Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

The Gemara continues analyzing Rava's attempt to prove that "touch" (maga) can include tent-impurity (ohel) based on Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding bed frames and window bars. Abaye rejects this proof, explaining that the case involves a space under a handbreadth (tefach), and due to a challenge raised against his explanation, Abaye is forced to explain that Rabbi Yosi holds concealed impurity does not break through (tumei tmunah eina boka'at). He proves his stance on concealed impurity from a Mishna discussing a cabinet (migdal) and Rabbi Yosi's commentary on it. A challenge is raised against Abaye from another case where Rabbi Yosi appears to hold that concealed impurity does break through and ascend (a dead dog that swallowed corpse flesh and is lying on a threshold). Rava resolves this by explaining that Rabbi Yosi does not rely on concealed impurity breaking out, but rather his dispute with Rabbi Meir regarding the dog is based on other considerations - whether the cavity of the dog contains a handbreadth of space and whether the threshold is considered part of the house. The Gemara returns to clarify the identity of Rabbi Yosi's disputant, who holds that tent-impurity is not included in the term "touch." The Gemara identifies him as Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yosi in a braita by stating that there are three items that impart corpse-impurity through only two of the three standard modes (touch, carrying, and tent): a ladleful of dust of a human carcass (melo tarvad rakav) imparts impurity through carrying and tent, but not touch; a barley-grain-sized bone (etzem k'seorah) imparts impurity through touch and carrying, but not tent; and a tombstone lid and supporting frame (golel v'dofek) impart impurity through touch and tent, but not carrying. His ruling regarding dust demonstrates that he does not categorize tent-impurity under touch. Regarding a carcass marrow-bone (kulit), the braita cites a scriptural source establishing that a sealed marrow-bone does not impart impurity, whereas a perforated one does. Rav Oshaya inquires whether a sealed marrow-bone that one intends to perforate is considered "lacking an action" (mechusar ma'aseh) because it requires perforation, or is it already considered perforated and can pass on impurity. He concludes that one's intent to perforate would make the bone susceptible to impurity. The Mishna rules that a formed embryo egg of a creeping creature (sheretz) is pure unless perforated. Regarding a mouse that is half flesh and half earth, touching the flesh imparts impurity - and according to Rabbi Yehuda, touching earth directly opposite the flesh also imparts impurity. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara brings a braita deriving that a sheretz egg requires embryo formation (rikem) and a perforation as thin as a hairbreadth (k'chut ha-se'arah) to transmit impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi clarifies that the half-earth mouse transmits impurity only if it developed flesh across its whole body. The braita discusses whether a sea-mouse is subject to the same laws of impurity as a land-mouse.

The Mishna distinguishes between the marrow-bones (kulit) of a corpse or consecrated sacrifices of pigul and notar (kodashim) and those of a carcass (neveila) or a creeping creature (sheretz). Touching a corpse or sacrificial marrow-bone imparts impurity whether sealed or perforated, whereas a neveila or sheretz marrow-bone imparts impurity through touch (maga) and carrying (masa) only if perforated. The Gemara notes that the Mishna specifies that a corpse's marrow-bone imparts impurity through touch (maga), but omits tent-impurity (ohel), and analyzes why: Rav Yehuda son of Rabbi Chiyya concludes that there is less than an olive-bulk (kezayit) of marrow, and that interior marrow does not halakhically heal or complete the bone's exterior (mo'ach bifnim eino ma'aleh arucha mibachutz). Abaye maintains that interior marrow does heal the exterior, but interprets the Mishna as speaking of a bone scraped thin (sheshifah) along its circumference. Rabbi Yochanan holds that the Mishna's term "touch" (maga) actually includes tent-impurity (ohel). To resolve a difficulty, the Gemara explains that the marrow inside is loose and rattling (mitkashkesh); for a corpse, compressed impurity breaks through (boka'at v'olah), whereas for neveila, loose marrow requires a physical perforation to transmit impurity. Two proofs are brought from Mishnayot in Ohalot in an attempt to demonstrate that the term maga can denote ohel, but difficulties are raised against both suggestions.

Rabbi Avahu cited in the name of Reish Lakish three situations where the measurement of walking four milin applies in halakha: traveling to find pure vessels for making dough, a minyan (or water for washing hands before prayer), and water for washing before eating bread. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak corrects this statement on two counts: first, it was stated by Aivu, not Rabbi Avahu; second, it applied to four matters, not three, adding the case from the Mishna of walking on a leather mat for the time it takes to walk four milin, which removes its impurity. Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Chanina limits the requirement of walking four milin to the direction one is already traveling, noting that one is not required to travel even a single mil backward. Regarding the impurity of human skin, a braita rules that a Roman legion entering a house renders the house ritually impure due to the presumption that soldiers carry skin from human skulls (karkaflein) for sorcery. A Mishna outlines the rules of connection (chibbur) regarding ritual impurity when flaying an animal's hide, as the detached part functions as a handle (yad): If flayed for a mat - where one cuts along the length first and removes it from the sides - the hide remains connected to the flesh until one removes more than a grip's width (kedei achizah), which the Gemara defines as a doubled handbreadth. If flayed top to bottom for a flask, it remains connected until the chest is flayed. If flayed upside down from the legs (margil), the entire hide remains connected until fully removed, since the chest is reached only at the end. Regarding the neck hide, Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri holds it is not connected, whereas the Sages hold it remains connected until completely flayed. The Gemara asks what the status of the hide is once flayed beyond the grip's width for a carpet. Rav answers that the detached hide becomes pure, while the attached hide remains impure as a protector (shomer) of the meat. Rabbi Asi holds that the handbreadth adjacent to the meat that is detached remains impure. Three difficulties raised against Rabbi Asi's position are resolved. A Mishna in Kelim (28:8) states that once the majority of an impure garment is torn, it becomes pure. Rabba bar Avuha limits this to a garment immersed that day (tevilat yom), as the owner's willingness to immerse it indicates he is unconcerned with ruining it and thus tore a full majority. Otherwise, one must be concerned that only half was torn, as the owner sought purity without destroying the garment and may not have been precise. Three difficulties raised against Rabbah bar Avuha's qualification - including one from our Mishna relying on precise measurements - are resolved in different manners. Regarding the Mishna in Kelim, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether cut hide rebinds itself (chalim). Reish Lakish holds that hide rebinds itself, limiting the Mishna to cloth rather than leather, as torn leather rebinds and retains its impurity. Three difficulties raised against Reish Lakish, including two from our Mishna, are resolved. Abaye explains that the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri and the Sages regarding neck hide centers on whether a protective covering destined to detach on its own (shomer he'asui linatek) retains the halakhic status of a protector (shomer).

Study Guide

Study Guide

Study Guide

The Gemara brings a third source to attempt to prove Rav Yosef's assertion that Sumchos holds one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat (chelev) in a single lapse of awareness is liable for two sin-offerings, but this attempt also fails. A Mishna details four times during the year - the eves of the last day of Sukkot, the first day of Pesach, Shavuot, and Rosh Hashanah - when an animal seller must inform the buyer if its parent or offspring were sold that day for slaughter, due to high meat demand raising concerns of same-day slaughter. On these four occasions, the Sages also instituted that the purchase is acquired by the buyer upon the payment of money, and they compel the butcher to slaughter in order to supply meat for the festival eve. The Gemara explains this ruling either as an acquisition made on the buyer's behalf through a third party (zicha) without the buyer's knowledge, or as a restoration of biblical law on these days where payment alone transfers ownership (ma'ot konot), overriding the standard rabbinic decree requiring physical pulling (meshicha). The Mishna and Gemara establish that the phrase "one day" (yom echad) regarding the prohibition of oto v'et beno is calculated according to the order of Creation (as those same words appear there), where night precedes day, unlike consecrated offerings (kodashim) where day precedes night. Rebbi derives from these words the obligation to give notification on these four festival eves. The sixth chapter deals with the mitzva of "Kisui HaDam," covering the blood and opens with a Mishna stating that the commandment to cover blood applies to non-sacred (chullin) undomesticated animals and birds, but not to kodashim. The Gemara clarifies why kodashim are exempt from blood-covering and establishes the exemption as referring to birds consecrated for Temple maintenance (bedek habayit).

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.