Talking Talmud

Following the dispute about pigul for a meal-offering, the Gemara investigates all the permitting factors for an offering to be accepted, before there are any considerations of pigul. Note that the sprinkling of the blood on the inner altar needs to be done correctly. Also, the count of blood worship tasks: 43 or 47 or 48? If the bloods of two animals mingles, there is room to be lenient, in terms of how many placements there were on the altar.

"With the bull" - looking at the comparison between the goats that would be brought for unwitting communal idolatry and the unwitting sin in other fields. Via the juxtaposition of verses. Also, putting the sacrifices into the context of the Jewish people being beloved by God. With more details on the curtain too.

In light of the placement of blood on the inner altar - either one or two placements - preserving the atonement capacity of the offering, even without blood placed on all four corners, the question of blood on the curtain (parokhet) must be asked. The Gemara establishes that all seven placements must be made on the curtain - but it asks also about four placements, because of a verse with a plural term and R. Shimon's opinion. Also, why does the Torah specify the need for incense on the inner altar (which was the incense altar), as the terms are redundant? Plus, the focus on the verses as source material for the halakhic details.

What happens to the clothing that is sprayed by the blood that is being sprinkled on the altar? With implications regarding laundering the garments worn by the kohanim. Also, regarding the blood that is placed on the inner altar -- which is specifically the sin-offering (goat) of Yom Kippur and the bull offering as well. The placement of this blood is essential to the atonement.

More on Beit Hillel's understanding that one placement of blood on the altar is sufficient - as derived from the "atonement" as stated in each verse about the sin-offering. The Gemara probes whether the law can be derived via logic, which sounds plausible, and not only from the verses - for example, an inference about the outer altar placement of blood because of the placement of blood on the inner altar. Also, not the shift in the cases, where Beit Hillel's position ends up being more stringent, and Beit Shammai more lenient, which is not their usual way. But look to Tractate Eduyot - as early mishnah! Note also more details of the placement of the blood, with details of what makes the placement acceptable to qualify the offering for atonement.

A new mishnah - starting chapter 4! A dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: How many placements of blood on the altar are required for atonement? Beit Shammai says two places on the altar are necessary, while Beit Hillel says one placement is sufficient. Both of which depend on respective differences in reading verses from the Torah. Plus, what about leftover blood from previous offerings? And can sprinkling of the blood be done via pouring, or are they considered separate acts altogether? The different readings of the Torah's verses are understood to be based on words that are written differently than the way they are vocalized - specifically, "kranot" vs. "kranat" (meaning, corners or corner). With comparable examples from tefillin and sukkah.

A new mishnah! If one slaughters an offering with intent to leave part of it for the next day - whether blood or parts of the animal - or to remove them from the Temple, the offering is subject to a dispute whether it is valid or not. There's no verse to disqualify this case, for example. Plus, when two verses appear to teach the same thing - in terms of not leaving the offering overnight. Also, one who slaughters an offering with intent that people who are ritually impure would eat from it - that offering is invalid, especially because this intent kicks in before the blood is even sprinkled for the offering. Which leads to the question of pigul vs. other invalidating concerns, such as the given person's impurity.

A new mishnah! One who has intent to handle the food of an offering to be eaten at the wrong time or wrong location - or parts of the animal that are not customarily eaten - with a measurement of a kezayit, an olive's worth. But note that less than an olive's worth of something eaten does not combine with less than an olive's worth that is burned in the wrong place or the wrong way. Plus, many other cases, including a fetus or eggs in a female animal at the time of slaughter. The Gemara on the mishnah begins with a statement from the amora R. Elazar, which is unusual. Also, further discussion of intent in such a way that the result is pigul - and pigul itself carries a karet punishment.

More on the debates between Resh Lakish and R. Yochanan: One who has eaten meat from the sacrifices before the blood has been sprinkled... Resh Lakish says this person deserves lashes; R. Yochanan says no. But if the meat itself had become impure, everyone agrees that the one who eats it would be rendered impure - quite different from the individual becoming impure. Also, what happens if the person who is impure who received the blood also conveys it? To what extent and when is the remnants of blood sufficient to render the practice fit? And what about the pouring of the blood? A baraita clarifies. With specific exclusions of remnants from the neck of an animal. With some gory details.

More on Ulla's opinion (based on Resh Lakish) that partial entry is akin to a complete entry - when it comes to an impure person and the Temple. In the context of "semihah" - laying hands on the animal - needing to be done in the same place as the slaughtering of the animal, usually without interruption (though of course our case is an exception). Note the distance between the gate of Nikanor and its relevance for the person with tzara'at. And note the effort involved for this laying on off hands - beyond just reaching out one's hand and touching the animal. Also, the impure person who handles the sacrificial, consecrated food - will he get lashes or not? (that's the ongoing machloket between Resh Lakish and R. Yochanan)

A new chapter (3)! With a new mishnah. Which continues the topics of chapter 2. If those who are disqualified from doing the Temple service do the slaughter of the offering, the offering is still valid. That is, assuming their intentions are correct, and so on, throughout their practice. What if collecting/receiving the blood is done by someone who is qualified, but hands it off to the disqualified person? What if blood spills to the floor? What if the blood was conveyed to the wrong place? The key element to making sure that the worship is valid is the capacity to revisit it and fix what has gone wrong - as long as there is "dam ha-nefesh." Also, the case of a ritually impure person who places his hand into the courtyard of the Temple - even though he hasn't entered fully - may require lashes (it's a machloket). In the case of the person who has had tzara'at and isn't yet purified, there may be leniency. Of course, the Gemara counters with examples why the leniency would not apply (until the Gemara specifies this impurity as being different).

What happens if the olive's measure of the offering was eaten in combination by 2 people? Is the concern that an olive's measure is eaten, or that the given person ate the olive measure? Or what if the olive's measure was eaten over a long, slower period of time than the usual "half a loaf of bread" time frame? Plus, even if the olive's measure was divided or slow, etc., it would not invalidate the offering - because those same actions don't combine.

More on improper intent for time and improper intent for place - pigul is the issue with time, and one can get karet for it, while improper intent for place is not considered pigul, and karet isn't at stake, though the offering would be invalid. The issues kick in first and foremost if there were two different "avodot" - offerings - and the intents were then confused. Plus, several different approaches. Also, a question of what is really meant by an olive's worth (the measure of ke-zayit), in terms of timing and placement, that perhaps can be answered by the sages in Babylonia. Plus, complicating negative intent removes the offering from the concerns of pigul - or can do so.

NOTE: Current events on the day of today's daf were uplifting and moving and miraculous and poignant (and sad) in many way - today is the day that the 20 living remaining hostages held captive by Hamas were freed. We speak about it briefly in tomorrow's episode, which we recorded on this day, but in the same vein, it bears mention now too. May God provide healing and comfort for those who need either or both most especially, and also for the entire nation. If any of the meat of the korban shelamim (the peace-offering) were to be eaten on the 3rd day, it would be a problem - and if the intent was to eat it then, it would likely be a matter of pigul. Perhaps the timing can be considered in comparison to the day or time passing of the zav or zavah. Also, a very long mishnah - on the particulars of timing and placement and intent, along with the blood having been offered correctly.

A new mishnah! (on the bottom of the previous daf). When there's intent to sprinkle from the blood outside the Temple, or to burn the sacrifical parts of the offering outside the Temple, or to eat from it outside of the Temple, or an olive measure of the skin of the tail - any of these actions would invalidate the offering, but without incurring the punishment of karet. Likewise, with intent for any of those above acts for "the next day," instead of on time - not only would the offering be invalidated (pigul, because of the improper intent), but the person would also incur karet. With a brief deep dive into the tail of the animal, and what is relevant here. But where are these details from? Two verses in the Torah address improper intent, one about place and one about time. Note that one verse is really about pigul and the other about notar - the leftover past the time issue.

