Podcast appearances and mentions of shelly kagan

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/neuroscience

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/animal-studies

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter.

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/critical-theory

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration.  In How to Count Animals, More Or Less (Oxford UP, 2019), Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally. Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea. Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The title for this one is pretty self-explanatory. These are the top 10 Christian/Atheist debates that I think everyone should watch. #10 The Euthyphro Dilemma - Matt Flannagan vs Jason Thibodeau #9 From Necessary Being to God? | Dr. Graham Oppy & Dr. Rob Koons #8 Randal Rauser the Atheist vs. Joe Schmid the Theist (Devil's Advocate Debate) #7 Daniel Dennett vs Alvin Plantinga Debate REMASTERED #6 William Lane Craig v Erik Wielenberg | "God & Morality" | NC State - Feb 2018 #5 William Lane Craig vs Peter Millican: "Does God Exist?", Birmingham University, October 2011 #4 Is God Necessary for Morality? | William Lane Craig & Shelly Kagan at Columbia University #3 William Lane Craig and Sean Carroll | "God and Cosmology" | 2014 Greer Heard Forum #2 Russell-Copleston Debate on God's Existence (1948) #1 Does God Exist? William Lane Craig vs. Christopher Hitchens - Full Debate [HD] Honorable Mentions: Craig vs. Rosenberg Lennox vs. Dawkins Craig vs. Law Peoples vs. Ahmed Arbour vs. Oppy Rasmussen vs. Oppy Craig vs. Tooley Craig vs. Draper White vs. Ehrman Craig vs. Penrose Craig vs. Ludemann Miller vs. Cavin Feser vs. Oppy Special thanks to Joe Schmid from Majesty of Reason for giving feedback on earlier versions of the script.

This program was recorded at a Veritas Forum event on Yale in 2014. The original title was, "Living Well in the Light of Death" and featured N.T. Wright, Bible Scholar and former Bishop, and Shelly Kagan, Professor of Philosophy. If you enjoyed this episode, please rate, review, and subscribe. And, if you're interested in more content from Veritas, check out our Beyond the Forum podcast. Visit veritas.org to learn more about the mission of the Veritas Forum and find more resources to explore the ideas that shape our lives.

En esta entrega, discutimos los planteado por Shelly Kagan en cuanto a la moralidad de las acciones. Acaso el hecho que un ser no sienta dolor, nos da permiso de hacerle "daño" ¿Acaso la moralidad está sujeta a tu deseo de no hacer algo, o al aspecto inherente de la otra persona que pudiera ser perjudicada por tus acciones?

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is:Shelly Kagan - readings for Ethics and the Future seminar (spring 2021) , published by velutvulpes on the LessWrong. This is a linkpost for This is a list of the readings from Shelly Kagan's seminar, “Ethics and the Future,” taught at Yale in Spring 2021. See the original linked Google Doc for full introduction. Background on Existential Risks: 1. Toby Ord, The Precipice, Chapters 3-6 and Appendices C and D (about 124 pages) The Basic Case for Longtermism: 1. Perhaps start with this very brief overview: Todd, “Future Generations and Their Moral Significance” (about 7 pages), which can be found online at:/ 2. Then look at the somewhat longer (but still breezy) exposition in Ord, The Precipice, Intro and Chapters 1-2, and Appendix E (65 pgs.) 3. Then read Chapters 1 and 3 from Nick Beckstead's dissertation, On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future (about 44 pages) 4. Finally, Greaves and MacAskill, “The Case for Strong Longtermism” (about 25). That will come to about 140 pages, most of which reads fairly quickly. If you want even more (consider what is listed next as recommended but not required)--look at: 5. Bostrom, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority” (17 pages), and also 6. Bostrom, “Astronomical Waste” (10 pages) 7. Finally, there is a passage from Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, that is quoted regularly in the longtermist literature (for example, by Beckstead). If you would like to see it in its original context, it is on pp. 453-4 (2 pages). All of these things can be found in the Files folder for the class, other than the Todd, the Ord, and the Parfit. The Social Discount Rate: 1. Start with Cowen, Discount Rates Table, a short passage from his Stubborn Attachments, which gives a quick sense of how even a “modest” discount rate effectively wipes out the significance of the long term future (1 page). 2. Then Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Appendix F (7 pages), for arguments against the social discount rate. 3. Cowen and Parfit, “Against the Social Discount Rate,” (from Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin (eds.) Justice between age groups and generations, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992, pp. 144–161) repeats much of the Parfit but gives some additional arguments. To (mostly) avoid the repetition, only read the two introductory pages (pp. 144-145) and the section on “economic arguments” (pp. 150-158). Though the first such economic argument (on opportunity costs) very closely follows the earlier Parfit, it does add some extra details. (11 pages.) 4. Then Ord, The Precipice, Appendix A (6 pages) for further discussion. 5. Next, read Greaves, “Discounting for Public Policy,” section 7, which is pages 404-409 (5 pages). That's the bit on the “pure” discount rate. (The rest of the paper isn't required, but is recommended for anyone who would like a thorough (though a bit technical) survey of some of the economics debates on the discount rate.) 6. Finally, Mogensen, “The Only Ethical Argument for Positive Delta” (33 pages). That's about 62 pages. 7. If you are interested in further discussion of the discount rate from an economist's perspective, you could take a look at Broome, “Discounting the Future,” (29 pages) though this is primarily on discounting with regard to future resources, not pure discounting of future welfare, so it is only recommended. Population Ethics I: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 16-18, and Appendix G (70 pages). Population Ethics II: 1. Start with Boonin, “How to Solve the Non-Identity Problem” (30 pages) 2. Next, Harman, “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?” (25 pages) 3. Then McMahan, “Climate Change, War, and the Non-Identity Problem” (27) 4. Beckstead, Overwhelming Importance, Chapter 4 (23 pages) 5. Ord, The Precipice, Appendix B (6 pages) 6. Finally, a few pages from Kagan, “Singer on Killing Animals...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Comparisons of Capacity for Welfare and Moral Status Across Species, published by Jason Schukraft on the Effective Altruism Forum. Executive Summary Effective altruism aims to allocate resources so as to promote the most good in the world. To achieve the most efficient allocation of resources, we need to be able to compare interventions that target different species, including humans, cows, chickens, fish, lobsters, and many others. Comparing cause areas and interventions that target different species requires a comparison in the moral value of different animals (including humans). Animals differ in their cognitive, emotional, social, behavioral, and neurological features, and these differences are potentially morally significant. According to many plausible philosophical theories, such differences affect (1) an animal's capacity for welfare, which is the range of how good or bad an animal's life can be, and/or (2) an animal's moral status, which is the degree to which an animal's welfare matters morally. Theories of welfare are traditionally divided into three categories: (1) hedonistic theories, according to which welfare is the balance of experienced pleasure and pain, (2) desire-fulfillment theories, according to which welfare is the degree to which one's desires are satisfied, and (3) objective list theories, according to which welfare is the extent to which one attains non-instrumental goods like happiness, virtue, wisdom, friendship, knowledge and love. Most plausible theories of welfare suggest differences in capacity for welfare among animals, though the exact differences and their magnitudes depend on the details of the theories and on various empirical facts. A central question in the literature on moral status is whether moral status admits of degrees. The unitarian view, endorsed by the likes of Peter Singer, says ‘no.' The hierarchical view, endorsed by the likes of Shelly Kagan, says ‘yes.' If moral status admits of degrees, then the higher the status of a given animal, the more value there is in a given unit of welfare obtaining for that animal. Status-adjusted welfare, which is welfare weighted by the moral status of the animal for whom the welfare obtains, is a useful common currency both unitarians and hierarchists can use to frame debates. Different theories entail different determinants of capacity for welfare and moral status, though there is some overlap among positions. According to most plausible views, differences in capacity for welfare and moral status are determined by some subset of differences in things like: intensity of valenced experiences, self-awareness, general intelligence, autonomy, long-term planning, communicative ability, affective complexity, self-governance, abstract thought, creativity, sociability, and normative evaluation. Understanding differences in capacity for welfare and moral status could significantly affect the way we wish to allocate resources among interventions and cause areas. For instance, some groups of animals that exhibit tremendous diversity, such as fish or insects, are often treated as if all members of the group have the same moral status and capacity for welfare. Further investigation could compel us to prioritize some of the species in these groups over others. More generally, if further investigation suggested we have been overestimating the moral value of mammals or vertebrates compared to the rest of the animal kingdom, we might be compelled to redirect many resources to invertebrates or non-mammal vertebrates. To understand the importance of these considerations, we must first develop a broad conceptual framework for thinking about this issue. Moral Weight Series Comparisons of Capacity for Welfare and Moral Status Across Species How to Measure Capacity for Welfare and Moral Status The Subjectiv...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A full syllabus on longtermism, published by jtm on the effective altruism forum. What this is A syllabus of readings relating to ‘longtermist' philosophy. I'm posting it here because I hope it might inform syllabi for university courses, reading groups or EA fellowships, and because I would love to see people share suggestions for other works to include. As this list was designed to include roughly a semester's worth of material it is, needless to say, not an exhaustive resource. Indeed, each of the dozen topics could have a syllabus of their own and I am not myself very familiar with the relevant literature – suggestions are very welcome! Some background Like many other student groups, my previous university EA community would often invite faculty speakers to join dinner discussions and fellowship meetings. In our group, the ethics professor Shelly Kagan has been generous enough to regularly attend group discussions. While he initially joined for conversations on Peter Singer's arguments on charity, we started a few years ago to instead focus on questions regarding intergenerational ethics. After a few very successful group discussions, I suggested that Kagan could teach a course on the topic and, a few years later, that course is now being taught as an undergraduate seminar. While Kagan was preparing the course, I offered to make a draft syllabus for it, and although I believe Kagan's actual syllabus looks quite different from the list I produced, I figured that it might nevertheless be worthwhile to share here on the forum. I should stress that this syllabus is independent of the course and professor and that any errors thus are entirely my own. Why I think this might be valuable I think we got quite lucky to find a university professor who was sufficiently interested in – and sympathetic to – longtermism that they would teach a course on it, and I'm not sure that this is something that could happen at every school with an EA group. But conditional on finding such a professor, I hope this syllabus could increase the likelihood of them teaching a course like this, which seems really valuable. Of course, I also hope that this could prove useful for reading groups, fellowships, and the like! Crucially, I do not see this as a resource for “convincing people that longtermism is true.” (Edit: For some compelling arguments as to why our community should be careful about seeking 'value-alignment', see this great post by CarlaZoeC.) Rather, I hope that the readings can inspire and inform robust conversations about the strengths and weaknesses of longtermism – a philosophy that, in the scheme of things, remains very new and unexplored. Indeed, several of the readings included here pose serious challenges to various aspects of longtermism that are worth carefully considering. Some considerations that went into making this syllabus Intergenerational ethics ≠ longtermism The course this syllabus was made for is called “Ethics and the Future,” which underscores the fact that, as I see it, ‘intergenerational ethics' (a philosophical topic or field) is not equivalent to ‘longtermism' (a philosophical position and research agenda within that field). So while longtermism is heavily featured, it's not the only thing you'll find on the syllabus. Formalism and accessibility In addition to the usual dose of jargon, many of the papers on this subject – especially on the topics of discounting and population ethics – include a lot of mathematical expressions that may pose a barrier to some readers. I tried to keep accessibility in mind when making the syllabus and excluded a few potential readings on those grounds, but I still suspect that some of the readings might be challenging to many students without a lot of formal training (myself included). Ultimately, however, this is just a dra...

Shan's former co-worker and co-conspirator of male contraceptives Marti Argueta is on the pod! He shares the origination and musical experimentation of The Nervous Physician, his latest EP. We dive into some fish-tank-talk, the future of jet-packs and the power of creative self-collaboration. Marti also discusses the conflicting perspectives presented in the book Death by Shelly Kagan and how these ideas affect our life. YouTube: https://youtube.com/channel/UCHzg4OE2RFbguMpBDwabtGw Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/artist/7kir5P7PaGLzwjxO7FFUkY?si=3YVT80vfR72fAwj-v87Vzw&dl_branch=1

Lydia Dugdale, MD, MAR is the Silberberg Associate Professor of Medicine and Director of the Center for Clinical Medical Ethics in the Department of Medicine at Columbia University Vagelos College of Physicians & Surgeons. Shelly Kagan is Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, where he has taught since 1995.

What can philosophy teach us about death?Since you could say the goal of philosophy is to help us think and communicate clearly and critically about fundamental aspects of nature and humanity, the answer seems to be—a whole lot.That’s why I’ve decided to take this philosophy of death class, offered by Yale University through its free Open Yale Courses program, and turn my education into podcast episodes we can all learn from.In this introduction episode, I break down how it will all work, and we get a front row seat to lecture one in the series taught by Yale philosophy professor Shelly Kagan. The series is made up of 26 lectures, each of which will get its own episode. My goal is to publish two episodes per month for the next 13 months. This is an experiment so I don’t know how it will turn out. But I’m excited to take this journey with you and see where it takes us. Ready, future philosophers? Death: Lecture one (Open Yale Courses)Death: About/Syllabus/Sessions/Survey/Buy Books (Open Yale Courses)Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 licenseConnectEnjoying Mortality Minded? Please take a minute to share this episode, rate the podcast, or leave a comment. It would be helpful and much appreciated as I continue working to turn my vision into reality.You can join me in exploring mortality and everything that follows from it by subscribing to Mortality Minded wherever you get your podcasts. Episodes and other content are also available on Mortality Minded.If social media's your thing, I’m @MortalityMinded on Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter. Or if you prefer to kick it old school, email me at connect@mortalityminded.comThanks for listening. Until next time, stay mortality minded.(Music: Brass Beat by Blake © 2011 licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 license.)

William Lane Craig vs Shelly Kagan: Is God Necessary for Morality?

In this episode, we sit down and discuss/argue about life and death, based of the essay "Death" by Thomas Nagel and Shelly Kagan's lecture series on death. We also have a Youtube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCD1RiH1j-M6C59z1upPXkWw?disable_polymer=true Your support helps me make more videos and podcasts: Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thatsbs _(We have rewards for supporters like bonus episodes & videos) _ Visit our Website: https://thatsbs.fireside.fm/ Share our conversation with a friend (or enemy) and help us get our name out. We record these conversation because we can't think of a more important way to expose bad ideas and promote good ones. Plus we're bored a lot and don't have that many friends. Help us keep doing what we're doing. Contact us --- thatsbspodcast@gmail.com Twitter: @ThatsBSPodcast Above all, Thanks for watching.

In this episode, we sit down and discuss/argue about life and death, based of the essay "Death" by Thomas Nagel and Shelly Kagan's lecture series on death. We also have a Youtube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCD1RiH1j-M6C59z1upPXkWw?disable_polymer=true Your support helps me make more videos and podcasts: Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thatsbs _(We have rewards for supporters like bonus episodes & videos) _ Visit our Website: https://thatsbs.fireside.fm/ Share our conversation with a friend (or enemy) and help us get our name out. We record these conversation because we can't think of a more important way to expose bad ideas and promote good ones. Plus we're bored a lot and don't have that many friends. Help us keep doing what we're doing. Contact us --- thatsbspodcast@gmail.com Twitter: @ThatsBSPodcast Above all, Thanks for watching.

Neste programa, Ivan Mizanzuk, Marcos Beccari e Rafael Ancara conversando sobre “Black Museum”, o quinto episódio da quarta temporada de Black Mirror. Quantas referências do universo de Black Mirror você identificou neste episódio? Aliás, está tudo no mesmo universo mesmo? LinksReferências em Black Mirror [The Verge] https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/3/16829438/black-mirror-easter-eggs-black-museum-season-4Mais Referências em Black Mirror [Cosmopolitan] https://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/tv/g14539227/15-black-mirror-references-you-might-have-missed-in-black-museum/?slide=8“Metalhead” – O episódio mais injustiçado de Black Mirror [Thread do Twitter] https://twitter.com/i/moments/1077528075028623362‘Black Mirror’ Is Obsessed with Black Suffering https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/mbp9my/black-mirror-is-obsessed-with-black-suffering“Death” with Shelly Kagan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2J7wSuFRl8&list=PLEA18FAF1AD9047B0

Neste programa, Ivan Mizanzuk, Marcos Beccari e Rafael Ancara conversando sobre “Black Museum”, o quinto episódio da quarta temporada de Black Mirror. Quantas referências do universo de Black Mirror você identificou neste episódio? Aliás, está tudo no mesmo universo mesmo? LinksReferências em Black Mirror [The Verge] https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/3/16829438/black-mirror-easter-eggs-black-museum-season-4Mais Referências em Black Mirror [Cosmopolitan] https://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/tv/g14539227/15-black-mirror-references-you-might-have-missed-in-black-museum/?slide=8“Metalhead” – O episódio mais injustiçado de Black Mirror [Thread do Twitter] https://twitter.com/i/moments/1077528075028623362‘Black Mirror’ Is Obsessed with Black Suffering https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/mbp9my/black-mirror-is-obsessed-with-black-suffering“Death” with Shelly Kagan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2J7wSuFRl8&list=PLEA18FAF1AD9047B0

It's the one universal on which we all agree: everyone dies. How we deal with death determines much of what we spend our lives trying to accomplish and become. At a Veritas Forum from Yale, theologian N.T. Wright (University of St. Andrews) and philosopher Shelly Kagan (Yale) discuss the reality of death and whether we should hope for something beyond it.

The process of dying can be horrible for many, but is there anything bad about death itself? The obvious answer is that deprives us of something that we might otherwise have experienced. But that leads to further philosophical issues...Shelly Kagan discusses some of these with Nigel Warburton in this episode of the Philosophy Bites podcast.

Quick! Name a living philosopher. Chances are if you can do it at all, you're going to say Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Shelly Kagan, or Daniel Dennett. Dennett is probably the best bet because he plays the game at several different levels. He was known until the death of Christopher Hitchins as one of the four horseman of the atheist apocalypse. But his work on free will and consciousness have conferred a kind of celebrity on him. Support the show: http://www.wnpr.org/donateSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week, we present first-ever Unorthodox live show, recorded at the Slifka Center at Yale University. Our Jewish guest is Shelly Kagan, Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale. He talks about his reputation as Tough Grader on Campus, and explains what it means that he’s a non-welfarist consequentialist.   Our guest gentile of the week—who told us he preferred the term “token goy” or “goykin”—is humorist and WNPR radio host Colin McEnroe. He asked the panel why yarmulkes always seem to fall off his head at bar mitzvah services, and, more seriously, why there seem to be certain tripwires within discussions about Israel that, when crossed, trigger accusations of anti-Jewish sentiment.   You can watch Shelly Kagan's Death course at: http://oyc.yale.edu/philosophy/phil-176. Listen to the Colin McEnroe Show here: http://wnpr.org/programs/colin-mcenroe-show. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The philosopher Peter Singer is famous for his attack on speciesism, the alleged prejudice that many exhibit in favour of human interests when compared with the interests of other animals. Here Shelly Kagan outlines Singer's position and takes issue with it. In the process he makes some interesting points about prejudices in general.

Lively interview with Yale University philosopher Shelly Kagan about death, the subject of his popular Yale course and new book. Join the discussion -- post a comment or question to Facebook: http://on.fb.me/MtVjb4

Lively interview with Yale University philosopher, Shelly Kagan, about death, the subject of his popular Yale course and new book.