Podcasts about Ravina

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1718!!יא כסלוRav Yaakov Naymanרב יעקב ניימאןרב ד׳קהילת עדת בני ישראל(1909 - 2009)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1717!!י כסלוRav Isser Zalman Meltzerרב איסר זלמן ב״ר ברוך פרץאבן האזל(1870 - 1953)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1715!!ז כסלוRav Yaakov Moshe Charlopרב יעקב משה ב״ר זבולון(1883 -1951)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1716!!ט כסלו (Shabbos)Rav Eliezer Geldzahlerרב אליעזר ב״ר אליהו יהושע(1958 - 2004)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1714!!ז כסלוDeath of King Herodיום שמת הורדוס(מגילת תענית פרק ט)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1713!!ו כסלוRav Michoel Ber WeissmandlThe Unheeded Cryרב מיכאל דב ב״ר יוסף ווייסמאנדלמן המצר(1903 - 1957)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1712!!ה כסלוThe Maharshaרב שמואל אליעזר ב״ר יהודה הלוי איידעל׳סמהרש״א(1555 - 1631)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1711!!ה כסלוRav Boruch Ber Leibowitzרב ברוך דוב ב״ר שמואל דודברכת שמואלראש ישיבת קמניץ(1864 - 1939)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1710!!ד כסלוThe Last Nevuah??נבואה האחרונהעוד ישבו ‏זקנים וזקנות ברחבות ירושלם(זכריה ח:ד)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1709!!ג כסלוRav Yaakov Moshe Kulefskyרב יעקב משה בן רפאל ניסן שלמה קולפסקיראש ישיבת נר ישראל(1925 - 2000)---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1707!!א כסלוThe Rebbe Recovers(1977)----------------------------------------AH GUTTEN CHOIDESH TO ALL!!My friends, the month of Kislev is upon us, and that means a new month of opportunities to learn from the lives of our greatest tzaddikim and leaders!!MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, A MONTH OF YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!The Yahrtzeits to be featured in the month of Kislev will be posted below.Sponsorships are available - l'zecher nishmas, as a zechus Refuah, for shidduchim, parnassa or zaarah shel kayama!!To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorship is $540.Daily sponsorship is $100.The cost to request and sponsor a Tzaddik that is not included on the following list is $180.זייט מצליח!!א גוט חודש!!-----------------------------------------Rosh Chodesh Kislev NiggunRosh Chodesh Kislev marks the return of the Lubavitcher Rebbe ZTL to public life after suffering a major heart attack just 38 days earlier. During the celebrations of the evening of Simchas Torah in the year 1977 (5738), while dancing with the Torah in the main synagogue, the Rebbe's face suddenly turned pale. As he sat back in his chair, the chassidim knew that something was very wrong, and the synagogue was quickly cleared. Still, the Rebbe stoically completed the last dance together with his brother-in-law Rabbi Shmaryahu Gurary.Dr. Ira Weiss, who flew in from Chicago to treat the Rebbe, testified that “on a scale of one to ten, he had the full-ten-scale-heart attack……it involved such extensive cardiovascular damage that in anyone's normal medical experience, one would worry about the possibility of survival.”And then, on the First of Kislev, for the first time in five weeks, the Rebbe left his office in 770 Eastern Parkway and returned to his home, signaling his complete and miraculous recovery. Chassidim all over rejoiced at the good news.Rosh Chodesh Kislev marked the beginning of sixteen additional years of life and leadership for the Rebbe. During this period he revealed ever deeper Torah secrets, and inspired many thousands of people to transform themselves and the world for good.From that day forward, the Rebbe redoubled his efforts on behalf of the Jewish nation, and for the dissemination of Torah and chassidus. The first of Kislev has since been celebrated by Lubavitcher chassidim as a day of thanksgiving and rejoicing.The following Niggun, composed by Reb Feitel Levin at the time of the Rebbe's return, which would become known as the “Alef Kislev Niggun”, captures the great joy experienced by the Chassidim due to the Rebbe's miraculous recovery.---------------------------------------------------Kislev Yahrtzeits!!1. The Rebbe Recovers2. Rav Akiva Sofer, Rav Aharon Kotler, Rav Nosson Meir Wachtfogel3. Rav Yaakov Moshe Kulefsky4. Nevuas Zechariah5. Maharsha, Rav Boruch Ber6. Rav Michoel Ber Weissmandel7. Megillas Taanis8. Rav Eliezer Geldzahler9. Mitteler Rebbe10. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer11. “Kislev Providence”12. Maharshal, Bas Ayin13. Ravina, Tchortkover14. Reuven ben Yaakov Avinu15. Rabi Yehudah HaNasi, Rav Dovid Leibowitz16. 2nd Modzhitzer Rebbe17. Alter of Novardok, Rav Shlomo Heiman18. Bostoner Rebbe19. Mezritcher Maggid20. Rav Yitzchak Hutner, Rav Avrohom Chaim Levine21. Yom Har Gerizim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank22. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron23. Galya Masechta24. Chaggai perek 2, Sdei Chemed, Rav AL Shteinman25. Aruch LaNer26. Ra'avad III27. Pri Chadash28. Rav Simcha Zelig Riger/Rav Elya Meir Bloch29. Cheshek Shlomo---------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------

Sources Can kodshim kalim be eaten when there is no altar? Abaye proved from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that they cannot be eaten. Rabbi Yirmia raised a difficulty against Abaye from a contradiction between braitot, resolving it in a way that one would conclude that kodshim kalim could be eaten even without an altar. However, Ravina provides an alternative resolution to the contradiction, and the Gemara brings another. Rav Huna says in the name of Rav that the altar in the Tabernacle of Shilo was made of stone. However, a difficulty is raised against this from a braita that explains that the fire of Moshe's copper altar continued until the time of Shlomo. They resolve it by saying that Rav Huna held by a different tannaitic opinion. Alternatively, one can explain that the fire could have still been on Moshe's altar, even though they were using the stone altar. If so, what was the fire used for? The Gemara suggests two possible answers. A Mishna is brought which says that the altar in the time of the Second Temple was expanded to be larger than the one in the First Temple, from 28x28 cubits to 32x32. Why? Rav Yosef suggests it was expanded as they needed more space. Ravin explained it based on a Mishna in Middot that described the addition of the shitin, two holes that were added for the libations.

Sources Can kodshim kalim be eaten when there is no altar? Abaye proved from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that they cannot be eaten. Rabbi Yirmia raised a difficulty against Abaye from a contradiction between braitot, resolving it in a way that one would conclude that kodshim kalim could be eaten even without an altar. However, Ravina provides an alternative resolution to the contradiction, and the Gemara brings another. Rav Huna says in the name of Rav that the altar in the Tabernacle of Shilo was made of stone. However, a difficulty is raised against this from a braita that explains that the fire of Moshe's copper altar continued until the time of Shlomo. They resolve it by saying that Rav Huna held by a different tannaitic opinion. Alternatively, one can explain that the fire could have still been on Moshe's altar, even though they were using the stone altar. If so, what was the fire used for? The Gemara suggests two possible answers. A Mishna is brought which says that the altar in the time of the Second Temple was expanded to be larger than the one in the First Temple, from 28x28 cubits to 32x32. Why? Rav Yosef suggests it was expanded as they needed more space. Ravin explained it based on a Mishna in Middot that described the addition of the shitin, two holes that were added for the libations.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

What does it mean to lead from a place of authenticity? In this episode, Ravina shares how facing imposter syndrome shaped her path to creating brave spaces rooted in honesty and care. Stay to the end for a short reading list and a writing prompt to help you craft your own intentional space. Visit thepoetrylab.com to find the Show Notes for this episode. The Poetry Lab Podcast is produced by Danielle Mitchell. With special guest hosts Lori Walker, bridgette bianca, Leonora Simonovis and Ravina Wadhwani.

We love to hear from our listeners. Send us a message. On this week's episode of the Business of Biotech, we're speaking with Bernard Ravina, M.D., CEO at Vima Therapeutics, a company that emerged from stealth in May with $60 million Series A financing to develop an oral candidate for dystonia, a movement disorder. Ravina talks about transitioning from government and academic medicine to industry, partnering with Atlas Ventures and defining the company's thesis, the reasons behind working in stealth mode and when to emerge, and the clinical plan and potential for VIM0423.  Access this and hundreds of episodes of the Business of Biotech videocast under the Business of Biotech tab at lifescienceleader.com. Subscribe to our monthly Business of Biotech newsletter. Get in touch with guest and topic suggestions: ben.comer@lifescienceleader.comFind Ben Comer on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bencomer/

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Ever blanked on stage? Ravina has—in front of her entire high school. What could've been the end of her poetry journey became a lesson in resilience, community, and remembering that showing up is the real win. In this episode, learn how support, self-compassion, and a little reframing can turn setbacks into stepping stones. Visit thepoetrylab.com to find the Show Notes for this episode. The Poetry Lab Podcast is produced by Danielle Mitchell. With special guest hosts Lori Walker, bridgette bianca, Leonora Simonovis and Ravina Wadhwani.

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Chullin Shiur #6 Daf 3a-b- Abaye, Rava, Rav Ashi, Ravina

Therapist, author, and poet RAVINA shares her homecoming journey of healing from intimate partner abuse. RAVINA is a South Asian bestselling author, spoken word artist & licensed therapist, based in Long Beach CA. Her specialization and passion lies in trauma treatment for individuals of marginalized identities, and communities of color facing trauma caused by oppression and systemic violence. RAVINA was born and raised in St Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. YELLOW is her collection of poetry published by World Stage Press & recipient of the Long Beach Best Poetry Collection of 2021. RAVINA is a Pushcart Prize Nominee and has performed poetry on nationally and internationally acclaimed stages including the United Nations, and the House of Blues. RAVINA is a performing spoken word artist with the collective Long Beach NeverSpeak!She is the founding director of WAHLA (Writing As Healing Los Angeles) - an award winning workshop and series that honors the intersection of creative writing, expression, and mental health. To learn more about our guest go to https://www.ravinacreative.com/ Intro and outro by Joy Jones. After you listen, don't forget to like, subscribe, and share. More about Dr. Thema can be found at www.drthema.com

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 23 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in honor of her daughter Rina. "With love to my incredible daughter who started me on my Daf journey with Hadran. I am continuously in awe of her, with gratitude for who she is and what she contributes to the world." Two additional explanations (three in total) are presented to resolve the contradiction between our Mishna and the braita concerning whether one should be concerned that pagans engage in bestiality with animals. Ravina proposes that ideally, one should not place an animal in a secluded area with a pagan. However, if the animal is already with the pagan, there is no concern that they engaged in bestiality. Ravina attempts to support this distinction by resolving a similar contradiction: our Mishna prohibits a woman from being secluded with a pagan, while a Mishna in Ketubot 26b does not express concern that a captive woman engaged in relations with her captor. This proof, however, is dismissed for two reasons. Rabbi Pedat addresses the contradiction by suggesting that each source follows a different viewpoint—either that of Rabbi Eliezer or the rabbis—who disagree about whether a red heifer may be purchased from a pagan. The Gemara explores three alternate explanations of this debate in an effort to refute Rabbi Pedat’s comparison, but all three are ultimately rejected. The Gemara draws an inference from the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the red heifer, as interpreted by Rabbi Pedat. Their discussion revolves around a case where it is uncertain whether the animal was involved in bestiality. If it were known with certainty, the animal could not be used for the purification process. This suggests that the red heifer carries the sanctity of offerings made on the altar, rather than the sanctity of bedek habayit—items designated for Temple maintenance. However, this conclusion is rejected on two grounds.

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 23 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in honor of her daughter Rina. "With love to my incredible daughter who started me on my Daf journey with Hadran. I am continuously in awe of her, with gratitude for who she is and what she contributes to the world." Two additional explanations (three in total) are presented to resolve the contradiction between our Mishna and the braita concerning whether one should be concerned that pagans engage in bestiality with animals. Ravina proposes that ideally, one should not place an animal in a secluded area with a pagan. However, if the animal is already with the pagan, there is no concern that they engaged in bestiality. Ravina attempts to support this distinction by resolving a similar contradiction: our Mishna prohibits a woman from being secluded with a pagan, while a Mishna in Ketubot 26b does not express concern that a captive woman engaged in relations with her captor. This proof, however, is dismissed for two reasons. Rabbi Pedat addresses the contradiction by suggesting that each source follows a different viewpoint—either that of Rabbi Eliezer or the rabbis—who disagree about whether a red heifer may be purchased from a pagan. The Gemara explores three alternate explanations of this debate in an effort to refute Rabbi Pedat’s comparison, but all three are ultimately rejected. The Gemara draws an inference from the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the red heifer, as interpreted by Rabbi Pedat. Their discussion revolves around a case where it is uncertain whether the animal was involved in bestiality. If it were known with certainty, the animal could not be used for the purification process. This suggests that the red heifer carries the sanctity of offerings made on the altar, rather than the sanctity of bedek habayit—items designated for Temple maintenance. However, this conclusion is rejected on two grounds.

In today's page of Talmud, Avodah Zarah 22, the sages continue their discussion about business dealings between Jewish and Gentile people. If they own a business together, can the Jewish partner accept profits from work done on Shabbat? But we also learn about two great luminaries of the Talmud - Rava and Ravina. What can we learn from their conduct? Listen and find out.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law.