Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryll Page in loving memory of her father George M. Levine, Yosef Michael haLevi, on his 16th yahrzeit. "His memory is a blessing and a constant presence in my life." Words can carry different meanings depending on their context. Several examples are brought from the Tanach to show the meanings of various words.  Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether invoking God's name in various contexts requires using the actual divine name or whether a substitute designation suffices. What textual sources do they cite to support their respective positions? One should be careful to change the language of the Mishna and even a verse if it may sound like one is cursing someone else while reciting it.  In the Mishna, Rabbi Meir disagreed with the rabbis that one can apply the principle that allows deriving a positive statement from a negative one. However, this creates a contradiction with his stance on stipulations, where he maintains that they must be formulated in both positive and negative terms. To resolve this inconsistency, the text reassigns the positions—switching who said what in our Mishna. Under what circumstances would someone be obligated or exempt from bringing a guilt offering for an oath of deposit? In which situations could a person become liable for multiple sacrifices regarding a single oath of deposit? An oath of deposit applies only to denying monetary claims, not to matters involving fines.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Avishag Edri for a refuah shleima and rescue of Alon Ben Idit. In which cases are people not obligated in an oath of testimony? What exact phraseology can be used for it to be considered an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice? Does one need to include the name of God? Is a word that refers to God also considered using the name of God? What names of God can or cannot be erased. There are various places in the Tanach where it is unclear if a word references God or someone else. The Gemara lists a number of these cases.

Study Guide Shevuot 34 Four different opinions are brought to explain why an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases. Difficulties are raised about each one of the four opinions and are resolved.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other (toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

Study Guide Shevuot 31 This week's learning is sponsored by Joy Benatar in memory of her mother, Miriam David, Malcah bat Meechael v'Esther, on her 9th yahrzeit. "A devoted wife, mother, grandmother, and educator." This week's learning is sponsored by Naomi Kadish for a refuah shleima for Mordechai Getzel ben Reizel and Chana bat Leah. Several bad practices are discouraged based on the verse in Shmot 23:7, "Distance yourself from false matters." After listing in the Mishna that women, relatives and disqualified witnesses are not obligated for an oath of testimony, there was a general line saying "And all who are not qualified to testify." Rav Pappa understands this line to include a king and Rav Acha to include a gambler. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath of testimony taken outside the court on one's own? What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath on a deposit initiated by others taken outside the court? Rav Pappa and his students disagreed about whether the root of the debate in both situations was the same. One is obligated to bring a sacrifice for an oath of testimony that was taken intentionally (the witnesses intentionally lied) and one for which they knew they were lying but did not understand the severity of the offense (that they would be obligated to bring a sacrifice. However, they do not bring a sacrifice if the witnesses do not remember that they knew the testimony. What part of the oath of testimony needs to take place in the court? In what situations can the witnesses be liable to bring several sacrifices?  

What is an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering? Anyone who cannot testify is excluded from responsibility, including women. The Gemara asks from where in the Torah is it derived that women cannot testify. They bring various braitot that all prove from the same verse, Devarim 19:17, each using a different drasha, that women cannot be witnesses. They learn other laws from that same verse regarding court cases, i.e. who stands and who sits, and requirements of the judges to be fair and balanced. What types of exceptions are made if a talmid chacham is being judged in the court?

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek. Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love." This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday. This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia. The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected. What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden. Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition. Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.

From where can one derive that the word "food" includes drinking? Does our Mishna support this understanding? In the cases in our Mishna where someone detailed a number of items that are forbidden, why is it assumed that they meant to create a separate oath for each item rather than to exclude other items from the oath? How does an expressive oath differ from an oath in which one denies having another person's item in one's possession? The debate regarding an oath that combines forbidden and permitted items, which was discussed previously, is now examined more in depth.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter  - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in memory of her beloved mother on her 28th yahrzeit. "Her love of family is a guiding force for me." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir on the birth of two new grandchildren. "With joy and gratitude to Hashem! Mazal Tov to our beloved children Elazar and Sarah on the birth, two months ago. of their daughter, Shaked Tova. And to our beloved children Eliav and Noya, upon the birth of their son Ofek Shalom, whose Brit was yesterday. שירבו שמחות בישראל! A contradiction is brought between a braita and the Mishna regarding the language "I take an oath that I will eat." This contradiction is resolved in two different ways. A braita explains what "mivta" is and what "isar" is. They are both languages of oaths. But an isar can be liable a sacrifice and also not necessarily. The meaning of this braita is a subject of debate between Abaye and Rava who disagree about whether isar is a language of being matpis on an oath or not. Rav Dimi explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan what negative commandments are transgressed by different types of oath of expression (past and future) and for vows. He explains that oaths about something that one will do in the future are "false oaths" and in the past are "vain oaths." However, there is a braita that says that false and vain oaths are the same. How can this braita be explained in light of Rav Dimi's statement?

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Storch in honor of  Patti Evan’s birthday. " יומולדת שמח to my dear friend and chevruta partner! Wishing you many more years of good health, Mazal and bracha. Loads of love." Are all the elements mentioned in the Mishna that are needed for sanctifying additional space essential or is it sufficient for just one of them?  This has ramifications for expansions in the second Temple period where not all these elements were present. This debate is dependent on  whether or not the kedusha from the first Temple remained forever or did it need to be resanctified in the time of Ezra.  From where is it derived that one who becomes impure while in the Temple will need to bring a sliding-scale sacrifice if one doesn't leave the temple immediately?  What are the measurements for how long one needs to be in there to be obligated in the sacrifice? Would it be the same measurements for one who did it intentionally and will be punished by lashes?

Today’s daf is dedicated in memory of Tzeela Gez and for the refuah shleima of her newborn son. The ceremony for consecrated additional space in Jerusalem and the azara of the Temple is discussed at length. Consecrating additional space was done in the same way that the Temple was dedicated as is derived from a verse in Shmot 25:9. If so, why were Temple vessels consecrating differently? Two thanksgiving offerings were carried during the procession of consecrating additional space to the city of Jerusalem. This is derived from the ceremony in Nechemia of consecrating the city of Jerusalem. How is it clear that it was bread from the thanksgiving offering, not animals? Just as Jerusalem is consecrated with thanksgiving breads, which are only permitted to be eaten in the city of Jerusalem, so the consecration of the azara is with the remainder of the meal offerings, which are only permitted to be eaten in the azara. Why are they also not made from chametz, as the thanksgiving breads are? What songs (Psalms) were recited? Why? In what formation were the breads carried?

Study Guide Shevuot 14 Questions on the braita at the end of Shevuot 13b are raised and answered.  The second chapter starts with a description of the 4 cases of "yediot ha'tuma" and explains the four cases. It also describes the laws of one who becomes impure while inside the Temple.  Rav Papa challenges the number four used in the Mishna and the Gemara brings 2 versions of his answer to his own question.  A few questions for which there are no answers regarding the criteria for having known something and then forgotten it, for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved.  The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?    

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Study Guide Shevuot 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Leya Landau in loving memory of her mother Ita bat Zvi on her 3rd yahrzeit. "She loved learning and encouraged me to start learning the daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Naama Tal in loving memory of her grandmother Devorah Cohen, who always valued learning.  The Gemara analyzes the different opinions brought in the Mishna regarding the purposes of the goat sin offerings brought on the outer altar on Yom Kippur and on the regalim and Rosh Chodesh. What is the basis for each opinion?

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? Four different answers are brought and analyzed. Some are rejected. From where is it derived that the sin offering of Yom Kippur offered inside is to atone for one who entered the Temple impure or ate sacrificial items when they knew at first they were impure, then forgot and then didn't remember?

This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “Nanny” Mauskopf, Basha Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meyer Yehuda. "A very special mother. By example she taught me how to be a mother and grandmother. We miss her dearly. May her Neshama have an Aliyah." The Mishna in Negaim is similar to the Mishna in Shevuot regarding the two shades of white that are considered leprous in the Torah and the two that the Rabbis added, and elaborates a little more. The Gemara explains that the Mishna there doesn't match Rabbi Akiva's opinion as the Mishna connects between avot, main categories and toladot, sub-categories and Rabbi Akiva connects between the order of the shades of white, which would mean one main category, baheret, then the next main category, se’et, and then each of their sub-categories – first the one for baheret, then the one for se’et. From where do we know that this is Rabbi Akiva's position? The first attempt to find the source is unsuccessful but it is proven from a second source.  From where do we derive that baheret also has sub-categories if the word in the verse mentioning sub-categories, sapachat, is said in connection with se'et?  From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in honor of her husband, Daniel Altman, on his fourth completion of the Daf Yomi cycle. "May he continue teaching the Daf and inspiring people to learn the Daf for decades to come, in good health." When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi wrote in the Mishna "Shevuot there are two that are four," was it his own opinion also or was he just quoting Rabbi Akiva's opinion but he actually doesn't hold that way? At first, they tried to prove it was Rebbi's own opinion, but this option failed and they adopted the other explanation. Rebbi holds that "v'neelam" means he knew and then forgot - does that word necessarily translate in that manner? By a woman who is a sotah, that word is mentioned and it doesn't mean that.   The Mishna states "Taking things out on Shabbat there are two that are four" - this is different from the Mishna in Shabbat which lists two that are four inside and two that are four outside. What are the mishnayot in each place referring to and why are they referring to different things?  The Mishna states "Leprous marks two that are four" - does the Mishna not accord with Rabbi Akiva's position? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

Shevuot bookmark Study Guide Shevuot 2 Masechet Shevuot is sponsored by Janet Hod "With immense gratitude to Hashem and also to Michelle and the Hadran team for all that they do" The Mishna lists four topics, each with four types of cases - two mentioned explicitly in the Torah and two that are extensions of the rabbis. the first topic is an oath of expression, when one takes an oath to either do or not to do something. The second is a person who is impure and forgets about their impure status and goes into the Temple or eats sacrificial items. The third and fourth relate to laws of carrying from one domain to another and a leprous mark. The first two cases incur the same type of sacrifice - a sliding scale offering, what one brings depends on the financial means of the one obligated to bring the sacrifice. The Mishna elaborates on the second category - one who goes to the Temple while impure and forgets momentarily about being impure or ate sacrificial items while being in a state of impurity. The process of atonement is through an individual sin offering. If one never realizes one's mistake or one does not even know that one became impure, one receives atonement from communal sin offerings. There are several communal sin offerings - brought on Rosh Chodesh, the three holidays (regalim) and Yom Kippur. For what sins do each of them atone? Are they meant to atone for the same transgressions or for different ones? What do the other sacrifices brought on Yom Kippur atone for (the two goats that are determined by a lottery - one is offered inside the Temple and one sent to Azazel)? There are several opinions about the purpose of each of the above sacrifices. For what purpose is the bull offering of the High Priest on Yom Kippur?  

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here While there are 613 mitzvot in the Torah, King David and some of the prophets narrowed it down to a smaller list of the most basic mitzvot. Why were these specific ones chosen, most of them relating to justice and righteousness and involving relations between people? The masechet ends with the famous story of Rabbi Akiva laughing when seeing a fox running out of the kodesh kodashim or hearing the Romans on their way to attack, after the Temple was already destroyed, while his friends were crying. When questioned about his reaction, he explains, based on verses, that in order for the positive prophecy of Zecharia to be fulfilled, first the negative prophesy of Uriah needs to be fulfilled.  

Introduction to Masechet Shevuot

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Today's daf is dedicated to the memory of the fallen soldiers of the IDF and security forces who fell in defense of Am Yisrael and Eretz Israel, and to the memory of those whose lives were tragically lost in terrorist attacks. May their memories be blessed. We are especially thinking of our Hadran learners who have lost children, grandchildren, siblings and close friends in the past year and a half. We continue to pray for the safety of our soldiers, for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi Cohen in loving memory of her mother, Elisheva bat Yehuda, Elisabeth Maybaum, on her 6th yahrzeit. "Having fled the Nazi regime as a child, it gave her such joy and hope to see her children and grandchildren living Jewish lives, learning Torah, settling in Eretz Israel and defending it. Tehi zichra baruch." Does one get multiple punishments for an act on yom tov that involves multiple melachot (as is the case for sacrifices for one who violates Shabbat)?  If so, why isn't planting also listed in the Mishna? The Mishna listed a case where one plowed and received eight sets of lashes because of unique circumstances. Seven other suggestions are made to cases that could have been brought in the Mishna that would have added an additional set of lashes. Cases are brought regarding cross breeding with animals that are considered both hekdesh and chulin. How many lashes does one receive? If one cannot receive that many, the court assesses how many they can handle (must be a number divisible by 3).  What if they change the assessment? Does it depend on whether they already starting giving the person lashes or not? On what else does it depend?  How does an assessment work when there are multiple sets of lashes? How does the actual giving of lashes take place? What type of whip do they use? Where does the person receive the whipping?  

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's father, Dr. Abraham Geffen, on his 10th yahrzeit. "He was the youngest of 8 children of Rav Tuvia and Sara Hene Geffen of Atlanta, and was devoted to his wife Ethel, his three children as well as his parents, siblings and extended family, synagogue community (Beth El of New Rochelle, NY) and was a dedicated physician, the Director of Radiology at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York for many years." What are the parameters of the prohibition to make an incision in one's body as an act of mourning? How are these details derived from the verses? Why is it forbidden to shave the corners of the beard specifically with a razor? Rabbi Eilezer adds other implements - tweezers and a plane. Why those and not scissors? What are the parameters of the prohibition of imprinting a tattoo? The Mishna lists various ways that one can be liable for many sets of lashes for the same action, or receive multiple sets of lashes for one action as one violated many negative commandments.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Rav Moshe and Tzipora Mashbaum, on her 4th yartzeit. "You graced us all with your glorious smile, innate wisdom and beautiful neshama. To say that you are missed every day is an understatement." Today's daf is for the refuah shleima of Elad ben Netta. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan's statement that one only receives lashes for eating maaser sheni outside Jerusalem after it was brought into Jerusalem, based on a derivation from Rabbi Yosi's words ina braita. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the derivation from Rabbi Yosi's as referring to a case where the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem, and the innovation is that it entered while still being tevel (untithed produce), and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as if they have been separated. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with this resolution (because it seems R' Yosi doesn't actually hold this position). The Gemara then presents two answers from Rabba and Ravina to resolve this difficulty. One who makes a bald spot on his head as a sign of mourning for the dead, who rounds the corners of his head or destroys the hair on his beard, or who makes a cut in his flesh for the dead receives lashes. The Gemara discusses the details of these commandments and the minimum measurements for which one would be liable.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sara Averick & Jose Rosenfeld in loving memory of Sara's beloved Aunt Rose, Rachel bat Chaim Nisan haLevi v'Nechama. "She was a Yiddish scholar who adored all her nieces and nephews. She was a beacon of light, laughter and joy." Rava bar Ada said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak that a non-kohen is only liable for eating bikkurim once they have been brought into the azara, since until that point, they are still considered chulin. , not sacred. Rav Sheshet ruled that placing the bikkurim in front of the altar is critical, but reading the mikra bikkurim is not. The Gemara brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael trying to prove that Rav Sheshet holds by his opinion. However, this suggestion is rejected. In the braita, Rabbi Yishmael derives the source for not eating maaser sheni after the destruction of the Temple. First, he tries to prove it from bechor, a firstborn animal, But after he rejects this suggestion, he proves it from a heikesh, a juxtaposition, from a verse in the Torah. The Gemara raises some questions against some of the content in the braita. Why couldn't they derive the law about maaser sheni from bechor and bikkurim together? Secondly, why was it so clear that the meat of a bechor could not be eaten after the Temple was destroyed, if, for example, the animal had already been offered as a sacrifice before the destruction? The first and second Mishna in the chapter both mention lashes for eating maaser sheni. To explain why the repetition, Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina establishes the second Mishna in a case of an impure person eating it in Jerusalem or the produce itself was impure and the person ate it in Jerusalem, whereas the first Mishna related to one receiving lashes for eating it outside Jerusalem (in a pure state). What is the source for receiving lashes for impurity of either the maaser sheni or the person eating it? From where is it derived that maaser sheni can be redeemed in Jerusalem if it is impure? From where is it derived that if a person bringing maaser sheni to Jerusalem is one step outside the walls of Jerusalem, one can still redeem it? What if the person is carrying it on their back and their body is in Jerusalem but the produce is not yet in Jerusalem?  

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit.  "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity.  We miss her every day.” The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar, but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion. 

Study Guide Makkot 15 This week's learning is sponsored by Elana Storch for the refuah shleima of Avraham haLevi Ben Eidel.  Today's daf is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Chaya Golda Bat Esther. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island for the refuah shleima of our friend and co-learner, Leah Brick, Leah Breindel bat Gittel Yenta בתוך שאר חולי ישראל. "We have watched and admired Leah as she meets this challenge with grace, equanimity and absolute faith, and look forward to sharing many smachot in good health with her - especially our Hadran LI trip to Israel!"  Rabba bar Hana quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that if a positive commandment precedes a negative commandment, one receives lashes and this is not considered a lav hanitak l'ase, a negative commandment that can be corrected/uprooted by a positive commandment for which one does not receive lashes. Rabbi Yochanan denies having said that. Raba doesn't understand why Rabbi Yochanan would deny it, as a case in our Mishna can prove Rabbi Yochanan's rule. However, the Gemara bring a case of a rapist, trying to prove why Rabbi Yochanan changed his mind and did not accept the above rule. Ulla (in three different attempts) and Rava each try to explain why the case of a rapist does not fit into the category of the rule (a positive commandment the precedes the negative commandment). All attempts by Ulla are rejected, but Rava's is accepted.

Presentation in PDF format Study Guide Makkot 14 The debate between Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yitzchak is discussed regarding whether or not one gets lashes for sins that one gets karet or death by the court. After bringing a third explanation for RAbbi Akiva's position, the Gemara brings the source for Rabbi Yitzchak's opinion. What do Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva derive from that verse? This question leads to a long back and forth discussion about what they each derive from various verses. The Mishna taught that one gets lashes for eating sacrificial items, kodashim,  when they are impure. Where can the warning for this be found? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different opinions. There is a back and forth discussion regarding their sources.

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

More details regarding the accidental killer are discussed - Where are they buried?  What happens if the Kohen Gadol is found out to be a chalal (son of a forbidden marriage)?  Is the relative of the victim allowed to kill the accidental murderer if the murderer leaves the city? What if the murderer is by a tree on the border where part is inside the border and part outside?

The sages expound some verses in Yehoshua that relate directly or indirectly to setting up the refuge cities.  The accidental killer leaves the city of refuge at the death of the Kohen Gadol. Who qualifies as a Kohen Gadol for this purpose? If there are multiple Kohanim Gedolim, do they all need to die or just one of them? Out of concern that the people in the city may pray for the death of the Kohen Gadol, their mothers would provide food and clothing for the accidental murderers.  The Gemara digresses to discuss prayers that have no basis (like praying for the Kohen Gadol to die) - do they come true? Different scenarios are brought regarding the timing of the death of the Kohen Gadol - after the killing but before the court determined that the killer needs to go to the city of refuge, or after the court's ruling but before the killer got to the city, etc. In each of these scenarios, does the accidental murderer go free or not?