Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Study Guide The Mishna lists various vows, such as "I vow to bring gold to the Temple" or "I vow to bring wine," and specifies the exact quantities required to fulfill each obligation. The Gemara then analyzes and clarifies the Mishna's rulings for every case mentioned. A debate exists between Rebbi and the Sages regarding the minimum amount of oil required for a vow—specifically, whether it is one log or three. The scholars who preceded Rav Papa suggested that the root of this dispute lies in their hermeneutical methods: whether to derive both a general principle and its details from a single external source, or to derive the principle from one source while drawing the details from the case itself. Rav Papa proposed an alternative theory but ultimately conceded after Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, cited a braita that definitively refuted his explanation. Regarding the minimum value for one who vows to bring a specific animal to the Temple, the law stipulates that different species require different minimum expenditures to fulfill the obligation.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

There is a contradiction raised against Rav Bibi, who testified about a case where the blood of a carcass was measured to see if there was enough to convey impurity. This contradicts a Mishna in Eduyot, where others testified that the blood of a dead animal is pure. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that there is a tannaitic debate on the matter and clarifies why those who declare it impure set the requisite amount at a quarter-log (revi'it). One may offer voluntary wine libations in the Temple, but only in the volumes used for obligatory offerings: three, four, or six log (or a combination thereof). A question is raised: must the pledged libations be offered all at once, or can they be split? This question is asked egarding someone who pledged five log (an invalid single amount): can one "divide" the five - meaning offer four and redeems the fifth or gives it away - or must one wait until one acquires another log to complete a set of six? Although Abaye and Rava both attempted to bring proofs to resolve this, their answers were rejected as inconclusive. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree over whether one can offer voluntary oil libations. Their debate centers on whether the laws of oil can be derived from the laws of wine. Regarding ownership, a mincha cannot be brought if it is jointly owned by partners. The Gemara explores why this differs from animal and bird sacrifices, which can be brought by partners. There are five (or six, according to Rabbi Shimon) types of voluntary mincha offerings: solet (no pre-baking/frying), machavat (pan), marcheshet (deep pan), rekikim (wafers), and challot (loaves). The Mishna delves into various ambiguous formulations used in vows and explains what specific type and quantity the individual is obligated to bring to ensure they fulfill their commitment.

There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).

The Gemara raises a difficulty from the laws of pigul against the principle that "anything ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled," which implies viewing the act of sprinkling the blood as having already occurred. After resolving this difficulty, the Gemara presents the position of Rav Ashi, who rejects this principle. However, following a challenge from the laws of meilah (misuse of consecrated property), it is clarified that his statement applies only to the laws of ritual impurity of foods; regarding meilah, conversely, Rav Ashi admits that the principle is valid, and the meat is released from the status of meilah the moment it is ready for sprinkling. Subsequently, another difficulty is raised against Rav Ashi from Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding the meat of an asham talui, as Rabbi Yosi - according to Rava's understanding - agrees with Rabbi Shimon that "anything standing to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled." This difficulty is resolved by providing an alternative explanation for Rabbi Yosi's position that does not rely on this principle. Additionally, Rav Ashi challenges the opposing view, and this difficulty is also resolved. The Mishna discusses the laws of deviations in meal-offering vows, detailing the law for cases where an individual vowed or pledged a specific type of mincha but brought a different type instead.

The Gemara cites Vayikra 27:11 to teach that blemished animals are called impure. Although the verse refers to "impure animals," there is a different verse (Vayikra 27:27) that explains that impure animals be redeemed; therefore, the first verse must refer specifically to blemished animals.  Shmuel maintains that items consecrated for their value can be redeemed even if they are unblemished. Two difficulties are raised against Shmuel - one by Rav Huna bar Manoach from our Mishna and another by Rav Papa from a braita. Both are resolved by distinguishing between common items and rare items suitable for Temple use; the Sages prohibited the redemption of rare items to avoid a shortage in the Temple. Several rabbis disagree with Shmuel, holding that items dedicated for their value cannot be redeemed if they are pure. There are two versions of Rabbi Oshaya's position regarding whether he agreed with Shmuel. A difficulty is raised against the version that he permitted their redemption, but it is ultimately resolved.

The Mishna states that when Yom Kippur fell on a Friday, preventing the meat from being cooked, the Babylonians would eat the goat sin offering raw. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that these people were actually Alexandrians, but they were called Babylonians due to a general dislike of the Babylonians. The Mishna discusses various errors that can occur while setting up the showbread and the frankincense, such as placing one or both on the wrong day or burning the frankincense at the incorrect time. For each scenario, the text explores the resulting legal status and the solution, if there is one. A Mishna from Tractate Yoma mentions a case where the Tamid offering was brought too early and had to be burned because it was disqualified. A braita applies this same rule to a mincha offering where the kemitza was taken at night. This raises a question: if sanctified vessels do not normally sanctify their contents at night when offerings cannot be brought, why is the mincha disqualified? To resolve this, it is explained that the offering is sanctified enough to be disqualified even if it is not sanctified for the altar. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from our Mishna, noting that when the bread is placed too early, it is not sanctified enough to be disqualified and can remain on the table for extra days. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between an act performed the night before it is due and an act performed several days early. Yet, this distinction still faces issues with the Mishna's case, as the bread should theoretically become sanctified on Friday night and be disqualified by the next Shabbat morning. Ultimately, two resolutions are offered to address this difficulty. The Mishna outlines how many days after baking the two loaves and the showbread may be eaten. Different scenarios are presented based on whether festivals fall before or after Shabbat, since these loaves cannot typically be baked on Shabbat or a festival. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, permitting the baking on a festival though not on Shabbat. Items whose value is sanctified can be redeemed whether they are ritually pure or impure. However, items sanctified within a sacred vessel possess inherent sanctity and cannot be redeemed even if they become impure. The only exception to this rule is a blemished animal, which retains the possibility of being redeemed despite its status.

