Podcasts about Ravina

Sources Can kodshim kalim be eaten when there is no altar? Abaye proved from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that they cannot be eaten. Rabbi Yirmia raised a difficulty against Abaye from a contradiction between braitot, resolving it in a way that one would conclude that kodshim kalim could be eaten even without an altar. However, Ravina provides an alternative resolution to the contradiction, and the Gemara brings another. Rav Huna says in the name of Rav that the altar in the Tabernacle of Shilo was made of stone. However, a difficulty is raised against this from a braita that explains that the fire of Moshe's copper altar continued until the time of Shlomo. They resolve it by saying that Rav Huna held by a different tannaitic opinion. Alternatively, one can explain that the fire could have still been on Moshe's altar, even though they were using the stone altar. If so, what was the fire used for? The Gemara suggests two possible answers. A Mishna is brought which says that the altar in the time of the Second Temple was expanded to be larger than the one in the First Temple, from 28x28 cubits to 32x32. Why? Rav Yosef suggests it was expanded as they needed more space. Ravin explained it based on a Mishna in Middot that described the addition of the shitin, two holes that were added for the libations.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

What does it mean to lead from a place of authenticity? In this episode, Ravina shares how facing imposter syndrome shaped her path to creating brave spaces rooted in honesty and care. Stay to the end for a short reading list and a writing prompt to help you craft your own intentional space. Visit thepoetrylab.com to find the Show Notes for this episode. The Poetry Lab Podcast is produced by Danielle Mitchell. With special guest hosts Lori Walker, bridgette bianca, Leonora Simonovis and Ravina Wadhwani.

We love to hear from our listeners. Send us a message. On this week's episode of the Business of Biotech, we're speaking with Bernard Ravina, M.D., CEO at Vima Therapeutics, a company that emerged from stealth in May with $60 million Series A financing to develop an oral candidate for dystonia, a movement disorder. Ravina talks about transitioning from government and academic medicine to industry, partnering with Atlas Ventures and defining the company's thesis, the reasons behind working in stealth mode and when to emerge, and the clinical plan and potential for VIM0423.  Access this and hundreds of episodes of the Business of Biotech videocast under the Business of Biotech tab at lifescienceleader.com. Subscribe to our monthly Business of Biotech newsletter. Get in touch with guest and topic suggestions: ben.comer@lifescienceleader.comFind Ben Comer on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bencomer/

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Ever blanked on stage? Ravina has—in front of her entire high school. What could've been the end of her poetry journey became a lesson in resilience, community, and remembering that showing up is the real win. In this episode, learn how support, self-compassion, and a little reframing can turn setbacks into stepping stones. Visit thepoetrylab.com to find the Show Notes for this episode. The Poetry Lab Podcast is produced by Danielle Mitchell. With special guest hosts Lori Walker, bridgette bianca, Leonora Simonovis and Ravina Wadhwani.

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Chullin Shiur #6 Daf 3a-b- Abaye, Rava, Rav Ashi, Ravina

Therapist, author, and poet RAVINA shares her homecoming journey of healing from intimate partner abuse. RAVINA is a South Asian bestselling author, spoken word artist & licensed therapist, based in Long Beach CA. Her specialization and passion lies in trauma treatment for individuals of marginalized identities, and communities of color facing trauma caused by oppression and systemic violence. RAVINA was born and raised in St Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. YELLOW is her collection of poetry published by World Stage Press & recipient of the Long Beach Best Poetry Collection of 2021. RAVINA is a Pushcart Prize Nominee and has performed poetry on nationally and internationally acclaimed stages including the United Nations, and the House of Blues. RAVINA is a performing spoken word artist with the collective Long Beach NeverSpeak!She is the founding director of WAHLA (Writing As Healing Los Angeles) - an award winning workshop and series that honors the intersection of creative writing, expression, and mental health. To learn more about our guest go to https://www.ravinacreative.com/ Intro and outro by Joy Jones. After you listen, don't forget to like, subscribe, and share. More about Dr. Thema can be found at www.drthema.com

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 23 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in honor of her daughter Rina. "With love to my incredible daughter who started me on my Daf journey with Hadran. I am continuously in awe of her, with gratitude for who she is and what she contributes to the world." Two additional explanations (three in total) are presented to resolve the contradiction between our Mishna and the braita concerning whether one should be concerned that pagans engage in bestiality with animals. Ravina proposes that ideally, one should not place an animal in a secluded area with a pagan. However, if the animal is already with the pagan, there is no concern that they engaged in bestiality. Ravina attempts to support this distinction by resolving a similar contradiction: our Mishna prohibits a woman from being secluded with a pagan, while a Mishna in Ketubot 26b does not express concern that a captive woman engaged in relations with her captor. This proof, however, is dismissed for two reasons. Rabbi Pedat addresses the contradiction by suggesting that each source follows a different viewpoint—either that of Rabbi Eliezer or the rabbis—who disagree about whether a red heifer may be purchased from a pagan. The Gemara explores three alternate explanations of this debate in an effort to refute Rabbi Pedat’s comparison, but all three are ultimately rejected. The Gemara draws an inference from the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the red heifer, as interpreted by Rabbi Pedat. Their discussion revolves around a case where it is uncertain whether the animal was involved in bestiality. If it were known with certainty, the animal could not be used for the purification process. This suggests that the red heifer carries the sanctity of offerings made on the altar, rather than the sanctity of bedek habayit—items designated for Temple maintenance. However, this conclusion is rejected on two grounds.

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 23 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in honor of her daughter Rina. "With love to my incredible daughter who started me on my Daf journey with Hadran. I am continuously in awe of her, with gratitude for who she is and what she contributes to the world." Two additional explanations (three in total) are presented to resolve the contradiction between our Mishna and the braita concerning whether one should be concerned that pagans engage in bestiality with animals. Ravina proposes that ideally, one should not place an animal in a secluded area with a pagan. However, if the animal is already with the pagan, there is no concern that they engaged in bestiality. Ravina attempts to support this distinction by resolving a similar contradiction: our Mishna prohibits a woman from being secluded with a pagan, while a Mishna in Ketubot 26b does not express concern that a captive woman engaged in relations with her captor. This proof, however, is dismissed for two reasons. Rabbi Pedat addresses the contradiction by suggesting that each source follows a different viewpoint—either that of Rabbi Eliezer or the rabbis—who disagree about whether a red heifer may be purchased from a pagan. The Gemara explores three alternate explanations of this debate in an effort to refute Rabbi Pedat’s comparison, but all three are ultimately rejected. The Gemara draws an inference from the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the red heifer, as interpreted by Rabbi Pedat. Their discussion revolves around a case where it is uncertain whether the animal was involved in bestiality. If it were known with certainty, the animal could not be used for the purification process. This suggests that the red heifer carries the sanctity of offerings made on the altar, rather than the sanctity of bedek habayit—items designated for Temple maintenance. However, this conclusion is rejected on two grounds.

In today's page of Talmud, Avodah Zarah 22, the sages continue their discussion about business dealings between Jewish and Gentile people. If they own a business together, can the Jewish partner accept profits from work done on Shabbat? But we also learn about two great luminaries of the Talmud - Rava and Ravina. What can we learn from their conduct? Listen and find out.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

The band HEART will be in Chicago at Ravina, The Hard Rock in Atlantic CityDetroit, Hinckley Minnesota, St Louis, and more cities ... Go to heart-music.com for details.Nancy Wilson of Heart is a a trailblazer , a Rock & Roll Hall of Famer, and just an all-around cool person.Nancy joined us to talk:-Working with her sister Ann for over 50 years, "Because we had the other focus on the music itself, it took a lot of pressure off of us as a relationship"-Playing Radio City Music Hall (Ann Hathaway brought her kids)-Todd Rundgren has always been that cool-college girl-mind-expanding-person-Writing new music -Playing the Kennedy Center Honors for Robert Plant, Jimmy Page, and John Paul Jones-Inspired by the Beatles on Ed Sullivan   To subscribe to The Pete McMurray Show Podcast just click here

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

O mundo está complicado, mas Paulo Portas acredita que tudo começou “no algoritmo”. Em Porque Falha o Estado?, o ex-vice-primeiro-ministro fala das virtudes de um mundo interdependente, que parece em risco, e sobretudo das virtudes desaparecidas com as redes (“O bom-senso é o bem mais raro do mercado”). Lamenta que os três problemas decisivos “não ocupem nem 5% do espaço público das discussões”. Mas mantém algum otimismo: a contra-globalização não vencerá.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Rav Moshe and Tzipora Mashbaum, on her 4th yartzeit. "You graced us all with your glorious smile, innate wisdom and beautiful neshama. To say that you are missed every day is an understatement." Today's daf is for the refuah shleima of Elad ben Netta. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan's statement that one only receives lashes for eating maaser sheni outside Jerusalem after it was brought into Jerusalem, based on a derivation from Rabbi Yosi's words ina braita. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the derivation from Rabbi Yosi's as referring to a case where the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem, and the innovation is that it entered while still being tevel (untithed produce), and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as if they have been separated. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with this resolution (because it seems R' Yosi doesn't actually hold this position). The Gemara then presents two answers from Rabba and Ravina to resolve this difficulty. One who makes a bald spot on his head as a sign of mourning for the dead, who rounds the corners of his head or destroys the hair on his beard, or who makes a cut in his flesh for the dead receives lashes. The Gemara discusses the details of these commandments and the minimum measurements for which one would be liable.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Rav Moshe and Tzipora Mashbaum, on her 4th yartzeit. "You graced us all with your glorious smile, innate wisdom and beautiful neshama. To say that you are missed every day is an understatement." Today's daf is for the refuah shleima of Elad ben Netta. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan's statement that one only receives lashes for eating maaser sheni outside Jerusalem after it was brought into Jerusalem, based on a derivation from Rabbi Yosi's words ina braita. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the derivation from Rabbi Yosi's as referring to a case where the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem, and the innovation is that it entered while still being tevel (untithed produce), and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as if they have been separated. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with this resolution (because it seems R' Yosi doesn't actually hold this position). The Gemara then presents two answers from Rabba and Ravina to resolve this difficulty. One who makes a bald spot on his head as a sign of mourning for the dead, who rounds the corners of his head or destroys the hair on his beard, or who makes a cut in his flesh for the dead receives lashes. The Gemara discusses the details of these commandments and the minimum measurements for which one would be liable.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Naveh Shimshon, born to their children, Peninah and Eitan Kaplansky. The Gemara delves into various issues regarding an "ir hanidachat," idolatrous city. Can a city become an idolatrous city if there was no subverted, but they decided on their own? If individuals get stoned, but if the majority of the city is convicted, they get killed by the sword, how does the court rule on the first half of the inhabitants before it is clear that the majority of the inhabitants will be guilty? Temporary residents are also considered part of the city, but how long do they need to live there to be considered temporary residents? Even though the righteous people of the city are not killed, their possessions are destroyed. What is the difference between the possessions of the righteous people and those of the idol worshippers different and how are there laws derived from the Devarim 13:16? Rav Chisda ruled that deposits of inhabitants are not burned. To what is he referring? If there is no square in the town, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yismael disagree about whether or not the city can be judged as idolatrous city. How does each derive their position from the verse in the Torah? The Mishna explained what is done with various sanctified items in the city - whether animals designated for sacrifices, second tithe produce and others. The Gemara brings a braita that expands on this list. What are animals designated for sacrificed left to die and cannot be redeemed and the money used so sacrifices? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each bring a different answer to this question. The first explanation of Reish Lakish is rejected and an alternative is suggested. Why didn't each one hold by the other's position? In the braita, Rabbi Shimon excludes firstborn animals and tithed animals from the burning. Is this referring to unblemished or blemished animals? Ravina and Shmuel each take a different position on this.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Naveh Shimshon, born to their children, Peninah and Eitan Kaplansky. The Gemara delves into various issues regarding an "ir hanidachat," idolatrous city. Can a city become an idolatrous city if there was no subverted, but they decided on their own? If individuals get stoned, but if the majority of the city is convicted, they get killed by the sword, how does the court rule on the first half of the inhabitants before it is clear that the majority of the inhabitants will be guilty? Temporary residents are also considered part of the city, but how long do they need to live there to be considered temporary residents? Even though the righteous people of the city are not killed, their possessions are destroyed. What is the difference between the possessions of the righteous people and those of the idol worshippers different and how are there laws derived from the Devarim 13:16? Rav Chisda ruled that deposits of inhabitants are not burned. To what is he referring? If there is no square in the town, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yismael disagree about whether or not the city can be judged as idolatrous city. How does each derive their position from the verse in the Torah? The Mishna explained what is done with various sanctified items in the city - whether animals designated for sacrifices, second tithe produce and others. The Gemara brings a braita that expands on this list. What are animals designated for sacrificed left to die and cannot be redeemed and the money used so sacrifices? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each bring a different answer to this question. The first explanation of Reish Lakish is rejected and an alternative is suggested. Why didn't each one hold by the other's position? In the braita, Rabbi Shimon excludes firstborn animals and tithed animals from the burning. Is this referring to unblemished or blemished animals? Ravina and Shmuel each take a different position on this.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Nachum haLevi on his 21st yahrzeit "He raised his family with the positive ethos of אבא, כתיב בתורה כך. Yehi zichro baruch!" If one sees one's father doing something wrong, what is the proper language one should use to correct one's father?  If one is supposed to get two death penalties for two separate actions or for one action involving two prohibitions, the ruling goes by the harsher death penalty. Rabbi Yosi disagrees in the latter case and holds that it goes by the one that was first prohibited to the person. What is the source for the former?  The Mishna explains that if one sins and gets lashes and then sins again, the third time they are put into a kipa, a small cell, and fed barley until their innards explode and they die. The Gemara limits this to a case of a sin punishable by karet, death in the hands of God, and explains that since the person is actually considered like a dead person since they have a death penalty hanging over them, which allows for the law of kipa to go into effect. Is the Mishna like Rebbi only who holds that one creates a chazaka after two times, or can it be explained according to Rashbag as well? Ravina explains it according to Rashbag, as the chazaka is created by the sins, not the lashes, which are repeated three times. A difficulty is raised against Ravina's explanation, but is resolved. What is the source in Tanach for the law of kipa?  A murderer who can't be convicted also is put in a kipa. The sages offer various possibilities of a murderer for whom this would be relevant.  There are certain transgressions that do not need to be ruled in court, but a zealous person who is on the scene is permitted to take the law into his/her own hands and kill the person. In what situations?   

Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Nachum haLevi on his 21st yahrzeit "He raised his family with the positive ethos of אבא, כתיב בתורה כך. Yehi zichro baruch!" If one sees one's father doing something wrong, what is the proper language one should use to correct one's father?  If one is supposed to get two death penalties for two separate actions or for one action involving two prohibitions, the ruling goes by the harsher death penalty. Rabbi Yosi disagrees in the latter case and holds that it goes by the one that was first prohibited to the person. What is the source for the former?  The Mishna explains that if one sins and gets lashes and then sins again, the third time they are put into a kipa, a small cell, and fed barley until their innards explode and they die. The Gemara limits this to a case of a sin punishable by karet, death in the hands of God, and explains that since the person is actually considered like a dead person since they have a death penalty hanging over them, which allows for the law of kipa to go into effect. Is the Mishna like Rebbi only who holds that one creates a chazaka after two times, or can it be explained according to Rashbag as well? Ravina explains it according to Rashbag, as the chazaka is created by the sins, not the lashes, which are repeated three times. A difficulty is raised against Ravina's explanation, but is resolved. What is the source in Tanach for the law of kipa?  A murderer who can't be convicted also is put in a kipa. The sages offer various possibilities of a murderer for whom this would be relevant.  There are certain transgressions that do not need to be ruled in court, but a zealous person who is on the scene is permitted to take the law into his/her own hands and kill the person. In what situations?   

This week, the guys are joined by actor Dax Ravina for a wild conversation that spans his journey into acting and his unexpected encounters with the paranormal. Dax shares the story of his first time witnessing orbs—alongside actors who star in the comedy show, Trailer Park Boys—and what unfolded during Dax's skywatch with the Bledsoe family. They also dive into the mind-bending realms of spoon bending, telepathy, and unlocking psychic abilities, exploring just how strange and powerful this reality can get.

Decoding the TalmudInside the Story, Substance, and Significance of the Book that Defines JudaismLesson 4To Create the TalmudHow the sages shaped its structure and substance.Meet the pivotal sages in the Talmud's story—from Rav and Shmuel's first academies to Rav Ashi and Ravina's final text—and see how they wove in stories as well as ethical and philosophical teachings.

