Podcasts about ahwaz

Iranian Languages and Dialects, Part XV: Khuzestani Arabic Summary Khuzestani Arabic is a fascinating dialectthat bridges Southern Mesopotamian Arabic with Persian linguistic influences.While it retains many core features of Eastern Bedouin-type dialects, it alsodemonstrates phonological shifts, Persian lexical borrowing, and uniquesyntactic structures that distinguish it from other Arabic varieties.Understanding these linguistic dynamics is essential for appreciating thecomplex history and sociolinguistic identity of Khuzestani Arabic speakers.Here's your chance to listen to authentic Khuzestani Arabic as Fatehem Jalali narrates the story of The Three Fish from Kalila and Dimna. Podcast: Orientalistics.Keywords#KhuzestaniArabic; #Linguistics;#ArabicDialects; #IranianArabs; #Khuzestan; #Ahwaz; #Sociolinguistics; #Persian;#Dialectology; #Phonology; #Syntax; #Vocabulary; #OralTradition; #GulfArabic;#IraqiArabic; #HistoricalLinguistics; #AchaemenidEmpire; #SassanianEmpire;#ParthianEmpire; #LanguagePolitics; #Bilingualism; #ArabicInIran;#MesopotamianHistory; #MinorityLanguages; #CulturalIdentity;Examples:. ابنتي تزوجت في سن صغير جدا  (بتی عرست ابسن زغیر)٢.  لو كان عندي مال لأقرضته لك (لو عندی فلوس چا دینتک)٣.  لقد اشترت لي أختي هذا التلفاز (اختی اشترتلی هاذه تلفزیون)٤.  نحن نتحدث العربية في المنزل ولكننا نتحدث الفارسية فيالخارج (احنه نحچی بل بیت عربی بس بارا فارسی)٥.  ماذا فعلت بالكتاب الذي أعطيتك إياه؟ (اشسوت بلالکتاب الذی آنه اطتک یا؟

Hey guys! Thanks for joining me again on Identity. In this episode, we are talking to Aliya Ahwazi, who is an Arab from Iran. With everything happening in Iran, I believe its time we listened to the voices of the people. All people of Iran have a unique experience, the more we know about one another the more we can empthazie, understand, and hold space for each other. Its time to open our hearts and minds to hearing different perspectives, different voices, voices that have been silenced for far too long. We do not connect with one another or become united by silencing each other, but by connecting, sharing, and relating to one another personal experiences. With that said, I'm excited to share this conversation with you all. Aliya Ahwazi is an Ahwaz Arab living in the United States. She advocates for the rights, dignity, and identity of the Ahwazi nation. You can find her on instagram @Ahwaz_studies --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/serva/support

Samira Abbassy was born in Ahwaz, Iran in 1965 and moved to Lon-don, UK as a child. After graduating from Canterbury College of Art, she began showing in London. She moved to New York in 1998, where she helped to set up the Eliza-beth Foundation for the Arts, and the EFA Studio Center. Her work has been included in shows at the Metropolitan and the British Museum, and is in private and public collections worldwide, including: the Metropolitan Museum, British Museum, the British Government Art Collection, the Grey Art Gallery at NYU, the Burger Collection, the Donald Rubin collection (Rubin Museum, NY), the Farjaam Collection, Dubai, the Los Angeles County Museum and the Afkhami Collection. Her work is currently on view at CANDICE MADEY Gallery. During Abbassy's thirty year career, her work has been the subject of twenty gallery solo shows in London, Dubai and New York. Her fellowships include: Yaddo fellowship in 2006 and 2022, and Sal-tonstall in 2017. She has been awarded two NYFA awards in 2007 and 2018, a Joan Mitchell award in 2010 and a Pollock-Krasner in 2014. Abbassy was also nominated for the Anonymous Was a Woman award in 2018. In 2019 her work was included in the 26th Venice Biennial presented by Heist gallery London. Abbassy has also worked as an educator in many educational institutions in the UK and the USA, some of which are: Hunter college, Penn State and the University of Virginia, where she was the artists in Residence in April 2012. Samira Abbassy Anastasis, 2021 Oil on birch panel 44 x 33 1/2 inches 111.8 x 85.1 cm, photo by Jeanette May. Samira Abbassy Reincarnated Fears, 2016 Oil on birch panel 48 x 36 inches 121.9 x 91.4 cm, photo by Jeanette May. Samira Abbassy Love & Ammunition II , 2014 Oil on birch panel 48 x 36 inches 121.9 x 91.4 cm, photo by Jeanette May.

Photo: Seal of the National Liberation Movement of Ahwaz. CBS Eyes on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow The five million Ahwazi Arabs of Iran vs the Tehran tyranny. Brenda Shaffer @ProfBShaffer @FDD https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/07/18/the-impact-of-the-ahwaz-protests-in-iran/

Photo: No known restrictions on publication.The New John Batchelor ShowCBS Audio Network@Batchelorshow1/2:  "Iran is more than Persia." @ProfBShaffer @FDDhttps://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/04/28/iran-is-more-than-persia/ Introduction: Why Ethnicity in Iran Is Important For most of the Soviet period, the West tended to refer to Soviet citizens as the “Russians” and assumed that the regime’s efforts to Russify non-Russian citizens across the Soviet Union were successful. Not until the mid-1980s, when protests emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, did it become clear that ethno-nationalism was a politically potent force in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and 15 new countries emerged, there was no denying that the Russification of the Soviet ethnic minorities had been a myth. Several times in recent decades, policymakers have had to play catch-up when central governments have weakened and ethnic and other communal cleavages took center stage. This was true amid the Soviet breakup, the Yugoslav Wars, and the Syrian civil war. There may be a similar blind spot regarding Iran’s multiethnic composition and regime stability. Iran is a multiethnic country; Persians comprise less than half of Iran’s population. Overwhelming majorities of non-Persian groups inhabit most of Iran’s border provinces, in contrast to Iran’s Persian-dominated center. Moreover, over 40 percent of the population of Iran lacks fluency in the Persian language. Ethnic cleavages and dissatisfaction pose growing challenges to the rule of the regime in Iran. When they overlap with poverty and lower levels of government services and infrastructure, these challenges become more severe. Iran’s ethnic minorities inhabit the state’s poorest provinces. The country’s growing environmental challenges, including widening water shortages, hit the ethnic minority provinces harder than the Persian center. The growing importance of the border provinces in anti-regime activity was evident during the last major round of anti-regime protests in Iran, which began in December 2017 and surged again in late 2019. The demonstrations started in the country’s provincial cities and were more intense in the minority-heavy provinces than in the Persian heartland. Technological changes, including widespread access to foreign television and social media in minority languages, have strengthened identity trends in Iran. Large percentages of Iran’s ethnic minorities regularly watch foreign television broadcasts in their native languages instead of regime television, which often depicts ethnic minorities with derogatory stereotypes. Ethnic groups in Iran are also exposed via social media to the wave of identity politics in the United States and Europe. This, too, may contribute to increased opposition to the regime, particularly among Iran’s youth. Previous generations in Iran had, by and large, submitted to the notion that ethnic minorities are inferior to the great Persian nation. But Iran’s minorities increasingly reject this idea, while Persian nationalism appears to be growing among Persians dissatisfied with the religious calling of the Islamic Republic. Since late 2017, the anti-regime activity of several ethnic groups entered a new stage, featuring increased armed attacks on army, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and government installations. Among Iran’s minorities, the Kurds, Ahwaz, and Baluch have active paramilitary groups. Most of the violent anti-regime activity in Iran takes place in their home regions: Sistan-Baluchistan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan. Iran’s border areas populated by Kurds and the Baluch endure regular threats to the regime’s forces. Ahwazi groups periodically conduct anti-regime attacks in Khuzestan but do not run a constant insurgency like the Kurds and Baluch do. A critical variable in assessing the potential ethnic threat to the regime is the attitude of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, because of their large numbers, wealth, and perceived status as a mainstay of the regime. A major turning point for this group took place last autumn in response to Iran’s support for Yerevan during Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan. Iranian Azerbaijanis observed Iranian trucks moving Russian arms and supplies to Armenia. The Iranian government arrested dozens of Azerbaijanis for protesting Tehran’s support for Armenia. Amidst rising Azerbaijani opposition, the regime’s policy of backing Armenia may no longer be sustainable. But the Azerbaijani challenge is not the only one. Ethnic minorities form a majority in several strategic locations in Iran. For instance, Khuzestan province, which is the center of Iran’s oil production and home to several important ports and a major road juncture, has a majority-Ahwaz population. Khuzestan is an unstable province, and sustained anti-regime activity there could affect Iran’s ability to produce, export, and transit oil and natural gas. In addition, Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port is located in Sistan-Baluchistan, a perennially unstable province populated almost entirely by Baluch. India invested heavily in Chabahar Port, which represents New Delhi’s attempt to counter China’s infrastructure projects in neighboring Pakistan. The shared non-Persian ethnic groups that straddle much of Iran’s borders, especially Baluch, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis, strongly impact Iran’s foreign policy with most neighboring states. These ethnic groups are a major challenge in the volatile security situation on Iran’s borders with Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. In recent years, Iran’s ethnic minorities have shown organizational ability on the ground. In an all-out regime crisis, revolts in several minority provinces in Iran could mount a significant challenge to the central government.

Photo: Some Iranians are not Persians. Mar Elias (Eliya), the Nestorian bishop of the Urmia [home of John Batchelor's ancestors] plain village of Geogtapa, c. 1831.The New John Batchelor ShowCBS Audio Network@Batchelorshow2/2:  "Iran is more than Persia." @ProfBShaffer @FDDhttps://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/04/28/iran-is-more-than-persia/ Introduction: Why Ethnicity in Iran Is Important For most of the Soviet period, the West tended to refer to Soviet citizens as the “Russians” and assumed that the regime’s efforts to Russify non-Russian citizens across the Soviet Union were successful. Not until the mid-1980s, when protests emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, did it become clear that ethno-nationalism was a politically potent force in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and 15 new countries emerged, there was no denying that the Russification of the Soviet ethnic minorities had been a myth. Several times in recent decades, policymakers have had to play catch-up when central governments have weakened and ethnic and other communal cleavages took center stage. This was true amid the Soviet breakup, the Yugoslav Wars, and the Syrian civil war. There may be a similar blind spot regarding Iran’s multiethnic composition and regime stability. Iran is a multiethnic country; Persians comprise less than half of Iran’s population. Overwhelming majorities of non-Persian groups inhabit most of Iran’s border provinces, in contrast to Iran’s Persian-dominated center. Moreover, over 40 percent of the population of Iran lacks fluency in the Persian language. Ethnic cleavages and dissatisfaction pose growing challenges to the rule of the regime in Iran. When they overlap with poverty and lower levels of government services and infrastructure, these challenges become more severe. Iran’s ethnic minorities inhabit the state’s poorest provinces. The country’s growing environmental challenges, including widening water shortages, hit the ethnic minority provinces harder than the Persian center. The growing importance of the border provinces in anti-regime activity was evident during the last major round of anti-regime protests in Iran, which began in December 2017 and surged again in late 2019. The demonstrations started in the country’s provincial cities and were more intense in the minority-heavy provinces than in the Persian heartland. Technological changes, including widespread access to foreign television and social media in minority languages, have strengthened identity trends in Iran. Large percentages of Iran’s ethnic minorities regularly watch foreign television broadcasts in their native languages instead of regime television, which often depicts ethnic minorities with derogatory stereotypes. Ethnic groups in Iran are also exposed via social media to the wave of identity politics in the United States and Europe. This, too, may contribute to increased opposition to the regime, particularly among Iran’s youth. Previous generations in Iran had, by and large, submitted to the notion that ethnic minorities are inferior to the great Persian nation. But Iran’s minorities increasingly reject this idea, while Persian nationalism appears to be growing among Persians dissatisfied with the religious calling of the Islamic Republic. Since late 2017, the anti-regime activity of several ethnic groups entered a new stage, featuring increased armed attacks on army, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and government installations. Among Iran’s minorities, the Kurds, Ahwaz, and Baluch have active paramilitary groups. Most of the violent anti-regime activity in Iran takes place in their home regions: Sistan-Baluchistan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan. Iran’s border areas populated by Kurds and the Baluch endure regular threats to the regime’s forces. Ahwazi groups periodically conduct anti-regime attacks in Khuzestan but do not run a constant insurgency like the Kurds and Baluch do. A critical variable in assessing the potential ethnic threat to the regime is the attitude of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, because of their large numbers, wealth, and perceived status as a mainstay of the regime. A major turning point for this group took place last autumn in response to Iran’s support for Yerevan during Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan. Iranian Azerbaijanis observed Iranian trucks moving Russian arms and supplies to Armenia. The Iranian government arrested dozens of Azerbaijanis for protesting Tehran’s support for Armenia. Amidst rising Azerbaijani opposition, the regime’s policy of backing Armenia may no longer be sustainable. But the Azerbaijani challenge is not the only one. Ethnic minorities form a majority in several strategic locations in Iran. For instance, Khuzestan province, which is the center of Iran’s oil production and home to several important ports and a major road juncture, has a majority-Ahwaz population. Khuzestan is an unstable province, and sustained anti-regime activity there could affect Iran’s ability to produce, export, and transit oil and natural gas. In addition, Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port is located in Sistan-Baluchistan, a perennially unstable province populated almost entirely by Baluch. India invested heavily in Chabahar Port, which represents New Delhi’s attempt to counter China’s infrastructure projects in neighboring Pakistan. The shared non-Persian ethnic groups that straddle much of Iran’s borders, especially Baluch, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis, strongly impact Iran’s foreign policy with most neighboring states. These ethnic groups are a major challenge in the volatile security situation on Iran’s borders with Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. In recent years, Iran’s ethnic minorities have shown organizational ability on the ground. In an all-out regime crisis, revolts in several minority provinces in Iran could mount a significant challenge to the central government.

Parham Rahimzadeh werd in 1990 geboren in de woestijn van Ahwaz, Iran, maar groeide op in Nederland. Met zijn debuutroman Arab vertelt hij het verhaal over een vwo-leerling die in drugs handelt om voor zijn depressieve vader te kunnen zorgen. Hoofdpersoon Bassam is een Nederlander en Arabische Iraniër die maar één ding wil: de vrijheid om zijn eigen, goede keuzes te kunnen maken, zelfs, en misschien zelfs juist, als zijn omgeving het daar niet mee eens is. Pieter van der Wielen spreekt met Parham Rahimzadeh.

Quella che si chiude è stata una settimana decisamente intensa, con l’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite che ha visto tutti i principali leader mondiali incontrarsi e presentare la propria posizione sulle questioni regionali e globali.Prima, però, sono avvenuti alcuni fatti apparentemente minori, ma davvero rilevanti:- nel cielo sopra Latakia, sulla costa mediterranea della Siria, l'antiaerea siriana ha abbattuto un cargo russo nel tentativo di colpire un caccia israeliano. La Russia ha subito puntato il dito contro Tel Aviv;- in Iran un attentato nell'ovest del Paese ha ucciso 25 persone e ferendone oltre 60, tra cui molti civili. Sia l'Isis sia il gruppo separatista al-Ahwaz hanno rivendicato l'attentato. Perché?- la Commissione diritti umani delle Nazioni unite ha rinnovato il mandato della commissione degli esperti che indaga da aprile sulle violazioni del diritto bellico e umanitario in Yemen.Nel suo secondo intervento davanti all’assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite, martedì il presidente americano Trump ha sostituito la Corea del Nord, al centro di un bellico discorso nel settembre dello scorso anno, con l’Iran come bersaglio della politica estera del suo governo, improntata sempre più al confronto diretto con i propri principali rivali strategici. «L’Iran deve rimanere isolato fino a che continuerà a sostenere il terrorismo e finché le sue aggressioni continueranno», ha detto Trump, che però ha intenzione di stabilire “grandi relazioni” con Teheran, a patto che «l’Iran cambi atteggiamento».

Trump says he’s open to meeting Rouhani on the sidelines of the UNGA, in what would be the first-ever meeting of presidents of the United States and the Islamic Republic. Hard to see it happening – for one thing, Iran’s Supreme leader back in August rejected the possibility of a meeting. For another, the blood is as bad as ever, with Tehran suggesting that the US was responsible for a terrorist attack on a memorial parade in Ahwaz over the weekend.

An attack on a military parade in the southern Iranian city of Ahwaz is likely to prompt Iranian retaliation against opposition groups at home and abroad. It also deepens Iranian fears that the United States. Saudi Arabia and others may seek to destabilize the country by instigating unrest among its ethnic minorities.

Understanding both the plight and role of minorities in shaping Iran�s future is crucial for America�s policy toward the Islamic Republic. On May 16, Hudson Institute and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization hosted a panel discussion with representatives of Iran�s Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Ahwazi, and Baloch populations who are working peacefully for federalism and pluralism.

Understanding both the plight and role of minorities in shaping Iran�s future is crucial for America�s policy toward the Islamic Republic. On May 16, Hudson Institute and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization hosted a panel discussion with representatives of Iran�s Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Ahwazi, and Baloch populations who are working peacefully for federalism and pluralism.