The Gemara raises a difficulty regarding the opinion that the Table (Shulchan) was positioned in an east-west orientation. It resolves this by explaining that the Table crafted by Moses was not placed centrally between the other rows of tables, but rather stood on the western side, close to the Parochet, not in between the others. Regarding the ten Tables and ten Menoras added by King Solomon, there is a Tannaic dispute: were they purely decorative - with only the one from Moshe's time being used for the service - or were the lamps lit and the bread arranged on all of them? In addition to the main Table, two other tables stood in the Ulam (the Entrance Hall) to serve as transition stations for the showbread. One was made of marble (or silver), where the bread was placed before being brought into the Sanctuary, and the other was made of gold, where the bread was placed upon its removal. This distinction is based on the halakhic principle "ma'alin b'kodesh v'lo moridin" (one ascends in holiness but does not descend). Since the bread had already been on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it could not be placed on a table of lesser value when being taken out. The Gemara finds support for this concept in the fact that the broken Tablets were placed in the Ark also. This leads to a discussion on the importance of preserving one's Torah learning and the gravity of forgetting it, while emphasizing that one must still honor a Torah scholar who has forgotten his learning due to circumstances beyond his control. The Mishna brings a tannaitic debate about how the bread was replaced each week, based on how each opinion understands the word "tamid" (continually) regarding the showbread. This triggers a fundamental debate regarding the mitzvah of Torah study and the verse, "This book of the Torah shall not depart (lo yamush) from your mouth." While some view this as a mandate to toil in Torah at every available moment, Rabbi Yochanan suggests that even a person who recites the Shema in the morning and evening has fulfilled "lo yamush." For such an individual, it is considered as if they had occupied themselves with Torah day and night.

Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?

Study Guide The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table's essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Pictures The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.

Study Guide There is a Tannaitic debate regarding whether an heir performs semicha (the laying of hands) on an inherited sacrifice and whether they are subject to the laws of temura (substitution) for such an animal. The Gemara provides scriptural sources for each of these positions. The Mishna specifies who is exempt from the requirement of semicha and the Gemara brings the reason/derivation for each exemption. Although semicha is a significant element of the sacrificial service, it is not indispensable; atonement is achieved even if the ritual is omitted. The Mishna details the location and manner in which semicha must be performed, and the Gemara cites the biblical sources for those details.

There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi's (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.

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Study Guide The Gemara cites a second braita featuring five arguments against the Baytusi claim that the Omer offering must always be brought on the first Sunday following the first day of Pesach. The braita concludes by deriving from the biblical verses that both the harvesting and the counting of the Omer must take place at night, while the actual sacrifice is offered during the day. Rava reviews the nine rabbinic arguments presented against the Baytusim(compiled from both braitot) and systematically rejects the first three claims found in each. The Mishna continues by describing the process of singeing (parching) the barley grains. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding the specific stage at which this is done and the manner in which it should be performed. Any barley flour remaining after the sifting process is redeemed. The Sages and Rabbi Akiva dispute whether this redeemed flour is ultimately exempt from tithing.

The Mishna details the ceremony of the Omer harvest, a public event designed to openly reject the opinion of the Baytusim (Boethusians) who held that the date for the Omer offering was the first Sunday after the first day of Pesach. Before the Pesach holiday, messengers of the Beit Din tied the standing barley into bundles to facilitate a quick harvest. On the night following the first day of Passover, residents from surrounding towns gathered to watch as the harvester and the crowd engaged in a question-and-answer ceremony confirming three times each detail: "Has the sun set?", "With this sickle?", "In this basket?", and even "On this Shabbat," if it came out on Shabbat. The Gemara quotes from Megillat Taanit two sets of days on which one cannot fast or eulogize, as they were days where the Sages won debates against the Tzedukim (Sadducees) regarding the Tamid sacrifice (proving it cannot be offered by individuals) and against the Baytusim regarding the date for the Omer offering. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai dismisses the Baytusim claim that Moses scheduled Shavuot for Sunday just to give Israel a "long weekend," pointing out the absurdity of their logic. To solidify the law, he and other Sages offer various proofs for starting the count on the 16th of Nisan, ensuring the tradition remained rooted in the festival itself rather than a fixed day of the week.

Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

Which types of meal offerings require hagasha – to be brought to the southwestern corner of the altar? From where do we derive which ones are including in this category? Are they derived by logical arguments or by drashot from the verses?

Study Guide The Mishna discusses the classification of the various meal offerings based on their components, examining which offerings require both oil and frankincense, which require only one of them, and which require neither. To clarify the source of these laws, the Gemara cites a braita that derives the various cases where oil, frankincense, or both are excluded from the verses concerning the Omer offering (the meal offering of the first fruits). During the analysis of the braita, the Gemara analyzes the choice of exclusions and questions why the Midrash focused specifically on the cases mentioned in the braita rather than excluding the law of the Priestly meal offering (minchat kohanim) instead. The Mishna rules that one who adds both oil and frankincense to a sinner's meal offering transgresses two negative prohibitions. However, there is a difference between adding oil and frankincense. If one adds oil, the offering is disqualified as it cannot be removed, but if one adds frankincense, it is not disqualified as it can be removed. Rav bar Rav Huna asks about frankincense that is crushed into small pieces that cannot be removed: is the offering disqualified, as it would be with oil, or is the issue with oil specifically that it is absorbed, whereas this frankincense is not absorbed into the mincha? Three attempts are brought to answer the question. After rejecting the first two, the third leads to the conclusion that it is disqualified.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.