Podcasts about rabbi shimon

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

On today's pages, Menachot 19 and 20, the Gemara explores the legal weight of a single conjunction, asking how the word "and" can transform the requirements of a Temple sacrifice. Through the divergent readings of Rabbi Shimon and the Sages, we see that the difference between a valid offering and a disqualified one often hangs on the placement of a comma or the reach of a pronoun. How can learning to read between the lines of an ancient law help us find more clarity in the complex narratives of our own lives? Listen and find out.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza, implying that only the three middle fingers are used for kemitza. To resolve this Rava explains that all five fingers are used but not all for the scooping. The kohen extends his three middle fingers over his palm to gather the dough, while simultaneously using his thumb and pinky to level the scoop by wiping away any excess flour protruding from the edges. This ensures the volume is exactly the capacity of his palm. This is one of the most difficult actions to be performed in the Temple, among them melika and chafina. Rav Papa questions whether non-traditional methods - such as scooping with the fingertips facing down, or in other atypical ways, are valid, ultimately leaving these queries unresolved. He also questions different methods of chafina of the incense that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur. Rav Papa and Mar bar Rav Ashi question atypical ways of placing the kometz in the sanctified vessel. All these questions are left unresolved. If there is too much oil or too little added to the mincha offering it is disqualified. There is a discussion about how much is too much and in what cases does it disqualify. Regarding the frankincense (levona), there is a dispute regarding the minimum amount required for the offering to remain valid. Rabbi Meir holds that a full handful must be present, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon allow for a reduction to two granules or even a single granule, respectively. There is a debate about whether these three opinions are only relevant in frankincense brought as a supplement to a meal offering or also when the frankincense is brought as its own offering. The validity of the meal offering is also tied to the kohen's mental intent (machshava). If the kohen intends, while taking the kometz (parallel to the act of slaughtering an animal) to eat the remains or burn the handful of the meal offering or the frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified but does not carry the penalty of karet. However, if he intends to consume or burn the offering outside its designated timeframe (the following day), the offering becomes pigul. This status not only invalidates the sacrifice but also makes anyone who eats it liable for the punishment of karet.

When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza, implying that only the three middle fingers are used for kemitza. To resolve this Rava explains that all five fingers are used but not all for the scooping. The kohen extends his three middle fingers over his palm to gather the dough, while simultaneously using his thumb and pinky to level the scoop by wiping away any excess flour protruding from the edges. This ensures the volume is exactly the capacity of his palm. This is one of the most difficult actions to be performed in the Temple, among them melika and chafina. Rav Papa questions whether non-traditional methods - such as scooping with the fingertips facing down, or in other atypical ways, are valid, ultimately leaving these queries unresolved. He also questions different methods of chafina of the incense that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur. Rav Papa and Mar bar Rav Ashi question atypical ways of placing the kometz in the sanctified vessel. All these questions are left unresolved. If there is too much oil or too little added to the mincha offering it is disqualified. There is a discussion about how much is too much and in what cases does it disqualify. Regarding the frankincense (levona), there is a dispute regarding the minimum amount required for the offering to remain valid. Rabbi Meir holds that a full handful must be present, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon allow for a reduction to two granules or even a single granule, respectively. There is a debate about whether these three opinions are only relevant in frankincense brought as a supplement to a meal offering or also when the frankincense is brought as its own offering. The validity of the meal offering is also tied to the kohen's mental intent (machshava). If the kohen intends, while taking the kometz (parallel to the act of slaughtering an animal) to eat the remains or burn the handful of the meal offering or the frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified but does not carry the penalty of karet. However, if he intends to consume or burn the offering outside its designated timeframe (the following day), the offering becomes pigul. This status not only invalidates the sacrifice but also makes anyone who eats it liable for the punishment of karet.

Study Guide The section of the Torah concerning the metzora (leper) details two distinct tracks for sacrifices: one for the wealthy, who bring three animal offerings, and a modified track for the poor. The purification process involves pouring oil into the kohen's left hand, followed by sprinkling it toward the parochet and placing it on the leper's right ear, thumb, and toe. Notably, the text contains several seemingly superfluous phrases in the wealthy leper's section, as well as extensive repetitions in the poor leper's section that could have been simplified with a cross-reference like "as mentioned above." Rabbi Zeira and Rava offer different explanations for these repetitions. Both scholars derive that the kemitza of the mincha (meal offering) must be performed with the right hand, but they reach this conclusion via different paths. Rabbi Zeira learns it from the fourfold mention of the word "left" in the leper section. In contrast, Rava utilizes a gezeira shava based on the word "right" used in the context of placing oil on the leper's ear, thumb, and toe, applying that requirement to the kemitza. Reish Lakish teaches a broader principle: whenever the Torah uses the words "finger" (etzba) or "kohen" the service must be performed with the right hand. While the Gemara initially assumes both words must appear together to trigger this requirement, Rava clarifies that either word alone is sufficient. However, following a challenge from Abaye, Rava distinguishes between two scenarios: in cases where the action is essential for atonement, either word indicates the right hand; in cases where the action is not essential for atonement, both words must be present to mandate the right hand. A difficulty is raised against Rava's explanation based on the position of Rabbi Shimon. To resolve this, the Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon requires both words in all instances. Two subsequent challenges to this theory and one is resolved by further refining Rabbi Shimon's position: the appearance of the word "finger" alone necessitates the right hand, but the word "kohen" does not, unless it appears in conjunction with "finger." If Rava holds that "finger" or "kohen" already serves as an indicator for using the right hand, why did he originally use a gezeira shava to learn this regarding kemitza? The Gemara explains that he requires two separate derivations - one for the act of kemitza itself and another for placing the kometz into a sanctified vessel. This theory is again questioned in light of Rabbi Shimon's view that the kometz does not require a vessel at all. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes the gezeira shava (for Rabbi Shimon) is necessary for the sinner's meal offering; otherwise, one might have thought it could be performed with the left hand, as, according to Rabbi Shimon himself, this specific offering is not intended to be mehudar (ornate or distinguished).

When the Torah uses the term "finger" or the term "kohen," it is understood to always mean the right hand. The bias against the left-hand is already understood, but note that the Torah specifies the right-hand on occasion. But there are other occasions when the left-hand was explicitly called for (also as per the Torah) - to the extent that Rabbi Shimon allowed left-handed acceptance of the blood. Going back to the verses, "finger" AND "kohen" is necessary in his estimation. And the mishnah seems not to have included this machloket.

Study Guide The section of the Torah concerning the metzora (leper) details two distinct tracks for sacrifices: one for the wealthy, who bring three animal offerings, and a modified track for the poor. The purification process involves pouring oil into the kohen's left hand, followed by sprinkling it toward the parochet and placing it on the leper's right ear, thumb, and toe. Notably, the text contains several seemingly superfluous phrases in the wealthy leper's section, as well as extensive repetitions in the poor leper's section that could have been simplified with a cross-reference like "as mentioned above." Rabbi Zeira and Rava offer different explanations for these repetitions. Both scholars derive that the kemitza of the mincha (meal offering) must be performed with the right hand, but they reach this conclusion via different paths. Rabbi Zeira learns it from the fourfold mention of the word "left" in the leper section. In contrast, Rava utilizes a gezeira shava based on the word "right" used in the context of placing oil on the leper's ear, thumb, and toe, applying that requirement to the kemitza. Reish Lakish teaches a broader principle: whenever the Torah uses the words "finger" (etzba) or "kohen" the service must be performed with the right hand. While the Gemara initially assumes both words must appear together to trigger this requirement, Rava clarifies that either word alone is sufficient. However, following a challenge from Abaye, Rava distinguishes between two scenarios: in cases where the action is essential for atonement, either word indicates the right hand; in cases where the action is not essential for atonement, both words must be present to mandate the right hand. A difficulty is raised against Rava's explanation based on the position of Rabbi Shimon. To resolve this, the Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon requires both words in all instances. Two subsequent challenges to this theory and one is resolved by further refining Rabbi Shimon's position: the appearance of the word "finger" alone necessitates the right hand, but the word "kohen" does not, unless it appears in conjunction with "finger." If Rava holds that "finger" or "kohen" already serves as an indicator for using the right hand, why did he originally use a gezeira shava to learn this regarding kemitza? The Gemara explains that he requires two separate derivations - one for the act of kemitza itself and another for placing the kometz into a sanctified vessel. This theory is again questioned in light of Rabbi Shimon's view that the kometz does not require a vessel at all. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes the gezeira shava (for Rabbi Shimon) is necessary for the sinner's meal offering; otherwise, one might have thought it could be performed with the left hand, as, according to Rabbi Shimon himself, this specific offering is not intended to be mehudar (ornate or distinguished).

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

Study Guide There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon's words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba's position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner's obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner's obligation in those scenarios as well. Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of "its actions prove its intent" (ma'asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava's final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.

Study Guide There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon's words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba's position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner's obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner's obligation in those scenarios as well. Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of "its actions prove its intent" (ma'asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava's final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.

Study Guide If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling - one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon - in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi's resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna. After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba's explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.

Study Guide If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling - one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon - in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi's resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna. After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba's explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

What offerings were made in the wilderness, after leaving Egypt? In Gilgal? What verses spurred Rabbi Shimon's opinion to say only some few sacrifices were made at Gilgal? The Pesach offering was made, of course. Note that the Children of Israel left Egypt without having been circumcised for years and years - until they then did circumcise themselves, with implications for their religious lives, including their offerings. Also, the 3 places the Divine Presence rested on the land of Israel: Shilo, Nov & Givon, and the Temple in Jerusalem. Plus, the fact that all of these places seem to have been in Binyamin's portion of the land of Israel. But what about Yehudah? And even Yosef? Also, the chronology of where the Mishkan was when, from the verses themselves.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

In this profound Mussar Masterclass (Day 114) on the Gate of Silence in Orchos Tzaddikim, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores why silence is praised as the greatest trait—even for fools—citing Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel ("nothing better than silence") and King Solomon ("even a fool appears wise when silent"). Silence protects from sin (insults, slander, flattery, falsehood), fosters listening, and prevents regret, as "words can kill from afar while a sword harms only nearby."Examples include Aaron's silence after his sons' death (earning divine favor), responding to insults with quiet (forgiving all sins), and avoiding synagogue chatter to focus on prayer. Rabbi Wolbe contrasts harmful speech (mockery, gossip, online cruelty) with beneficial silence that reveals secrets and earns trust. He urges minimizing words—speaking half what we hear—while using speech wisely to uplift, teach Torah, and praise good deeds.The episode concludes the Gate with a call to cultivate silence as a "universal remedy" for spiritual growth, humility, and avoiding transgression.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 4, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #KingSolomon, #Words ★ Support this podcast ★

In this profound Mussar Masterclass (Day 114) on the Gate of Silence in Orchos Tzaddikim, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores why silence is praised as the greatest trait—even for fools—citing Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel ("nothing better than silence") and King Solomon ("even a fool appears wise when silent"). Silence protects from sin (insults, slander, flattery, falsehood), fosters listening, and prevents regret, as "words can kill from afar while a sword harms only nearby."Examples include Aaron's silence after his sons' death (earning divine favor), responding to insults with quiet (forgiving all sins), and avoiding synagogue chatter to focus on prayer. Rabbi Wolbe contrasts harmful speech (mockery, gossip, online cruelty) with beneficial silence that reveals secrets and earns trust. He urges minimizing words—speaking half what we hear—while using speech wisely to uplift, teach Torah, and praise good deeds.The episode concludes the Gate with a call to cultivate silence as a "universal remedy" for spiritual growth, humility, and avoiding transgression.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 4, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #KingSolomon, #Words ★ Support this podcast ★

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

In this Mussar Masterclass (Day 113) on the Gate of Silence in Orchos Tzaddikim, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores the profound power of speech through Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel's declaration: "All my life I grew up among sages and found nothing better for oneself than silence." King Solomon adds that even a fool appears wise when silent, and one regrets speech far more than silence.The episode contrasts four (or five) categories of speech: forbidden (mockery, flattery, falsehood, slander—each excluding one from the World to Come by opposing Hashem's essence of oneness, truth, purpose, and sustenance); unnecessary/idle chatter (most worldly talk); and beloved/permissible speech (Torah study, praising good deeds, condemning evil to guide others, and essential livelihood matters). A clever servant's tongue dish (soft vs. hard) illustrates how words can uplift or devastate.Rabbi Wolbe warns against modern pitfalls like social media's anonymous cruelty and sensationalism, urging mindful, positive speech that reflects inner holiness. Silence protects from sin, fosters listening, and allows deeper spiritual focus—ultimately elevating the soul.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 2, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #KingSolomon, #Words ★ Support this podcast ★

In this Mussar Masterclass (Day 113) on the Gate of Silence in Orchos Tzaddikim, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores the profound power of speech through Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel's declaration: "All my life I grew up among sages and found nothing better for oneself than silence." King Solomon adds that even a fool appears wise when silent, and one regrets speech far more than silence.The episode contrasts four (or five) categories of speech: forbidden (mockery, flattery, falsehood, slander—each excluding one from the World to Come by opposing Hashem's essence of oneness, truth, purpose, and sustenance); unnecessary/idle chatter (most worldly talk); and beloved/permissible speech (Torah study, praising good deeds, condemning evil to guide others, and essential livelihood matters). A clever servant's tongue dish (soft vs. hard) illustrates how words can uplift or devastate.Rabbi Wolbe warns against modern pitfalls like social media's anonymous cruelty and sensationalism, urging mindful, positive speech that reflects inner holiness. Silence protects from sin, fosters listening, and allows deeper spiritual focus—ultimately elevating the soul.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 2, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #KingSolomon, #Words ★ Support this podcast ★

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

In this Mussar Masterclass (Day 112), Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe opens the Gate of Silence (Shtika) in Orchos Tzaddikim, praising silence as the greatest trait discovered among sages. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel declares: “All my life I grew up among sages and found nothing better for the body than silence.” King Solomon adds that even a fool who remains silent is considered wise, and one regrets speech far more often than silence.Silence protects from sin—especially lashon hara (slander), insults, and harmful words—while allowing deeper listening and reflection. Rabbi Wolbe critiques modern culture's loss of restraint, especially on social media, where anonymity enables vicious speech people would never say face-to-face (cyberbullying, sensationalism, "if it bleeds, it leads"). He warns that habitual negative speech erodes decency even toward the righteous.The episode calls for cultivating silence not as muteness, but as mindful speech: uplifting others, avoiding gossip, and recognizing words' power to heal or destroy. True wisdom lies in knowing when to speak—and when to refrain.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 1, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #Ethics, #SocialMedia, #Caution ★ Support this podcast ★

In this Mussar Masterclass (Day 112), Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe opens the Gate of Silence (Shtika) in Orchos Tzaddikim, praising silence as the greatest trait discovered among sages. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel declares: “All my life I grew up among sages and found nothing better for the body than silence.” King Solomon adds that even a fool who remains silent is considered wise, and one regrets speech far more often than silence.Silence protects from sin—especially lashon hara (slander), insults, and harmful words—while allowing deeper listening and reflection. Rabbi Wolbe critiques modern culture's loss of restraint, especially on social media, where anonymity enables vicious speech people would never say face-to-face (cyberbullying, sensationalism, "if it bleeds, it leads"). He warns that habitual negative speech erodes decency even toward the righteous.The episode calls for cultivating silence not as muteness, but as mindful speech: uplifting others, avoiding gossip, and recognizing words' power to heal or destroy. True wisdom lies in knowing when to speak—and when to refrain.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on June 16, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on January 1, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #Speech, #Silence, #LashonHara, #Ethics, #SocialMedia, #Caution ★ Support this podcast ★

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Study Guide There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia's position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe served as the kohen gadol. The Gemara raises objections to his statement.

Study Guide Three additional resolutions, bringing the total to five, are proposed to reconcile the contradiction between the two baraitot, each of which presents a different view of Rabbi Shimon on whether an onen may eat the Pesach offering at night. A challenge is raised against the third resolution, evidence is presented in support of the fourth, and a statement of Rava bar Rav Huna is cited to bolster the fifth.

Rabbi Shimon's position of the acute mourner and the Pesach offering - and ways of resolving the apparent contradictions in his respective positions. Specifically, must the kohen become impure for the death of a close relative or does he have permission to do so? A clear dispute. But the need for a "met mitzvah" - perhaps that is not disputed, and the kohen must become impure for the sake of that need to bury. Also, a deeper dive into the view that says the acutely mourning kohen must partake of the Pesach offering.

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware. Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim, or only to kodshei kodashim. From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma. The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.