Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Conflicting traditions existed regarding Rav's ruling in the case of a dislocated femur in a bird. Ultimately, the analysis indicates that Rav permitted such a bird, except in regions where the prevailing custom was to forbid it. However, after presenting various differing opinions regarding this issue, which leaned primarily toward permissibility, the Gemara brings an incident demonstrating that the widespread, accepted custom was indeed to forbid this condition; consequently, the practical halakha is established to be stringent in accordance with this accepted communal custom. Rav Huna defines a treifa as an animal that cannot survive for more than twelve months. A contradiction is raised against this definition from a braita that brings three alternative opinions regarding what legally constitutes a treifa, none of which align with Rav Huna's position. This difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rav Huna follows a different Tanna, whose view is reflected in another braita stating that one must wait through the winter months to determine whether an animal can successfully recover from its specific ailment.

The Mishna enumerates all the physical defects that cause a bird to be rendered a treifa, as well as those that leave it kosher. If a weasel (chulda) attacks a bird in an area where the brain membrane could have been perforated, the bird is considered a treifa. There are, however, different tests one can perform to ascertain whether the membrane was actually punctured, and the Gemara suggests various methods for this inspection. Conversely, in the case of birds that live in the water, a broken skull creates an absolute presumption that the brain membrane was punctured, meaning that no subsequent test will be effective in permitting the bird. If a bird was caught in a fire and burned, the Gemara outlines specific ways to determine whether its internal organs were affected to the point of rendering the bird a treifa. This diagnostic procedure relies on checking for a change in color - either from red to green, or from green to red, depending on the specific internal organ being evaluated. Following the Mishnaic list of kosher conditions in a bird that do not render it a treifa, the Amoraim introduce specific qualifications and limitations to restrict the scope of some of these permitted cases.

Pictures Rava raises several difficulties against Rav Nachman's position that the term "until" implies up to but not including the final value. However, it concludes that the exact meaning depends on the specific context as one must always rule stringently with requisite amounts (shiurim), with the sole exception of a single requisite amount regarding the laws of niddah. Regarding some of the cases enumerated as kosher in the Mishna (if the spleen and kidneys are removed, or the lungs shrivel up out of fear), the Sages qualify and restrict the specific parameters under which the animal is permitted. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding a skinned animal (geludah), where the skin has been entirely removed. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes, however, that Rabbi Meir ultimately retracted his position and conceded to the view of the Sages.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

The Gemara discusses what other protective materials a bird could fall upon that would successfully cushion its impact and prevent it from being rendered a treifa. Relatedly, if a bird's wings become stuck to each other or to its body, a debate arises as to whether or not the bird will become a treifa upon falling, as its ability to break the fall is compromised. Two opinions are brought regarding the scope of this debate - specifically, whether the dispute applies to a case where only one wing is glued or if it is restricted to a case where both wings are glued. The Mishna rules that if the majority of an animal's ribs are broken, it is a treifa. While there are twenty-six ribs total, consisting of thirteen on each side, two of these are excluded from the halakhic count; therefore, a majority is defined as twelve ribs, which can be comprised of six on each side or any other combination totaling twelve. Rav rules that even a single rib dislocated along with its socket from the vertebra renders the animal a treifa. Rav Asi and Rav Kahana then questioned Rav regarding a case where two opposite ribs are completely removed while the vertebra remains intact, to which Rav responded that it is a neveila because the animal is essentially cut in half. Several questions are raised against this response in light of Rav's own previous statement, wondering why they would ask about two ribs if Rav already held that even one dislocated rib is a treifa. Ultimately, the Gemara resolves this by reinterpreting the precise details of their question and explaining that they were unaware of Rav's original ruling when they questioned him. Three of the seven extra cases of treifot introduced by the Amoraim were authored by Shmuel and are analyzed here because one of them directly relates to uprooted ribs. The next case in the Mishna transitions to an attack by a predator animal that emits venom (derisa), creating a treifa status. At first, a statement of Rav is brought asserting that a cat does not emit venom capable of making an animal a treifa, prompting the Gemara to question why this rule could not be inferred directly from the wording of the Mishna itself. Rav Chisda rules that a cat and a mongoose do emit venom that can kill a small kid or a baby lamb. A contradictory braita is brought against this view, and the contradiction is ultimately resolved in two possible manners.

A braita establishes the laws of a needle found in the thickness of the beit hakosot, ruling that a single-sided penetration is kosher while a complete perforation renders the animal a treifa. The presence of a drop of blood or a scab determines if the injury occurred before shechita. Internal organ crushing (risuk evarim) caused by falls is a treifa according to the Mishna. Rav Huna rules that an animal left on a roof and subsequently found below is not assumed to have crushed organs, a principle the Gemara applies to a practical case involving Ravina's goat. Addressing a sheep with dragging hind legs, Rav Yeimar and Ravina debate whether the cause is common rheumatism or a severed spinal cord. Rav Huna, Rav Menashye, and Rav further delineate which specific impacts - such as goring rams, sheep handled by thieves, or direct blows from a stick - instigate a concern for internal trauma. Rav Nachman rules that the womb protects a fetus from organ crushing during birth, and three sources are brought to attempt to prove his ruling, but all proofs are rejected. Animals falling in a slaughterhouse are similarly not suspected of risuk evarim. The Gemara outlines the physical indicators of recovery for a fallen animal, establishing when a twenty-four-hour waiting period or an internal inspection of the body cavity is required. Shmuel addresses a bird that strikes the surface of the water, ruling it valid if it swims its body length. The Gemara evaluates various impact surfaces - including garments, nets, sifted ash, and different preparations of flax - to determine whether their specific textures and density buffer a fall or cause a treifa status.

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

The Gemara explores the halakhic distinction between finding a needle embedded within the wall of the beit hakosot (reticulum) versus inside the liver. In the liver, the orientation of the needle indicates its trajectory, allowing the Sages to determine whether it caused a disqualifying perforation. Conversely, in the beit hakosot, the orientation is inconclusive, as the movement of food within the stomach could have pushed the needle out. When a perforation is discovered, it may be uncertain whether the puncture occurred before or after the shechita (ritual slaughter). The Sages present differing opinions regarding whether it can be assumed to have happened after the shechita in order to permit the animal. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva dispute two unrelated matters: the status of certain fats (chelev) on the stomach as either permitted or forbidden, and the interpretation of the phrase "and I will bless them" in Birkat Kohanim (the Priestly Blessing)—specifically, whether God's blessing is directed toward the Kohanim or toward the Jewish people. The Gemara delineates which internal fats are sticky enough to serve as an effective seal over a tear, preventing it from rendering the animal a treifa. In this context, the Sages evaluate whether to rule leniently based on the overarching principle that the Torah has compassion for the financial resources of the Jewish people.

The Gemara discusses additional cases of treifot, alongside several real-life incidents brought before the Sages, detailing how they ruled - or, in certain instances, declined to render a definitive decision. The first issue concerns a lung that has become attached to the ribs. Because the lesion causing the adhesion might have originated in the chest wall rather than the lung itself, the animal might not be a treifa. The Sages dispute whether this condition is permissible and outline diagnostic methods to determine the source of the underlying wound. Regarding cysts or fluid-filled blisters on the lung, the majority of the Sages permit the animal, whereas Rabbi Yochanan forbids it. The Sages divide over a case where a needle is discovered inside the lung. One opinion holds that the needle likely traveled through the gullet into the stomach, perforating internal organs on its way to the lung, which renders the animal a treifa. The opposing view permits the animal, operating under the assumption that the needle took a direct path down the windpipe into the bronchi without causing a disqualifying perforation.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

Pictures Under what conditions do perforations, cracks, or missing fragments in the windpipe render an animal or bird a treifa? How do perforations add up to the requisite amount needed to determine the animal is a treifa? The Sages delineate specific measurements for damage to the windpipe, depending on the type of perforation. For a crack along its length, the organ remains kosher provided that a little remains intact at the beginning and the end of the windpipe. The Sages discuss the precise anatomical boundaries of several vital organs, as these definitions carry significant halakhic weight across multiple areas of law. This includes defining the exact parameters of the neck to establish the zone permitted for ritual slaughter, and identifying the borders of the chest to isolate the specific cut of meat designated for the kohen from a peace offering. Furthermore, the Sages map out the exact perimeters of the brain and the heart to establish the critical zones where a perforation of any minimal size immediately disqualifies the animal as a treifa. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding the threshold size of a perforation in the aorta (the primary artery originating from the heart) that renders an animal a treifa. Rav maintains that a puncture of any minimal size is fatal, whereas Shmuel rules that the animal is only deemed a treifa if the majority of the aorta's circumference is perforated or severed. What are the precise boundaries of the spinal cord, and what specific injuries make it a treifa? The Gemara establishes the lower boundary of the spinal cord up to which physical trauma affects the animal's halakhic status. An animal is rendered a treifa if its spinal cord is severed, or if the internal neural tissue undergoes severe degradation, such as liquefying or softening to the point where the structural integrity of the cord is lost.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

Study Guide Picture What are the defects and traumas that render an animal a treifa? The Mishna lists various categories, such as a perforated gullet, a severed windpipe, a perforated brain membrane, a perforated heart chamber, a broken spine and a severed spinal cord, a completely removed liver, as well as various perforations or tears to the lungs, stomach, gallbladder, small intestines, and rumen. The list also includes severe external trauma, such as falling from a roof, having a majority of the ribs broken, or being clawed by specific predators. The Mishna establishes the overarching rule: any animal afflicted with a defect or injury such that a similar animal cannot survive is deemed a treifa. Resh Lakish derives the principle that a treifa cannot survive from the verse, "These are the living things which you may eat," teaching that only an animal capable of living is permitted for consumption, whereas one that cannot live is forbidden. Conversely, the opposing view holds that a treifa can survive, deriving from the same verse that a specific type of animal that is capable of living is permitted for consumption, while another animal that is capable of living (the treifa) is forbidden. However, after the Gemara rejects this proof from the verse, it brings another verse to support the opinion that a treifa can survive: "Between the living thing that may be eaten and the living thing that may not be eaten." The Mishna's list does not include all cases, as there are additional cases of treifot—four that are referenced by the acronym BSGR, and another seven Amoraic traditions known as the "shev (seven) shematata." Although these cases are not explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, they can be derived from the rule stated at its end, according to which any animal that is incapable of living is considered a treifa. However, how can the tannaitic tradition of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, which limits the list of treifot to exactly eighteen, be reconciled? After a failed attempt, the Gemara settles the count according to Rabbi Yishmael by grouping all types of perforations into one broad category and all types of severed parts into another single category, thereby reconciling the calculated total with all the treifot appearing in the various lists.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself - which only disqualifies the shechita - and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit. Can a person render someone else's property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend's animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another's animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma'aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna's position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions - applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action. Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

Study Guide

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding whether a secular slaughter requires intent has ramifications in the case of one who slaughters an additional animal during the slaughter of a para aduma (engaging in an extraneous activity). If slaughter does not require intent, the cutting of the second animal's simanim is considered a completed act of slaughter, and consequently, the para aduma is disqualified because an extraneous activity was performed at that time. Conversely, if slaughter requires intent, the unintended slaughter is not considered an act at all, and the para aduma remains valid. The disqualifications of shechita begin with the law of shehiya (pausing), which occurs when the slaughterer pauses between the slaughter of one siman and the next. A tannaitic dispute is analyzed regarding the duration of time that disqualifies due to pausing, questioning whether it is the time of an act of slaughter or the time it takes to examine the knife. Several amoraim define the duration of slaughter: Rav defines it as the time needed to slaughter another animal, while Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the disqualifying pause for a bird slaughter is measured by the time it takes to slaughter an animal or a bird. Additional opinions expand this duration to include the time required for physical handling of the animal, such as the time it takes to lower it to the ground or lift it and push it down. The details of the disqualifications continue with ikur (tearing the simanim instead of cutting them) and chalada (inserting the knife beneath the simanim or behind them). These flaws in the act of slaughter trigger a tannitic dispute between Rabbi Yeshevav and Rabbi Akiva over whether animals disqualified by an improper slaughter, such as shehiya, chalada, or ikur, are considered a treifa and do not impart impurity, or whether they are treated as a neveila and impart impurity through carrying. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva reversed his original understanding and agreed with Rabbi Yeshevav that the status of these animals is like a neveila in all regards. A contradiction to the Mishna arises from a Mishna at the beginning of the third chapter, which lists a severed windpipe among the defects that define an animal as a treifa, seemingly contradicting our Mishna's ruling that such a defect is considered a neveila. To resolve this contradiction, four potential resolutions are proposed, two of which are ultimately rejected.

The Gemara continues the debate over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna l'shechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina l'shechita ela basof). Two further difficulties are raised against the latter opinion and are resolved. There is a debate about whether the shechita needs to be done in a single, continuous cut (shechita mefura'at) or can be done in two or three different spots along the neck. The Gemara raises two difficulties against those who require shechita mefura'at. These challenges are resolved. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav brings a ruling about chalada, a disqualification of shechita when the knife is hidden under the simanim. The Gemara tries to assess what he is adding which wasn't already stated in the Mishna in Chullin 32a. The second part of Rav's statement was that if the knife is under the hide, the shechita is valid. However, the beit midrash of Rav (Bei Rav) stated that it was unknown whether he actually permitted it under the hide. This statement by the scholars of his beit midrash led to several related questions that remain unresolved (teiku), such as hiding the knife under a cloth, under tangled wool, or concealing it during only a minority of the cut. A Mishna rules that slaughtering two heads at once or two people holding a single knife and slaughtering are both valid. However, completely severing the head in one instantaneous downward blow is invalid due to pressing (drisa). The Mishna qualifies this: if the person was actually drawing the knife back and forth, but it came off after just moving the knife in one direction, if the knife was long enough, the shechita is valid. If they slaughtered with a back-and-forth motion, even if the blade is very small, the meat is kosher. Two sources are brought to support the need for moving the blade back and forth when slaughtering.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

The Mishna states that slaughtering (shechita) is performed by cutting the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) or the majority of each of the two simanim for an animal, and one siman or the majority of one siman for a bird. The Gemara asks for the source in the Torah for slaughtering an animal at the neck, meaning by cutting the simanim. The Gemara brings five different answers to this question. Within the discussion of the fifth answer, the Gemara brings the verse in Vayikra 11:46, which compares animals to birds. Other explanations of this verse are brought, including one derivation that birds only require the slaughtering of one siman, while fish can be eaten without shechita at all. Another source is brought to prove this distinction based on the differing ways animals, birds, and fish were originally created. Rabbi Yitzchak ben Pinchas held that by Torah law, one is not required to perform shechita on birds at all. His source is derived from the verse requiring the covering of the blood (kisuy hadam) for birds and undomesticated animals (Vayikra 17:13)

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

The braita continues with the analysis of the unique laws governing earthenware vessels. Through a series of suggested logical kal v'chomer arguments, they demonstrate how scriptural verses restrict the ways these vessels contract and protect against ritual impurity, each in their own unique manner. Specifically, the verses dictate that an earthenware vessel can only contract impurity through its interior airspace (me'aviro) and never from its outer surface (miggabbo). Conversely, other types of vessels cannot contract impurity from their airspace but do contract it from their outer surface. The Mishna sets forth an additional rule of contrasting halakhic status: a state that renders a wooden vessel ritually pure leaves a metal vessel impure, and vice versa. A braita clarifies that unfinished wooden vessels are susceptible to impurity while flat wooden vessels are pure. For metal, the law is reversed: unfinished metal vessels are pure while flat metal vessels are susceptible to impurity. The braita explains what is defined as an unfinished vessel in this context. The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Nachman regarding the underlying reason for the distinction between unfinished wood vessels and unfinished metal vessels - whether it is because these vessels are made for honor, or because they are expensive and therefore their crafting is not considered complete as long as any detail is missing. There is a practical ramification between these two opinions regarding vessels made of bone. The scriptural source establishing that bone vessels can contract ritual impurity is subsequently derived. The Mishna introduces contrasting rules regarding the tithing obligations of bitter and sweet almonds. A braita explains that bitter almonds are subject to tithing only when they are young and small, since they are unfit for consumption when they are mature and large, whereas sweet almonds are subject to tithing only when they are large. Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi quotes an opinion that either both stages are completely exempt or both are completely obligated. The Gemara explains the opinion that both are obligated by explaining that mature bitter almonds can be sweetened by roasting them over a fire. The Mishna outlines the changing legal status of grape-seed water (temed). Prior to fermentation, it does not possess the status of wine and cannot be purchased using second tithe funds, yet it disqualifies a mikveh if three logs of it fall inside a mikveh that does not have the requisite amount of water (forty se'ah). Once it ferments, its status changes to wine, meaning it can be purchased with second tithe funds and no longer disqualifies a mikveh. The Mishna also introduces a contrasting rule regarding brothers who are partners in an estate or partners after already dividing their estate, balancing their obligations toward the Temple half-shekel surcharge (kalbon) against their obligations toward the cattle tithe. The Gemara analyzes which tanna this Mishna follows regarding the status of temed, since on the surface, it does not appear to align with any opinion appearing in the Mishna in Masechet Maasrot (Chapter 5, Mishna 6).

The Mishna states that the method of slaughtering a red heifer (para aduma) is not the same method used for breaking the back of the neck of a decapitated heifer (egla arufa), and vice-versa. A braita brings a source demonstrating that one cannot break the back of the neck of the para aduma and that one cannot slaughter the egla arufa. Both laws are derived from verses found within the passage of the egla arufa. The Mishna notes that while blemished kohanim are disqualified from Temple service, blemished Levites are fit for their respective duties. Conversely, while Levites are restricted to a specific age range for their service, kohanim can work in the Temple at all ages. A braita derives a source for both of these exclusive rules from a verse in Bamidbar 8:24. The age limitation on Levites only concerned the period of carrying the Tabernacle in the desert; for the singing service, there is no age limitation, provided the Levite can still sing properly. Regarding this age restriction for the Levites, a contradiction arises between two verses, as one states the youngest age one can work is thirty, while another states twenty-five. The Gemara reconciles this by differentiating the stages: at twenty-five a Levite begins his training, and at thirty he can actually perform the service. A braita brings a debate about the minimum age for kohanim to begin serving in the Temple - either at the biological age of maturity (the appearance of two pubic hairs) or at the age of twenty. The maximum age for their service is when they reach old age, which Rabbi Ela in the name of Rabbi Chanina defines as the point when one begins to tremble. Rav Chisda explains the scriptural source behind this minimum age debate. Later, the Gemara brings two explanations regarding whether Rebbi's requirement of twenty as the minimum age is an enacted rabbinic law, or if it was instituted because the older kohanim felt uncomfortable with teenagers performing the sacred Temple service. The method of contracting ritual impurity in earthenware vessels is not the same method of contracting impurity in other vessels. A braita details the exact differences and delineates the scriptural sources from which they are derived.

Study Guide The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat" regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely. The Mishna states the age rules for birds for sacrifices: mature turtledoves (torim) are valid while young ones are not, whereas young pigeons (bnei yonah) are valid while mature ones are not. The Gemara defines the exact boundaries of these stages, analyzing the transitional phase known as techilat hatzahov (when the plumage around the neck begins to turn a golden/yellow color), which is disqualified in both species.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

The sons of Rabbi Chiya taught that when performing melika (pinching the neck of a sacrificial bird), the kohen may draw the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) toward the back of the neck and sever them without breaking the neck bone. The Sages dispute whether they meant this is the only valid method (to avoid rendering the bird a treifa by breaking the bone first), or if breaking the neck bone prior to cutting the simanim is also permitted as a Torah-prescribed approach. The Mishna supports this latter explanation. Rabbi Yannai raises a difficulty against the sons of Rabbi Chiya based on an inference from another line in the Mishna, which the Gemara resolves by demonstrating that an alternative inference can be drawn. The Gemara notes a debate regarding whether melika can be performed with a back-and-forth sawing motion (holacha v'hava'a) similar to shechita. Rabbi Yirmia quotes a statement by Shmuel comparing shechita and melika. After analyzing what specific law was being equated, the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is teaching that if one begins the melika too high on the neck (hagrama) and finishes in the correct area, it is disqualified -  just as we learned regarding shechita. Rami bar Yechezkel cites a braita stating that there is no issue with birds if the simanim are found to be displaced. The Gemara disputes whether this applies only according to the opinion that shechita of a bird is not a Torah law, or if it holds true even for those who view it as a Torah obligation derived via halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai. A further debate ensues over whether Rami bar Yechezkel's braita applies exclusively to melika or extends to the shechita of a bird as well. Additionally, Rabbi Yirmia's statement in the name of Shmuel is presented as a conflicting view to this braita. Zeira rules that if the neck bone is broken, the animal or bird immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if the animal is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if breaking the neck bone creates a neveila, how could melika ever be validly performed on a bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? This would mean the kohen is performing melika on a bird that is already dead. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rava's challenge from the laws of a bird burnt offering, and the Gemara resolves the issue.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

Slaughterers who failed to show their knives to a Chacham (Sage) for inspection were penalized, though the severity of the penalty differed depending on whether the knife was subsequently found to be smooth or notched. The teeth of a harvest sickle incline in one direction; therefore, if one used it to slaughter in the direction that cuts cleanly without tearing, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute its validity. However, Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that both agree the slaughter is invalid, and their actual debate is whether the animal is classified as a neveila (a carcass, which imparts impurity) or a treifa. The windpipe features a large ring at the top that encircles it entirely, unlike the lower rings which are C-shaped and do not completely cover it. The Mishna presents two opinions regarding the highest anatomical point where slaughter can be performed without being disqualified by hagrama (slanting outside the designated slaughter area). The Tanna Kama rules that the large ring must be completely severed while leaving a width of a thread of the top ring untouched. Conversely, Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda rules that as long as the majority of the windpipe is cut in the valid area, the slaughter is kosher, even if the slaughterer subsequently cuts above it into the area known as "the hat" (kova) - since the act was legally complete once the majority was cut. Rav and Shmuel explain that Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda also forbade slaughtering directly on the smaller rings, permitting it only between them since they do not encircle the entire windpipe. However, after challenging this with a contradictory braita where Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda explicitly permits slaughtering on the smaller rings, the Gemara concludes that Rav and Shmuel agreed with his view regarding the large ring but ruled against his lenient stance on the smaller rings. When Rabbi Zeira moved from Babylonia to Israel and permitted slaughtering on these rings, the Sages questioned why he did not maintain the stringencies of Rav and Shmuel, given the halakhic rule that a traveler must observe the stringencies of both their place of origin and their destination. Two resolutions are suggested, each presenting different exceptions to the rules of local custom. Ultimately, the Gemara notes that customs varied across different regions of Babylonia, and not all areas adopted this stringency. There is a dispute between Rav Papi and Rav Papa regarding the exact anatomical boundary for the highest point of the windpipe where shechita remains valid.

The Mishna rules that "one may always slaughter." Raba and Rav Yosef both understand this to refer to the period of Exile, but each explains it according to a different Tannaitic view - either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. These Sages disagreed over whether the Jewsl in the desert were forbidden to eat meat unless it was brought as a sacrifice, or whether they were permitted to eat meat even without formal ritual slaughter (shechita). After delving into the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and resolving various difficulties raised against each position, the Gemara challenges the explanations of both Raba and Rav Yosef based on the textual context of the Mishna. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the phrase "one may always slaughter" includes even a Jew who eats non-kosher meat l'teavon (out of appetite). The Gemara then analyzes which specific types of nicks in a knife disqualify a slaughter and render the animal a treifa, and which do not. The Gemara outlines various customs regarding the method used to check the knife, alongside a debate concerning which parts of the blade must be examined.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

Study Guide

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor's intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor's thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor's action is significant when the minor's intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor's actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action. Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek). The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita. The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices. The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner's permission, the act is legally ineffective. The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected. Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna's phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.

Study Guide The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule. While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible to determine the reality, one may be required to investigate rather than rely on the majority.

If it is discovered after shechita that the knife has nicks, can we assume the slaughter was valid because the nicks occurred after the two simanim were cut, or is there a concern that they occurred while cutting the hide before the simanim? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda disagree on this matter. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's ruling to permit, but they are resolved. From where do we derive the principle that an item retains its status until proven otherwise (chazaka)? Rabbi Yonatan derives it from the case of a leprous house, but Rav Acha disagrees with his derivation.

There is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned slaughterer might perform an invalid slaughter without realizing it. The second statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel is that a slaughterer must inspect the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) to ensure they were properly severed. While Rav Yosef attempts to provide a proof for this requirement, Abaye rejects it. The Gemara discusses the status of meat that was not inspected, debating whether it is classified as a treifa or a neveila. Both positions are rooted in their interpretation of Rav Huna's principle: a living animal is presumed forbidden until it is proven that a valid shechita was performed, but once slaughtered properly, it is presumed kosher until proven to be a treifa. The Gemara then analyzes the second half of Rav Huna's statement, inferring that an animal remains kosher even if there is an unproven concern that it might be a treifa. This is illustrated by a case where a wolf takes an internal organ and returns it with a hole; we do not assume the hole existed prior to the wolf's intervention. Rabbi Abba challenges this from a ruling regarding food nibbled by creatures, where we fear teh hole where they are nibbling was a pre-existing hole from a snake who may have injected venom into it. To resolve this, Rav Huna distinguishes between matters of danger and matters of ritual prohibition (issur). While Rava rejects this distinction, arguing that stringency regarding danger should imply stringency regarding prohibitions, Abaye accepts the differentiation, citing proofs from the laws of impurity. After Rava rejects Abaye's proof and Rav Shimi raises a difficulty with Rava's position that the Gemara resolves, Rav Ashi concludes by bringing support for Rav Huna's position.

Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Shmuel that if one heats a knife and uses it for slaughtering, the animal is not considered a treifa. Although the heat could potentially damage the animal, the sharp edge of the blade severs the windpipe and gullet before the heat from the sides of the blade can cause a burn. A question is raised regarding a person who strikes another with a hot knife, resulting in a leprous mark: is this classified as a boil (shechin) or a burn (michve)? The Gemara explores the practical halakhic implications of this distinction. Two sources are brought to resolve the matter - the first being the aforementioned statement of Rabbi Zeira - but the Gemara distinguishes between the cases and reaches no definitive conclusion. The Gemara then transitions to a discussion regarding benefit from knives used for idol worship, detailing when they are forbidden or permitted. It further addresses the status of meat slaughtered with a knife previously used for non-kosher slaughter, as well as the process for kashering a knife used on a treifa. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav notes that a slaughterer should maintain three distinct knives: one dedicated solely to slaughtering, one for cutting meat, and one for removing cheilev (forbidden fats).