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More about Yentl (second discussion of the movie, Talmud and Naichmonides topics)Yevamot 63a&b: Link https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.63b.1?lang=biNaichmonides “Holy Letter”: https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/4013413/Marienberg-Holy-Letter-Pop-Culture-HEC2010-01-libre.pdf?1390835693=&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Holy_Letter_and_Pop_Culture_Represe.pdf&Expires=1742803951&Signature=E4WJVfhsNFP48CIzYQz6IsNoIc3RSZYWNJE2EGGe4zhXdVSHbl20Vu5ciYj95LmDrvT0aT3OqcJGbaaMtRAJL-EUUaSVrqosnWlKPZaBSKB4ItjxJSVTf7YcikjKOUXOwpLBflTb8OWqQ5m6zCHQzQS~tg-owbOIt30m7~lW1cLEJA8ji7mmtGHbLMALdLaPH2J9-1mu3zfQFNg27XQ1u81ko3zsv~8kSK0hwwSPOJQ9GN62HJMPfGjcGZtZ-BTA5AWbyOJzi5dohMTv4uC0UlU6DNzfeogIGBxuzIptrggVE6bkcbwhlOItnBccfs8mlrDXDQ~QWwEUFLyQf7Adgg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA
Relationship and relationship charts are the essence of most of this daf. What relationships disqualify relatives from testifying against or about a relative? Note that these are all men - as witnesses, though some of the relationships include in-law status via women. And note that these are not the same relationships as the prohibited marriage/yevamot relationships. Also, a "lid on a barrel" - the mechutanim (fathers of bride and groom) can testify against each other. But can a man testify against or about his betrothed? Is that too close of a relationship? But he wouldn't be in deep mourning for her if she died (nor she for him).
Welcome to our Perek Shira class. Today is the song of the Levyatan/Leviathan, which is a large whale-like creature. His song is הוֹדוּ לַיי כִּי טוֹב כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ: (תהילים קלו א) Praise Hashem. Thank Hashem because He is good, His kindness is forever. The sefer Lekutei Amarim quotes the Gemara in Bava Batra that tells us that all creatures were create male and female in order to procreate, including the Leviathan. But Hashem said, if they procreate and produce such large creatures….this could destroy the world (this is obviously not the present day whale, and it's something a slightly kabalistic concept), so Hashem killed the female and salted her for the sadikim to eat from in the future, as we know, from famous quote that when Mashiach comes we will sit in the Succah of the skin of the Levyatan (again these are kabalistic messages). So this Levyatan has been a widower for the past few thousand years, and he continues to live on, as it says in Tehilim 104, 26 לִ֝וְיָתָ֗ן זֶֽה־יָצַ֥רְתָּ לְשַֽׂחֶק־בּֽוֹ׃ The Levyatan You created to play with , whatever that means. God delights in the Levyatan. So this Levyatan has lasted now in this world for all these years, and as the Gemara in Yevamot tells us, Someone who doesn't have a wife doesn't have goodness. So this poor Levyatan widower has been all alone all these years, and it says, It's not good for man to be alone. And yet he is alone. And the answer is, he's here alone because it's better for the world's good. That's why he says הוֹדוּ לַיי כִּי טוֹב כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ: (תהילים קלו א) / I praise Hashem, I thank Hashem because He's good. The kindness is good for everybody else . I might not be understanding what's going on, but it's good for everybody else. And actually, for the Levyatan it's Tov that he's alone, because otherwise it would destroy the world. That's what means that God's kindness is forever. God created a world of kindness, not a world to be destroyed by these large Levyatans. The Levyatan is singing, so to say, for the world good, although he himself seems not to be benefiting from it. The sefer Birkat HaShir asks about the concept that Hashem plays with Levyatan (this is just for a lesson and not something that can be understood literally) and explains that since this Levyatan is a widower and is all alone, Hashem tries to make him happy. And as we are supposed to be like Hashem, there are many such stories of Gedolim. After the wedding of a certain Chasid who was a widower, at 2am, the Gadol asked his Gabbai to bring him to this man's house. The Gabbai asked, Why do you want to go there now? Why not go in the morning ? The Rabbi answered, " After a wedding, a person comes home and wants to discuss the wedding with his wife. This man is going to come home alone, with no one to discuss it with. So I'm going to go there and discuss it with him." This is the way of Hashem, Who is there causing this Levyatan to be delighted, whatever that means. He's alone and therefore he sings, Hodu l'Hashem Ki Tov, Ki LeOlam Hasdo As we mentioned, this concept of Hashem delighting with Levyatan is a kabbalistic concept. The Gemara in Avodah Zara describes what Hashem does every day. The first three hours Hashem learns Torah, whatever that means. The next three hours of the day, He judges the world. The next three hours, He is feeding the world, from the smallest of creatures to the largest. And finally, לִ֝וְיָתָ֗ן זֶֽה־יָצַ֥רְתָּ לְשַֽׂחֶק־בּֽוֹ׃ God is Mesahek im HaLevyatan- God is enjoying, or delighting with Levyatan as the pasuk says. Obviously, this is a very deep concept, what the Levyatan is. Nonetheless, he obviously he realizes that he was destined for greater things. So although he's alone and the rest of the world seems to be procreating, he's still singing the song of Hodu L'Hashem Ki Tov. Ki LeOlam Hasdo
A new chapter! With an introduction to the basis of the laws of inheritance. Including the rules of the first-born, and referring to the daughters of Tzlofchad. The first mishnah gives the list of who inherits and bequeaths to each other, who inherits but doesn't bequeath, doesn't inherit, but does bequeath, and neither. The Gemara wants to address the order of these cases -- including the fact that the sages did not want to begin the mishnah with calamity. Plus, cases reminiscent of Yevamot with cases of yibum and inheritance.
Rava concludes that the Mishna relates to a different case than the Rabbi Tarfon/Rabbi Akiva debate in Yevamot 118b. Our Mishna is a case where the thief knows who he/she stole from. Therefore, whether or not one needs to return the item directly or one can let the person know that the stolen item is available to be picked up is dependent on the severity of the actions of the thief - whether or not the thief swore and admitted and needs repentance from that or not. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva's debate is not dependent on whether or not one swore as the issue there is because the thief does not know the identity of the one whom he/she stole from. If one appointed an agent in front of witnesses to receive a loan payment (for example), Rav Hisda and Rabba disagree about whether when the agent receives the payment, the borrower is no longer responsible if something happens to the money on the way or was the agent appointed to make it easier for the borrower to get the money back to the original owner but does not assume responsibility. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's opinion, that the agent assumes responsibility, one from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 98b and one from our Mishna. Both are resolved. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar held like Rav Chisda as well. Shmuel was hesitant to allow people to send money with agents appointed by the creditor as they do not assume responsibility even if they carry a stamp and a signature of the creditor. How were people able to collect loans back from debtors who lived far away? How can it be done securely? Two stories are brought highlighting a possible method. The nature of the payment of the one-fifth, chomesh, is discussed - is it to effect atonement for the thief or is it a financial payment? If it is a financial payment, and the thief dies, the children are liable to pay it. This contradicts a braita which rules that they do not. How can that contradiction be resolved?
Rava concludes that the Mishna relates to a different case than the Rabbi Tarfon/Rabbi Akiva debate in Yevamot 118b. Our Mishna is a case where the thief knows who he/she stole from. Therefore, whether or not one needs to return the item directly or one can let the person know that the stolen item is available to be picked up is dependent on the severity of the actions of the thief - whether or not the thief swore and admitted and needs repentance from that or not. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva's debate is not dependent on whether or not one swore as the issue there is because the thief does not know the identity of the one whom he/she stole from. If one appointed an agent in front of witnesses to receive a loan payment (for example), Rav Hisda and Rabba disagree about whether when the agent receives the payment, the borrower is no longer responsible if something happens to the money on the way or was the agent appointed to make it easier for the borrower to get the money back to the original owner but does not assume responsibility. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's opinion, that the agent assumes responsibility, one from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 98b and one from our Mishna. Both are resolved. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar held like Rav Chisda as well. Shmuel was hesitant to allow people to send money with agents appointed by the creditor as they do not assume responsibility even if they carry a stamp and a signature of the creditor. How were people able to collect loans back from debtors who lived far away? How can it be done securely? Two stories are brought highlighting a possible method. The nature of the payment of the one-fifth, chomesh, is discussed - is it to effect atonement for the thief or is it a financial payment? If it is a financial payment, and the thief dies, the children are liable to pay it. This contradicts a braita which rules that they do not. How can that contradiction be resolved?
Study Guide Bava Kamma 103 In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitot like Rabbi Yehuda - how could a sale be valid when the agent changes what the buyer wanted as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? A braita is quoted about one who buys land but uses someone else's name on the document of sale to discourage others from bringing claims against the property rights of the land. At first, it is suggested that the author of this braita disagrees with the opinion of the rabbis in Israel as the seller thinks the buyer is the other person (whose name appears in the sale document) when it is actually sold to the buyer. However, the braita is then explained differently and the ruling in the braita does not relate to the issue the rabbis in Israel were discussing. Rav Kahana bought flax from someone but hadn't yet received the flax. As the price of flax then increased, the seller sold Rav Kahan's flax and returned Rav Kahana the amount of money he received for selling it, which was more than Rav Kahana had given him originally. Is there an issue of interest here? Rav ruled that it depended on whether or not the one who bought the flax for the higher price knew that it was Rav Kahana's flax or thought it was the seller's. At first, the Gemara suggests that this distinction suggests that Rav held like the rabbis in Israel, but then they explain that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The Mishna explained that one who steals, takes an oath denying it, and then admits their lie, must return the lost item directly to the hands of the one it was stolen from and adds an extra fifth (which is calculated as 25% of the value of the item) and brings a guilt offering, asham gezeila, to achieve atonement. The Mishna assumes that only if the thief took an oath it is necessary to return the lost item directly to the one who it was stolen to receive the atonement, but if one did not take an oath, but witnesses testified against the thief, then it is enough to put the item aside and wait for the one who it was stolen from to come and collect it. The Gemara questions that this seems to match neither Rabbi Tarfon's nor Rabbi Akiva's opinion about returning a stolen item as appears in the Mishna in Yevamot 118b regarding one who stole and five people claim he/she stole from them and the thief doesn't know which one is the one he/she stole from. Three different suggested answers are brought. The first two are rejected.
Study Guide Bava Kamma 103 In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitot like Rabbi Yehuda - how could a sale be valid when the agent changes what the buyer wanted as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? A braita is quoted about one who buys land but uses someone else's name on the document of sale to discourage others from bringing claims against the property rights of the land. At first, it is suggested that the author of this braita disagrees with the opinion of the rabbis in Israel as the seller thinks the buyer is the other person (whose name appears in the sale document) when it is actually sold to the buyer. However, the braita is then explained differently and the ruling in the braita does not relate to the issue the rabbis in Israel were discussing. Rav Kahana bought flax from someone but hadn't yet received the flax. As the price of flax then increased, the seller sold Rav Kahan's flax and returned Rav Kahana the amount of money he received for selling it, which was more than Rav Kahana had given him originally. Is there an issue of interest here? Rav ruled that it depended on whether or not the one who bought the flax for the higher price knew that it was Rav Kahana's flax or thought it was the seller's. At first, the Gemara suggests that this distinction suggests that Rav held like the rabbis in Israel, but then they explain that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The Mishna explained that one who steals, takes an oath denying it, and then admits their lie, must return the lost item directly to the hands of the one it was stolen from and adds an extra fifth (which is calculated as 25% of the value of the item) and brings a guilt offering, asham gezeila, to achieve atonement. The Mishna assumes that only if the thief took an oath it is necessary to return the lost item directly to the one who it was stolen to receive the atonement, but if one did not take an oath, but witnesses testified against the thief, then it is enough to put the item aside and wait for the one who it was stolen from to come and collect it. The Gemara questions that this seems to match neither Rabbi Tarfon's nor Rabbi Akiva's opinion about returning a stolen item as appears in the Mishna in Yevamot 118b regarding one who stole and five people claim he/she stole from them and the thief doesn't know which one is the one he/she stole from. Three different suggested answers are brought. The first two are rejected.
Yevamot 16:6-7 | Tuesday, December 26th 2023 | 14 Teves 5784
Yevamot 16:4-5 | Monday, December 25th 2023 | 13 Teves 5784
Yevamot 16:2-3 | Sunday, December 24th 2023 | 12 Teves 5784
Yevamot 15:10-16:1 | Saturday, December 23rd 2023 | 11 Teves 5784
Yevamot 15:8-9 | Friday, December 22nd 2023 | 10 Teves 5784
Yevamot 15:6-7 | Thursday, December 21st 2023 | 9 Teves 5784
Yevamot 15:4-5 | Wednesday, December 20th 2023 | 8 Teves 5784
Yevamot 15:2-3 | Tuesday, December 19th 2023 | 7 Teves 5784
Yevamot 14:9-15:1 | Monday, December 18th 2023 | 6 Teves 5784
Yevamot 14:7-8 | Sunday, December 17th 2023 | 5 Teves 5784
Yevamot 14:5-6 | Saturday, December 16th 2023 | 4 Teves 5784
Yevamot 14:3-4 | Friday, December 15th 2023 | 3 Teves 5784
Yevamot 14:1-2 | Thursday, December 14th 2023 | 2 Teves 5784