Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

Which types of meal offerings require hagasha – to be brought to the southwestern corner of the altar? From where do we derive which ones are including in this category? Are they derived by logical arguments or by drashot from the verses?

Study Guide The Mishna discusses the classification of the various meal offerings based on their components, examining which offerings require both oil and frankincense, which require only one of them, and which require neither. To clarify the source of these laws, the Gemara cites a braita that derives the various cases where oil, frankincense, or both are excluded from the verses concerning the Omer offering (the meal offering of the first fruits). During the analysis of the braita, the Gemara analyzes the choice of exclusions and questions why the Midrash focused specifically on the cases mentioned in the braita rather than excluding the law of the Priestly meal offering (minchat kohanim) instead. The Mishna rules that one who adds both oil and frankincense to a sinner's meal offering transgresses two negative prohibitions. However, there is a difference between adding oil and frankincense. If one adds oil, the offering is disqualified as it cannot be removed, but if one adds frankincense, it is not disqualified as it can be removed. Rav bar Rav Huna asks about frankincense that is crushed into small pieces that cannot be removed: is the offering disqualified, as it would be with oil, or is the issue with oil specifically that it is absorbed, whereas this frankincense is not absorbed into the mincha? Three attempts are brought to answer the question. After rejecting the first two, the third leads to the conclusion that it is disqualified.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.

The word "oto" (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, "and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered" (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach. The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north - specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary. The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source. The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement. The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north. In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya's source differently. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution. For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue. The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.

There is a debate regarding whether apple juice can be used to leaven the dough for the two mincha offerings that are required to be chametz. In Mishna Terumot 10:2, it is explained that apples of teruma that leaven a dough are significant and cannot be nullified; this is because leavening is considered a transformative action that fundamentally alters the dough. While it may initially appear that the Mishna supports the position that apple juice is a valid leavening agent for these offerings, the text can also be reconciled with the opposing view. One can distinguish between different levels of leavening, suggesting that the "leavening" mentioned in the Mishna may be chametz nukshe, which does not satisfy the specific leavening requirements for the mincha offerings. Rabbi Ila and Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi debate whether the mincha of a sinner, which is offered without oil, may contain water. Initially, the Gemara assumes the root of this debate is whether we determine the measurement of an item that has changed form based on its original state or its current state. If we follow the current size, water may be added because the kometz (handful) is measured based on the substance in its present form. However, if it must be measured by its original size, adding water would mean the handful no longer contains the required amount of flour, as the volume has been altered by the liquid. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that both sages agree items are measured by their current state; their actual debate concerns how to interpret the requirement for a sinner's mincha to be "dry"—whether this means it must be completely dry of all liquid, or merely dry of oil. The Gemara continues to delve into whether the halakhic measurements of items that have changed in size are determined by their present state or their original state. A Mishna in Uktzin 2:8 is cited regarding the laws of ritual impurity (tumah) for a piece of meat that has shrunk to less than the size of an egg (kebeitzah)—the minimum volume required to transmit impurity. Two groups of sages disagree over the correct version of this Mishna: one asserting that we assess the item based on its original size, and the other maintaining we assess it by its current size. The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion that items are measured by their original size; specifically, in a case where meat expanded to exceed the size of an egg, it is ruled to transmit impurity. This challenge is resolved by explaining that the law in that specific source is Rabbinic in nature, rather than a Torah law. A second difficulty is raised from a braita discussing the opposite case: if meat shrinks below the required volume, it no longer transmits impurity. However, Raba rejects this proof, explaining that all would agree an item cannot transmit impurity if its current state is too small. He clarifies that the sages were only stringent in cases where an item was originally too small but later expanded to the requisite volume. The true point of disagreement, according to Raba, is a case where the item originally met the requirement, shrunk, and then expanded again. The question is whether the item was "rejected" (nidcheh) during its middle stage - thereby losing its ability to transfer impurity permanently - or if it regains its ability to transmit impurity upon re-expanding. A difficulty is then raised against the position that it remains pure even after re-expanding. A challenge from Tosefta Terumot 4:2 is brought against Raba's premise that everyone agrees a shrunken item is measured by its current state. This challenge involves the laws of separating tithes from fresh figs for dried ones; however, the difficulty is ultimately resolved by explaining that the case does not concern standard tithes, but rather terumat ma'aser (the tithe of the tithe). Unlike regular ma'aser, terumat ma'aser does not require an exact measurement, and it is considered preferable to err on the side of generosity by giving more to the Kohen.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?  

A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose. Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections. The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear. The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid? Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.

Study Guide

The braita explains that there is no way to test techelet (blue dye), and therefore one should only purchase it from an expert. Initially, the Gemara suggested this meant there was no way to distinguish between authentic techelet and kala ilan (a vegetable-based fake). However, this was rejected because there are indeed chemical tests available, as the Gemara explains. Ultimately, the conclusion is that there is no way to test if the strings were dyed "for the sake of the mitzva" (l'shma) or merely "for a tasting" (to test the color). The Gemara then addresses: From whom may one buy tzitzit and assume they are valid? And why is it forbidden to sell tzitzit to a non-Jew? There is also a dispute regarding whether tzitzit is a "time-bound positive commandment" (mitzvat aseh she'hazman grama). Rav Yehuda would place tzitzit on his wife's garments. However, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is time-bound and women are therefore exempt. The rabbis disagree with him, believing that nighttime is also a time for tzitzit. Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "And you shall see it" that the obligation only applies during the day. The Gemara brings many other drashot (interpretations) on this verse, most of which relate to the profound importance of the mitzva of tzitzit. What is unique about the color techelet that this specific color was chosen for the mitzva? It serves as a reminder of the heavenly throne.   

The rabbis disagree on the required length of tzitzit strings, which implies that a specific length is necessary. However, this appears to contradict a ruling by the elders of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that there is no requisite amount. This contradiction is reconciled by explaining that their statement refers to the maximum length. A braita emphasizes the importance of the strings hanging down, as proven by the usage of the word "tzitzit" in a different context (Yechezkel 8:3). How are tzitzit prepared? Specifically, how far from the garment's edge should they be, and how many strings are inserted and in what manner? There are various opinions on these matters. Is a bracha recited when preparing tzitzit? Can a non-Jew prepare them? Rav Chisda believed these two questions were connected and challenged Rav based on that premise; however, Rav Chisda's understanding was ultimately rejected. Which part of the process must be performed "for the sake of" the mitzva? Some maintain that the strings must be spun for the sake of the mitzva, while others hold that only the final preparation of the tzitzit must be done with this intent.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the law of a sadin (a linen garment) in the context of tzitzit. While Beit Shammai exempts a linen garment from the obligation of tzitzit to avoid the prohibition of shaatnez (mixing wool and linen), Beit Hillel holds it is obligated. Their reasoning is based on the textual juxtaposition of the laws of shaatnez and tzitzit, which teaches that the positive commandment (aseh) of tzitzit overrides the negative prohibition (lo taaseh) of shaatnez. Although the halakha follows Beit Hillel, Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok testifies that anyone who attached tchelet (wool) to a linen garment in Jerusalem was viewed with wonder - as it caused onlookers to mistakenly believe shaatnez was generally permitted. Rabbi explains that the Sages eventually prohibited this practice because people did not know about the drasha permitting shaatnez and would come to think that shaatnez was permitted in general. Since difficulties were raised against Rabbi's explanation, Rava and Rabbi Zeira offer four alternative reasons for why the Sages prohibited wool tzitzit on linen garments: Decree of "kala ilan": There is a concern that one might use a dye that looks like techelet but is not the authentic wool dyed with snail secretions. In such a case, the wearer violates the prohibition of shaatnez (wool and linen) without having fulfilled the mitzvah that allows it. Decree of "teima" (testing): A concern regarding the validity of the tzitzit - lest the techelet used was dyed during the "testing" of the color, which is invalid because it was not dyed specifically for the sake of the mitzva (lishma). Concern of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui ": Rava and Rabbi Zera explain a concern that if the linen garment tears within three fingerbreadths of its edge, a person might sew it back up and leave the sewing threads to serve as tzitzit. This would be invalid because the Torah requires the mitzva to be actively made by attaching the strings to the garment, rather than utilizing threads that were already there for a different purpose. Decree of night garments: Since a garment worn exclusively at night is exempt from tzitzit, wearing wool strings on a linen night garment would constitute a shaatnez violation without any mitzva to permit it. The Gemara discusses the definition of a garment obligated in tzitzit regarding a hybrid garment made of leather and fabric. Rava rules that we follow the primary material of the garment: if the body of the garment is fabric and the corners are leather, it is obligated; if the body is leather and the corners are fabric, it is exempt. Rav Achai disagrees, arguing that the status follows the material of the corners themselves. Regarding the construction of the tzitzit, Rav Huna rules that if one attached tzitzit to a garment while it only had three corners and then completed the fourth corner afterward, the tzitzit is invalid due to "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" (Make it, and not from that which is already made). The Gemara challenges this from the practice of the "Early Pious Ones," who would attach techelet after weaving only three fingerbreadths of the garment (when only two corners were in existence). The Gemara resolves this by understanding the custom of the pious ones to be performed at the end, when there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave (when the four corners were already in existence). Finally, the Gemara challenges the invalidation of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" based on Rabbi Zera's ruling, which validates attaching new tzitzit onto a garment that already has tzitzit (and then removing the old ones). Rava suggests that because of the prohibition of "bal tosif" (do not add to the mitzvot), the act of attaching the strings before the obligation exists is not considered a significant "act." However, Rav Papa challenges Rava's reasoning, explaining that it depends on human intent: if one intends to cancel the first set of strings and replace them with the new ones, it is considered a significant act. This raises the question: if intent makes it a valid act, why was the case of attaching tzitzit before the garment was finished invalid in light of Rabbi Zeira permitting the case of the extra strings?

Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

Link to Ptil Techelet website. The Gemara brings two different versions of the incident involving Mar bar Rav Ashi, whose tzitzit were torn on Shabbat while he was walking home. This raises the subject of "kevod haberiyot" (human dignity), which overrides a "lo ta'aseh" (negative commandment) in the Torah. Both versions bring the explanation of Rav bar Shaba, who explained that this law refers specifically to the negative commandment of "lo tasur" (do not stray from the words of the Sages), meaning that it only overrides Rabbinic prohibitions. For tzitzit, one must place two strings of techelet and two white strings. The Mishna rules, however, that this is not essential – one can have only white or only techelet. Also regarding the tefillin of the hand and the tefillin of the head - they are two independent mitzvot and do not hinder one another; someone who has only one of them puts it on and recites the blessing over it. The Gemara suggests that the Mishna does not follow the view of Rebbi, who holds that the techelet and the white do hinder one another. He learns this from the verse "And you shall see him" (u're-item oto), which teaches that both must be together, while the rabbis learn that it is possible to see each kind separately. However, two other suggestion were brought to explain the Mishna according to the view of Rebbi: Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: The law in the Mishna (that they do not hinder) was stated regarding the order of precedence. It is a mitzva to first place the white (since the white is the color of the "corner" of the garment, which appears in the verse first), but if one placed techelet before white, one has fulfilled the obligation, though the mitzva has not been performed in the most ideal way. Rava: The Mishna is speaking about gerdumin (remnants) of one of the colors - strings that were torn after they were already placed in the garment - the tzitzit remains valid. His words rely on the words of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, who said that remnants of techelet are valid. The minimum measure that must remain in a string to maintain its validity is "enough to tie them" (kedei le'anvan), meaning a length sufficient to make a slipknot. From the statement of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, Rava concludes that one must tie a knot on each and every "chulya" (group of windings) in the tzitzit. The reason for this is that if one does not tie a knot at every chulya, if just a short strand is permitted, the moment the string is severed above the first knot, all the windings will unravel and disappear. The knots between the chulyot ensure that even if part of the string is cut off, the structure of the rest of the tzitzit will be preserved and it will remain valid under the law of gerdumin. However, Rava's assumption is rejected as the sons of Rabbi Chiya may only permit gardumim when there are knots at every chulya.  

There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin on the left hand. However, left-handed people wear them on the right. There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel yad on the upper part of the arm. There are two different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel rosh on the top of the head. There is a Tannatic debate between Rabbi Yishmael and the rabbis about whether each tzitzit is a distinct mitzva (Rabbi Yishmael), or if one cannot fulfill the mitzva without having tzitzit on all four corners. The Gemara brings three practical ramifications of their debate. There are three examples brought of changes one can make to a four-cornered garment which, while it may no longer look like a four-cornered garment, would still be obligated in tzitzit. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yishmael, but the Gemara states that the halakha is not like that and brings a story with Mar bar Rav Ashi and Ravina to prove it.

Rav Chisda explains that if one speaks between placing the tefillin shel yad and the tefillin shel rosh, an additional blessing must be recited upon the shel rosh. From this, one can infer that if no interruption occurs, only one blessing is required. However, this poses a difficulty in light of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that there are separate blessings for the shel yad and shel rosh. Abaye and Rava resolve this conflict, yet their resolution is interpreted differently by Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, resulting in two distinct customs. The tefillin shel yad is placed first, followed by the shel rosh. When removing them, the order is reversed: the shel rosh is removed first, then the shel yad. This specific sequence is derived from the verse in Devarim 6:8. If one dons tefillin early in the morning before the proper time has arrived, the blessing is recited the moment the obligation begins. As stated in Berakhot 9b, this occurs when it becomes light enough to recognize an acquaintance from a distance of four cubits. There are three opinions regarding how late one may wear tefillin: until sunset, until the last people leave the market, or until one goes to sleep. Two versions of Rav Nachman's ruling exist - either supporting or opposing the middle position. This ruling either aligns with or contradicts the practice of Rav Chisda and Raba bar Rav Huna, who would pray Maariv while still wearing tefillin. A challenge is raised against Raba bar Rav Huna's practice based on his own statement implying that tefillin must be removed as darkness falls. This is resolved by explaining that his statement referred specifically to Shabbat. There are two different derivations for the exemption of tefillin on Shabbat: one links it to the exemption of wearing tefillin at night, while the other does not. Is it forbidden to don tefillin at night? If so, does one transgress a positive commandment or a negative one? One should touch the tefillin while wearing them to maintain constant awareness of them. This is derived via a kal v'chomer (a fortiori argument) from the tzitz (the Kohen Gadol's forehead plate). Tefillin are worn on the left hand, as derived from various verses indicating that the word "yad" refers specifically to the left hand.

Pictures The exact order of the four biblical passages (parshiot) within the tefillin shel rosh is critical; if they are not arranged in their specific sequence, the tefillin are disqualified. Abaye and Rava debate the specifics of this requirement, questioning the validity of the tefillin if the two "outer" sections (the first and last) or the two "inner" sections are transposed. Several physical elements of the tefillin are classified as halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai: the embossed letter Shin on the Shel Rosh, the requirement for the boxes to be perfectly square, the titura (the base), and the ma'abarta (the passageway for the straps). Regarding the straps (retsuot), the outer side must be black. The underside may be other colors, though red is strictly prohibited. If a strap is partially torn, it is disqualified. The Gemara distinguishes this from tzitzit or a hyssop branch, where "remnants" may still be valid; this is because tefillin straps serve an object of inherent kedusha (sanctity), requiring a higher standard. The knot of the shel rosh must be shaped like the letter dalet (halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai). Rav Nachman rules that the knot should be prominent and face outward, reflecting the idea that tefillin serve as a sign to the nations that "God's name is called upon you." This purpose also dictates the exact placement of the knot at the base of the skull and the box on the head. Finally, the blessing is recited after the tefillin are placed but before the final wrapping or tightening is completed.

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Rav Chelbo relates that he saw Rav Huna roll the mezuza from the word "echad" toward the word "shema" and format the paragraphs as setumot (closed). This practice is questioned by a braita where Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes that Rabbi Meir wrote mezuzot on duchsustos with margins at the top and bottom and formatted the paragraphs as petuchot (open). Rabbi Meir's reasoning was that the paragraphs are not adjacent in the Torah text itself. Since Rav (Rav Huna's teacher) rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that raises a difficulty on Rav Huna's practice. To resolve the difficulty, it is suggested that Rav only ruled like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding the margins. Abaye further supports this resolution by showing that Rav gives weight to local custom, and the established custom is to write them setumot. The Gemara brings an example to show that Rav gave weight to the established custom from a statement he made regarding use of a sandal for chalitzah, noting that even the testimony of the prophet Eliyahu would not overturn a practice the people have already adopted to use a sandal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty on Rav Huna. He explains Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's position as being that while it is a mitzva (ideal) to make them setumot, if they were written petuchot, it would be valid; he reads the words in the braita as "even petuchot." Support for Rav Nachman is brought from a braita stating that a worn-out Sefer Torah or tefillin cannot be repurposed into a mezuza because one does not "lower" an object from a higher level of sanctity to a lower one. From the reason given in the braita, one can infer that if it were not a matter of "lowering" in sanctity, it could be repurposed. This would prove that setumot could be used, as those sections are setumot in a Sefer Torah. However, this suggested proof is rejected. The Gemara raises two other difficulties on the inference that, but for the issue of "lowering" sanctity, a Sefer Torah or tefillin could be repurposed for a mezuza. The first is that tefillin are written on klaf on the side facing the flesh, while a mezuza is written on duchsustos on the side facing the hair. The second difficulty is that a mezuza requires lines (sirtut), while tefillin do not. Both difficulties are resolved. Rav Chelbo further observes that Rav Huna would not sit on a bed while a Sefer Torah was resting upon it, opting instead to place the Torah on an inverted vessel on the ground. However, Rabba bar bar Hana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, permits sitting on the same bed as a Torah. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel states that a mezuza written in a "letter" (iggeret) format is invalid, as it requires the formal writing style of a Sefer. He also rules that hanging a mezuza on a stick or placing it behind a door is invalid and even "dangerous," as it must be fixed "on your gates." Shmuel specifies that the mezuza must be placed within the hollow of the doorway.

Ravin, the son of Chinina, said in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the law follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in "this" issue and anywhere else he issued a ruling. Rav Papa and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak each identify a possible case where Rabbi Chanina ruled like Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. One suggests it was regarding how to measure 40 se'ah in a large box for purposes of impurity. The other suggests it was regarding the stringent ruling of the impurity of liquids - specifically, to which liquids this unique type of impurity extends. The Gemara brings a situation where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri mixed untithed produce with tithed produce and was told by Rabbi Tarfon to buy produce from the market to tithe upon it. In a different version, Rabbi Tarfon told him to buy produce from non-Jews. This advice is analyzed through two lenses: whether a market purchase is considered tithed by Torah law because most am ha'aretz tithe, or whether land ownership by non-Jews in Israel removes the Torah obligation of tithing the produce. Rav Papa confirms to Rav Yemar bar Shelamya that the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri even in this specific case. A statement by Rav regarding a tear in the parchment of a Sefer Torah is also analyzed. Rav rules that a tear spanning two lines may be sewn, but a tear of three lines may not. This is qualified by Rabba Zuti, who distinguished between "new" and "old" parchment, which is defined not by age but by whether or not it was processed with gall. Furthermore, the sewing must be done with sinews (gidin) and not plain thread. A question is left unresolved regarding whether these measurements apply if the tear occurs between columns or between lines. Regarding the writing of a mezuza, Rav Chananel in the name of Rav states that if it is written with two words on a line, it is valid. Rav Nachman explains that it can be written like a shira (song) - for example, two words, then three, then one. When questioned by a braita, he distinguishes between the requirements of a Sefer Torah and a mezuza. The Gemara clarifies that while a mezuza can be written in shira format, it must not be formatted like a "tent" or a "tail" (narrowing or widening). There is a discussion regarding the final words of the mezuza, "al ha'aretz." Should they be placed at the end of the line or at the beginning? The two views reflect different symbolic meanings: one highlights the height of heaven above the earth, while the other highlights the distance between them. Rav Chelbo mentions Rav Huna, who would roll the mezuza scroll from the end to the beginning and made the paragraphs "closed" (setumot). This is challenged by a ruling of Rabbi Meir, who made the paragraph breaks "open" (petuchot).

Rav makes a statement that is contradicted by a braita. He says that the last page of a Sefer Torah can end in the middle of the page, while a braita says it must finish at the end. After trying to reconcile Rav's position with the braita by limiting it to a Chumash (a parchment containing only one book of the Torah) and not a full Sefer Torah, the Gemara questions this from another statement of Rav (brought by Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal). There are two versions of the explanation for Rav's second statement, which may affect whether his position can be reconciled with the braita and whether one needs or is permitted to finish the last line of the Torah in the middle of the line. Two other statements of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal in the name of Rav are brought regarding the Torah. The first discusses a specific rule regarding the last eight verses of the Torah describing Moshe's death: an individual reads them in a shul. There is a debate among the commentaries regarding the meaning of this rule. Initially, it is suggested that this rule follows the view that Yehoshua wrote these verses, but the Gemara concludes it can also be explained according to Rabbi Shimon, who held that Moshe wrote them b'dema. The second statement is that one who buys a Sefer Torah in the market does not fulfill the mitzva in the proper manner, as ideally one should write a Sefer Torah rather than buy it. A piece of parchment used in a Sefer Torah can contain between three and eight columns. A column should include approximately 30 letters. However, there are different rules regarding the last page of the Torah. How many letters can be added in the margin if needed, and under what circumstances? If one omits the name of God, how can this be fixed? There are five tannaitic opinions, ranging from no solution to scraping the ink of a different word and inserting God's name there (placing the other word between the lines) to even allowing half the name of God to be added between the lines. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri's opinion is that the name of God can be added between the lines, but only if it is the whole name. Ravin son of Chinina said in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the law follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in "this" issue and anywhere else he issued a ruling. The Gemara tries to establish what "this" issue is. Each time a possibility is suggested, starting with our sugya,  it is rejected because others also issued rulings, and when the Gemara listed who ruled like whom, Ravin bar Chinina and rabbi Chanina did not appear there.

The Menora in the Temple featured various decorative parts, including goblets, knobs, and flowers. The Gemara details the quantity of each and their specific placement on the Menora. Rav explained that the Menora's height was nine handbreadths from the point where the lowest branches met. The text describes the gold used for the Menora as "michlot zahav." Rabbi Ami interpreted this phrase to mean that all the refined gold from King Solomon's era was used for its construction. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explained that the Menora is called "tehora" (pure) because it was shown to Moshe as a heavenly image. The Gemara explores why this same explanation is not applied to the "shulchan hatehora" (the pure table) used for the showbread; in that case, the phrase indicates that the table could potentially become impure. There were other items as well that God had to show Moshe, as they were difficult for him to grasp. The Mishna explains that the two parshiot (sections) in the mezuza are essential. Initially, it is assumed this refers to the small tip of the letter yud (kotzo shel yud), but this is rejected as being obvious. Instead, the Gemara suggests it serves to disqualify a mezuza if its letters are touching one another. Various rabbis discuss different issues regarding the letters hey and yud and whether or not certain formations disqualify them. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that when Moshe went to receive the Torah, he found God attaching crowns to the letters. When Moshe asked why, God showed him Rabbi Akiva, who was extrapolating heaps of laws from every crown. Moshe was taken aback, as he did not understand Rabbi Akiva's teachings. However, once he heard Rabbi Akiva answer a student that a certain law was "a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai," Moshe was relieved. Yet, when he asked God what the reward would be for such a great scholar, God showed him Rabbi Akiva's tragic death, and Moshe was once again disturbed. In both instances, God told Moshe, "Be silent, for this is My decree." Seven specific letters are adorned with three crowns. There were also special requirements for writing the letters yud and chet, with explanations provided for each. The rabbis discuss in which situations mistakes in a Sefer Torah can be corrected and in which situations they cannot.

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

The Mishna lists different elements of the mincha and other offerings that are essential. The Gemara delves into the derivations for each of these. Some elements are repeated Torah, and this repetition serves as an indicator that the act must be performed in that specific way. Others are deemed essential due to a specific formulation in the verse - a word that indicates a particular detail is necessary. The Gemara delves into two specific issues related to items on the list. One involves the four species of the lulav. A statement of Rav Chanan bar Rava is brought—that the essential element of the four species is that they be present, but they do not all need to be taken at once. A difficulty is raised against him from a braita that makes clear that the species need to be bound together. This is resolved by explaining that there are two different Tannaitic positions on this, based on whether or not the species are required to be bound. The second issue is the sprinkling of the blood of the Red Heifer, which must be performed while facing the Sanctuary. There are two contradictory braitot: one holds that if the blood is not sprinkled while facing the Sanctuary, it is disqualified, while another holds that it is not. Two resolutions are brought - either each source reflects a different Tannaitic position, or each is addressing a different situation.

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

The tzitz (headplate of the Kohen Gadol) effects atonement only for the disqualification of impurity (tum'ah) and not for other disqualifications such as yotzei (sacrificial meat taken outside its boundaries), piggul (improper intent), notar (remnants left past the legal time), or ba'al mum (a blemished animal). Both in the braita and in the discussions of the amoraim, these laws are derived from the biblical verses - establishing that the tzitz atones specifically for impurity and not for other types of disqualifications. The Gemara highlights a contradiction between two braitot: one states that the tzitz atones for an individual's offering only if it occurred inadvertently (shogeg), while the other states that the tzitz atones whether it occurred inadvertently or intentionally (mezid). The Gemara offers four potential solutions to resolve this contradiction, the first of which is rejected.  

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.  

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.

The Mishna details the cases in which a meal-offering (mincha) becomes pigul (disqualified due to improper intent), carrying the penalty of karet (divine excision), and the cases where it is merely disqualified (pasul) without the liability of karet. A question is raised: According to the opinion that if the remnants (shirayim) were diminished between the removal of the handful (kemitza) and the burning of the handful (haktara), one still burns the handful - even though the remnants may not be eaten - does this act of burning still "count" regarding the laws of pigul (such that it is considered as if the rest was offered according to the law)? Furthermore, does it function to remove the prohibition of meila, misuse of consecrated property from the remaining remnants? Rav Huna and Rava both compare this case to a disqualification caused by the offering "leaving" its designated area (yotzei), but they do so from opposite directions - disputing whether yotzei is a more stringent or more lenient type of disqualification. Rava proves his position based on an emendation made by Rabbi Hiyya to the text of our Mishna. Abaye, however, rejects this proof. Ultimately, Rava retracts his initial stance based on a different source. Abaye rejects this argument as well.