Podcasts about Beit Hillel

Where should the tzitzit be attached to the 4-cornered garment? How long do tzitzit need to hang down? But they don't have a measure... or at least not as long as they are long enough to count as being "strings." A point upon which Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree. Plus, is there a blessing made upon tying tzitzit or only upon wearing them? Also, diving into the details of the dying of tekhelet and its rules. Plus, the need for expertise - and just how special the tekhelet was.

The rabbis disagree on the required length of tzitzit strings, which implies that a specific length is necessary. However, this appears to contradict a ruling by the elders of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that there is no requisite amount. This contradiction is reconciled by explaining that their statement refers to the maximum length. A braita emphasizes the importance of the strings hanging down, as proven by the usage of the word "tzitzit" in a different context (Yechezkel 8:3). How are tzitzit prepared? Specifically, how far from the garment's edge should they be, and how many strings are inserted and in what manner? There are various opinions on these matters. Is a bracha recited when preparing tzitzit? Can a non-Jew prepare them? Rav Chisda believed these two questions were connected and challenged Rav based on that premise; however, Rav Chisda's understanding was ultimately rejected. Which part of the process must be performed "for the sake of" the mitzva? Some maintain that the strings must be spun for the sake of the mitzva, while others hold that only the final preparation of the tzitzit must be done with this intent.

The rabbis disagree on the required length of tzitzit strings, which implies that a specific length is necessary. However, this appears to contradict a ruling by the elders of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that there is no requisite amount. This contradiction is reconciled by explaining that their statement refers to the maximum length. A braita emphasizes the importance of the strings hanging down, as proven by the usage of the word "tzitzit" in a different context (Yechezkel 8:3). How are tzitzit prepared? Specifically, how far from the garment's edge should they be, and how many strings are inserted and in what manner? There are various opinions on these matters. Is a bracha recited when preparing tzitzit? Can a non-Jew prepare them? Rav Chisda believed these two questions were connected and challenged Rav based on that premise; however, Rav Chisda's understanding was ultimately rejected. Which part of the process must be performed "for the sake of" the mitzva? Some maintain that the strings must be spun for the sake of the mitzva, while others hold that only the final preparation of the tzitzit must be done with this intent.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the law of a sadin (a linen garment) in the context of tzitzit. While Beit Shammai exempts a linen garment from the obligation of tzitzit to avoid the prohibition of shaatnez (mixing wool and linen), Beit Hillel holds it is obligated. Their reasoning is based on the textual juxtaposition of the laws of shaatnez and tzitzit, which teaches that the positive commandment (aseh) of tzitzit overrides the negative prohibition (lo taaseh) of shaatnez. Although the halakha follows Beit Hillel, Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok testifies that anyone who attached tchelet (wool) to a linen garment in Jerusalem was viewed with wonder - as it caused onlookers to mistakenly believe shaatnez was generally permitted. Rabbi explains that the Sages eventually prohibited this practice because people did not know about the drasha permitting shaatnez and would come to think that shaatnez was permitted in general. Since difficulties were raised against Rabbi's explanation, Rava and Rabbi Zeira offer four alternative reasons for why the Sages prohibited wool tzitzit on linen garments: Decree of "kala ilan": There is a concern that one might use a dye that looks like techelet but is not the authentic wool dyed with snail secretions. In such a case, the wearer violates the prohibition of shaatnez (wool and linen) without having fulfilled the mitzvah that allows it. Decree of "teima" (testing): A concern regarding the validity of the tzitzit - lest the techelet used was dyed during the "testing" of the color, which is invalid because it was not dyed specifically for the sake of the mitzva (lishma). Concern of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui ": Rava and Rabbi Zera explain a concern that if the linen garment tears within three fingerbreadths of its edge, a person might sew it back up and leave the sewing threads to serve as tzitzit. This would be invalid because the Torah requires the mitzva to be actively made by attaching the strings to the garment, rather than utilizing threads that were already there for a different purpose. Decree of night garments: Since a garment worn exclusively at night is exempt from tzitzit, wearing wool strings on a linen night garment would constitute a shaatnez violation without any mitzva to permit it. The Gemara discusses the definition of a garment obligated in tzitzit regarding a hybrid garment made of leather and fabric. Rava rules that we follow the primary material of the garment: if the body of the garment is fabric and the corners are leather, it is obligated; if the body is leather and the corners are fabric, it is exempt. Rav Achai disagrees, arguing that the status follows the material of the corners themselves. Regarding the construction of the tzitzit, Rav Huna rules that if one attached tzitzit to a garment while it only had three corners and then completed the fourth corner afterward, the tzitzit is invalid due to "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" (Make it, and not from that which is already made). The Gemara challenges this from the practice of the "Early Pious Ones," who would attach techelet after weaving only three fingerbreadths of the garment (when only two corners were in existence). The Gemara resolves this by understanding the custom of the pious ones to be performed at the end, when there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave (when the four corners were already in existence). Finally, the Gemara challenges the invalidation of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" based on Rabbi Zera's ruling, which validates attaching new tzitzit onto a garment that already has tzitzit (and then removing the old ones). Rava suggests that because of the prohibition of "bal tosif" (do not add to the mitzvot), the act of attaching the strings before the obligation exists is not considered a significant "act." However, Rav Papa challenges Rava's reasoning, explaining that it depends on human intent: if one intends to cancel the first set of strings and replace them with the new ones, it is considered a significant act. This raises the question: if intent makes it a valid act, why was the case of attaching tzitzit before the garment was finished invalid in light of Rabbi Zeira permitting the case of the extra strings?

A dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai on whether a linen cloak is obligated in tzitzit (including tekhelet, that is, which has to be a wool thread). Is that a problem of sha'atnez? The halakhah follows Beit Hillel. So what is the rabbinic decree and how should they publicize it? From what garments need the tzitzit, the Gemara moves to the concern of indigo, which is a plant-based dye and fraudulent when it comes to tekhelet, and that itself received a rabbinic decree -- against people using it and err with regard to the mitzvah inadvertently. Also, the concern of sha'atnez being in a night garment, which itself would be exempt from tzitzit. Plus, the early pious folks who would tie tzitzit on the corners before 4 were even present - which raises the question of "adding" to a mitzvah, which itself is prohibited.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the law of a sadin (a linen garment) in the context of tzitzit. While Beit Shammai exempts a linen garment from the obligation of tzitzit to avoid the prohibition of shaatnez (mixing wool and linen), Beit Hillel holds it is obligated. Their reasoning is based on the textual juxtaposition of the laws of shaatnez and tzitzit, which teaches that the positive commandment (aseh) of tzitzit overrides the negative prohibition (lo taaseh) of shaatnez. Although the halakha follows Beit Hillel, Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok testifies that anyone who attached tchelet (wool) to a linen garment in Jerusalem was viewed with wonder - as it caused onlookers to mistakenly believe shaatnez was generally permitted. Rabbi explains that the Sages eventually prohibited this practice because people did not know about the drasha permitting shaatnez and would come to think that shaatnez was permitted in general. Since difficulties were raised against Rabbi's explanation, Rava and Rabbi Zeira offer four alternative reasons for why the Sages prohibited wool tzitzit on linen garments: Decree of "kala ilan": There is a concern that one might use a dye that looks like techelet but is not the authentic wool dyed with snail secretions. In such a case, the wearer violates the prohibition of shaatnez (wool and linen) without having fulfilled the mitzvah that allows it. Decree of "teima" (testing): A concern regarding the validity of the tzitzit - lest the techelet used was dyed during the "testing" of the color, which is invalid because it was not dyed specifically for the sake of the mitzva (lishma). Concern of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui ": Rava and Rabbi Zera explain a concern that if the linen garment tears within three fingerbreadths of its edge, a person might sew it back up and leave the sewing threads to serve as tzitzit. This would be invalid because the Torah requires the mitzva to be actively made by attaching the strings to the garment, rather than utilizing threads that were already there for a different purpose. Decree of night garments: Since a garment worn exclusively at night is exempt from tzitzit, wearing wool strings on a linen night garment would constitute a shaatnez violation without any mitzva to permit it. The Gemara discusses the definition of a garment obligated in tzitzit regarding a hybrid garment made of leather and fabric. Rava rules that we follow the primary material of the garment: if the body of the garment is fabric and the corners are leather, it is obligated; if the body is leather and the corners are fabric, it is exempt. Rav Achai disagrees, arguing that the status follows the material of the corners themselves. Regarding the construction of the tzitzit, Rav Huna rules that if one attached tzitzit to a garment while it only had three corners and then completed the fourth corner afterward, the tzitzit is invalid due to "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" (Make it, and not from that which is already made). The Gemara challenges this from the practice of the "Early Pious Ones," who would attach techelet after weaving only three fingerbreadths of the garment (when only two corners were in existence). The Gemara resolves this by understanding the custom of the pious ones to be performed at the end, when there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave (when the four corners were already in existence). Finally, the Gemara challenges the invalidation of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" based on Rabbi Zera's ruling, which validates attaching new tzitzit onto a garment that already has tzitzit (and then removing the old ones). Rava suggests that because of the prohibition of "bal tosif" (do not add to the mitzvot), the act of attaching the strings before the obligation exists is not considered a significant "act." However, Rav Papa challenges Rava's reasoning, explaining that it depends on human intent: if one intends to cancel the first set of strings and replace them with the new ones, it is considered a significant act. This raises the question: if intent makes it a valid act, why was the case of attaching tzitzit before the garment was finished invalid in light of Rabbi Zeira permitting the case of the extra strings?

Bet Shamai and Bet Hillel were two major Jewish schools in Jerusalem that lasted about 100 years from about 10 BCE to 70 CE. The schools were founded by two great Jewish leaders Hillel and Shamai. There were hundreds of debates of Jewish law between the two prominent schools. A fascinating discussion about Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel and their important contributions to Judaism and Jewish History. 

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

More on Beit Hillel's understanding that one placement of blood on the altar is sufficient - as derived from the "atonement" as stated in each verse about the sin-offering. The Gemara probes whether the law can be derived via logic, which sounds plausible, and not only from the verses - for example, an inference about the outer altar placement of blood because of the placement of blood on the inner altar. Also, not the shift in the cases, where Beit Hillel's position ends up being more stringent, and Beit Shammai more lenient, which is not their usual way. But look to Tractate Eduyot - as early mishnah! Note also more details of the placement of the blood, with details of what makes the placement acceptable to qualify the offering for atonement.

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured” the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

A new mishnah - starting chapter 4! A dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: How many placements of blood on the altar are required for atonement? Beit Shammai says two places on the altar are necessary, while Beit Hillel says one placement is sufficient. Both of which depend on respective differences in reading verses from the Torah. Plus, what about leftover blood from previous offerings? And can sprinkling of the blood be done via pouring, or are they considered separate acts altogether? The different readings of the Torah's verses are understood to be based on words that are written differently than the way they are vocalized - specifically, "kranot" vs. "kranat" (meaning, corners or corner). With comparable examples from tefillin and sukkah.

Study Guide A braita is presented that derives from the verse “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured” the principle that if one performs just a single application of blood for each offering brought on the outer altar, they have fulfilled their obligation—supporting the halakha stated in the Mishnah. However, this verse is also used for various other interpretations and halakhot. This raises a question: how does the author of the braita derive this law from the verse if it is already employed for other teachings? Those who interpret the verse differently derive this law by another method: they learn the rule from the sin offering (in accordance with Beit Hillel) and extend it from there to other offerings. How do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel each derive their respective views regarding the sin offering from the biblical verses?

When one views a legal/halachik problem through the lens of empathy and sensitivity to the human problems sometimes caused by halacha, one's view of the halachik issue can be different from viewing it purely academically. One sees the differences in learning between purely academic Roshei Yeshiva and those who were also active Rabbonim. This perspective might help understand the differences between the worldviews of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Source SheetPlease use this link to register for the 50 Year Celebration on Oct 30 or to send Rabbi Lapin a message. https://Matmonimcelebration.com

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

The Rebbe sends blessings in connection with 12–13 Tammuz and responds to previous letters. He acknowledges receipt of Le'or HaHalachah with thanks and brief notes, discusses assisting someone in need, and shares concise halachic insights on warfare, sale of chametz, and the debate between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. https://www.torahrecordings.com/rebbe/igroskodesh/015/011/5604

Zionism asked the Jewish People if they could wield power properly, Rabbi Hanan Schlesinger says. The answer, according to him, is now clear: They cannot.Before co-founding the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue center Roots/Shorashim/Judur, Hanan had never met a Palestinian before. 2013 changed that. Inspired by his interfaith experience decades prior, Hanan threw himself into peace work and is now Roots' Director of International Relations. Hanan is a member of the Rabbinical Council of America and the International Rabbinic Fellowship, as well as Beit Hillel, an Israeli rabbinical association. He is a Rabbis Without Borders fellow, and was honored in 2013 and again in 2014 as the Memnosyne Institute Interfaith Scholar.Now, he joins us to answer 18 questions, including Jewish power, coexistence, and Palestinian-Israeli peace.This interview was held on June 4.

Today's daf is sponsored by Elisheva Gray in loving memory of Gidi Nahshon, z''l, Yoel Melech ben Moshe v'Sarah, on his tenth yahrzeit. "Gidi was a wonderful mentor, friend and chevruta. He made Aliyah to Israel from Prague and was in the IDF during both the 1967 and Yom Kippur wars. I feel his presence in my Daf Yomi studies every day, and I am grateful that he passed on to me his d'vekut for Israel and for Torah. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Miri Darchi in loving memory of her father Aharon Shimon ben David and Malka Tzirel.  Abaye raises a difficulty against Rabba's position, that males before reaching maturity cannot father a child, from a verse in the Torah regarding a man who engages in relations with a shifcha harufa. The drasha on that verse includes a male over the age of nine. However, the difficulty is resolved, as this is not an indicator that the child can impregnate a woman at that age. Another difficulty is raised against Rabba from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that derives an exemption for a ben sorer u'moreh who himself is a father - how could he be a father if he did not impregnate the woman before reaching maturity, since according to Rabbi Kruspedai, there is only a three-month window after reaching maturity to be a ben sorer u'moreh? This is resolved as well by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's drasha as the source for Rabbi Kruspedia's ruling - the three months is based on the fact that the child could potentially be called a father within three months of reaching maturity as his wife could become pregnant and would be showing it after the first three months. Rabbi Kruspedai's opinion is based on the majority of women who give birth at nine months and begin showing at three months and doesn't consider a woman who gives birth at seven months and would be showing at two and a third months. Could this prove that woman who gives birth at seven months also begins showing at three months and not at a third of her pregnancy (two and a third months)? This suggestion is rejected as he follows the majority. However, is that really true? This contradicts the concept that in capital law we try to find any possible way to exonerate the accused from the verse "and the congregation shall save." Two Mishnayot are brought to prove that we do follow the majority even in capital cases, but the second one is rejected as it can be explained differently. Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about a mother who has an incomplete sexual encounter with her minor son. Does this disqualify her from marrying a kohen, as she could be considered a zona from the interaction? Rav Chisda (either quoted someone else or he was quoted by someone else) explains that they all agree if the child was nine, that she would become disqualified, and if he was younger than eight, then she would not. Their disagreement is about a child who is between eight and nine, as in the days of the Tanach men were able to father children at eight, even though already in the time of the tannaim, this was no longer the situation. The debate is whether we learn from those times or follow what is true presently. What is the source that in the times of the Tanach men fathered children at age eight? At first, they try to prove from Shlomo, as his great grandfather Achitofel was twenty-six years older than him. However, this proof is rejected, as the lineage includes Bat-Sheva who was a woman and she could have been younger, and the men were older. The second attempt is brought from Avraham and Sara, but this is rejected as well as it is not clear whether Avraham was older than Sara's father, Haran or younger. The final proof comes from Bezalel who was the great-grandson of Caleb, who was twenty-six years older than him. If two years are deducted due to three pregnancies, then the remainder of the twenty-four years prove that each father was eight years old at the birth of his son. Why are girls exempted from being a ben sorer u'moreh?

Today's daf is sponsored by Elisheva Gray in loving memory of Gidi Nahshon, z''l, Yoel Melech ben Moshe v'Sarah, on his tenth yahrzeit. "Gidi was a wonderful mentor, friend and chevruta. He made Aliyah to Israel from Prague and was in the IDF during both the 1967 and Yom Kippur wars. I feel his presence in my Daf Yomi studies every day, and I am grateful that he passed on to me his d'vekut for Israel and for Torah. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Miri Darchi in loving memory of her father Aharon Shimon ben David and Malka Tzirel.  Abaye raises a difficulty against Rabba's position, that males before reaching maturity cannot father a child, from a verse in the Torah regarding a man who engages in relations with a shifcha harufa. The drasha on that verse includes a male over the age of nine. However, the difficulty is resolved, as this is not an indicator that the child can impregnate a woman at that age. Another difficulty is raised against Rabba from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that derives an exemption for a ben sorer u'moreh who himself is a father - how could he be a father if he did not impregnate the woman before reaching maturity, since according to Rabbi Kruspedai, there is only a three-month window after reaching maturity to be a ben sorer u'moreh? This is resolved as well by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's drasha as the source for Rabbi Kruspedia's ruling - the three months is based on the fact that the child could potentially be called a father within three months of reaching maturity as his wife could become pregnant and would be showing it after the first three months. Rabbi Kruspedai's opinion is based on the majority of women who give birth at nine months and begin showing at three months and doesn't consider a woman who gives birth at seven months and would be showing at two and a third months. Could this prove that woman who gives birth at seven months also begins showing at three months and not at a third of her pregnancy (two and a third months)? This suggestion is rejected as he follows the majority. However, is that really true? This contradicts the concept that in capital law we try to find any possible way to exonerate the accused from the verse "and the congregation shall save." Two Mishnayot are brought to prove that we do follow the majority even in capital cases, but the second one is rejected as it can be explained differently. Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about a mother who has an incomplete sexual encounter with her minor son. Does this disqualify her from marrying a kohen, as she could be considered a zona from the interaction? Rav Chisda (either quoted someone else or he was quoted by someone else) explains that they all agree if the child was nine, that she would become disqualified, and if he was younger than eight, then she would not. Their disagreement is about a child who is between eight and nine, as in the days of the Tanach men were able to father children at eight, even though already in the time of the tannaim, this was no longer the situation. The debate is whether we learn from those times or follow what is true presently. What is the source that in the times of the Tanach men fathered children at age eight? At first, they try to prove from Shlomo, as his great grandfather Achitofel was twenty-six years older than him. However, this proof is rejected, as the lineage includes Bat-Sheva who was a woman and she could have been younger, and the men were older. The second attempt is brought from Avraham and Sara, but this is rejected as well as it is not clear whether Avraham was older than Sara's father, Haran or younger. The final proof comes from Bezalel who was the great-grandson of Caleb, who was twenty-six years older than him. If two years are deducted due to three pregnancies, then the remainder of the twenty-four years prove that each father was eight years old at the birth of his son. Why are girls exempted from being a ben sorer u'moreh?

Unlock the wisdom of ancient debates and discover how two opposing viewpoints can both hold truth. Our latest episode challenges the notion of conflict resolution within Jewish law, taking inspiration from the timeless arguments between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. We explore why the rulings typically follow Beit Hillel and what this teaches us about humility, openness, and respectful debate. These lessons carry parallels to today's public policy discussions and societal tensions, offering fresh insights into navigating modern disagreements.Success doesn't happen overnight, and a friend's remarkable journey from nothing to building a booming business is a testament to this truth. Through their story, we explore the virtues of perseverance and patience, drawing connections to a Talmudic debate on the value of human existence amidst life's challenges. Life isn't without its struggles, but these moments are ripe with potential for spiritual growth and self-reflection. We'll share how the lessons of the Talmud and morning blessings can inspire us to make the most out of our lives.Finally, we celebrate the spiritual over the material, emphasizing the significance of values and humility in our daily lives. Through personal stories and reflections, we discuss the impact of parental attitudes on children's perception of wealth, and the importance of instilling values that transcend materialism. As we wrap up, we extend our heartfelt gratitude for the community's support of the Talmud study class at Torch, encouraging listeners to share the joy of Torah study. Wishing everyone a Shabbos filled with learning, gratitude, and friendship._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud.This Episode (#71) of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast is dedicated in honor of Bruce Licht.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on January 31, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on February 7, 2025_____________DONATE to TORCH: Please consider supporting the podcasts by making a donation to help fund our Jewish outreach and educational efforts at https://www.torchweb.org/support.php. Thank you!_____________SUBSCRIBE and LISTEN to other podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at https://www.TORCHpodcasts.com_____________EMAIL your questions, comments, and feedback: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Please visit www.torchweb.org to see a full listing of our outreach and educational resources available in the Greater Houston area!_____________#Talmud, #Humility, #Eruvin, #Shammai, #Hillel ★ Support this podcast ★

Unlock the wisdom of ancient debates and discover how two opposing viewpoints can both hold truth. Our latest episode challenges the notion of conflict resolution within Jewish law, taking inspiration from the timeless arguments between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. We explore why the rulings typically follow Beit Hillel and what this teaches us about humility, openness, and respectful debate. These lessons carry parallels to today's public policy discussions and societal tensions, offering fresh insights into navigating modern disagreements.Success doesn't happen overnight, and a friend's remarkable journey from nothing to building a booming business is a testament to this truth. Through their story, we explore the virtues of perseverance and patience, drawing connections to a Talmudic debate on the value of human existence amidst life's challenges. Life isn't without its struggles, but these moments are ripe with potential for spiritual growth and self-reflection. We'll share how the lessons of the Talmud and morning blessings can inspire us to make the most out of our lives.Finally, we celebrate the spiritual over the material, emphasizing the significance of values and humility in our daily lives. Through personal stories and reflections, we discuss the impact of parental attitudes on children's perception of wealth, and the importance of instilling values that transcend materialism. As we wrap up, we extend our heartfelt gratitude for the community's support of the Talmud study class at Torch, encouraging listeners to share the joy of Torah study. Wishing everyone a Shabbos filled with learning, gratitude, and friendship._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud.This Episode (#71) of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast is dedicated in honor of Bruce Licht.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on January 31, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on February 7, 2025_____________DONATE to TORCH: Please consider supporting the podcasts by making a donation to help fund our Jewish outreach and educational efforts at https://www.torchweb.org/support.php. Thank you!_____________SUBSCRIBE and LISTEN to other podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at https://www.TORCHpodcasts.com_____________EMAIL your questions, comments, and feedback: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Please visit www.torchweb.org to see a full listing of our outreach and educational resources available in the Greater Houston area!_____________#Talmud, #Humility, #Eruvin, #Shammai, #Hillel ★ Support this podcast ★

Today's daf is sponsored by Cheryl & Avi Savitsky and family in loving memory of Cheryl's father, Dr. Steven F. Stein, Shimon Feivish Ben Yirsroel Yitzchak haKohen, on his 41st yahrzeit. "His simchat hachayim was palpable to anyone who met him and that is something we strive to emulate each and every day."  Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Suri's father, haRav Reuvain ben Chaim. "He loved learning Torah and particularly the daf. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of Allen Kronisch, Avner Yosef ben Zelta Priva v'Yehuda Aryeh on his 35th yahrzeit. "He made the decision to be a chozer b'tshuva and in turn his children and grandchildren are following in his footsteps. Both of his children learn the daf. He is missed." The court in Nehardea established that for monetary cases, witness testimony is admissible even when witnesses disagree about details like the currency's color during their detailed questioning (bedikot). Initially, this ruling was attributed to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha's view, which accepts testimony from two witnesses who observed an event separately. However, this explanation was later rejected. Instead, Nehardea's ruling was aligned with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's interpretation of Beit Hillel: when one witness testifies to a loan of one hundred zuz and another to two hundred zuz, the debtor must pay one hundred zuz, since both witnesses agree on at least this amount. The rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree about deadlines for submitting new evidence in two distinct cases. The accepted law follows the rabbis' opinion in one instance and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's view in the other. When a loan document is held by a third party, there is a question about whether that person can credibly testify that the loan was repaid. Rav Nachman made a ruling in such a case, but the Gemara presents two different versions: in one, he trusted the woman holding the document; in the other, he did not. Each version includes Rava raising an objection to Rav Nachman's decision. Rav Dimi brings Rabbi Yochanan's ruling on the dispute between the rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, since his ruling was unclear, the Rav Shmuel brings a different version of Rabbi Yochanan to clarify his position. Regarding whether one party can compel the other to have their case heard in a larger court in another city, the answer varies depending on which side makes the request.

Today's daf is sponsored by Cheryl & Avi Savitsky and family in loving memory of Cheryl's father, Dr. Steven F. Stein, Shimon Feivish Ben Yirsroel Yitzchak haKohen, on his 41st yahrzeit. "His simchat hachayim was palpable to anyone who met him and that is something we strive to emulate each and every day."  Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Suri's father, haRav Reuvain ben Chaim. "He loved learning Torah and particularly the daf. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of Allen Kronisch, Avner Yosef ben Zelta Priva v'Yehuda Aryeh on his 35th yahrzeit. "He made the decision to be a chozer b'tshuva and in turn his children and grandchildren are following in his footsteps. Both of his children learn the daf. He is missed." The court in Nehardea established that for monetary cases, witness testimony is admissible even when witnesses disagree about details like the currency's color during their detailed questioning (bedikot). Initially, this ruling was attributed to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha's view, which accepts testimony from two witnesses who observed an event separately. However, this explanation was later rejected. Instead, Nehardea's ruling was aligned with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's interpretation of Beit Hillel: when one witness testifies to a loan of one hundred zuz and another to two hundred zuz, the debtor must pay one hundred zuz, since both witnesses agree on at least this amount. The rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree about deadlines for submitting new evidence in two distinct cases. The accepted law follows the rabbis' opinion in one instance and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's view in the other. When a loan document is held by a third party, there is a question about whether that person can credibly testify that the loan was repaid. Rav Nachman made a ruling in such a case, but the Gemara presents two different versions: in one, he trusted the woman holding the document; in the other, he did not. Each version includes Rava raising an objection to Rav Nachman's decision. Rav Dimi brings Rabbi Yochanan's ruling on the dispute between the rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, since his ruling was unclear, the Rav Shmuel brings a different version of Rabbi Yochanan to clarify his position. Regarding whether one party can compel the other to have their case heard in a larger court in another city, the answer varies depending on which side makes the request.

Contrasting Opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel on Hanukkah Lighting: A Practical Halachic Discussion

New mishnayot! A case of a house that collapsed on a husband and wife -- apparently, a second marriage, as the heirs of each deliberate which of the two died first. But there's no way to be certain which died first. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute how to divide their property. Also, a new mishnah: A case of a house that collapsed on a son and a mother -- Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the estate should be divided (presuming that he's an only son and she's a widow). Plus, the extra value of learning in the Land of Israel.

If a father and a son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first and the son did not leave enough money to pay his wife's ketuba or a creditor, the wife/creditor and the father's heirs each bring a different claim. The father's heirs claim the son died first and they inherit all the father's money, leaving the son's estate with nothing to pay the wife/creditor. The wife or creditor claim that the father died first and the son inherited the father's property and his heirs can now pay what is owed. Beit Shamai ruled that they split the disputed property equally. Beit Hillel holds that the money remains in the hands of the father's heirs as ain safek motzi m'yedai vadai, meaning they have a definitive claim as they inherit the father and the creditor's claim is uncertain so we follow what is certain. Shmuel asked if one who borrowed money and added into the deed that the land from property that the borrower will acquire in the future is lined to the loan, is that effective even to those who hold that one cannot acquire items that have not yet come into this world? Several sources are brought to attempt to answer the question but each is rejected as either the case details are different or they can each be attributed to Rabbi Meir who holds that one can acquire items that are not in this world. A follow-up question is asked regarding one who took one loan and then another and then acquired more land - does one have more of a lien on that property than the other? 

If a husband and wife die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question regarding various types of property. The wife's heirs claim the husband died first and therefore they should collect her ketuba money, her tzon barzel property, and usufruct (melog) property. In contrast, the husband's heirs do not want to pay the ketuba money and they want to keep her possessions. The husband's heirs claim the wife died first, meaning there is no obligation to pay the ketuba money and all her possessions were inherited by the husband upon her death. Beit Shamai rules that they split the money in half, which Beit Hillel differentiates between the three issues -the ketuba, tzon barzel, and usufruct property. The ruling of Beit Hillel regarding the tzon barzel property is unclear and the amoraim offer different opinions about what he meant. If a mother and only son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question about who died first and who inherits the mother's property - his heirs or hers. In this case, Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that they split it equally. However, Rabbi Akiva rules that the money remains where it is. Ben Azai is bothered by the fact that Rabbi Akiva created a debate in the case where both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agreed.

If a father and a son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first and the son did not leave enough money to pay his wife's ketuba or a creditor, the wife/creditor and the father's heirs each bring a different claim. The father's heirs claim the son died first and they inherit all the father's money, leaving the son's estate with nothing to pay the wife/creditor. The wife or creditor claim that the father died first and the son inherited the father's property and his heirs can now pay what is owed. Beit Shamai ruled that they split the disputed property equally. Beit Hillel holds that the money remains in the hands of the father's heirs as ain safek motzi m'yedai vadai, meaning they have a definitive claim as they inherit the father and the creditor's claim is uncertain so we follow what is certain. Shmuel asked if one who borrowed money and added into the deed that the land from property that the borrower will acquire in the future is lined to the loan, is that effective even to those who hold that one cannot acquire items that have not yet come into this world? Several sources are brought to attempt to answer the question but each is rejected as either the case details are different or they can each be attributed to Rabbi Meir who holds that one can acquire items that are not in this world. A follow-up question is asked regarding one who took one loan and then another and then acquired more land - does one have more of a lien on that property than the other? 

If a husband and wife die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question regarding various types of property. The wife's heirs claim the husband died first and therefore they should collect her ketuba money, her tzon barzel property, and usufruct (melog) property. In contrast, the husband's heirs do not want to pay the ketuba money and they want to keep her possessions. The husband's heirs claim the wife died first, meaning there is no obligation to pay the ketuba money and all her possessions were inherited by the husband upon her death. Beit Shamai rules that they split the money in half, which Beit Hillel differentiates between the three issues -the ketuba, tzon barzel, and usufruct property. The ruling of Beit Hillel regarding the tzon barzel property is unclear and the amoraim offer different opinions about what he meant. If a mother and only son die at around the same time and it is unclear who died first, there is a question about who died first and who inherits the mother's property - his heirs or hers. In this case, Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that they split it equally. However, Rabbi Akiva rules that the money remains where it is. Ben Azai is bothered by the fact that Rabbi Akiva created a debate in the case where both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agreed.

Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her grandson, Ephraim Yachman, z'l who sacrificed his life in Gaza, December 2024.  Today's daf is sponsored by David Kahan in honor of Professor Paul Gompers and Dr. Jody Dushay. "Thank you for your magnificent hospitality." If two people share a hall or other item that cannot be divided, can one insist that the other either buy the other half or sell their share? Rav Yehuda rules that the one who wants to split it gives the choice to the other to decide whether to buy or sell (gud o' agud). Rav Nachman rules that one cannot force the other to buy/sell and the item remains under joint ownership. Rava questions Rav Nachman in a case where a father left his firstborn and another son an animal and a slave, how can they be divided if the firstborn gets two portions? Rav Nachman responds that for two days the firstborn uses them and the next day the other son uses them. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda. The first is from the debate between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel about a slave that is freed by one master and not the other (half slave-half free). In the end, they both agree that because of tikun olam, to allow the slave to marry, the owner is forced to free the slave and gets paid for it. But were it not for that, the owner would not be forced, thus raising a difficulty with Rav Yehuda's position. Another difficulty is raised regarding a rich and poor brother who inherited a bathhouse. The rich one does not need to offer the poor one to buy him out. Both difficulties are resolved in the same manner - since in both cases, there is no possibility to offer both options - the slave can buy his freedom but cannot sell himself completely to be a slave (once freed a slave cannot go back to being a slave), and the poor brother can be bought out buy doesn't have the funds to buy his brother's share - therefore Rav Yehuda's solution can't be used. A final source is brought to raise a difficulty against Rav Nachman as it clearly states that if an item cannot be divided, one buys the whole item from the other. They attempt to suggest that the issue is a tannaitic debate, but that explanation is rejected and the difficulty on Rav Nachman remains. Abaye explained to Rav Yosef that Rav Yehuda's position was based on Shmuel's opinion as explained by dividing sifrei kodesh as Shmuel ruled that even though one volume cannot be divided, two volumes (for ex. Torah and the Prophets) could be, thus showing that forcing the other to buy/sell is possible as how else would the two volumes be divided (since each is worth a different amount). However, this suggestion is rejected as Shmuel's ruling regards a case where both agree to divide, not when one forces the other. Ameimar ruled like Rav Yehuda. However, they question this ruling from a case where two brothers inherited two maidservants (each knowing how to do something different - one cooked and one weaved) and Rava ruled that the brothers not divide them by each taking one and compensating the other for the difference in value. However, this case is different as the ruling of Rav Yehuda is only in a case where one receives the complete item and the other the money. In this case, each needed both maidservants and if they were to split them neither would receive something complete. Can one bind books of Torah with those of the Prophets and the Writings, as perhaps people will think that it is all one book? How much space must one leave between books of the Torah or the Prophets in a scroll?

Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her grandson, Ephraim Yachman, z'l who sacrificed his life in Gaza, December 2024.  Today's daf is sponsored by David Kahan in honor of Professor Paul Gompers and Dr. Jody Dushay. "Thank you for your magnificent hospitality." If two people share a hall or other item that cannot be divided, can one insist that the other either buy the other half or sell their share? Rav Yehuda rules that the one who wants to split it gives the choice to the other to decide whether to buy or sell (gud o' agud). Rav Nachman rules that one cannot force the other to buy/sell and the item remains under joint ownership. Rava questions Rav Nachman in a case where a father left his firstborn and another son an animal and a slave, how can they be divided if the firstborn gets two portions? Rav Nachman responds that for two days the firstborn uses them and the next day the other son uses them. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda. The first is from the debate between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel about a slave that is freed by one master and not the other (half slave-half free). In the end, they both agree that because of tikun olam, to allow the slave to marry, the owner is forced to free the slave and gets paid for it. But were it not for that, the owner would not be forced, thus raising a difficulty with Rav Yehuda's position. Another difficulty is raised regarding a rich and poor brother who inherited a bathhouse. The rich one does not need to offer the poor one to buy him out. Both difficulties are resolved in the same manner - since in both cases, there is no possibility to offer both options - the slave can buy his freedom but cannot sell himself completely to be a slave (once freed a slave cannot go back to being a slave), and the poor brother can be bought out buy doesn't have the funds to buy his brother's share - therefore Rav Yehuda's solution can't be used. A final source is brought to raise a difficulty against Rav Nachman as it clearly states that if an item cannot be divided, one buys the whole item from the other. They attempt to suggest that the issue is a tannaitic debate, but that explanation is rejected and the difficulty on Rav Nachman remains. Abaye explained to Rav Yosef that Rav Yehuda's position was based on Shmuel's opinion as explained by dividing sifrei kodesh as Shmuel ruled that even though one volume cannot be divided, two volumes (for ex. Torah and the Prophets) could be, thus showing that forcing the other to buy/sell is possible as how else would the two volumes be divided (since each is worth a different amount). However, this suggestion is rejected as Shmuel's ruling regards a case where both agree to divide, not when one forces the other. Ameimar ruled like Rav Yehuda. However, they question this ruling from a case where two brothers inherited two maidservants (each knowing how to do something different - one cooked and one weaved) and Rava ruled that the brothers not divide them by each taking one and compensating the other for the difference in value. However, this case is different as the ruling of Rav Yehuda is only in a case where one receives the complete item and the other the money. In this case, each needed both maidservants and if they were to split them neither would receive something complete. Can one bind books of Torah with those of the Prophets and the Writings, as perhaps people will think that it is all one book? How much space must one leave between books of the Torah or the Prophets in a scroll?

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. It is day 194 of the war with Hamas. Military correspondent Emanuel Fabian and environmental reporter Sue Surkes join host Jessica Steinberg for today's episode. Fabian discusses the latest in Gaza, as Israeli tanks pushed back into parts of the northern Gaza Strip on Tuesday, with two brigades joining ongoing missions in Gaza while other troops are situated outside Gaza, on the border, preparing themselves to enter for the expected large-scale strike on Rafah. He also talks about the latest in the north, as two Hezbollah commanders were killed in IDF strikes following attack drones that injured three Israelis in the Beit Hillel community in the north and no sense of when 60,000 evacuated Israelis can return home. Fabian also speaks about ongoing clashes in the West Bank, where violence has broken out between Israeli settlers and Palestinians following the Friday killing of 14-year-old shepherd Benjamin Achimeir, near Ramallah. There are considerable troops located in the West Bank, says Fabian, but it is complicated to contain three fronts simultaneously. Surkes turns to the passage of the first reading of the climate bill, long-discussed but narrow in terms of planned targets, and largely controlled by budgetary expectations from the Finance Ministry. She also discusses the long-awaited shipment of livestock from Australia, turned around in the fall because of maritime attacks by the Houthis, then relaunched again in March, and noted for the crowded conditions of the lambs and cows. Surkes then describes several building developments in Jerusalem, the planned Burj Jerusalem near Yad Vashem and Har Herzl, along with a long-debated expansion of a city police station on the city's Lupine Hill, both fiercely opposed by several community groups. For the latest updates, please see The Times of Israel's ongoing live blog. Discussed articles include: Live blog April 17, 2024 Commando seriously hurt as Israeli tanks said to push back into northern Gaza 2 Hezbollah commanders killed in IDF strikes as attack drones injure 3 in north Two Palestinians shot dead by settlers in clashes near West Bank village Knesset passes 1st reading of climate bill without any clear budgeting Controversial shipment of livestock reaches Israel from Australia after months-long odyssey Planned ‘Jerusalem Burj' skyscraper draws opposition over proximity to landmarks Police revive plan to build complex on beloved Jerusalem hill, angering residents THOSE WE HAVE LOST: Civilians and soldiers killed in Hamas's onslaught on Israel THOSE WE ARE MISSING: The hostages and victims whose fate is still unknown IMAGE: Members of the emergency squad of Safed take part in a drill on April 5, 2024. (Photo by David Cohen/Flash90)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

One who redeems ma'aser sheni on coins, and the desacralizes the coins to use them to buy the food in Jerusalem - how those coins can be exchanged, a dispute between Beit Shammai vs. Beit Hillel. Plus, the sourcing of the word "money" twice in the biblical verse. Also, when money is an exchange instead of a sale or a purchase payment.

Study Guide Bava Metzia 44 Today's daf is sponsored by Ariella and Michael Radwin in honor of Sivan's bat mitzvah this coming Shabbat. "Mazel tov to Sivan! May you lead a life of Torah and ma’asim tovim, and may you someday be blessed to stand under the chuppah" Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one is obligated in shlichut yad by merely intending to use the object. On what words in the Torah does each one rely upon to support his opinion? If one tilted the barrel and took out some wine to drink, and then the barrel broke, one would be liable to replace only the wine taken. However, if one lifted the whole barrel to take some wine, and then the barrel broke (unexpected damages), one must replace the value of the entire barrel. When one purchases an item the transaction takes effect when buyer pulls or lifts the item. However, if the buyer merely paid the money, the transaction is not yet effective. If one purchases currency with a different currency, one currency will be considered the currency of the transaction and the other the commodity. The Mishna lists several examples and establishes which is considered the currency and which is the commodity. When changing gold with silver, Rebbi has two opposite opinions about which is considered the currency and which is the commodity - one when he was younger and one later in life. Rav Ashi attempts to prove his earlier opinion, that gold is the currency. Rabbi Chiya held that way as well, and Rava quotes a braita and proves that the tanna of the braita also held by that position. Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have a debate regarding trading maaser sheni coins from silver to gold coins. This debate seems to connect with the aforementioned issue of which of the two is considered currency and which is the commodity? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each have a different understanding of the debate.

Study Guide Bava Metzia 45 Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have a debate regarding trading maaser sheni coins from silver to gold coins. There are three versions of the debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what the basis of the debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is. The first version links their debate to the issue of whether silver or gold is considered a currency or commodity com[pared to the other. However, the other two version think the issue is exclusively a maaser sheni issue and does not relate to the currency/commodity debate. Rav and Levi debate whether money can be used for a kinyan chalipin, a symbolic act of acquiring. Chalipin must be performed with an item that has inherent value. Does money have inherent value because it is made from metal or is it viewed only in terms of the image on the coin which will eventually wear away?

Study Guide Bava Metzia 45 Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have a debate regarding trading maaser sheni coins from silver to gold coins. There are three versions of the debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what the basis of the debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is. The first version links their debate to the issue of whether silver or gold is considered a currency or commodity com[pared to the other. However, the other two version think the issue is exclusively a maaser sheni issue and does not relate to the currency/commodity debate. Rav and Levi debate whether money can be used for a kinyan chalipin, a symbolic act of acquiring. Chalipin must be performed with an item that has inherent value. Does money have inherent value because it is made from metal or is it viewed only in terms of the image on the coin which will eventually wear away?

Study Guide Bava Metzia 44 Today's daf is sponsored by Ariella and Michael Radwin in honor of Sivan's bat mitzvah this coming Shabbat. "Mazel tov to Sivan! May you lead a life of Torah and ma’asim tovim, and may you someday be blessed to stand under the chuppah" Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one is obligated in shlichut yad by merely intending to use the object. On what words in the Torah does each one rely upon to support his opinion? If one tilted the barrel and took out some wine to drink, and then the barrel broke, one would be liable to replace only the wine taken. However, if one lifted the whole barrel to take some wine, and then the barrel broke (unexpected damages), one must replace the value of the entire barrel. When one purchases an item the transaction takes effect when buyer pulls or lifts the item. However, if the buyer merely paid the money, the transaction is not yet effective. If one purchases currency with a different currency, one currency will be considered the currency of the transaction and the other the commodity. The Mishna lists several examples and establishes which is considered the currency and which is the commodity. When changing gold with silver, Rebbi has two opposite opinions about which is considered the currency and which is the commodity - one when he was younger and one later in life. Rav Ashi attempts to prove his earlier opinion, that gold is the currency. Rabbi Chiya held that way as well, and Rava quotes a braita and proves that the tanna of the braita also held by that position. Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel have a debate regarding trading maaser sheni coins from silver to gold coins. This debate seems to connect with the aforementioned issue of which of the two is considered currency and which is the commodity? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each have a different understanding of the debate.

If one gives money to a money changer, if it is not bound and sealed, the money changer is permitted to use it and is thereby responsible if the money gets lost. There is a debate whether the money changer is also responsible for oness (accidental damage). Regarding shlichut yad, if one decides to use an item they are watching and it then breaks, if the item changes in value from the time the shomer decides to use it until the time it breaks, what value is the shomer obligated to pay? Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva have a debate regarding this issue. The Gemara brings five attempts, four of which are rejected, to understand the disagreement between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel. According to the conclusion, the debate is not regarding a fluctuation in the market price, but the value of the animal itself increases or decreases by having offspring/wool to be sheared. According to who do we pasken? 

If one gives money to a money changer, if it is not bound and sealed, the money changer is permitted to use it and is thereby responsible if the money gets lost. There is a debate whether the money changer is also responsible for oness (accidental damage). Regarding shlichut yad, if one decides to use an item they are watching and it then breaks, if the item changes in value from the time the shomer decides to use it until the time it breaks, what value is the shomer obligated to pay? Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva have a debate regarding this issue. The Gemara brings five attempts, four of which are rejected, to understand the disagreement between Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel. According to the conclusion, the debate is not regarding a fluctuation in the market price, but the value of the animal itself increases or decreases by having offspring/wool to be sheared. According to who do we pasken? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryl and Harold Sasnowitz in loving memory of their mothers, Malka bat Chaya Etle & Mordechai, and Toby Raizel bat Rechel & Tzvi whose yahrzeits both fall on 16 Adar. "They left a legacy of Yiddishkite that has grown through multiple generations."  Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one can keep impure truma wine in one's house to be used over time for creating a good smell in the house (ziluf) or does one need to be concerned that it may cause transgression as one may forget that the wine is impure and may drink it. Rabbi Yishamel son of Rabbi Yosi suggests a compromise approach, however, others did not like the suggestion. If honey is dripping from a vessel and the honey owner promises the wine owner that if he/she spills the wine, the honey owner will compensate him/her for the loss of wine, then the honey owner must pay. However, from a different braita it seems that one can claim, "I never really meant what I said, I was just fooling with you." How is this resolved? Why does the Mishna not only bring a case of honey/wine but also a case with two people who each have a donkey (one worth more than the other) that gets swept away by a river and one asks the other to save his/hers instead of saving their own donkey? Two questions are asked about variations on the donkey case. What if one saves the other donkey and is promised to be compensated for his/her donkey but then their donkey comes out of the river on its own - do they still receive compensation as promised? What if one tries to save the donkey but is unsuccessful? The Tosefta Bava Metzia 7:7 is quoted where there are several cases of distribution of expenditures for a group of people traveling together if for example robbers come or if they need to hire someone for the group. What are the criteria used for determining the method of dividing? The Tosefta continues with a case of people on a boat that is beginning to sink - how do they determine how much each person needs to throw off the boat to save themselves? If one steals a field and then gives it to thugs who come to seize property, does the thief need to return the land or can he/she say to the owner, "Go get it from the thugs?" On what does it depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryl and Harold Sasnowitz in loving memory of their mothers, Malka bat Chaya Etle & Mordechai, and Toby Raizel bat Rechel & Tzvi whose yahrzeits both fall on 16 Adar. "They left a legacy of Yiddishkite that has grown through multiple generations."  Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one can keep impure truma wine in one's house to be used over time for creating a good smell in the house (ziluf) or does one need to be concerned that it may cause transgression as one may forget that the wine is impure and may drink it. Rabbi Yishamel son of Rabbi Yosi suggests a compromise approach, however, others did not like the suggestion. If honey is dripping from a vessel and the honey owner promises the wine owner that if he/she spills the wine, the honey owner will compensate him/her for the loss of wine, then the honey owner must pay. However, from a different braita it seems that one can claim, "I never really meant what I said, I was just fooling with you." How is this resolved? Why does the Mishna not only bring a case of honey/wine but also a case with two people who each have a donkey (one worth more than the other) that gets swept away by a river and one asks the other to save his/hers instead of saving their own donkey? Two questions are asked about variations on the donkey case. What if one saves the other donkey and is promised to be compensated for his/her donkey but then their donkey comes out of the river on its own - do they still receive compensation as promised? What if one tries to save the donkey but is unsuccessful? The Tosefta Bava Metzia 7:7 is quoted where there are several cases of distribution of expenditures for a group of people traveling together if for example robbers come or if they need to hire someone for the group. What are the criteria used for determining the method of dividing? The Tosefta continues with a case of people on a boat that is beginning to sink - how do they determine how much each person needs to throw off the boat to save themselves? If one steals a field and then gives it to thugs who come to seize property, does the thief need to return the land or can he/she say to the owner, "Go get it from the thugs?" On what does it depend?

More opinions are brought about why Beit Shammai require a dinar for marriage. Beit Hillel's holds that a woman can be betrothed with a pruta. What is the value of that pruta? What if the item is something that fluctuates in value? What if it was worth less but somewhere else could be worth a pruta? What if after the fact there is a question about the marriage and the current value is a pruta but it may have been worth more earlier when the marriage took place? Several actual cases are brought. Rav instituted lashes for people who did various things including getting betrothed without prearranging, or in the marketplace, or by betrothal through intercourse. The latter, while permitted by the Torah, was frowned upon by the rabbis.

Today's daf is sponsored by Betsy Frank in honor of Penny's Daf Yomi Salon. Today's daf is sponsored by Marilyn Katz in honor of Rebecca Koenigsberg. "She is a constant source for me of inspiration and knowledge, and whose constant observation of the mitzva of hachnassat orchim extends to regularly serving as the siyum mesaderet for our small local group of daf-yomi-ers." Why does Beit Shammai hold that the money required for betrothal is significantly higher than the amount Beit Hillel says? Several answers are suggested. 

A new mishnah on this last daf! Specifically, under what circumstances is a husband allowed to divorce his wife - of course, a machloket, this time, between Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva (based on interpreting a verse). Plus, 4 ways to understand the word, "ki," in the biblical text. Also, ending the tractate with the full emotions of divorce - in sorrow and some measure or regret - a husband shouldn't continue to stay married to a wife he hates, but he then is hated by God (with a distinction between first and second marriages).

If a slave is used as a designated payment for a loan (apotiki) and the master frees the slave, the slave has no responsibility to the creditor. However, the rabbis instituted a takana and force the master to free him. To compensate the creditor, the slave writes a promissory note for his value. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the one who frees the slave writes the promissory note. Rav and Ulla each explain this case differently. Which master freed the slave, which master needs to free the slave and who writes the promissory note according to Rashbag? What is the purpose of the takana and what is the root of the debate between tana kamma and Rashbag? If one designated a field to repay and loan and the field is damaged, can the creditor collect from other property of the debtor? On what does it depend? If a slave is half freed, Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether or not the owner needs to free the other half. In the end, Beit Shamai convince Beit Hillel that we need to free the slave in order to permit him to marry a woman so he can fulfill the mitzva of procreation. Can one free a slave partially? There is a debate between Rebbi and the rabbis about whether this works. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about whether the debate relates only to a slave freed by a document or also by money. 

2 mishnayot: 1. A slave whose owner uses him as a payment of debt to another person, but then is freed before he functions as that payment. What happens?? A tikkun olam decree to keep the peace - and ensure that the slave remains free. Plus, rereading the mishnah by the Gemara - in two ways (by Rav and Ulla). 2. A slave who is half-freed and half-slave... an in-between status that is not easily resolved. How should this person function? It's a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and - unusually - Beit Shammai is upheld by Beit Hillel, for the sake of the good of this person.

A final statement of Rabbi Yochanan quoting Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is regarding the rabbinic ordinance that one who is within four cubits of a dead person is considered impure as it is likely one may have put one's hand over the dead body without realizing. However, an exception is made in the courtyard of a burial cave as there is a separation between the courtyard and the burial area, assuming it is a certain minimum size. Beit Hillel holds that the size needed is only 4x4 handbreadths. However, this size needed depends on how one enters the courtyard of the cave - from above or from the side. The same types of drashot that were taught regarding the house and the vineyard are taught regarding the betrothal of a woman - what cases are included and which are excluded and where is it derived from the verses? From the order in the Torah of house, vineyard, wife, they derive that first one should build a house, then plant a vineyard and only after that, find a wife and get married. A verse from Proverbs 24:27 is brought to teach the same idea, however, there are several different ways to extrapolate that verse - perhaps referring to order of learning (Torah, then Mishna then Talmud) or learning that will then lead to good deeds. More details regarding the exemption from war for those just married are explained and connected to verses. The Mishna discusses the third speech that is given to the people before going out to war, sending home those who are soft-hearted. Who is considered soft-hearted? There are a number of different opinions. What are the practical differences between them? There were officers who stood in the front and in the back of the nation to ensure that no one try to run away from war, as running away is demoralizing and leads to defeat. Which type of war are these exemptions for? All wars? Just optional wars? There is a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the tana kama and the Gemara explains the difference between them. The new chapter deals with the egla arufa ceremony. If one finds a dead body and they don't know who killed the person, judges from the central Sanhedrin (of 71 judges) come and measure to find the closest city. How many judges? Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether it is five or three. from where in the verses do they each derive their opinion? The body must be found on the ground and not buried under something or hanging from a tree or floating in the water. The ceremony must be performed in Hebrew - from where is this derived?

Study Guide Sotah 25 The week's learning is sponsored by the Greenstone Family in loving memory of their dear husband, father and grandfather, Dov Shabtai Ben Yehoshua Lev. "Saba was a dedicated and committed learner of Torah. The fact that he was consistent in his learning speaks to his devotion to the study of Torah, and it's clear that he instilled that same passion in his children and grandchildren. Saba was always so proud to see his many of his children and grandchildren learn Daf Yomi." Today's daf is sponsored by Shelly and Avi Yonitzman in loving memory of Albert Kobny and wishing long life to Sarina Kovny.  A woman who behaves in a manner that is considered a breach of the marriage contract (dat yehudit), loses her ketuba. But is this only if she is warned or not? Three different sections of our Mishna are each brought to try to prove that she needs warning. The first two are rejected but the third is conclusive. If a wife violated dat yehudit but the husband doesn't care and wants to stay married to her, can he? They try to answer this question from a case in our Mishna, but that answer is rejected. If a husband warned his wife not to go into a room alone with another man (kinui), can he change his mind and rescind the warning? They try to answer the question from our Mishna and another Mishna in Sotah, but both are rejected. They find the answer in a braita, one can rescind the kinui. However, there is a debate about whether that can be done only before she is found in the room alone with the man (setira), or even after that. The Gemara strengthens the position of the opinion that it cannot be rescinded after setira. In the Mishna, Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding a case of a sotah whose husband died before she drinks the water. Does she lose her ketuba money or not? The debate is based on whether one views a document that is meant to be collected as if it was already collected. If one views it as collected, then the woman gets her ketuba money as the burden of proof lies on the husband. If not, it is the reverse. There is another debate in the Mishna regarding a woman who can not have children - can she be brought to be a sotah? Is the husband forbidden to marry her in the first place? Rabbi Elazar holds that since he can have another wife, he is permitted to marry her, in which case, she can also be brought to drink the sotah water. Rav Nachman limits his opinion to a woman who at some point was able to have children, as an aylonit for sure cannot become a sotah based on a drasha from the verses of the sotah.

Today's Talmud pages, Nazir 32 and 33, discuss the possibly incorrect opinion of Beit Hillel on the topic of erroneous consecration of a bull. Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin joins us for a live recording of the podcast to discuss the ways that Rambam ignored the authoritative take of the Talmud on this page to share his own opinion. Can we have our own interpretations of the Talmud if they contradict the authoritative take on a passage? Listen and find out. Take One is a Tablet Studios production. The show is hosted by Liel Leibovitz, and is produced and edited by Darone Ruskay, Quinn Waller and Elie Bleier. Our team also includes Stephanie Butnick, Josh Kross, Mark Oppenheimer, Robert Scaramuccia, and Tanya Singer.  Check out all of Tablet's podcasts at tabletmag.com/podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices