The John Batchelor Show

TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY AND DELAYED REHABILITATION Colleague Joseph Torigian. Torigian outlines Xi Jinping's entry into Tsinghua University via political recommendation and his navigation of "princeling" stigma by working at the grassroots level. The segment covers his marriage to singer Peng Liyuan, noting their shared history of persecution. It also explains Xi Zhongxun's delayed rehabilitation, attributed to political tensions with Deng Xiaoping, who utilized Xi's skills but remained wary of his influence. NUMBER 15

FAMILY TRAUMA AND XI JINPING'S EXILE TO THE NORTHWEST Colleague Joseph Torigian. The narrative shifts to the family's trauma, describing a teenage Xi Jinping escaping detention only to be denounced by his starving mother for the family's safety. Torigian discusses Xi Jinping's exile to the "sacred" but impoverished Northwest, which exposed him to peasant realities. Meanwhile, an imprisoned Xi Zhongxun wrote unanswered letters to leadership, pleading for relief and expressing concern over the country's agricultural stability. NUMBER 14

THE DANGEROUS NOVEL AND RED GUARD TORTURE Colleague Joseph Torigian. Torigian deepens the analysis of the "dangerous" novel Liu Zhidan, which Mao claimed was a counter-revolutionary plot indicative of "revisionism." This fear of losing revolutionary zeal, similar to the Soviet Union's path, drove Mao to utilize the Red Guards. The summary covers Xi Zhongxun's brutal treatment, including being kidnapped and tortured by Red Guardsin 1967 as the country descended into civil war. NUMBER 13

THE MOVE TO BEIJING AND XI ZHONGXUN'S 1962 PURGE Colleague Joseph Torigian. This segment explains that the book title comes from Mao's praise of Xi Zhongxun for prioritizing the party despite suffering. It traces the family's move to Beijing, the birth of "favorite son" Xi Jinping, and the father's complex loyalty to Mao. Torigiandetails Xi Zhongxun's 1962 purge, which foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution; he was removed for supporting a novel about martyr Liu Zhidan, which Mao viewed as a challenge. NUMBER 12

XI ZHONGXUN'S 1935 IMPRISONMENT AND EARLY CCP INFIGHTING Colleague Joseph Torigian. Torigiandiscusses his book, The Party Interests Come First, focusing on Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping's father. The segment details Xi's 1935 imprisonment by rival communists who accused him of "mountainism" and "rightism," only to be saved by Mao Zedong's arrival. It explores the vicious ideological infighting within the early CCP, Xi's role in the Sino-Japanese War, and the disastrous failure of radical land reform policies. NUMBER 11

THE EARLY LIFE OF XI ZHONGXUN Colleague Joseph Torigian. Joseph Torigian introduces the early life of Xi Zhongxun, father of Xi Jinping. Born in 1913 in poverty-stricken Shaanxi province, Xi grew up surrounded by famine and warlord violence. Torigian recounts a pivotal incident where a teenage Xi attempted to poison a school administrator during a revolutionary purge. While imprisoned for this act, he formally joined the Communist Party, motivated less by Marxist theory than by a romanticized view of revolution found in novels. NUMBER 9

THE EARLY LIFE OF XI ZHONGXUN Colleague Joseph Torigian. Joseph Torigian introduces the early life of Xi Zhongxun, father of Xi Jinping. Born in 1913 in poverty-stricken Shaanxi province, Xi grew up surrounded by famine and warlord violence. Torigian recounts a pivotal incident where a teenage Xi attempted to poison a school administrator during a revolutionary purge. While imprisoned for this act, he formally joined the Communist Party, motivated less by Marxist theory than by a romanticized view of revolution found in novels. NUMBER 9

PEARL HARBOR AND LINDBERGH'S BLOCKED MILITARY SERVICE Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brandsrecounts the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese strike and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war united the European and Asian theaters, resolving FDR's political dilemmas. Lindbergh attempted to volunteer for the Army Air Corps but was blocked by the Roosevelt administration due to his pre-war criticism. Consequently, he served as a civilian consultant, eventually flying unauthorized combat missions against the Japanese in the Pacific. NUMBER 8

THE GREER INCIDENT AND THE DISASTROUS DES MOINES SPEECH Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brands details the escalation of tensions in 1941, starting with FDR's declaration of an "unlimited national emergency." The segment covers the Greer incident, which FDR misrepresented to provoke hostility, and culminates in Lindbergh'sdisastrous Des Moines speech. By identifying the British, the Roosevelt administration, and Jewish Americans as war agitators, Lindbergh was branded an anti-Semite, effectively destroying his political viability and the America First Committee. NUMBER 7

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND THE AIR POWER DEBATE Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brandsdescribes Lindbergh's testimony before Congress and his popularity at massive rallies. A key debate emerges regarding air power: Roosevelt argues it makes America vulnerable to attack, whereas Lindbergh insists it enhances hemispheric defense, making invasion impossible. Brands notes that while Lindbergh was politically naive compared to FDR, his message of "America First" and a fortress America initially resonated with large audiences who cheered his anti-war message. NUMBER 6

LEND-LEASE AND BRITISH PROPAGANDA Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brands explains the passage of the Lend-Lease Act (HR 1776), which effectively ended American neutrality by committing industrial resources to Britain. The segment reveals the covert British propaganda campaign led by William Stephenson to manipulate US opinion. Brands also describes how FDR utilized a likely forged map of a German-partitioned South America to frighten Americans, while Lindbergh argued that aiding Britain was supporting imperialism rather than democracy. NUMBER 5

FDR'S THIRD TERM AND THE RISE OF AMERICA FIRST Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brands discusses the political landscape of 1940, where FDR maneuvers for an unprecedented third term, which Lindbergh views as a move toward dictatorship. The segment covers the rise of the America First Committee, with Lindbergh as its star speaker. Brands highlights Roosevelt's mastery of the press, using backgrounders to shape public opinion while privately viewing Lindbergh—and his ability to command an audience—as a significant political obstacle. NUMBER 4

THE EROSION OF NEUTRALITY AFTER POLAND AND FRANCE Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brandsoutlines the erosion of neutrality following the fall of Poland and France. Roosevelt maneuvers to adjust neutrality laws and aids Britain via the destroyers-for-bases deal, despite isolationist skepticism. Lindbergh and his allies fear these steps are a trap leading to inevitable war. Meanwhile, Churchill's correspondence with FDR becomes increasingly manipulative, desperate to secure American support against Germany, while Lindbergh warns that the British are seeking a US bailout. NUMBER 3

LINDBERGH'S TRANSITION TO PUBLIC ANTI-INTERVENTIONIST Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brandsdetails Lindbergh's transition into a public anti-interventionist figure. Motivated by his father's persecution during WWIand a desire to avoid another European quagmire, Lindbergh utilizes his celebrity to broadcast isolationist views on the radio. Brands notes that while British officials dismissed Lindbergh as a political "schoolboy," the aviator argued that American interests differed distinctively from the British Empire's survival, and that the US should not bail them out. NUMBER 2

LINDBERGH'S 1939 RETURN AND FDR'S FAILED RECRUITMENT Colleague H.W. Brands. H.W. Brandsdiscusses Charles Lindbergh's 1939 return to America amidst rising European tensions. Lindbergh, world-famous for his 1927 transatlantic flight and the tragic kidnapping of his son, is greeted by paparazzi and invited to meet FDR. Brands explains that while Roosevelt found Lindbergh charming, the President unsuccessfully attempted to recruit the aviator into his administration to control his potential opposition to American intervention in the looming war. NUMBER 1

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT THE SLOW REHABILITATION OF XI ZHONGXUN Colleague Joseph Torigian. Torigian details the slow rehabilitation of Xi Zhongxun, noting it took years after his release to fully return to work. He explains this delay occurred because Xi was persecuted by Mao personally. The Party moved cautiously to avoid signaling a sudden directional shift that might suggest the political system was collapsing. 1910 MAO

