Sefer Hachinuch

The final of the 613 Misvot, as listed by the Sefer Ha'hinuch, is the command to write a Sefer Torah. This Misva is introduced in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 30:19), where Hashem commands, “Ve'ata Kitbu Lachem Et Ha'shira Ha'zot” (“And now, write for yourselves this song”). The Gemara teaches that it is “praiseworthy” to write a Sefer Torah oneself, if he can, and that one who does is considered as though he stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah. If, however, one is not capable of writing his own Sefer Torah, then he may hire a Sofer (scribe) to write one for him. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah commanded writing for oneself a Sefer Torah for the simple reason that this ensures access to a Sefer Torah from which to study. Since everyone is commanded to write a Sefer Torah, everyone will have a Sefer Torah to learn from, without having to go borrow one, and this will help ensure that a person spends time learning. The more accessible something is, the more likely one is to use it, and so the Torah wanted that we all have access to a Sefer Torah, as this will helps guarantee that we learn Torah. Halacha requires one to write his own Sefer Torah even if he inherited one from his father, and the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that this provision serves to ensure a plethora of Sifreh Torah. Not everybody can afford a Sefer Torah, and so the Torah wanted everyone – even those who already have a Sefer Torah – to write one, such that there would be Sifreh Torah available for those who do not have one. Additionally, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, Sifreh Torah gradually wear out, and the ink fades, and so the Torah wanted people to write their own Sifreh Torah, in order for the Torah scrolls to be new and in good condition. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that although the Biblical command refers specifically to the writing of a Sefer Torah, there is certainly value also in having other works of Torah literature written. Even if one received such books from his predecessors, it is a Misva to have more Torah books produced. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that it was customary among righteous people to allocate a room in their home where scribes, whom they hired, would write Torah books. (Of course, the Sefer Ha'hinuch lived before the invention of the printing press, and thus all books had to be handwritten.) In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha'hinuch presents a number of Halachot relevant to the way a Sefer Torah should be written. He writes that a space the size of the letter Yod must be left in between each pair of adjacent words, and an empty space the size of a line of text must be left in between the lines. Each line should consist of thirty letters. The allusion given for this practice is the word “Le'mishpehotechem” (“according to your families”) written three times. This word consists of ten letters, and so three times this word teaches us the total of number of letters that should be written on each line of the Sefer Torah. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement taught that this allusion expresses the notion that if a person, his son and grandson all learn Torah, then he is guaranteed that Torah will remain in his family for all time. The Sages inferred this concept from the verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (59:21), “And these words, which I have placed in your mouth, shall not be removed from your mouth, from the mouth of your offspring, or from the mouth of your offspring's offspring…from now and forever” – indicating that once Torah is studied by three generations, it remains in that family for eternity. The three instances of “Le'mishpehotechem” hint to this concept, that after three generations of Torah study, the family is assured of having the Torah remain with it forever. A line in the Sefer Torah should not consist of fewer than thirty letters, as this would resemble an “Iggeret” (formal letter), and the Sefer Torah is to be a book. A line should not consist of more than thirty letters, as it would then be difficult to find the next line, since the beginning and end of the lines would be very far apart. If a word at the end of the line has five letters, but there's room for only three letters, then the extra two letters may be written outside the column. If there is room for only two letters, then those two spaces should be left empty, and the word should be written on the next line. Although two letters may be written outside the column in the case described above, a two-letter word should not be written outside the column. Tradition requires writing certain letters larger or smaller than the rest of the text. Also, certain letters are written with specific numbers of “Tagin” (“crowns”) above the letters. These laws apply only “Le'chatehila” (optimally). If the “Tagin” were not placed correctly, or if the lines were too close or too far from one another, or too lengthy or too short, the Sefer Torah is nevertheless valid, as long as the letters were written properly. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods. The Sefer Ha'hinuch maintains that this Misva is binding only upon men, because this obligation is linked to the obligation to study Torah – as discussed above – and women are exempt from the Misva of Torah study. One who was able to write a Sefer Torah but failed to do so has neglected this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha'hinuch warns that such a person is deserving of harsh punishment, as fulfilling this Misva is necessary for learning Torah. Conversely, one who fulfills this Misva is rewarded with blessing and will be enriched by the ability to study. Many Rabbis addressed the question of why most people do not write a Sefer Torah, or even hire somebody to write a Sefer Torah for them. If, as we have seen, writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, then why do otherwise G-d-fearing people not write Torah scrolls for themselves? A famous answer to this question is given by the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327). He notes that whereas in earlier generations, people would use Sifreh Torah as their texts of Torah study, nowadays, we study from other books. Sifreh Torah are used only for the public reading in the synagogue, and we learn from printed Humashim and other Torah texts. Therefore, the Rosh writes, nowadays, we fulfill this Misva by obtaining texts of Torah literature to learn. The Sefer Ha'hinuch, as mentioned earlier, commented that having such books fulfills the spirit of the Misva of writing a Sefer Torah, but according to the Rosh, this is how we fulfill the actual Misva, since these texts are what we use for learning. According to the Rosh, then, we all fulfill this Misva by having works of Torah literature in our homes. We find among later Poskim different opinions as to how to understand the Rosh's position. The Perisha (commentary to the Tur by Rav Yehoshua Falk, Poland, 1555-1614) maintained that according to the Rosh, one who writes a Sefer Torah nowadays, but does not acquire other texts, does not fulfill the Biblical obligation. Since we do not use Sifreh Torah for learning, one cannot satisfy his obligation through the writing of a Sefer Torah, and he must acquire texts from which to study. The Perisha went even further, stating that having only a Sefer Torah is an insult to the Torah. Since we no longer have the tradition of how to interpret the “Tagin” and other features of the Torah text, one who has only a Torah scroll, and no works of Torah literature, is bound to misunderstand the Torah. The Bet Yosef (commentary to the Tur by Maran Rav Yosef Karo, Spain-Israel, 1488-1575), however, disagreed. In his view, the Rosh concedes that the primary Misva is to write a Sefer Torah, but he also allows fulfilling the Misva by acquiring works of Torah literature. The Sha'agat Aryeh (Rav Aryeh Leib Ginzburg, c. 1695-1785) offers an entirely different reason for why it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (30) states that some minor elements of the tradition for writing a Sefer Torah have been lost. We cannot definitively ascertain the precise spelling of a small number of words, whether they should be written with or without the letter “Vav.” Therefore, the Sha'agat Aryeh writes, we cannot fulfill the Torah obligation of writing a Sefer Torah, since we lack the knowledge necessary to ensure that the text is written correctly. The Torah reading in the synagogue is not a Biblical obligation, but rather a practice enacted by the prophets, and so we can observe this practice even if the text of the Sefer Torah is not precisely accurate. But writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, and it thus cannot be fulfilled, due to our lack of knowledge regarding the precise spelling of all the words. For this reason, the Sha'agat Aryeh avers, it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Iggerot Moshe, disputes this line of reasoning. A famous Halachic principle establishes that “Safek De'Orayta Le'humra” – when it comes to Torah obligations, we must act stringently in situations of uncertainty. Therefore, Rav Moshe argues, we should be required to write a Sefer Torah despite the uncertainties that we have regarding certain words, because of the possibility that we write them correctly. As long as there is a chance that we can fulfill the Torah obligation by writing a Sefer Torah, we should be required to do so, in accordance with the rule of “Safek De'Orayta Le'humra.” Rav Moshe therefore suggests a different reason for why people do not write a Sefer Torah, explaining that Halacha does not require incurring an exceedingly large expense for the fulfillment of a Misva. Although one must be willing to spend all the money he has if necessary to avoid transgressing a Misvat Lo Ta'aseh (Biblical prohibition), one is not required to spend more than one-fifth of his assets to fulfill a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). For the vast majority of people, commissioning the writing of a Sefer Torah would require spending more than one-fifth of their assets, and so they are exempt. Rav Moshe then goes even further, showing that in fact one is not required to spend more than one-tenth of his assets for this Misva, as this would undermine his ability to fulfill other Misvot. Indeed, as Rav Moshe notes, the Tur (Rav Yaakob Ben Asher, Spain, 1269-1340) writes that everyone “Asher Yado Maseget” – “who can afford it” – is required to write a Sefer Torah. Now this condition, that one can afford to fulfill the Misva, applies to all affirmative commands, as mentioned. And yet, the Tur mentions this point specifically in the context of the Misva of writing a Sefer Torah. Apparently, the Tur felt that this Misva in particular is contingent upon one's financial abilities, and one should not commission the writing of a Sefer Torah if this would compromise his fiscal ability to fulfill other Misvot. Another explanation is that some views allow fulfilling this Misva jointly with other people. Therefore, by participating in the cost of writing a Sefer Torah (such as by “purchasing” a letter, which is customary in many communities), one satisfies his obligation according to this opinion. If a person does have the privilege of commissioning a Sefer Torah, and he wants to give it to a synagogue, he should lend it, rather than giving it as a gift. Writing a Sefer Torah does not suffice for fulfilling the Misva; he must own the Torah after it is written. Therefore, one should retain ownership over his Sefer Torah, and give it to a synagogue on loan. Indeed, it is customary to write contracts to this effect when a Sefer Torah is donated, stipulating that the Sefer Torah is being lent, and not given, to the synagogue. Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that if one has a respectable place in his home where he can keep a Sefer Torah, he should do so, and he should make a point of reading some of the weekly Torah portion from the scroll each week. This way, he fulfills the Misva according to all opinions, as he writes a Sefer Torah which he occasionally uses for study.

The Torah in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 31:12) commands that the entire nation – men, women and children – must assemble in Jerusalem for a special ceremony, called “Hakhel” (“assemble”), every seven years. This ceremony, which featured the public reading of certain sections of the Torah by the king, would take place after the conclusion of the Shemita year, on the first day of Hol Ha'moed Sukkot. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (34) comments that as Hakhel constitutes a Misvat Aseh She'ha'zman Gerama – an affirmative command which applies at a particular time – it should, in principle, apply only to men. As a general rule, women are exempt from these kinds of Misvot. However, Hakhel marks an exception to this rule, as the Torah explicitly commands assembling the men, women and children. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the entire essence of the Jewish Nation lies in the Torah. It is the Torah that distinguishes us from all other peoples. Other nations perform acts of kindness, and have houses of prayer, but the Torah is unique to Am Yisrael. And, it is the Torah that enables us to earn eternal life and the unprecedented delights of the next world. Therefore, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains, it is worthwhile for the nation to come together at certain times in order to reaffirm its identity, to be reminded that the core essence of Am Yisrael is our commitment to the Torah. Once in seven years, a major assembly is held, and everybody will know that this assembly is being held for the purpose of conducting a public Torah reading. This will leave a profound impression on the people, reminding them of the primary importance of Torah in our lives. This awareness will arouse within the people a fierce desire to learn the Torah, and as a result of this desire, they will commit to learn the Torah intensively, thus becoming worthy of Hashem's blessings. The king would read the Torah at Hakhel in the Ezrat Nashim section of the courtyard of the Bet Ha'mikdash. He was permitted to read the Torah while sitting, though he was deemed praiseworthy if he stood for the reading. He would read from the beginning of the Book of Debarim through the first paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Va'et'hanan, and then skip to the second paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Ekeb. He would then read from the section of “Aser Te'aser” in Parashat Re'eh through the end of the sections of the blessings and curses. Trumpets would be sounded throughout the city of Jerusalem announcing the event of Hakhel, and a large wooden stage would be erected in the middle of the Ezrat Nashim. The king would step up onto the stage, where he would be visible to the entire crowd, and everyone would assemble around the stage. The Sefer Torah would be passed around the nation's leaders (from the “Hazan Ha'kenesset,” to the “Rosh Ha'kenesset,” to the deputy Kohen Gadol, and then to the Kohen Gadol), until it was finally handed to the king. This was done as an expression of honor for the king. The king opens the Sefer Torah, recites the Berachot, and reads the aforementioned sections. After the reading, he recites seven additional Berachot. A man or woman who was able to attend Hakhel and failed to do so, or a king who refuses to read the Torah at Hakhel, transgresses this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that those who neglect this Misva are liable to grave punishment, because Hakhel constitutes a “strong pillar” that upholds our religion, and thus failing to fulfill this Misva threatens the perpetuation of our faith. The Misva of Hakhel, as mentioned, is linked to the Misva of Shemita, as it is conducted during Sukkot after the conclusion of the Shemita year. As such, it applies only when the Misva of Shemita applies, meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel. A number of writers raised the question of why the Sages did not enact any commemoration of the Misva of Hakhel. Many other laws that apply during times of the Bet Ha'mikdash are required even nowadays, at least in some form, in commemoration of the Misva that was observed in the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash. Hakhel is an exception, as the Sages did not require any form of ceremony for us to conduct to commemorate this Misva. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1845-1905) suggested that the Rabbis instituted commemorations for Misvot that applied during the times of both the first and second Bateh Mikdash. The Misva of Hakhel, however, requires a king, and thus it was not observed in the latter part of the Second Commonwealth, after the Jews lost sovereignty and they did not have a king. Therefore, the Sages did not enact a commemoration of Hakhel. Another explanation is that the custom observed in some communities to remain awake on the last night of Sukkot (Hoshana Rabba) reading the Book of Debarim commemorates Hakhel, the king's reading of Debarim during Sukkot. Yet a third theory is that the custom of “Hatan Torah,” calling a distinguished member of the congregation for the reading of the final section of the Torah on Simhat Torah, commemorates Hakhel. We might add that in a certain sense, the concept of Hakhel is commemorated each and every Shabbat, when Jews congregate in the synagogue and hear the Torah reading and the Rabbi's speech. Like during Hakhel, a large assembly gathers for the purpose of hearing and learning Torah, which reinforces our appreciation of the importance of Torah, and its centrality in our lives. The children see the tumult and excitement, as everyone has come together in the synagogue, and they understand that all this is done for the purpose of learning the Torah. They thus grow up recognizing and appreciating the singular significance of Torah, which is the core essence of Jewish identity.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 28:9) commands, “Ve'halachta Bi'drachav” – “You shall walk in his ways.” The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that this verse introduces the obligation to follow G-d's example, to conduct ourselves in accordance with the qualities that He models for us. The Gemara, in several places (including Sota 14), teaches that just as G-d is merciful, kind and compassionate, we must be merciful, kind and compassionate in our interactions and dealings with other people. Although we human beings are limited and imperfect, and are thus incapable of attaining G-d's pristine perfection, this verse commands us to strive to follow His example. This includes performing acts of kindness for other people, just as G-d provided Adam and Hava with clothing, visited Abraham Abinu when he was ill, comforted Yishak when his father passed away, and buried Moshe Rabbenu after his death. We are to follow G-d's example and perform these and other acts of kindness. The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, is obvious, as we are to constantly strive to improve our character, by working to follow the example set for us by G-d Himself. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that this Misva affects everything we do, governing the way we eat, conduct our financial affairs, our interactions with other people, and our prayers and Torah study. Everything we do should be done in accordance with the character traits modeled for us by the Almighty. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha'hinuch adds, the Rambam taught that this Misva includes the obligation to follow the “middle way,” meaning, to avoid extremes, and conduct ourselves reasonably and moderately. We must be neither stingy nor overly generous. We need to find the “happy medium” with regard to our character traits. This Misva requires us to constantly scrutinize our conduct, and evaluate ourselves, to determine whether we behave with proper Middot (character traits). The Sages inferred this concept from the verse (Tehillim 50:23), “Ve'sam Derech,” which could be read as “Ve'sham Derech” – “and assessing the way,” alluding to the requirement to introspect and evaluate one's behavior. One who lives this way, the Sages teach, will earn a portion in the world to come, and will have the privilege of beholding the Shechina. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One transgresses this command by failing to work to improve his character and to suppress his Yeser Ha'ra (evil inclination) so that he faithfully abides by the Misvot. Rav Moshe Cordovero (Safed, 1522-1570) wrote a famous work, Tomer Debora, which presents a detailed, step-by-step guide for how to follow G-d's thirteen attributes of mercy which He pronounced to Moshe (Shemot 34:6-7). In the context of the Sefer Ha'hinuch's discussion of this Misva, he addresses an important philosophical question relevant to the attribution of human character traits to G-d. Although we find that G-d is described in the Torah and by the prophets as having various qualities, we must not make the mistake of attributing to Him human properties. For example, one of the thirteen attributes of mercy is “Erech Apayim” (patience, being slow to anger), which seems to imply that G-d experiences anger which He then restrains. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that it is preposterous to think of G-d as actually experiencing anger. After all, one feels anger because of frustration, His inability to control the situation in the way He wants. G-d, of course, has unlimited power over the universe, and can do anything He wishes. He thus never has any reason to feel angry. And, anger is a sign of a faulty character, whereas G-d, quite obviously, is perfect. Necessarily, then, the descriptions of G-d's anger must be understood allegorically. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that since there is a great deal of evil in the world, and many people worship other deities, the world deserves annihilation. G-d's allowing the world to continue existing is depicted as His restraining His anger, in that He refrains from punishing the world the way it deserves to be punished. The Gemara (Berachot 7a) comments that G-d is angry for one moment each day (“Ve'Kel Zo'em Be'chol Yom”), and the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains this as a reference to the moment each day when the world's sins “tip the scales,” exceeding its merits. At that moment, G-d is “angry” in the sense that the world deserves to be annihilated. G-d Himself, as explained, does not actually become angry, but the world becomes deserving of G-d's anger, and this is the meaning of those passages which depict G-d as angry. The Misva of “Ve'halachta Bi'drachav” is the 611 th Misva, and 611 is the Gematria of the word “Torah.” This alludes to the singular importance of this Misva, as it is all-encompassing, calling upon us to conduct all our affairs, throughout the entire day, in accordance with the values and character traits taught to us by G-d. A beautiful example of the significance of this Misva is a story told of a wealthy woman who was passing by a department store, and she noticed several children peering into the store window. She discovered that these were underprivileged orphans, who longingly stared at all the beautiful clothing for sale in the store, which they could never purchase. The woman brought them inside the store and purchased for them complete outfits, from head to toe. As they were leaving, one of the children turned to her and asked, “Who are you? Are you G-d?” “No,” the woman replied, “I am one of His children.” “That makes sense,” the children said. “You are related to Him, so you act like Him.” The Jewish People are called G-d's children. When we act kindly and compassionately, we show the world that G-d, our Father, is kind and compassionate, and we thus bring honor and glory to not only ourselves, but also to Hashem.

In the Vidui Ma'aser proclamation that a farmer was required to make every several years, avowing compliance with the various tithing obligations, he declares, “Ve'lo Natati Mimenu Le'met” (Debarim 26:14) – that he did not use the Ma'aser (tithe) for the needs of a dead body. This refers to the misuse of the money of Ma'aser Sheni, meaning, the funds onto which one had transferred the sanctity of Ma'aser Sheni, the tithe of one's produce which is to be eaten in Jerusalem. This money must be brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food and beverages, which are then to be eaten there in Jerusalem. This verse – “Ve'lo Natati Mimenu Le'met” – establishes a Biblical prohibition against using Ma'aser Sheni money for any other purpose. The Torah speaks of using the money for a “dead body,” referring to any purpose that does not sustain life, meaning, anything other than food or beverage. Thus, one may not use the money for utensils or jewelry. One may, however, use the money for skin ointments. This Halacha forms the basis of the general rule that applying ointment onto one's skin is considered in a certain sense like eating. It is forbidden to use Ma'aser Sheni money even for Misva purposes, such as for a coffin or shrouds for a dead body. One who violated this prohibition, and used Ma'aser Sheni money for something other than food or drink, must take that sum of money and purchase food or drinks, which he must then consume in Jerusalem. This prohibition thus falls under the category of “Lav Ha'nitan Le'tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money, and for which one is therefore not liable to Malkut. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when the obligation of Ma'aser Sheni applies.

After the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, a farmer is required to make a proclamation avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations, as dictated by the Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:13-15). In this declaration, the farmer specifies several laws that he obeyed, including, “Ve'lo Bi'arti Mimenu Be'tameh” (26:14), which means that he did not eat his Ma'aser Sheni in a state of Tum'a (impurity). The Ma'aser Sheni tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, and the Torah here informs us that it is forbidden to partake of this produce in a state of Tum'a. The fact that the farmer declares that he did not eat the produce while Tameh (impure), and that he concludes, “I have done in accordance with all that You commanded me,” shows that this is prohibited. This verse thus establishes a Biblical prohibition against eating Ma'aser Sheni produce while impure. This command forbids both eating Ma'aser Sheni while one is himself Tameh, and eating Ma'aser Sheni which has become Tameh, even though he is not Tameh. The Torah prohibition refers only to eating Ma'aser Sheni in Jerusalem, where it is to be consumed. If, for whatever, one ate Ma'aser Sheni outside Jerusalem, while he or the produce was Tameh, he does not transgress this Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, this is forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. One who eats Ma'aser Sheni in a state of Tum'a is liable to Malkut; if he does so outside Jerusalem, then he receives Malkut for violating the Rabbis' edict. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when tithing produce is required on the level of Torah law.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo presents the text of the “Vidui Ma'aser” proclamation which a farmer must make every three years, avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations. This text includes the pronouncement, “Lo Achalti Ve'oni Mimenu” (Debarim 26:14) – that the farmer did not partake of the hallowed Ma'aser Sheni produce in a state of Aninut, meaning, immediately after a family member's death, before the burial. The Ma'aser Sheni tithe, which is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, has Halachic sanctity, and the Torah here establishes that, due to its sanctity, an Onen (person in a state of Aninut) is forbidden from eating it. An Onen is forbidden also from eating other hallowed foods, meaning, the meat of Korbanot (sacrifices). This is deduced from the story told in Parashat Shemini (10) of the events that transpired on the first day when Aharon and his sons served as Kohanim in the Mishkan. Two of Aharon's sons tragically died that day, and Aharon and his remaining sons refrained from eating the meat of a sacrifice which would normally be eaten. Moshe asked why they did not eat the meat, and Aharon explained that as he was in a state of Aninut, he was not permitted to partake of the sacrifice. Aharon said, “Ve'achalti Hatat Hayom, Hayitab Be'eneh Hashem” (“If I would eat a sin-offering today, what this be pleasing in G-d's eyes?” – Vayikra 10:19). The Sefer Ha'hinuch offers two explanations for why the Torah forbade an Onen from eating hallowed food. First, he writes, a person eating sacrificial food of Ma'aser Sheni is considered as though he eats “from the table of G-d,” as G-d's guest, and it is disrespectful to sit at a king's table in a state of sorrow and anguish. As we read in Megilat Ester (4:2), “En La'bo El Sha'ar Ha'melech Bi'lbush Sak” – it was not allowed to appear in the area in front of King Ahashverosh's palace wearing sackcloth, the garments worn by mourners. In the king's presence, one must appear happy and cheerful. If this was true of King Ahashverosh, then it is certainly true – and much more so – of Hashem, the King of the universe. Therefore, the Torah commanded that a person who just suffered the loss of a family member is not permitted to eat “at the King's table,” meaning, to eat sacred food. Secondly, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, the Gemara teaches that “Kohanim Ochelim U'be'alim Mitkaperim” – a person bringing a sacrifice achieves atonement through the Kohanim's consumption of the sacrifice. Therefore, when the Kohanim partook of sacrifices, they needed to have certain intentions so that their consumption of the sacrifice would have the desired effect. A person in a state of Aninut is distraught, and thus unable to concentrate and have the proper focus when he eats. For this reason, the Sefer Ha'hinuch suggests, the Torah forbade an Onen from eating sacrifices. On the level of Torah law, a person is considered an Onen on the day of a family member's passing and burial. The night after that day, he is considered an Onen by force of Rabbinic enactment, and must therefore continue refraining from hallowed food. The status of Aninut remains throughout the period from the family member's passing, until the burial. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when sacrifices were brought, and when Ma'aser Sheni and other tithes were required on the level of Torah law. One who eats a Ke'zayit of Ma'aser Sheni or sacrificial food on the day of a family member's passing is liable to Malkut. On the night after the death and burial, when Aninut is extended by force of Rabbinic enactment, one who transgresses receives Malkut for violating the law imposed by the Sages.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:12-15) commands one to make a verbal declaration after “the third year,” avowing his compliance with his various tithing obligations. Each year, a farmer must give a portion of his produce – Teruma – to a Kohen, as well as one-tenth – Ma'aser Rishon – to a Levi. In addition, on the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, he must take another tenth – Ma'aser Sheni – to Jerusalem and eat it there. On the third and sixth years, this tithe is substituted with Ma'aser Ani – a tithe for the poor. (During the Shemita year, all the produce is declared ownerless, and thus no tithing obligations apply.) The Torah here commands that after each year of Ma'aser Ani – meaning, after the third and sixth years – one must make a proclamation avowing his having satisfied these requirements. This verbal proclamation is commonly known as “Vidui Ma'aser” – “the tithing confession.” Normally, the term “Vidui” (“confession”) refers to the confession of sin; in this instance, it denotes avowing having done the right thing. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that what distinguishes the human being from all other creatures is the faculty of speech. Even animals have some degree of intelligence, but none of them have the power of verbal communication. For this reason, the Sefer Ha'hinuch observes, many people are especially careful about how they speak, even more careful than they are about how they act. Keenly aware of the special importance of this defining human characteristic, they exercise particular caution in regard to their speech. Therefore, the Torah commanded a farmer to verbally affirm his meeting his Terumot and Ma'aserot obligations, as this will ensure his compliance with these laws. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that giving Terumot and Ma'aserot is an especially important responsibility, as these donations support those who serve Hashem in the Bet Ha'mikdash. Thus, in order to help enforce these obligations, the Torah requires farmers to make the Vidui Ma'aser proclamation. One who knows he will have to verbally affirm compliance with these requirements will likely comply with them, in order not to compromise his speech through a false declaration. The Misva of Vidui Ma'aser thus helps ensure that one meets his obligations. One must declare Vidui Ma'aser specifically during the day. It is done in the Bet Ha'mikdash, as the Torah commands making this declaration “Lifneh Hashem Elokecha” – “before Hashem your G-d” (26:13). Nevertheless, the Rambam rules that one who declared Vidui Ma'aser somewhere else, outside the Bet Ha'mikdash, has fulfilled his obligation. As mentioned, one must declare Vidui Ma'aser after the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle. Specifically, it is done on the final day of Pesach the following year, meaning, in the fourth year, and in the Shemita year. This Misva is binding only upon men, and only during the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1843-1905), who served as the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, maintained that the Vidui Ma'aser proclamation should be made even nowadays, when there is no Bet Ha'mikdash. This position was disputed by the Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953).

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:5) introduces the Misva known as “Mikra Bikkurim,” which requires a farmer to make a special proclamation upon bringing his Bikkurim – first ripened fruits – to the Bet Ha'mikdash. In this proclamation, the farmer recalls the story of Beneh Yisrael's enslavement in Egypt and the miracles of the Exodus. He then expresses his gratitude for the land which G-d has given him, from which he produced quality fruit. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah requires the farmer to not only bring his first fruits, but also to make this proclamation, because verbally expressing one's feelings has a stronger impact than the feelings themselves. By pronouncing with one's mouth G-d's kindnesses, and his feelings of gratitude, those feelings become even stronger. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that G-d wants the farmer to feel deep appreciation for the fruits themselves, and for the ability he was given to bring these fruits to Jerusalem, the good health and strength that G-d has granted him. And once he is expressing his gratitude for these blessings, he expresses gratitude also for what G-d has done for the Jewish People, miraculously redeeming them from Egyptian bondage, and bringing them to the Land of Israel. Through these expressions of gratitude, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, the farmer becomes worthy of continued blessing. It is because G-d wants us to earn His abundant blessings that He gives us this Misva, though which we become worthy of His kindness and grace. In the Mikra Bikkurim proclamation, the farmer expresses gratitude for the fruits he produced from “Ha'adama Asher Natata Li Hashem” – “the land which You, Hashem, have given me” (26:10). Therefore, this proclamation is made only by those who are given a portion of the land. Women, who do not receive a portion, do not recite Mikra Bikkurim, even though they are required to bring Bikkurim if they have agricultural land and produce fruit. Likewise, a Tumtum and Adroginus – people whose gender cannot be ascertained – do not recite Mikra Bikkurim. Additionally, an Apotropus – administrator of an estate on behalf of the deceased's orphans – does not recite Mikra Bikkurim when he brings Bikkurim on the orphans' behalf from the land left by their father. Since this land does not belong to him, he cannot recite, “Ha'adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” and so he does not recite Mikra Bikkurim. An interesting exception to this rule is a convert, who recites Mikra Bikkurim despite the fact that he does not receive a portion of Eretz Yisrael. The reason is that Eretz Yisrael was given to the descendants of Abraham Abinu, who is called an “Ab Hamon Goyim” – “the father of a multitude of nations” (Bereshit 17:5). Abraham is considered the “father” of not only his biological descendants, but also members of other nations who join Am Yisrael. Therefore, a convert is able to refer to the Land of Israel as “Ha'adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” because he is regarded as an heir of Abraham Abinu, to whom G-d promised the land. The Sefer Ha'hinuch raises the question of why a woman is excluded from the Misva of Mikra Bikkurim simply because there is one phrase in the proclamation which is not relevant to her. Wouldn't we assume that it is worth making this proclamation, given that the vast majority of the text is applicable to a woman no less than to a man? The Sefer Ha'hinuch answers that this Halacha shows the importance of precision when we pray and speak to Hashem. We must ensure never to say to G-d anything which is not perfectly accurate. Indeed, if even one phrase in a proclamation is inaccurate, then the proclamation should not be made, because when we speak to G-d, we must adhere to the strictest standards of precision. This Misva, of course, applies only when the Misva of Bikkurim applies – meaning, only in the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash. It applies specifically in the Land of Israel, and, by force of Rabbinic enactment, in the areas of Syria which King David conquered and annexed into his kingdom. One who brings his Bikkurim and fails to recite this declaration has transgressed this affirmative command.

In the final verses of Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:17-19), the Torah introduces three Misvot relevant to the evil nation of Amalek. The first is the command to always remember Amalek's attack on Beneh Yisrael soon after the Exodus from Egypt. The significance of Amalek's attack can be understood in light of a verse in Parashat Balak (Bamidbar 24:20), in which Bilam proclaims, “Reshit Goyim Amalek” – that Amalek was “the first among the nations.” Targum Onkelos explains this to mean that Amalek was the first nation to wage war with Beneh Yisrael after they left Egypt. The Sages compare Amalek's attack to somebody who jumps into a bath of scalding water, into which nobody else had dared to enter. This fellow was badly burned, but he had the effect of cooling the water somewhat, so that others could enter. Similarly, after the miracles of the Exodus and the splitting of the sea, all the nations of the world feared Beneh Yisrael, and did not dare initiate hostilities against them. Amalek was defeated after attacking Beneh Yisrael, but the attack had the effect of exposing Beneh Yisrael's vulnerability, “cooling” the fear that the rest of the world had felt, thus paving the way for future offensives by other peoples. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that Amalek launched this unprovoked attack due to its “evil heart and evil nature.” The Torah wants us to remember this event, the Sefer Ha'hinuch adds, so that we realize that anybody who causes to harm to Am Yisrael is despised by G-d. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains, the downfall of the enemy nations is commensurate with the extent of their efforts to cause us harm and destroy us. The harder they try to fight against us, the greater the devastation that they will suffer as a result. This notion is relevant to our time, as well, when we have enemies who are expending an enormous amount of effort to wage war against the Jewish People. The Kabbalists teach that the concept underlying this Misva refers not only to the actual nation of Amalek, but to all those who follow Amalek's evil example, and fight viciously against Am Yisrael. We must firmly believe that the modern-day “Amalekites” are despised by Hashem, and He will bring retribution for the pain and harm that they cause to the Jewish Nation. The Sefer Ha'hinuch notes that the Torah did not specify when or how often we are to fulfill this Misva to remember Amalek's attack. As opposed to the Misva to remember the Exodus from Egypt, which, as the Sages inferred from the text of the Torah, requires mentioning the Exodus each day and night, the Misva to remember Amalek's assault is not given any time-frame. However, the accepted custom is to fulfill this Misva once a year, on the Shabbat before Purim, by reading these verses from the Torah in the synagogue. This is done because on Purim, we read the Megilla, which tells of the destruction of Haman and his sons, who belonged to the nation of Amalek. In advance of the reading of the destruction of Amalek, then, we fulfill the Misva to remember what Amalek did to us. Later, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one transgresses this affirmative command by going his entire life without ever verbally remembering Amalek's attack. It appears that in his view, the Torah obligation requires verbally recalling Amalek's attack just once at some point in one's life. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that this command applies in all places and in all time-periods, and is binding only upon men. He explains that since women do not generally go out to war, they are exempt from the obligation to remember Amalek's attack, which is linked to the Misva of waging war to annihilate Amalek. Later scholars raised the question of how to reconcile the Sefer Ha'hinuch's comments with the Gemara's teaching that in the case of a Milhemet Misva (a war which there is a Misva to wage), everyone must participate, including brides and grooms. The Gemara clearly assumes that when it comes to obligatory wars, the responsibility falls upon even women. The answer given is that women fulfill non-combat roles, such as preparing and delivering food and other supplies for the soldiers. They do not, however, participate in the actual fighting, and therefore, in the view of the Sefer Ha'hinuch, they are not included in the Misva to remember Amalek's attack, since they do not fight against Amalek. In the next verse, the Torah introduces the command, “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek Mi'tahat Ha'shamayim” – to eradicate Amalek from the face of the earth. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra relates that King David's general, Yoab, waged war against Amalek, and killed only the males. When he returned, David asked him why he did not kill also the women, and Yoab replied by citing the phrase “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek.” His schoolteacher, Yoab recalled, taught him that the word “Zecher” in this verse should be pronounced, “Zechar” – “the males of,” such that the obligation is to kill only the men. This is a mistake, as the correct pronunciation is “Zecher,” which means “memory of,” and the Misva requires killing even the women. According to some views, this schoolteacher was tracked down and punished for the grave mistake that was made when teaching this command. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin teaches that upon entering the Land of Israel, Beneh Yisrael became obligated in three Misvot: appointing a king, building the Bet Ha'mikdash, and annihilating the nation of Amalek. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that this command is binding upon all those who have the practical ability to kill Amalekites. Fundamentally, this Misva applies in all times and places. In practice, of course, we are unable to identify anybody as a member of the nation of Amalek. The Assyrian emperor Sanhedrib captured much of the ancient world and transferred entire populations from their lands, such that residents of a country cannot be assumed to be the descendants of the original nations who lived there. Hence, nobody can be identified as a member of the nation of Amalek, and we are thus unable to fulfill this Misva. The final words of Parashat Ki-Teseh are “Lo Tishkah” – “Do not forget,” introducing a third command, forbidding us from forgetting what Amalek did to our ancestors. In addition to the affirmative command to remember Amalek's attack, we are also prohibited from doing anything that would cause us to forget what they did. The Gemara understood that the affirmative command requires verbally recalling Amalek's attack, whereas the prohibition forbids us from forgetting it in our minds.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:13-16) forbids having in one's possession inaccurate weights and measures, meaning, instruments which give incorrect readings of weight, volume or size, and could thus cheat either the seller or the buyer. Using such instruments, the Torah states, is considered “To'abat Hashem” – “an abomination to G-d.” The Torah here forbids having inaccurate weights and measures in one's possession even if they are not being used. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that possessing such instruments is forbidden “Pen Yiheyeh Le'mokesh” – “lest it becomes a trap,” meaning, because it might lead to sinful conduct. The Rambam writes that other people, who do not realize that the instrument is not accurate, might innocently use it, and will unknowingly end up stealing, by overcharging or underpaying for merchandise. From the Sefer Ha'hinuch's formulation, however, it appears that he understood the concern to be for the person himself. Even though he knows that the instrument is imprecise, he might nevertheless be tempted to use it in order to steal. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra (89) establishes that this prohibition applies even if it can be assumed that the instrument will never be used. For example, if the instrument had been used as a bedpan, for urine, such that we cannot conceive of people using it later to measure food or beverages, nevertheless, one may not keep it in his home. The Torah speaks of the various instruments in this context with repetitive phrases – “Eben Va'aben”; “Efa Ve'efa.” The Rambam writes that although the Torah repeats these phrases, this command is to be listed as a single Biblical prohibition, and not as two prohibitions. One might have assumed that the extra words imply additional commands, such that one who transgresses this prohibition is actually guilty of multiple violations. The Rambam writes that this is not the case, as the Torah occasionally repeats itself for emphasis, and thus one violates only a single prohibition by having inaccurate weights or measures in his possession. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who keeps a faulty scale or measuring device in his home violates this command, but is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha'hinuch gives two reasons why one is not liable to Malkut for this violation. Firstly, and more obviously, this falls under the category of “Lav She'en Bo Ma'aseh” – a prohibition which one transgresses passively, without performing a forbidden act. One violates this command simply by keeping the forbidden instrument in his home, and failing to bring it out of his home. As no action is performed, the violator is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha'hinuch then adds a second reason, explaining that this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha'nitan Le'tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money. If one uses an inaccurate instrument to weigh or measure merchandise, and thereby steals, he corrects his misconduct by repaying the person from whom he stole. Malkut are not administered for a violation that can be rectified, and so one is not subject to Malkut for violating the prohibition against faulty weights and measures. Later writers raised the question of how the Sefer Ha'hinuch could apply the rule of “Lav Ha'nitan Le'tashlumin” to the prohibition against possessing faulty weights or measures. As explained earlier, this command forbids not only using these instruments, but even just having them in one's home. This violation thus does not entail any theft, and, as such, it cannot be rectified through payment. How, then, does the Sefer Ha'hinuch classify this prohibition under the category of “Lav Ha'nitan Le'tashlumin”? The Minhat Hinuch (Rav Yosef Babad, 1801-1874) and the Or Same'ah (Rav Meir Simcha Ha'kohen of Dvinsk, 1843-1926) answer this question based on the aforementioned explanation of the command not to even possess faulty weights and measures. As we saw, the Torah issued this command in order to prevent the use of these instruments, which entails theft. Now if somebody actually uses inaccurate weights and measures, to the detriment of the other party to the transaction, then he is not liable to Malkut, because he repays the amount that he stole from his fellow. It stands to reason that if this violation is not punishable by Malkut, then the possession of faulty weights and measures, which is forbidden only as a safeguard against the actual use of such devices, cannot be punishable by Malkut. The prohibition enacted as a safeguard against theft cannot be treated more seriously than theft itself. Therefore, since one does not receive Malkut for using inaccurate instruments, one does not receive Malkut for having them in his possession, either. This prohibition should remind us of the importance of exercising caution with regard to what we allow into our possession. If the Torah forbids keeping in storage an old, broken scale, as it may possibly lead to forbidden activity, then certainly we must ensure not to allow in our homes things that people use and which could lead to misconduct. We must be careful with regard to the literature that enters our home, and also not allow unfiltered internet access, which poses far greater spiritual danger than an old scale in the basement. The Torah's command teaches us of the diligence required when building and maintaining a Torah home, that we must not keep in the home anything which could cause people to stumble and act improperly.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:10-11) addresses the case of an argument that erupts between two men, and the wife of one of the men violently attacks the other, reaching for his private area. Since she endangered the man fighting with her husband, the Torah commands, “Ve'kasota Et Kapah” – “You shall cut off her hand.” This command is understood as a general obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued or has come under assault, by attacking the person who threatens him. The verse continues, “Lo Tahos Enecha,” adding a prohibition against having compassion for the attacker. The Torah thus introduces both an affirmative command to rescue the pursued, and a prohibition against turning away and allowing the pursuer to continue. If one can stop the pursuer by inflicting an injury – as in the case described by the Torah, where the woman's hand could be severed – then this should be done. If the only way to stop the pursuer is by killing him, then he must be killed. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that G-d wants us to maintain law and order in society, and so the Torah commands us not to allow the strong to take advantage of the weak. Moreover, the weak and vulnerable tend to be humbler and more devoted to G-d, and the Torah thus wants us to protect them against the violent elements of society who have no regard for Torah values. This Misva applies even if the Rodef (pursuer) is an adult who pursues a young child. The child's life must be protected by stopping the adult pursuer. If one was able to rescue the pursued by injuring the Rodef, but nevertheless killed him, he is considered a murderer, as he killed unnecessarily. It is only if the pursuer cannot be stopped without being killed that one is allowed – and thus required – to kill the pursuer. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 49a) applies this rule to the story told in the Book of Shemuel II (chapter 2) of Abner, who killed Asah'el, who was chasing after him. Abner was considered guilty of murder because he could have protected himself by injuring Asah'el, and he did not need to kill him. If a woman is in labor, and, due to complications, she becomes dangerously ill, the doctor may kill the fetus in order to save the woman, as the fetus is considered to be “pursuing” the mother, in that it threatens the mother's life. However, once the baby's head has exited the mother's body, then this situation is treated as the natural process of childbirth, and the infant may not be killed, even if the mother's condition is life-threatening. The obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued applies also in the case of a man pursuing a woman with whom relations are forbidden, with the intent to violate her. This man, too, is considered a Rodef, and must be stopped, even if this necessitates killing him. This applies also if a man pursues another man for the purpose of committing a homosexual act with him. If somebody makes his way to commit a different capital offense, however, one may not kill or injure the fellow to stop him from committing the violation. Instead, Bet Din is assigned the task of trying the sinner after the fact. These two Misvot – the affirmative command to the rescue the pursued, and the prohibition against refraining from doing so – apply in all times and places, and are binding upon both men and women. One who is able to rescue the pursued but fails to do so transgresses these two commands as well as the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta'amod Al Dam Re'echa” (Vayikra 19:16), which forbids sitting idly instead of rescuing somebody whose life is in danger.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:7-10) commands that if someone's married brother died without children, and he chooses not to marry the widow in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum, then he must perform a special ceremony called Halisa. Once a married man dies without children, the widow is bound to the deceased's brother (a relationship called “Zika”), such that she is not permitted to marry anybody else. The deceased's brother bears an obligation to perform Halisa to release the widow from this bond if he does not want to marry her. The Halisa ceremony involves the brother wearing a special shoe which the widow unties and removes from his foot, after which she spits in front of him. The concept underlying the Halisa ceremony is that the widow demonstrates to the brother her willingness to be subservient to him, as represented by her removing his shoe, an act which a servant would perform for a master. She was prepared to serve him if he would marry her in order to perpetuate her deceased husband's legacy. But since he has refused to marry her, she no longer gives him respect, to the extent that she now spits in his presence. This obligation applies only if the brother was born before the husband passed away. If the husband died and his parents then begot a child, the widow is not bound to this brother, since the brothers were not alive at the same time. The Misva applies only to paternal brothers, meaning, brothers who share the same father. If the deceased had only a brother from the same mother, but not a brother from the same father, then there is no Misva of Yibum in such a case. The Torah writes that Yibum or Halisa is required if a husband dies without a “son” (“U'ben En Lo”), but this refers to either a son or a daughter. If the deceased has a son or a daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa. If the deceased had a son or daughter who has since passed away, and has a grandchild from that son or daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa, since the deceased has living offspring. When Halisa is to be performed, three judges are chosen to oversee the process, which involves certain texts which both the widow and her brother-in-law must recite. In order to publicize the Halisa, an additional five Rabbis are brought to observe. Before the Halisa, the Rabbis instruct the widow and brother-in-law, “Go to such-and-such place,” as the location of the Halisa must be designated in advance. The Rabbis then ask the brother-in-law a series of questions, ascertaining that he is at least thirteen years of age, and that this woman is indeed his deceased brother's widow. The judges also ask the widow if she had eaten that day, as she should not eat anything on the day of the Halisa before the ceremony. The reason is that the woman is required to spit her own saliva, and not fluid from anything she had eaten. The shoe used for Halisa must be made from leather, and optimally should be placed on the brother's right foot. This special shoe has laces and straps tied up the brother's leg. He must wear the shoe directly on his foot, without socks, as nothing may come in between the shoe and his foot. The widow unties the shoe and removes it. The brother must keep his foot on the ground throughout the process, and may not assist at all in the untying or removal of the shoe. She then spits in front of the brother, enough for the Rabbis to see. The Rabbis of the Bet Din then announce three times, “Halutz Ha'na'al,” and write her a “Get Halisa,” a text that pronounces her release from the bond to the brother-in-law. The widow is then permitted to marry anyone she wishes. Torah law permits a woman to marry a Kohen after Halisa, as she is not considered a Gerusha (divorcee), who is forbidden from marrying a Kohen. However, the Sages enacted that a woman who has performed Halisa may not then marry a Kohen, as though she had been divorced. If the deceased's brother does not wish to marry the widow, and he refuses to perform Halisa, then he has violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that he is considered a “Ro'a Leb” – an “evil-hearted person,” as he keeps his widowed sister-in-law trapped and unable to marry.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that if a married, childless man dies, and he has a brother, then the brother must perform “Yibum,” meaning, he must marry the widow. If he does not wish to marry her, then he performs a ceremony called Halisa, which is listed as a separate Misva. In explaining the reason behind the Misva of Yibum, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that when a couple marries, they are considered a single unit. This idea is rooted in the very first married couple – Adam and Hava – in that Hava was created from a part of Adam's body. This shows that a wife is, in a sense, regarded as part of the husband. Now when a husband dies without leaving behind a spiritual legacy in the form of children who inherit his devotion to serving G-d, the Torah creates a method by which the deceased husband can be considered to beget children, such that he leaves a legacy. His brother marries the widow – who is considered part of the deceased – and their children will be considered the children of the deceased. The Misvot they perform will be partially credited to the deceased, thus elevating his soul. Of course, the biological father – the deceased's brother – also shares in these merits, as he is the one who actually produces and raises the children. But in this way, the deceased can be considered to partially leave behind a spiritual legacy, and this is why the Torah introduced the concept of Yibum. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains on this basis the story of Onan, Yehuda's second son, who married the widow of his older brother, Er, in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum. However, although Onan married the widow, the Torah (Bereshit 38:9) tells that Onan refused to impregnate her, because he knew “Ki Lo Lo Yiheyeh Ha'zara” – “that the offspring would not be his.” The Sefer Ha'hinuch interprets this to mean that the child he would produce would not be attributed entirely to him, as he would be “sharing” this child with his deceased brother. Onan was not interested in only a partial share of the child, and so he refused to produce children with the widow. In any event, according to the Sefer Ha'hinuch, the concept underlying the Misva of Yibum is that it enables the deceased to leave a spiritual legacy here in the world through his brother's marriage to his wife. The Misva of Yibum applies regardless of whether the husband died after he married his wife, or he died after Erusin (betrothal), before the completion of the marriage. Only a paternal brother is required to perform Yibum; a brother who shares only a mother with the deceased, and not a father, is not required to marry the widow. If the deceased was married to several wives, and had no children with any of them, then one of his brothers performs Yibum or Halisa to any of the deceased's wives. The oldest surviving brother has first rights to perform Yibum, before the younger brothers. Once a brother performs Halisa, the widow may then not marry him. If the deceased also had other wives, they are also forbidden for marriage to the brother who performed Halisa, and also to all the other brothers, by force of Rabbinic enactment. Yibum should not be performed immediately after the husband's death. The brother must wait ninety days – including the day of death and the day of the Yibum – as it must first be ascertained that the widow is not pregnant with the deceased's child. If she is, then there is no Misva of Yibum, and thus the brother-in-law may not marry her. Therefore, a waiting period is required to ensure she is not pregnant before the deceased's brother marries her. If a husband died while his wife was pregnant with his only child, but she miscarried, then she requires Yibum, because the deceased did not leave any children. The deceased's brother fulfills this Misva by having relations with the widow. He fulfills the Misva even if he did not have intention at the time of the relations to fulfill the obligation. However, the Sages enacted that the brother should formally betroth the widow before having relations. This special betrothal before Yibum is referred to as a “Ma'amar.” The Misva of Yibum applies in all times and places. Even today, the brother of a childless husband who dies is required to perform Yibum, but it is customary to instead perform Halisa. If the brother performed neither Yibum nor Halisa, then he is in violation of this affirmative command.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Seseh (Debarim 25:5) commands that when a married man dies without children, the widow may not have relations with another man until Yibum or Halisa. The term Yibum refers to the marriage of the deceased's brother to the widow, and Halisa is a ceremony which the brother and widow perform if the brother does not wish to marry her. The Torah here commands that until Yibum or Halisa is performed, the widow may not have relations with any man, as the “Zika” (Halachic link) to her brother-in-law forbids her for all other men. If the widow does have relations with another man before Yibum or Halisa, then both she and the man violate this prohibition, and are liable to Malkut. The Rambam implies that this prohibition is violated only if the widow marries another man. The Sefer Ha'hinuch, however, writes that this command forbids relations with the widow even outside the context of marriage. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains the reason for this command in his discussion of the next Misva, the obligation upon the deceased's brother to perform Yibum.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:4), “Lo Tahsom Shor Be'disho” – “You shall not muzzle an ox as it threshes.” This establishes a prohibition against preventing an animal from eating as it works outside in the field. The Torah gives the example of an ox on the threshing floor, but this command applies to all animals. It applies even to non-kosher animals, as the animal's status vis-à-vis human consumption is of no relevance to this prohibition. It also applies to any form of work outside in the field, and not only to threshing. Anytime a person has an animal perform work in the field, he may not prevent the animal from eating. It makes no difference whether the animal wishes to eat produce that is still attached to the ground, or produce that has already been harvested. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah introduced this prohibition in order to engender within a person a kind, compassionate, sensitive character. Although G-d created animals to serve human beings, He commanded us to show sensitivity to the animals who work for us so that we accustom ourselves to show sensitivity to the people who work for us, pay them fairly, and care for their needs and for their wellbeing. This command refers only to animals; the laws regarding the rights of human workers is addressed in other contexts. One violates this prohibition even if he muzzled the animal before it started working and then kept the muzzle on as the animal worked. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who muzzled an animal while it was working in the field has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. Even if one did not muzzle the animal, but he shouted at the animal when it tried to eat, thus preventing it from eating, he is liable to Malkut. With respect to this prohibition, moving one's lips to shout qualifies as an “action” such that the violator is regarded as having transgressed by committing a forbidden act, and is thus liable to Malkut. If somebody leased his fellow's animal and muzzled it while it worked in the field, then in addition to receiving Malkut, the violator must compensate the owner for failing to feed the animal. One who leases someone's animal accepts responsibility to feed it, and thus if he prevents the animal from eating, he owes the owner money for failing to meet this obligation. Normally, if a person commits an act for which he is liable to both Malkut and payment, he receives the Malkut and does not need to pay (“En Adam Lokeh U'meshalem”). In this instance, however, the violator must compensate the animal's owner, because the financial obligation is incurred not by the forbidden act of muzzling the animal, but rather by the failure to feed the animal as required.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that when somebody is found guilty of a violation, he must be given Makut (lashes). The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that this command is actually intended for the benefit of the transgressor. The afflictions that sinners endure in this world have the effect of cleansing their record, such that they can be worthy of the eternal rewards in the next world. In G-d's great love for Am Yisrael, whom He treats as His precious children, He prescribed a system of punishment in this world so that violators can have the opportunity to receive great rewards in the world to come. Before the Malkut were administered, the violator would have his hands tied to a pole. The court official would tear the violator's shirt until his chest was exposed, and stand on a stone behind him. The whip was made from the hide of a calf. One-third of the prescribed lashes were directed to the front of the violator's body, and the other two-thirds struck his back. This command applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and only when there are courts consisting of judges who had received the official Semicha (ordination) that originated with Moshe Rabbenu. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that if a court failed to administer Malkut when this was required, they were deserving of severe punishment, because it is the threat of punishment that deters prospective sinners and thereby ensures compliance with the Torah's laws. In this same verse, the Torah introduces a prohibition against lashing the convicted sinner more than the prescribed number of lashes. The Sages understood this command as establishing a general prohibition against striking a fellow Jew. This is inferred from the repetitious phrase in this verse – “Lo Yosif, Pen Tosif” – which implies that this prohibition is directed not only to the court official administering Malkut, but to all of us, forbidding striking our fellow. The Torah here states that a violator is given forty Malkut, but tradition explains this to mean thirty-nine. The Rambam writes that in truth, the verse should be understood literally, as referring to forty lashes, but tradition lowered the number to thirty-nine as a safeguard, to ensure that the court official does not exceed forty lashes. The Sefer Ha'hinuch questions why the Rambam advanced this novel theory, when the Gemara explicitly states that the word “Arba'im” (“forty”) in this verse means “one less than forty.” In any event, these thirty-nine lashes are the maximum amount the violation would receive. An assessment would be made by physicians beforehand to determine how many lashes the sinner could endure, based on his age and physical condition. If he could not tolerate even three lashes, then he would not receive any. The number of lashes needed to be a multiple of 3. Thus, for example, if the doctors determined that the violator could handle twenty lashes, then he would receive eighteen lashes. If, as the sinner is whipped, he lost control of his bodily functions, then he was not whipped anymore. If the whip was torn at some point after the court official began administering the Malkut, then he was required stop, without giving more lashes. If, however, the whip broke before the official began lashing the sinner, then he would repair the whip and proceed. If the sinner's hands were not tied well to the pole, and he was able to escape, then he was not given lashes thereafter. It is forbidden not only to strike one's fellow, but even to merely lift one's hand and threaten to strike him. This Halacha is inferred from the story told in Parashat Shemot (2:13) of Moshe approaching two men whom he saw fighting. He turned to the “wicked one” and asked why he was striking his fellow. The Sages understood that Moshe saw this man lift his hand to strike the other, and so this person is called “the wicked one,” as it is forbidden even to lift one's hand to strike somebody. This second aspect of the prohibition, which forbids striking one's fellow, applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. The first aspect of this command, of course, applies only in the Land of Israel, during times when courts are authorized to administer punishment. One who strikes his fellow must make a series of payments to compensate him for the harm inflicted. As such, the violator is not liable to Malkut, as one is not liable to Malkut if he incurred a financial obligation by committing the transgression. If, however, one struck his fellow and the harm inflicted was worth less than a “Peruta” (the smallest unit of currency), then since there is no obligation to pay, he is liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:19) that if one forgets sheaves of grain during the harvest, they must be left for the poor. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah required leaving these sheaves for the poor because when the underprivileged see the landowners harvesting their produce, they say to themselves, “These folks have such an abundance of a grain! If only we could have just several sheaves!” Out of compassion for the impoverished, G-d granted their request by giving them rights to the sheaves of grain that are forgotten during the harvest. Additionally, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, leaving these sheaves for the poor will help the owner engender within himself the qualities of compassion and sensitivity, as a result of which he will be worthy of Hashem's blessings. This requirement applies only to small sheaves of grain, specifically, sheaves amounting to one Se'a or less. If larger sheaves are forgotten, one may go back to retrieve them. Furthermore, the sheaves must be left for the poor only if they are forgotten by everybody. If the owner forgot about them but the workers did not, or vice-versa, then they may be retrieved. Even if some stranger saw that these sheaves were forgotten and informed the workers or owner, the sheaves may be retrieved. This Misva applies only in areas where the Teruma obligation applies – meaning, in Eretz Yisrael, and in regions near Eretz Yisrael. It is binding upon both men and women alike. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one who violates this command by retrieving forgotten sheaves shows that he has a bad character, as he withholds that which ought to be given to the needy. In this same verse, the Torah adds a prohibition against going back to retrieve forgotten sheaves (“Lo Tashub Le'lekahto”). Thus, one is bound by both an affirmative command to leave the sheaves for the poor, and a prohibition forbidding him from taking it. One who transgresses this prohibition by retrieving forgotten sheaves is not liable to Malkut, because he can rectify his violation by bringing it back and leaving it for the poor, and one is not liable to Malkut for a violation which can be rectified (“Lav Ha'nitak”). According to some opinions, however, one would be liable to Malkut if, after unlawfully retrieving forgotten sheaves, the sheaves are lost and destroyed. Since he can no longer rectify his transgression by returning them, he is liable to Malkut.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Ve'lo Tahabol Beged Almana” – that one who lends money to a widow may not take something from her as collateral in lieu of payment. This applies regardless of whether the widow is needy or wealthy. Even if she is rich, it is forbidden for a lender to take one of her possessions as collateral. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued this prohibition in order to accustom us to act mercifully and compassionately. Widows are generally downtrodden and vulnerable, and taking collateral from a widow would make her feel taken advantage of. The Torah wants us to show particular compassion and sensitivity to widows, and so a creditor may not seize collateral from her. It is forbidden for a lender to take collateral from a widow even if she agrees to give one. This prohibition applies at all times and in all places, and is binding upon both men and women. One violates this command by taking collateral from a widow once the debt is due and she has not paid. It is permissible to take collateral from a widow as security at the time the loan is given. If a lender took collateral from a widow in violation of this command, he must return it. For this reason, he is not liable to Malkut, because Malkut are not administered when one committed a violation which he can rectify through payment. However, the Rambam maintains that if the lender took collateral and it was subsequently lost or destroyed, then he is liable to Malkut, since he can no longer rectify the violation by returning the object. The Sefer Ha'hinuch questions this ruling, noting that the value of the lost collateral will be deducted from the sum of the debt owed by the widow. Hence, the creditor is considered to have repaid for what he unlawfully took, and should therefore not be liable to Malkut even if the original object is lost or destroyed.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Lo Tateh Mishpat Ger Yatom” – forbidding judges from “swaying” a trial involving a litigant who is either a foreigner or an orphan. A judge might tilt the decision in one of two opposite directions in a such a case. First, since foreigners and orphans are, generally, weaker and more vulnerable, the judge might not take their arguments seriously, and might have a natural bias in favor of the other litigant, who is likely wealthier and more well-known. Conversely, the judge might tilt the decision in favor of the foreigner or orphan, out of pity for this litigant's disadvantaged condition. The Torah commands that a judge must be honest and impartial when handling such cases, without showing bias toward the foreigner or orphan, or to the opposing litigant. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that if a litigant is both a foreigner and an orphan, then the judge who sways the decision in either direction violates this prohibition twice – as he sways the judgment of both a foreigner and an orphan. Additionally, the Sefer Ha'hinuch notes, the judge violates the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta'asu Avel Ba'mishpat” (Vayikra 19:15), which forbids judges from ruling unjustly. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that although this command is generally applicable to men – as only men serve as judges – it can, in some instances, be relevant even to women. If the litigants agree to bring their dispute to a female judge, and have her try the case, then she becomes bound by this prohibition, and would thus transgress this command if she sways the judgment against or in favor of a foreigner or orphan.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 2416), “Lo Yumtu Abot Al Banim, U'banim Lo Yumtu Al Abot” – “Fathers shall not be killed because of their sons, and sons shall not be killed because of their fathers.” This verse is understood to mean that a court is not permitted to put a defendant to death based on the testimony of his parent or child. Although the Torah speaks here specifically of testimony regarding a capital crime, this command in truth includes all court cases, even cases involving financial disputes. A Bet Din is forbidden by force of this command from acting upon testimony given by a witness about a family member. The Torah gives the example of a capital case because one might have assumed that a person would not testify untruthfully about his family member's capital offense, which would lead to his or her execution. Since we would have thought to accept testimony incriminating one's family member of a capital crime, the Torah introduced this command specifically in the context of an offense incurring the death penalty. Likewise, although the Torah speaks here of a parent testifying about a child, and a child testifying about a parent, this prohibition actually applies to testimony about any family member. The example of a parent and child is given because of the strong feelings of love and affection that exist between parents and children. We might have thought to accept incriminating testimony about one's parent or child, because it is difficult to imagine that one would falsely testify against one's parent or child. The Torah therefore gave this particular example, but the prohibition applies also to other family members. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah forbade accepting testimony about family members in order to help ensure the veracity of testimony accepted in courts of law. A stable society requires a functioning judicial system, and so it is imperative that courts act upon testimony which cannot be questioned. Therefore, the Torah forbade accepting testimony on behalf of family members, as family members might lie in order to help one another. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah extended this prohibition to include also incriminating testimony against family members as a safeguard against accepting testimony given on behalf of family members. If the Torah allowed accepting incriminating testimony, courts might then begin accepting even testimony on behalf of family members, and so the Torah disqualified all testimony about the witness' family members. Additionally, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, family members generally live with one another, which frequently gives rise to tensions and fighting. When friction arises, a person might decide to come to court and falsely testify about his family member towards whom he feels resentment. He will then later regret having brought the false accusation, once his anger subsides. The Torah therefore commanded that testimony about family members must not be accepted. On the level of Torah law, this disqualification applies only to paternal relatives – father and son, grandfather and grandson, paternal brothers, the sons of brothers, and a man with his brother's son. The Rabbis extended this prohibition to include also family members related maternally, or through marriage. According to some opinions, however, even these relationships are included in the Biblical prohibition. Regardless, it is clear that brothers and first cousins may not testify about one another. Second cousins, however, may testify about one another. A second cousin may testify about his second cousin's parent, and vice-versa. According to some opinions, although one may not testify about a grandparent or grandson, one may testify about a great-grandparent or great-grandson. Others, however, maintain that when it comes to a family's direct line, testimony is invalid even about somebody three or more generations removed. Anytime a person is ineligible to testify about a woman due to a familial relationship, he is also ineligible to testify about her husband. Likewise, if someone cannot testify about a man due to their familial relationship, he may not testify about his wife. Thus, for example, just as one cannot testify about his wife's sister, he may not testify about her husband. However, one may testify about that husband's family members. If a man betrothed a woman (Erusin), they may not testify about one another, even before they marry. At my wedding, two Rabbis served as witnesses – Rabbi Max Maslaton and Rabbi David Ozeri. It was later determined that since Rabbi Maslaton and Rabbi Ozeri's wife are first cousins, they are considered relatives, and are thus disqualified to serve as witnesses together. As such, the betrothal ceremony needed to be repeated with different witnesses. This is an example of the Halacha mentioned above, that a disqualifying familial connection with a woman is applied also to her husband. This prohibition applies even today, when witnesses are brought before a Bet Din in cases involving financial disputes. It applies to the judges of the Bet Din, forbidding them from accepting the testimony of a litigant's family member. Of course, they are not liable to Malkut for this transgression, as it is committed without performing an action (“Lav She'en Bo Ma'aseh”).

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:15) commands, “Be'yomo Titen Secharo” – requiring an employer to promptly pay his worker the wages due to him, without any delay. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because generally, people depend on their wages for their basic sustenance. Ensuring to pay workers on time so that they can pay for their necessities helps engender compassion and sensitivity for other people. The Torah wants us to be merciful and compassionate, because when we act toward people with mercy and compassion, we earn Hashem's mercy and compassion, and He showers us with His blessings. This Misva includes both wages for work that one performed, as well as payment for leasing. Thus, if a person leases his fellow's animal or utensil, he is required by force of this command to promptly pay the owner the rental fee. If an employee works during the day, then the employer must pay the wages that night, until morning. If the employee works at night, then the employer must pay the wages the next day, until dark. If the arrangement is for the employee to work for a week, a month or a year, then the time his wages are due depends on when his term of employment ends. If it ends during the day, then he must be paid by the end of the day, and if it ends during the night, then the payment must be given during that night. If somebody brings an artisan a utensil or some other item to repair, then the owner is not required to pay the artisan until he returns the repaired item. Once he returns it, the payment must be made immediately. This requirement applies only if the worker claims his wages; the employer does not violate this command as long as the employee has not yet asked for his money. Furthermore, this prohibition does not apply if the employer does not have the money owed to the worker. However, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that it is certainly proper not to hire a worker before ensuring that he will be able to pay his wages. This command applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:13) that a lender who took collateral from the borrower must return it to the borrower when he needs it. Previously, the Torah introduced a prohibition forbidding the lender from keeping the item with him when the borrower needs it; in this verse, the Torah adds an affirmative command to return the object. Thus, for example, if the lender seized a tool which the borrower requires for his livelihood, then the lender must return it in the morning, when the borrower needs to work, and the borrower then brings it back to the lender at the end of the day. If the lender took a blanket which the borrower needs to keep him warm at night, then the lender must return it in the evening, and the borrower then brings it back to the lender in the morning. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah introduced this command in order for us to train ourselves to act kindly and compassionately. By treating others with mercy and sensitivity, we become worthy of Hashem's mercy and abundant blessings. This command applies only with regard to collateral taken in lieu of payment once the debt was due and the borrower did not repay. In such a case, the lender must return the object to the borrower when the borrower needs it. But if the loan was given from the outset on collateral, then the lender may keep the collateral with him at all times, because this was the condition on which the loan was given. The Sefer Ha'hinuch raises the question as to what purpose there would be in taking collateral in lieu of payment if it must be returned to the borrower whenever he needs it. If the concept of taking collateral is to apply pressure upon the borrower to repay the loan, then why does the Torah require returning the item to the borrower whenever he needs it? Does this not undermine the entire purpose of collateral? The Sefer Ha'hinuch answers that, firstly, the collateral assures that the debt will not be cancelled at the end of the Shemita year. Normally, debts are cancelled at the end of Shemita, but when the lender took collateral in lieu of payment, the debt remains even after Shemita. Secondly, collateral allows the lender to collect the debt from the borrower's inheritors if he dies before repaying the loan. Normally, after a debtor passes away, the creditor cannot collect the moveable possessions in the estate as payment. If, however, he had taken collateral in lieu of payment, then he may. If the item taken as collateral is a luxury item, which the borrower does not need for any practical purpose, then the lender does not need to return it at all. He may hold onto it for thirty days, and then, after thirty days, he may sell it under the auspices of Bet Din, and then keep the money as payment for the loan. A lender who refuses to return an item taken as collateral when the borrower needs it is in violation of both this affirmative command, and the prohibition mentioned earlier.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:10) that when a creditor is owed money, “Lo Tabo El Beto La'abot Aboto” – he may not enter the debtor's home to forcefully seize his property in lieu of payment. The lender is not permitted to take the law into his own hands by forcefully seizing collateral, and must rather wait for the court to require the borrower to give him something as collateral. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command in the interest of maintaining law and order in society, to ensure that people do not resort to violent tactics to obtain what they want. If a person would be allowed to forcefully seize what is owed to him, society would be overrun by chaos, and the strong would always overpower the weak. The Torah therefore requires that a lender take collateral in lieu of payment only with the authorization of a Bet Din. This command applies also to court officials, forbidding them from entering the borrower's home without his permission. They must instead wait outside the borrower's home, and have him bring them possessions to be given to the lender. The court official may, however, forcefully grab the collateral from the borrower's hand outside his home. The lender is not permitted to forcefully grab the collateral, even outside the borrower's home. This command applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. If someone seized collateral from his debtor without permission from the Bet Din, he transgresses this prohibition. He is not liable to Malkut, however, because he can rectify his transgression by simply returning that which he unlawfully took, and one is not liable to Malkut for a violation which can be rectified (“Lav Ha'nitak”). The Rambam writes, though, that if the lender seized the collateral, and it was subsequently lost or destroyed, then the lender is indeed liable to Malkut, because he can no longer return it and thus rectify his violation. The Sefer Ha'hinuch questions this ruling, noting that even in this case, although the lender can no longer return the actual collateral, he can pay its value to the borrower, and thereby rectify the transgression. Seemingly, then, even if the unlawfully seized collateral is lost or destroyed, the lender should not be liable to Malkut. Two verses later (24:12), the Torah commands, “Lo Tishkab Ba'aboto,” introducing a prohibition forbidding a lender from keeping with him the collateral when the borrower needs it. If, for example, the borrower gave as collateral a blanket which he needs to keep him warm at night, the lender must return it at night. If the borrower gave a cooking utensil, it must be returned when the borrower needs to prepare food. If the lender keeps the collateral with him even when the borrower needs it, he is in violation of this command. He is not liable to Malkut, because this command is transgressed through inaction (“Lav She'en Bo Ma'aseh”), and Malkut are administered only for violations committed through an action.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:8) commands, “Hishamer Be'nega Ha'sara'at” – that we must “exercise care” with regard to Sara'at infections. This is understood as a prohibition against removing a Sara'at infection from one's skin, garment or home. If a Sara'at discoloration is seen, one is required to follow the procedure outlined elsewhere by the Torah, and it is forbidden for him to simply remove it. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that Sara'at is intended to serve as a sign of spiritual ills which a person must correct. It is meant to lead the person to prayer and repentance, so that he improves himself. If a person responds instead by just removing the infection, this constitutes a form of rebellion against G-d, as he rejects G-d's “wakeup call” to repentance, “turning off the alarm” instead of answering the call and working to improve his behavior. This command forbids removing even a portion of the infection, and it applies both before the Kohen inspects the discoloration, and after the Kohen has determined that it qualifies as Sara'at. One who violates this prohibition is liable to Malkut once he removes enough of the infection that the portion which remains amounts to less than the minimum size to qualify as a Sara'at infection. If he removes some of the infection, and the amount which remains is sufficient to qualify as Sara'at, then he is liable to Malkut Mi'de'rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). If a Sara'at skin infection appears on the skin of an uncircumcised male, on the portion which is to be removed for the Berit Mila, the circumcision is performed even though this involves removing the Sara'at infection. The rule of “Aseh Doheh Lo Ta'aseh” establishes that, in most instances, an affirmative command is to be performed even if this entails violating a prohibition. Therefore, the affirmative command of Berit Mila overrides the prohibition against removing a Sara'at infection. This command applies whenever the laws of Sara'at apply, and is binding in all places, upon both men and women. As mentioned, one who removes a Sara'at infection from his body, clothing or home is liable to Malkut.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:6), “Lo Yahabol Rehayim Va'recheb” – forbidding a lender from seizing as collateral the borrower's millstones, with which he grinds wheat for the preparation of bread. Although the Torah certainly entitles creditors to take collateral, a creditor may not take something which the borrower needs for preparing food. The Torah gives the specific example of “Rehayim Va'racheb” – the two stones of the mill – but this applies also to utensils needed to knead or cook, and to knives for slaughtering animals. A lender who takes such items as collateral is guilty of a separate violation for each one which he seizes. For example, if the lender took the borrower's Shehita (slaughtering) knife, millstone, and pot, then he has committed three separate transgressions. The two millstones are considered separate utensils in this respect, and thus the creditor would be guilty of two violations for seizing the millstones, even though the borrower cannot use one without the other. If the lender did unlawfully take such an item as collateral, Bet Din has the authority to forcefully remove it from his possession and return it to the borrower. This prohibition applies only when the payment is due, and the borrower is unable to pay. In such a situation, the lender is not permitted to seize against the borrower's will property which the borrower needs for food preparation. However, at the time the loan is given, the lender is allowed to take such utensils as collateral if the borrower agrees. Just as one is certainly allowed to purchase any item which the owner agrees to sell, one is allowed to demand any collateral that the borrower is willing to give in exchange for the loan. If the lender violated this prohibition, and the utensils he seized were burned or lost, then he is liable to Malkut, because he is no longer able to return the collateral in lieu of Malkut. He is liable to a separate set of Malkut for each utensil which he unlawfully seized. This command applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:5) that during “Shana Rishona” – the first year after a couple gets married – the groom may not go out to war. He must be excused from both fighting and other military duties, such as preparing weapons or food for the soldiers. In the next verse, the Torah adds an affirmative command requiring the groom to remain home with his wife during the first year, and make her happy (“Ve'simah Et Ishto”). The first command forbids the groom from leaving for war or other prolonged absences, and the second requires the groom to remain home to bring joy to his new wife. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued these commands so that the husband and wife will build a strong, happy relationship before they beget children. G-d wants children to be produced and raised by upstanding people, who are loyal and committed to one another. He therefore commanded that a married couple remain together and focus on one another during the first year of marriage, which has the effect of building a strong emotional bond, thus protecting against any thoughts of illicit relationships. This bond, formed during the first year, helps ensure that the couple's children will be produced and raised in the framework of a loving marriage characterized by mutual respect and devotion. These laws apply regardless of whether one a marries a girl who had never before been married, or if he marries a widow or divorcee. Since he marries a new wife, he must devote the first year to strengthening their bond. The first command, which forbids the groom from participating in war, applied in times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when Am Yisrael fought wars. The second command applies in all times and places. According to one opinion, the groom may not leave the bride even if she allows him to, unless he is going for the purpose of a Misva, or for a brief period. Others maintain that the groom may leave for a necessary purpose if the wife agrees, though it would be preferable for her in this case to accompany him so they remain together.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:4) that if a woman remarries after getting divorced, and her second husband then dies or divorces her, her first husband may not marry her a second time. Even though she is no longer married to the second husband, nevertheless, the first husband may not marry her again. A husband may remarry his wife whom he had divorced if she had not married someone else in the interim, but if she had married in the interim, then the first husband may never marry her again. This prohibition applies only if the woman got married to another man, or was Halachically betrothed to a different man. If, however, she had a relationship with another man without marrying him, then the first husband may remarry her. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued this prohibition to protect against immoral conduct. If it were permissible to remarry one's divorcee who had married someone else in the interim, men would be able to “trade” their wives, by divorcing their wives, exchanging them, and then remarrying them the next day. In a sense, people would have a permissible way of committing adultery. The Torah therefore forbade remarrying one's wife after she had married somebody else in the interim. We are to distance ourselves from all forms of immoral conduct, even those which could be considered technically permissible. The Sefer Ha'hinuch's understanding of this prohibition shows us the Torah's emphasis on distancing ourselves from impropriety, even beyond that which is actually forbidden. This command applies in all times and places. Although it is directed primarily to the husband, the woman is also included in this command. The Ramban maintained that this command is also the source of the law forbidding marital intimacy after a wife had an adulterous relationship. Even though the husband and wife are still married until the Get is delivered, intimacy becomes forbidden once the wife is unfaithful. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement noted that this prohibition appears to call into question our relationship with Hashem. Numerous verses in the Nebi'im (prophets) liken our relationship with G-d to a marriage, and our nation's worship of foreign deities to a “marriage” to those pagan gods. And, the Nebi'im describe the Hurban (destruction) as G-d's “divorce” of Am Yisrael. If, indeed, G-d had “divorced” our ancestors, and they “married” other deities through their foreign worship, then it would seem that G-d can then never “marry” us again. If so, then how can we ever be redeemed, once we have “married” foreign gods after being “divorced” by G-d? The Rabbis of Mussar answer that if a man divorced his wife, and at some later point it is discovered that the divorce was not Halachically valid, then he may bring the wife back even if she had married someone else in the interim. Since the divorce was invalid, she is considered to have been married to the first husband all throughout the interim period. Proper Teshuba (repentance) has the effect of retroactively reversing the sin, such that it is considered to never have occurred. Therefore, Hashem's “divorce” of Am Yisrael is retroactively undone, like a divorce which was discovered to have been invalid. Through repentance, then, we are able to be brought back to Hashem, as it in essence “invalidates” the “divorce” which He had given us.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:1) that if a husband wishes to divorce his wife, he should do so by giving her a document (“Sefer Keritut”), which is commonly known as a “Get.” The Sefer Ha'hinuch notes that whereas some other religions do not allow husbands to divorce their wives, the Torah allows for divorce. He explains that a wife is to be the husband's helper, and the most precious of all things he has in his life, and if this is not the case, and he feels that the wife is not assisting him, then he should have the option of dissolving the marriage. If divorce would not be an option, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, several problems could arise, including adultery, as there would be no consequences of disloyalty. The Torah therefore allowed the possibility of dissolving a marriage if it is not serving its purpose. The Sefer Ha'hinuch further notes that the Torah requires divorcing through the transmission of a written document, whereas in some other religions, it suffices for the husband to simply make a declaration that the wife is no longer married to him. The Torah requires a Get, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains, because otherwise, a wife could commit adultery and then falsely claim that her husband had verbally terminated the marriage before the illicit relationship. Secondly, if divorce required simply a verbal pronouncement, then a husband might rashly divorce his wife immediately upon feeling angry or aggrieved. The Torah therefore arranged that one who seeks to divorce his wife must have a special document written – a process which takes some time – so that he might have a change of heart, and will not divorce before making a clearheaded, firm decision to do so. In order for the husband to effect the divorce, he must either place the Get in the wife's hand, or in the hand of her appointed messenger. If she is standing in her property, the husband can throw the document into the property next to her. The divorce must be given in the presence of two witnesses; it does not take effect if no witnesses were present, or even if one witness was present. It is customary for the text of the Get to be written in Aramaic, though it is valid if the text is written in any language. There is a custom to write the text on twelve lines. Tosafot explain that this alludes to the word “Get,” which equals 12 in Gematria. This Misva applies in all times and places. If a man divorces his wife without giving her a Get, she remains Halachically married to him, and he is in violation of this affirmative command. This is considered a grievous sin, as the wife might then have a relationship with another man, which would constitute an adulterous relationship.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:25-26) establishes that when a worker is hired to work in an agricultural field, the employer must allow him to partake of the fruits with which he works. As long as the produce has yet to reach the point where it is subject to the various tithing obligations (Terumot and Ma'aserot), the worker is to be granted the right to eat some of the fruits. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah introduced this Misva in order to teach people to treat others with an “Ayin Toba” (“good eye”), generously, sharing their material blessings. If a person stingily refuses to allow his workers to eat some of the large quantity of produce which is being harvested, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, he is unworthy of receiving Hashem's blessings. The Torah therefore commands the employer to allow his worker to eat some produce, so that he would earn great blessing. Torah law distinguishes in this regard between two different kinds of workers. If a worker deals with produce that has already been harvested, then he is permitted to eat some of the fruits while he works; once he finishes working, he may not eat any fruit. But if the workers are picking the produce from the ground or from the tree, then, according to Torah law, they are permitted to partake of the produce only after they have filled a basket, before proceeding to begin filling a different basket. The Rabbis, however, enacted a provision allowing the workers to eat the produce as they walk about during the harvest. This enactment was made due to the concern that the workers might spend a great deal of time eating after filling each basket, and this would waste time for which the employer is paying them to work. In order to protect the employers against wasted time, the Sages allowed the workers to eat some produce they harvest as they walk about doing their work, even before the basket is filled. A worker is entitled to eat only from the produce with which he is working. If he is involved in figs, then he may not eat grapes from the vineyard, and vice versa. If he is working in one field, he may not take produce from a different field, even of the same species. An employer who refuses to allow his worker to partake of produce to which he is entitled violates this affirmative command. In this same verse, the Torah commands, “Ve'el Kelyecha Lo Titen,” which forbids the worker from placing produce in his utensils to eat later. This is understood as introducing a prohibition forbidding the worker from taking more produce than he needs to satiate his appetite. Although the Torah requires the employer to allow the worker to eat produce if he is hungry, the worker is not entitled to take more than he requires for satiation. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both male and female employees. A worker who takes more produce than he requires for satiation is in violation of this command. However, he is not liable to Malkut, because he must pay the employer for what he unlawfully took, and a violator is not liable to Malkut if he can rectify the transgression by making a monetary payment. The Sefer Ha'hinuch raises the question of why the Torah would need to introduce this prohibition, as it seemingly is included in the general prohibition against theft. If the Torah allows a worker to eat only the amount he needs to satisfy his hunger, then taking additional produce would, seemingly, constitute outright theft. Why, then, did the Torah need to issue a special prohibition forbidding this? The Sefer Ha'hinuch answers that a separate prohibition was necessary because a worker is likely to justify taking extra produce. He might feel that he is not paid enough, or he might wrongly assume that his employer does not mind if he takes a little extra. For a variety of reasons, a worker might find ways to rationalize his unlawful excess. Therefore, the Torah introduced a special prohibition, in order to prevent the worker from making this mistake. Significantly, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah issued this prohibition for the benefit of the employee, to protect him from the temptation to steal. G-d did the worker a favor, so-to-speak, by removing a potential stumbling-block, saving him from the lure of theft. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains on this basis the famous teaching of Rabbi Hananya Bar Akashya, “Rasa Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu Le'zakot Et Yisrael, Lefichach Hirba Lahem Torah U'Misvot” – “The Almighty wished to bring merit to Yisrael; He therefore gave them an abundance of Torah and Misvot.” This “abundance” of laws, the Sefer Ha'hinuch suggests, refers to the laws introduced by the Torah as safeguards against other laws. G-d brings us merit by helping ensure our compliance with His Misvot, through the addition of laws which serve to protect against sin. In the next verse, the Torah adds yet another command relevant to the situation of a worker in the field: “Ve'hermesh Lo Tanif Al Kamat Re'echa” – “You shall not wave a sickle upon your fellow's standing grain.” This means that a worker hired to harvest grain may not cut some grain for himself in the process of cutting grain for his employer. He is permitted to partake of some produce only after he finishes cutting the grain from the ground. One who transgresses this prohibition is not liable to Malkut, because, as discussed earlier, he simply repays the employer for the grain which he unlawfully took for himself, and one does not receive Malkut for a violation which can be rectified through a monetary payment.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:22) commands that if a person makes a pledge to G-d, “Lo Te'aher Le'shalemo” – it is forbidden for him to delay the fulfillment of the pledge. In the next verse, the Torah issues an affirmative command to follow though on one's pledges: “Mosa Sefatecha Tishmor Ve'asita” (“You shall keep and perform that which leaves your mouth”). Fulfilling pledges thus involves two separate commands: a prohibition against delaying the fulfillment of a vow, and an affirmative command requiring the prompt fulfillment of the vow. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the prohibition of “Bal Te'aher” (delaying the fulfillment of a pledge) forbids delaying the fulfillment of a pledge for the period of three Regalim (the pilgrimage festivals – Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot). Meaning, if somebody vowed to offer a voluntary sacrifice in the Bet Ha'mikdash, he is in violation of “Bal Te'aher” only if three Regalim pass without him fulfilling the vow. The affirmative command to fulfill a pledge, however, is transgressed immediately, once one has the opportunity to fulfill the pledge and is unable to do so. Thus, if a person pledges money to charity, and he has the money available, then he is required to pay his pledge immediately, since there are, presumably, needy individuals who require charity, such that the pledge can be fulfilled right away. Some Poskim, however, maintain that even the prohibition of “Bal Te'aher” is violated if one does not immediately fulfill his pledge to charity. According to this view, the period of three Regalim is relevant to the case of a pledge to offer a sacrifice, and to the mandatory charitable donations that one is obligated to give, such as various portions of one's agricultural produce (Leket, Shicheha and Pe'a). When it comes to other forms of charity, however, in the view of these Poskim, one transgresses both the affirmative command and the prohibition of “Bal Te'aher” once he has the opportunity to fulfill his pledge but fails to do so. This applies also to pledges made to synagogues. A synagogue employs staff whose livelihoods depend on their salaries, and so they are considered like Aniyim (needy individuals) with respect to this Halacha. Once a person makes a pledge to a synagogue, he must fulfill his pledge as soon as he can, as the synagogue needs funds at all times to pay its employees. One who unnecessarily delays the fulfillment of his pledge to the synagogue violates the affirmative command of “Mosa Sefatecha Tishmor Ve'asita,” and, according to some Poskim, he also violates the prohibition of “Bal Te'aher.” If one does not have the funds available to fulfill his pledge, he should pay with a credit card. Of course, it is far easier to pledge than to pay. However, Halacha requires paying as quickly and easily as one pledges, without any unnecessary delays.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:20), “Lo Tashich Le'ahicha,” establishing the prohibition against charging one's fellow Jew interest on a loan, or paying a Jewish lender interest on the loan. It is forbidden not only for a lender to charge a fellow Jew interest, but also for a borrower to pay a fellow Jew interest. We would have naturally assumed that since people in need of a loan would happily agree to pay interest in exchange for the money they require at the present moment, such an arrangement should be permissible. However, the Torah forbids both charging interest and paying interest. The Torah refers to interest in this verse with the term “Neshech,” which literally means “bite.” Interest “bites” the debtor, as he suffers the incremental growth of the debt with time. In the next verse, the Torah introduces an additional command, instructing, “La'nochri Tashich” – that we are to lend to pagans on interest. Not only is it permissible to lend to pagans on interest, we are specifically required to lend them on interest, and not to extend to them interest-free loans. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that we are to show kindness in the form of granting interest-free loans to those who are devoted to Hashem, but not to those who betray Him. Therefore, the Torah forbids charging interest from fellow Jews, but requires lending to idolaters specifically on interest. If one has to choose between granting an interest-free loan to a Jew, or lending to a pagan on interest, he is required to forego the profit and lend to the Jew. If someone lent to a pagan on interest, and the borrower then converted to Judaism before repaying the debt, the lender collects the interest accrued until the time of the conversion. The convert is required to pay the accrued interest because people might otherwise question the sincerity of his conversion, and claim that he converted in order to have the interest waived. A Jew who borrows money from a gentile is allowed to pay interest. One may lend to pagans on occasion, as needed, but not as a regular practice, so as not to be influenced by their idolatrous beliefs and practices. However, a righteous Torah scholar may regularly lend to pagans, as there is no concern of him learning from and embracing their faith and lifestyle. One who grants a pagan an interest-free loan transgresses this prohibition. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all times and places.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:19) that an animal that was given to a harlot as payment for her services, or that was given as barter in exchange for a dog, may not be used as a sacrifice. One who offers as a sacrifice an animal that had been used as payment in one of these two situations transgresses this Biblical command. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the purpose of a sacrifice is to lead a person to purity of thought, which will then lead to proper behavior. If a person brings as a sacrifice an “Etnan Zona” (animal that had been used as payment for a harlot's services), he might have immoral thoughts at the time the sacrifice is offered. Illicit relationships constitute an especially grave sin, and thus if a sacrifice leads a person to such thoughts, it will have the effect of distancing him from Hashem, rather than bringing him closer to Hashem. This would undermine the entire purpose of the sacrifice, and so the Torah forbade offering such an animal as a sacrifice. As for a “Mehir Keleb” (sheep used as payment for a dog), the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one of the characteristics of dogs is brazenness, as the verse states in Yeshayahu (56:11), “Ve'ha'kelabim Azeh Nefesh” – “And the dogs are brazen.” One who sacrifices an animal used as payment for a dog might think of the dog while offering the sacrifice, and these thoughts might cause him to become brazen. A sacrifice is meant to bring a person humility and regret, as he sees what is done to the animal and will then think that he deserves to have this done to him because of his wrongdoing. The Torah forbade offering as a sacrifice an animal associated with a dog, as this could lead the person to stubbornness, such that he will not humbly confess to his having acted wrongly, and will not regret his misdeeds. The Sefer Ha'hinuch acknowledges that this explanation might sound somewhat strained and unconvincing. He urges his son – to whom he wrote this book – to trust that there is wisdom in these comments, difficult as it may at first seem to accept them. The lesson emerging from the Sefer Ha'hinuch's comments is the importance of thoughts and intentions in the service of Hashem. A sacrifice itself does not bring a person atonement, or draw him closer to G-d; it is the effect of the experience of offering a sacrifice that elevates a person and enhances his relationship with the Almighty. An “Etnan Zona” is invalid for use as a sacrifice regardless of whether the harlot who received the animal is Jewish, not Jewish, or a Shifha (maidservant). Even if the harlot is a family member of the man who solicited her services, the animal given to her as payment is disqualified as a sacrifice. However, if a husband gives his wife an animal so she would consent to have relations while she is a Nidda, this animal does not attain the status of “Etnan Zona.” If one paid a harlot an animal that had already been consecrated as a sacrifice, it is not disqualified, as it had been consecrated before being used as payment for a harlot's services. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when sacrifices were offered. One who brought an “Etnan Zona” or “Mehir Keleb” as a sacrifice is liable to Malkut, just like a person who offers as a sacrifice an animal with a physical blemish. The Sefer Ha'hinuch here lists the prohibitions of “Etnan Zona” and “Mehir Keleb” as a single Biblical command. The Ramban, however, disagrees, and lists two separate commands – one forbidding an “Etnan Zona,” and a second forbidding a “Mehir Keleb.”

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:18), “Lo Tiheyeh Kedesha Mi'benot Yisrael” – there shall not be a “Kedesh” among the women of our nation. According to the Rambam, this verse forbids having an intimate relationship with a woman without a Ketuba (the contract given to a woman at a wedding) and Kiddushin (betrothal). Even if the man and woman are allowed to marry one another, they may not have a relationship outside the framework of marriage. The Ramban understood this verse differently, as forbidding relations with a woman who is forbidden for marriage, and with whom Kiddushin is not effective. For example, one cannot betroth a family member; such a betrothal has no halachic effect. According to the Ramban, then, relations with a family member would be forbidden by force of this verse. The Ramban writes that this verse also commands Bet Din not to allow a woman to act in a manner of “Hefker,” meaning, without restraint, freely having relationships with men. Such a woman, the Ramban explains, is not likely to discern between men with whom relations are permissible, and those with whom relations are forbidden. Therefore, the Torah requires the court to intervene and stop a woman who acts promiscuously. Targum Onkelos translates this verse as forbidding a woman from having relations with an Ebed Kena'ani (gentile servant). The Ramban includes this interpretation in his understanding of the command. This prohibition applies in all places and in all time periods, and is binding upon both men and women. One who has a relationship outside the framework of marriage, according to the Rambam, or with someone with whom Kiddushin is not effective, according to the Ramban, has transgressed this command, and is liable to Malkut.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:16), “Lo Tasgir Ebed El Adonav” – that when a servant flees from his master, it is forbidden to bring him back to his master. This is understood as referring specifically to the case of a gentile servant who escapes from his master outside the Land of Israel, and travels to the land. In such a case, it is forbidden to bring the servant back to his master outside Eretz Yisrael, even if his master is Jewish. It goes without saying that the servant may not be returned if his master is a pagan, as he would then go back to a life of pagan worship. When a servant flees from his master to Eretz Yisrael, the Bet Din forces the master to deliver a Shetar Shihrur (emancipation document), releasing the servant from his state of subservience, whereupon the servant becomes a full-fledged convert. The court also forces the servant to sign a document committing to compensate his master for the money lost by granting him his freedom. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issues this command in order to show respect to Eretz Yisrael. As the Land of Israel is a place of greater spirituality, a servant who flees there should not be taken away and returned to his land of origin, and should instead be allowed to remain in the special land which G-d has given the Jewish People. The Sefer Ha'hinuch follows the view that the institution of Ebed Kena'ani (gentile servants), at least in principle, applies even nowadays, and he thus writes that this command is applicable in all times. He adds that it is binding upon both men and women. One who brings a servant who had fled to Eretz Yisrael back to his master transgresses this prohibition. However, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, the violator is not liable to Malkut, because it is not definite at the time he commits the forbidden act that the command will be violated. If the master decides not to take the servant back, and chooses instead to release him, then the person who returned the servant will not have been in violation of this command. Therefore, the violator cannot be definitively warned of the consequences of the act beforehand, and, as such, he is not liable to Malkut. In the next verse, the Torah adds a separate prohibition – “Lo Tonenu” – which forbids mistreating the servant in such a case, either verbally or financially. As a newly-freed servant, convert, and foreigner, he is vulnerable and disadvantaged, and therefore, while it is of course forbidden to mistreat anybody, the Torah issues a special prohibition forbidding improper treatment of this servant. The Sefer Ha'hinuch notes that the Torah refers here to a servant who had accepted upon himself the obligations of the Torah. When a gentile becomes a Jew's servant, he undergoes Berit Mila and immersion, and his process of conversion is completed upon being released. This prohibition in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women. A person who mistreats a released servant, either verbally or financially, transgresses this Biblical command. The violator is not liable to Malkut, even if he mistreated the servant through an action, because it is possible to transgress this command without performing an action (i.e. through verbal abuse). Although we do not have servants nowadays, there are a number of important lessons that we learn from these commands. First, just as a servant who comes to the Holy Land is not to be returned to his master, and must instead be allowed to remain and reap the spiritual benefits of Eretz Yisrael, we, too, are required to always strive for growth, and to put ourselves in a position to grow. We should ensure to remain in places and frameworks that facilitate spiritual achievement, and to never allow ourselves to regress. Secondly, of course, the Torah here teaches us about the special sensitivity that we must have when dealing with people who are weak and vulnerable. We are to exercise extra special care when speaking or working with those who are fragile to ensure that we do not cause them any sort of pain, and we must do everything we can to give them the help and encouragement that they need.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:11) that a person who becomes Tameh (ritually impure), such as by experiencing a nocturnal emission, must leave the camp. This refers specifically to the “Mahaneh Leviya” – the section of Beneh Yisrael's camp in the wilderness that was reserved for the Leviyim. Those who experienced bodily emissions that bring Tum'a (impurity) are barred from this area of the camp, and, needless to say, from the area of the Mishkan in the center of the camp. Once the Bet Ha'mikdash was built in Jerusalem, this command forbids somebody with this level of impurity from entering the area of Har Ha'bayit (Temple Mount). This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and it applies even nowadays. The Torah says in the Book of Vayikra (26:31), “Va'hashimoti Et Mikdeshechem” – “I shall make your Sanctuary desolate,” implying that even in the Bet Ha'mikdash's state of desolation, the site retains its special status of sanctity. Therefore, even nowadays, it is forbidden to walk on Har Ha'bayit in a state of Tum'a. Two verses later (23:13), the Torah commands that when soldiers go out to war, and are encamped, “Ve'yad Tiheyeh Lecha Mi'hutz La'mahaneh” – they must designate a place outside the camp for performing their bodily functions. Rather than relieve themselves anywhere they find convenient, inside the camp, they are required to set aside a particular place outside the camp for this purpose, so that the camp remains clean. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the soldiers who fought the wars were exceptionally righteous men, as those who were guilty of sins would be excused from participation in battle. Therefore, since the army consisted entirely of righteous Sadikim, the Shechina accompanied them. Cleanliness is a vital precondition for G-d's presence to reside among us, and so the soldiers were required to set aside a location outside the camp for performing their bodily functions, in order for the Shechina to remain with them. This Misva applies in the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, when Beneh Yisrael went out to war. It is binding specifically on males, as only men would wage war. A soldier who fails to set aside a place outside the camp for performing his bodily functions, and relieves himself in the camp, transgresses this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one who violates this Misva is severely punished, because his violation causes the Shechina to leave the people. In the next verse (23:14), the Torah commands, “Ve'yad Tiheyeh Lecha Al Azenecha” – “You shall have a spade together with your weapons,” requiring the soldiers to keep a shovel with them during wartime. The shovel was needed to dig a hole in the ground for performing their bodily functions, and to then cover the bodily waste. The Gemara in Masechet Ketubot (5) adds a different reading of this verse, explaining it to mean, “You shall have a hand over your ear” (reading the word “Azenecha” as “Oznecha” – “your ear”). When a person hears Lashon Ha'ra (negative speech about other people) spoken, he should take his finger and plug his ear, to block the forbidden speech from being heard. The Gemara comments that the forefinger is specifically created such that the tip can plug the ear, for this very purpose – so that we can block our ears from hearing Lashon Ha'ra. Just as the soldiers are required to have a shovel with them to keep their camp clean, and free of the filth of bodily waste, we are to keep our ears “clean” and free of the “filth” of negative speech about other people.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:8-9) forbids “despising” or “rejecting” people from the nations of Edom and Egypt, and establishes that a third-generation Edomi or Misri (Egyptian) may marry into the Jewish Nation. Meaning, if a person from Edom or Egypt converts to Judaism, then the convert's grandchild may marry a Jew. The Sefer Ha'hinuch lists as two separate Biblical commands the prohibition against refusing to allow the marriage of a third-generation Edomi, and refusing to allow the marriage of a third-generation Misri. The Torah here draws a distinction between these two nations, whose members may marry a Jew after two generations, and the nations of Amon and Moab, whose male descendants for all time are barred from marrying into Beneh Yisrael. As discussed in regard to Misva 561 and Miva 562, the Torah forbids people from Amon and Moab from marrying into Beneh Yisrael because these nations showed ingratitude to Beneh Yisrael. They descended from Lot, who owed his life to Abraham Abinu, and yet, they did not come to assist Beneh Yisrael by offering them provisions as they traveled near their territory in the wilderness after the Exodus. For this ingratitude, descendants from Amon and Moab are forever barred from marrying into the Jewish Nation. By contrast, descendants of Edom and Egypt are allowed to marry a Jew after two generations. The Sefer Ha'hinuch discusses the difference between these two pairs of nations. He writes that although the Egyptians bitterly oppressed Beneh Yisrael for many years, nevertheless, this period of oppression was in fulfilled of G-d's decree. G-d had informed Abraham Abinu that his descendants would endure persecution in a foreign country (Bereshit 15:13), and this decree was fulfilled through the Egyptians' enslavement of Beneh Yisrael. Of course, the Egyptians were held accountable for their cruelty, and punished accordingly, but, nevertheless, since their oppression of Beneh Yisrael fulfilled a divine decree, they are not barred from joining our nation. Amon and Moab, however, chose to show ingratitude, and so they are forever prohibited from joining Am Yisrael through marriage. If a man and woman from Edom (or Egypt) married, and, after the wife conceived, they converted to Judaism, then the baby is considered a second-generation Edomi, such that his child may marry a Jew. Even though the baby underwent conversion in utero, nevertheless, he is treated as the child of an Edomi convert, and not as a convert himself. If a male convert from Amon married a female convert from Edom (or Egypt), then their children are regarded as descendants of Amon, not as descendants of Moab. Therefore, their offspring may not marry into the Jewish Nation. Conversely, if a male convert from Edom (or Egypt) married a female convert from Amon, their children are regarded as Edomites (or Egyptians), and thus their offspring may marry into the Jewish Nation. With regard to gentiles, lineage is determined based on patrilineal descent, and thus the children have the status of the father. For Jews, as we know, children's status is determined based on the mother's status. These commands apply in all places and all times. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one violates these prohibitions by refusing to allow one's child to marry a third-generation Edomi or Egyptian out of hatred for these nations. It goes without saying that if the match is rejected for some other reason, this does not violate the Biblical command. These prohibitions are transgressed only if one does not permit his child to marry a third-generation descendant of Edom or Egypt specifically out of animosity for these nations. Of course, one is not liable to Malkut for transgressing these prohibitions, as the violation is committed without performing an action. The Sefer Ha'hinuch clarifies that there is certainly no Misva to marry descendants from Edom or Egypt. The Torah here only forbids rejecting them as marriage partners out of contempt for these nations. As mentioned regarding previous Misvot, nowadays, we cannot identify the descendants of the ancient gentile nations. The Assyrian emperor Sanherib conquered much of the ancient world, and, whenever he conquered a country, he had its population exiled somewhere else, and brought a different nation's population to that region. Therefore, the people living in Edom or Egypt after the Assyrian conquests are not necessarily from the ancient nations of Edom and Egypt. Any gentile who converts to Judaism may be presumed to be among the majority of gentiles, who may marry into the Jewish Nation after conversion, and is thus permitted to marry a Jew.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:7) commands with regard to the nations of Amon and Moab, “Lo Tidrosh Shelomam Ve'tobotam, Kol Yamecha Ad Olam” – that we may not “seek their peace and wellbeing.” This verse establishes a prohibition against offering these nations peace before going out to war against them. Normally, before Beneh Yisrael go out to war, they are required by Torah law to first offer a peaceful arrangement in order to avoid military conflict. When it comes to Amon and Moab, however, the Torah actually forbids offering peace before initiating conflict. The Torah issues this command after introducing the prohibition against allowing men from these nations to join Beneh Yisrael in marriage. These nations, which descended from Lot, Abraham Abinu's nephew, owed a debt of gratitude to Beneh Yisrael, and yet, they failed to offer assistance by bringing provisions when Beneh Yisrael traveled in the desert near their territory. On account of this lack of gratitude, which the Sefer Ha'hinuch describes as a form of “Achzariyut” (cruelty), the Torah bars the men of Amon and Moab from marrying into our nation, and forbids offering them peace before going to war against them. This command is binding upon the men – because only men go out to war – and applies only when Beneh Yisrael reside in their land and fight wars. As a practical matter, this command became inapplicable once the Assyrian emperor Sanherib captured much of Eretz Yisrael and the surrounding regions, and exiled entire populations. After the Assyrian conquest, we can no longer identify the people of Amon and Moab, as the nations' populations were all moved around throughout the region. Therefore, we cannot fulfill the special Misvot regarding these two nations. The Rishonim address the question of why the Torah needed to issue this prohibition, given G-d's command to Beneh Yisrael not to initiate hostilities against the nations of Amon and Moab (Debarim 2:9,19). If we are not permitted to wage war against these nations, then how can we commanded not to offer peace before waging battle? The Rambam (Sefer Ha'misvot, Shoresh 3) explains that the command not to initiate hostilities against Amon and Moab applied only during the period of Beneh Yisrael's travels through the wilderness. After Beneh Yisrael entered the Land of Israel, however, they were no longer forbidden from waging war against Amon or Moab. The Ramban disagrees, and maintains that the command forbidding waging war against Amon and Moab applied even after Beneh Yisrael entered the land. According to the Ramban, the distinction lies between the original territory of Amon and Moab, and territories which they conquered and annexed. In these nations' original territory, Beneh Yisrael are not permitted to wage war, as G-d gave these lands to the people of Amon and Moab. If, however, Amon and Moab expand their territory, then Beneh Yisrael are permitted to initiate hostilities in the annexed lands, and when they do, they are not permitted to first offer peace.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 22:6) commands that people from the nations of Amon and Moab are forbidden from marrying into the Jewish nation. Quite obviously, this refers to an Amoni or Moabi who had converted to Judaism, and is thus a full-fledged Jew; if he hadn't converted, and is still a gentile, then he in any event may not marry a Jew, because he is not Jewish. The Torah instructs that even after an Amoni or Moabi converts and becomes a Jew, he may not marry a Jewish girl. Even generations later, somebody who descends from an Amoni or Moabi may not marry into the Jewish Nation. The Torah gives two reasons for why members of these nations may not marry into the Jewish People. The first is that they did not bring Beneh Yisrael food and water when they passed near their borders as they traveled from Egypt to the Land of Israel. Secondly, they hired Bilam to place a curse on Beneh Yisrael, showing virulent hatred toward our nation. The Sefer Ha'hinuch notes that this command shows us the great importance of Hesed, and how severely G-d looks upon miserliness and disregard for people in need. Amon and Moab's failure to bring food and water to our ancestors, who were weary from travel, is looked upon as a display of evil and cruelty, to the extent that forever more, their descendants are barred from marrying into the Jewish Nation. The Sefer Ha'hinuch then poses the question of why Amon and Moab are singled out in this respect from other nations who acted cruelly toward Am Yisrael. Egypt oppressed Beneh Yisrael for hundreds of years, and yet, a third-generation Egyptian is permitted to marry into the Jewish People. Why are the descendants of the Egyptians allowed, but the descendants of Amon and Moab aren't? The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that Amon and Moab were guilty of an especially grave “Nebala” (misdeed) – failing to show appreciation. These nations were founded by the sons of Lot, who lived in Sedom and was rescued from the city's destruction in the merit of Abraham Abinu. The people of Amon and Moab owe their very existence to Abraham Abinu, and they thus owe a debt of gratitude to Abraham's descendants. Therefore, their failure to show Beneh Yisrael basic sensitivity when Beneh Yisrael passed near their border was considered particularly severe. The Egyptians, by contrast, did not owe Beneh Yisrael anything; in fact, Beneh Yisrael owed them a debt of gratitude for welcoming them to Egypt and supporting them during a time of famine. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the ingratitude shown by Amon and Moab is considered such a grave lack of gratitude that it can never be repaired, and this quality remains forever within these nations and their descendants. Therefore, they are not worthy of marrying into the Jewish People. Only the males of Amon and Moab are barred from marrying into the Jewish Nation; the women are allowed to marry after they convert to Judaism. The Gemara explains that the women of Amon and Moab were not expected to go out to bring Beneh Yisrael provisions, and this was thus the men's responsibility. Therefore, only the men are barred from marrying into the Jewish Nation. This prohibition applied until the time of the Assyrian emperor Sanherib, who conquered much of Eretz Yisrael and all the surrounding lands, and moved populations from one country to the next. After the Assyrian conquests, the people who lived in any given country cannot be assumed to belong to the people who had lived there previously, and can just as easily descend from a different people. Statistically, then, it is more likely that somebody from Amon and Moab actually descends from a different nation. Halacha allows relying on a statistical majority (“Kol De'parish Me'ruba Parish”), and so after Sanherib's time, men from Amon and Moab are permitted to marry into the Jewish Nation. The most famous convert from the nation of Moab, of course, is Rut, who married Boaz. We read in Megilat Rut that the first in line, so-to-speak, to marry Rut was a man named Tob, who is referred to anonymously as “Ploni Almoni” (“so-and-so”). He did not wish to marry Rut, and the reason he gave was “Pen Ash'hit Et Nahalati” – this would adversely affect his children (4:6). At first glance, it seems difficult to understand his concern. If a female convert from Moab is allowed to marry into the Jewish Nation, then why would the children born from this marriage have any sort of inferior status? And if this fellow was of the opinion that even the females from Moab were not allowed to marry into the Jewish Nation, then why was he worried only about the children, and not about the forbidden marriage itself? The Brisker Rav (Rav Yishak Zev Soloveitchik, 1886-1959) explained that the issue at stake hinged on a question regarding the origin of the law which permits marrying a female convert from Amon or Moab. One possibility is that this provision was conveyed to us as a “Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai” – having originally been taught to Moshe atop Mount Sinai. Another possibility, however, is that the Sages arrived at this conclusion based on the “Shelosh Esreh Middot” – the various exegetical tools with which the Rabbis were authorized to extract Halachot from the text of the Torah. The Brisker Rav noted that there is a critical difference between these two perspectives. If this law was taught as a “Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai,” then it can never be questioned or challenged. If, however, the Sages in one generation inferred this law through the process of analyzing the Torah text, then the scholars in a subsequent generation could, under certain conditions, dispute their predecessors' reading of the text. The Brisker Rav thus explained that this “Ploni Almoni” followed the view that the Rabbis inferred this provision based on their analysis of the text, and thus, conceivably, the Sanhedrin in a later generation could reach a different conclusion. The marriage to Rut would then retroactively be considered forbidden, and all the offspring produced by this marriage would be regarded as illegitimate. The truth, however, is that this provision was taught as a “Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai,” and therefore, it could never be changed. Boaz thus married Rut, realizing that the Halachic basis for permitting this marriage could never be challenged in the future.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:3) commands that a Mamzer may not “enter the congregation of God.” The term “Mamzer” refers to the product of an incestuous or adulterous relationship, and the command that such a person may not “enter the congregation of God” means that he may not marry somebody from Am Yisrael. He is not actually barred from the “congregation”; he is certainly allowed to participate in all affairs in the Jewish community, and he is restricted only from marrying. In fact, the Talmud teaches that a Mamzer who is a Torah scholar takes precedence for an Aliya to the Torah over a Kohen who is ignorant in Torah. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah forbade a Mamzer from marrying into the Jewish Nation because of the sinful action from which he originated. There is no doubt, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, that a person's nature impacts his offspring, and thus the sinful origins of a Mamzer affect his nature and his soul. Hashem seeks to protect us from impurity and spiritual harm, and so He commanded that a Mamzer may not marry into the Jewish Nation. Not all forbidden unions result in the status of a Mamzer. For example, if a woman had relations when she was a Nidda, then the child is not a Mamzer. An illicit relationship confers the Mamzer status upon the product regardless of whether the sin was committed intentionally or mistakenly (such as if the man and woman thought this union was permissible). If a non-Jewish man has relations with a Jewish woman, the child is Jewish, and is not considered a Mamzer, even if the woman was married. If a non-Jewish man has relations with a Mamzeret (female Mamzer), then the child is a Mamzer, like the mother. If a Mamzer had relations with a non-Jewish woman, then the child is a non-Jew, and if the child converts, then he is considered a full-fledged convert, and does not have the status of Mamzer. A Mamzer is permitted to marry a Mamzeret, and their children are considered Mamzerim. The way to terminate the “chain” of Mamzerut is for a Mamzer to marry a Shifha (gentile maidservant). Such a marriage is permissible, and the children born from this marriage have the status of servants, like the mother. Once they are released, they become full-fledged converts, and are not considered Mamzerim. A Mamzer is allowed to marry a convert. If two converts marry each other, their children may marry Mamzerim. This prohibition applies in all times and places. A Mamzer who married a Jewish girl, or a Mamzeret who married a Jewish man, and consummated the marriage, is liable to Malkut. The Rambam maintains that this prohibition is violated only in the framework of marriage; if a Mamzer has relations with somebody whom he had not married, then this prohibition is not transgressed. Others, however, disagree, and maintain that even relations outside the framework of marriage violate this command.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 23:2) commands that a man who is a “Pesu'a Daka” or “Kerut Shofcha” may not marry a Jewish girl. These terms refer to forms of damage caused to the reproductive organs that make a man infertile. A “Pesu'a Daka” is a man whose testicles were crushed, and a “Kerut Shofcha” is somebody whose member was cut. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah forbade such a man from marrying a Jewish girl in order to disincentivize what was a common phenomenon in the ancient world. Men would volunteer to have their reproductive organs permanently damaged so that they could be appointed by the king to guard and care for the royal harem. We know this from Megilat Ester, which tells of King Ahashverosh's “Sarisim” (eunuchs), the most famous of whom was Hegai, who was in charge of the young women brought to the palace for the king to choose a new queen. Men would have this done to them in exchange for the money and prestige that came with a job in the king's palace. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that as we are a sacred nation, it is improper for a man to harm himself in this fashion. For this reason, the Sefer Ha'hinuch adds, this prohibition applies only if the damage to the reproductive organs were inflicted by the person himself or by somebody else. If this happened on its own, “Bi'ydeh Shamayim” (“at the hands of G-d”), then the man is permitted to marry. Since the purpose of the prohibition is to deter men from having this done to them, it applies only to situations which were caused by people, and not to those which occurred on their own. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and, quite obviously, is relevant only to men. If a man with one of these conditions marries a Jewish girl and consummates the marriage, he has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The man is permitted to marry a female convert, or a gentile maidservant who was released and converted. According to the Talmud Yerushalmi, a man with one of these conditions violates this command by having relations with a Jewish girl, even outside the framework of marriage.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 22:29) commands that a man who forced himself upon a young virgin girl must marry her (if she so wishes), to ensure that she is cared for. It then commands, “He may not send her away throughout his life.” Thus, in addition to the Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) requiring him to remain married to the girl (which we discussed in the previous Misva), the Torah also issues a prohibition forbidding divorcing her. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh” – a prohibition whose violation can be rectified by fulfilling the associated affirmative command. One who violates this prohibition by divorcing the girl can rectify his mistake by marrying her again, and so this prohibition is considered a “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh.” There is a general rule that one who transgresses such a prohibition is not liable to Malkut, since he can rectify his mistake in lieu of punishment. Therefore, one who divorced the woman he had married after forcefully violating her is not liable to Malkut, as he can rectify the transgression by marrying her again. Normally, when the Torah presents a “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh,” it first introduces the prohibition, and then introduces the Misvat Aseh which can be fulfilled to rectify the violation. In this instance, the Torah first presents the Misvat Aseh – “Ve'lo Tiheyeh Le'isha,” requiring the man to remain married to the girl – and only then introduces the prohibition – “Lu Yuchal Shalehah Kol Yamav” – that he may not divorce her. However, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the sequence does not matter, and even though the Misvat Aseh is presented here before the prohibition, nevertheless, this qualifies as a “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh,” such that if the man divorces the woman, he is not liable to Malkut, because he can correct his mistake by remarrying her. One exception to this rule is the case of a Kohen who married a girl whom he had forcefully violated. A Kohen is not permitted to marry a divorcee, and thus after he divorces the girl, he cannot then rectify his transgression by remarrying her. Therefore, a Kohen who transgresses this prohibition by divorcing the girl whom he had violated is, indeed, liable to Malkut, as he cannot rectify his misdeed. The Gemara brings different views as to whether this applies also in a case where the violator becomes unable to rectify his transgression due to circumstances beyond his control. For example, if the man divorces the girl, and she then dies, he obviously can no longer remarry her. Likewise, if she marries somebody else, he is unable to marry her again, even if her second husband dies or divorces here, because the Torah forbids marrying a woman one had divorced after she married somebody else. According to one view, since the violator did not create a situation whereby he can no longer rectify his sin, we apply the rule of “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh,” and he is not liable to Malkut. This view maintains that only if “Bitlo” – the person created the situation that made him unable to rectify his transgression, such as in the case of a Kohen who divorced – he is liable to Malkut, but not if this situation resulted from circumstances beyond his control. However, the Sefer Ha'hinuch follows the view of “Kiyemo Ve'lo Kiyemo” – that once the transgression is no longer rectifiable, the violation cannot be considered a “Lav Ha'nitak La'aseh,” and so the sinner is liable to Malkut. Therefore, even if the man divorced the girl and she died, or married somebody else, he becomes liable to Malkut, since he can no longer rectify his violation by remarrying her.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (22:29) commands that if a man forced himself upon a Na'ara Betula (virgin girl), he must pay a fine of 50 Kesef to her father, and “Lo Tiheyeh Le'isha” – he must marry her. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah seeks to deter prospective criminals from committing this dreadful act, by requiring a man who does this to marry and support the girl forever. If a person considers perpetrating such a crime, he will realize that afterward, he will be required to marry and support the girl for the rest of his life – in addition to the fine paid to the father – and this will cause him to suppress his evil inclination and desist. The Sefer Ha'hinuch adds that this Misva also ensures that the victim, who was violated and humiliated, and whom men might not want to marry because she had been violated, will be cared for. The Torah commands the man to marry her so that the girl will not have to remain alone, and will have a husband to support her and provide her with her needs. A general rule is that if the encounter occurred outside the city, where there are no people in the vicinity, then it could be assumed that the man forced himself upon the girl, and nobody was there to help her. If, however, this took place in a city, where the girl could have called for help, then it can be assumed that the relationship was consensual, unless it can be proven otherwise. The man must marry the girl even if he finds her undesirable, such as if she suffers from some unseemly blemish, or has leprosy. The girl can refuse to marry him, and the father, too, can refuse to allow the man to marry her. When the man marries the victim, he does not give her a Ketuba. The purpose of the Ketuba document, which requires a husband to pay a large amount to the wife in case of divorce, is to make it difficult for the husband to divorce the wife. In the case of a man who forcefully violated a girl, he is not permitted to divorce her against her will, and so a Ketuba is not necessary. If a person forcefully violated a girl who is related to him, and thus forbidden to him for marriage, then, quite obviously, he may not marry her. Likewise, if she is not faithful to him, then they must divorce, just as in any case of an adulterous wife. This Misva is binding upon males, and applies in all places and in all times, though the requirement to pay a fine applies only in the times of the Bet Ha'mikdash, as nowadays, courts are not authorized to impose fines. The requirement to marry the girl if she so desires, however, applies even today.

The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 26:1) that one may not place an “Eben Maskit” on the ground on which to bow. This refers to a stone with a design that was either drawn or engraved on the stone. The Torah forbids bowing on such a stone, even if one bows to express his submission to Hashem. The Rambam writes that the Torah forbade bowing on an “Eben Maskit” because this resembles the idolatrous practice of placing in front of an object of worship a decorative stone, and then bowing on the stone. In order to distance ourselves from pagan worship, the Torah forbade many practices which were common among idolaters, including bowing on a stone with a design. Therefore, it is forbidden to bow on such a stone, even if one bows to Hashem. The Sefer Ha'hinuch adds a second reason for this prohibition, noting that bowing on a decorative stone gives the impression of bowing to the stone. The Torah does not forbid bowing on a garment or some other perishable item, but bowing on a stone, which is permanent, appears as a type of pagan worship, and is thus forbidden. This Torah prohibition applies only to “Pishut Yadayim Ve'raglayim” – bowing down on the floor with one's hands and knees, as we do during the Aboda service on Yom Kippur. Bowing on an “Eben Maskit” without lowering oneself to the floor is prohibited only by force of Rabbinic enactment. It is permissible to cover an “Eben Maskit” with a cloth, such as a carpet, and then bow on it. This is why it is customary in synagogues that have stone floors without carpeting to place materials on the floor for the bowing during the Yom Kippur service. The Torah formulates this command as a prohibition against bowing on these stones “Be'arsechem” – “in your land.” The Sages understood that this prohibition actually applies even outside the Land of Israel, and the word “Be'arsechem” implies that bowing on an “Eben Maskit” is permitted in the Bet Ha'mikdash, which is not considered “our” land (as it is G-d's domain). In the Bet Ha'mikdash, it is permissible to bow to Hashem directly on the stone floor. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that according to the reason he offered for this prohibition – to avoid giving the impression of bowing to the stone – it is understandable that it does not apply in the Bet Ha'mikdash, where one could hardly be suspected of worshiping a stone. According to the Rambam's understanding, however, that the Torah wanted to distance us from anything that resembles pagan practice, we might wonder why an exception would be made in the Bet Ha'mikdash. Some commentators suggest that since the Kohanim were known to be especially vigilant (“Kohanim Zerizim Hem”), the Torah was not concerned about bowing in the Mikdash in a manner resembling the pagans' bowing. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who bowed on the ground on a stone with a design has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. It must be emphasized that this prohibition refers to somebody who bows to G-d, not to an idol or to the stone itself. If one bows to an object, then he is liable to capital punishment for transgressing the grave prohibition of idol-worship. The Torah speaks here of one who believes in G-d and seeks to worship Him; even in such a case, bowing on an “Eben Maskit” is prohibited.

The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:53) addresses the situation of a Jew who falls into financial straits, and decides to sell himself as a servant to a non-Jewish master. In such a situation, the Torah commands, “Lo Yirdenu Be'ferech Le'enecha” – the gentile master may not impose harsh labor upon the servant before our eyes. This means that if we learn of a fellow Jew whose gentile master imposes upon him “Abodat Perech” – harsh work, then we must rescue him from the master. The term “Abodat Perech,” as was discussed in the context of a different Misva, refers to not only physically harsh labor, but also tasks that cause emotional distress, such as open-ended jobs, and jobs which are not needed but are demanded simply to cause the servant to work. When we hear of a fellow Jew subjected to such conditions under a gentile master, we are required to do what we can to bring him to freedom. We may not decide that since this Jew made the mistake of selling himself into the gentile's service, we have no responsibility to rescue him, and we can let him suffer the consequences of his poor decision. The Torah commands that although this Jew is to blame for the adverse situation in which he finds himself, we nevertheless bear the obligation to help him. The Sefer Ha'hinuch emphasizes that the prohibition is to allow the Jew to remain in servitude “Le'enecha” – before our eyes, implying that this applies only if we hear of a Jew in this situation. We are not obligated to search and investigate to find Jews who work as servants for gentiles; it is only when such a situation comes to our attention that we bear the obligation to rescue the servant and extricate him from his state of servitude. Some sources indicate that this command is directed to Bet Din, the nation's religious leadership. The Sefer Ha'hinuch, however, understood that this command is directed to each and every Jew, both male and female, who is in a position to rescue the servant. He writes that this Misva applies only in times when the Jews have sovereignty and the authority to compel non-Jewish masters to release their servants. One who fails to extricate the Jewish servant in times when this Misva applies has transgressed this prohibition, though he is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is transgressed without performing an action (“Lav She'en Bo Ma'aseh”). The Rambam, in Hilchot Matenot Aniyim (8:10), points to this command as a source for the Misva of Pidyon Shebuyim – rescuing Jewish captives. Anytime a Jew is taken captive, those who are in a position to rescue him have an obligation to do so. A number of commentators noted that whenever a Jew is in the service of a gentile master, there is a Misva to bring him out of this condition, even if the master is not imposing upon him harsh labor. Apparently, the Torah introduces an additional Misvat Lo Ta'aseh (prohibition) that applies to the specific circumstances of a Jewish servant who is bring mistreated by his gentile master. While the technical aspect of this Misva – rescuing a Jew who is in the service of a non-Jew – does not apply nowadays, the underlying principle most certainly does. This Misva shows us the responsibility we have to help our fellow Jews even when they are to blame for their situation. Even if somebody caused his own downfall, we are obligated to assist him if we can. Indeed, many of our fellow Jews have, unfortunately, given themselves over to “masters” who cause them great harm – such as alcohol, drugs, gambling, and other addictive behaviors. We do not have the right to say that since they are to blame for engaging in these addictive habits in the first place, we have no obligation to help them. The Torah here teaches of our responsibility to extricate our fellow Jews from subservience even if they had placed themselves in this position. And thus when we see or hear of, Heaven forbid, a fellow Jew suffering under the “servitude” of addiction, of any kind, we are dutybound to do whatever we can to ensure that he receives the help he needs to regain his freedom.

The Torah in Parashat Behar says about gentile servants, “Le'olam Bahem Ta'abodu” – that they are to remain in service forever (Vayikra 25:46). This verse establishes a Torah prohibition forbidding releasing a non-Jewish servant. Whereas Jewish servants are released either after six years of service, or in the Yobel (jubilee year), gentile servants are not released. Non-Jewish servants are commonly referred to in Halachic literature as “Ebed Kena'ani” (“a Canaanite servant”), but in truth, this status applies to all gentile servants. They are referred to as “Canaanites” because Noah placed a curse upon his grandson, Canaan, that his descendants would work as slaves, and thus the title “Kena'ani” is associated with servitude. The Sefer Ha'hinuch, in discussing this Misva, explains the procedure that was followed when a Jew purchased a gentile servant. The servant spends one year working for the master, and after a year has passed, the master asks the servant if he is prepared renounce his former faith and embrace Jewish belief. If the servant refuses, then he is released, as he cannot be allowed to remain among our people. But if the servant agrees, then he begins the process of conversion by undergoing Berit Mila and immersing in a Mikveh for the purpose of becoming an Ebed Kena'ani. He is then obligated in all Misvot which are binding upon women, and it is then forbidden for the master to release him. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains this prohibition as based on the notion that Am Yisrael was chosen for a special mission, to devote themselves to the service of the Almighty. As such, it is appropriate that they will have servants to help them with their day-to-day tasks, thus freeing their time so they can tend to their spiritual pursuits. Fellow Jews are also assigned this mission, and so the Torah wants Am Yisrael to have servants from other nations. The reason why an Ebed Kena'ani must undergo partial conversion, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, is so that he would not exert a negative influence upon the Jews among whom he lives. On this basis, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains why Halacha permits releasing an Ebed Kena'ani when this is necessary for the sake of fulfilling a Misva. The classic example is a situation where nine men are present for a Minyan, and one wishes to release his servant so that he will become a full-fledged Jew and can thus complete the Minyan. Halacha permits releasing the servant in such a case – even though praying with a Minyan constitutes a Misva De'rabbanan (Misva ordained by the Sages), whereas releasing a servant is forbidden by force of Torah law. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that since the purpose of this prohibition is to facilitate our service of G-d, it does not apply in a case where freeing a servant is what is needed to facilitate the fulfillment of a Misva, even a Misva ordained by the Sages. If a Jew cohabited with a gentile maidservant, the product of this union has the status of an Ebed Kena'ani, and all the laws relevant to gentile servants apply to him, as well. If a master treats his servant in a way which clearly indicates his intention to free him, then Bet Din compels the master to release the servant. Examples include having the servant betroth a Jewish woman, having the servant wear Tefillin, or inviting him to conduct the congregational Torah reading. These activities are all done by full-fledged Jewish men, and not by servants, and thus once any of these is done, the master must write a document declaring the servant free. This command applies in all places and in all times. It is binding upon both men and women, though the Sages teach that a woman should not purchase an Ebed Kena'ani, in order to avoid suspicion. One who releases his servant transgresses this command, but is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is introduced in the form of a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). It is important to clarify that when the Sefer Ha'hinuch speaks in this context of Am Yisrael's unique stature, this refers to the special mission to which we have been assigned. The status of “chosen nation” is not just a privilege – it is a great responsibility, the obligation we bear to devote our lives to the service of G-d, and to disseminate the knowledge of awareness of His existence. The Sefer Ha'hinuch here teaches us of the awesome responsibility that each and every one of us carries as a member of Hashem's special nation, that we must use our precious time properly, to fulfill our duty to the very best of our ability.

The Torah in Parashat Behar presents a number of laws relevant to an Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant), including the command, “Lo Yimacheru Mimkeret Abed” – that a servant may not be sold in the manner in which servants were normally sold (25:42). In ancient times, servants whose masters wished to sell them were placed on a tall stone, like a podium, where prospective buyers could see them. The Torah forbids selling a Jewish servant in this manner, which was considered demeaning. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because it is improper to treat a fellow Jew disrespectfully – even if he is an Ebed Ibri, who finds himself in this situation because he stole and was unable to pay the victim. We might have assumed that such a person is allowed to be treated disrespectfully, as he is guilty of a crime, and so the Torah commanded preserving the dignity of even an Ebed Ibri. The Sefer Ha'hinuch adds that a wealthy person never knows how long his good fortune will last, and he, too, could find himself at some point in financial straits, and needing to sell himself as a servant. He should therefore be sensitive to the feelings of an Ebed Ibri and treat him with respect. This prohibition applies to both men and women, in times when the laws of Ebed Ibri are binding – meaning, in periods when the laws of Yobel (the jubilee year) are applicable (which is when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel in their allotted territories). One who sells a Jewish servant in a demeaning manner is in violation of this command, but is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition can be violated without an action, by verbally instructing the servant to stand on the podium. In the next verse (Vayikra 25:43), the Torah forbids having one's Jewish servant work “Be'farech” – meaning, perform grueling labor. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one example of this prohibition is “Aboda She'en Lah Kisba” – open-ended work. If a master tells the servant to perform a certain task “until I return,” without giving the servant any indication of when he will be returning, this causes the servant psychological torment, and therefore falls under the prohibition of “Be'farech.” Another example of this prohibition is assigning one's servant a job for no reason, just for the purpose of having him work. Thus, for instance, it would be forbidden to command a servant to prepare a beverage which is not needed, and then discard it. This command applies to both males and females, when the laws of Jewish servants are applicable. One is not liable to Malkut for transgressing this command, as it can be violated verbally, without performing an action. The Sefer Ha'hinuch concludes his discussion of this Misva by noting that although we do not have Jewish servants nowadays, nevertheless, the concept underlying this Misva is no less relevant in our time as it was in the past. When we hire workers or laborers, we must treat them with respect and dignity, with the understanding of the cyclical nature of poverty and wealth. The fact that a person is now wealthy and is able to hire laborers does not mean that this condition will always remain; he might one day find himself needing to perform labor to support himself. Hashem chooses to whom to grant wealth, and He chooses the precise time-frame during which the person will enjoy wealth. A person is not wealthy for even a moment longer than Hashem decided he should be wealthy. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that even if a person hides all his money, or purchases vast amounts of real estate, Hashem can take away all his property the moment He decides that this person should no longer have wealth. This awareness should prevent us from arrogance and from disrespecting those with less money than we have.

In discussing various laws relevant to a Jewish servant, the Torah commands, “Lo Ta'abod Bo Abodat Abed” – literally, “Do not work him like a servant” (Vayikra 25:39). This is understood to mean that a master who purchases a fellow Jew as an Ebed (servant) is not permitted to assign the servant demeaning work. The Sefer Ha'hinuch gives the example of a “Balinta” – having one's servant accompany him as he walks outside with a cushion for him to put on the ground if the master grows weary and wishes to rest. Another example is having one's servant carry his towel and other belongings to the bathhouse. These chores are considered beneath the dignity of an Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant), and they are thus forbidden by force of this Biblical command. The Sages in the Talmud remarked that the master's responsibilities toward his servant extend so far that “Kol Ha'koneh Ebed Ibri Ke'koneh Adon Le'asmo” – one who purchases a Jewish servant in effect purchases a master. The Torah demands treating the servant with respect, like an employee, and not like a servant. Even though the master of course can compel the servant to work, he must ensure to show him respect and dignity. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah issued this command in order to draw our attention to the exalted status of our nation. The Torah commands masters to treat their Jewish servants with special respect and dignity to impress upon us that each and every member of our nation is special. This newfound respect for the Jewish Nation, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains, will, in turn, enhance our respect for the Torah which was given to our people. The Sefer Ha'hinuch adds that the Torah wants the master to realize and reflect upon the fact that the servant was forced into this status due to financial hardships, which could befall anyone, even the master. This awareness will lead the master to repent and to strictly follow G-d's will so he remains worthy of material blessing and will not fall into financial straits. Finally, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, this Misva serves to accustom people to act kindly and compassionately, and to distance themselves from cruelty and insensitivity. By molding our characters in this way, we become worthy of the great blessings which Hashem wants to bestow upon us. Elsewhere, in the Book of Debarim (15:16), the Torah says about a servant, “Ki Tob Lo Imach” – that life “with” the master is good. The Sages inferred from this verse that the servant must live “with” the master in the sense that he is given the same comforts and standard of living as the master. He is to be fed the same foods and beverages, and given the same comfortable beds, as the master. This Misva applies to both men and women, but only during periods when the laws of servants apply – meaning, when the laws of Yobel apply (which is when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel). One who forces his servant to perform demeaning labor violates this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut. Since this prohibition is generally transgressed verbally, without an action, by simply commanding the servant, one is not liable to Malkut even if he forces the servant through an action. All Jews have the status of servants of Hashem. As such, the command forbidding disrespecting an Ebed Ibri extends, in a sense, to each and every Jew. We must recognize the value and worth of every fellow Jew, as a servant of the Almighty, and ensure not to disrespect or disparage a fellow Jew in any way.

The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:37) introduces the prohibition of “Ribit” – lending to a fellow Jew on interest. The Sefer Ha'hinuch notes that the Torah repeats this command, first forbidding “Neshech,” and then forbidding “Marbit.” These two terms, the Sefer Ha'hinuch writes, are synonymous; the Torah does not add any new information by forbidding “Marbit” after commanding that a lender may not demand “Neshech.” The reason for the repetition, the Sefer Ha'hinuch explains, is to impress upon us the importance of this law, and the severity of charging interest. The Sefer Ha'hinuch draws an analogy to a parent, who, when admonishing a child, will repeat the warning several times for emphasis, in order to impress upon the child how severe a matter this is. This is done out of love and concern for the child, to ensure that the child distances himself from negative behavior. Likewise, G-d, in His great love for us, repeated the prohibition against charging interest in order to draw our attention to the gravity of this violation, so that we distance ourselves from it. The classic case of Ribit is “Ribit Ketzutza” (“fixed interest”), such as when a person lends 100 Dinarim on condition that the borrower repays 120 Dinarim within the year. This type of Ribit is forbidden on the level of Torah law. Another example of Ribit which the Torah forbids is where the lender takes the borrower's home as collateral, uses it, and gives it back after the receiving from the borrower the full sum which he had lent. In this case, the lender has received back the loan as well as rights to the home rent-free. As such, he transgresses the Torah prohibition of Ribit. The lender would have to deduct the cost of rent for the interim period from the amount owed to him by the borrower. The Sages forbade certain forms of Ribit which are permissible according to Torah law, but resemble forbidden interest. One example is where a person lends money on condition that he will receive the principal in full, as well as a percentage of the profits earned with this money. Since the principal is guaranteed, this resembles a loan, as opposed to a business venture, and is therefore forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Sages also forbade “Ribit Mukdemet” (“preliminary Ribit”), meaning, giving gifts to somebody from whom one wishes to borrow money, and then receiving the loan. The gifts received before the loan resemble interest, and such a loan is therefore forbidden. The same is true of “Ribit Me'uheret” – giving the lender a gift after repaying the full sum of the loan. Another example of Ribit which the Sages forbade is the case where the lender did not have the cash which the borrower requested, so he gave him agriculture produce valued at that amount as a loan. Later, the borrower sells the produce back to the lender at a discounted price, and then, when repaying the loan, he gives the lender the full sum – meaning, the full value of the produce which he received as his loan. This does not constitute Ribit on the level of Torah law, but the Sages nevertheless forbade such as an arrangement, which falls under the category of “Ha'aramat Ribit” – a way that a lender can receive interest through a legal loophole. A person may pay a broker to convince somebody to lend him money. Since the brokerage fee is not going to the lender, this does not violate the prohibition of Ribit. The Sages warn, “Kol Ha'osek Be'ribit Mitmotet” – those who lend on interest in violation of Torah will suffer financial ruin. The Sefer Ha'hinuch goes so far as to say that a single coin earned through lending on interest can cause numerous treasuries to be destroyed. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both males and females. If one lent on interest in violation of Torah law, the Bet Din would force the lender to return the interest to the borrower. In the case of interest which is forbidden Mi'de'rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), the Sages do not force the lender to return the money to the borrower. If, however, the borrower acts on his own and seizes the interest which he was unlawfully charged, the Bet Din will not force him to return it. In the aforementioned case of “Ha'aramat Ribit,” if the borrower seized the money which he paid, the Bet Din forces him to return it to the lender. The Gemara comments that one who lends on interest will be excluded from Tehiyat Ha'metim (the resurrection of the dead). Some have explained that this is a fitting punishment for the sin of lending on interest, because charging interest has the effect of “burying” the borrower in his debt. As the interest accumulates, the borrower falls deeper into debt, and is thus unable to “climb” out of the “hole” into which he had sunken. Appropriately, the lender is punished by remaining permanently in the grave, without ever having his life restored.

The tribe of Levi did not receive a territory in the Land of Israel as did the other tribes. Instead, forty-eight cities throughout the land were designated as cities for the Leviyim. Each of these cities was to be surrounded by 1,000 Amot of empty space, and then an additional 2,000 Amot for gardens, orchards and the like. In Parashat Behar (25:34), the Torah forbids altering this prescribed arrangement, and failing to set up the Leviyim's cities the way the Torah required. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that the Torah forbade changing the prescribed arrangement because the Leviyim were the Torah scholars and teachers, to whom people would come to learn and to consult. This is indicated by the verse in Sefer Debarim (33:10) that says about the tribe of Levi, “Yoru Mishpatecha Le'Yaakob Ve'Toratecha Le'Yisrael” – “They shall teach Your statutes to Yaakob, and Your Torah to Yisrael.” In order to engender the people's respect for Torah, G-d commanded that the Leviyim's cities should be arranged and maintained in an aesthetically pleasing manner, in a way which leaves a favorable impression and invites admiration. Special attention is given to the proper arrangement of these cities, ensuring open space and fields and orchards outside the city, in order to raise the esteem of the Leviyim in the eyes of the people. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that these cities must be built and maintained “Be'tachlit Ha'yofi” – as beautifully as possible. The Torah prescribed the arrangement which would invite the people's respect, and it forbade deviating from this arrangement, because this is how the Torah determined that the cities would bring honor to the tribe of Levi. This command applies in the Land of Israel, when the Jewish People reside in the land. It applies to all people – Kohanim, Leviyim and Yisraelim – and to both men and women. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that he does not know the precise Shiur (amount) that one must deviate from the prescribed arrangement in order to be liable to Malkut. It is clear, however, that violators would be liable to Malkut, as they have transgressed a Biblical prohibition that involves a concrete action. In this context, the Sefer Ha'hinuch brings the Rambam's famous comments in his conclusion to Hilchot Shemita Ve'yobel, explaining why the Leviyim were not given a share in the land like the other tribes. The Rambam writes that the members of this tribe were set aside to serve Hashem and to study and teach Torah, and they were therefore absolved from the mundane pressures and responsibilities that occupy other people's time. Thus, they did not engage in agriculture, and were instead supported by the rest of the nation. They likewise did not serve in the military. The Rambam writes that the Leviyim were considered “Hel Hashem” – “G-d's army,” and He guaranteed that they would be cared for. The Rambam proceeds to comment that this special status is not reserved only for the tribe of Levi. He writes that anyone who wishes to abstain from the mundane pursuits in which most people engage, in order to devote themselves exclusively to studying and teaching Torah, “is sanctified as the holiest of holies.” This is considered praiseworthy, the Rambam writes, and G-d will care for the person's basic material needs, just as G-d cared for the needs of the tribe of Levi. The Rambam does not say that such a person should impose himself on the community and demand that he be supported, but rather that if he works minimally to earn enough for his basic sustenance, G-d guarantees that he will be cared for. These famous comments of the Rambam are often cited as an important source for those who wish to devote themselves to full-time Torah learning, compromising their material standards, so they could become scholars who teach Torah, instead of pursuing a lucrative career.

The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:29) introduces the unique law relevant to the sale of “Bateh Areh Homa” – homes situated in walled cities. After the sale of such a house, the seller has precisely one year to buy it back. If he does not buy it back within a year, then he is not entitled to demand the right to buy it back thereafter. It does not even return to him on Yobel (the jubilee year), when other lands are returned to their original owners. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that due to the special importance of the Land of Israel, the Torah wanted to encourage homeowners who sell their properties to buy them back quickly. It therefore imposed a one-year deadline, so that those who find it necessary to sell a home will be incentivized to repurchase it as soon as possible. When the seller buys back the home, he must pay the full price. Normally, such an arrangement would constitute Ribit (forbidden interest on a loan), because the buyer has, in effect, lent the seller the value of the home, and in exchange received the house rent-free during the interim period. Free access to the home during the interim period, in principle, qualifies as Ribit and is forbidden by Torah law. However, the Torah makes an exception in this case, allowing the seller to buy back the home for full price, without deducting the amount he would have charged to rent the home. A “Bet Areh Homa” may be bought back within a year only by the seller; nobody else can purchase the home from the buyer. The seller must buy it with money he earns or receives in exchange for his possessions; he cannot buy it back with borrowed money. The price must be paid in full all at once, and not in installments. If the buyer dies within the first year after the purchase, the seller can buy the home back from the buyer's inheritors. Likewise, if the seller dies, his inheritors may buy the home back from the buyer until a year has passed since the time of the transaction. This Misva applies to both males and females, and only in the Land of Israel. It is binding only in periods when the laws of Yobel apply – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish People live in the Land of Israel, and the tribes are living in their allotted territories.

The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:24) commands, “Ge'ula Titnenu La'aretz” – literally, “You shall grant the land redemption.” This refers to the requirement to return purchased property to its original owner on the Yobel – the “jubilee” observed every fifty years. The buyer must return the land to the original owner free of charge, without receiving any money in return. The reason underlying this command, as the Sefer Ha'hinuch already explained in the context of an earlier Yobel-related Misva, is that it reminds us that G-d created the world and it belongs exclusively to Him. By forcing buyers to return the purchased land to the original owners, the Torah reminds us that G-d exerts ultimate control over the entire earth. This awareness will deter us from stealing or taking other people's possessions unlawfully, as we will recognize that G-d exerts complete control over the earth, and will thus take away whatever we have that does not rightfully belong to us. An important exception to this requirement is the case of “Bet Areh Homa” – a house in walled city. The Torah establishes that if such a house is sold, the buyer is allowed to buy it back within the first year after the sale, and if he does not, then the house remains forever with the buyer, and does not return on Yobel. Unlike other properties, which return to their original owner in Yobel, a house in a walled city which is not bought back within a year of the sale remains in the buyer's possession forever, and does not have to be returned on the Yobel year. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that if the buyer sells the house to somebody else within a year of buying it, the original owner nevertheless has a year from the time of the original sale to buy it back. The second transaction does not “restart the clock,” so-to-speak, and the buyer can repurchase the home only until a year has passed from the time he sold it. The Sefer Ha'hinuch explains that the one-year limit is imposed as a penalty, of sorts, upon the seller, to discourage people from selling homes in Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, even if the buyer then sells the property to somebody else, there is no reason to extend the strict deadline by which the original owner must buy the property back if he so wishes. If, on the day the year ends, the buyer is not present to receive the money from the seller who wishes to repurchase the home, then he may give the money to Bet Din, and then break into the house to take it over. Since the buyer is not in the area, the seller is allowed to buy the house back by force. If the Yobel begins within the first year after the house was sold, the house is not returned, and its status is unaffected by the onset of Yobel. The seller still has an entire year to buy it back, and if he does not, then it remains forever in the buyer's ownership. The law of Bet Areh Homa does not apply in the city of Jerusalem, even though it is a walled city. The city of Jerusalem is considered the property of the entire Jewish Nation, and so it is excluded from the rules of Bet Areh Homa. When it comes to a field that is sold, the seller does not have the right to repurchase it within the first two years after the transaction. After two years have passed, he may purchase it whenever he wishes, and if he does not, then he receives it back on Yobel. The Ramban explains that since a field is a source of Parnasa (livelihood), the Torah allowed the seller to buy it back, even many years later, as he likely depends on the field for his sustenance. A house, however, is not a source of sustenance, and so the Torah did not entitle the seller of a house to buy it back, and did not require that it be returned in Yobel. However, since it is embarrassing to sell a home, the Torah granted the seller the right to buy it back during the first year. Once a year has passed, the seller has presumably settled into his new residence, and so he no longer enjoys the right to buy back the home. This Misva applies to both men and women. It is binding only in the Land of Israel, and only when the laws of Yobel apply – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the land. The Sefer Ha'hinuch writes that one who does not return land to its original owner on Yobel is deserving of harsh punishment, and is considered as though he denies G-d's creation of the world. Since the law of Yobel is meant to reinforce our belief in G-d's control over the world, failing to observe this law is akin to denying the fundamental tenet of creation.