Closereads: Philosophy with Mark and Wes

On Spinoza's Ethics, Third Part, "Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions." We want to see how emotions ground ethics, but first, we have to explain what emotions are, which means explaining how mind and body (and causality) work together on Spinoza's account. A passion is being affected by something that we don't understand, whereas reason (which will yield ethical behavior) involves grasping a cause clearly and distinctly. The latter means it's in your individual mind, whereas even if you don't understand the cause, it's still in God's mind, which each of us is essentially a part of. Read along with us, starting on p. 83 (PDF p. 129). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1916), Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," sec. 3, "Person and Act." While you may want to listen to part one, we're more or less starting fresh, as parts one and two (the latter only available to paying supporters at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy), were mostly about how Scheler rejects Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. We're skipping several pages here to start with section 3 on the recommendation from a member of the International Scheler society, hoping that at least we will find out what makes a person: What makes each of us unique and worthy of moral respect? Read along with us, starting on p. 382 (PDF p. 415). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We discuss "On the Problem of Empathy," ch. 4 "Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons," starting with section 2, "The Mental Subject" and into section 3, "The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences." We're trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a "person" is as someone we're able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the "I" (the self) is. It is the thing that "has" experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they're supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory. Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," in Max Scheler's most famous work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916). Ethical Formalism is Kant: What makes something ethically correct is just something about the type of act and willing involved. Non-formalism pays attention to the content, e.g. our sentiments (a la Hume). As we've been studying on The Partially Examined Life, phenomenologists starting with Brentano sought to merge the two: Things in our experience just present themselves as intuitively praiseworthy, and this is sufficient to establish ethical obligations. We have been reading about how Scheler relies in his ethical theorizing on our experiences of sympathy and love, but we wanted to learn more about what it is about particular people that we love and respect: What is it to be a "person" in the moral sense? This book moves very slowly, so in this part he's still just distinguishing himself from Kant when it comes to saying some basic things about your relation to your own selfhood. Read along with us, starting on p. 370 (PDF p. 403). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On The Basis of Morality (1840), Part III: "The Founding of Ethics," Ch. 5: "Statement and Proof of the Only True Moral Incentive." Everything up to this point in the book has been negative: Morality can't be founded on pure reason as Kant thinks, or on the idea of the good life (eudaimonia) per Aristotle. Schopenhauer tells us that all actions are motivated by someone's "weal" or "woe." We are naturally self-interested (motivated by own own weal and woe), but such actions will not be moral. So Schopenhauer's puzzle is: How can I be effectively motivated by someone else's weal and woe? I must somehow identify with that person so that the Other's suffering induces my compassion. This is the only source of moral value. Read along with us, starting on p. 165 (PDF p. 193). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” Ch. 1, “Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds." Given Husserl's method of “reduction” whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people's minds. We don't just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies. Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101). You can choose to watch this unedited on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Mark and Wes read through and discuss the beginning of Felix Guattari's "Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist" (1973). Guattari was a Lacanian psychotherapist, and he argues for explaining fascist tendencies via a "micropolitics of desire," i.e. looking at the individual psychology of fascism instead of merely focusing on sociological, material causes of the rise of fascism. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Mark and Wes read through and discuss Karl Marx's "The German Ideology" (1846), delving deep into the middle of his critique of Max Stirner's "The Ego and Its Own" (recently covered on The Partially Examined Life ep. 358). Marx articulates and criticizes Stirner's attempt to distinguish the mere common egoism of an unthinking person from the enlightened egoism that Stirner is recommending. Read along with us, starting on p. 259 (PDF p. 255). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Mark and Wes read through and discuss Edmund Husserl's Ideas (1913), ch. 1, "Matter of Fact and Essence" in First Book, "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology," Part One, "Essence and Eidetic Cognition." This is the book that basically designed phenomenology as a movement, and this part of the reading lays some groundwork by describing what these "essences" that phenomenology studies are, and how they differ from matters of fact. Read along with us, starting on p. 5 (PDF p. 14). To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're discussing John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1843), specifically from Book III, "Of Induction," ch. 8, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry." What is induction, and why is it part of logic? Science doesn't just observe regularities, but tries to isolate what is connected with what through a combination of experiments and observations. Read along with us, starting on p. 278, i.e. PDF p. 284. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We continue reading Part One of Being and Nothingness, with ch. 2, "Negations." We get some context and then jump into the classic question of whether existence in itself is just pure being, such that nothingness is just a result of human judgments on it, or whether nothingness is something objective that we grasp. We end by introducing the famous "absent Pierre in the café" example. Read along with us, starting on p. 36, i.e. PDF p. 87. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We skip the introduction of Being and Nothingness (1943) and start with Part One, "The Problem of Nothingness," Ch. 1, "The Origin of Negation." Read along with us, starting on p. 33, i.e. PDF p. 84. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We begin Bradley's argument for idealism: The world as we perceive it is appearance, not reality. In ch. 1, "Primary and Secondary Qualities," we see him give Locke's arguments for the distinction and Berkeley's response that both alike are in the mind, not the world. We try to make sense of this given our recent reading for The Partially Examined Life of Thomas Reid, who argued for realism against Berkeley and others. Read along with us, starting on p. 17. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bradley was a prominent British Hegelian, best known now for being the springboard for Bertrand Russell, who was initially a follower but then rejected idealism entirely to co-create what is now known as analytic philosophy. Today we read just the Introduction to this massive 1893 tome, where Bradley argues that metaphysics is possible and worthwhile. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 5. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We move from the discussion of the four types of causes, to "disclosure," to an environmental critique. Read along with us starting on p. 10. To get parts 3-5, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What is technology, REALLY? People think of it as neutral, as something that can be used for good or misused, but what is it really to be a TOOL in such a way? Heidegger analyzes causality itself, arguing that our modern emphasis on the mechanical (efficient) cause of something is impoverished as compared to Aristotle's. Read along with us starting on PDF p. 38: (p. 4 in the text). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On "The Varieties of Religious Experience," the conclusion of lecture 15. Why do some saintly types engage in ascetic practices like voluntary poverty? James thinks we could all do with some self-discipline of this sort, as extreme as the examples of literary saints may be. Self-denial is a less destructive way of expressing a martial character than actually going to war. Read along with us, starting on p. 352 (PDF p. 369). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being," starting on section 6. What is "The Intelligence" anyway? How does its storehouse of Forms get into the material world? Read along with us, starting on p. 51. To get part 3, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On "The Intelligence, The Ideas, and Being" from the Enneads (270 C.E.), about the various elements of Neo-Platonist cosmology: You've got The One, which is so awesome that it has literally no properties (so you can't even say it's awesome), then The Intelligence, which is the repository of the Forms (these first two together serve the same function as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), then The Soul (the World Soul) that actually exists in time and creates things, then lots of little souls, individual Forms that are transmitted around via "the seminal reasons," and the grubby material world that nonetheless may have received enough Form to make us look up the chain of Being toward its divine elements. Read along with us, starting on p. 46 (PDF p. 48). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We begin a long series on Maurice Merleau Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945), focusing on Part I, "The Body": "Experience and Objective Thought." M-P talks first about what seeing an object (like a house) in the world involves. It pre-supposes a relation to us as perceivers, which involves our situatedness in a body. Yet when we make our own body into an objective object in space and time (like the house), we've shifted it from this primordial center of perception into something described like perception. What is involved in this shift?  Read along with us, starting on p. 77 (PDF p. 102). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," with the "Experience and Meeting" section, whereby we try to make sense of the theory that the self is metaphysically a relation to other people. How does a model of philosophy based on the cogito (first person perception) necessarily objectify other people? How does speaking "to" someone provide a break from this intentional (objectifying) speaking "of" others? Does this relation to others actually require language? Is bringing in animals off-limits in talking about the phenomenology of consciousness? Read along with us, starting on p. 63. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We read the first pages of Emmanuel Levinas' 1958 article, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge." In these initial sections, subtitled "The Problem of Truth" and "From the Object to Being," he's recounting how Heideggerian phenomenology argued that being (including our unarticulated awareness of being) is more fundamental than knowledge (a verbalized, objectifying attitude toward the world attributed to a tradition initiated by Descartes). Read along with us, starting on p. 60 (PDF p. 66). For more about Levinas, you can listen to PEL eps. 145 and 146, plus ep. 71 on Buber. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We discuss the fact-value distinction, both with regard to ethics but also epistemology, i.e. how the search for facts depends on what we're looking for. Read along with us, starting on p. 6. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're reading a 1984 essay by Mark's U. of Michigan undergrad advisor, included among the most cited philosophy papers in some list that Wes found. Railton's goal is to give a naturalistic account of ethics (i.e. ethics within a framework of natural science) that both connects tightly to observed empirical facts and also makes moral facts real parts of our world, not merely reducible to non-moral facts about pleasure, social norms, or the like. In this first part, Railton lays out what naturalism in ethics amounts to and begins to explain why past empiricists like Hume don't provide an account of morality that is adequately normative: Merely describing what people tend to shoot for doesn't explain why such a norm is binding on us. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on this text about the mechanics of how mind and body work together. Is this schematically useful or hopelessly archaic? You decide! Read along with us, starting at article 22. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're reading the final text by René Descartes, published in 1649, about how mind and body relate to each other. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969), we finish up the negative conception ("freedom from") and give Berlin's strange account of positive freedom ("freedom to"), which involves an identification of some part of you (e.g. for Plato, your rationality), the obeying of which makes you free, even if what you "want" goes against this. Read along with us, starting on p. 20. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're reading through the beginning of "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1969). What are the various ways we can conceive of freedom, and is the concept necessarily political? Can you legitimately say you've been deprived freedom because, e.g., you can't afford some necessity? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 1, ch. 9. Why does Aristotle insist that Forms have to be in objects, contra Plato? What would it mean for the Forms to be mathematical objects per the Pythagoreans' view? Read along with us starting on p. 23. At some point we'll return to Aristotle's take on Plato's forms via his treatment later in the look, but this is enough of Chapter 9! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Aristotle offers a critique of Plato's theory of forms at a few points in his Metaphysics, and in this and the following part of this series, we'll be tackling this by reading part of book 1, ch. 9. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi's Islamic, Stoic-flavored ethical treatise. What habits should we instill that will immunize us against loss? What constitutes enough mourning? How does a feeling of loss go away, and can (and should) we hasten this? Read along with us, starting on p. 124. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're reading a 9th century Arabic philosopher (from what's now Iraq), in fact the "father of Arab philosophy," Yaqub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi, writing about how we can immunize ourselves to the sorrows of life through some means akin to Stoicism, which Al-Kindi as scholar of the Greeks knew all about. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant's Ethics." Read along with us, PDF p. 228 (text p. 210). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're reading an early Hegel essay, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," ch. 2: "The Moral Teaching of Jesus: The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant's Ethics." Here Hegel describes how Jesus' ethics broke with Judaism. Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We complete our treatment of Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." How can a controlled level of irony help us gain health and truth? Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 324 in the middle. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We read the conclusion to Soren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony (1841), "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth of Irony." The discussion starts with the role of irony in good art, and then moves on to discuss the proper role of irony as an existential strategy in a well-grounded, thoughtful life. Read along with us, starting at PDF p. 321. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Part I, "Pride and Humility," sections 3 and 4. Pride, according to Hume, has both a cause (whatever you're proud of) and an object (the self). Hume describes this structure as both "natural" (as opposed to being a social construction) and "original" (based on an innate psychological capacity). Pride involves both impressions (e.g. you perceive that you find pleasure in whatever you're proud of), and ideas (e.g. you understand the relation of the thing we're proud of to yourself). For both of these types of mental entities, pride or any other emotion will also involve associated ideas and impressions; pride in something will make us think of other things, and feeling pride about a particular thing gives rise to related feelings, e.g. pride in those other things. We switched which edition of the text we were reading since part one. Read along with us, starting on PDF p. 201. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), this time reading sections 1 and 2 in Part I, "Pride and Humility." How does David Hume deal with human emotions, given his empiricism that begins with the premise that our minds contain only impressions and ideas (which are mainly different from impressions in that they are fainter, like a memory of an apple as compared to the perception of an apple)? Read along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We complete Plato's "divided line" schema at the end of Book VI of the Republic (and are going to hold off on the actual allegory of the cave in book VII for the time being, so this is the end of this series for now), discussing the "intelligible" realm and Socrates' strange distinction between the "mere hypotheses" of geometry, where the abstract material is based on empirical matters vs. reasoning that relies only on the forms, yet is enabled by dialectic, as opposed to some kind of intellectual intuition directly of those forms. Follow along with us, starting on PDF p. 4. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Toward the end of Book VI and into Book VII of the Republic, Plato gives a series of metaphors for the role "the good itself" plays in our knowledge and values. We read here starting at line 507b of the G.M.A. Grube/C.D.C Reeve translation, where we hear that the form of the good is to our ability to know anything as the sun is to our ability to see anything. We conclude by discussing the first half of Plato's "divided line" image, whose lower half marks off reflections/images and then the material objects that these are images of. Because these are in the lower half, we can't have any real knowledge of them; thus physical science should be impossible. Follow along with us. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Continuing on the 1975 paper, we describe how the various maxims of Grice's conversational "Cooperative Principle" can be violated in systematic ways to produce conversational implicature. We talk in non-literal ways, yet other people still think we're trying to communicate and successfully understand us. Follow along with us in the text. Part Three can only be found at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We read through Paul Grice's 1975 ordinary language philosophy paper. What are the assumptions behind everyday conversation? When someone violates a conversational norm by, e.g., giving too much information or stating something literally untrue, what are the strategies by which we try to make sense of what they're saying as still a sensible contribution to the conversation? Follow along with us in the text. This also serves as part three to The Partially Examined Life's episode #325. However, this should be understandable without listening to any of that. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices