Podcasts about Rabbi Akiva

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

A new mishnah! Taking a false oath about the past, or an oath about the future, which is not upheld, which turns it into a false oath, about tangible or intangible matters, means a sliding scale offering. Likewise, if it pertains to other people. Plus, the stringencies of oaths (shevuot) vs. vows (nedarim), with regard to each other. Also, if a person swears about another party - falsely - either that person needs to bring the sacrifice or not - a large debate. Oaths also seem to pertain to matters that are either good or bad - and a textual inference is necessary to present them as not necessarily being harmful or beneficial. Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael, and Rav vs. Shmuel -- which is not the same dispute, though we might have thought they were. Plus, the formulation with regard to oaths to make them oaths.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Rabbi Jacobson will discuss the following topics:What is the connection between this Omer period, Lag B'Omer and the weekly Torah portion? Revealing the hidden and deeper good even in negative experiences What is the central theme of this week's Torah chapter? Is Judaism rigid or flexible? Static or dynamic? What personal and global lessons does it offer us for our times? Why are some blessings so great that they have to be hidden within curses?   Is it appropriate to get an aliya when they read the tochacho? Why did the Mitteler Rebbe not learn from the Alter Rebbe's previous readings that the curses are actually blessings? Can we say that the only reason we are still in golus is due to the pleasure Hashem gets from our effort to overcome the darkness and the challenges it presents? What is the difference between Lag B'Omer and Yud Tes Kislev? Should Israel be relying on America for protection? What can we learn from Rashbi's criticizing the Roman government? Why does Lag B'omer, the Mattan Torah of the Inner Torah, precede Shavuos? Is the Zohar the source of Chassidus? Why did Rabbi Akiva's students stop dying? Why are we allowed to sing during the days of Sefirah? What is the difference between sefiros and partzufim? What is the personal application of Yesod?  Is this week a good time to receive blessings to conceive healthy children?Can you share a few stories about his relationship with the Rebbe? 

In this powerful episode, we explore one of the most well-known — and puzzling — stories from the time of the Omer: the tragic death of Rabbi Akiva's 24,000 students. Why did such a spiritually elite group meet such a harsh end? And more importantly, what message is this story trying to send us across the centuries?Join us as we uncover the deeper meaning behind the Talmudic statement that they “did not show proper respect for one another” — and how this applies not just to how we treat others, but also how we view ourselves.Whether you're in the middle of counting the Omer or just looking to grow in character and connection, this episode will leave you with practical insight into the Jewish approach to honor, humility, and healthy relationships.

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

The Lag BaOmer Perspective: Fire From Within Lag BaOmer begins in darkness—the plague that claimed Rabbi Akiva's students and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai's years in hiding—but ends in brilliance. We light bonfires not merely for celebration, but to honor the inner blaze that emerges when faith refuses to dim. Rabbi Akiva's humility sparked a fire that could break stone, and Rabbi Shimon's unwavering commitment transformed exile into revelation. This episode explores how true light is forged in silence and struggle, and how each of us can carry that flame into the world. In honor of Eretz Yisroel. May G-d protect our brave soldiers and return all the hostages in Gaza immediately. Dedicated in loving memory of Edward Ben Efraim, Shlomo Ben Edward, and Yirachmiel Daniel Ben Gedalia. For the Refuah Shlema of Pennina Bas Shoshanna Miriam and all who need healing. Listen now at ParshaPerspective.com

Les 12000 couples de Rabbi Akiva by Rav David Touitou

We hope you enjoy this shiur. If you would like to sponsor or dedicate any of our shiurim or help with the running costs please do not hesitate to get in contact with us at office@rabbiroodyn.com or WhatsApp +447791221449May Hashem heal the wounded, free the captives and lead our soldiers to a swift and painless victory.#jew #jewish #torah #torahfortoughtimes #rabbiroodyn #bringthemhome #rabbi #torahanytime #Judaism #Israel #shiur #responsetotragictimes #jewishunderstanding #omer #sefira #The48Ways #LagBomer

In the classic song of Bar Yochai there is a line which translates to "when Hashem thought to make Man, he envisioned you (Rebbi Shimon)"—what was it about Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai which made him worthy of such a compliment?

Rabbi Jacobson will discuss the following topics:What lessons can we learn from 13 Iyar, the 73rd yahrzeit of Reb Yisroel Aryeh Leib a”h  What does his name and life teach us? What did the Rebbe say after he stood up from shiva for his brother in 1952? How do we deal with setbacks and difficulties? How do we personalize this day? Is there a connection between the 13 and 14th of Iyar? Why do we celebrate on the day Rashbi passed away? What is the connection between Rashbi and joy? What do we learn from Rashbi and Lag B'omer? What impact does the inner dimension of Torah have on our lives? What is the significance of counting the Omer? How do we apply to our lives the fact that the Omer counting begins after the barley offering? What different meanings are there in the word sefira? Why do we refine our emotions during these days? Why not focus on cognitive emotions? After counting the Omer why do we recite psalm 67 about the conductor of songs? Why do we not make a blessing after we missed one day of counting? Do we get a special reward for counting all 49 days? Why do we not schedule weddings and listen to music during the days of the Omer? Why does Chabad (and others) resume the customs of mourning after Lag B'Omer? How is it possible that Rabbi Akiva's students did not show respect to each other? Why did Rabbi Akiva not stop their behavior? What lessons can we learn from this in dealing with conflicts today?Why is there a custom to study the tractate of Sotah during these days? What is the meaning of “l'hazhir ha'gdolim al ha'ktanim”? What relevance does the service of the priests have to most of us who are not kohanim? Why can a Kohen with physical deformities not serve in the temple?

A fascinating discussion as we dive into the remarkable journey of Rabbi Akiva—one of the most influential sages in Jewish history. From humble beginnings as an uneducated shepherd to becoming a towering Torah scholar with 24,000 students, Rabbi Akiva's life is full of powerful lessons about perseverance, faith, love, and leadership. We explore key moments in his story, including his late start in learning, his deep partnership with his wife Rachel, and his unwavering belief in the future of the Jewish people—even in times of national tragedy.

The biblical command to love others might be more about social contracts than warm fuzzy feelings. What if "love your neighbor" wasn't just a moral cliché, but a radical political theory? In this week's Madlik episode, we explore how the biblical concept of love in Judaism goes far beyond sentiment, representing a powerful social contract that shapes how we build just societies. Challenging Conventional Wisdom Many associate "love your neighbor as yourself" with Christian teachings, unaware of its origins in Leviticus. This episode aims to reclaim this foundational concept, examining it through the original texts and a Jewish lens and uncovering its profound implications for social and political philosophy. Key Insights: • Context is crucial: The commandment appears alongside practical economic and ethical guidelines, suggesting a broader application beyond personal relationships. • Love as action: The Hebrew phrasing implies loving what's good for your neighbor, focusing on welfare and justice rather than emotion alone. • A tool for ethical decision-making: The Bible creates a thought experiment that by considering what we'd want for ourselves, we gain a framework for fair treatment of others. • The gift of giving: Some interpretations link "love" (ahava) to the concept of giving (hav), emphasizing generosity as a core expression of love. Rethinking Love as a Social Contract Geoffrey Stern challenges us to view "love your neighbor" not just as an individual ethical guideline, but as a foundational principle for structuring society. This perspective aligns fascinatingly with the work of political philosopher John Rawls. Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance": • Imagine creating a society without knowing your place in it (rich/poor, talented/average, religious, secular etc.) • This thought experiment forces us to consider fairness for all, not just the majority • It echoes the biblical command to love your neighbor "as yourself" – putting yourself in another's position "What if 'love your neighbor' is the measuring stick we need to use when creating a just society?" - Geoffrey Stern Practical Implications: • Rethinking social safety nets: If you didn't know whether you'd be born advantaged or disadvantaged, what protections would you want in place? • Balancing opportunity and security: How do we create a system that rewards initiative while ensuring basic dignity for all? What if “neighbor” refers less to someone of the same religion, tribe or ethnicity and more for someone who one wishes to form a social contract with? • Defining community: Who counts as our "neighbor" in an increasingly interconnected world? Challenges to Consider Emotional agency: Can love truly be commanded? While we can't control feelings, we can cultivate loving actions and mindsets. Balancing self and other: How do we interpret "as yourself" without neglecting self-care or enabling codependency? Applying ancient wisdom: How do we translate these principles into modern policy and social structures? What We Learned About Love and Justice This exploration of "love your neighbor" reveals it's far more than a simple ethical maxim. It's a powerful tool for ethical reasoning, a guide for building just societies, and a challenge to constantly expand our circle of moral consideration. The next time you encounter this familiar phrase, consider: • How would your decisions change if you couldn't determine where you stood in your social system? • What would our communities look like if we used this principle as a foundation for policy-making? • How can you actively practice this form of love in your daily interactions and civic engagement? By reframing "love your neighbor" as a radical social contract, we unlock its potential to transform not just individual hearts, but entire societies. This episode of Madlik invites us to see love not as mere sentiment, but as a powerful force for justice and human flourishing. Timestamps [00:00] — The Radical Reframe: Is “Love Your Neighbor” Really About Politics? [01:45] — How Leviticus 19 Contextualizes Love With Justice and Economics [04:02] — Ethical Laws in Detail: Gleaning, Wages, and Honesty [06:25] — Love vs. Hate: The Torah's Practical Definitions [10:13] — Rabbi Akiva's Declaration: Why This Verse is a “Great Principle” [12:01] — How Medieval Commentaries Interpret “Love” Through Justice [17:15] — Emotional Agency and the Commandment to Love [20:17] — Christianity's Take: How the New Testament Riffs on Leviticus [24:55] — Giving as an Act of Love: Rabbi Riskin on the Root of Aha'vah [28:02] — John Rawls and Torah: Justice, Fairness, and the Veil of Ignorance Links & Learnings Sign up for free and get more from our weekly newsletter https://madlik.com/ Safaria Source Sheet: https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/645145 Transcript on episode web page: https://madlik.com/?p=5948

This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “Nanny” Mauskopf, Basha Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meyer Yehuda. "A very special mother. By example she taught me how to be a mother and grandmother. We miss her dearly. May her Neshama have an Aliyah." The Mishna in Negaim is similar to the Mishna in Shevuot regarding the two shades of white that are considered leprous in the Torah and the two that the Rabbis added, and elaborates a little more. The Gemara explains that the Mishna there doesn't match Rabbi Akiva's opinion as the Mishna connects between avot, main categories and toladot, sub-categories and Rabbi Akiva connects between the order of the shades of white, which would mean one main category, baheret, then the next main category, se’et, and then each of their sub-categories – first the one for baheret, then the one for se’et. From where do we know that this is Rabbi Akiva's position? The first attempt to find the source is unsuccessful but it is proven from a second source.  From where do we derive that baheret also has sub-categories if the word in the verse mentioning sub-categories, sapachat, is said in connection with se'et?  From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? 

This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “Nanny” Mauskopf, Basha Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meyer Yehuda. "A very special mother. By example she taught me how to be a mother and grandmother. We miss her dearly. May her Neshama have an Aliyah." The Mishna in Negaim is similar to the Mishna in Shevuot regarding the two shades of white that are considered leprous in the Torah and the two that the Rabbis added, and elaborates a little more. The Gemara explains that the Mishna there doesn't match Rabbi Akiva's opinion as the Mishna connects between avot, main categories and toladot, sub-categories and Rabbi Akiva connects between the order of the shades of white, which would mean one main category, baheret, then the next main category, se’et, and then each of their sub-categories – first the one for baheret, then the one for se’et. From where do we know that this is Rabbi Akiva's position? The first attempt to find the source is unsuccessful but it is proven from a second source.  From where do we derive that baheret also has sub-categories if the word in the verse mentioning sub-categories, sapachat, is said in connection with se'et?  From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in honor of her husband, Daniel Altman, on his fourth completion of the Daf Yomi cycle. "May he continue teaching the Daf and inspiring people to learn the Daf for decades to come, in good health." When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi wrote in the Mishna "Shevuot there are two that are four," was it his own opinion also or was he just quoting Rabbi Akiva's opinion but he actually doesn't hold that way? At first, they tried to prove it was Rebbi's own opinion, but this option failed and they adopted the other explanation. Rebbi holds that "v'neelam" means he knew and then forgot - does that word necessarily translate in that manner? By a woman who is a sotah, that word is mentioned and it doesn't mean that.   The Mishna states "Taking things out on Shabbat there are two that are four" - this is different from the Mishna in Shabbat which lists two that are four inside and two that are four outside. What are the mishnayot in each place referring to and why are they referring to different things?  The Mishna states "Leprous marks two that are four" - does the Mishna not accord with Rabbi Akiva's position? 

A relationship can be based upon many different things but if you want it to endure there is one thing which reigns supreme.

More on whose opinion is represented in the mishnah - Rabbi Yishmael vs. Rabbi Akiva, and why each would be the opinion represented. Plus, the underlying discussion about the lashes that would be applied to the person who has violated the halakhah in question in the mishnah.

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in honor of her husband, Daniel Altman, on his fourth completion of the Daf Yomi cycle. "May he continue teaching the Daf and inspiring people to learn the Daf for decades to come, in good health." When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi wrote in the Mishna "Shevuot there are two that are four," was it his own opinion also or was he just quoting Rabbi Akiva's opinion but he actually doesn't hold that way? At first, they tried to prove it was Rebbi's own opinion, but this option failed and they adopted the other explanation. Rebbi holds that "v'neelam" means he knew and then forgot - does that word necessarily translate in that manner? By a woman who is a sotah, that word is mentioned and it doesn't mean that.   The Mishna states "Taking things out on Shabbat there are two that are four" - this is different from the Mishna in Shabbat which lists two that are four inside and two that are four outside. What are the mishnayot in each place referring to and why are they referring to different things?  The Mishna states "Leprous marks two that are four" - does the Mishna not accord with Rabbi Akiva's position? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

The Gemara's introduction to Shevuot seems far afield - in its sidestepping to tzara'at blemishes and Shabbat details. So it explains the connection to lashes in the previous tractate. Plus, the sacrificial offerings that are brought on a sliding scale - dependent on one's economic status. Plus, the period of lapsed awareness of one's status as impure (for example). Also, whose opinion is represented in the mishnah? The Gemara first explains that it is not in line with the opinions of either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. Until it comes back around to Rabbi Yishmael.

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

Today's Talmud page, Makkot 24, brings our tractate to a close. Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin joins us to sum up what we've learned, and explain Judaism's wonderful attitude to punishment and reward. Why did Rabbi Akiva laugh when he saw Jerusalem destroyed? Listen and find out.

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here While there are 613 mitzvot in the Torah, King David and some of the prophets narrowed it down to a smaller list of the most basic mitzvot. Why were these specific ones chosen, most of them relating to justice and righteousness and involving relations between people? The masechet ends with the famous story of Rabbi Akiva laughing when seeing a fox running out of the kodesh kodashim or hearing the Romans on their way to attack, after the Temple was already destroyed, while his friends were crying. When questioned about his reaction, he explains, based on verses, that in order for the positive prophecy of Zecharia to be fulfilled, first the negative prophesy of Uriah needs to be fulfilled.  

Why Lashon Hara is one of the only "aveiros" which cause a negative physical response.

More on the 613 mitzvot - and ways of encapsulating the most essential mitzvot into many fewer. Plus, the way one prophet follows the next, supplanting the message of the previous one (in concern and petition to God, not competition). Also, two stories of how the sages mourned the prominence and hegemony of Rome having taken over the holy places -- most of the sages weep, but Rabbi Akiva laughs. For all that desecration, even foxes in the ruins of the Temple, fulfills the prophecy of Uriah, which affirms for him that Zechariah's prophecy of redemption and a rebuilt Jerusalem will also come to pass.

Rabbi Akiva laughed

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here While there are 613 mitzvot in the Torah, King David and some of the prophets narrowed it down to a smaller list of the most basic mitzvot. Why were these specific ones chosen, most of them relating to justice and righteousness and involving relations between people? The masechet ends with the famous story of Rabbi Akiva laughing when seeing a fox running out of the kodesh kodashim or hearing the Romans on their way to attack, after the Temple was already destroyed, while his friends were crying. When questioned about his reaction, he explains, based on verses, that in order for the positive prophecy of Zecharia to be fulfilled, first the negative prophesy of Uriah needs to be fulfilled.  

The talmidim of Rabbi Akiva seem to have really loved one another, so why was it such a big deal that they didnt respect each other?

In his fourth and final teaching, Rabbi Akiva shares a powerful and serious parable that is designed to shake us up and take life seriously but also contains the undertones of a very inspirational and comforting message. This Ethics Podcast was originally released on the Ethics Podcast on Jun 16, 2019 – – – – […]

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

In an astonishingly profound teaching, Rabbi Akiva informs us of the special role that humans have in completing the objective of the Almighty's creation; and the amplified role that our nation has in effectuating that; and the tools that we were given to achieve that goal. This Ethics Podcast was originally released on the Ethics […]

A new mishnah! Bikkurim - first fruits - and other special offerings where one who eats incorrectly and gets lashes. NOTE CLARIFICATION TO THE AUDIO: The issue of lashes upon eating the Bikkurim is specifically in the case that a kohen ate the offerings before the person who brought them recited the verses (two separate people (which wasn't clear, in listening to the recording). Plus other prohibited foods - like a korban Pesach, if it were left over night. Plus, the case of the mother bird and one who didn't send her away. Also, a discussion about whose opinion is represented in the mishnah -- Rabbi Akiva or Rabbi Shimon? With a deep dive into Rabbi Shimon's approach (via a very long baraita). Specifically with regard to eating specific foods outside of Jerusalem (what happens with Maaser Sheni, and the limitations on who can eat from it, for example).

Shemini talks about the different Kosher and Unkosher animals. Rabbi Akiva pointed out the wonders of creation, that there are creatures that have so much power in one domain, yet would die very quickly if they switch environments. Some lessons we can learn from this in our own lives.Have a wonderful Shabbos

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

Rabbi Akiva is one of the titanic figures of the Mishnaic Era. He served as the vital link transmitting the Torah that he studied from his predecessors to his students amid ceaseless oppression under the Romans. In the first of three consecutive Mishnas authored by Rabbi Akiva, we learn the keys to avoiding catastrophic promiscuity, […]

Presentation in PDF format Study Guide Makkot 14 The debate between Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yitzchak is discussed regarding whether or not one gets lashes for sins that one gets karet or death by the court. After bringing a third explanation for RAbbi Akiva's position, the Gemara brings the source for Rabbi Yitzchak's opinion. What do Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva derive from that verse? This question leads to a long back and forth discussion about what they each derive from various verses. The Mishna taught that one gets lashes for eating sacrificial items, kodashim,  when they are impure. Where can the warning for this be found? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different opinions. There is a back and forth discussion regarding their sources.

The end of chapter 2, and the beginning of chapter 3. First, a killer who goes into exile must be upfront about why he's in exile. And in the event of people wanting to honor him, he would need to protest just the once. But not more. The chapter closes with a dispute. Also, the beginning of chapter 3, with its first mishnah -- namely, for when people get lashes. Plus: who and why the Givonim? Note: The Gemara explains the view that says - for every violation of karet, one also gets lashes, but not everyone agrees with that! So the Gemara presents the 3 opinions on this topic, only one of which is represented in the mishnah - specifically, that of Rabbi Akiva.

Reviewing the opinions of Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yitzchak on lashes and more severe punishments from the previous daf, with some focus on Rabbi Yitzchak's opinion. Plus, Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that one who committed all of the illicit sexual relationships in one period of forgetting or lack of awareness would need to bring a sin-offering for each relationship. But the only way one could violate the prohibition against sleeping with one's sister, who is also one's father's sister, and one's mother's sister - that takes a wicked person who is the son of a wicked person, in terms of violating and violating again, for such relationships to be possible in one person (and then raising the question whether that's one sin-offering or three). [Who's Who: Rabbi Yitzchak] Also, what happens when a person is ritually impure and needs to bring that sacrifice? And what if an impure person did eat from the offering (eg - Shelamim) while impure? To be punished, one still needs a warning from the biblical text.

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Perhaps the greatest Jewish scholar of all time was Rabbi Akiva. The Talmud tells us the Moses was in awe of the brilliance of Rabbi Akiva.Rabbi Akiva, who lived in the 2nd Century CE is also perhaps the most fascinating Jewish leader. A simple illiterate shepherd, he married, Rachel the daughter of the wealthiest man in Israel. At forty he went to school for the first time but quickly became Israel's greatest scholar. His life is full of twists and turns until it end under Roman torture.