Ever wondered what the fishy smell is down there? Poppy and Rubina are joined by Dr Ravina to learn about vaginal health, how to keep it 'clean' and bust some popular myths. Have a message for Poppy and Rubina? If you're over 16, you can message the BGDIT team via WhatsApp for free on 07968100822. Or email us at browngirlsdoittoo@bbc.co.ukIf you're in the UK, for more BBC podcasts listen on BBC Sounds: bbc.in/3UjecF5

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Penina Lipskier in honor of her son's wedding, Daniel to Ella and in loving memory of his friends, Yakir Hexter and David Schwartz HY"D who were killed during the war. "May we only know smachot!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the occasion of their daughter Yael Perlman and her new husband Matt Shapiro making aliyah to Jerusalem on Sunday! "We are so proud of their decision and look forward to sharing their experiences of their new life in our holy land!"  Ravina suggests to Rav Ashi a fourth response to Rav Sheshet's question, can an item can be acquired by the buyer when it is placed in the buyer's vessels on the property of the seller? However, this too is rejected and the question is left unanswered. The Mishna in Kiddushin Chapter 1, Mishna 5 established that moveable items can be acquired by pulling. However, it is limited by either Rav Chisda, Rav Kahana, or Rava to a case where the item cannot be lifted. When Abaye taught this qualification of the Mishna, Rav Ada bar Matna raised a difficulty against it from a tannaitic source. Three other sources are also brought to question this limitation, but all the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel differentiate between a case where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor (30 se'ah) of wheat for 30 sela" and one where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor for 30 sela, each se'ah for a zuz." In the former, the sale is final only when the measuring is complete, in the latter, the sale is final for each se'ah as it goes into the measuring cup. A difficulty is raised against the first case from a braita quoted previously where the sale is final even before filling up the cup, provided the cup used was the buyer's. This difficulty is resolved by assuming the braita refers to a case more similar to the latter case of Rav and Shmuel.

SIGN UP!: UPCOMING LIVE Q&A! https://bit.ly/RBQALIVE   Dedication opportunities are available for episodes and series at  https://ohr.edu/donate/qa   Questions? Comments? podcasts@ohr.edu   Yeshivat Ohr Somayach located in the heart of Jerusalem, is an educational institution for young Jewish English-speaking men. We have a range of classes and programs designed for the intellectually curious and academically inclined - for those with no background in Jewish learning to those who are proficient in Gemara and other original source material. To find the perfect program for you, please visit our website https://ohr.edu/study_in_israel​ whatsapp us at https://bit.ly/OSREGISTER or call our placement specialist at 1-254-981-0133 today!   Subscribe to the Rabbi Breitowitz Q&A Podcast at https://plnk.to/rbq&a   Submit questions for the Q&A with Rabbi Breitowitz https://forms.gle/VCZSK3wQJJ4fSd3Q7   Subscribe to our YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/c/OhrSomayach/videos   8-7-24 00:00 - What is Eliyahu HaNavi's biography?   06:44 - Hazal talks about four exiles of Galus. Why is the Galus of Edom assumed to be the last and the one we are currently in?   15:34 - Why does the Gemara repeat itself word for word?   24:10 - When there is no speaker named in the Gemara do we assume it is Ravina and Rav Ashi?   25:10 - What are the minor Tractates?   31:55 - What is כרת, excision of the soul?   38:07 - When Yosef cried on Binyamin's neck Chazal explains that this is referring to the  destruction of the two temples. Why was this prophecy relevant at that time?   42:55 - When the Pasuk says that brothers were concerned what Yosef would do to them after Yaakov's death, what exactly were they concerned about?   45:50 - How do we connect to Tisha Ba'Av?   56:48 - Were the Malachim lying when they asked where Sarah was?   01:03:15 - Why did Baalei Mussar find it difficult to accept Mashiach?   01:06:35 - What does it mean Derech Eretz Kadma L'Torah? Does this mean there is morality outside of the Torah?   01:15:50 - Hazal say that Tamar was a Bas Cohen. How does this work chronologically?   01:19:11 - Does we encourage people to convert who have a lot of opposition from their family?   01:25:09 - What are the halachos of a Cohen visiting Auschwitz?   01:27:20 - Did the holocaust lead to the state of Israel?   01:29:55 - What does it mean that it is a Halacha that Esav hates Yaakov?   01:32:35 - Should we encourage goyim to be Christian seeing as Rambam says Christianity is a necessary step from Paganism to belief in God?   01:33:55 - Is the ideal state of the world without a Beis Hamikdash?     You can listen to this and many other Ohr Somayach programs by downloading our app, on Apple and Google Play, ohr.edu and all major podcast platforms. Visit us @ https://ohr.edu  PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS