Talking Talmud

Wherever you have the word "torah" (meaning, law, not the Torah in total) and the word "chukah" (meaning, statute) - then the capacity to invalidate the offering kicks in . But does that mean either/or or both? It certainly sounds like both - but the Gemara tracks it through and either/or sounds better by the end... Plus, the list of occasions or specific categories of people for which these terms are present in context in the Torah. Also, scriptural repetition about the requirements of the grain-offering establishes those details (where the repetition takes place) as essential. But the offering itself must be a permanent one for this essential status. Until the case where temporary status seems not to be a problem, in light of the number of repetitions...?

If one has intent to leave blood over from an animal sacrifice, does everyone agree that doing so would invalidate the offering? The Tannaim hash it out - with a focus on Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua. With a lot of heartfelt drama in the details of this passage. Also, a new mishnah: If you didn't do a whole slew of the tasks associated with the grain-offering, the tasks on that list won't invalidate the offering. Plus, the Gemara that delves into the specifics of those tasks, and why those details matter to preserve the validity of the offerings. And more on the Temple service for the shelamim - peace-offerings too. Plus, the 15 tasks associated with these grain-offerings all together.

Rabbi Hanina helped Rabbi Hamnuna with understanding something in Torah that he counted as equivalent to all the rest of his Torah learning: namely, on the burning of the handful and pigul, of course. Also, starting chapter 3 with a new mishnah! Taking the fistful of grain, but as something that is not meant to be eaten or that which is not meant to be burned - that would still be valid (except for one who disagrees). With a delving into these details, and then a conundrum regarding the double-language in the source verses.

A long mishnah - on the affect of pigul when it only affects part of the "permitter" - matirin - namely, by burning one part, the rest becomes permitted for consumption. Including a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the sages -- which leads to other areas of dispute between them. And further, a dispute between Rav and Shmuel about the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the sages. Also, the 43 (or 47 or 48) presentations of blood from the animal sacrifices of Yom Kippur. Also, a sesame seed and the smallest amount of potential pigul. Plus, a rejection of Rabbi Meir's views here.

2 mishanyot! 1 - How combinations can make items pigul or not. With the cases of the thanksgiving offering (animal offering plus loaves) and also the "Shtei HaLehem" - lambs and 2 loaves of Shavuot. Also, a long discussion about what question Rabbi Elazar asked of Rav (to determine the question itself), in terms of pigul with varied factors -- the order of events, with regard to offerings, intent, minimal measure, and so on. Plus, a mention of "cannabis" (hemp) in the context of mixtures. 2 - Pigul intent renders the libations pigul once they've been sanctified, but the libations, if brought with pigul intent, would not make the offerings themselves pigul.

Is there such a thing as pigul for half of the offering? It's a machloket! And a further development of Rabbi Yosei's position, which doesn't presume karet and whether some amount of pigul intent contaminates everything - for example, the 2 loaves of lechem ha-panim. What is the smallest unit, so to speak, that can become a problem of pigul? Or can it be in parts at all? Also, what about mitigating factors against the phenomenon of pigul - to make an offering permitted, when it might have become pigul? Also, delving into the position of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, regarding combining intents and whether pigul results. Plus, the implications of a communal offering (vs. a personal one), with regard to purity/impurity.

Returning to pigul, in a new mishnah, with a focus on Rabbi Yosei's position of when the wrong intent would not result in a punishment of karet. Also, on how removing the fistful of grain was considered parallel to the slaughtering in animal sacrifice. And then the placement of the handful into a vessel is akin to collecting the blood of an animal sacrifice after slaughtering in a vessel. Plus, another new mishnah: the 2 loaves of "lechem ha-panim" (the shewbread) and the 2 bowls of frankincense on the Shulhan/Table - and how they are subject to pigul too.

A long mishnah... specifically on how grain-offerings can be brought with invalidating intent, and how that will make the offerings "pigul." Yet, sometimes, the offering will be invalid, but the punishment for that would not be "karet" (and other times, it would be karet). Plus, the measure of an olive's worth, and the impact of that size portion. Also, the distinction between a sinner's grain-offering, in that the frankincense is not offered, and the burden of violation to the extent of pigul is slightly harder. Plus, again, whether a half-olive measure of eating and a half-olive measure of burning can combine to make a full-olive measure of violation (spoiler: the answer is no).

More on the kohen's fistful from the grain - ensuring no barrier to the grain itself. Plus, the physical description of how to take the grain in one's hand, with the understanding of a basic action - namely, what it means to take a handful. But what about if one used fingertips? Are all fingers supposed to be involved? The Torah has phrasing from which some details may be gleaned. Also, the frankincense! Which itself is (usually) essential to the menahot. Plus, a dispute about what happens for an offering of frankincense on its own, as compared together with the grain-offering (or the lehem hapanim).

When the Torah uses the term "finger" or the term "kohen," it is understood to always mean the right hand. The bias against the left-hand is already understood, but note that the Torah specifies the right-hand on occasion. But there are other occasions when the left-hand was explicitly called for (also as per the Torah) - to the extent that Rabbi Shimon allowed left-handed acceptance of the blood. Going back to the verses, "finger" AND "kohen" is necessary in his estimation. And the mishnah seems not to have included this machloket.

If oil and grain for the grain-offering were mixed outside the wall, would that be kosher as an offering or not? It's a machloket! With verses as prooftexts for each view. Also, left-handed grain-taking, which is, again, problematic in terms of the grain-offering. Plus, the explicit mention of the left-hand in the verses about the person recovering from tzara'at, and the way the rules of interpretation handle it (no pun intended).

On the "griddle-cakes" of the kohen gadol, Rabbi Yohanan addresses how partial cakes can be sanctified. But a beraita makes it clear that they needed to be brought as full cakes, not partial ones, so the kohen gadol could bring the amount of a smaller cake for the morning and afternoon, which might be lesser in some aspect, but no less sanctified. How does all of this connect to the ordinary minhah offering - why not learn one from the other? Plus, when do you bring a "havitin" without oil? Frankincense? With 4 "gufa" inquiries on this daf, referring back to the case on the previous one.

On the offering that is brought by a person who would make it invalidated, which means that there's no rectification for the grain-offering, by returning the fistful to the original vessel. Also, that vessel only functions to sanctify something when it's not on the ground. [Who's Who: Rav Avimi] Rav Avimi seems to have forgotten his Torah, especially that of Tractate Menahot - and there's discussion of his experience of studying with Rav Hisda. Also, more on the question of the vessel on the ground - where Rav Sheshet says: Go look and see what people do (but how did that work, generations after the Temple?). With recourse to the example of switching/refreshing the Lehem HaPanim (the shewbread). But isn't the Table (the Shulhan) resting on the ground?!

More on learning the details of the treyfa from "min ha-bakar" - to disqualify the treyfa. How several verses work together to learn the teaching that the Gemara wants to prove. Plus, a new mishnah! With a list of ways the offering would be rendered invalid. Also, a statement from Rav that seems to contradict the statement that a non-kohen taking the fistful of the grain would render it invalid. Can this error simply be redone? That may depend on the details of the case.

What happens in the case of a person who needs purification from tzara'at - a whole process - where the order of the tasks may make a difference in terms of validity - in the goal of using the case of tzara'at to answer the question the grain-offering, and ultimately rejecting it. Also, another parallel to animal sacrifices... in terms of paving the way for the sanctification of sacrifices, including, for example, melikah (of the bird). Plus, a kal va-chomer vs. verses understanding, where neither is quite rejected.

The meal-offerings that are exceptions to the general acceptance of them when offered in error: a sin-offering, and a minhat kena'ot, the "jealousy" offering of the sotah-woman. With verses to establish why the sin-offering is necessarily different, while the sotah-offering is a little more complicated, and dependent also on some logic. But wait - there's another offering that cannot be offered with any error of intent: the Omer! Which permits new grain for use, so if it was not brought correctly, it wouldn't permit the new grain. With a parallel to the nazir. And what about a guilt-offering?

Where are the most sacred offerings brought? And the less sacred offerings? That is, the northern and southern parts of the Temple courtyard, respectively. And what happens if the offering were brought in the wrong part of the courtyard? Also, what happens if one's intent is not for a grain-offering, but an animal sacrifice, for example? Or not for the right grain-offering? Intent is evident in the different kind of grain-offerings produced (fried, fluffy dough, etc.). And yet, the evident wrong-intent rarely invalidates the grain-offering. Why?

Shifting away from the animal sacrifices of Tractate Zevahim to grain-offerings and the particulars of offering from grain. The first key aspect of a grain-offering is removing a fistful of grain from it, and the parallel is drawn between the handling of it and that of the blood that was collected from animal sacrifice for the altar. Opening with a new mishnah, of course: If that fistful were taken, but not in the name of the offering being brought - the offering is still valid except for a sin-offering and a "minhah kenaot" - a "jealousy" offering that is brought by the Sotah woman. Also, the various kinds preparation of grain-offerings (all of which would be fit) - a flat griddle fried cake, a more spongy dough, etc. So if the kohen offered one in place of the other, with wrong intent, it's still clear what was done, and it leaves the grain-offering fit because it's identifiable. Note the difference between a grain-offering that is brought because the given offering is supposed to be from grain, as compared to when one is offered for the sake of an animal sacrifice, but when there was some reason that the animal wouldn't be brought.

More on private altars - beginning with whether a nighttime slaughter on a private altar was permitted. Plus, other details of the nature of the particulars of the acts on the altars. Also, issues of intent (back to pigul!) on the public altar in an era when there were private altars too. Plus, the effort to derive the laws about the private altars from the known laws about bird offerings and their potential for disqualification (specifically about timing and non-kohanim).

More on the altars outside and prior to the Temple - from Gilgal to Nov & Givon, and Shilo (when private altars weren't allowed). The Gemara explains that a verse in Deuteronomy that speaks of "menuchah" (rest) and "nachalah" (inheritance) should be applied to Shilo and Jerusalem, or perhaps the reverse. Also, investigating the claim that there were no grain-offerings at a private altar. The Gemara also pushes for implicit recognition that bird-offerings and grain-offerings were fundamentally different from larger animal sacrifice, which seem to have been more special.

What offerings were made in the wilderness, after leaving Egypt? In Gilgal? What verses spurred Rabbi Shimon's opinion to say only some few sacrifices were made at Gilgal? The Pesach offering was made, of course. Note that the Children of Israel left Egypt without having been circumcised for years and years - until they then did circumcise themselves, with implications for their religious lives, including their offerings. Also, the 3 places the Divine Presence rested on the land of Israel: Shilo, Nov & Givon, and the Temple in Jerusalem. Plus, the fact that all of these places seem to have been in Binyamin's portion of the land of Israel. But what about Yehudah? And even Yosef? Also, the chronology of where the Mishkan was when, from the verses themselves.

When the Children of Israel stopped for some time at Gilgal, when private offerings were allowed. But what offerings did they actually bring? And which were simply not done then? Also, a deep dive into the sacrifices brought by a nazir. Plus, what it takes for an offering to be voluntary.

Which animals were allowed to be sacrificed altogether? Male, female, blemishes and not, etc. But what about a treyfa (an animal that was going to die within the year)? Plus, the Gemara probes the implications from this status to the animals that boarded Noah's ark. Distinguishing between "clean" and "unclean" animals may have been unclear before the giving of the Torah, but they could derive which animals were kosher and not by virtue of how many of each was saved on the ark (7 for the kosher animals, even if they didn't yet know that they would be "kosher" animals). Also, the Gemara eases into halakhot about non-Jews bringing offerings outside of the Temple, and on private altars that were not acceptable for the Jews (at that time). Plus, the possibility of lacunae in the biblical verses cited by the Gemara. And the Jews could advise the non-Jews as to how to make the offerings, but not do it themselves.

A dispute over whether one is liable for slaughtering a premature guilt-offering outside of the Temple - a very specific case. Also, if what you slaughter isn't fit to be a Temple offering to begin with, for example, than there's no liability. Plus, offerings that were allowed to be brought outside of the courtyard (or, rather, the Tabernacle) because it hadn't yet been established as the sole location for this. Thus, in the wilderness - offerings were made in the Tent of the Meeting, and largely by the class of the first born, rather than the kohanim. At least, until the kohanim were established at the day of establishing the Tabernacle itself. Also, the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, their father's reaction, their uncle's reaction, and what it means to sanctify God in their deaths.

On blemished animals, premature animals, an animal and its offspring - any of these offered outside of the Temple would not make the person offering them liable, but they still violate a negative commandment. With some dispute over premature animals. Plus, the people who aren't ready to bring their offering - not the animal being unready, but the person who needs to bring it have no yet finished the time they need to wait to fulfill the process of becoming ready for the offering. For example, waiting the number of days before the possibility of purification kicks in, as per the Torah. Plus, the Amoraic refining the phrasing of the mishnah.

On slaughtering the red heifer "outside of the pit" has to mean more than "outside of the Temple," as this offering was always made outside of the Temple. So what is the concern here? The Gemara provides a few suggestions. Also, a sidestep away from the dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish on the daf about the concern of impurity in the land - and whether there might be bones in the ground from the time of the Flood (which, if there, are reason to be concerned about impurity in the ground). But did the Flood actually come to the land of Israel? And could there be anything interfering with the (apparently identifiable) bedrock? Plus, women would give birth to children who would draw water to contribute to the next red heifer offering (as part of the process) - children who were kept free of ritual impurity to be able to play this role. And if that isn't clear for the whole land, then at least Jerusalem - where R. Yehoshua essentially stipulates that the holy city is not impure. Also, more on the Flood itself - and how the huge animals were saved from the waters, given that they wouldn't have fit on the ark.

Ending chapter 13: On the case that a sin-offering is lost, replaced, and then the first one is found - to what may it be compared? A question that itself is called into question. And what is happened to the animal that is not offered as the sin-offering, when it is not yet disqualified as an offering anyway? The parallel is made to suggest a burnt-offerring, though that has its own challenges. Also, the first - and entirety of - mishnah for chapter 14: Beginning with 2 offerings that were supposed to be sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard. Plus, animals that are disqualified that are sacrificed, as it were, outside the Temple courtyard. Plus offerings that were not disqualified by being offered outside of the Temple courtyard. Plus, the distinction between communal offerings and individual offerings, and when there was a possibility of both a private and a public "bamah," outside of the Temple (or Mishkan, as the case may have been).

When the remnants of an offering's blood are brought outside of the Temple - that's a liability for violating offering outside of the Temple. This aspect of the blood is considered essential to the offering - with many subsequent implications (and subject to dispute). Also, a new mishnah - on melikah of the birdsa and also slaughtering - when the action taken outside the Temple is problematic and when it is not. Also, the Gemara shifts focus from preparation of the offering to the liability for it, when offered outside of the Temple. Plus, another mishnah: On collecting the blood of a sin-offering - what happens when the blood is in one cup and then brought to an altar outside of the courtyard, or inside - that's liable.

Mishnayot! Mishnah 1 - More on grain-offerings, when the offering is brought outside of the Temple courtyard - when the kohen's fistful has not been removed prior to the offering - that isn't a complete offering. But what if it is (the fistful of grain has been removed), and then it is offered incorrectly? Mishnah 2 - When the fistful and the levonah (frankincense) is offered outside, perhaps liability won't kick in until both are burned outside (only one might not be enough). The Gemara asks whether the fistful of grain being burned might be sufficient, even without the levonah. Mishnah 3 - If sacrificial blood, water libations, Also, the discussion shifts to the water libations of sukkot, in contrast to wine libations, and where they need to be offered. And note the "Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai" about the water libations.

Two mishnayot! 1 - Circumstances of liability for offerings outside of the Temple and what happens those offerings are then invalidated. Plus, the return of pigul and notar as disqualifications. 2 - Moving on to the grain offering - a list of different circumstances of a grain offering, where it is brought outside of the Temple. Also, various other ways these offerings can go wrong, including dealing with the minimal requirements of a measure for the offering. Plus, when the person who handles these offerings wrongly is exempt, what is the rationale for that exemption?

On the case of one who is ritually impure and eats from the sacrificial foods, whether they are pure or impure, may or may not be liable for the violation. Except that Rabbi Yosi HaGalillee says that person would only be liable if the food he ate was pure. Also, a new mishnah: The stringency of slaughtering outside of the Temple and the offering up there, as well as its leniency. Plus, what happens in the case of lapses in awareness of the offering up outside of the courtyard? It's a dispute - whether that person needs to bring a sin-offering for each separate offering out of that lack of awareness, or not. Also, incomplete offerings - do they incur a liability of the sin-offering, or is one exempt because of the lack of completeness?

After we've established how we know that slaughtering outside of the Temple violates a prohibition and likewise offering outside of the Temple, there's an investigating of the offerings that are meant to be burnt and offered in various places. Also, a focus on Rabbi Yishmael's and Rabbi Akiva's views regarding sprinkling the blood outside the Temple, and moving into discussion of offerings that were to be brought inside, and then incomplete and finished outside of the Temple. Plus, the sources they respectively derive their opinions regarding these issues from. Also, what about making such an offering outside of the Temple courtyard - in the era of "now" - when there is no Temple? Was the sanctification of the Temple and Jerusalem forever, or just for the time that the Temple stood?

Chapter 13! On offering sacrifices in locations that are not specified, and therefore also prohibited for sacrifices. The new mishnah raises the cases of offering outside the Temple. With a difference of approach between Rabbi Yossi HaGalilee and the sages. Plus, a ritually pure person who ate that which was impure would be exempt from a sin-offering, and the mishnah provides the explanation why. Also, the sources for all this in verses. Also, a focus on why this kind of offering outside of the Mishkan (or Temple) can't carry a "karet" punishment as derived from logic - though the Gemara first attempts to show how that logic would be upheld (by Rabbi Avin - and then knocked down by Rava).

When the bulls and he-goats are taken out to get burned and they render the people who handle them impure, what happens if the carcasses need to be brought back through the courtyard? Plus, the question of multiple people carrying a carcass - but the carcass can leave the courtyard before the "back" carriers would be out of the courtyard. And then it boils down to a verse... Also, when a kosher bird imparts impurity - what is the measure needed for it to do so? Plus, a deep dive into Rabbi Meir's opinion, as established in the mishnah. And the question whether the degrees of impurity will kick in, but that kind of impurity starts out as pretty severe to begin with.

More on the hides that would go to the kohanim, unless disqualification gets in the way -- but that really depends on when the disqualification takes place, including before or after the sprinkling of the blood of that offering. Also, specific offerings where the meat was not eaten - "internal sin-offerings," for which the blood was brought on the inner altar - and they were burned at Beit HaDeshen, the place of ashes (bulls and he-goats) and they render those who deal with them impure. Also, the "birah" - defining this location.

Two mishnayot: Mishnah 1 - When the burnt offering is disqualified, the kohanim won't get the hide of the offering, depending on when the disqualification took place, and why it's been disqualified (for example, not brought in the name of the right offering - which would not fulfill the person's obligation in bringing that offering, but the kohanim would get the hide). The Gemara focuses on what it means that the offering belongs to a person, but not hekdesh (and not that of a convert). Plus, the limud/learning that teaches that the kohanim get the hides of kodshei kodshim, and the hides of the kodshei kalim go to the owners who bring the offerings. Mishnah 2 - What happens to the hides when they've already been flayed from the offering, before disqualification? Rabbi Hanina, deputy high priest, said he never saw the hides going out to be burnt - which leads Rabbi Akiva to draw conclusions that the sages then rebut.

On kings and whether Moses was one - with the argument that he was not king, and also that he was, but without being the progenitor of a dynasty of kingship. Which leads to a discussion of monarchic dynasties - and the lack thereof, including King Saul. Also, how kohanim who are unfit for the service of a given day do not eat from that day's offerings... except that the shares of meat given the kohanim with blemishes has already been established! Plus, the logic of the order of the statements on these points.

The Gemara addresses the acute mourning of Aharon (Aaron) in the Torah when Nadav and Avihu die on the altar, when they bring the "strange fire" - and, among other offerings, a sin-offering was brought too - and Moshe (Moses) rebukes Aharon for burning the sin-offering among them. How much does Aharon's conduct inform the practices-to-be of kohanim in a state of acute mourning in the generations to come? Also, was Moshe himself a kohen, given his partaking of the offerings on this day of establishing the Mishkan? Doesn't the very fact that he was able to eat from the offerings mean he must have been a kohen? It's not that simple

Rabbi Shimon's position of the acute mourner and the Pesach offering - and ways of resolving the apparent contradictions in his respective positions. Specifically, must the kohen become impure for the death of a close relative or does he have permission to do so? A clear dispute. But the need for a "met mitzvah" - perhaps that is not disputed, and the kohen must become impure for the sake of that need to bury. Also, a deeper dive into the view that says the acutely mourning kohen must partake of the Pesach offering.

On kohanim who weren't eligible to eat from the sacrificial meats - beginning with a t'vul yom, one who has immersed in the mikveh for purity, but the sun has not yet set, so he isn't pure yet, for the purposes of eating from the offerings. [What's What: Mishmarot] Plus, the question of a "ba'al mum" - the degree to which even the "blemished" kohen is still a kohen in many important and privileged ways. Also, a kohen who is in acute mourning - and therefore cannot serve in the Temple at that time, but still may (or may not?) partake of the foods that were eaten by the kohanim. For example, sacrificial meats. And the Pesach offering in contrast to them... He still has to be purified by the time of eating, but there are stringencies in place with regard to these foods.

Additional consideration of the rules about absorption and how they apply to the meal offering - and also the sin-offering, both of which are specified, when we might have thought only one would apply. Plus, the regulations of the sin-offering, including the kohen's using his right hand. Also, closing out the chapter - ending on a "teku" - when both blood and grease is absorbed by a seller's garment. And opening a new chapter with a new mishnah - with the case of one who has gone to the mikveh, but still needs to offer a sacrifice to remove impurity.

A new mishnah! (on the bottom of 96) - with Rabbi Tarfon's perspective, perhaps especially nuanced because he himself was a kohen. See his disagreement with the sages. With delving into the purging and rinsing, including the Pesach sacrifice as an example. Note that pigul and notar are not the focus in the way they have been previously, but the purging of the pot takes center stage (also based on biblical verses). Also, another new mishnah: when two foods are in the same dish with different statuses (for example, more or less holy), the food that imparts the greater flavor takes precedence in terms of the level of sanctity and accompanying restrictions because of it. But this text seems to have a gap that the Gemara fills in - without stating the possibility of a gap...

More on how absorbed flavors are to be removed from earthenware - now recognizing that smashing the earthenware would be a problem in Jerusalem. That is, the holy city had certain cautions against garbage and trash piles, which meant that the debris from the Temple needed to be handled in specific ways, depending on its composition. Also, the learning style of Rami bar Hama and Rav Sheshet, as presented by Rabbi Yitzhak b"r Yehudah. R. Yitzhak wants proofs from sources, not from logic, and even when Rami bar Hama sets out to use tannaitic sources to answer R. Yitzhak's question (about the impurity of garments and vessels), he defaults to logic.

