Talking Talmud

When 2 potential witnesses deny any knowledge of the event(s) they're asked to testify about, the claim is that they need to deny at exactly the same time. And since that precise of a time is not possible, perhaps they weren't really liable... (this is the view of R. Yosi HaGlili, who says they could have spoken at "the same time," with a certain amount of time to make a short utterance. Also, the case of one witness -- when that would be acceptable, and when insufficient. Note the eye to the protection of women.

After 4 ways to keep yourself away from falsehood on yesterday's daf, we have another 9 ways here (13 in total) - and all of them fall under this category. Also, who is intended in the category of "those who are not fit to testify" when there's already been a list of those who are not fit to testify!?! Perhaps a king. Perhaps the one who plays with dice. Also, a new mishnah: defining the oath of testimony (swearing that they have nothing to say on behalf of the plaintiff). Including the concern that one denies having anything to say about several cases - that will mean a liability for each false oath taken.

Chapter 4! On the "oath of testimony" - the witness swears on the Bible that his testimony is correct, as rooted in a verse in Vayikra/Leviticus, as formal court proceedings. A new mishnah: This oath of testimony is only issued to men. An other points of trustworthiness. But how valid is that testimony? Also, note that this "men" is specific - to exclude women, as compared to other more generic uses. Of course, there are other circumstances where women's testimony is acceptable. Plus, the formality of witnesses standing while giving testimony.

2 mishnayot! 1 - If someone swears that something is factually incorrect is in fact true, or if someone swears about something that is impossible to have seen. But what if he's swearing to something as he understands it? There's concern about the plain meaning of words as people understand them. 2 - Oaths that one takes to confirm that one's statement is true - shevuat bitui - in contrast to the one taken in court. Plus, one who says "Amen" to a formulation of an oath without uttering all the words of the oath is akin to one who did utter all of the words. It amounts to taking an oath.

What about conditional oaths? That means one oath forbids something, but the second may not. Unless he engineered the events of the first one, and neglected the second one. Also, the story of the brothers Eifa and Avimi, and their learning of Shevuot in the beit midrash.

A new Mishnah! With exceptions to the basic laws of oaths - for example, if one swears not to fulfill a mitzvah. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beterah says that one who makes an oath that you're not allowed to make would still entail a violation, but the Tanna Kama seems to think that it wouldn't count as violating. Likewise, an issue to swear on a mitzvah to keep it. Plus, another new mishnah! Different wordings of swearing off something, though in the end, he would only be held accountable or on punishment. This "shevuot bitui" - risks the false oath in the intentional breaking of the oath - and needing lashes.. And an oath in vain?

More on the tannaitic dispute of the previous daf. Delineating the logic of amplification - ribui u-miyut vs. kelal u-prat u-kelal. They're two different schools of thought, and the rationale holds across the Talmud, for each of them. But they're also very similar. Plus, taking an oath in an unavoidable way. Also, one who took an oath, but he forgot about the item he had foresworn... Likewise, forgetting an oath itself -- these aspects of forgetting will affect whether an offering is required. Including some mockery from the colleagues in the land of Israel. Plus, the case of someone who unwittingly breaks his oath -- what if he had remembered? Would he have broken the oath anyway, or not?

A new mishnah! Taking a false oath about the past, or an oath about the future, which is not upheld, which turns it into a false oath, about tangible or intangible matters, means a sliding scale offering. Likewise, if it pertains to other people. Plus, the stringencies of oaths (shevuot) vs. vows (nedarim), with regard to each other. Also, if a person swears about another party - falsely - either that person needs to bring the sacrifice or not - a large debate. Oaths also seem to pertain to matters that are either good or bad - and a textual inference is necessary to present them as not necessarily being harmful or beneficial. Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael, and Rav vs. Shmuel -- which is not the same dispute, though we might have thought they were. Plus, the formulation with regard to oaths to make them oaths.

What if one takes an oath not to eat, and then ingests non-food items, does that break the oath? What about eating non-kosher food? The key is the "isur kolel," an inclusive prohibition. For example, not eating on Yom Kippur is more inclusive than not eating non-kosher food. Also, more extensive prohibitions -- prohibited in the kind of food and the circumstances of eating (for example, consecrated, or Yom Kippur). In one scenario, multiple things can be forbidden at the same time, each nested within the other, as it were.

When we talk about eating and drinking - is drinking included in an oath about eating, or not? With practical implications for whether offerings would be required after violating the oath (or perhaps not). Also, the case of one who takes an oath not to drink - without specification - and then drinks many things - he still is liable only for one offering. What if he gives a list of things he won't drink? Is that to exclude everything else, that he might be willing to drink, or is it just about the moment and the beverages before him? How complete of a statement does he need?

A discussion about speech and eating. Which includes defining when one's speech incurs a requirement to bring an offering -- like the blasphemer? A nazir? Plus, "konamot." And oaths about eating that do not specify the details or amounts of prohibition... the Gemara specifies the inferred amounts, when nothing is stated. What about non-food? Does dirt count as eating? What about grapeseed, which isn't eaten outside of a mixture? How do you define that amount for eating? (Or how much dirt counts as eating). Also, a new mishnah! About one who swears about not eating - and then eats and drinks - is that a liability for 2 offerings, or only one? With other comparable cases.

Rabin brought the Torah of Rabbi Yochanan in Israel to Babylonia to establish the difference between a false oath, not keeping one's word, and swearing in vain (with 3 different verses in the Torah that establish the prohibition). Plus, every negative commandment that has an action - gets lashes. But if there's no action, no lashes -- except for the exceptions, where lashes would be incurred. Also, establishing the views of the sages with regard to the unspecified statements - and what they mean in terms of amounts, and so on. For example: if a minute amount of food is prohibited, does it incur a sacrifice? In part, it's contingent on establishing the definitions - what is the minimum amount for eating to count as eating?

Starting chapter 3 with a Mishnah - and the new topic of uttering oaths. Plus, the question of taking oaths, and getting tripped up by them. Something that is obvious that it's impossible... maybe could have ben done better. Note: Oaths of utterance, oaths that are explicit in the verses, and the "before/after" factor.... If someone takes an oath not to eat - a certain amount, or any amount, a small amount would or would not make him liable, depending on whose view. Plus, anything one might uttered, if uttered in that way, can be held in abeyance. Plus, determining the "right" language to use can truly matter. Also, the difference between a false oath and one taken in vein - and how the two versions of the Ten Commandments in the Torah each contains one version. Were they uttered at the same like the versions about Shabbat?

Finishing chapter 2! If there are 2 paths, one with a known source of impurity and the other ostensibly pure, and you don't know which is which, and he walked both paths, he was definitely impure, but it's not known when he became impure. But what if he forgot where he walked? How does he track when he became impure? Also, what about a person who did the same transgression where it entails a sin-offering, for example, and he did it again, and isn't sure about what h remembered and what he forgot. With a clear dispute among Amoraim.

The case of a couple who are engaged in sexual intercourse when she realizes she has begun menstruating -- which makes their intimacy a violation of niddah. The question, of course, is what are they to do? With extenuating factors in whether the man is a Torah scholar, for example. Also, some aggadata on the daf: the consequences - on a metaphysical level - if the couple don't separate. And if a couple takes caution with regard to to the time when she expects to start menstruating, they'll be rewarded as a positive consequence.

One who discovers that he is impure after entering the Beit HaMikdash needs to depart as quickly and/or directly as possible. But what if he used the shortest route, but took a long time to walk it (or a long route quickly)? Also, one who enters a home that is impure because of tzara'at, that same person stays pure - if he walks in differently from normal. Plus, the kohen's check of the house for tzara'at. Also, the positive mitzvah that is included in the sum total for which one is not liable.

More on adding to the city of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard - where Rav Nachman says one of the factors listed in the mishnah is necessary (as compared to all of them). With the question of lasting sanctification or resanctification, in the time of Ezra and Nechemiah's return to Zion. Note differences between the First Temple and the Second Temple. Also, the question of shifts in status (in terms of impurity upon entry, or thereafter) between the Mishkan (Tabernacle) and the Mikdash (Temple).

Sourcing the process of adding to the city of Jerusalem and/or the Temple's courtyard -- in verses. With discussion of whether Moshe's sanctification of Temple vessels lasted for the generations or whether they needed new anointing... and what implications are there (if any) from the vessels to the area? Also, the song to accompany the expansion of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard - also, from the verses. Plus, the question of using verses as prayer, but not incantation.

The end of chapter 1! Does the goat that is sent to "Azazel" atone for kohanim? Unclear, but they have other means of atonement. Plus, the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon on atonement. And, with the new chapter, a long mishnah, beginning with the case of a person who touches an impure thing and then enters the holy (or handles the holy foods) - but inadvertently (namely, the transgression is "hidden from him" - the consequences depend on the particulars. And the mishnah continues with many cases, with details about purity -- including extending the size of Jerusalem or the courtyard of the Temple. Plus, the case of where the action is known, but not the impurity (specifically in the case of a sheretz -- creepy-crawly).

On Yom Kippur atoning for sin, regardless of a person's regret. With a dive into Rabbi Yehudah vs. Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi), as to the extent of the atonement and what happens with unrepented sins. And which view underlies or agrees with the mishnah? Also, the sacrifices atone - but only with repentance, so isn't that going to be the case with Yom Kippur too? But even if Yom Kippur does atone without teshuvah, what happens if the thing to atone for is the violation of Yom Kippur itself?

What can be done with an animal designated for offering that is no longer needed for whatever reason (that does not include a blemish to the animal)? For example, if the owner (the one who sinned) died...so he can't carry out the plan for atonement? Several possible solutions are considered. Also, going back to the atonement of Yom Kippur and all the kinds of transgressions it applies to. Including, it seems, sins for which a person did not repent! (as long as the sinner isn't denying God's existence)

More on the animals that were consecrated for a year, yet not used within the year, and now what? The case of grain offerings is brought to determine what happens in the case of "t'vul yom," someone awaiting the end of the day for his dunking in a mikveh to take full effect. Also, physical sanctity of communal offerings can be conditional. As with the first case, what if the item isn't used, but before it's truly been sanctified? It's a dispute whether you can redeem the animals, let them out to pasture to incur a blemish, or to have to wait and let the animal die. Plus, the red heifer - parah adumah - can it really be conditional ?

Parsing the specific goats - Rosh Chodesh, festivals, Yom Kippur - where each atones for specific things, and is where each thing can't usurp the atonement property of the others, or be used for other things. The particulars of the offering of the goats also make the difference in how and for what they each atone (sin-offerings have different procedures, including different locations of offering - inner and outer altars). Also, other animals that have been consecrated for the daily offerings - the consecration last for a year. If the animal develops a blemish, the sanctity can be redeemed, but what if there's no blemish, just the consecration expires. A parallel is drawn to ketoret, incense - in terms of desacralizing incense that wasn't used within the year of consecration.

Continuing on the question of atonement and how one way to atone doesn't necessarily atone for other needs for atonement. In this case, the he-goats of Yom Kippur vs. the goats of Rosh Chodesh. [What's What: Binyan Av] And where do the offerings of the holidays fit in with the Rosh Chodesh offerings and those of Yom Kippur? Plus, the linguistic comparison of "avon" - sin - for the goats of Rosh Chodesh and the tzitz, the front plate worn by the kohen gadol. Though the conclusion leads to great specificity in what atones for what.

Does the goat-offering atone for 3 different kinds of impurities? The verse indicates it won't atone for all kinds of impurities, only some of them. But what kind of impurities does it atone for? Perhaps for an idolater - but it's too egregious of a transgression. Perhaps for a woman after childbirth -- but what is her sin for which she brings a sin-offering? Perhaps she has (falsely) sworn off relations with her husband in the throes of labor (but it's a machloket). So the Gemara comes around to talking again about the impurity that is brought into the Temple or with regard to its sanctified foods -- inadvertently, to be sure. But how does this atonement relate to the atonement provided by the day of Yom Kippur? What if a person doesn't have time to bring the atoning offering before Yom Kippur?

An investigation into the verses that teach that the sliding scale sacrifice is offered to atone for bringing impurity into the Temple, or the consecrated foods. Also, a long baraita on these violations and the specific sliding-scale offering, including 3 specific kinds of impurity, and the question what the Yom Kippur se'ir (he-goat) atones for.

On the shades of white of tzara'at, in terms of color and brightness, and how they were to be compared, and perhaps even mixed. With various analogies to help explain the relationships among the various colors and intensities. With a possible dig at the Roman empire, in the last analogy.

Beginning on the previous daf - we have a deep dive into the halakhic approach, when it comes to interpreting the biblical text. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi uses "ribui u-miyut" -- amplification and limitation (vs. "k'lal u-p'rat" -- generalization and specification). Both approaches infer meaning and practical applications from the wording of the biblical text. It turns out that either is acceptable, as long as the scholar is consistent. Which was Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's approach, though? Also, a return to the case of carrying from private-to-public domain from the mishnah, with the appropriate comparison to the mishnah and its cases at the beginning of Tractate Shabbat.

More on whose opinion is represented in the mishnah - Rabbi Yishmael vs. Rabbi Akiva, and why each would be the opinion represented. Plus, the underlying discussion about the lashes that would be applied to the person who has violated the halakhah in question in the mishnah.

The Gemara's introduction to Shevuot seems far afield - in its sidestepping to tzara'at blemishes and Shabbat details. So it explains the connection to lashes in the previous tractate. Plus, the sacrificial offerings that are brought on a sliding scale - dependent on one's economic status. Plus, the period of lapsed awareness of one's status as impure (for example). Also, whose opinion is represented in the mishnah? The Gemara first explains that it is not in line with the opinions of either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. Until it comes back around to Rabbi Yishmael.

A new - and long - mishnah: Those who violate their oaths need to bring a sacrifice for not following through on their commitment (2 such cases). But is that only with regard to the future (with the past, another 2 are added)? Likewise, 2 that are 4 with regard to the oaths of the kohanim. Plus, 2 that are 4 in carrying from on domain to another (that is, from private to public; and then public to private is added to make 4). Plus, the various stages of lack of awareness while on is transgressing -- which can have impact on the person's sin-offerings. With various opinions represented in the mishnah (including that of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir - regarding the cases of the lack of awareness).

More on the 613 mitzvot - and ways of encapsulating the most essential mitzvot into many fewer. Plus, the way one prophet follows the next, supplanting the message of the previous one (in concern and petition to God, not competition). Also, two stories of how the sages mourned the prominence and hegemony of Rome having taken over the holy places -- most of the sages weep, but Rabbi Akiva laughs. For all that desecration, even foxes in the ruins of the Temple, fulfills the prophecy of Uriah, which affirms for him that Zechariah's prophecy of redemption and a rebuilt Jerusalem will also come to pass.

Details of the whip itself are derived or inferred from verses in the Torah -- specifically to focus on the process of flogging the sinner. Also, the last mishnah of Makkot: with the list of one who gets lashes to the exclusion of karet, thanks to the inherent humiliation in the lashes. Also, 3 practices were decided by the earthly courts and then approved by the heavenly court - so the Gemara proves that heavenly support through supporting verses. Likewise, a heavenly voice that confirmed 3 other courts' decisions - including backing King Solomon's famous "cut the babt in half" decision, to make it clear that there was no chance that the other woman was the real mother. Plus, the tradition of the 613 mitzvot, with 365 negative ones and 248 positive ones, and how we get to 613 (hint: "Torah tzivah lanu Moshe....").

3 mishnayot, but first: more on plowing, in such a way that leads to lashes. Then: details of lashes -- how many, where on the body, in numbers divisible by 3. Also, when transgressors are covered by one set of lashes or get several in a row - with time to heal in between the sets. And lastly, a detailed description of the process of the lashes - including where the person doing the flogging stands, how he flogs, and how the person getting the lashes stands, and holds himself, and so on.

A daf with 2 mishnayot: 1. One who tattoos a tattoo is liable for lashes -- if the person both engraved in the skin and also added the ink. But maybe that's only if the tattooist wrote the Name of God. Or alternatively, the name of idolatry. Likewise, things that look like tattoos seems also to be at least taboo, even if they don't incur lashes. 2. Repeated violations of the same constraint on a nazir will incur multiple sets of lashes - or only one, depending on whether he was warned. The question arises with sha'atnez too - whether one is liable for one event or multiple events. And likewise kilayim - in terms of planting or plowing while mixing species.

Finishing out ma'aser sheni - determining when one would be subject to lashes if the produce is eaten outside of Jerusalem. That measure is derived from the proximity of verses in the Torah that align lashes with the phenomenon of eating outside of Jerusalem. Plus, the tithing of one fig that wasn't tithed - how does that work? Note how designating food for tithing might actually result in more lashes than if no designation had taken place. Also, a new mishnah -- on one who shaves his head or the like in mourning, which is prohibited. How is one held accountable, and for what actions, exactly?

More on Bikkurim - first fruits: Rav Sheshet says that not placing the produce in the right place next to the altar will prevent it from counting as first fruits, but not reciting the verses from the Torah won't invalidate the first fruits. Which then leads to discussion of whose view he is citing. With comparisons to "bekhor" - first animals - and also to ma'aser sheni (second tithings). Also, from there, the discussion of why ma'aser sheni isn't practiced in the absence of the Temple (eating food in sanctity in Jerusalem could theoretically happen without the Temple, but the aim is to prove why that is not the case, even many years after the Temple's destruction).

A case of a kohen who eats from a korban olah before the throwing of the blood on the altar... but even kohanim aren't allowed to eat from an olah/burnt-offering. In any case, the inappropriate eating of sacrifices leads to reason for 6 sets of lashes (or maybe 5, which is part of the discussion). Also, more on bikkurim, the first fruits - and what invalidates them as food for the kohen, or perhaps not. Plus, a comparison to mixing flour and oil for the meal-offering.

A new mishnah! Bikkurim - first fruits - and other special offerings where one who eats incorrectly and gets lashes. NOTE CLARIFICATION TO THE AUDIO: The issue of lashes upon eating the Bikkurim is specifically in the case that a kohen ate the offerings before the person who brought them recited the verses (two separate people (which wasn't clear, in listening to the recording). Plus other prohibited foods - like a korban Pesach, if it were left over night. Plus, the case of the mother bird and one who didn't send her away. Also, a discussion about whose opinion is represented in the mishnah -- Rabbi Akiva or Rabbi Shimon? With a deep dive into Rabbi Shimon's approach (via a very long baraita). Specifically with regard to eating specific foods outside of Jerusalem (what happens with Maaser Sheni, and the limitations on who can eat from it, for example).

With regard to the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird when you come to take the eggs (or the fledgling birds), if one took the mother bird instead of sending her away - what happens? It's a machloket! Either the perpetrator here receives lashes, or he should just send away the mother bird now, and not get lashes. (it's an example of the positive commandment that comes together with the negative commandment, and doesn't (necessarily) get lashes). And there's one other mitzvah that has that same capacity - namely, the rapist who marries and divorces the woman he raped (and can remarry her). Also, on forbidden foods - when does one eats them get lashes? With a focus on creepie-crawlies and water creatures, and eventually land creatures, and those that fly -- all of which are learned out from verses in the Torah. Eight possible violations in total.

A difficult daf. When a combination of mitzvot (positive and negative) and the violation thereof lead to lashes vs. when the result is no lashes. Plus, Rabbi Yochanan changes his mind. Plus, the case of a man who rapes a woman, has to marry her, can't divorce her, and then does divorce her - what happens to him? Also, how the time factor to do a positive commandment is relevant to his rectifying this situation.

Reviewing the opinions of Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yitzchak on lashes and more severe punishments from the previous daf, with some focus on Rabbi Yitzchak's opinion. Plus, Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that one who committed all of the illicit sexual relationships in one period of forgetting or lack of awareness would need to bring a sin-offering for each relationship. But the only way one could violate the prohibition against sleeping with one's sister, who is also one's father's sister, and one's mother's sister - that takes a wicked person who is the son of a wicked person, in terms of violating and violating again, for such relationships to be possible in one person (and then raising the question whether that's one sin-offering or three). [Who's Who: Rabbi Yitzchak] Also, what happens when a person is ritually impure and needs to bring that sacrifice? And what if an impure person did eat from the offering (eg - Shelamim) while impure? To be punished, one still needs a warning from the biblical text.

The end of chapter 2, and the beginning of chapter 3. First, a killer who goes into exile must be upfront about why he's in exile. And in the event of people wanting to honor him, he would need to protest just the once. But not more. The chapter closes with a dispute. Also, the beginning of chapter 3, with its first mishnah -- namely, for when people get lashes. Plus: who and why the Givonim? Note: The Gemara explains the view that says - for every violation of karet, one also gets lashes, but not everyone agrees with that! So the Gemara presents the 3 opinions on this topic, only one of which is represented in the mishnah - specifically, that of Rabbi Akiva.

If the verdict comes from the court that an inadvertent killer has to go to the city of refuge to exile, but there is no kohen gadol at that time - the killer cannot every leave his exile. Plus, Yoav and the mistakes he made in trying to seek refuge. Plus, the angel of Rome. Plus, a new mishnah, with a person in need of exile who is in a tree, on the border of the city of refuge. And another mishnah, with the role of ma'aser sheni - and the Levite cities Along with the need to take refuge in a city other than your own, even if your residence is in a city of refuge.

The verses of the Torah suggest that Joshua wrote part of the Torah - which might just be the passages about the city of refuge (since he later implemented the plan for them, upon entering the land). Or did Joshua simply repeat it later in his own book? A worthy dispute. Also, a new mishnah: The role of the kohen gadol and his death with regard to exiles returning from the city of refuge. Plus, the role of the anointed kohen. Plus, how the mothers of the kohanim gedolim helped the exiles, so they wouldn't pray for the deaths of the mothers' sons (though those prayers might not bring about his death either!). Plus, a real case of defamation and lashes. Also, a mishnah about the timing when the exile verdict comes down - depending on the life of the kohen gadol, and what happens if that seat is empty.

More on the cities of refuge -- what kinds of cities are suitable for this purpose? Medium-sized cities, with water available, and marketplaces, and a sizable enough population -- which should be replenished if those numbers drop. Also, if a student (of Torah, presumably) is exiled, his teacher is exiled with him -- as essential to his life. Which points to the idea that people should only teach suitable students (who are not likely to end up in a city of refuge). If a teacher is exiled, the entire yeshivah goes with him too. Plus, the sages and the verses they used to learn out details about those who kill inadvertently. In the hopes that all happens as it should. Also, a city of refuge that is already home to a majority of unintentional killers cannot accept new ones. Plus, what happens in a city that has no elders to begin with?

Are people responsible for doing the wrong thing when they thought it was permitted at the time that they did it, or to what extent is a person responsible for making sure he or she has knowledge of those permitted/prohibited actions? The example is a ger toshav - and the question of when punishing consequences kick in. That is, when does it seem close to deliberate, in contrast to the consequences all being left to God. With examples from the Torah where people were held responsible for transgressions they hadn't known they were committing (for example, Avimelech when he thought Sarah and Avraham were siblings, leaving her permitted for Avimelech to take as a wife - though she wasn't really). Also: 2 mishnayot - on the cities of refuge, and who can and cannot take refuge there. For example, a blind person cannot. An enemy of an "unintentional" killing cannot usually go to exile (and might be put to death for murder instead). Plus, the location of the 6 cities of refuge. Plus, initially, the killer ran to a city of refuge before the court judgement.

A new mishnah! But first - the written form of the Torah's verses, as compared to the read/pronounced form. Now, when one throws a stone into a public gathering - that person would go to exile in the city of refuge (among other cases, and with exclusions). Plus, cases between father and son, teacher and student, etc., where there might well be a mitzvah for the perpetrator to have a mitzvah for the action, including deliberate hitting (as compared to throwing a stone). With the Gemara doing the heavy duty lifting to interpret the mishnah. Plus, a jump to shemitah - and a comparison to voluntary action. Also, another mishnah: A father's accidental of a son, and a son's accidental killing of a father - the killer goes to the city of refuge. This right seems reserved to a Jew who kills a Jew (unless it's a ger toshav who kills a ger toshav). Note that the father who strikes his son for is own education is in a different category, because that might be a mitzvah, in context.

Last mishnah of the chapter: After the witnesses have testified, and the court has issued its verdict (a death sentence), and the defendant runs away... and he comes back, but is not judged again. Rather, witnesses testify to the previous judgement. Plus, the concern about a court being a "bloody court" for sentencing however many to death - and the concern that no death sentences (so the court would never be a bloody court, but, at the same time, murderers would be getting away, as it were). Also: Chapter 2! With a new mishnah - and unintentional killing which may allow the killer to take refuge in a city of refuge, protected from an avenging relative. But not every unintentional killing has that protection. Also, another mishnah! What happens if a person is chopping with an axe and the axe-head - or the wood - flies through the air and kills another... would that woodchopper be able to be exiled to the city of refuge?

A new mishnah - a long one, including discussion of verses that provide the key details about witness testimony (not conspiring witnesses, though). For example, how many witnesses may offer testimony to establish the case. Plus, the significance of warning, especially in capital cases. Also, another mishnah: where different groups of witnesses see the same event from different angles. Plus, what happens if the potential victim of conspiring witnesses truly did wrong things?

3 mishnayot! 1 - Conspiring witnesses who plot to impose monetary penalties on their victim. The witnesses can divide the payment that they are then required to pay, but each gets the full total of lashes (with a linguistic connection on the verses of the Torah - according to Abaye, vs. Rava's claim of imposing lashs on another). 2 - Conspiring witnesses are only deemed such when other witnesses come forward to establish that they couldn't have witnessed what they claim to have witnessed - with testimony about the witnesses themselves, and not about the event they are speaking about. And then witnesses can come forward who knock down the witnesses who claimed the witnesses were conspiring - and reestablish the original testimony. And so on for 100 sets of witnesses. Also, Rava introduces a number of cases where the witnesses are faulty and problematic, but not conspiring. Which is difficult, but not as bad as the conspiracy of conspiring witnesses. 3 - The penalty to the conspiring witnesses - and when they would experience "as they conspired to do to another." That is, their execution would only kick in if another's life was taken because of them. But the halakhah also seems to balk at imposing the death sentence on them, after their victim has been put to death - to the distinction to the "final judgement" with regard to the victim, not actually putting him to death.