’s reply is even more pointed and accusatory.