A new mishnah (from the bottom of 94) - a garment with blood that was sprayed from a sin-offering and that was later moved out of the Temple courtyard - should be brought back to the courtyard for its laundering process. Earthenware vessels would need to be destroyed... which repurifies them, essentially. Likewise, the garment might be torn, so that it could be returned the courtyard in purity. But doesn't it then become so small that it's just a tiny scrap? How to achieve that middle ground that is not a garment and therefore repurified, but still large enough to launder (only "garments" were laundered)? Also, note that anywhere that the sin-offering is cooked, there's a need for purging and rinsing. But what about a vessel in which its broth is poured? That's not cooking - and yet it needs to be broken. What about using that same vessel for a food that is quintessentially dairy, like kutach? These rules about the sacrifices inform our understanding of kashrut, certainly.

Starting with an investigation into the word "beged," or garment, that would become impure and perhaps need laundering. With a discussion of that which is susceptible to impurity, with 3 scenarios to distinguish between what is "fit" for impurity and what is in fact becoming impure. Size is relevant, and so is how plain the garment is - if it's supposed to be embroidered and is not as yet, then it is not finished and not fit for impurity (but if it is supposed to be a plain garment, it would be). Also, moving back to the laundering question - specifically with regard to leather. With a biblical teaching that leather is relevant, but also a key distinction is made between soft leather (garments) and hard leather - and also between laundering that involves water and rubbing to clean the item, as compared to water alone.

What if the garment that the blood from a sin-offering sprayed onto was an impure garment? With the phrasing of the question giving away the premise of the sage who asks it. Also, a new mishnah - a list of the animals from which blood would not require laundering if it were absorbed in the kohen's garment. Also, there's a need to have the "right" amount of blood consecrated - a minimum for the sake of the need of laundering - and the question then is how is that known, with the conclusion of Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. But what proportions are necessary for the water, for the purification process? And how does dipping one's fingers to sprinkle the blood have impact on the need to do so again (more dipping, more sprinkling)? Plus, another mishnah: On the gathering of the blood and the impact of that on the need for laundering.

Chapter 11! With a new mishnah - on the absorption of the blood of a sin-offering into the kohen's garments, upon which it has sprayed, and the fact that it must be laundered. But if the sin-offering itself was disqualified, then the blood from that animal does not need this kind of washing. Plus, what about the blood from a bird-sin-offering? Does its neck constitute a receptacle, or a vessel, for collecting the blood? Plus, what if the bird left the courtyard? When is its wanderings relevant to the validity of the bird offering? Plus, the sin-offering that comes to exclude the bird sin-offering.

More on the order of the sacrifices, when there's a conflict - this time, in the context of what should be eaten first. With "frequency" and "sacredness/sanctity" being the salient factors. Until "prevalence" is introduced as a factor as well. Also, a new mishnah: When oil is distributed in the Temple courtyard, it is easily identified as among the foodstuffs for the kohanim, or coming as leftovers from certain grain products, but oil is considered less prominent, even to the dispute as to whether oil can be given as a gift. Plus, wine libations - where the sprinkling on the altar seems to be a concern of extinguishing the fire there.

Bird offerings precede grain offerings, when you have to choose. Even though there are communal grain offerings. They are, after all, living creatures. And they provide atonement. Though the grain offerings have details that argue for their precedence too. Also, an order of a list of offerings from the Torah, including a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and tithings. Which raises questions about the time frame, but also the details of kodshei kodshim.

Chapter 10! With a focus on mitzvot that conflict in their timing. A new mishnah... on establishing the order of offerings, given this kind of conflict. That which is most frequent comes first. And a second mishnah! Applying "sanctity" as the determining factor of precedence. Plus other rules of thumb - including, perhaps most importantly, biblical verses that establish the order, at least of some potentially conflicting offerings.

Items are sanctified when they are put in holy vessels, but not all substances in all materials of vessels. So too, the priestly garments also atone. Note that the service needed to be done in new, pre-washed garments, for the sake of the glory (and wealth) of the Temple. Also, how the priestly garments are connected to the sacrifices from the Torah. And a quick catalogue of which garment atones for what sin. Plus, bloodshed and evil speech (lashon hara) seem to have two ways to atone (each), and also are named as acts for which there is no atonement.