Podcasts about Shmuel

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here. Siyum Masechet Shevuot is dedicated by Raquel & Joe Bijou in loving memory of our dearest Grandpa Richard Cohen. Naftali ben Yosef HaKohen. "You always cherished family and valued learning. By completing this masechet, we have accomplished both. We love and miss you deeply, and we hope to continue fulfilling many more mitzvot in your memory." If one watches an item belonging to another (shomer), there are different levels of responsibility, depending on whether the shomer was paid/not paid or one borrowed or rented an object. When a shomer takes a false oath regarding the item, if the lie either didn't change the level of responsibility or created an obligation instead of providing an exemption, then there is no liability since there were no financial repercussions from the lie. However, even though one is exempt from liability for an oath concerning a deposit, Rav rules that the person is still liable for an oath of expression. Shmuel disagrees. What is the basis of their debate?

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here. Siyum Masechet Shevuot is dedicated by Raquel & Joe Bijou in loving memory of our dearest Grandpa Richard Cohen. Naftali ben Yosef HaKohen. "You always cherished family and valued learning. By completing this masechet, we have accomplished both. We love and miss you deeply, and we hope to continue fulfilling many more mitzvot in your memory." If one watches an item belonging to another (shomer), there are different levels of responsibility, depending on whether the shomer was paid/not paid or one borrowed or rented an object. When a shomer takes a false oath regarding the item, if the lie either didn't change the level of responsibility or created an obligation instead of providing an exemption, then there is no liability since there were no financial repercussions from the lie. However, even though one is exempt from liability for an oath concerning a deposit, Rav rules that the person is still liable for an oath of expression. Shmuel disagrees. What is the basis of their debate?

Avodah Zarah Bookmark Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA in honor of the staff of Hadran who make learning possible. "Pirkei Avot 1:6 teaches us עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וּקְנֵה לְךָ חָבֵר, make for yourself a Rav, and acquire for yourself a companion. We are blessed to have Rabbanit Michelle Farber as our extraordinary teacher, and we- Leslie, Joe, David, Sue, Helen, Batya, Adam, Alana, and Bill- are blessed to have the companionship of our learning." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik & Prof. Adi Wyner in honor of the upcoming wedding of their daughter, Eva Wyner, who was just promoted to Director of Jewish Affairs for the State of NY in Governor Hochul’s Executive Chamber. And in honor of their future son-in-law, Reuven Rosen, who just graduated with honors from Rutgers’ MD/ Ph.D. program and who will be starting his medical residency at NYU. The Mishna says that all types of business dealings with idol worshippers are forbidden three days before their holidays. Rav and Shmuel discuss the spelling of the word used for holidays - "eidaihem" - is it with an aleph or ayin? From which verse in the Torah is the meaning of the term derived from, according to each opinion? One of the verses mentioned is the basis of a long aggada about the nations coming before God in the World-to-Come, looking to get rewarded. God reprimands them for never having kept the Torah. Various claims are made by the nations trying to justify why they didn't keep the Torah.

Shvuas hashomrin that your chayev and patur on choimesh and ashum and the machlokes rav and Shmuel by shvuas bitui

Avodah Zarah Bookmark Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA in honor of the staff of Hadran who make learning possible. "Pirkei Avot 1:6 teaches us עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וּקְנֵה לְךָ חָבֵר, make for yourself a Rav, and acquire for yourself a companion. We are blessed to have Rabbanit Michelle Farber as our extraordinary teacher, and we- Leslie, Joe, David, Sue, Helen, Batya, Adam, Alana, and Bill- are blessed to have the companionship of our learning." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik & Prof. Adi Wyner in honor of the upcoming wedding of their daughter, Eva Wyner, who was just promoted to Director of Jewish Affairs for the State of NY in Governor Hochul’s Executive Chamber. And in honor of their future son-in-law, Reuven Rosen, who just graduated with honors from Rutgers’ MD/ Ph.D. program and who will be starting his medical residency at NYU. The Mishna says that all types of business dealings with idol worshippers are forbidden three days before their holidays. Rav and Shmuel discuss the spelling of the word used for holidays - "eidaihem" - is it with an aleph or ayin? From which verse in the Torah is the meaning of the term derived from, according to each opinion? One of the verses mentioned is the basis of a long aggada about the nations coming before God in the World-to-Come, looking to get rewarded. God reprimands them for never having kept the Torah. Various claims are made by the nations trying to justify why they didn't keep the Torah.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

When both parties are untrustworthy and cannot take an oath, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Meir disagree about the proper procedure. A debate emerges about who holds which opinion, as one maintains the money should be split while the other argues that the oath returns to its original place, though it remains unclear which rabbi said which. Additionally, there is disagreement about the meaning of the position stating "the oath returns to its place." Rabbi Ami explains that one position is held by the rabbis in Israel while the other belongs to the rabbis in Babylonia. Rav Pappa clarifies that the Babylonian rabbis are Rav and Shmuel, while the Israeli position is represented by Rabbi Abba. Shimon ben Tarfon offers several statements concerning the importance of associating with the right people and avoiding the wrong ones. The Gemara examines the case of a storekeeper who was asked to pay someone's workers. The workers claim they never received payment while the storekeeper insists he paid them. The question arises whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed with the Mishna's opinion that each party can take an oath to get paid by the employer. Another issue concerns contradictory witness testimony. If two groups of witnesses contradict each other in court, can they be believed to testify in a different case? Or since we know one group certainly lied, should we reject both groups' testimony in future cases? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda each take different positions on this matter.

Chapter 15 depicts the (successful) procession of the Aron to Jerusalem. The account in Sefer Shmuel (Book of Samuel ch.6) is so passionate. Our chapter is so technical, filled as it is with names and roles of the Levitical families. Beyond Chronicles' seeming obsession with names, what drives our chapter differently to the narrative in Shmuel?

When both parties are untrustworthy and cannot take an oath, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Meir disagree about the proper procedure. A debate emerges about who holds which opinion, as one maintains the money should be split while the other argues that the oath returns to its original place, though it remains unclear which rabbi said which. Additionally, there is disagreement about the meaning of the position stating "the oath returns to its place." Rabbi Ami explains that one position is held by the rabbis in Israel while the other belongs to the rabbis in Babylonia. Rav Pappa clarifies that the Babylonian rabbis are Rav and Shmuel, while the Israeli position is represented by Rabbi Abba. Shimon ben Tarfon offers several statements concerning the importance of associating with the right people and avoiding the wrong ones. The Gemara examines the case of a storekeeper who was asked to pay someone's workers. The workers claim they never received payment while the storekeeper insists he paid them. The question arises whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed with the Mishna's opinion that each party can take an oath to get paid by the employer. Another issue concerns contradictory witness testimony. If two groups of witnesses contradict each other in court, can they be believed to testify in a different case? Or since we know one group certainly lied, should we reject both groups' testimony in future cases? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda each take different positions on this matter.

Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) on the occasion of the Bat Mitzvah of her granddaughter Tamar Chava Baumser. "She demonstrates that there are no boundaries to acts of gemulat chasidim." Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Chani Farber and Saar Har-Chen, on the occasion of their wedding. We wish you a new home that will be grounded in the happiness that is promised to one who brings their learning always, as we learned with Chani's mother, Rabbanit Michelle: אַשְׁרִי מִי שֶׁבָּא לְכָאן וְתַלְמוּדוּ בְּיָדו. If the person who is obligated to take an oath by Torah law is not trustworthy, i.e. if they lied in a previous case or are in the category of those who are exempt from testifying, the obligation to take the oath is placed upon the other person. If one asks a storekeeper to pay their workers and they will pay back the storekeeper later, and the storekeeper claims that he/she paid them and the workers claim they were never paid, each of them takes an oath and the person needs to pay them both. Ben Nanas agrees that the person needs to pay both, but does not allow each side to take an oath as it creates a situation where clearly one side is taking a false oath. The Mishna lists other cases where there is a disagreement between a storekeeper and a buyer about whether the money was already paid or the item was given to the buyer. Who takes the oath in each case? Generally, when one holds a deed in hand, they have the upper hand. However, the Mishna mentions cases where the one holding the deed needs to take an oath in order to collect the money. The Gemara explains why the worker is believed to say he/she didn't get paid for a job performed. However, this halacha is qualified as only applying in a case where the time in which the worker should have been paid hasn't passed yet - once that time passes, there is an assumption that the employer paid the worker. Shmuel and Rav both hold that the worker can take this oath to get paid only if there were witnesses who saw the worker being hired. If not, the employer can claim he/she never hired the worker at all and therefore is believed by saying the worker was already paid because of a "migo." Rava disagrees with this.

What happens to a loan on collateral if the collateral is lost? A discussion that leads into an application of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer to Shmuel's position - which seems counter-historical in terms of how the Gemara is put together. Also, does the shemitah year cancel the debt that is loaned on collateral? Perhaps that depends on whether it's symbolic or covering the loan.

Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) on the occasion of the Bat Mitzvah of her granddaughter Tamar Chava Baumser. "She demonstrates that there are no boundaries to acts of gemulat chasidim." Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Chani Farber and Saar Har-Chen, on the occasion of their wedding. We wish you a new home that will be grounded in the happiness that is promised to one who brings their learning always, as we learned with Chani's mother, Rabbanit Michelle: אַשְׁרִי מִי שֶׁבָּא לְכָאן וְתַלְמוּדוּ בְּיָדו. If the person who is obligated to take an oath by Torah law is not trustworthy, i.e. if they lied in a previous case or are in the category of those who are exempt from testifying, the obligation to take the oath is placed upon the other person. If one asks a storekeeper to pay their workers and they will pay back the storekeeper later, and the storekeeper claims that he/she paid them and the workers claim they were never paid, each of them takes an oath and the person needs to pay them both. Ben Nanas agrees that the person needs to pay both, but does not allow each side to take an oath as it creates a situation where clearly one side is taking a false oath. The Mishna lists other cases where there is a disagreement between a storekeeper and a buyer about whether the money was already paid or the item was given to the buyer. Who takes the oath in each case? Generally, when one holds a deed in hand, they have the upper hand. However, the Mishna mentions cases where the one holding the deed needs to take an oath in order to collect the money. The Gemara explains why the worker is believed to say he/she didn't get paid for a job performed. However, this halacha is qualified as only applying in a case where the time in which the worker should have been paid hasn't passed yet - once that time passes, there is an assumption that the employer paid the worker. Shmuel and Rav both hold that the worker can take this oath to get paid only if there were witnesses who saw the worker being hired. If not, the employer can claim he/she never hired the worker at all and therefore is believed by saying the worker was already paid because of a "migo." Rava disagrees with this.

rWotD Episode 2964: Shmuel Alexandrov Welcome to Random Wiki of the Day, your journey through Wikipedia's vast and varied content, one random article at a time.The random article for Sunday, 15 June 2025, is Shmuel Alexandrov.Rabbi Shmuel Alexandrov of Bobruisk (Hebrew: שמואל אלכסנדרוב; 1865–1941) was a prominent student of the Volozhin Yeshiva, who became close to the tradition of Chabad Hasidism. Alexandrov was a Jewish Orthodox mystical thinker, philosopher and anarchist, whose religious thought, an original blending of Kabbalah, Orthodox Judaism, contemporary philosophy and secular literature, are marked by universalism and some degree of antinomianism. His works include פך השמן ("the Oil Jug"), a commentary on Pirkey Avot, and a large collection of essays, מכתבי מחקר וביקורת ("Letters of Research and Investigation"). Alexandrov was influenced by the anarchistic implications of the work of Rav Kook (the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of the British Mandate for Palestine), from which he sought to derive practical instruction. Another influence on Alexandrov was Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. Alexandrov lived all his life in Bobruisk and was murdered in the Holocaust.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 01:03 UTC on Sunday, 15 June 2025.For the full current version of the article, see Shmuel Alexandrov on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm generative Stephen.

Today's daf is sponsored by Binyamin Cohen to wish Mazel tov to Caroline Musin Berkowitz on completing Shas! "We're inspired by your amazing accomplishment and dedication to learning." What categories of items are excluded from oaths of the shomrim? How is this derived from the Torah? What is the argument between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in the Mishna regarding items that are or are not considered like land (to be exempt from oaths)? Another criterion for oaths is that the claim must be for a measured item. Rava and Abaye disagree about how to understand this. The Mishna lists several cases regarding a disagreement between the creditor and debtor about the value of an item given as collateral that the creditor claims was lost. In which cases would one side, or perhaps both, need to take an oath? If one loans money with collateral and the item gets lost, what type of responsibility does the creditor assume for the item? What if the creditor and debtor disagree regarding the value of the lost item? Shmuel holds that the creditor no longer owes any money even if the item is worth significantly less than the loan. How does his opinion work with the Mishna?

Today's daf is sponsored by Binyamin Cohen to wish Mazel tov to Caroline Musin Berkowitz on completing Shas! "We're inspired by your amazing accomplishment and dedication to learning." What categories of items are excluded from oaths of the shomrim? How is this derived from the Torah? What is the argument between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in the Mishna regarding items that are or are not considered like land (to be exempt from oaths)? Another criterion for oaths is that the claim must be for a measured item. Rava and Abaye disagree about how to understand this. The Mishna lists several cases regarding a disagreement between the creditor and debtor about the value of an item given as collateral that the creditor claims was lost. In which cases would one side, or perhaps both, need to take an oath? If one loans money with collateral and the item gets lost, what type of responsibility does the creditor assume for the item? What if the creditor and debtor disagree regarding the value of the lost item? Shmuel holds that the creditor no longer owes any money even if the item is worth significantly less than the loan. How does his opinion work with the Mishna?

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould “in gratitude to HaShem for helping me to find a new partner to love and be loved by, and to walk with on a new journey.” The Gemara continues by presenting cases involving disputes between lenders and borrowers regarding debt repayment, along with the ruling given in each case. In the Mishna there is a contradiction because it is written that we do not administer oaths to a minor and it is also written that we administer oaths to a minor. Rav and Shmuel each interpret the case of administering oaths to a minor in different ways. Rav says it refers to a child who makes a claim for their deceased father's money, and therefore we administer an oath because the loan was to an adult, even though he is not the actual creditor who gave the money originally. According to his explanation, the Mishna matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because the Sages disagree in such a case and do not obligate. The Gemara brings two different explanations to understand what the point of dispute is between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Sages. Shmuel's explanation is that the Mishna refers to the oath of one who tries to collect his father's loan from an orphan. There is no oath for cases of land, slaves, documents, and consecrated property. Also, there are no laws of double, four and five payment, and oaths of guardians for these type of items. From where is this derived in the verses?

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould “in gratitude to HaShem for helping me to find a new partner to love and be loved by, and to walk with on a new journey.” The Gemara continues by presenting cases involving disputes between lenders and borrowers regarding debt repayment, along with the ruling given in each case. In the Mishna there is a contradiction because it is written that we do not administer oaths to a minor and it is also written that we administer oaths to a minor. Rav and Shmuel each interpret the case of administering oaths to a minor in different ways. Rav says it refers to a child who makes a claim for their deceased father's money, and therefore we administer an oath because the loan was to an adult, even though he is not the actual creditor who gave the money originally. According to his explanation, the Mishna matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because the Sages disagree in such a case and do not obligate. The Gemara brings two different explanations to understand what the point of dispute is between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Sages. Shmuel's explanation is that the Mishna refers to the oath of one who tries to collect his father's loan from an orphan. There is no oath for cases of land, slaves, documents, and consecrated property. Also, there are no laws of double, four and five payment, and oaths of guardians for these type of items. From where is this derived in the verses?

Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima for Shmuel Henoch Yaakov Ben Chiyena. Rav Nachman instituted a shevuat heiset, a rabbinic oath, for defendants who completely denied a claim. There is debate about the exact circumstances under which Rav Nachman required this oath. What distinguishes a Torah-mandated oath from a rabbinically instituted one (heiset)? The Gemara presents three possible differences. Under what circumstances can a creditor demand that a debtor repay money in front of witnesses, such that without witnesses, the debtor's claim of having already repaid becomes invalid? The Gemara quotes two different versions of Rav Asi's position, as well as two different versions of Shmuel's response to Rav Asi. Their opinions are then questioned and explained in light of our Mishna. The Gemara presents four actual cases involving disputes between creditors and debtors, explaining how each case was ruled. In some instances, Abaye and Rava disagreed about the proper ruling.

Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima for Shmuel Henoch Yaakov Ben Chiyena. Rav Nachman instituted a shevuat heiset, a rabbinic oath, for defendants who completely denied a claim. There is debate about the exact circumstances under which Rav Nachman required this oath. What distinguishes a Torah-mandated oath from a rabbinically instituted one (heiset)? The Gemara presents three possible differences. Under what circumstances can a creditor demand that a debtor repay money in front of witnesses, such that without witnesses, the debtor's claim of having already repaid becomes invalid? The Gemara quotes two different versions of Rav Asi's position, as well as two different versions of Shmuel's response to Rav Asi. Their opinions are then questioned and explained in light of our Mishna. The Gemara presents four actual cases involving disputes between creditors and debtors, explaining how each case was ruled. In some instances, Abaye and Rava disagreed about the proper ruling.

Chapter 1:11 A post-wedding conversation that connects Shmuel's thoughts on turning 62 with the words of the ancient sages and the images of water

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.  

Sourcesheet: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WJ7XoKkEkvWhPRXTwmuHGGyVQkRf2ei58zWBRARp7r8/edit?usp=drive_linkThe episode tackles the first (of five) essays of the great book by R. Yehudah Halevi known as the Kuzari. Building off of the previous episode outlining the book's framing and methodology, we see how this is applied to the primary question of Judaism: why the Jewish people? We take R. Yehudah Halevi's answer to this question seriously, while noting that it may not be representative of mainstream Jewish thought.For more sheets and other info check out ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://sites.google.com/view/rishonim⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Check out my Substack writing: ⁠Shmuel's Substack⁠⁠⁠Do you want to send me some suggestions? Criticism or corrections? Comments or questions? Contact me at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠therishonim@gmail.com⁠⁠⁠⁠

Workplace Conduct between Men & Women.As we enter the workforce where men and women work together, let's learn about the halachos of yichud and conduct in the office.Help make classes like this happen!https://cash.app/$livingchassidushttp://Paypal.me/livingchassidushttps://livingchassidus.org/donate/Zelle: 205-937-9914https://www.venmo.com/u/LivingChassidus

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.  

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Maggie Sandler's birthday! "Your incredible work elevates not just the content of our daily learning, but its entire atmosphere, as you create a beautiful, seamless experience for all of us. You truly bring to life the principle of hiddur mitzva that we learned in Masechet Shabbat: ״זֶה אֵלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ״, הִתְנָאֵה לְפָנָיו בְּמִצְוֹת" Before administering the oath to a defendant, the court delivers several cautionary statements about the severity of swearing falsely. These warnings are designed to deter the person from taking a false oath. A braita lists all these statements, and the Gemara both raises difficulties with them and clarifies their meaning and sources. The Gemara then turns to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding the minimum amounts required for a claim, denial, and admission. They disagree about the interpretation of the sentence: "The claim is two maah of silver and the admission is one pruta." Rav holds that for the oath to apply, the total claim must amount to two maah and a pruta—with the minimum denial being two maah and the minimum admission being one pruta. Shmuel, however, rules that both the minimum admission and the minimum denial need only be worth a pruta each, while the minimum total claim must be worth two maah. Rava explains that Rav's interpretation finds support in the Mishna, while Shmuel's position aligns with the biblical verses in the Torah.  

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Maggie Sandler's birthday! "Your incredible work elevates not just the content of our daily learning, but its entire atmosphere, as you create a beautiful, seamless experience for all of us. You truly bring to life the principle of hiddur mitzva that we learned in Masechet Shabbat: ״זֶה אֵלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ״, הִתְנָאֵה לְפָנָיו בְּמִצְוֹת" Before administering the oath to a defendant, the court delivers several cautionary statements about the severity of swearing falsely. These warnings are designed to deter the person from taking a false oath. A braita lists all these statements, and the Gemara both raises difficulties with them and clarifies their meaning and sources. The Gemara then turns to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding the minimum amounts required for a claim, denial, and admission. They disagree about the interpretation of the sentence: "The claim is two maah of silver and the admission is one pruta." Rav holds that for the oath to apply, the total claim must amount to two maah and a pruta—with the minimum denial being two maah and the minimum admission being one pruta. Shmuel, however, rules that both the minimum admission and the minimum denial need only be worth a pruta each, while the minimum total claim must be worth two maah. Rava explains that Rav's interpretation finds support in the Mishna, while Shmuel's position aligns with the biblical verses in the Torah.  

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other (toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other (toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

A new mishnah! Taking a false oath about the past, or an oath about the future, which is not upheld, which turns it into a false oath, about tangible or intangible matters, means a sliding scale offering. Likewise, if it pertains to other people. Plus, the stringencies of oaths (shevuot) vs. vows (nedarim), with regard to each other. Also, if a person swears about another party - falsely - either that person needs to bring the sacrifice or not - a large debate. Oaths also seem to pertain to matters that are either good or bad - and a textual inference is necessary to present them as not necessarily being harmful or beneficial. Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael, and Rav vs. Shmuel -- which is not the same dispute, though we might have thought they were. Plus, the formulation with regard to oaths to make them oaths.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

   In this episode we take a closer look at why Rashi understands that the key theme of Shoftim is developing the Mishkan. How do we reconcile this idea with the main narrative of the Sefer that talks about the problems of the times with Avoda Zara? We also discuss Chazal attributing authorship of the Sefer to Shmuel. How did they know this? What does this teach us about the Sefer?   Similarly, we look at the basic theme of Shmuel. Why do we call the Sefer called Shmuel and not Dovid? Isn't Dovid the protagonist for more of the Sefer than Shmuel? Similarly, why does the Sefer include the stories of Eli in Shmuel and not in Shoftim? And also why are the last stories of Dovid in Melachim? Nach Yomi: Join R' Wittenstein's Nach Yomi on WhatsApp. We learn a perek a day five days a week, with a nine minute shiur covering the key issues. Click here to join!  For tours, speaking engagements, or sponsorships contact us at jewishhistoryuncensored@gmail.com PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS