Podcasts about beit shammai

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

More on Beit Hillel's understanding that one placement of blood on the altar is sufficient - as derived from the "atonement" as stated in each verse about the sin-offering. The Gemara probes whether the law can be derived via logic, which sounds plausible, and not only from the verses - for example, an inference about the outer altar placement of blood because of the placement of blood on the inner altar. Also, not the shift in the cases, where Beit Hillel's position ends up being more stringent, and Beit Shammai more lenient, which is not their usual way. But look to Tractate Eduyot - as early mishnah! Note also more details of the placement of the blood, with details of what makes the placement acceptable to qualify the offering for atonement.

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured” the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

A new mishnah - starting chapter 4! A dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: How many placements of blood on the altar are required for atonement? Beit Shammai says two places on the altar are necessary, while Beit Hillel says one placement is sufficient. Both of which depend on respective differences in reading verses from the Torah. Plus, what about leftover blood from previous offerings? And can sprinkling of the blood be done via pouring, or are they considered separate acts altogether? The different readings of the Torah's verses are understood to be based on words that are written differently than the way they are vocalized - specifically, "kranot" vs. "kranat" (meaning, corners or corner). With comparable examples from tefillin and sukkah.

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured” the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

When one views a legal/halachik problem through the lens of empathy and sensitivity to the human problems sometimes caused by halacha, one's view of the halachik issue can be different from viewing it purely academically. One sees the differences in learning between purely academic Roshei Yeshiva and those who were also active Rabbonim. This perspective might help understand the differences between the worldviews of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Source SheetPlease use this link to register for the 50 Year Celebration on Oct 30 or to send Rabbi Lapin a message. https://Matmonimcelebration.com

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

The Rebbe sends blessings in connection with 12–13 Tammuz and responds to previous letters. He acknowledges receipt of Le'or HaHalachah with thanks and brief notes, discusses assisting someone in need, and shares concise halachic insights on warfare, sale of chametz, and the debate between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. https://www.torahrecordings.com/rebbe/igroskodesh/015/011/5604

Unlock the wisdom of ancient debates and discover how two opposing viewpoints can both hold truth. Our latest episode challenges the notion of conflict resolution within Jewish law, taking inspiration from the timeless arguments between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. We explore why the rulings typically follow Beit Hillel and what this teaches us about humility, openness, and respectful debate. These lessons carry parallels to today's public policy discussions and societal tensions, offering fresh insights into navigating modern disagreements.Success doesn't happen overnight, and a friend's remarkable journey from nothing to building a booming business is a testament to this truth. Through their story, we explore the virtues of perseverance and patience, drawing connections to a Talmudic debate on the value of human existence amidst life's challenges. Life isn't without its struggles, but these moments are ripe with potential for spiritual growth and self-reflection. We'll share how the lessons of the Talmud and morning blessings can inspire us to make the most out of our lives.Finally, we celebrate the spiritual over the material, emphasizing the significance of values and humility in our daily lives. Through personal stories and reflections, we discuss the impact of parental attitudes on children's perception of wealth, and the importance of instilling values that transcend materialism. As we wrap up, we extend our heartfelt gratitude for the community's support of the Talmud study class at Torch, encouraging listeners to share the joy of Torah study. Wishing everyone a Shabbos filled with learning, gratitude, and friendship._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud.This Episode (#71) of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast is dedicated in honor of Bruce Licht.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on January 31, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on February 7, 2025_____________DONATE to TORCH: Please consider supporting the podcasts by making a donation to help fund our Jewish outreach and educational efforts at https://www.torchweb.org/support.php. Thank you!_____________SUBSCRIBE and LISTEN to other podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at https://www.TORCHpodcasts.com_____________EMAIL your questions, comments, and feedback: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Please visit www.torchweb.org to see a full listing of our outreach and educational resources available in the Greater Houston area!_____________#Talmud, #Humility, #Eruvin, #Shammai, #Hillel ★ Support this podcast ★

Unlock the wisdom of ancient debates and discover how two opposing viewpoints can both hold truth. Our latest episode challenges the notion of conflict resolution within Jewish law, taking inspiration from the timeless arguments between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. We explore why the rulings typically follow Beit Hillel and what this teaches us about humility, openness, and respectful debate. These lessons carry parallels to today's public policy discussions and societal tensions, offering fresh insights into navigating modern disagreements.Success doesn't happen overnight, and a friend's remarkable journey from nothing to building a booming business is a testament to this truth. Through their story, we explore the virtues of perseverance and patience, drawing connections to a Talmudic debate on the value of human existence amidst life's challenges. Life isn't without its struggles, but these moments are ripe with potential for spiritual growth and self-reflection. We'll share how the lessons of the Talmud and morning blessings can inspire us to make the most out of our lives.Finally, we celebrate the spiritual over the material, emphasizing the significance of values and humility in our daily lives. Through personal stories and reflections, we discuss the impact of parental attitudes on children's perception of wealth, and the importance of instilling values that transcend materialism. As we wrap up, we extend our heartfelt gratitude for the community's support of the Talmud study class at Torch, encouraging listeners to share the joy of Torah study. Wishing everyone a Shabbos filled with learning, gratitude, and friendship._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud.This Episode (#71) of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast is dedicated in honor of Bruce Licht.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on January 31, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on February 7, 2025_____________DONATE to TORCH: Please consider supporting the podcasts by making a donation to help fund our Jewish outreach and educational efforts at https://www.torchweb.org/support.php. Thank you!_____________SUBSCRIBE and LISTEN to other podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at https://www.TORCHpodcasts.com_____________EMAIL your questions, comments, and feedback: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Please visit www.torchweb.org to see a full listing of our outreach and educational resources available in the Greater Houston area!_____________#Talmud, #Humility, #Eruvin, #Shammai, #Hillel ★ Support this podcast ★

Contrasting Opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel on Hanukkah Lighting: A Practical Halachic Discussion

New mishnayot! A case of a house that collapsed on a husband and wife -- apparently, a second marriage, as the heirs of each deliberate which of the two died first. But there's no way to be certain which died first. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute how to divide their property. Also, a new mishnah: A case of a house that collapsed on a son and a mother -- Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the estate should be divided (presuming that he's an only son and she's a widow). Plus, the extra value of learning in the Land of Israel.

On a day that mixes different emotions – being both a holiday and a day of remembrance, today's daf is dedicated to the memory of those who were tragically taken from us one year ago today. May our learning be an aliyah for their neshamot, a tribute to their lives, and a reflection of the strength and resilience of our people in the face of the unimaginable pain we have all experienced since that day.  From where does Beit Shammai learn that hatarat nedarim can be done with three regular people, since he doesn't hold by the gzeira shava of "ze hadavar" from slaughtering outside the Temple? Why was Tu B'av considered a day of celebration? The sages bring six different answers explaining what incident happened on that date to merit a celebration for generations.  Seven people together span all the generations, from Adam to Eliyahu Hanavi, who, based on tradition, never died. Who are they and how do we know each overlapped with the next?

On a day that mixes different emotions – being both a holiday and a day of remembrance, today's daf is dedicated to the memory of those who were tragically taken from us one year ago today. May our learning be an aliyah for their neshamot, a tribute to their lives, and a reflection of the strength and resilience of our people in the face of the unimaginable pain we have all experienced since that day.  From where does Beit Shammai learn that hatarat nedarim can be done with three regular people, since he doesn't hold by the gzeira shava of "ze hadavar" from slaughtering outside the Temple? Why was Tu B'av considered a day of celebration? The sages bring six different answers explaining what incident happened on that date to merit a celebration for generations.  Seven people together span all the generations, from Adam to Eliyahu Hanavi, who, based on tradition, never died. Who are they and how do we know each overlapped with the next?

One who redeems ma'aser sheni on coins, and the desacralizes the coins to use them to buy the food in Jerusalem - how those coins can be exchanged, a dispute between Beit Shammai vs. Beit Hillel. Plus, the sourcing of the word "money" twice in the biblical verse. Also, when money is an exchange instead of a sale or a purchase payment.

If one gives money to a money changer, if it is not bound and sealed, the money changer is permitted to use it and is thereby responsible if the money gets lost. There is a debate whether the money changer is also responsible for oness (accidental damage). Regarding shlichut yad, if one decides to use an item they are watching and it then breaks, if the item changes in value from the time the shomer decides to use it until the time it breaks, what value is the shomer obligated to pay? Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva have a debate regarding this issue. The Gemara brings five attempts, four of which are rejected, to understand the disagreement between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel. According to the conclusion, the debate is not regarding a fluctuation in the market price, but the value of the animal itself increases or decreases by having offspring/wool to be sheared. According to who do we pasken? 

If one gives money to a money changer, if it is not bound and sealed, the money changer is permitted to use it and is thereby responsible if the money gets lost. There is a debate whether the money changer is also responsible for oness (accidental damage). Regarding shlichut yad, if one decides to use an item they are watching and it then breaks, if the item changes in value from the time the shomer decides to use it until the time it breaks, what value is the shomer obligated to pay? Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva have a debate regarding this issue. The Gemara brings five attempts, four of which are rejected, to understand the disagreement between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel. According to the conclusion, the debate is not regarding a fluctuation in the market price, but the value of the animal itself increases or decreases by having offspring/wool to be sheared. According to who do we pasken? 

More opinions are brought about why Beit Shammai require a dinar for marriage. Beit Hillel's holds that a woman can be betrothed with a pruta. What is the value of that pruta? What if the item is something that fluctuates in value? What if it was worth less but somewhere else could be worth a pruta? What if after the fact there is a question about the marriage and the current value is a pruta but it may have been worth more earlier when the marriage took place? Several actual cases are brought. Rav instituted lashes for people who did various things including getting betrothed without prearranging, or in the marketplace, or by betrothal through intercourse. The latter, while permitted by the Torah, was frowned upon by the rabbis.

More opinions are brought about why Beit Shammai require a dinar for marriage. Beit Hillel's holds that a woman can be betrothed with a pruta. What is the value of that pruta? What if the item is something that fluctuates in value? What if it was worth less but somewhere else could be worth a pruta? What if after the fact there is a question about the marriage and the current value is a pruta but it may have been worth more earlier when the marriage took place? Several actual cases are brought. Rav instituted lashes for people who did various things including getting betrothed without prearranging, or in the marketplace, or by betrothal through intercourse. The latter, while permitted by the Torah, was frowned upon by the rabbis.

Today's daf is sponsored by Betsy Frank in honor of Penny's Daf Yomi Salon. Today's daf is sponsored by Marilyn Katz in honor of Rebecca Koenigsberg. "She is a constant source for me of inspiration and knowledge, and whose constant observation of the mitzva of hachnassat orchim extends to regularly serving as the siyum mesaderet for our small local group of daf-yomi-ers." Why does Beit Shammai hold that the money required for betrothal is significantly higher than the amount Beit Hillel says? Several answers are suggested. 

The Gemara does a deep dive on Beit Shammai's opinion that for Kiddushin to take place with money it must be at a value of at least a dinar. Several opinions are offered to help understand Beit Shammai's reasoning.

Today's daf is sponsored by Betsy Frank in honor of Penny's Daf Yomi Salon. Today's daf is sponsored by Marilyn Katz in honor of Rebecca Koenigsberg. "She is a constant source for me of inspiration and knowledge, and whose constant observation of the mitzva of hachnassat orchim extends to regularly serving as the siyum mesaderet for our small local group of daf-yomi-ers." Why does Beit Shammai hold that the money required for betrothal is significantly higher than the amount Beit Hillel says? Several answers are suggested. 

A new mishnah on this last daf! Specifically, under what circumstances is a husband allowed to divorce his wife - of course, a machloket, this time, between Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva (based on interpreting a verse). Plus, 4 ways to understand the word, "ki," in the biblical text. Also, ending the tractate with the full emotions of divorce - in sorrow and some measure or regret - a husband shouldn't continue to stay married to a wife he hates, but he then is hated by God (with a distinction between first and second marriages).

2 mishnayot: 1. A slave whose owner uses him as a payment of debt to another person, but then is freed before he functions as that payment. What happens?? A tikkun olam decree to keep the peace - and ensure that the slave remains free. Plus, rereading the mishnah by the Gemara - in two ways (by Rav and Ulla). 2. A slave who is half-freed and half-slave... an in-between status that is not easily resolved. How should this person function? It's a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and - unusually - Beit Shammai is upheld by Beit Hillel, for the sake of the good of this person.

First, a mishnah - a brainteaser of 6 people who take conditional vows of nezirut, depending on determinable unknowns. The question of whether those vows kick in depending on the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Plus, some talmudic revision of the phrasing of the mishnah. Also, the absence of talmudic text on Amud Bet. Plus, a brief review of the Baalei HaTosafot.

What happens if you consecrate something in error? Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai dispute the outcome - not consecrated and consecrated, respectively. Also, delving into the side of Beit Shammai, and the rationale of priority when it comes to consecration, whether that which is more valuable or that which is indeed first.

A new mishnah: when witnesses come to court to testify about another person's vow of nezirut. Plus contradictory witnesses. With a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai on how to square the contradictions. Also, moving on to the new chapter, 4: another new mishnah: where one person takes a vow as a nazir, and subsequent people say that they each are too, then they're all nezirim... except that if the first person is released from nezirut, then those who said "and I!" are no longer bound either. Likewise, other wordings that indicate the same. Plus, the amount of time it takes to greet another is the limit on how quickly others chime in to the first person's vow. Note the discussion between R. Yehudah HaNasi and Resh Lakish.

When a vow for nezirut is conditioned upon an external event, such as the positioning of a cow or a door, and whether the vow will be upheld. Plus, the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai continues. Also, Rava's understanding of the role of the cow in this kind of case, plus his revision, as it were, to include the possibility of both the cow and the door.

Chapter 2: One who uses unusual expressions in taking on nezirut (for example, including refraining from dried figs in the vow), and whether that has impact on the assumption of nezirut. A machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Also, specific definitions of the korbanot mitigate against just deciding whatever sacrifice one wanted to offer, for example. Misspeaking for such a thing is allowable to some extent, but the vow for nezirut is expected to comply with the definition, as people know what a nazir is, and shouldn't have introduced external details.

Study Guide Nedarim 71 Today’s daf is sponsored by Elisa Hartstein in loving memory of her father Malcolm Minsk, Mordechai Nachum ben Tzvi v’Chaya Bluma, for whom she completes 11 months of kaddish today and who she misses very much. "Thanks to my kaddish buddies including daffers Judi and Emma for their support and companionship." The Mishnah stated that if a woman vowed while betrothed then divorced and got engaged on the same day, her father and new husband can annul the vow. Shmuel brings a proof from a verse to show that this is also true for vows that the first fiancé already knew about. The Gemara brings the Tosefta to support Shmuel's opinion. It emerges from the Tosefta that Beit Shammai believes that it is not possible for a second fiancé to break vows known to the first fiancé, but Beit Hillel holds that he can. The Gemara asks a question: If a husband divorces his wife, is the divorce considered a ratification of the vow or as silence? In what case would there be relevance to this question?    

A woman who takes a vow while betrothed, divorces that same day, gets betrothed to another that same day - the father can revoke her vow and the second (or last in this kind of chain) can revoke it. That is, she is always under her father's auspices, as a young woman, or under her husband's, but she hasn't aged into her own authority. Plus, the verses that explain the bottom lines of these cases. Also, a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the nature of revoking the woman's vow.

Study Guide Nedarim 71 Today’s daf is sponsored by Elisa Hartstein in loving memory of her father Malcolm Minsk, Mordechai Nachum ben Tzvi v’Chaya Bluma, for whom she completes 11 months of kaddish today and who she misses very much. "Thanks to my kaddish buddies including daffers Judi and Emma for their support and companionship." The Mishnah stated that if a woman vowed while betrothed then divorced and got engaged on the same day, her father and new husband can annul the vow. Shmuel brings a proof from a verse to show that this is also true for vows that the first fiancé already knew about. The Gemara brings the Tosefta to support Shmuel's opinion. It emerges from the Tosefta that Beit Shammai believes that it is not possible for a second fiancé to break vows known to the first fiancé, but Beit Hillel holds that he can. The Gemara asks a question: If a husband divorces his wife, is the divorce considered a ratification of the vow or as silence? In what case would there be relevance to this question?    

A new mishnah! Taking a vow to protect yourself from thugs who you feel are putting you in danger, and you take a vow to protect yourself. With a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, how far that goes. Plus, the law of the land is the law (assuming that doesn't mean laws made against Judaism). Also, another mishnah! The need to redeem saplings (for example) that have been consecrated - with various parameters. Plus, the vows people take in a time of need - like, the protect the saplings, plus the case of the tallit. Namely, promises made as recompense for getting saved.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in loving memory of her father, Tzvi Ben Moshe on his 14th yahrzeit.  Today's daf is sponsored by Risa Tzohar in loving memory of her grandmother, Rose Schwartz Wittels. The Gemara interprets the Mishna that distinguished between neder and nedava according to Rabbi Yehuda's opinion and explains why he distinguishes between them. In the process, they brought a braita with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion which spoke about the early pious people who took on being a nazir in order to be able to bring a sin offering. In this braita, Rabbi Shimon's opinion is presented. He disagrees and explains that every nazir is considered a sinner. Abaye cites three people (Shimon the Tzadik in his story on Nedarim 9b, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Elazar the Kapar) who viewed nazirs as sinners. What is the sin of being a nazir, according to them, and from which verse in the Torah did they derive this? The Mishna lists what words are kinui of vows, cherem, nazir and oaths. Regarding a kinui, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree - is it the language of the gentiles or the language of the sages that was made up for us to use? According to Reish Lakish, why would the rabbis make up words to use in place of the actual words? It was to avoid using God's name in vain. Is their dispute the same as the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding a kinui of a kinui? Some examples of a kinui of a kinui are brought? The Mishna says that using the language of something that is forbidden or related to sacrifices would be a valid language of a vow.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in loving memory of her father, Tzvi Ben Moshe on his 14th yahrzeit.  Today's daf is sponsored by Risa Tzohar in loving memory of her grandmother, Rose Schwartz Wittels. The Gemara interprets the Mishna that distinguished between neder and nedava according to Rabbi Yehuda's opinion and explains why he distinguishes between them. In the process, they brought a braita with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion which spoke about the early pious people who took on being a nazir in order to be able to bring a sin offering. In this braita, Rabbi Shimon's opinion is presented. He disagrees and explains that every nazir is considered a sinner. Abaye cites three people (Shimon the Tzadik in his story on Nedarim 9b, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Elazar the Kapar) who viewed nazirs as sinners. What is the sin of being a nazir, according to them, and from which verse in the Torah did they derive this? The Mishna lists what words are kinui of vows, cherem, nazir and oaths. Regarding a kinui, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree - is it the language of the gentiles or the language of the sages that was made up for us to use? According to Reish Lakish, why would the rabbis make up words to use in place of the actual words? It was to avoid using God's name in vain. Is their dispute the same as the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding a kinui of a kinui? Some examples of a kinui of a kinui are brought? The Mishna says that using the language of something that is forbidden or related to sacrifices would be a valid language of a vow.  

[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Sunday, September 25, Erev Rosh Hashanah] Who said halakhot were to be derived from the language of the ketubah? The mishnah connects the ketubah issues to that of sotah - the case of a woman suspected of adultery. The comparison leads to a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, regarding the terms of one's ketubah. Also, the question of whether a yevamah can collect her ketubah from the first husband while the yavam is alive? What would it mean for that money to be available? Moreover, how would everyone feel if that were put into practice? The mishnah is treated as important good advice.

Chapter 8! With a new mishnah, of course. On usufruct property that a wife brings into the marriage, and the husband has the right of the produce of the property. For example, when a woman inherits prior to her betrothal. But what happens if she's already betrothed? It's a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Plus, an expressed discomfort with the halakhah as it's determined here. Plus, what if he doesn't know about the inheritance?! Also, a mishnah that is compared to Takanat Usha - on this kind of property, specifically. And again, what if the husband didn't know about the property she inherits? So much is property law, so much seems to be decided on a case by case basis, which is not always our norm.

Dedicated in the memory of Dr. Dodi Tobin z"l. || A series of what amounts to recommendations by the sages for a healthy diet during pregnancy. Including how a mother's diet of etrogim made the child smell good, to the extent that the child was used to spice. Plus, more marriage politics around nursing, which are apparently eternal. Also, just how delectable all kinds of food, meat and wine and mushrooms and turnip and even pomegranates can be, to drive people beyond distraction in their desire and appetite for the food. And how the way one treats the waiters is indicative of one's righteousness - and if one is righteous enough, Elijah the Prophet just might pop by for a visit. Plus, the next mishnah. And - 2 sages with comparable names. And a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai that brings us back to pregnancy and nursing.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Levant and Dickson families. "Wishing our daughters, Dalia Dickson and Miriam Levant a giyus kal as they start the army today! May Hashem watch over them and may they have a safe and meaningful service." 

Still fighting with the tech. So many apologies!! || A disturbing daf - where we begin our discussion with the Gemara's case of prepubescent marriage (on Shabbat). The case is fairly straightforward - in terms of injury to the virgin on Shabbat, and Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai dispute how long the couple can rely on her prepubescent state to prevent concerns of the impurity of Niddah. Similarly, the case of a girl who is the right age/stage for puberty, but hasn't yet menstruated. Also, a discussion of the bridegroom who is exempt from saying Shema on the wedding night (from Wednesday night through to Saturday night, if the bride is a virgin and they haven't consummated the marriage) - a case that has its parallel on Berakhot 16b, and Rabban Gamliel who did say Shema. Note how the framing of the discussion is very different.

Mishnayot! A women who testifies that her husband has died can remarry, but does she get the ketubah money? It's a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and one that Beit Shammai wins. Also, the 5 women whose testimony is not believed regarding a man's death because they are too likely to have it in for his potential widow. Plus, the difference between a bill of divorce and the testimony to a man's death. Also, a woman remarries on the basis of a witness's testimony and another witness comes and contradicts that testimony - she stays remarried.

A dispute between R. Yehudah and R. Yosei on a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai over cases of a husband who believes his wife to be dead, and sleeps with either the mother-in-law or the sister-in-law, and how those scenarios would impact his marriage, in the event that the wife turns up alive, after all. Plus, the rationales for the approach to permit the couple to return to each other. Also, R. Yosei. On a case of two couples, where the wives are sisters, and the testimony on disappearance that is found to be mistaken. What are the implications for the couples to be able to return to each other? And who is disqualified from being with whom? Note how complicated and ambiguous the mishnah that this Gemara works off of to interpret is.

4 mishnayot! Practical details about kohanim and whom they can marry. For example, a kohen who is betrothed a widow, and is later appointed to be the kohen gadol, he's fine, they can marry. Plus, a story to make the point: R. Yehoshua ben Gamla. Also, how the kohen gadol cannot do yibum, only chalitzah. Also, the case of the aiylonit and the kohen gadol and the mitzvah of p'ru ur'vu. Plus, the kohen gadol is actually not supposed to marry too young of a girl. Also, a man may not disregard the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying when he gets married - unless he already has children. The details of which, are of course, disputed by Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.

Cases of questionable inheritance, which need some real calculation and navigation to determine who should inherit what (particularly property). Plus, a new mishnah - where a yevamah-to-be inherits prior to yibum... Which complicates the inheritance she bequeaths as well. Also, when a husband died before a Sotah woman has a chance to have her test to determine whether she has committed adultery takes place - what happens is a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, which aligns with the issues of inheritance earlier on the daf.

The question of whether the co-wives of a daughter would be permitted to the brothers... As answered in the time of R. Dosa ben Hyrcanus, in accord with Beit Shammai (which is a startling alignment). He was elderly and rather homebound, so he wasn't available for consultation or elaboration on his psak, so eventually, a crew of rabbis make the trek to his home. And the Gemara presents what seems to be the entirety of their visit and inquiry. Plus, the harsh language among brothers... (and then we meet him too). Also, lessons from Haggai the prophet, about the case of the co-wives of the daughter, the tithing in Jordan, and details about whom we accept how easily for conversion. Specifically, two groups of people who would have thought to have factors that would invalidate them as possible converts -- but the names of these groups are similar to two groups that were indeed valid to convert, which muddies things. Which leads into questions of different standards, how much Jewish practice does it take to be considered Jewish, etc. Plus, a discussion of the non-Jews and their desecration if the first Beit HaMikdash, which is held against the Tarmodim (one of the groups), and the violence against women in war... With implications for Jewish lineage...

More on Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel... Specifically, did the members of Beit Shammai actually follow the approaches of Beit Shammai. Note also the affinity of other sages for either given approach - for example, Rabbi Tarfon (and his opinion, in contrast to R. Yochanan ben Nuri). Rabban Gamliel should be following Beit Hillel... But is introduced here as a follower of Beit Shammai?! Plus, several more cases by which to investigate the question of whether Beit Shammai people followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, or did they follow Beit Hillel, as per the bat kol (heavenly voice) that said everyone should be following Beit Hillel?