3 interpretations of the most recent mishnah: Shmuel maintains that the atonement kicks in when the blood is appropriately on the altar. Resh Lakish, however, says that if the offering is invalidated, the atonement doesn't work, but there is still room for Shmuel's understanding about atonement. A third understanding is R. Yohanan, which is that there's no atonement. Note that the Gemara does relate the views to each other. Also, a shift to focus on the burnt-offering, and Rabbi Shimon's understanding of the details of what invalidates such an offering - with a comparison between the mishandling or error in transferring or placing the blood vs. an issue with the suitability of the animal itself (for example, and this is the Gemara's first example of a problematic animal, the animal used in bestiality).

What happens if the animal to be slaughtered is partly outside of where it needs to be for the slaughtering in the courtyard - Shmuel's father answers Shmuel. Ideally, no. And then the Gemara brings other cases - what the animal were suspended in the air? Shmuel says it's fine, and his father notes that it has to be in the courtyard, and suspension in the air doesn't fulfill that requirement. What if the slaughterer was suspended in the air? Also, a new mishnah - with a list of what is NOT acceptable to do, rather than what is, in terms of where the blood needed to be placed.

A new mishnah! If the blood from the animal spills on the floor instead of being collected, and only then it's collected, that offering is invalid. The Gemara delves into the verses that teach what is necessary - in terms of what needs to be accepted. Plus, positioning in slaughtering the animal, such that no blood should fall. Also, a dilemma: if the bowl used for collecting the blood drops out before the blood reaches the air space of the bowl, is that valid or not? The answer may be a parallel to a barrel used to collect water from a pipe that may later be used for purification (or not - does the lack of fitness for purification answer the bottomless bowl question, or not?).

The kohen needs to stand on the floor when he's doing the Temple service. When is a stone on the floor part of the floor, and when is it on top of the floor, and how is that counted with regard to the kohen's need to be standing on the floor? What are the implications of a loose stone, as a matter of the Temple's decorum? Also, a deep dive into the given that the kohanim must do the service with their right hands, and when the Torah says, "finger," it also means the right hand.

The Torah teaches that Aaron will bear the sin committed with the sacred items - but what is that sin?? We know about the concern of pigul, so what is added here? Might it be an issue of purity and impurity? Also, another disqualification from the mishnah - namely, a kohen who does his part of the service while sitting instead of standing. Plus, the principle of no two verses deriving the same law, specifically common law, as derived for other cases.

Liquid that can complete the volume of 40 se'ah of water needed for a mikveh also would work to fill the basin in the Temple. The question then is which substances meet this definition of the liquids that can indeed complete the water of a mikveh or the kiyor. Plus, a discussion of the insects that "develop from water" - and the quesiton of science in the Talmud. Also, with regard to impurity that invalidates the kohen for the service, must it come from a dead body? What about a creepy-crawlie? (or reverse the cases, for that matter) Plus, the distinction between those who bring about atonement as compared to those who achieve atonement.

What if the kohen dunks his hands and feet into the basin instead of running the water from the basin over his hands and feet? Does that work? The Gemara delves into the source verses for this practice and suggests that the water must come "from" the basin - though perhaps "in it" works as well. Also, a 3-way debate if the water in the basin remains overnight - is it valid for purification and consecration?

Halakhot brought from the land of Israel to the scholars of Babylonia - Rav Dimi quoting R. Yochanan, on the dilemma raised by Ilfa: If water is left overnight, will that work to sanctify hands and feet? Which themselves can stay sanctified overnight. Also, the question of whether leaving the Temple courtyard would require re-washing and sanctifying the kohen's hands and feet. Can the hands and feet be sanctified outside of the Temple? What about if one needs the bathroom?

On the garments of the kohen - and how he can bandage a finger with a reed, for example, while he is serving in the Temple, but not if he weren't part of the worship at that time. Plus, a full bandage being a concern of being another garment, and being a problem of adding to the required garments. Size being relevant as well. Also, the kohen gadol who purifies for the service of Yom Kippur, including washing his hands and feet, and also considering the clothing changes - missing an immersion doesn't necessarily invalidate his service. With clear details of how the kohen must position himself - which is interesting, given that it's not quite intuitive.

A kohen who isn't wearing all of the priestly garments cannot do the service. And he has to wear them well - but if they are too long or too short or too worn out, that would still be acceptable. But not if we doubled up or left off one of them (4 garments for a regular kohen, 8 for the kohen gadol). What about a bandage (we'll see tomorrow that it depends). Or dirty. All of those factors would invalidate the service. Also, the fabric of the garments have very specific criteria as well - in terms of it being fine linen and the way the threads are made.

The mishnah identified the person handling the offering with the status of a "tevul yom" -- one who is waiting until nightfall for the purity effected by immersing in the mikveh earlier in the day to kick in -- as one whose offering would not be valid. So the search for the source for this conclusion is undertaken by the Gemara - including a comparison to shaving the head and/or points of the face. Also, a sampling of the establishment of norms for those who might bring such a korban - in this case, a zav or one akin to a zav, with an unhealthy seminal emission (one who is a mehusar kippurim) - with a connection to the red heifer.

Chapter 2 - with 2 new forms of disqualification: the wrong person or a person with the wrong status bringing the offering -- or bringing it at the wrong time. The mishnah lists the many people who would invalidate the offering just by virtue of who they are or what their status is. And then the Gemara looks to source each of the people who would have invalidated the offering, with an effort to find the precise ones. Plus, the example of the "onen," the acute mourner, if he is the kohen gadol, whose service would invalidate the offering. As sourced in the story of Nadav and Avihu, and Aaron's refraining from offering sacrifices immediately after their shocking deaths.

More on whether the conveyance of the blood from the place of slaughter to the altar needs to be via walking. Plus, how to handle a bird, whose slaughtering is already at the altar, without collection and conveyance of the blood. The discussion, when reported in the land of Israel generated laughter, which is eventually explained. What about a non-kohen doing the conveying? With all kinds of possible permutations.

Where is the sin-offering slaughtered? And what happens if the offering is slaughtered elsewhere? [What's What: The footprint of the Temple, and which areas are where.] And how does the incorrect intent in the wrong place have impact on the validity of the offering? Plus, the question of whether conveying the blood from one part of the Temple to another needs intent (and whether it needs walking to be valid). Also, can a non-kohen do this aspect of the service? What aspects of this process is the formal "avodah," and what parts are just maintenance, as it were?

A new mishnah! If a Korban Pesach and a sin-offering were slaughtered, but not for their own sakes correctly, then they won't be fit for those specific purposes. And this need for correct intent applies to all 4 acts of worship with regard to the blood - correct slaughter, collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar. But whether conveying the blood is truly part of this worship is opened for discussion. Also, a discussion of pigul - namely, the meat of an offering outside of its specific time of offering. Including a discussion of a kohen who dips a finger in the blood and whether that has impact on the validity of the korban and also on the question of pigul. Part of the issue is that most laws of these offerings are derived from the peace-offering, shelamim, but pigul has different halakhot for the sin-offering.

More on the timing of the slaughtering of the Korban Pesach - whether it needs to be done in the afternoon of the 14th of Nisan or whether the morning of the 14th works too. Also, a newborn animal and how it can't be offered and also can't be given as a tithe. Plus, the case of one who does wrong (eating forbidden fat), designates his sin-offering, becomes a heretic (so his designation is negated and the offering is disqualified), and then comes back to faith -- is the offering reinstated? What about someone who loses his cognitive abilities (at the same point where the first one became a heretic), and then he was healed - is the offering reinstated? Both cases are necessary, as the Gemara explains. What if the court rules that the fat isn't actually forbidden? And then retracts the ruling that it was permitted - is that offering disqualified or no? Plus, the time that all the sages agreed.

More on the parallels and comparsions between various offerings, and the way intent for the particular offering does (or does not) invalidate a meal-offering. Including whether the blood of the given (animal) offering can be present in the Holy of Holies. Also, a new mishnah! Is a Korban Pesach that is slaughtered in the morning of the 14th of Nisan considered slaughtered at the wrong time? Plus, the new wrinkle of whether the offering is eaten, as compared to the korban olah, which is not. And returning to the question of early on the 14th of Nisan counts as the correct time for the Pesach sacrifice.

A beraita quoting a dispute between between R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua. A comparison between the sin-offering and the guilt-offering, distinguishing between them in several ways, including details about the way blood was applied to the altar, above and below a red line on the altar. With other details being similar to uphold the comparisons.

Can one switch a Korban Pesach to be a different offering? Or any offerings to be other offerings? How similar or dissimilar would the two different offerings need to be? To establish the various boundaries for the offerings, as they emerge from comparison to the Korban Pesach. [Who's Who: Mavog] [Who's Who: Rav Mesharshiyah] To establish that there are different kinds of sin-offerings, with real practical differences among them.

The Gemara uses the Torah's verses to prove which offerings need to be offered specifically in the name of its purpose and for the owner. With a distinction between sin-offerings that are offered in atonement and apology for violating a karet-level sin, as compared to the nazir's sin-offering. Which sacrifices can be learned from other sacrifices, or specifically not? Also, the Korban Pesach, and how its timing is essential, but so too is it essential that it be offered for its specific purpose.

Now, the peace-offerings that are brought on occasions of thanksgiving - what if one were slaughtered in the name of a different person's thanksgiving? Is the fact that it's still a thanksgiving offering sufficient for it to be fit as an offering, or must another be offered? Also, other offerings that have to be made in the name of the specific sacrifice (like the Korban Pesach, which has to be a Shelamim/peace-offering).

More questions on sacrifices that were brought with incorrect intent. Do these incorrect sacrifices that are kosher as sacrifices function to atone for those who bring them? The in-depth discussion begins on amud alef and continues through amud bet. Note that a korban olah atones for a lack of fulfillment of a positive commandment -- what happens if a person needs to atone for two such violations? Including a parallel to the laying on of hands (semiha) for the offering, though in the end, it is set aside.

A sacrifice brought for a different reason than the original intent is a kosher/valid sacrifice, but it doesn't remove the obligation for whatever sacrifice from the individual who needs to bring it. Plus, Resh Lakish and his penchant for lying on his stomach in the beit midrash (study hall), presumably as an example of his very simple living. He is named here because of his queries on the above principle regarding a sacrifice brought for the wrong intention. Meaning, if the offering is valid, why wouldn't it provide atonement for the person offering it? Rabbi Eliezer has an answer, based on a parallel to an offering that was designated by a given individual, but not brought before that person died. With a parallel to the woman who bears a child (with the open question regarding her potential dealth in the interim, given the maternal death rate at the time). Also, other sages weigh in on the same divided opinions - with precedent of a comparable situation, and making suppositions about how Resh Lakish would have responded to a query. Plus, more on the apparently comparable case of a mother's children and whehther they can effect the atonement ...

[Apologies for this late release. Unfortunately, we are beholden to the app we use for publication of each episode, and we were delayed, apparently, by the app updating, or not updating, as the case was. We hope it will be in good form now for a long time to come.]What is the biblical source that the 4 different "blood" acts of worship - slaughter, receiving the blood in a consecrated vessel, bringing the blood to the altar, and throwing the blood on the altar - need to be done specifically for the sake of the specific offering being brought and also for the correct owner of that offering? Also, once those sources are established, a review of how the laws were actually derived from them - with principles of generalizations and specifics being applied.

If an offering is brought in the name of a different purpose from its originally intended purpose, it may or may not be fit as an offering. With comparisons to other arenas of Halakhah, specifically with regard to containers and the laws of purity and impurity. Also, an in-depth consideration of "change" - what happens when the owner of the offering is the change, and not the purpose of the offering itself? Why can't the offering be transferred to another?

An introduction to Seder Kodashim... with its focus on Temple ritual and the distance of those practices from how we practice Judaism today (and, for that matter, from how the sages did too). Including overviews for the kinds of korbanot (sacrifies), where they're offered, and the wide range of occasions when sacrifices are made. Also, a new mishnah! Namely, how korbanot can be offered not for the reason they were being brought - and they are still "kosher," fit as offerings, but with some exceptions. Plus, a comparison to bills of divorce written "in the name of" the woman being divorced. Where Rava raises a theory, a contradiction, and a resolution.

Where not attributing a sage's opinions to him by name is a punishment - specifically, here, in the case of Rabbi Meir, in follow-up to the previous daf's story of a kind of mutiny. Also, a debate over which kind of scholar is preferable - one who is incisive and sharply analytic or one who knows large swathes of information? Plus, the honor that Rav Yosef and Rabbah showed to each other. Also, another round of the sages, next generation - the honor given to Abaye for teaching material that none refuted.

Still and again, new mishnayot! 1 - An order of hierarchy when one has limited resources, where sometimes the man takes precedence and sometimes the woman does. Including a much too close for comfort recognition of this need, potentially, in the case of captives. Likewise, a man chooses to save himself, his teacher, his father - to save them in that order, though his mother would take precedence over all -- again, a bit disturbing, but in terms of irreplaceablity, perhaps reasonable. Plus, more stages, given various statuses. Also, there are 10 things that are harmful to one learning Torah, some of whcih sound distracting or destructive under other circumstances as well. Also, when the nasi (or king), the av beit din, or a Torah scholar enters the study hall, directives to the students when to stand and when it mattered less. Which leads to drama about who is worthy of being stood up for, especially when not everyone has the same degree of Torah scholarship as everyone else. Note the rudeness and kindness for Rabbi Shimon about Tractate Uktzin.

On the anointing of kings... and the anointed kohen - how was the anointing done? A crown and a letter X (in Greek, however). Also, good omens, including when/where to schedule the coronation of a king - in this case, specifically, King Solomon. Including discussion of the idea of using omens to begin with - is this akin to the prohibited divination or simply symbolic wishes or prayers? Plus, the special foods that are symbolic for the new year - eaten on Rosh Hashanah. Also, more on the way the anointed kohen would function, and then including the kohen anointed in battle (not to be confused with the regular kohen gadol in the Beit HaMikdash in peacetime). Plus, another 2 new mishnayot! On how the kohen offers the karbanot when he's in mourning, without eating from them, and followed by the common practice taking precedence -- where both the halakhic principle and the example of it are included in the mishnah.

The sages derive halakhah from a brief phrase in a verse from Leviticus - on an "am ha-aretz," a commoner, or more specifically from a halakhic sense, a person who is not careful regarding certain aspects of Jewish law - and when he would bring a sin-offering to atone. This status excludes a "meshumad," an apostate, who can't atone with a sin-offering for a general intent to act against Torah. Though even the apostate can be selective in when he wants to observe Torah and when he is intent on breaking the given halakhah - for example, one who is willing to eat forbidden fat, but not willing to eat blood. Plus, an apostate vs. a heretic, where the first follows his desire, while the second is antagonistic to Torah. Also, a new mishnah! More on the anointed kohen - namely, one who was made kohen gadol with the anointing oil, and not what happened later, in the Second Temple period, where the kohen gadol was inaugurated by wearing the 8 garments of the kohen gadol, as there was no anointing oil then. Note the differences (or lack thereof) between the kohanim in the different eras. Plus, the anointing of a king, and the anointing in the future...

Chapter 3 - with a new mishnah! (on the bottom of the previous daf) - the anointed kohen who sins unwittingly because of his own erroneous ruling, and then he leaves that standing of anointed kohen before he has brought his atonement offering -- that is, he steps down because of some blemish unrelated to the erroneous ruling... What animal does he bring if he is no longer the anointed kohen? (In fact, there's no change at this time). Note the attention to the structure of the mishnah. And another new mishnah! On the order of stature of the anointed kohen or the king and a sin and sin-offering (is the sin before they achieve the status, for example?). Also, a shift to focus on the king (nasi) and his offering. Plus, a story of Rabban Gamliel traveling with Rabbi Yehoshua, who had brought flour, and using the stars for navigation. Also, a discussion of "asher" and "ashrei," which have dramatically different meanings. With more in the moral/ethical plane - focusing on the intent of the person who sins, but might have intended to fulfill a mitzvah (to wit, see the story of Lot and his daughters).

More on Rabbi Yossi HaGelili's opinion and the king's exemptions from having to bring atonement offerings. Note the privilege and, alternatively, the limitations of having wealth, as a king must. Also, a new mishnah! When various people violate mitzvot unwittingly that would get a "karet" sentence if done with intent, then they each bring specific animals as offerings. And here too, an unusual opinion, this time, Rabbi Shimon.

More on the anointed kohen, in comparison with the court - specifically, the bringing of a sin-offering for a violation that would receive "karet" if done intentionally and entails a sin-offering when done unwittingly. Plus, the significance of these details being biblical in origin, and therefore prompt a hunt for the source text, as compared to a halakhic dispute. Also, a new mishnah: When the court would not be required to bring the offering. Note that the "aseh" and "lo ta'aseh" come together - which likely would have benefited from more specific articulation in the episode. The cases of ritual impurity or contamination in the Temple come front and center - and are contrasted with the same kind of erroneous judgement having a different outcome with regard to the offering if it were about a menstruant woman, as compared to the consecretated foods in the Temple. Thus, limitations on the requirement to bring an offering in the event of an erroneous ruling. Also, another new mishnah! With additional limitations, specifically on the kinds of cases for which the court might have issued an erroneous ruling and then not necessarily been obligated to bring an offering in atonement. For example: false testimony. Plus, what is the liability of a king in these kinds of capacities? (Hint: It's a machloket)

A new chapter! With several mishnayot. 1 - (from the previous daf) - If/when the anointed kohen who makes an erroneous ruling, which he then does unwittingly - he needs to bring a sin-offering in atonement. He is considered akin to the court, as it were, with regard to himself, as the court is, with regard to the public. Note the kohen's authority to determine halakhah as well. 2 - On the court's involvement (or lack thereof) in the kohen's offering, in that they really can't provide the means for his atonement. 3 - If the erroneous ruling pertains to idolatry - with a parallel to a ruling to uproat an area of the Torah - and the contingincy of being unaware of the matter altogether.

When people returned to the land of Israel from Babylonia after that exile, they brought an offering on behalf of the people from the era of Tzedkiyahu. But all of that generation and long died! Normally, a designated sin-offering that isn't offered before the person offering it dies is left alone to get a blemish. But for a public offering, that doesn't work. But an inference can be made from the he-goat of Rosh Chodesh, in terms of it being a communal offering. But maybe the cases aren't comparable, say, if nobody died before the offering was made? Maybe eglah arufah is a good comparison? Some of the returning members of the community were actually still alive at this time - survivors from the time of the First Temple, which was certainly a sad time for them, but they were able to offer the sin-offering. Were they the minority or the majority? Also, the case where one of the public dies - when all the people must bring the offering. Now what? And so a search for parallet categories begins.

A new mishnah! (beginning on 4b) - Who actually brings the offering to atone for the erroneous ruling? What about when the sin is per tribe? Or if the majority of people in less than a majority of tribes?