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT MAO'S SINICIZATION OF MARXISM AND THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD Colleague Joseph Torigian. Torigian discusses how Mao "sinicized" Marxism, rejecting Sovietdogmatism to interpret ideology flexibly. While Xi Zhongxun respected Mao's practical application of Leninism to China, Torigian notes that abandoning the Soviet model—viewed as "revisionist"—ultimately resulted in the Great Leap Forward, causing the deaths of approximately 30 million people. 1910 QING DYNASTY

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT PARTY PERSECUTION AND THE MINDSET OF PURGED OFFICIALSColleague Joseph Torigian. Joseph Torigian explains the mindset of purged officials like Xi Zhongxun, comparing them to characters in Darkness at Noon. He notes that loyal revolutionaries believed the Party represented a "world historical force." Consequently, enduring persecution without losing faith was viewed as a way to prove one's "mettle" and selflessness. 1966 TIBET RED GUARDS

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT: LINDBERGH'S DISMAY AT BRITISH COMPLACENCY AND GERMAN POWER Colleague H.W. Brands. Professor Brands details Charles Lindbergh's complex worldview, combining a stubborn admiration for German efficiency with confusion regarding Nazi politics. Lindbergh viewed Britain as a declining empire that would inevitably drag the United States into another war to bail them out of their diplomatic failures. 1931

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT: FDR'S NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND THE SHIFT TO A WARTIME FOOTING Colleague H.W. Brands. The segment examines Franklin Roosevelt's May 1941 declaration of a national emergency, which halted daily activities like baseball and movies as Americans listened via loudspeakers. Professor Brands explains how FDR used this moment to prepare the American mind for a "moral war" alongside Britain. SEPTEMBER 1941

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT: A PRIVATE HERO GOES PUBLIC TO OPPOSE INTERVENTION Colleague H.W. Brands. The discussion focuses on Charles Lindbergh's decision to leverage his fame for radio airtime upon returning to the United States in 1939. Despite his deep distrust of politics, Lindbergh felt compelled to speak out to prevent America from repeating the mistakes of World War I.

THE LEGACY OF THE AMATEUR SPIES Colleague Charles Spicer. Graham Christie and Philip Conwell-Evanscompiled a rare book titled None So Blind, printing only 100 copies to document their warnings to the Britishgovernment about the Nazi threat. Their efforts went largely unrecognized until historian Martin Gilbert began to correct the record, moving beyond the simplistic "Guilty Men" narrative to acknowledge that appeasement was a widely supported strategy at the time. The protagonists met modest ends: Ernest Tennant's memoir was overlooked, Conwell-Evans lived quietly in Notting Hill, and the heroic Christie died by suicide in his nineties, leaving behind only a small plaque in St. Paul's Cathedral. The Travelers Club remains one of the few places where their story—and the history of these attempts to civilize the Nazis—is remembered. NUMBER 16 1945-46 GORING AT NUREMBERG

NUREMBERG AND THE POST-WAR SILENCE Colleague Charles Spicer. At the Nuremberg trials, Ribbentropappeared a broken man, attempting to call amateur spies like Conwell-Evans as witnesses to prove his pre-war desire for peace, a defense that ultimately failed to excuse his war crimes. His widow, Anneliese, later wrote memoirs obsessing over social slights in London, displaying a detachment from the reality of the Holocaust. Conversely, in the "Ministries Trial," Lord Vansittart denied his connections to the German resistance, likely because admitting to these chaotic back-channel efforts was too uncomfortable for a Foreign Office that preferred the narrative of inevitable total war. Consequently, the Anglo-German Fellowship, despite having had government approval, was brushed under the carpet of history, its role in attempting to avert catastrophe largely forgotten. NUMBER 15 1945-46 TRIBUNAL JUDGES.

THE FALL OF FRANCE AND THE FLIGHT OF HESS Colleague Charles Spicer. As the German army overran France and the Low Countries in May 1940, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister and began utilizing the intelligence Christie had provided through Vansittart. The summer of 1940 also saw the publication of Guilty Men, a polemic that unfairly blamed appeasers for the war, simplifying a complex history and embedding a narrative of betrayal in the public consciousness. Across the Atlantic, Lord Lothian, having turned against Germany, successfully persuaded Roosevelt to support Britain, crucial for the war effort. The narrative touches on the bizarre flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland, who sought the Duke of Hamilton—a figure connected to the Fellowship—in a deluded attempt to negotiate peace between the two nations. NUMBER 14 1946 HANGED WILHELM FRICK AT NUREMBERG

THE PHONY WAR AND CONTINUED CONSPIRACIES Colleague Charles Spicer. Following the outbreak of war in September 1939, the amateur spies remained active during the "Phony War," engaging with renewed efforts by the German opposition to replace the government. While the Oster Conspiracy remained a theoretical possibility, an independent assassination attempt by Georg Elser failed to kill Hitler, unrelated to the diplomatic plots. Graham Christie continued to meet with Hermann Göring, who played both sides, leading Christie to conclude that while Göring was evil, he might have been a preferable alternative for a negotiated peace. Meanwhile, Ernest Tennant risked his life on missions to Norway, and despite the bravery of these intermediaries in providing accurate information about the German threat, the British government still failed to fully grasp the scale of the danger before the invasion of France. NUMBER 13 0CT0BER 16, 1946 HANGED JULIUS STRIECHER REMAINS.

THE TENNANT MISSION AND THE SUMMER OF 1939 Colleague Charles Spicer. In the summer of 1939, Ernest Tennant undertook a secret mission to Austria to meet his former friend Ribbentrop, acting with the plausible deniability of 10 Downing Street. At a confiscated castle, Tennant learned that Hitler was mirroring Ribbentrop'saggressive stance, planning a long war and targeting Poland. This intelligence convinced London to accelerate a defense pact with Poland, though Chamberlain failed to secure a necessary alliance with the Soviet Union due to his personal antipathy toward Stalin. Despite accurate intelligence from the amateur spies regarding the imminent invasion of Polandand the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the British leadership failed to act decisively or explore regime change, missing the final opportunities to stop the dictator before the outbreak of hostilities. NUMBER 12 1946 DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AT NUREMBERG

DIPLOMATIC FAILURES AND SOVIET INFILTRATION IN 1939 Colleague Charles Spicer. By early 1939, British efforts to maintain peace were hampered by disastrous appointments, specifically the pro-appeasement ambassador Neville Henderson in Berlin and the increasingly irrational and Anglophobic Ribbentrop in London. Intelligence provided by Philip Conwell-Evans and Graham Christie reached Foreign Secretary Halifax, who began to doubt Chamberlain's appeasement policy as he moved closer to Churchill's position. Meanwhile, the Anglo-German Fellowship faced internal contradictions, such as a controversial dinner for a Nazi women's leader, which Halifaxadvised against cancelling to keep communication channels open. The narrative also reveals that left-wing opposition to these efforts was manipulated by Soviet intelligence, as exemplified by "Simon Haxey," the author of Tory MP, who was later exposed as a recruiter for Soviet spies. NUMBER 11 1946 NUREMBERG ACCUSED AND THE GUARDS

THE OSTER CONSPIRACY AND THE CRISIS OF 1938 Colleague Charles Spicer. During the crisis year of 1938, the protagonists provided robust intelligence regarding the "Oster Conspiracy," a credible plan by German military and police officials to remove Hitler from power if he invaded Czechoslovakia. However, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain undermined this potential coup by pursuing "Plan Z," his personal initiative to fly to Germany and negotiate directly with Hitler, effectively removing the conspirators' casus belli. Following the Munich Agreement, the brutality of Kristallnacht shocked the world, yet the Anglo-German Fellowship was not vilified; instead, it remained a vital conduit for intelligence flowing to Lord Vansittart and the British cabinet. Despite the moral impossibility of forgiving the regime after November 1938, British officials and amateur spies continued to maintain relations in a desperate attempt to find a solution short of total war. NUMBER 10 1945-46. THE ACCUSED HANS FRANK IN HIS CELL.

THE MAP OF WAR AND THE KORDT CONNECTION Colleague Charles Spicer. In early 1938, as Sir Robert Vansittart was sidelined for the appeaser Horace Wilson, the amateur spies continued to provide highly accurate intelligence regarding Hitler's expansionist plans. Graham Christie obtained specific military details from his "friend" Hermann Göring, while Philip Conwell-Evans relied on the Kordt brothers—diplomats embedded in the Germanembassy who secretly opposed the Nazis. This network provided London with a clear map of Hitler's intentions for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and during the "May Crisis," their intelligence contributed to a rare moment of allied coordination that temporarily forced Hitler to back down, frustrating the dictator. NUMBER 9 194546 GORING IN HIS CELL AT NUREMBERG.

HALIFAX, HITLER, AND THE SOVIET FEAR Colleague Charles Spicer. By late 1937, the Anglo-German Fellowship was under surveillance by both MI5 and the NKVD, as Stalin feared the organization might successfully broker an alliance between Britain and Germany against the Soviet Union. In November, Foreign Minister Lord Halifax visited the Berghof, where the cultural disconnect was so profound that he initially mistook Hitler for a footman. Although Halifax was appalled by Hitler's brutality—specifically his suggestion to shoot Gandhi to solve problems in India—he was momentarily fooled into believing Hitler did not want war. This meeting highlighted the dangerous gap between the civilized assumptions of British diplomacy and the predatory reality of the Nazi regime. NUMBER 8 1945-46 NUREMBERG

THE CORONATION AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS Colleague Charles Spicer. The coronation of George VI in May 1937 became a backdrop for diplomatic maneuvering, culminating in a disastrously overcrowded party at the German embassy organized by the social-climbing Anneliese Ribbentrop. While Nazi sympathizers and high society mingled, the Anglo-German Fellowship was infiltrated by Kim Philby, who was hired to manage publicity while secretly reporting to Soviet intelligence. Simultaneously, realizing the futility of civilizing the Nazis, Conwell-Evans and Christie transitioned into functioning as a "private detective agency" for Vansittart, utilizing their access to gather intelligence that the official services lacked. Despite the social chaos and espionage, German War Minister von Blomberg attended the coronation and was well-received, hinting at alternative diplomatic paths had Ribbentrop not intervened. NUMBER 7 1946 DEFENSE COUNCIL AT THE NUREMBERG TRIAL

RIBBENTROP'S ARRIVAL AND SOCIAL DISASTERS Colleague Charles Spicer. Joachim von Ribbentroparrived at Victoria Station as the new German ambassador with a cynical mission from Hitler to forge an alliance that would neutralize Britain while Germany conquered the continent. His tenure was immediately marred by clumsiness and a lack of humor; he gave ill-advised press remarks and famously delivered a Nazi salute to King George VI, nearly causing the monarch to fall backward. His wife, Anneliese, was equally thin-skinned and offended by the British press's mockery, which only intensified the ridicule. Meanwhile, the British appointed Neville Henderson as their ambassador to Berlin, a man whose fatalism and desire not to antagonize Hitler led him to pursue a disastrous policy of appeasement. NUMBER 6 1946 NUREMBERG TRIAL ATTENDANCE.

LLOYD GEORGE AT THE BERGHOF Colleague Charles Spicer. In September 1936, Lloyd George traveled to Hitler's Alpine retreat, the Berghof, where he successfully charmed the dictator, who was delighted by the visit and the validation it offered. The meeting was marked by mutual goodwill, with Lloyd George finding Hitler unpretentious and well-educated, a view he later publicized in the British press. During their discussions, Lloyd George proposed reopening the Locarno treaty to address German grievances regarding Versailles, noting that Hitler responded with visceral hatred whenever the subject of Russia was raised. Although criticized in hindsight, the visit was a serious diplomatic attempt to engage the regime, leveraging Lloyd George's status as the statesman who had originally drafted the war guilt clause. NUMBER 5 1945-46 GORING AND FOUR OTHER NUREMBERG TRIAL ACCUSED

THE 1936 OLYMPICS AND DIPLOMATIC GAMES Colleague Charles Spicer. During the 1936 Berlin Olympics, the Nazi regime launched a charm offensive, wining and dining officials like Vansittart, who returned to Londonalarmed yet somewhat placated by Hitler's apparent desire for peace. Ribbentrop, desperate for promotion, hosted lavish events but was viewed by British diplomats as an intellectual lightweight and socially insecure. In a significant diplomatic maneuver, the Anglo-German Fellowship circumvented Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's refusal to meet Hitler by arranging for former Prime Minister David Lloyd George to visit the dictator. Lloyd George, a political titan and the man who had won the First World War, was seen as an ideal figure to build rapport and potentially civilize the German leadership. NUMBER 4 1945-46 KESSELRING ACCUSED

GRAHAM CHRISTIE AND THE RISE OF MILITARISM Colleague Charles Spicer. Graham Christie is introduced as a brilliant WWI air ace and engineer who, after suffering from war trauma, dedicated himself to understanding Germany and feeding intelligence to Sir Robert Vansittart, the head of the British Foreign Office. By 1935, the British protagonists were appalled by the Nuremberg Laws but chose to lobby their German contacts privately, arguing that such discrimination was bad for business. As Germany rearmed, Christie utilized his friendship with fellow aviator Hermann Göring to gather intelligence on the Luftwaffe, consistently warning London of the military buildup. Christie even provided advance warning of the Rhineland remilitarization in 1936, a moment historians view as the greatest missed opportunity to stop Hitler, had Britain not been paralyzed by pacifist sentiment. NUMBER 3 1945-46 GORING AND THE ACCUSED OF AGGRESSSIVE WAR.

COMMERCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FELLOWSHIP Colleague Charles Spicer. The Anglo-German Fellowship was headquartered at the Metropole Hotel in London in 1935, immediately attracting major business interests, including Unilever, which had vast assets in Germany and sought to avoid war to protect its commercial empire. While business leaders were initially anxious about the brutality of the Nazi regime, the stabilization following the Night of the Long Knives led optimists to believe the regime could be civilized. Ribbentrop took credit in Berlin for the Fellowship's success, which gave members extraordinary access to Hitler. The organization also attracted Germanindustrialists like Robert Bosch, who despised the Nazis but joined the Berlin counterpart, the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, hoping to maintain international ties and prevent conflict. NUMBER 2 1945-46. TWO GERMAN ADMIRALS ACCUSED  N THE NUREMBERG TRISL

THE AMATEUR SPIES AND THE 1934 DINNER Colleague Charles Spicer. In December 1934, Ernest Tennant, a British banker deeply scarred by the loss of friends and family in the First World War, attended a pivotal dinner in Berlin with Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop. Tennant, along with fellow protagonist Philip Conwell-Evans, sought to prevent another continental war by fostering closer ties between British and German society through organizations like the Anglo-German Fellowship. Ribbentrop, an Anglophile who had lived in London, used these social connections to move decision-makers closer to the Nazi leadership, exploiting the fact that the British government initially viewed Hitler with disdain and had not engaged him diplomatically. The narrative introduces the Travelers Clubin London as a hub for these internationalists and intelligence figures, setting the stage for a story of amateur espionage aimed at civilizing a regime that would eventually launch a predatory war. NUMBER 1 1945 NUREMBERG PROSECUTION

THE 1975 COLLAPSE AND THE WAR'S STRATEGIC FAILURE Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. Following the 1973 peace deal and US withdrawal, Congressional aid to South Vietnam plummeted, leaving the ARVN deprived of essential logistics and air support. When the NVA launched their final offensive in 1975, the US did not intervene, leading to a chaotic collapse of the South Vietnamese military and the fall of Saigon. The war concluded as a strategic failure where the US fought a political war based on the domino theory without understanding local realities, resulting in immense loss of life for little geopolitical gain. NUMBER 16 1964 SAIGON

LAM SON 719 AND THE FAILURE OF VIETNAMIZATION Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. The 1971 invasion of Laos (Lam Son 719) exposed the failure of Vietnamization, as South Vietnamese troops were routed without USground support, proving they lacked the leadership and logistics to fight alone. By 1972, only massive American air power, reinstated by Nixon during the Easter Offensive, saved South Vietnam from collapse, while Nixonsimultaneously pursued détente with China and the USSR to isolate Hanoi. The relentless "Linebacker" bombing campaigns eventually forced North Vietnam back to the negotiating table, though the peace deal essentially replicated terms available years earlier. NUMBER 15

THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION AND DOMESTIC UNREST Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. In 1970, Nixonauthorized an incursion into Cambodia to destroy NVA sanctuaries and supply lines, but the operation failed strategically as the enemy simply retreated deeper into the country and returned later. While the invasion widened the war and ignited massive domestic unrest, including the fatal shootings at Kent State, it also consolidated Nixon's political base, the "Silent Majority." This polarization was evidenced by the "Hard Hat" riots, where workers attacked anti-war protesters, demonstrating that a significant portion of the country still supported the administration's efforts. NUMBER 14

NIXON'S SABOTAGE AND HAMBURGER HILL Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. Richard Nixon won the 1968 election by using Henry Kissinger to secretly sabotage LBJ's peace talks, eventually accepting the same terms in 1973 after four more years of bloodshed. Once in power, Nixon's continuation of "search and destroy" tactics led to the Battle of Hamburger Hill in 1969, where troops captured a meaningless objective only to abandon it, sparking congressional and public outrage. This backlash forced Nixon to abandon coercive ground tactics and pivot toward "Vietnamization," as the American public would no longer tolerate high casualties for insignificant terrain. NUMBER 13

THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. In 1968, North Vietnamlaunched the Tet Offensive to deliver a knockout blow; while a military disaster for the communists, the televised breach of the US Embassy shattered American claims of progress and turned public opinion. Simultaneously, the siege of Khe Sanh symbolized the war's futility, as US forces fought fiercely to hold the base only to abandon and bulldoze it shortly after the battle concluded. These events led trusted figures like Walter Cronkite to declare the war a stalemate, convincing President Johnson that he had lost the support of middle America. NUMBER 12

SEARCH AND DESTROY AND THE FAILURE OF ATTRITION Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. General Westmoreland implemented a strategy of attrition aimed at reaching a "crossover point" where enemies were killed faster than they could be replaced, requiring the construction of massive infrastructure and thousands of firebases. However, this "search and destroy" tactic largely failed because the enemy avoided contact 90% of the time, retreating to sanctuaries when threatened and choosing when to fight. The strategy proved ineffective against an adversary willing to wait out American patience, as US operations often resulted in a "swing and a miss" rather than decisive engagement. NUMBER 11

THE BATTLE OF IA DRANG AND NVA ADAPTATION Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. In 1965, the US introduced combat troops and air mobility tactics, showcased at the Battle of Ia Drang, where General Westmoreland used infantry as "tethered goats" to draw the enemy out for destruction by artillery. However, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) quickly adapted by "hugging" American lines to neutralize superior US firepower, proving they could inflict significant damage and control the terms of engagement. Despite high casualties, the NVA utilized human wave attacks and close-quarters combat, turning what the US hoped would be decisive victories into bloody massacres. NUMBER 10

VIETNAM AS A POLITICAL WAR AND THE GULF OF TONKIN DECEPTION Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. Geoffrey Wawro explains that the Vietnam War was a political war of choice, where the Johnson administration manipulated the Gulf of Tonkin incident to secure a "blank check" from Congress. The administration presented a US-provoked skirmish and a fictitious second attack as unprovoked aggression, using the deception to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and signal toughness against communism. This maneuver was designed to protect Johnson's domestic political standing against conservatives without initially intending to launch a massive ground war. NUMBER 9

