Podcasts about rabbi yosi

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim, as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim, is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?    

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim, as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim, is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?    

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete  to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.  

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete  to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.  

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser, and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv"-"around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition (heikesh), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary (Heichal) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava. Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.

Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser, and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv"-"around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition (heikesh), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary (Heichal) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava. Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

What is the source in the Mishna for the halakha that one is not liable for the laws of notar and impurity when eating blood? Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether one is liable for eating items that are not fit for consumption while in a state of impurity. Is their dispute limited to items that themselves became impure, or does it also apply to a person who is impure and eats sacrificial items that are pure? Sacrificial offerings are slaughtered with six intentions: for a specific sacrifice, for a specific person, for God, for consumption by fire, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to be accepted by God. In addition, sin and guilt offerings must be slaughtered with intent for the specific sin they atone for. Rabbi Yosi stated that even if the slaughterer did not explicitly have all these intentions in mind, the offering remains valid. This is due to a stipulation enacted by the court that the slaughterer should not articulate all these intentions, in order to prevent errors that could invalidate the sacrifice, as the intention is performed by the one slaughtering/offering the sacrifice, not the owner of the sacrifice.   

What is the source in the Mishna for the halakha that one is not liable for the laws of notar and impurity when eating blood? Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether one is liable for eating items that are not fit for consumption while in a state of impurity. Is their dispute limited to items that themselves became impure, or does it also apply to a person who is impure and eats sacrificial items that are pure? Sacrificial offerings are slaughtered with six intentions: for a specific sacrifice, for a specific person, for God, for consumption by fire, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to be accepted by God. In addition, sin and guilt offerings must be slaughtered with intent for the specific sin they atone for. Rabbi Yosi stated that even if the slaughterer did not explicitly have all these intentions in mind, the offering remains valid. This is due to a stipulation enacted by the court that the slaughterer should not articulate all these intentions, in order to prevent errors that could invalidate the sacrifice, as the intention is performed by the one slaughtering/offering the sacrifice, not the owner of the sacrifice.   

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.  

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.  

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers. 

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers. 

A dispute on the prohibition of the idol when it's owned by a Jew vs. owned by non-Jew (Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael). Also, vessels that were used in the "Temple of Onias" -- "chonyo," outside of the Temple, once it had been built. [Note: Historically, the specific temple of Onias was a center of worship for Egyptian Judaism.] Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi forgot (!) the verse from which the external worship was prohibited -- and then he was reminded of it by Rabbi Yosi bar Shaul. Also, the specifics of the Temple - as presented in the tractate Middot - were key in terms of assessing what could and could not be used in the Temple - once they were used unlawfully, even unto the Temple's altar itself (in the time of the Hasmoneans). It was a problem of the stones not being smooth, and so they were hid - but why hide? Why not repurpose them? Plus, the gold of Jerusalem and the coins that were permitted for use.

Rabbi Yosi vs. the Rabbis - on a field that was fertilized by the manure of idolatry, or the like, and how that field can be planted, and what terms are required for that to happen. Plus, the potential ramifications of their same logic on leavened dough. When the problematic item that is prohibited from benefit, can it be redeemed for money, and then destroy those coins in the Dead Sea? The rabbis say that there's no financial redemption for idolatry. Also, several new mishnayot: One who takes wood from an asherah tree cannot get benefit from that wood, so what happens if that wood were used to heat a new oven? Or an old oven? Or bread? Or a garment that was woven with idolatrous items? What about revoking the idolatrous status? As long as thee non-Jew is clear that he's not treating the tree as an object of worship, then he is not. Plus, the Roman god of Mercury and the stone-throwing idolatrous worship thereof.

Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 48Episode 2040Today's daf features three mishnayot. The first two define different kinds of asheira trees. As part of that exploration we tweak our understanding of the concept of a tree that was planted for non-idolatry purposes but was later worshipped, and the argument between Rabbi Yosi bar Rabbie Yehudah and the Rabbis. The last mishnah discusses benefitting from the shade of an asheira. I hope you enjoy. Cheers.Join the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqfSefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.48a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/#dafyomi #talmud00:00 Intro01:28 Defining three types of asheiras10:02 Tweaking our understanding of worshipping a tree35:35 Benifitting from the shade of an asheira46:10 Conclusion

Today's daf is sponsored by Emma Rinberg in memory of her beloved father Dr. Eric N. Glick - Yitzchak Nisan ben Yaacov v'Etta Faiga. "Though you died 35 years ago, your wisdom and caring nature accompany me daily." Rabbi Chanina ben Tradion's death is described - for what was he punished? How and why were others in his family punished with him? Rabbi Yosi ben Kisma predicted his death and in the aftermath of Rabbi Yosi's death, Rabbi Chanina gets caught by the Romans and is killed in exactly the way Rabbi Yosi predicted. His daughter is punished by being sent to be a prostitute, and Bruria, her sister, convinces her husband, Rabbi Meir, to rescue her. This ultimately leads to his being wanted by the Romans and he flees to Babylonia. The Gemara quotes braitot that list different activities that are forbidden to be involved in on account of being connected with idol worship and others because of "moshav leitzim," which is defined as those who sit around idle and scorn others. The antidote to moshav leitzim is learning Torah, as is derived from verses in Tehillim 1:1-2.

