Podcasts about fiery cushman

How do we learn? Usually from experience, of course. Maybe we visit some new place, or encounter a new tool or trick. Or perhaps we learn from someone else—from a a teacher or friend or YouTube star who relays some shiny new fact or explanation. These are the kinds of experiences you probably first think of when you think of learning. But we can also learn in another way: simply by thinking. Sometimes we can just set our minds to work—just let the ideas already in our heads tumble around and spark off each other—and, is if by magic, come away with a new understanding of the world. But how does this happen exactly? And does it only happen in humans?    My guest today is Dr. Tania Lombrozo. Tania is a Professor of Psychology at Princeton University; she and her research group study learning, reasoning, explanation, belief, and more. In a recent paper, Tania outlines this puzzling alternative form of learning—learning by thinking, as it's known—and presents evidence that it happens in both humans and AIs.   In this conversation, Tania and I talk about her longstanding work on explanation, and how it led her to study this less- obvious form of learning. We zoom in on four flavors of learning by thinking—learning through explanation, through simulation, through analogy, and through reasoning. We talk about the evidence that machines also learn in this way, and we consider whether animals could, too. We discuss how to resolve the paradox at the heart of "learning by thinking": how it could be that reshuffling old bits of knowledge can actually lead to new understanding. Along the way, Tania and I touch on: chain of thought prompting in LLMs, the Reddit community 'Explain Like I'm Five,' the illusion of explanatory depth, the power of thought experiments, Darwin and Galileo, imagination and rationalization, how psychology and philosophy complement each other, and whether we can also learn—not just by thinking in our proverbial armchairs—but also by writing and talking.   So, happy 2025, friends! We've got some great stuff lined up for the coming year. If you like what we're doing with the show, we would—as ever—appreciate your support. And the main way you can support us is just by helping us get the word out—by telling a friend about us, or a colleague, or a student, or your thousands of social media followers.   Alright, without further ado, onto my conversation with Dr. Tania Lombrozo. Enjoy!   A transcript of this episode will be available soon.   Notes and links 3:30 – An influential early paper on “chain-of-thought prompting” in Large Language Models. A recent preprint by a team, including Dr. Lombrozo, exploring the cases where “chain-of-thought prompting” actually impairs performs in LLMs. 8:00 – For some of Dr. Lombrozo's important earlier work on explanation, see here and here. 11:15 – The Reddit community ‘Explain Like I'm Five.' 13:00 – An early paper on the “curse of knowledge”—the difficulty of ignoring what you know. 19:00 – Dr. Lombrozo's recent review article on “learning by thinking” is here. Another article of hers on the same topic is here. 20:00 – The original report of the “self-explanation” effect. The original report of the “illusion of explanatory depth.” 30:00 – For a basic description of Galileo's falling bodies thought experiment see here. A discussion of this thought experiment by philosopher Tamar Gendler. 38:00 – For analysis of Darwin's analogy between artificial and natural selection, see here and here. 42:00 – A paper on rationalization by Fiery Cushman.  48:00 – A paper from Dr. Lombrozo's lab on “need for explanation.” The original paper describing the construct of “need for cognition.” 52:00 – The original report of “framing effects” by Tversky and Kahneman. 54:00 – A paper by Annette Karmiloff-Smith discussing “representational redescription.” 1:02:00 – A recent overview of issues surrounding “explainable” AI.    Recommendations Alison Gopnik, Andrew Meltzoff, & Patricia Kuhl, The Scientist in the Crib Frank Keil, Wonder: Childhood and the Lifelong Love of Science   Many Minds is a project of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute, which is made possible by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation to Indiana University. The show is hosted and produced by Kensy Cooperrider, with help from Assistant Producer Urte Laukaityte and with creative support from DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by Ben Oldroyd. Our transcripts are created by Sarah Dopierala.   Subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also now subscribe to the Many Minds newsletter here! We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com.    For updates about the show, visit our website or follow us on Twitter (@ManyMindsPod) or Bluesky (@manymindspod.bsky.social).

Most of us would sacrifice one person to save five. It's a pretty straightforward bit of moral math. But if we have to actually kill that person ourselves, the math gets fuzzy. That's the lesson of the classic Trolley Problem, a moral puzzle that fried our brains in an episode we did almost 20 years ago, then updated again in 2017. Historically, the questions posed by The Trolley Problem are great for thought experimentation and conversations at a certain kind of cocktail party. Now, new technologies are forcing that moral quandary out of our philosophy departments and onto our streets. So today, we revisit the Trolley Problem and wonder how a two-ton hunk of speeding metal will make moral calculations about life and death that still baffle its creators. Special thanks to Iyad Rahwan, Edmond Awad and Sydney Levine from the Moral Machine group at MIT. Also thanks to Fiery Cushman, Matthew DeBord, Sertac Karaman, Martine Powers, Xin Xiang, and Roborace for all of their help. Thanks to the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism students who collected the vox: Chelsea Donohue, Ivan Flores, David Gentile, Maite Hernandez, Claudia Irizarry-Aponte, Comice Johnson, Richard Loria, Nivian Malik, Avery Miles, Alexandra Semenova, Kalah Siegel, Mark Suleymanov, Andee Tagle, Shaydanay Urbani, Isvett Verde and Reece Williams. EPISODE CREDITS  Reported and produced by - Amanda Aronczyk and Bethel HabteOur newsletter comes out every Wednesday. It includes short essays, recommendations, and details about other ways to interact with the show. Sign up (https://radiolab.org/newsletter)! Radiolab is supported by listeners like you. Support Radiolab by becoming a member of The Lab (https://members.radiolab.org/) today. Follow our show on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook @radiolab, and share your thoughts with us by emailing radiolab@wnyc.org Leadership support for Radiolab's science programming is provided by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Science Sandbox, a Simons Foundation Initiative, and the John Templeton Foundation. Foundational support for Radiolab was provided by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

Joseph Outa chats with Professor Fiery Cushman, professor of psychology at Harvard University. Fiery directs the Moral Psychology Research Lab where he investigates how people make decisions in social contexts; he focuses on questions like why and how did punishment evolve, what are the emotional systems that prevent us from doing harm, and how do humans make sense of each other's behaviors. He received his BA and PhD from Harvard University and has been bestowed with various awards and fellowships including the APA Distinguished Award for Early Career Contributions, the Stanton Prize from the Society of Philosophy and Psychology, just to name a few. He has written over 50 journal articles and is published in prestigious journals like Cognition, Psychological Science and the Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), and his research has been continuously funded by organizations such as NSF, the Templeton Foundation and the Office of Naval Research. In this episode, Joseph and Fiery talk about an unpublished manuscript titled "The Possibility of Violence" which examines how our morals constrain the possibilities we consider when making decisions, as well as a case study of a violence-reduction program in the Chicago Public School system.

Fiery Cushman @fierycushman, professor of psychology at Harvard University

An enormous amount of research in philosophy and cognitive science has been devoted to belief representation in theory of mind, or the capacity we have to figure out what other people believe. Because of all this focus on belief, one might be tempted to think that belief is one of the most basic theory of mind capacities we have. But is that really what the evidence shows? Jonathan and his coauthors argue that it doesn't show that at all. Instead, they argue that it's actually the capacity to figure out what others know—rather than what they believe—that's the more basic capacity. Links and Resources * Jonathan Phillips (https://philosophy.dartmouth.edu/people/jonathan-s-phillips) * The Paper (https://philpapers.org/archive/PHIKBB.pdf) * Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/does-the-chimpanzee-have-a-theory-of-mind/1E96B02CD9850016B7C93BC6D2FEF1D0) * Knowledge wh and false beliefs: Experimental investigations (https://academic.oup.com/jos/article-abstract/35/3/467/4986223) * Knowledge before belief : Response-times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief (https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Knowledge-before-belief-%3A-Response-times-indicate-Phillips-Knobe/99512f791f124e3cf1f6a2e45b4118c66246c973) * Do non-human primates really represent others' ignorance? (https://dogs.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Horshler-MacLean_2019_Cognition_DoNon-humanPrimatesReallyRepresentOthersIgnorance.pdf) * How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden? (https://dogs.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/publications-files/Pubs2021/Horschler%20et%20al%202021%20-%20How%20do%20non-human%20primates%20represent%20others%20awareness%20of%20where%20objects%20are%20hidden.pdf) * Laurie Santos and The Comparative Cognition Laboratory (https://caplab.yale.edu/) * John Turri and the Philosophical Science Lab (https://john.turri.org/) * Fiery Cushman and the Moral Psychology Research Lab (https://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/) * Ori Friedman and the UWaterloo Child Cognition Lab (https://sites.google.com/view/uwaterloocclab) * Alia Martin and the Infant and Child Cognition Lab (https://vuwbabylab.com/) * Joshua Knobe (https://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/) Paper Quotes Since the 1970's, research has explored belief attribution in a way that brings together numerous areas of cognitive science. Our understanding of belief representation has benefitted from a huge set of interdisciplinary discoveries from developmental studies, cognitive neuroscience, primate cognition, experimental philosophy, and beyond. The result of this empirical ferment has been extraordinary, giving us lots of insight into the nature of belief representation. We hope this paper serves as a call to arms for cognitive scientists to join researchers who have already begun to do the same for knowledge representation. Our hope is that we can marshal the same set of tools and use them to get a deeper understanding of the nature of knowledge. In doing so, we may gain better insight into the kind of representation that may— at an even more fundamental level— allow us to make sense of others' minds. Special Guest: Jonathan Phillips.

No primeiro episódio do podcast, Pedro Chrismann (IBMEC-RJ), Danilo Almeida (FURG) e Guilherme Almeida (FGV-RJ) discutem o artigo "Rationalization is Rational" de Fiery Cushman, Criacionismo, Direito, Gastronomia e explicam por que passar pano é racional.

A striking feature of the real world is that there is too much to think about. This feature is remarkably understudied in laboratory contexts, where the study of decision-making is typically limited to small “choice sets” defined by an experimenter. In such cases an individual may devote considerable attention to each item in the choice set. But in everyday life we are often not presented with defined choice sets; rather, we must construct a viable set of alternatives to consider. I will present several recent and ongoing research projects that each aim to understand how humans spontaneously decide what actions to consider—in other words, how we construct choice sets. A common theme among these studies is a key role for cached value representations. Additionally, I will present some evidence that moral norms play a surprisingly and uniquely large role in constraining choice sets and, more broadly, in modal cognition. This suggests a new avenue for understanding the specific manner in which morality influences human behavior.

In this episode Zhang Yiming and I interview Fiery Cushman, an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, on the logic of Moral Luck. For more on this topic see: Philosophy and Science of Mind Encyclopedia Entry (English) Philosophy and Science of Mind Encyclopedia Entry (Chinese)

Most of us would sacrifice one person to save five. It’s a pretty straightforward bit of moral math. But if we have to actually kill that person ourselves, the math gets fuzzy. That’s the lesson of the classic Trolley Problem, a moral puzzle that fried our brains in an episode we did about 11 years ago. Luckily, the Trolley Problem has always been little more than a thought experiment, mostly confined to conversations at a certain kind of cocktail party. That is until now. New technologies are forcing that moral quandry out of our philosophy departments and onto our streets. So today we revisit the Trolley Problem and wonder how a two-ton hunk of speeding metal will make moral calculations about life and death that we can’t even figure out ourselves. This story was reported and produced by Amanda Aronczyk and Bethel Habte. Thanks to Iyad Rahwan, Edmond Awad and Sydney Levine from the Moral Machine group at MIT. Also thanks to Fiery Cushman, Matthew DeBord, Sertac Karaman, Martine Powers, Xin Xiang, and Roborace for all of their help. Thanks to the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism students who collected the vox: Chelsea Donohue, Ivan Flores, David Gentile, Maite Hernandez, Claudia Irizarry-Aponte, Comice Johnson, Richard Loria, Nivian Malik, Avery Miles, Alexandra Semenova, Kalah Siegel, Mark Suleymanov, Andee Tagle, Shaydanay Urbani, Isvett Verde and Reece Williams. Support Radiolab today at Radiolab.org/donate.  

The eighteenth century writer Jeremy Bentham thought that telling right from wrong as simple: morally right things were the ones that increased the total of human happiness. Wrong things were the ones that increased the stock of suffering. His principle is known as utilitarianism. It sounds rational, but does it do justice to the way we actually think about morality? Some things seem wrong even when, according to utilitarianism, they are right. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have started to apply experimental methods to moral philosophy. In this programme, neuropsychologist Paul Broks looks at the recent research. Some experimenters, such as Guy Kahane in Oxford, have been putting people in scanners to see which bits of the brain are most active when they struggle with moral dilemmas. Fiery Cushman at Harvard has been getting people to carry out simulated immoral acts (such as asking volunteers to fire a fake gun at the experimenter) to see how they react to unpleasant but essentially harmless tasks. And Mike Koenigs at Wisconsin Madison University has been looking at how psychopathic criminals and people with brain damage deal with moral puzzles. One school of thought now suggests that utilitarianism, far from being the "rational" way to decide right from wrong, is actually most attractive to people who lack the normal empathic responses – people very like Jeremy Bentham, in fact. This programme is part of a week of programmes looking at the history of ideas around Freedom.

FIERY CUSHMAN (https://www.edge.org/memberbio/fiery_cushman) is Assistant Professor, Cognitive, Linguistic, Social Science, Brown University. The Conversation: https://www.edge.org/panel/fiery-cushman-the-paradox-of-automatic-planning-headcon-13-part-iii

Dave and Tamler begin with a brief, heartfelt discussion about the Boston Bombings.  Tamler talks about why Patriots' Day and the Boston Marathon mean so much to a kid growing up in Boston.  They speculate a bit about the motive behind the attack and ask why the perpetrators didn't come out and claim responsibility.  In the second and third segments, Molly Crockett joins us to challenge Fiery Cushman for the prize of classiest episode ever.  She tells us about her research on the effects of serotonin depletion on retributive behavior, and how it was reported as "Chocolate and Cheese help you make better decisions" in the popular media.  We talk about the responsibility that scientists have to make sure that their studies are reported properly, and how brain research can (despite David's previous claims) help shed light on human nature and behavior.  Also: Tamler mangles the pronunciation of roughly 14 brain regions, Dave yearns for the days when restrictions of human experimentation were non-existent, and both Dave and Tamler subtly and then not so subtly try to get Molly to hook them up with...molly.  Enjoy!LinksDirty Water by the Standells [youtube.com]Patriots' Day [wikipedia.org]Molly Crockett  [mollycrockett.com]Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Tabibnia, G., Lieberman, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2008). Serotonin modulates behavioral reactions to unfairness. Science, 320, 1739.Serotonin [wikipedia.org]Striatum [wikipedia.org]DMT [wikipedia.org]   Special Guests: Fiery Cushman and Molly Crockett.

Our classiest episode yet (OK, that's not saying much, but still...)--Psychologist Fiery Cushman joins us for a discussion about collective punishment and collective responsibility. We use Fiery's recent paper on the practice of "beaning" in baseball (punishing one player for a teammate's offense by throwing a 95 MPH fastball at the player's head) to illustrate the phenomenon. Is the "innocent" player being punished because he is somehow morally responsible for his teammate's offense?  Or does deserve have nothing to do with it?  Also in this episode: listener feedback (sort of, we're just psyched to have a Norwegian stand-up comic as a listener), and Fiery solves the 3,000 year-old problem of moral responsibility just so he can get out of Dave's hotel room.  LinksFiery Cushman [brown.edu]Beanball [wikipedia.org]Hatfield-McCoy Blood Feud [wikipedia.org]Major League (1989) [imdb.com]Revenge: A story of hope, by Laura BlumenfeldBlood Revenge, by Christopher Boehm"The Two Faces of Revenge: Moral Responsibility and the Culture of Honor." T Sommers."John Kruk and Desert." [Flickers of Freedom blog post]

Should morality be immune from luck? It seems so. Yet outcomes beyond participants' control seem to affect our judgements of culpability. Fiery Cushman, a psychologist in the area of experimental philosophy (x-phi), has been investigating the phenomenon of moral luck and our apparently conflicting judgements about culpability and luck. In this interview with Nigel Warburton for the podcast Philosophy Bites he discusses his research on conflicting moral intuitions about outcomes, intentions, wrongness, culpabiity and punishment. Philosophy Bites is made in association with the Institute of Philosophy.