Podcasts about Shmuel

As we are wrapping up sefer Shmuel over the next 2 weeks we will get to see the last few stories that happen in Dovid's reign but also get to see his recap of certain events.For the original course page please visit⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ https://webyeshiva.org/course/king-davids-diaries/

In this episode of Out of Zion, Dr. Susan Michael and Rabbi Shmuel Bowman discuss how the relationship between Jews and Christians is transforming through life-saving partnerships and meaningful relationships.

Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin on the left hand. However, left-handed people wear them on the right. There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel yad on the upper part of the arm. There are two different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel rosh on the top of the head. There is a Tannatic debate between Rabbi Yishmael and the rabbis about whether each tzitzit is a distinct mitzva (Rabbi Yishmael), or if one cannot fulfill the mitzva without having tzitzit on all four corners. The Gemara brings three practical ramifications of their debate. There are three examples brought of changes one can make to a four-cornered garment which, while it may no longer look like a four-cornered garment, would still be obligated in tzitzit. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yishmael, but the Gemara states that the halakha is not like that and brings a story with Mar bar Rav Ashi and Ravina to prove it.

There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin on the left hand. However, left-handed people wear them on the right. There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel yad on the upper part of the arm. There are two different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel rosh on the top of the head. There is a Tannatic debate between Rabbi Yishmael and the rabbis about whether each tzitzit is a distinct mitzva (Rabbi Yishmael), or if one cannot fulfill the mitzva without having tzitzit on all four corners. The Gemara brings three practical ramifications of their debate. There are three examples brought of changes one can make to a four-cornered garment which, while it may no longer look like a four-cornered garment, would still be obligated in tzitzit. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yishmael, but the Gemara states that the halakha is not like that and brings a story with Mar bar Rav Ashi and Ravina to prove it.

Para 6Spotify Notes . Torah 30:3 (Paragraph Vav)Big idea: Hashem created the world so we can attain השגת אלקות (hasagas Elokus) and live in relationship with Him. But because He is אין סוף (Ein Sof) and we are בעלי גבול (ba'alei gvul), the gap seems unbridgeable. The answer is צמצומים (tzimtzumim). Not for concealment, and ultimately transmission and gilui. Malchus has two functions. It contains and defines, and it also enables expression. When Malchus is pure הִתְבַּטְלוּת (hisbatlus), לית לה מגרמה כלום (leis lah m'garmah klum), it reflects like the moon reflecting the sun. That is מלכות דקדושה (Malchus d'kedusha). When the vessel takes on “identity,” and perceived intependence the whole transmission becomes warped. That is Malchus in גלות (galus), and the same “pieces” that are potentially kedusha become reoriented as מלכות דסטרא אחרא (Malchus d'sitra achra). The sharp example is secular “wisdom” like science. It can be a כלי to reveal Hashem, but when it becomes a closed framework that claims independence from the Creator, the greatest potential for gilui becomes the greatest concealment.Arba Malchuyos and the rescue mission: How it gets repaired: Chesed cuts Malchus away from the ארבע מלכויות and returns it to its source. Avraham Avinu embodies this repair. He is סונא בצע (sonei betza). He rejects spoils. He pursues the ארבע מלכים and restores Malchus to kedusha. He is the עמוד האמונה (amud ha'emunah) because he can see unity inside the world's pieces. From Avraham flows the “four sons” framework, and a major teshuvah theme emerges. True teshuvah includes asking forgiveness even for what you do not know you did wrong. Otherwise teshuvah is still confined within your own דעת (daas) and your own box.Shalosh Regalim, simcha, and restoring Ohr Panim: The life-force of Malchus d'kedusha is אור הפנים (ohr hapanim), accessed through the שלוש רגלים (shalosh regalim) and שמחת המצוות (simchas hamitzvos). Amalek represents the center of purposelessness and ליצנות (leitzanus). Shmuel “cuts” Agag, symbolically slicing the כוח of the four distorted malchuyos and reattaching Malchus to kedusha. The regalim restore alignment, rebuild the vessel, and reopen the channel so sechel elyon can once again enter sechel tachton with integrity.

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Shiur dedicado à elevação das almas de Yossef ben Moshê Z´´L e Chaia Mushka Z´´L bat Harav Avraham Meir SheichiêA surpreendente história do Rei de Israel que recebeu 41 anos de sucesso, expansão territorial e paz — não por sua perfeição, mas por ter recusado ouvir Lashon Hará contra um profeta.

Rav Chelbo relates that he saw Rav Huna roll the mezuza from the word "echad" toward the word "shema" and format the paragraphs as setumot (closed). This practice is questioned by a braita where Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes that Rabbi Meir wrote mezuzot on duchsustos with margins at the top and bottom and formatted the paragraphs as petuchot (open). Rabbi Meir's reasoning was that the paragraphs are not adjacent in the Torah text itself. Since Rav (Rav Huna's teacher) rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that raises a difficulty on Rav Huna's practice. To resolve the difficulty, it is suggested that Rav only ruled like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding the margins. Abaye further supports this resolution by showing that Rav gives weight to local custom, and the established custom is to write them setumot. The Gemara brings an example to show that Rav gave weight to the established custom from a statement he made regarding use of a sandal for chalitzah, noting that even the testimony of the prophet Eliyahu would not overturn a practice the people have already adopted to use a sandal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty on Rav Huna. He explains Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's position as being that while it is a mitzva (ideal) to make them setumot, if they were written petuchot, it would be valid; he reads the words in the braita as "even petuchot." Support for Rav Nachman is brought from a braita stating that a worn-out Sefer Torah or tefillin cannot be repurposed into a mezuza because one does not "lower" an object from a higher level of sanctity to a lower one. From the reason given in the braita, one can infer that if it were not a matter of "lowering" in sanctity, it could be repurposed. This would prove that setumot could be used, as those sections are setumot in a Sefer Torah. However, this suggested proof is rejected. The Gemara raises two other difficulties on the inference that, but for the issue of "lowering" sanctity, a Sefer Torah or tefillin could be repurposed for a mezuza. The first is that tefillin are written on klaf on the side facing the flesh, while a mezuza is written on duchsustos on the side facing the hair. The second difficulty is that a mezuza requires lines (sirtut), while tefillin do not. Both difficulties are resolved. Rav Chelbo further observes that Rav Huna would not sit on a bed while a Sefer Torah was resting upon it, opting instead to place the Torah on an inverted vessel on the ground. However, Rabba bar bar Hana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, permits sitting on the same bed as a Torah. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel states that a mezuza written in a "letter" (iggeret) format is invalid, as it requires the formal writing style of a Sefer. He also rules that hanging a mezuza on a stick or placing it behind a door is invalid and even "dangerous," as it must be fixed "on your gates." Shmuel specifies that the mezuza must be placed within the hollow of the doorway.

Rav Chelbo relates that he saw Rav Huna roll the mezuza from the word "echad" toward the word "shema" and format the paragraphs as setumot (closed). This practice is questioned by a braita where Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes that Rabbi Meir wrote mezuzot on duchsustos with margins at the top and bottom and formatted the paragraphs as petuchot (open). Rabbi Meir's reasoning was that the paragraphs are not adjacent in the Torah text itself. Since Rav (Rav Huna's teacher) rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that raises a difficulty on Rav Huna's practice. To resolve the difficulty, it is suggested that Rav only ruled like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding the margins. Abaye further supports this resolution by showing that Rav gives weight to local custom, and the established custom is to write them setumot. The Gemara brings an example to show that Rav gave weight to the established custom from a statement he made regarding use of a sandal for chalitzah, noting that even the testimony of the prophet Eliyahu would not overturn a practice the people have already adopted to use a sandal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty on Rav Huna. He explains Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's position as being that while it is a mitzva (ideal) to make them setumot, if they were written petuchot, it would be valid; he reads the words in the braita as "even petuchot." Support for Rav Nachman is brought from a braita stating that a worn-out Sefer Torah or tefillin cannot be repurposed into a mezuza because one does not "lower" an object from a higher level of sanctity to a lower one. From the reason given in the braita, one can infer that if it were not a matter of "lowering" in sanctity, it could be repurposed. This would prove that setumot could be used, as those sections are setumot in a Sefer Torah. However, this suggested proof is rejected. The Gemara raises two other difficulties on the inference that, but for the issue of "lowering" sanctity, a Sefer Torah or tefillin could be repurposed for a mezuza. The first is that tefillin are written on klaf on the side facing the flesh, while a mezuza is written on duchsustos on the side facing the hair. The second difficulty is that a mezuza requires lines (sirtut), while tefillin do not. Both difficulties are resolved. Rav Chelbo further observes that Rav Huna would not sit on a bed while a Sefer Torah was resting upon it, opting instead to place the Torah on an inverted vessel on the ground. However, Rabba bar bar Hana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, permits sitting on the same bed as a Torah. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel states that a mezuza written in a "letter" (iggeret) format is invalid, as it requires the formal writing style of a Sefer. He also rules that hanging a mezuza on a stick or placing it behind a door is invalid and even "dangerous," as it must be fixed "on your gates." Shmuel specifies that the mezuza must be placed within the hollow of the doorway.

A guerra entre Amatsiá e Yoash mostra como uma vitória pode se transformar em queda quando o ego toma o lugar da fé. O Yêtser HaRá existe para ser vencido e revelar nossa verdadeira grandeza, mas segui-lo é chamado de loucura, pois leva o homem a perder a razão e a própria missão espiritual.

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

A história de Amatsiá revela que a verdadeira emuná começa quando seguimos a palavra de Hashem sem garantias de devolução.

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

A long mishnah - on the affect of pigul when it only affects part of the "permitter" - matirin - namely, by burning one part, the rest becomes permitted for consumption. Including a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the sages -- which leads to other areas of dispute between them. And further, a dispute between Rav and Shmuel about the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the sages. Also, the 43 (or 47 or 48) presentations of blood from the animal sacrifices of Yom Kippur. Also, a sesame seed and the smallest amount of potential pigul. Plus, a rejection of Rabbi Meir's views here.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

Rabbi Kaplan is the head Shliach of the Maryland Region, He has created and taught many courses on Tfilah as well as the Siddur Illuminated by Chassidus.Rabbi Kaplan will talked about the Chassidus behind our words of davening.

In this week's episode Rabbi Kohn discusses the legacy of his uncle Rabbi Shmuel Kohn who passed away suddenly this week. He makes a connection from the Parsha to the life that he lived and how we can gain from it. More specifically Rabbi Kohn goes over the famous essay from Nachmondies on this weeks Parsha which was origanally taught to him by his Uncle. Making a connection from he lessons of Nachmondies to who Rabbi Shmuel Kohn was as a person and how we can learn from him. Subscribe to The Practical Parsha Podcast. For questions or comments please email RabbiShlomoKohn@gmail.com. To listen to Rabbi Kohn's other podcast use this link- the-pirkei-avos-podcast.castos.com/   If you would like to support this podcast please use this secure link to donate: SUPPORT THE PODCAST  Chapters (00:00:00) - Practical Parsha Podcast(00:00:45) - A Personal Moment in the Weekly Parasha(00:03:45) - Parshas Bo(00:06:02) - The Mitzvah of the Karbon Pesach(00:11:44) - The Ramban(00:18:53) - The Law of God's Sustaining the World(00:20:34) - The Hidden Miracles of Our Lives

Glenn

#428> Divrei Sholom V'Emes: The Maskilic Manifesto And The Controversy (with Prof. Shmuel Feiner)> Episode sponsored by Paul Shaviv. For anyone involved in schools -Principals, Administrators, Presidents, Board members etc - Paul Shaviv's now-classic book on Jewish school management is indispensable!  Based on decades of experience in several major communities, and in schools across the Jewish spectrum - all you need to know!   ‘The Jewish High School:  A Complete Management Guide': https://amzn.to/49BkQyD> To purchase the new edition of Divrei Sholom V'Emes (ships from Israel): https://www.bialik-publishing.co.il/Words-of-Peace-and-Truth> To purchase the old edition (all 4 parts in one): https://amzn.to/49BkgkrSupport the show

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

Can you really build a profitable real estate portfolio in a place like Santa Cruz, California? Matt Mainini has done exactly that—and in this episode of The Property Profits Podcast, he shares how. From house hacking and seller financing to short-term rentals and affordable housing, Matt breaks down the smart strategies that helped him thrive in one of the priciest markets in the country. He also talks about his latest project: converting a hotel into over 100 studio units, the majority of which are reserved for veterans. Get Interviewed on the Show! - ================================== Are you a real estate investor with some 'tales from the trenches' you'd like to share with our audience? Want to get great exposure and be seen as a bonafide real estate pro by your friends? Would you like to inspire other people to take action with real estate investing? Then we'd love to interview you! Find out more and pick the date here: http://daveinterviewsyou.com/ #RealEstateInvesting #CaliforniaRealEstate #ShortTermRentals #AffordableHousing #VeteranHousing #PropertyProfitsPodcast