When both parties are untrustworthy and cannot take an oath, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Meir disagree about the proper procedure. A debate emerges about who holds which opinion, as one maintains the money should be split while the other argues that the oath returns to its original place, though it remains unclear which rabbi said which. Additionally, there is disagreement about the meaning of the position stating "the oath returns to its place." Rabbi Ami explains that one position is held by the rabbis in Israel while the other belongs to the rabbis in Babylonia. Rav Pappa clarifies that the Babylonian rabbis are Rav and Shmuel, while the Israeli position is represented by Rabbi Abba. Shimon ben Tarfon offers several statements concerning the importance of associating with the right people and avoiding the wrong ones. The Gemara examines the case of a storekeeper who was asked to pay someone's workers. The workers claim they never received payment while the storekeeper insists he paid them. The question arises whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed with the Mishna's opinion that each party can take an oath to get paid by the employer. Another issue concerns contradictory witness testimony. If two groups of witnesses contradict each other in court, can they be believed to testify in a different case? Or since we know one group certainly lied, should we reject both groups' testimony in future cases? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda each take different positions on this matter.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rochelle Cheifetz in loving memory of her mother, Chana Cohen, Chana bat Rav Moshe and Tzipora Mashbaum, on her 4th yartzeit. "You graced us all with your glorious smile, innate wisdom and beautiful neshama. To say that you are missed every day is an understatement." Today's daf is for the refuah shleima of Elad ben Netta. The Gemara questions Rabbi Yochanan's statement that one only receives lashes for eating maaser sheni outside Jerusalem after it was brought into Jerusalem, based on a derivation from Rabbi Yosi's words ina braita. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the derivation from Rabbi Yosi's as referring to a case where the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem, and the innovation is that it entered while still being tevel (untithed produce), and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as if they have been separated. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with this resolution (because it seems R' Yosi doesn't actually hold this position). The Gemara then presents two answers from Rabba and Ravina to resolve this difficulty. One who makes a bald spot on his head as a sign of mourning for the dead, who rounds the corners of his head or destroys the hair on his beard, or who makes a cut in his flesh for the dead receives lashes. The Gemara discusses the details of these commandments and the minimum measurements for which one would be liable.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sara Averick & Jose Rosenfeld in loving memory of Sara's beloved Aunt Rose, Rachel bat Chaim Nisan haLevi v'Nechama. "She was a Yiddish scholar who adored all her nieces and nephews. She was a beacon of light, laughter and joy." Rava bar Ada said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak that a non-kohen is only liable for eating bikkurim once they have been brought into the azara, since until that point, they are still considered chulin. , not sacred. Rav Sheshet ruled that placing the bikkurim in front of the altar is critical, but reading the mikra bikkurim is not. The Gemara brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael trying to prove that Rav Sheshet holds by his opinion. However, this suggestion is rejected. In the braita, Rabbi Yishmael derives the source for not eating maaser sheni after the destruction of the Temple. First, he tries to prove it from bechor, a firstborn animal, But after he rejects this suggestion, he proves it from a heikesh, a juxtaposition, from a verse in the Torah. The Gemara raises some questions against some of the content in the braita. Why couldn't they derive the law about maaser sheni from bechor and bikkurim together? Secondly, why was it so clear that the meat of a bechor could not be eaten after the Temple was destroyed, if, for example, the animal had already been offered as a sacrifice before the destruction? The first and second Mishna in the chapter both mention lashes for eating maaser sheni. To explain why the repetition, Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina establishes the second Mishna in a case of an impure person eating it in Jerusalem or the produce itself was impure and the person ate it in Jerusalem, whereas the first Mishna related to one receiving lashes for eating it outside Jerusalem (in a pure state). What is the source for receiving lashes for impurity of either the maaser sheni or the person eating it? From where is it derived that maaser sheni can be redeemed in Jerusalem if it is impure? From where is it derived that if a person bringing maaser sheni to Jerusalem is one step outside the walls of Jerusalem, one can still redeem it? What if the person is carrying it on their back and their body is in Jerusalem but the produce is not yet in Jerusalem?  

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.