Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Rav makes a statement that is contradicted by a braita. He says that the last page of a Sefer Torah can end in the middle of the page, while a braita says it must finish at the end. After trying to reconcile Rav's position with the braita by limiting it to a Chumash (a parchment containing only one book of the Torah) and not a full Sefer Torah, the Gemara questions this from another statement of Rav (brought by Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal). There are two versions of the explanation for Rav's second statement, which may affect whether his position can be reconciled with the braita and whether one needs or is permitted to finish the last line of the Torah in the middle of the line. Two other statements of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal in the name of Rav are brought regarding the Torah. The first discusses a specific rule regarding the last eight verses of the Torah describing Moshe's death: an individual reads them in a shul. There is a debate among the commentaries regarding the meaning of this rule. Initially, it is suggested that this rule follows the view that Yehoshua wrote these verses, but the Gemara concludes it can also be explained according to Rabbi Shimon, who held that Moshe wrote them b'dema. The second statement is that one who buys a Sefer Torah in the market does not fulfill the mitzva in the proper manner, as ideally one should write a Sefer Torah rather than buy it. A piece of parchment used in a Sefer Torah can contain between three and eight columns. A column should include approximately 30 letters. However, there are different rules regarding the last page of the Torah. How many letters can be added in the margin if needed, and under what circumstances? If one omits the name of God, how can this be fixed? There are five tannaitic opinions, ranging from no solution to scraping the ink of a different word and inserting God's name there (placing the other word between the lines) to even allowing half the name of God to be added between the lines. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri's opinion is that the name of God can be added between the lines, but only if it is the whole name. Ravin son of Chinina said in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the law follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in "this" issue and anywhere else he issued a ruling. The Gemara tries to establish what "this" issue is. Each time a possibility is suggested, starting with our sugya,  it is rejected because others also issued rulings, and when the Gemara listed who ruled like whom, Ravin bar Chinina and rabbi Chanina did not appear there.

The Menora in the Temple featured various decorative parts, including goblets, knobs, and flowers. The Gemara details the quantity of each and their specific placement on the Menora. Rav explained that the Menora's height was nine handbreadths from the point where the lowest branches met. The text describes the gold used for the Menora as "michlot zahav." Rabbi Ami interpreted this phrase to mean that all the refined gold from King Solomon's era was used for its construction. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explained that the Menora is called "tehora" (pure) because it was shown to Moshe as a heavenly image. The Gemara explores why this same explanation is not applied to the "shulchan hatehora" (the pure table) used for the showbread; in that case, the phrase indicates that the table could potentially become impure. There were other items as well that God had to show Moshe, as they were difficult for him to grasp. The Mishna explains that the two parshiot (sections) in the mezuza are essential. Initially, it is assumed this refers to the small tip of the letter yud (kotzo shel yud), but this is rejected as being obvious. Instead, the Gemara suggests it serves to disqualify a mezuza if its letters are touching one another. Various rabbis discuss different issues regarding the letters hey and yud and whether or not certain formations disqualify them. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that when Moshe went to receive the Torah, he found God attaching crowns to the letters. When Moshe asked why, God showed him Rabbi Akiva, who was extrapolating heaps of laws from every crown. Moshe was taken aback, as he did not understand Rabbi Akiva's teachings. However, once he heard Rabbi Akiva answer a student that a certain law was "a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai," Moshe was relieved. Yet, when he asked God what the reward would be for such a great scholar, God showed him Rabbi Akiva's tragic death, and Moshe was once again disturbed. In both instances, God told Moshe, "Be silent, for this is My decree." Seven specific letters are adorned with three crowns. There were also special requirements for writing the letters yud and chet, with explanations provided for each. The rabbis discuss in which situations mistakes in a Sefer Torah can be corrected and in which situations they cannot.

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

The Mishna lists different elements of the mincha and other offerings that are essential. The Gemara delves into the derivations for each of these. Some elements are repeated Torah, and this repetition serves as an indicator that the act must be performed in that specific way. Others are deemed essential due to a specific formulation in the verse - a word that indicates a particular detail is necessary. The Gemara delves into two specific issues related to items on the list. One involves the four species of the lulav. A statement of Rav Chanan bar Rava is brought—that the essential element of the four species is that they be present, but they do not all need to be taken at once. A difficulty is raised against him from a braita that makes clear that the species need to be bound together. This is resolved by explaining that there are two different Tannaitic positions on this, based on whether or not the species are required to be bound. The second issue is the sprinkling of the blood of the Red Heifer, which must be performed while facing the Sanctuary. There are two contradictory braitot: one holds that if the blood is not sprinkled while facing the Sanctuary, it is disqualified, while another holds that it is not. Two resolutions are brought - either each source reflects a different Tannaitic position, or each is addressing a different situation.

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

The tzitz (headplate of the Kohen Gadol) effects atonement only for the disqualification of impurity (tum'ah) and not for other disqualifications such as yotzei (sacrificial meat taken outside its boundaries), piggul (improper intent), notar (remnants left past the legal time), or ba'al mum (a blemished animal). Both in the braita and in the discussions of the amoraim, these laws are derived from the biblical verses - establishing that the tzitz atones specifically for impurity and not for other types of disqualifications. The Gemara highlights a contradiction between two braitot: one states that the tzitz atones for an individual's offering only if it occurred inadvertently (shogeg), while the other states that the tzitz atones whether it occurred inadvertently or intentionally (mezid). The Gemara offers four potential solutions to resolve this contradiction, the first of which is rejected.  

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.  

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.

The Mishna details the cases in which a meal-offering (mincha) becomes pigul (disqualified due to improper intent), carrying the penalty of karet (divine excision), and the cases where it is merely disqualified (pasul) without the liability of karet. A question is raised: According to the opinion that if the remnants (shirayim) were diminished between the removal of the handful (kemitza) and the burning of the handful (haktara), one still burns the handful - even though the remnants may not be eaten - does this act of burning still "count" regarding the laws of pigul (such that it is considered as if the rest was offered according to the law)? Furthermore, does it function to remove the prohibition of meila, misuse of consecrated property from the remaining remnants? Rav Huna and Rava both compare this case to a disqualification caused by the offering "leaving" its designated area (yotzei), but they do so from opposite directions - disputing whether yotzei is a more stringent or more lenient type of disqualification. Rava proves his position based on an emendation made by Rabbi Hiyya to the text of our Mishna. Abaye, however, rejects this proof. Ultimately, Rava retracts his initial stance based on a different source. Abaye rejects this argument as well.  

When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza, implying that only the three middle fingers are used for kemitza. To resolve this Rava explains that all five fingers are used but not all for the scooping. The kohen extends his three middle fingers over his palm to gather the dough, while simultaneously using his thumb and pinky to level the scoop by wiping away any excess flour protruding from the edges. This ensures the volume is exactly the capacity of his palm. This is one of the most difficult actions to be performed in the Temple, among them melika and chafina. Rav Papa questions whether non-traditional methods - such as scooping with the fingertips facing down, or in other atypical ways, are valid, ultimately leaving these queries unresolved. He also questions different methods of chafina of the incense that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur. Rav Papa and Mar bar Rav Ashi question atypical ways of placing the kometz in the sanctified vessel. All these questions are left unresolved. If there is too much oil or too little added to the mincha offering it is disqualified. There is a discussion about how much is too much and in what cases does it disqualify. Regarding the frankincense (levona), there is a dispute regarding the minimum amount required for the offering to remain valid. Rabbi Meir holds that a full handful must be present, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon allow for a reduction to two granules or even a single granule, respectively. There is a debate about whether these three opinions are only relevant in frankincense brought as a supplement to a meal offering or also when the frankincense is brought as its own offering. The validity of the meal offering is also tied to the kohen's mental intent (machshava). If the kohen intends, while taking the kometz (parallel to the act of slaughtering an animal) to eat the remains or burn the handful of the meal offering or the frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified but does not carry the penalty of karet. However, if he intends to consume or burn the offering outside its designated timeframe (the following day), the offering becomes pigul. This status not only invalidates the sacrifice but also makes anyone who eats it liable for the punishment of karet.

Study Guide The section of the Torah concerning the metzora (leper) details two distinct tracks for sacrifices: one for the wealthy, who bring three animal offerings, and a modified track for the poor. The purification process involves pouring oil into the kohen's left hand, followed by sprinkling it toward the parochet and placing it on the leper's right ear, thumb, and toe. Notably, the text contains several seemingly superfluous phrases in the wealthy leper's section, as well as extensive repetitions in the poor leper's section that could have been simplified with a cross-reference like "as mentioned above." Rabbi Zeira and Rava offer different explanations for these repetitions. Both scholars derive that the kemitza of the mincha (meal offering) must be performed with the right hand, but they reach this conclusion via different paths. Rabbi Zeira learns it from the fourfold mention of the word "left" in the leper section. In contrast, Rava utilizes a gezeira shava based on the word "right" used in the context of placing oil on the leper's ear, thumb, and toe, applying that requirement to the kemitza. Reish Lakish teaches a broader principle: whenever the Torah uses the words "finger" (etzba) or "kohen" the service must be performed with the right hand. While the Gemara initially assumes both words must appear together to trigger this requirement, Rava clarifies that either word alone is sufficient. However, following a challenge from Abaye, Rava distinguishes between two scenarios: in cases where the action is essential for atonement, either word indicates the right hand; in cases where the action is not essential for atonement, both words must be present to mandate the right hand. A difficulty is raised against Rava's explanation based on the position of Rabbi Shimon. To resolve this, the Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon requires both words in all instances. Two subsequent challenges to this theory and one is resolved by further refining Rabbi Shimon's position: the appearance of the word "finger" alone necessitates the right hand, but the word "kohen" does not, unless it appears in conjunction with "finger." If Rava holds that "finger" or "kohen" already serves as an indicator for using the right hand, why did he originally use a gezeira shava to learn this regarding kemitza? The Gemara explains that he requires two separate derivations - one for the act of kemitza itself and another for placing the kometz into a sanctified vessel. This theory is again questioned in light of Rabbi Shimon's view that the kometz does not require a vessel at all. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes the gezeira shava (for Rabbi Shimon) is necessary for the sinner's meal offering; otherwise, one might have thought it could be performed with the left hand, as, according to Rabbi Shimon himself, this specific offering is not intended to be mehudar (ornate or distinguished).

Earlier, Rabbi Yochanan employed the principle that something that takes place in the Temple courtyard can obviously also be performed in the Sanctuary (such as slaughtering the peace offering), as the Sanctuary is more sanctified. However, in a different situation, a verse is needed to derive that items permitted to be eaten in the courtyard can also be eaten in the Sanctuary (in unique circumstances). Why was a verse needed if the principle of Rabbi Yochanan could have been used? The Gemara answers by distinguishing between a ritual (slaughtering) and eating. There are three debates between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding mincha (meal) offerings. First, if they are mixed outside the Temple courtyard, are they disqualified? Second, if the mincha batter is missing some part before the kemitza (handful) is taken, can it be refilled? Third, if the remainder is missing a part after the kometz is taken, can the kemitza be burned? In each debate, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind each approach. In all three instances, a support is brought for Rabbi Yochanan or a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position which remains unanswered. In the third debate, a difficulty is also raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position but is resolved. The Mishna ruled that if the kohen performs the kemitza with his left hand, it is disqualified. The source for this is that when explaining the process of the leper's purification, the text specifically says "left hand." Since the text regarding the mincha offering simply says "hand" without the word "left," we can assume that if an action can be done with the left, the Torah will specifically say "left"; conversely, if it appears without specifying a hand, it must refer to the right hand. The Gemara questions this drasha, suggesting that perhaps the verse is not intended to teach about other mentions of the word "hand." However, after pointing out that the phrase "left hand" appears four times in the section on the leper's purification, it becomes clear that the repetition comes to teach that in other cases where the word "hand" is mentioned, it refers exclusively to the right hand.  

Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan). This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish. A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse "from the cattle" that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v'chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v'chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

Study Guide There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon's words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba's position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner's obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner's obligation in those scenarios as well. Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of "its actions prove its intent" (ma'asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava's final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.

Study Guide If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling - one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon - in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi's resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna. After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba's explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.

Introduction to Masechet Menachot

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

Before the Tabernacle was erected, even blemished animals or male or female could be offered as sacrifices. This is derived from the juxtaposition of animals to birds in Bereishit 8:20, which describes the offerings Noach brought after the Flood; since blemishes do not disqualify birds and females can be brought as burnt offerings, they likewise did not disqualify blemished animals or females. However, if an animal was missing a limb, it could not be offered. This is learned from Bereishit 6:19, "From all live animals," implying that only fully intact animals were acceptable. The Gemara asks why this verse is not used to exclude a treifa, and answers by identifying a different source for excluding a treifa. Only kosher animals could be offered, even before the Tabernacle was built. But since this was before the Torah was given, how could there be a distinction between kosher and non‑kosher animals? Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explains that the distinction refers to animals that would eventually be considered kosher. Noach brought two of each species into the Ark, but of the kosher species he brought seven of each so that he would have animals available for sacrifice after the Flood. How did Noach know which animals would later be deemed kosher? Either this was revealed miraculously, or the animals entered the Ark on their own, with the kosher species arriving in groups of seven while the non‑kosher species arrived only in pairs. There is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether, before the Tabernacle was erected, people brought only burnt offerings or also peace offerings. This debate hinges on whether the descendants of Noach were permitted to bring peace offerings, a question derived from Hevel's sacrifice - specifically the phrase "from the fat thereof" - and from a verse in Shir HaShirim 4:16. A challenge is raised against the opinion that peace offerings were not brought, based on Yitro's offering of peace offerings. The resolution depends on whether Yitro's sacrifice occurred before or after the giving of the Torah. Indeed, there is a tannaitic dispute about the timing of Yitro's arrival, rooted in the question of what he heard that motivated him to come and convert: Israel's victory over Amalek, the giving of the Torah, or the splitting of the Sea. Non‑Jews may offer sacrifices anywhere and at any time, since the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Temple applies only to Jews. However, Jews may not serve as their agents in performing the sacrifice. The Gemara relates a story about Ofrah Hermiz, the mother of the Persian king Shapur, who asked him to bring a sacrifice on her behalf. Rava advised her on the matter but arranged for non‑Jews to perform the actual sacrificial act. In the desert, the Israelites were permitted to eat kodashim kalim anywhere within the camp. Rav Huna stated that they could eat them anywhere that Jews were present. The rabbis sought to clarify his statement, given that the desert encampment clearly consisted of distinct camps, while his words seemed to imply otherwise.

The Mishna rules that one who offers the leper's guilt offering outside the Azara before the proper time for the owner to bring it (i.e., before the eighth day of purification) is exempt from liability. Rav Chilkiya bar Tuvi limits this exemption to a case where the offering was brought for its own sake. If, however, it was offered not for its own sake, one would be liable for offering it outside, since such an offering could theoretically be valid if brought inside. Rav Huna disagrees with Rav Chilkiya. He maintains that if an offering cannot be brought for its own sake - because its proper time has not yet arrived - it also cannot be accepted when brought for the sake of a different sacrifice. A challenge is raised against Rav Huna from the case of the Pesach offering, which, when brought at a time other than Pesach, is offered as a peace offering even though it cannot be brought as a Pesach. This challenge is rejected, as the Pesach offering is unique: an animal designated as a Pesach automatically assumes the status of a peace offering on all other days of the year. Three sources are cited in support of Rav Chilkiya's position. The first two are dismissed as inconclusive, but the third appears to confirm his view, both according to Rav Dimi and Rav Ashi. An interpretation is brought that reconciles even this final source with Rav Huna's position. A braita derives scriptural sources for the Mishna's rulings that one is exempt from liability for offering outside items that are meant to be eaten, as well as for performing actions that do not constitute the final stage of the sacrificial service. The Mishna further states that the firstborns served as priests until the construction of the Tabernacle, at which point the kohanim replaced them. Rav Huna, however, asserts that the kohanim began their service earlier - at the time the Torah was given, nearly ten months before the Tabernacle was erected. This apparent contradiction is resolved by noting that the matter is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

Study Guide What actions are performed on public bamot but not on private bamot? What is considered "outside its gat," as mentioned in connection with the slaughtering and burning of the para aduma (red heifer)? There is a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan, which is rooted in an earlier disagreement about whether the Flood reached the Land of Israel. Each of them raises three challenges to the other's position.

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

Study Guide

What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who takes a kometz (a handful of a meal offering) or one who accepts the blood outside is not liable? The Gemara demonstrates that there is no basis to assume liability and explicitly rejects a suggestion that there might be reason to think otherwise. The verse forbidding slaughter outside includes three distinct phrases that specify where the prohibition applies and where it does not. What is derived from the use of all three? Ulla and Rava disagree about whether one is liable if they slaughter on the roof of the Heichal, which is dependent on how these phrases are understood. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether one is liable nowadays if one slaughters outside the area where the Azara once stood. Their debate hinges on whether the sanctity of the First Temple remains in effect or whether it was nullified with the Temple's destruction.

Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse "outside the camp" in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north of Jerusalem. The Mishna then turns to the laws of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside the Temple. The tanna kama rules that one who both slaughters and offers outside is liable for each act, while Rabbi Yosei HaGelili exempts a case in which both actions occur outside, since the offering was already invalidated by the improper slaughter and the subsequent offering does not constitute a transgression. The rabbis respond that even an offering slaughtered properly inside becomes invalid once taken outside, yet the prohibition of offering it outside still applies. The Mishna continues with the laws of eating sacrificial meat while impure: an impure person is liable whether he eats pure or impure sacrificial meat, though Rabbi Yosei HaGelili again exempts an impure person who eats impure meat, arguing that he consumed something already disqualified. The rabbis counter that even pure meat becomes impure upon contact with the impure person before it is eaten. The Gemara seeks the scriptural sources for both the punishment and the warning associated with slaughtering and offering outside. The punishment for both acts is explicit, and the warning for offering outsideis derived from Devarim 12:13, "Beware lest you offer your burnt offerings." The warning for slaughtering outside, however, is not clearly stated, and the Gemara explores four possible verses as its source, rejecting the first two and concluding with two possibilities.

Two additional questions are raised regarding the impurity status of those who handle the bull and goat offerings whose bodies are burned outside Jerusalem, but neither question receives a definitive answer. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the impurity of the scapegoat (se'ir la'azazel) that is sent off a cliff on Yom Kippur. While both sides agree that the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside Jerusalem impart impurity to food and drink, they dispute whether the scapegoat does the same. According to the rabbis, since the scapegoat is a live animal - and live animals generally do not become impure or transmit impurity - it does not impart impurity in this case either, even though the person who sends it off does become impure. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the scapegoat does transmit impurity, because anything destined to eventually acquire a severe level of impurity (i.e., the ability to transmit impurity to humans) already imparts impurity to food and drink even before reaching that stage. The rabbis' position is challenged based on a braita from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who discusses a concept similar to Rabbi Meir's in the context of the carcass of a kosher bird. Since the bird will eventually attain a severe level of impurity (when someone eats it), it already imparts impurity to food and drink beforehand. If the rabbis agree with Rabbi Yishmael, then this principle should apply to the scapegoat as well. But if they do not follow Rabbi Yishmael, then the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside the Temple should likewise not impart impurity to food and drink. Rav Dimi resolves this by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's view in a way that allows the rabbis to accept his principle while still excluding the scapegoat. Although items destined to eventually reach a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink, this applies only to items that are generally subject to impurity - namely, dead animals. It does not extend to live animals, such as the scapegoat. Two questions are raised regarding Rabbi Yishmael's principle that an item destined to eventually contract a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink. How do we define the phrase "they will ultimately contract severe impurity"? If an additional action is required before the item reaches that stage, this may prevent it from transmitting impurity, since it is still one step removed from becoming fully impure. The questions, therefore, focus on what qualifies as a "missing action." Would the need to remove the item from the Azara count as such an action? What about the case of a kosher bird's carcass held in one's hand, the size of an olive, that is on the verge of being eaten? Another issue discussed is whether this type of impurity renders food and drink a first-degree impurity or only a second-degree impurity.

The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim. In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va'chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to derive this. A braita records a debate between two tannaim regarding the phrase "the burnt offering of a man" in the verse that grants the kohen rights to the hide. One opinion says it excludes a burnt offering of hekdesh, property belonging to the Temple, while the other says it excludes the burnt offering of a convert. Three explanations are offered for what is meant by a burnt offering of hekdesh, and one explanation is given for the case of a convert, since a convert is certainly considered a "person." The three explanations of hekdesh are: a burnt offering brought from leftover funds of an offering; one who consecrates an offering for bedek habayit, the maintenance of the Temple; and one who consecrates all of their property, among which there were animals. The exemption regarding a convert refers to a case where the convert designated a burnt offering and then died without heirs. Since the sacrifice is ownerless, it does not qualify as a "burnt offering of a man." A braita is cited to explain the derivation of the laws in the Mishna. Although the verse says "man," the offerings of women and slaves are included as well, as is derived from a phrase in the verse. It also records a debate about how kodshei kodashim are included and kodashim kalim excluded from this law - whether it is learned from a kal va'chomer, from a verse, or whether no derivation is needed at all, since the hide always follows the meat, and the meat of other kodshei kodashim goes to the kohen. The Mishna concludes that the determining factor for whether the hide goes to the kohen in a case where the meat was disqualified is whether the hide was still attached at the moment of disqualification.

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Study Guide There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia's position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe served as the kohen gadol. The Gemara raises objections to his statement.

Study Guide Three additional resolutions, bringing the total to five, are proposed to reconcile the contradiction between the two baraitot, each of which presents a different view of Rabbi Shimon on whether an onen may eat the Pesach offering at night. A challenge is raised against the third resolution, evidence is presented in support of the fourth, and a statement of Rava bar Rav Huna is cited to bolster the fifth.