Podcasts about Azara

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara. Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara" instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara, and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketoret, incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara, they distinguish between public lashon hara, which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara, atoned by the ketoret, which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara. Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara" instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara, and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketoret, incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara, they distinguish between public lashon hara, which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara, atoned by the ketoret, which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim, as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim, is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?    

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim, as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim, is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?    

This week we will learn about the sanctity and physical position of the alter (Mizbeach) in the courtyard (Azara) of the Temple. The Gemara then describes the service of the grain offering (Mincha) and how and where it was performed. We will then learn about the 2 bird offereings, their similarities and differences.For more info or to visit the main shiur page please visit⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ https://webyeshiva.org/course/daf-yomi-one-week-at-a-time-zevachim/

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.  

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.  

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Ignacio (Israel) Marmurek, on his 42nd yahrzeit. "A pillar of the Jewish community of Buenos Aires, an ardent Zionist, a loving family man, I am proud to be his granddaughter, and he is missed." Communal peace offerings and guilt offerings have the same requirements. The derivation that communal peace offerings are slaughtered in the North is initially brought from a verse in Vayikra 23:19–20, but this is rejected because it relies on a juxtaposition built upon another juxtaposition - deriving communal peace offerings from sin offerings, which themselves are derived from burnt offerings. Instead, Bamidbar 10:10 presents a direct juxtaposition between communal peace offerings and burnt offerings, making it a stronger source. This raises two questions: why are communal peace offerings juxtaposed to sin offerings in the first verse, and why, in the verse regarding the ram offering of the nazir, is the peace offering juxtaposed with both the sin and burnt offering? One answer is given for the first question, and two possible answers are offered for the second. The Mishna introduces kodshim kalim, sacrifices with a lower level of sanctity. These may be slaughtered anywhere within the Azara and eaten by the owner anywhere in Jerusalem. The first examples cited are the thanksgiving offering (toda) and the peace offering (ram) of the nazir, as they share the same requirements and must be consumed within one day and one night. What is the source that kodshim kalim must be eaten in Jerusalem? Abaye and Rava each derive it differently from Vayikra 10:14. However, Abaye's interpretation is preferred due to a difficulty found in Rava's approach. Regular peace offerings may be eaten over two days and the intervening night. The Gemara cites three verses concerning peace offerings where slaughtering is mentioned, and derives a distinct law from each one—including the rule that they may be slaughtered anywhere in the Azara. Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna disagree on how these verses should be interpreted and what halakhot can be extracted from them. One of the laws derived from these verses is that the door to the Sanctuary (Heichal) must be open when peace offerings are slaughtered. The Gemara proceeds to analyze the scope and implications of this requirement.

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Ignacio (Israel) Marmurek, on his 42nd yahrzeit. "A pillar of the Jewish community of Buenos Aires, an ardent Zionist, a loving family man, I am proud to be his granddaughter, and he is missed." Communal peace offerings and guilt offerings have the same requirements. The derivation that communal peace offerings are slaughtered in the North is initially brought from a verse in Vayikra 23:19–20, but this is rejected because it relies on a juxtaposition built upon another juxtaposition - deriving communal peace offerings from sin offerings, which themselves are derived from burnt offerings. Instead, Bamidbar 10:10 presents a direct juxtaposition between communal peace offerings and burnt offerings, making it a stronger source. This raises two questions: why are communal peace offerings juxtaposed to sin offerings in the first verse, and why, in the verse regarding the ram offering of the nazir, is the peace offering juxtaposed with both the sin and burnt offering? One answer is given for the first question, and two possible answers are offered for the second. The Mishna introduces kodshim kalim, sacrifices with a lower level of sanctity. These may be slaughtered anywhere within the Azara and eaten by the owner anywhere in Jerusalem. The first examples cited are the thanksgiving offering (toda) and the peace offering (ram) of the nazir, as they share the same requirements and must be consumed within one day and one night. What is the source that kodshim kalim must be eaten in Jerusalem? Abaye and Rava each derive it differently from Vayikra 10:14. However, Abaye's interpretation is preferred due to a difficulty found in Rava's approach. Regular peace offerings may be eaten over two days and the intervening night. The Gemara cites three verses concerning peace offerings where slaughtering is mentioned, and derives a distinct law from each one—including the rule that they may be slaughtered anywhere in the Azara. Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna disagree on how these verses should be interpreted and what halakhot can be extracted from them. One of the laws derived from these verses is that the door to the Sanctuary (Heichal) must be open when peace offerings are slaughtered. The Gemara proceeds to analyze the scope and implications of this requirement.

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings? The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one. However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la, misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav, this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted. The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara. This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal. In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be. Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings? The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one. However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la, misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav, this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted. The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara. This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal. In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be. Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.  

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one’s clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar. Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term “from the keren” (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna’s use of “from the base” includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base. A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.  

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.  

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.  

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?   Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.  

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?   Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.  

In this episode of The Dish on Health IT, Tony Schueth and Rob Dribbon are joined by Neikisha Charles Director of Quality Improvement and Risk Management of Bedford Stuyvesant Family Health Center (Bed-Stuy), a federally qualified health center (FQHC) in Brooklyn, NY. Together, they dig into common misconceptions about FQHCs and shine a spotlight on the opportunities they present for strategic engagement across the healthcare ecosystem—especially for health IT and life sciences organizations.Neikisha opens with her personal journey: starting as a data analyst at Bed-Stuy in 2021 and quickly rising into her current leadership role because of her knack for using data to drive quality improvement. Her story illustrates the increasing sophistication of FQHCs and sets the tone for a broader conversation about how these organizations are evolving.To help orient listeners who may not fully understand the role of FQHCs, Neikisha provides a clear definition: FQHCs are federally funded community-based providers mandated to offer care to all residents in underserved areas, regardless of insurance status. They are deeply attuned to social determinants of health and committed to removing access barriers for vulnerable populations.Rob adds context from his years in pharma, highlighting the unique value proposition of FQHCs—namely, their holistic and integrated approach to care. He urges listeners not to overlook these organizations simply because they've historically focused on commercial health systems.Neikisha then debunks a major myth: that FQHCs only serve uninsured or homeless patients. In fact, Bed-Stuy primarily serves Medicaid-managed populations, but also sees commercially insured and uninsured individuals, offering services on a sliding scale. Services range from primary care and mental health to dental, podiatry, and optometry, along with extensive care coordination and social support services.When asked what health IT vendors and life sciences companies may be missing, Neikisha makes it clear: FQHCs are not tech or data-poor. Bed-Stuy uses a robust EHR (eClinicalWorks), the Azara DRVS population health platform, and Artera for two-way patient communication. These tools aren't just window dressing—they are integrated into care delivery to close gaps, improve compliance, and monitor population health in real time.She offers a compelling case study: When colorectal cancer screening rates began to drop, Neikisha led a data-driven campaign using Azara to identify noncompliant patients, Artera to send targeted outreach texts, and a partnership with Exact Sciences to offer Cologuard kits to patients by mail. The result? A 12.3% increase in screening compliance over 18 months.Rob underscores the significance of this approach—not just the smart use of technology, but also the community-level relationships and the trust that make this kind of intervention effective.The discussion then shifts to interoperability. Neikisha notes the complexities of data exchange and the importance of dedicated roles like a Director of Health Integration to manage relationships and reporting. Bed-Stuy is connected to a regional health information organization (RHIO), uses platforms like Azara to track transitions of care, and maintains read-only EMR access with key partners to streamline care coordination. While true vendor-agnostic interoperability remains elusive, FQHCs are actively working with what's available.Tony brings the conversation back to the bigger picture: What gaps do vendors and life sciences partners need to close? Neikisha points to the need for better education about what FQHCs actually do and who they serve. She challenges companies to co-create solutions with FQHCs—offering tools that reflect real-world workflows and support sustainable partnerships rather than transactional engagements.The episode wraps with both Rob and Neikisha emphasizing the untapped potential of FQHCs. With over 30 million Americans relying on them for care, these organizations are not fringe players—they are essential infrastructure. And as Neikisha puts it, they're “here to stay.” To partner successfully, the first step is simple: reach out, learn what's needed, and build something meaningful together.Related ContentWhat Are FQHCs, & Should Life Sciences Manufacturers Even Care About Them?HIT Perspectives May 2025: FQHC Myth vs Fact Bedford Stuyvesant Family Health Center Brooklyn NY - Primary Care Services 

Azara García: "Me quedé tirada a final del año sin poder negociar con nadie"Cerramos la tercera temporada regular de TRAILTALKINGReview con la visita de Azara García. Tras un 2024 de incertidumbre por una lesión que no ha terminado de encontrar los motivos, Azara nos cuenta que ahora está pudiendo entrenar y disfrutar para prerparar sus objetivos. Con ella repasamos como afronta los próximos años y también nos cuenta su relación con las marcas, sponsors y la federación.

Jane Austen (1775 - 1817)Translated by José Jordán de Urríes y Azara (1868 - 1932)Orgullo y prejuicio (en inglés, Pride and Prejudice), publicada por primera vez el 28 de enero de 1813 como una obra anónima, es la más famosa de las novelas de Jane Austen y una de las primeras comedias románticas en la historia de la novela. Su primera frase es, además, una de las más famosas en la literatura inglesa: «Es una verdad mundialmente reconocida que un hombre soltero, poseedor de una gran fortuna, necesita una esposa». Es una novela de desarrollo personal, en la que las dos figuras principales, Elizabeth Bennet y Fitzwilliam Darcy, cada uno a su manera y, no obstante, de forma muy parecida, deben madurar para superar algunas crisis y aprender de sus errores para poder encarar el futuro en común, superando el orgullo de clase de Darcy y los prejuicios de Elizabeth hacia él. Summary by Phileas Fogg.Genre(s): Literary Fiction, RomanceLanguage: Spanish

Nacido en Aragón, destacó como militar, ingeniero y naturalista español. Enviado a América del Sur en 1781 para delinear fronteras entre territorios españoles y portugueses, dedicó más de dos décadas a explorar la fauna y flora de la región. Documentó especies, cuestionó ideas establecidas sobre la distribución geográfica de los animales y contribuyó al desarrollo de teorías evolutivas. Sus observaciones detalladas y críticas a teorías europeas influyeron en naturalistas posteriores como Charles Darwin. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Join us on the latest episode, hosted by Jared S. Taylor!Our Guests: LuAnn Kimker, Senior Vice President (SVP) for Clinical Innovation at Azara Healthcare & Sinead Forkan-Kelly, Director of Client Success and Growth Strategies at American Medical Association (AMA).What you'll get out of this episode:The American Medical Association (AMA) prioritizes hypertension management to prevent cardiovascular disease.Azara Healthcare provides real-time data insights for better treatment decisions.The AMA MAP framework guides care teams in accurate measurement and rapid action.Automated outreach tools help increase patient engagement and adherence.Collaboration between AMA and Azara supports care teams nationwide in improving hypertension care.To learn more about Azara Healthcare & American Medical Association (AMA):Azara Healthcare Website http://www.azarahealthcare.comAzara Healthcare LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/azara-healthcare/AMA Website http://www.ama-assn.orgAMA LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/american-medical-association/Our sponsors for this episode are:Sage Growth Partners https://www.sage-growth.com/Quantum Health https://www.quantum-health.com/Show and Host's Socials:Slice of HealthcareLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/sliceofhealthcare/Jared S TaylorLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jaredstaylor/WHAT IS SLICE OF HEALTHCARE?The go-to site for digital health executive/provider interviews, technology updates, and industry news. Listed to in 65+ countries.

Imagine a world where each wrinkle tells a story of joy, and every year added to your age means a deeper well of wisdom to draw from. That's the world Asara Tsehai, founder of Juicy to 100 Nation, not only envisions but lives passionately at 65 years young. Our conversation with her is a revelation of what she terms 'conscious aging'—a blend of youthful wellness and seasoned wisdom that redefines the golden years. Azara's four-decade quest for the 'fountain of youth' through avenues like African dance and Chicago stepping exemplifies how life can be exuberant and fulfilling, breaking the mold of what society often portrays as a slow march toward obscurity.Our heartfelt exchange traverses the landscape of self-care, touching upon its critical role in financial stability as we approach the horizon of retirement. The dialogue uncovers the neural shifts that catalyze personal evolution, and what it truly means to be a "juicy woman" — one who is unapologetically feminine, sensuous, and perfectly imperfect. Asara and I explore the leap from acquiring knowledge to taking action, the monumental impact of visual exemplars, and the sanctity of spaces that foster intuition and incremental wellness. As the conversation culminates, we celebrate the collective wisdom that takes flight when women of wisdom unite. To our cherished listeners, this episode is a testament to the energy and empowerment you infuse into V.I.B.E. Living, and for that, our gratitude knows no bounds.Asra's Bio At 65, Asara Tsehai boldly declares, "I plan to be Fine, Fit & Fabulous even beyond 100 years young, and so can you!" She's not merely engaging in conversation; she's insisting on the dialogue surrounding conscious aging for women of all ages, as the visionary founder behind The Juicy to 100 Nation; a dynamic sisterhood of women who refuse to let age define them. These women are not only dedicated to aging gracefully; they're dedicated to aging outrageously, living Juicy and Delicious lives even beyond 100 years young. Asara with 40 years of experience in wellness and leadership has inspired over 10,000 women on their wellness journey. With a wealth of experience in Wellness and Transformational Teambuilding, Asara has transformed non-profits, corporations, and organizations alike.   As CEO of "Ancient Treasure," she offers her clients an exclusive combination of ancient health rituals, a lifestyle promoting radiant health, and holistic skincare, for ageless glowing skin providing simplicity, wellness, and beauty in one transformative experience.Social Media www.facebook.com/asaratsehai  https://bit.ly/90dayswellness https://bit.ly/keepthemguessingpageWe hope you have enjoyed this episode. Please like, comment, subscribe and share the podcast.To find out more about Lynnis and what is going on in the V.I.B.E. Living World please go to https://linktr.ee/LynnisInterested in joining the new V.I.B.E. Wellness Woman Network go to https://www.vibewellnesswoman.com and sign-up to be notified when the network launches.

Teruma | Just a Vav: Rashi and Textual Criticism, by Rav Yitzchak Etshalom Why is Rashi explaining a "Vav" that isn't there? (Shemot 25:22).  Rashi's comment on Shemot 25:22, explaining the letter "vav" in the word ואת as being superfluous, has raised eyebrows over the centuries...since in our Sifrei Torah, the word is את, without a Vav. We identify other Rishonim who apparently had that reading in their text of the Torah and then review those supercommentaries of Rashi who addressed this unusual note. This leads us to a discussion of the phenomenon of textual variants in Tanakh and the fact that it is not an isolated phenomenon; we see examples of this in the manner in which Biblical texts are quoted in Chazal as well as the well-known story of the three Sifrei Torah found in the Azara, each of which had one unique feature relative to the other two, leading the Chakhamim to favor the two over the one. The unexpected result was that each of these scrolls was ultimately judged to be invalid.  Source sheet >>

`Mujeres de las piedras´ son breves biografías de las féminas más relevantes e importantes del mundo de la Geociencia. Los arqueólogos Fernanda Castaño y Sebastián Apesteguía son los autores de la obra que se descarga gratis en Mujeres de las piedras. Breves biografías de algunas geólogas y paleontólogas que nos precedieron - Fundación Azara (fundacionazara.org.ar)"Una pequeña devolución a las mujeres que nos formaron"