MCNAMARA'S REDEMPTION AT THE WORLD BANK Colleague William Taubman. After leaving the Defense Department, McNamara sought redemption as President of the World Bank, shifting its focus to aiding the "poorest of the poor" and combating diseases like river blindness. He viewed this humanitarian work as an attempt to explain the lives lost in Vietnam, later admitting that the bombing campaigns he oversaw failed to break enemy morale just as they had in World War II. While he claimed ignorance regarding the toxicity of Agent Orange and struggled with family estrangement due to the war, he eventually attempted to reconcile his legacy and his relationship with his son. NUMBER 8 1897

MCNAMARA'S PRIVATE TURN AGAINST THE WAR Colleague William Taubman. By 1966, McNamara had privately turned against the war, confessing to aide John McNaughton his desperate desire to "bring the boys home," yet he maintained public support for the conflict out of loyalty to the presidency. He faced intense anti-war hostility, including a confrontation at Harvard where he was trapped by students, and was deeply shaken by the self-immolation of Norman Morrison outside his Pentagon window. Although he organized the military defense of the Pentagon against protesters, he later admitted that he sympathized with their views and would have shut the building down had he been leading the demonstration. NUMBER 7 1968

MCNAMARA, THE KENNEDYS, AND JACKIE'S PLEA Colleague William Taubman. Fearing a political challenge from Robert Kennedy in 1964, Johnson used McNamara to monitor the Kennedys' intentions, specifically sending him to determine if Jackie Kennedy would publicly support an RFK nomination. Despite acting as Johnson'sagent, McNamara maintained a deep, emotionally complex relationship with Jackie, serving as a father figure to her children and comforting her after the assassination. This bond created a conflict for McNamara, as Jackie eventually pounded on his chest during a private meeting, desperately pleading with him to stop the slaughter in Vietnam. NUMBER 6 1966

MCNAMARA AND JOHNSON'S DANGEROUS FEEDBACK LOOP Colleague William Taubman. Following JFK's assassination, Lyndon Johnson retained McNamara, relying on his efficiency and self-confidence to counter his own insecurities and depressive episodes. A dangerous feedback loop developed where McNamara, eager to please his new boss, adopted Johnson's "tone for action" regarding Vietnam, providing brilliant arguments for escalation that reinforced Johnson's instincts to fight. Johnson came to view McNamara as his "fair-haired boy," utilizing him for everything from the war effort to domestic projects and even considering him for the Vice Presidency. NUMBER 5 1966 LBJ ;

MCNAMARA JOINS THE KENNEDY CABINET Colleague William Taubman. In 1960, Robert Kennedy and Sargent Shriver recruited a reluctant McNamara for the Kennedy cabinet; despite McNamara's insistence that he was unqualified for the Treasury or Defense posts, he agreed to meet the President-elect. He accepted the position of Secretary of Defense on the condition that he could appoint his own staff based on merit and avoid the social cocktail circuit to remain a working secretary. Although President Kennedy agreed to these terms, he reportedly discarded McNamara's written list of conditions immediately after their meeting. NUMBER 4 11963

THE WHIZ KIDS AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY Colleague William Taubman. After the war, Tex Thorntonrecruited McNamara as part of the "Whiz Kids" team to modernize Ford Motor Company using statistical control methods, a role in which McNamara excelled and eventually rose to the presidency. Unlike his peers who settled in the executive enclave of Grosse Pointe, McNamara chose to live in the academic community of Ann Arbor, reflecting his desire to remain connected to intellectual life and serve society rather than focus solely on corporate profits. This period highlighted his tendency to serve strong, authoritative figures, a pattern that repeated with Henry Ford II, JFK, and LBJ. NUMBER 3 1929 CORD MOTOR COMPANY