Podcasts about Shmuel

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other (toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

A new mishnah! Taking a false oath about the past, or an oath about the future, which is not upheld, which turns it into a false oath, about tangible or intangible matters, means a sliding scale offering. Likewise, if it pertains to other people. Plus, the stringencies of oaths (shevuot) vs. vows (nedarim), with regard to each other. Also, if a person swears about another party - falsely - either that person needs to bring the sacrifice or not - a large debate. Oaths also seem to pertain to matters that are either good or bad - and a textual inference is necessary to present them as not necessarily being harmful or beneficial. Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael, and Rav vs. Shmuel -- which is not the same dispute, though we might have thought they were. Plus, the formulation with regard to oaths to make them oaths.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

   In this episode we take a closer look at why Rashi understands that the key theme of Shoftim is developing the Mishkan. How do we reconcile this idea with the main narrative of the Sefer that talks about the problems of the times with Avoda Zara? We also discuss Chazal attributing authorship of the Sefer to Shmuel. How did they know this? What does this teach us about the Sefer?   Similarly, we look at the basic theme of Shmuel. Why do we call the Sefer called Shmuel and not Dovid? Isn't Dovid the protagonist for more of the Sefer than Shmuel? Similarly, why does the Sefer include the stories of Eli in Shmuel and not in Shoftim? And also why are the last stories of Dovid in Melachim? Nach Yomi: Join R' Wittenstein's Nach Yomi on WhatsApp. We learn a perek a day five days a week, with a nine minute shiur covering the key issues. Click here to join!  For tours, speaking engagements, or sponsorships contact us at jewishhistoryuncensored@gmail.com PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS