Podcasts about article iii

The 4th Circuit court of appeals yesterday issued an order on MS-13 terrorist Abrego-Garcia that is absolutely horrific. It reads like a badly written soft-cover romance novel. It is larded public policy aspirations that do not fall within the authority of the inferior trial courts, and imagines a speculative slippery slope that is nowhere to be found in the facts of the case before it. All of that on a foundation of a horrifically flawed understanding of even the basic facts of the case before it. It finishes by claiming the ultimate authority to govern the American people, with the Article II Executive Branch of government bound to bend the knee to whatever these unelected, black-robed, tyrannical inferior district trial court judges wish to levy upon us.Our Founders did not create a nation in which were all to be ruled by Article III judges, least susceptible of all government branches to the political will of the American people. Especially when they rule not only without authority but out of ignorance. Let's break it all down!

This Day in Legal History: Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.On April 18, 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., a significant decision reinforcing the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The case arose after Congress enacted legislation requiring federal courts to reopen certain final judgments in securities fraud cases that had been dismissed under an earlier statute of limitations ruling. The plaintiffs, whose claims had already been dismissed with finality, sought to revive their lawsuits under this new provision.In a 7–2 decision, the Court struck down the law, holding that Congress cannot force Article III courts to reopen final judgments. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stressed the importance of finality in judicial decisions and warned against legislative interference with core judicial functions. He argued that once a case is decided, it becomes law of the case and should not be revisited at Congress's whim.The ruling underscored the judiciary's independence from political pressure and reaffirmed that each branch of government must respect the constitutional boundaries of the others. Scalia noted that permitting Congress to override final court decisions would blur the lines between legislative and judicial authority, threatening the rule of law.This decision was not just a technical interpretation of procedural law; it was a firm statement about institutional integrity. Plaut became a cornerstone case for understanding the limits of congressional power over the courts. It continues to be cited in debates over judicial independence and the sanctity of final judgments.A federal appeals court rejected an emergency attempt by the Trump administration to block a judge's order requiring the government to aid in the return of Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a Maryland man deported to El Salvador despite a 2019 court ruling barring his removal. The court condemned the Justice Department's actions, with Judge Harvie Wilkinson calling them a violation of fundamental liberties and due process. He criticized the administration for acting as though it could abandon individuals in foreign prisons without legal recourse.The Supreme Court previously upheld a similar directive from District Judge Paula Xinis, requiring the administration to work toward bringing Abrego Garcia back from Salvadoran custody. The government claims Garcia is affiliated with the MS-13 gang and lacks the right to remain in the U.S., arguing that Xinis overstepped by involving herself in foreign affairs. However, Wilkinson stressed that due process rights apply regardless of alleged affiliations and warned that ignoring court orders could lead to broader abuses of power, including the potential deportation of U.S. citizens.Abrego Garcia, who has no criminal record in either country, was deported alongside 250 alleged gang members to El Salvador's high-security prison. His 2019 immigration court ruling protected him from deportation due to threats of gang-based extortion.Trump Loses Emergency Appeal to Halt Maryland Deportation CaseThe U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments on May 15 regarding President Donald Trump's attempt to limit birthright citizenship, a constitutional principle rooted in the 14th Amendment. Although the case won't directly determine the legality of Trump's executive order, it will address whether lower court rulings that blocked the policy nationwide should be scaled back to apply only to specific plaintiffs or jurisdictions.Trump's order, signed in January, seeks to deny citizenship to babies born in the U.S. unless at least one parent is a citizen or permanent resident. It directs federal agencies to withhold documents like Social Security cards and passports from newborns who don't meet that criterion. Critics argue this violates well-established legal interpretations of the 14th Amendment, which affirms citizenship for nearly everyone born on U.S. soil.The Justice Department argues that nationwide injunctions—orders that block policies across the country—exceed judicial authority and should be narrowed. The administration also questions whether the states and groups suing have legal standing. Despite these claims, lower courts have uniformly refused to allow the executive order to take effect.Opponents, including 22 Democratic-led states and immigration advocacy groups, argue that Trump's effort seeks to strip citizenship from thousands of children and overturn long-standing legal precedent. Trump maintains that birthright citizenship was originally intended only for formerly enslaved people, not for the children of non-citizens.US Birthright Citizenship: Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Case - BloombergUS Supreme Court to hear Trump bid to enforce birthright citizenship order | ReutersFifth Circuit Judge James Ho sharply criticized the power of trial-level judges in a recent opinion, focusing on what he sees as overreach in politically sensitive cases. Ho issued a writ of mandamus instructing a district judge in Louisiana to vacate her order reopening a death penalty case years after it had been dismissed. He was joined by fellow Trump appointee Judge Andrew Oldham, while Judge Catharina Haynes dissented, arguing the appellate process should proceed normally.In his concurring opinion, Ho warned against what he called the misuse of judicial power to obstruct democratic outcomes. He connected the Louisiana case to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that reversed a nationwide order from Chief Judge James Boasberg in Washington, D.C., which had blocked the deportation of alleged Venezuelan gang members under the Alien Enemies Act. The Supreme Court said the Venezuelan plaintiffs should have filed their suit in Texas, where they were detained, effectively transferring jurisdiction and narrowing Boasberg's reach.Ho used that ruling to reinforce his argument that appellate courts must intervene swiftly when district judges exceed their authority. He accused some judges of rushing to block policies they oppose politically, calling it a threat to the electorate's choices and governmental efficiency. He argued that deferring to the standard appeals timeline enables what he called “district judge supremacy.”Judge Haynes pushed back in dissent, criticizing the majority's allegation that the district court manipulated legal processes, especially since neither party in the case had challenged the judge's integrity. She maintained the threshold for a mandamus was not met and objected to the majority's tone and assumptions.James Ho Knocks Trial Judge Who Blocked Venezuelan DeportationsThis week's closing theme is The Moldau by Bedřich Smetana, a defining work in Czech Romantic nationalism and one of the most evocative tone poems in classical music. Smetana, born in 1824 in what is now the Czech Republic, was a pioneering composer who sought to express the identity, history, and natural beauty of his homeland through music. A contemporary of Liszt and Wagner, he was deeply influenced by the idea of programmatic music—compositions that tell a story or paint a picture without the use of words.The Moldau (or Vltava, in Czech) is the second and most famous piece from Smetana's larger symphonic cycle Má vlast(My Homeland), composed between 1874 and 1879. The piece traces the course of the Vltava River from its source in the Bohemian forest, through the countryside, past villages and castles, and ultimately to its merger with the Elbe River. Through rich orchestration and shifting textures, Smetana portrays everything from bubbling springs and flowing currents to a peasant wedding and moonlit night dances by water nymphs.Composed while Smetana was going completely deaf, The Moldau is as much a feat of imagination as it is of musical skill. The main theme, introduced by the flutes and then carried through the orchestra, is one of the most recognizable and emotionally stirring in classical music. It serves not just as a musical depiction of a river but as a symbol of Czech identity, resilience, and natural beauty.Closing with The Moldau offers a moment to reflect on continuity, movement, and national spirit—fitting themes for a week shaped by legal currents and constitutional debate.Without further ado, The Moldau, by Bedřich Smetana – enjoy! This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Judge Paula Xinis, presiding over the legally nonsensical case of MS-13 terrorist Kilmar Armando Abrego-Garcia in his current residence at the tropical El Salvadoran prison resort CECOT, has just ordered that Garcia is entitled to compel testimony from the Article II Executive Branch about it's internal foreign affairs discussions.This is, of course, a grotesque violation of the separation of powers by this unelected, black-robed, tyrannical, inferior trial court Article III judge, whose judicial arrogance apparently knows no bounds. Delusionally believing that she has the full backing of SCOTUS do order the Article II Executive Branch to do whatever she wishes, Judge Xinis (class of Obama 2016) has decided to race hard, Thelma & Louise style, at the constitutional crisis cliff.Sadly it must be noted that not helping matters has been the scattered legal argument and communication of the White House on all this, where defense of the Article II Executive Branch prerogatives from overreaching judges demands clarity.Join me as I break it all down into plain English!#abregogarcia #cecot #nayibbukele #donaldtrump

President Trump's legal team has been effectively exposing the insane ranting of Article III federal Judge Paula Xinis as she incompetently and lawlessly attempts to force the Article II Executive Branch to engage in foreign policy actions of her preference, for the purpose of compelling President Trump to return to the US Kilmar Armando Abrego-Garcia, a designated terrorist who has had a final order of deportation in his pocket for SIX YEARS, and is currently residing at the El Salvadoran prison resort of CECOT.Join me as we step through the most recent White House filings that really show how lawless Judge Xinis's feckless orders are. #abregogarcia #cecot #paulaxinis

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.This is the beginning of Article III, section 1 of the US constitution, establishing the federal judiciary. Nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and usually serving for life, federal judges serve a key role in the highest levels of the American justice system. The federal judiciary is designed to exert a check on the power of the legislative and the executive branches. Now that the Trump Administration is making sweeping changes to the way things are done in Washington, some federal judges are using this power to obstruct the President. But are they right to do so? Joining Heritage Explains today is Senior Legal Fellow Hans von Spakovsky. —Follow Hans on X: https://twitter.com/HvonSpakovsky?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorMore by Hans at Heritage.org: https://www.heritage.org/staff/hans-von-spakovsky—Have thoughts? Let us know at heritageexplains@heritage.org

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is the beginning of Article III, section 1 of the US constitution, establishing the federal judiciary. Nominated by the president and confirmed by the […]

We are watching two elections today, in both Florida and Wisconsin. There is a lot on the line in both.The Atlantic reports a story about an “innocent” person with no connections to any form of criminal activity, a five-year-old son with disabilities, and an American wife who is removed from the country for no good reason in an effort to attack Trump and his policies. It is a story that, as it turns out, when you look a little deeper, is more “fake news” than a personal tragedy. The Atlantic ends up showing that even when the Trump administration messes up, it is good for the country.U.S. Senior District Judge Edward Chen, a federal judge in San Francisco, moved to postpone the Trump administration from ending a Biden-era program that shielded hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants from deportation. Rep. Andy Biggs unveiled a resolution to remove James Boasberg, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for alleged “failure to maintain the standard of good behavior” mandated by Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.Marine Le Pen, head of the right-wing National Rally Party of France, has been banned from running for president by a French court as she faces lawfare similar to what Donald Trump faced here. Elie Mystal said that all laws passed before 1965 should be considered “presumptively unconstitutional,” saying that before the Voting Rights Act was passed, the United States was an apartheid country. Hooters of America is filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, hoping to rebrand as they try to survive.Become a supporter of Tapp into the Truth: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/tapp-into-the-truth--556114/support Tapp into the Truth on Rumble. Follow, watch the older shows, and join the live streams.If you love high-quality jerky, you need to check out Jerky Snob. They deliver small-batch, artisan jerky straight to your door every month—no MSG, no nitrates, just premium cuts and bold flavors. You can choose from 2, 4, or 8-bag subscriptions, and every delivery brings something new and delicious. One of my favorite things is the variety—spicy, smoky, sweet, all from different craft makers. It's like a jerky tasting adventure every month. Plus, it makes an awesome gift! Grab your subscription at tappintofood.com and treat yourself to better jerky. If recent events have proven anything, you need to be as prepared as possible for when things go sideways. You certainly can't count on the government for help. True liberty requires self-reliance. My Patriot SupplyDiversify and protect your hard-earned wealth. Use America's Premiere Conservative Gold Company, Harvard Gold Group. Use promo code TAPP.Support American jobs! Support the show! Get great products at great prices! Go to My Pillow and use promo code TAPP to save! Visit patriotmobile.com or Call (817) 380-9081 to take advantage of a FREE Month of service when you switch using promo code TAPP! Morning Kick is a revolutionary new daily drink from Roundhouse Provisions that combines ultra-potent greens like spirulina and kale with probiotics, prebiotics, collagen, and even ashwagandha. Just mix with water, stir, and enjoy!If you are a content creator in need of a professional drone or you just enjoy flying a drone on the weekend, EXO Drones has you covered!  EXO Drones Plus, get 15% off your order by using this link.Follow Tapp into the Truth on Locals Follow Tapp into the Truth on SubstackHero SoapPatriot DepotBlue CoolersKoa CoffeeBrainMDDiamond CBDSauce Bae2nd SkullEinstokBeanstoxBelle IsleMomento AIHoneyFund"Homegrown" Boone's BourbonIsland BrandsBlackout Coffee Co.Full Circle Brewing Co.Pasmosa Sangria  

Standing is the legal ability to file a lawsuit.Only those directly involved and affected by an issue have standing.Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts the right to preside over "cases" and "controversies."A three-part test must be met for standing: Injury in Fact, Causation (Traceability), and Redressability.Injury in Fact: The plaintiff must have a concrete and particularized injury.Causation: There must be a direct link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.Redressability: The court must be able to remedy the plaintiff's injury.Individual Standing: Lawsuits for personal harms suffered.Third-Party Standing: Suing on behalf of someone else under specific conditions.Organizational Standing: Organizations suing on behalf of their members.Taxpayer Standing: Limited exceptions for challenging government spending.Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992): Mere ideological interest is insufficient for standing.Massachusetts v. EPA (2007): States can sue with specific harms caused by federal inaction.Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013): General interest in enforcing a law is insufficient for standing.Challenges to standing include arguing no real injury, no direct causation, or the case is moot.Ensure a direct, personal injury when considering a lawsuit.Show a clear link between the defendant's actions and the harm.Courts do not hear cases based purely on moral or political beliefs.Check if an organization can file on your behalf if affected.Standing ensures courts hear cases where plaintiffs are directly involved and affected by the outcome.Plaintiffs must demonstrate injury, causation, and redressability.Understanding standing is crucial for legal action and following high-profile cases.

The judiciary, originally intended as a neutral arbiter of the law, has become an activist institution that repeatedly undermines the executive and legislative branches, overriding the will of the people. Judges have weaponized their authority to block lawful executive orders, interfere in immigration enforcement, and manipulate election laws, effectively placing themselves above the elected government. This unchecked judicial overreach has turned courts into a de facto ruling class, vetoing  policies they personally agree with while allowing other agendas to advance unchallenged. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal court jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, allowing lawmakers to strip courts of the ability to hear cases where they have clearly overstepped their authority. By invoking this power, Congress can restore the proper balance between the branches of government, ensuring that the judiciary does not continue to function as a super-legislature with no accountability to the people.Jurisdiction stripping is not an attack on the judiciary but rather a constitutional safeguard against judicial tyranny. Courts are not meant to dictate national policy or obstruct elected leaders from governing within their constitutional authority. By removing federal courts' jurisdiction over immigration, election integrity, religious liberty, and executive orders, Congress can ensure that policy decisions remain in the hands of the people's elected representatives, not unelected judges with ideological agendas. If the courts can override the President's ability to enforce the law and Congress's ability to pass legislation, then elections become meaningless, and the judiciary becomes the ultimate power in the land. Jurisdiction stripping restores democratic control by ensuring that the judiciary is bound by the Constitution and prevented from overstepping its role. Without this action, the courts will continue to function as a political weapon, blocking lawful governance while shielding  policies of  people who share their ideological bend from legal challenges. The Constitution was designed to prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful, and jurisdiction stripping is the necessary tool to return the judiciary to its intended, limited role as an interpreter of the law—not its maker.In this episode, we take a look at the power that congress holds to reign this in.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

The judiciary, originally intended as a neutral arbiter of the law, has become an activist institution that repeatedly undermines the executive and legislative branches, overriding the will of the people. Judges have weaponized their authority to block lawful executive orders, interfere in immigration enforcement, and manipulate election laws, effectively placing themselves above the elected government. This unchecked judicial overreach has turned courts into a de facto ruling class, vetoing  policies they personally agree with while allowing other agendas to advance unchallenged. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal court jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, allowing lawmakers to strip courts of the ability to hear cases where they have clearly overstepped their authority. By invoking this power, Congress can restore the proper balance between the branches of government, ensuring that the judiciary does not continue to function as a super-legislature with no accountability to the people.Jurisdiction stripping is not an attack on the judiciary but rather a constitutional safeguard against judicial tyranny. Courts are not meant to dictate national policy or obstruct elected leaders from governing within their constitutional authority. By removing federal courts' jurisdiction over immigration, election integrity, religious liberty, and executive orders, Congress can ensure that policy decisions remain in the hands of the people's elected representatives, not unelected judges with ideological agendas. If the courts can override the President's ability to enforce the law and Congress's ability to pass legislation, then elections become meaningless, and the judiciary becomes the ultimate power in the land. Jurisdiction stripping restores democratic control by ensuring that the judiciary is bound by the Constitution and prevented from overstepping its role. Without this action, the courts will continue to function as a political weapon, blocking lawful governance while shielding  policies of  people who share their ideological bend from legal challenges. The Constitution was designed to prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful, and jurisdiction stripping is the necessary tool to return the judiciary to its intended, limited role as an interpreter of the law—not its maker.In this episode, we take a look at the power that congress holds to reign this in.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

Judge Julia Smith Gibbons of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit shares how the relationships she formed throughout her career paved the way for her to become the first woman trial judge of a court of record in Tennessee, followed by distinguished service on both the U.S. District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. She is the recipient of the Devitt Award, the highest honor awarded to an Article III judge, for significant contributions to the administration of justice, the advancement of the rule of law, and improvement of society as a whole. Listen in as Judge Gibbons shares insights gained throughout her trailblazing career.

Today, we arrive, with Fr. Mike, at the In Brief section for Article III. Together, we revisit eight of the main ideas or “nuggets” from the readings of the past six days. Fr. Mike concludes this section by reminding us of the importance of the unity between and veneration of the 46 books of the Old Testament and the 27 of the New. Today's readings are Catechism paragraphs 134-141. This episode has been found to be in conformity with the Catechism by the Institute on the Catechism, under the Subcommittee on the Catechism, USCCB. For the complete reading plan, visit ascensionpress.com/ciy Please note: The Catechism of the Catholic Church contains adult themes that may not be suitable for children - parental discretion is advised.

1UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISIONIn re:INTRUM AB, et al.,1Debtors.Chapter 11Case No. 24-90575 (CML)(Jointly Administered)NOTICE OF APPEALPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 and 8003,notice is hereby given that the Ad Hoc Committee of holders of 2025 notes issued by Intrum AB(the “AHC”) hereby appeals to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texasfrom (i) the Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262) (the “Motion to Dismiss Order”) and (ii) theOrder (I) Approving Disclosure Statement and (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor (Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263) (the“Confirmation Order”). A copy of the Motion to Dismiss Order is attached as Exhibit A and acopy of the Confirmation Order is attached as Exhibit B. Additionally, the transcript of theBankruptcy Court's oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and ConfirmationOrder (ECF No. 275) is attached as Exhibit C.Below are the names of all parties to this appeal and their respective counsel:1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors'service address in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, Ste 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 62I. APPELLANTA. Name of Appellant:The members of the AHC include:Boundary Creek Master Fund LP; CF INT Holdings Designated Activity Company; CaiusCapital Master Fund; Diameter Master Fund LP; Diameter Dislocation Master Fund II LP; FirTree Credit Opportunity Master Fund, LP; MAP 204 Segregated Portfolio, a segregated portfolioof LMA SPC; Star V Partners LLC; and TQ Master Fund LP.Attorneys for the AHC:QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLPChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comB. Positions of appellant in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that isthe subject of this appeal:CreditorsCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 2 of 63II. THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEALA. Judgment, order, or decree appealed from:The Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262); the Order (I) Approving Disclosure Statementand (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor(Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263); and the December 31, 2024 Transcript of OralRuling Before the Honorable Christopher M. Lopez United States Bankruptcy Court Judge (ECFNo. 275).B. The date on which the judgment, order, or decree was entered:The Motion to Dismiss Order and the Confirmation Order were entered on December 31,2024. The Court issued its oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and theConfirmation Order on December 31, 2024.III. OTHER PARTIES TO THIS APPEALIntrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLCMILBANK LLPDennis F. Dunne (admitted pro hac vice)Jaimie Fedell (admitted pro hac vice)55 Hudson YardsNew York, NY 10001Telephone: (212) 530-5000Facsimile: (212) 530-5219Email: ddunne@milbank.comjfedell@milbank.com–and–Andrew M. Leblanc (admitted pro hac vice)Melanie Westover Yanez (admitted pro hac vice)1850 K Street, NW, Suite 1100Washington, DC 20006Telephone: (202) 835-7500Facsimile: (202) 263-7586Email: aleblanc@milbank.commwyanez@milbank.com–and–PORTER HEDGES LLPJohn F. Higgins (SBN 09597500)Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 3 of 64Eric D. Wade (SBN 00794802)M. Shane Johnson (SBN 24083263)1000 Main Street, 36th FloorHouston TX 77002Telephone: (713) 226-6000Facsimile: (713) 226-6248Email: jhiggins@porterhedges.comewade@porterhedges.comsjohnson@porterhedges.comIV. OTHER PARTIES THAT MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THIS APPEALThe following chart lists certain parties that are not parties to this appeal, but that may havean interest in the outcome of the case. These parties should be served with notice of this appealby the Debtors who are aware of their identities and best positioned to provide notice.All Other Creditors of the Debtors, Including, But Not Limited To:• Certain funds and accounts managed by BlackRock Investment Management (UK)Limited or its affiliates;• Capital Four;• Davidson Kempner European Partners, LLP;• Intermediate Capital Managers Limited;• Mandatum Asset Management Ltd;• H.I.G. Capital, LLC;• Spiltan Hograntefond; Spiltan Rantefond Sverige; and Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil;• The RCF SteerCo Group;• Swedbank AB (publ).Any Holder of Stock of the Debtors• Any holder of stock of the Debtors, including their successors and assigns.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 4 of 65Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 2025.QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &SULLIVAN, LLP/s/ Christopher D. PorterChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comCOUNSEL FOR THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OFINTRUM AB 2025 NOTEHOLDERSCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 5 of 6CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI, Christopher D. Porter, hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 2025, a copy ofthe foregoing document has been served via the Electronic Case Filing System for the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas./s/ Christopher D. PorterBy: Christopher D. PorterCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 6 of 6EXHIBIT ACase 24-90575 Document 296-1 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 31IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB, et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))Jointly AdministeredDebtors. ))ORDER DENYING MOTION OF THE AD HOCCOMMITTEE OF HOLDERS OF INTRUM AB NOTES DUE 2025TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASES PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 1112(B) ANDFEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1017(F)(1)(Related to Docket No. 27)This matter, having come before the Court upon the Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee ofHolders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) [Docket No. 27] (the “Motion toDismiss”); and this Court having considered the Debtors' Objection to the Motion of the Ad HocCommittee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (the “Objection”) andany other responses or objections to the Motion to Dismiss; and this Court having jurisdiction overthis matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the Amended Standing Order; and this Court havingfound that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having foundthat it may enter a final order consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution; and thisCourt having found that the relief requested in the Objection is in the best interests of the Debtors'1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f2 32estates; and this Court having found that the Debtors' notice of the Objection and opportunity fora hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and Objection were appropriate and no other notice need beprovided; and this Court having reviewed the Motion to Dismiss and Objection and havingheard the statements in support of the relief requested therein at a hearing before this Court; andthis Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Objectionestablish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had beforethis Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is HEREBYORDERED THAT:1. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied for the reasons stated at the December 31, 2024 hearing.2. This Court retains exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive venue with respect to allmatters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.DAeucegmubste 0r 23,1 2, 0210294CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f2 3EXHIBIT BCase 24-90575 Document 296-2 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 135IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))(Jointly Administered)Debtors. ))ORDER (I) APPROVINGDISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND(II) CONFIRMING JOINT PREPACKAGED CHAPTER 11PLAN OF INTRUM AB AND ITS AFFILIATEDDEBTOR (FURTHER TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS)The above-captioned debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, the“Debtors”), having:a. entered into that certain Lock-Up Agreement, dated as of July 10, 2024 (asamended and restated on August 15, 2024, and as further modified,supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time in accordance with itsterms, the “the Lock-Up Agreement”) and that certain Backstop Agreement,dated as of July 10, 2024, (as amended and restated on November 15, 2024 andas further modified, supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time inaccordance with its terms), setting out the terms of the backstop commitmentsprovided by the Backstop Providers to backstop the entirety of the issuance ofNew Money Notes (as may be further amended, restated, amended and restated,modified or supplemented from time to time in accordance with the termsthereof, the “Backstop Agreement”) which set forth the terms of a consensualfinancial restructuring of the Debtors;b. commenced, on October 17, 2024, a prepetition solicitation (the “Solicitation”)of votes on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of IntrumAB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (asthe same may be further amended, modified and supplemented from time totime, the “Plan”), by causing the transmittal, through their solicitation andballoting agent, Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC (“Kroll”), to theholders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of, among other things: (i) the1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these chapter 11 cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2102, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f1 133452Plan, (ii) the Disclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate (as the same may befurther amended, modified and supplemented from time to time, the“Disclosure Statement”), and (iii) the Ballots and Master Ballot to vote on thePlan (the “Ballots”), (iv) the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7];c. commenced on November 15, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), these chapter 11 cases(these “Chapter 11 Cases”) by filing voluntary petitions in the United StatesBankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”or the “Court”) for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code(the “Bankruptcy Code”);d. Filed on November 15, 2024, the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7] (the “Solicitation Affidavit”);e. Filed, on November 16, 2024 the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 16] and theDisclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB andits Debtor Affiliate [Docket No. 17];f. Filed on November 16, 2024, the Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of ofthe Debtors' Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions [Docket No. 14] (the“First Day Declaration”);g. Filed on November 17, 2024, the Declaration of Alex Orchowski of KrollRestructuring Administration LLC Regarding the Solicitation of Votes andTabulation of Ballots Case on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code [Docket No. 18] (the “Voting Declaration,” andtogether with the Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Ballots, and theSolicitation Affidavit, the “Solicitation Materials”);h. obtained, on November 19, 2024, the Order(I) Scheduling a Combined Hearingon (A) Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and (B) Confirmation of the Plan,(II) Approving Solicitation Procedures and Form and Manner of Notice ofCommencement, Combined Hearing, and Objection Deadline, (III) FixingDeadline to Object to Disclosure Statement and Plan, (IV) Conditionally (A)Directing the United States Trustee Not to Convene Section 341 Meeting ofCreditors and (B) Waiving Requirement to File Statements of Financial Affairsand Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, and (V) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 71] (the “Scheduling Order”), which, among other things: (i)approved the prepetition solicitation and voting procedures, including theConfirmation Schedule (as defined therein); (ii) conditionally approved theDisclosure Statement and its use in the Solicitation; and (iii) scheduled theCombined Hearing on December 16, 2024, at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing CentralCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f1 133453Time) to consider the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and theconfirmation of the Plan (the “Combined Hearing”);i. served, through Kroll, on November 20, 2025, on all known holders of Claimsand Interests, the U.S. Trustee and certain other parties in interest, the Noticeof: (I) Commencement of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases; (II) Hearing on theDisclosure Statement and Confirmation of the Plan, and (III) Certain ObjectionDeadlines (the “Combined Hearing Notice”) as evidence by the Affidavit ofService [Docket No. 160];j. caused, on November 25 and 27, 2024, the Combined Hearing Notice to bepublished in the New York Times (national and international editions) and theFinancial Times (international edition), as evidenced by the Certificate ofPublication [Docket No. 148];k. Filed and served, on December 10, 2024, the Plan Supplement for the Debtors'Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization [Docket 165];l. Filed on December 10, 2024, the Declaration of Jeffrey Kopa in Support ofConfirmation of the Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum ABand its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [DocketNo. 155];m. Filed on December 14, 2024, the:i. Debtors' Memorandum of Law in Support of an Order: (I) Approving, on aFinal Basis, Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement; (II) Confirming theJoint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization; and (III) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 190] (the “Confirmation Brief”);ii. Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of Confirmation of the JointPrepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate.[Docket No. 189] (the “Confirmation Declaration”); andiii. Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and itsDebtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (FurtherTechnical Modifications) [Docket No. 191];n. Filed on December 18, 2024, the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Further Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 223];CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 3 4 o of f1 133454WHEREAS, the Court having, among other things:a. set December 12, 2024, at 4:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) as the deadlinefor Filing objection to the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and/orConfirmation2 of the Plan (the “Objection Deadline”);b. held, on December 16, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) [andcontinuing through December 17, 2024], the Combined Hearing;c. heard the statements, arguments, and any objections made at the CombinedHearing;d. reviewed the Disclosure Statement, the Plan, the Ballots, the Plan Supplement,the Confirmation Brief, the Confirmation Declaration, the SolicitationAffidavit, and the Voting Declaration;e. overruled (i) any and all objections to approval of the Disclosure Statement, thePlan, and Confirmation, except as otherwise stated or indicated on the record,and (ii) all statements and reservations of rights not consensually resolved orwithdrawn, unless otherwise indicated; andf. reviewed and taken judicial notice of all the papers and pleadings Filed(including any objections, statement, joinders, reservations of rights and otherresponses), all orders entered, and all evidence proffered or adduced and allarguments made at the hearings held before the Court during the pendency ofthese cases;NOW, THEREFORE, it appearing to the Bankruptcy Court that notice of theCombined Hearing and the opportunity for any party in interest to object to the DisclosureStatement and the Plan having been adequate and appropriate as to all parties affected or to beaffected by the Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, and the legal and factual bases setforth in the documents Filed in support of approval of the Disclosure Statement and Confirmationand other evidence presented at the Combined Hearing establish just cause for the relief grantedherein; and after due deliberation thereon and good cause appearing therefor, the BankruptcyCourt makes and issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and orders for thereasons stated on the record at the December 31, 2024 ruling on plan confirmation;2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have meanings given to them in the Plan and/or theDisclosure Statement. The rules of interpretation set forth in Article I.B of the Plan apply to this CombinedOrder.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 4 5 o of f1 133455I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWIT IS HEREBY FOUND AND DETERMINED THAT:A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1. The findings and conclusions set forth herein and in the record of theCombined Hearing constitute the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law underRule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rules7052 and 9014. To the extent any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact,or vice versa, they are adopted as such.B. Jurisdiction, Venue, Core Proceeding.2. This Court has jurisdiction over these Chapter 11 Cases pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue of these proceedings and the Chapter 11 Cases in this district is properpursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 157(b)(2) and this Court may enter a final order hereon under Article III of the United StatesConstitution.C. Eligibility for Relief.3. The Debtors were and continue to be entities eligible for relief under section109 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Debtors were and continue to be proper proponents of thePlan under section 1121(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.D. Commencement and Joint Administration of the Chapter 11 Cases.4. On the Petition Date, the Debtors commenced the Chapter 11 Cases. OnNovember 18, 2024, the Court entered an order [Docket No. 51] authorizing the jointadministration of the Chapter 11 Case in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b). The Debtorshave operated their businesses and managed their properties as debtors in possession pursuant toCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 5 6 o of f1 133456sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee, examiner, or statutory committeehas been appointed in these Chapter 11 Cases.E. Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement.5. The Disclosure Statement and the exhibits contained therein (i) containssufficient information of a kind necessary to satisfy the disclosure requirements of applicablenonbankruptcy laws, rules and regulations, including the Securities Act; and (ii) contains“adequate information” as such term is defined in section 1125(a)(1) and used in section1126(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, with respect to the Debtors, the Plan and the transactionscontemplated therein. The Filing of the Disclosure Statement satisfied Bankruptcy Rule 3016(b).The injunction, release, and exculpation provisions in the Plan and the Disclosure Statementdescribe, in bold font and with specific and conspicuous language, all acts to be enjoined andidentify the Entities that will be subject to the injunction, thereby satisfying Bankruptcy Rule3016(c).F. Solicitation.6. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, the Solicitationand the transmittal and service of the Solicitation Materials were: (i) timely, adequate, appropriate,and sufficient under the circumstances; and (ii) in compliance with sections 1125(g) and 1126(b)of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules 3017 and 3018, the applicable Local Bankruptcy Rules,the Scheduling Order and all applicable nonbankruptcy rules, laws, and regulations applicable tothe Solicitation, including the registration requirements under the Securities Act. The SolicitationMaterials, including the Ballots and the Opt Out Form (as defined below), adequately informedthe holders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of the procedures and deadline for completingand submitting the Ballots.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 6 7 o of f1 1334577. The Debtors served the Combined Hearing Notice on the entire creditormatrix and served the Opt Out Form on all Non-Voting Classes. The Combined Hearing Noticeadequately informed Holders of Claims or Interests of critical information regarding voting on (ifapplicable) and objecting to the Plan, including deadlines and the inclusion of release, exculpation,and injunction provisions in the Plan, and adequately summarized the terms of the Third-PartyRelease. Further, because the form enabling stakeholders to opt out of the Third-Party Release (the“Opt Out Form”) was included in both the Ballots and the Opt Out Form, every known stakeholder,including unimpaired creditors was provided with the means by which the stakeholders could optout of the Third-Party Release. No further notice is required. The period for voting on the Planprovided a reasonable and sufficient period of time and the manner of such solicitation was anappropriate process allowing for such holders to make an informed decision.G. Tabulation.8. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, (i) the holders ofClaims in Class 3 (RCF Claims) and Class 5 (Notes Claims) are Impaired under the Plan(collectively, the “Voting Classes”) and have voted to accept the Plan in the numbers and amountsrequired by section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) no Class that was entitled to vote on thePlan voted to reject the Plan. All procedures used to tabulate the votes on the Plan were in goodfaith, fair, reasonable, and conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of theBankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules, the Disclosure Statement, theScheduling Order, and all other applicable nonbankruptcy laws, rules, and regulations.H. Plan Supplement.9. On December 10, 2024, the Debtors Filed the Plan Supplement with theCourt. The Plan Supplement (including as subsequently modified, supplemented, or otherwiseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 7 8 o of f1 133458amended pursuant to a filing with the Court), complies with the terms of the Plan, and the Debtorsprovided good and proper notice of the filing in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, theBankruptcy Rules, the Scheduling Order, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases.All documents included in the Plan Supplement are integral to, part of, and incorporated byreference into the Plan. No other or further notice is or will be required with respect to the PlanSupplement. Subject to the terms of the Plan and the Lock-Up Agreement, and only consistenttherewith, the Debtors reserve the right to alter, amend, update, or modify the Plan Supplementand any of the documents contained therein or related thereto, in accordance with the Plan, on orbefore the Effective Date.I. Modifications to the Plan.10. Pursuant to section 1127 of the Bankruptcy Code, the modifications to thePlan described or set forth in this Combined Order constitute technical or clarifying changes,changes with respect to particular Claims by agreement with holders of such Claims, ormodifications that do not otherwise materially and adversely affect or change the treatment of anyother Claim or Interest under the Plan. These modifications are consistent with the disclosurespreviously made pursuant to the Disclosure Statement and Solicitation Materials, and notice ofthese modifications was adequate and appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the Chapter11 Cases. In accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 3019, these modifications do not require additionaldisclosure under section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code or the resolicitation of votes under section1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and they do not require that holders of Claims or Interests beafforded an opportunity to change previously cast acceptances or rejections of the Plan.Accordingly, the Plan is properly before this Court and all votes cast with respect to the Plan priorto such modification shall be binding and shall apply with respect to the Plan.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 8 9 o of f1 133459J. Objections Overruled.11. Any resolution or disposition of objections to Confirmation explained orotherwise ruled upon by the Court on the record at the Confirmation Hearing is herebyincorporated by reference. All unresolved objections, statements, joinders, informal objections,and reservations of rights are hereby overruled on the merits.K. Burden of Proof.12. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have met their burden of provingthe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code by a preponderance of theevidence, the applicable evidentiary standard for Confirmation. Further, the Debtors have proventhe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) by clear and convincing evidence. Each witness whotestified on behalf of the Debtors in connection with the Confirmation Hearing was credible,reliable, and qualified to testify as to the topics addressed in his testimony.L. Compliance with the Requirements of Section 1129 of the BankruptcyCode.13. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of section 1129 of theBankruptcy Code as follows:a. Section 1129(a)(1) – Compliance of the Plan with Applicable Provisions of theBankruptcy Code.14. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122 and 1123, as required by section 1129(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.i. Section 1122 and 1123(a)(1) – Proper Classification.15. The classification of Claims and Interests under the Plan is proper under theBankruptcy Code. In accordance with sections 1122(a) and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,Article III of the Plan provides for the separate classification of Claims and Interests at each Debtorinto Classes, based on differences in the legal nature or priority of such Claims and Interests (otherCaCsaes e2 42-49-09507557 5 D oDcoucmumenetn 2t 9266-32 FFiilleedd iinn TTXXSSBB oonn 1021//3113//2245 PPaaggee 91 0o fo 1f 3143510than Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, and Priority Tax Claims, which areaddressed in Article II of the Plan and Unimpaired, and are not required to be designated asseparate Classes in accordance with section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code). Valid business,factual, and legal reasons exist for the separate classification of the various Classes of Claims andInterests created under the Plan, the classifications were not implemented for any improperpurpose, and the creation of such Classes does not unfairly discriminate between or among holdersof Claims or Interests.16. In accordance with section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, each Class ofClaims or Interests contains only Claims or Interests substantially similar to the other Claims orInterests within that Class. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of sections 1122(a),1122(b), and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Codeii. Section 1123(a)(2) – Specifications of Unimpaired Classes.17. Article III of the Plan specifies that Claims and Interests in the classesdeemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan. Holders of Intercompany Claims andIntercompany Interests are either Unimpaired and conclusively presumed to have accepted thePlan, or are Impaired and deemed to reject (the “Deemed Rejecting Classes”) the Plan, and, ineither event, are not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan. In addition, Article II of the Planspecifies that Administrative Claims and Priority Tax Claims are Unimpaired, although the Plandoes not classify these Claims. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 101 o of f1 1334511iii. Section 1123(a)(3) – Specification of Treatment of Voting Classes18. Article III.B of the Plan specifies the treatment of each Voting Class underthe Plan – namely, Class 3 and Class 5. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.iv. Section 1123(a)(4) – No Discrimination.19. Article III of the Plan provides the same treatment to each Claim or Interestin any particular Class, as the case may be, unless the holder of a particular Claim or Interest hasagreed to a less favorable treatment with respect to such Claim or Interest. Accordingly, the Plansatisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.v. Section 1123(a)(5) – Adequate Means for Plan Implementation.20. The Plan and the various documents included in the Plan Supplementprovide adequate and proper means for the Plan's execution and implementation, including: (a)the general settlement of Claims and Interests; (b) the restructuring of the Debtors' balance sheetand other financial transactions provided for by the Plan; (c) the consummation of the transactionscontemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement, the Restructuring Implementation Deed andthe Agreed Steps Plan and other documents Filed as part of the Plan Supplement; (d) the issuanceof Exchange Notes, the New Money Notes, and the Noteholder Ordinary Shares pursuant to thePlan; (e) the amendment of the Intercreditor Agreement; (f) the amendment of the FacilityAgreement; (g) the amendment of the Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement; (h) theconsummation of the Rights Offering in accordance with the Plan, Rights Offering Documentsand the Lock-Up Agreement; (i) the granting of all Liens and security interests granted orconfirmed (as applicable) pursuant to, or in connection with, the Facility Agreement, the ExchangeNotes Indenture, the New Money Notes Indenture, the amended Intercreditor Agreement and theCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 112 o of f1 1334512Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement pursuant to the New Security Documents (including anyLiens and security interests granted or confirmed (as applicable) on the Reorganized Debtors'assets); (j) the vesting of the assets of the Debtors' Estates in the Reorganized Debtors; (k) theconsummation of the corporate reorganization contemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement,the Agreed Steps Plan and the Master Reorganization Agreement (as defined in the RestructuringImplementation Deed); and (l) the execution, delivery, filing, or recording of all contracts,instruments, releases, and other agreements or documents in furtherance of the Plan. Accordingly,the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Codevi. Section 1123(a)(6) – Non-Voting Equity Securities.21. The Company's organizational documents in accordance with the SwedishCompanies Act, Ch. 4, Sec 5 and the Plan prohibit the issuance of non-voting securities as of theEffective Date to the extent required to comply with section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.vii. Section 1123(a)(7) – Directors, Officers, and Trustees.22. The manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee (or any successorto and such officer, director, or trustee) of the Reorganized Debtors will be determined inaccordance with the existing organizational documents, which is consistent with the interests ofcreditors and equity holders and with public policy. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies therequirements of section 1123(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.b. Section 1123(b) – Discretionary Contents of the Plan23. The Plan contains various provisions that may be construed as discretionarybut not necessary for Confirmation under the Bankruptcy Code. Any such discretionary provisionCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 123 o of f1 1334513complies with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and is not inconsistent with the applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan satisfies section 1123(b).i. Section 1123(b)(1) – Impairment/Unimpairment of Any Class of Claims orInterests24. Article III of the Plan impairs or leaves unimpaired, as the case may be,each Class of Claims or Interests, as contemplated by section 1123(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.ii. Section 1123(b)(2) – Assumption and Rejection of Executory Contracts andUnexpired Leases25. Article V of the Plan provides for the assumption of the Debtors' ExecutoryContracts and Unexpired Leases as of the Effective Date unless such Executory Contract orUnexpired Lease: (a) is identified on the Rejected Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease List;(b) has been previously rejected by a Final Order; (c) is the subject of a motion to reject ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases that is pending on the Confirmation Date; or (4) is subject to amotion to reject an Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease pursuant to which the requestedeffective date of such rejection is after the Effective Date. Thus, the Plan satisfies section1123(b)(2).iii. Compromise and Settlement26. In accordance with section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code andBankruptcy Rule 9019, and in consideration for the distributions and other benefits provided underthe Plan, the provisions of the Plan constitute a good-faith compromise of all Claims, Interests,and controversies relating to the contractual, legal, and subordination rights that all holders ofClaims or Interests may have with respect to any Allowed Claim or Interest or any distribution tobe made on account of such Allowed Claim or Interest. Such compromise and settlement is theproduct of extensive arm's-length, good faith negotiations that, in addition to the Plan, resulted inCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 134 o of f1 1334514the execution of the Lock-Up Agreement, which represents a fair and reasonable compromise ofall Claims, Interests, and controversies and entry into which represented a sound exercise of theDebtors' business judgment. Such compromise and settlement is fair, equitable, and reasonableand in the best interests of the Debtors and their Estates.27. The releases of the Debtors' directors and officers are an integral componentof the settlements and compromises embodied in the Plan. The Debtors' directors and officers: (a)made a substantial and valuable contribution to the Debtors' restructuring, including extensive preandpost-Petition Date negotiations with stakeholder groups, and ensured the uninterruptedoperation of the Debtors' businesses during the Chapter 11 Cases; (b) invested significant timeand effort to make the restructuring a success and maximize the value of the Debtors' businessesin a challenging operating environment; (c) attended and, in certain instances, testified atdepositions and Court hearings; (d) attended and participated in numerous stakeholder meetings,management meetings, and board meetings related to the restructuring; (e) are entitled toindemnification from the Debtors under applicable non-bankruptcy law, organizationaldocuments, and agreements; (f) invested significant time and effort in the preparation of the Lock-Up Agreement, the Plan, Disclosure Statement, all supporting analyses, and the numerous otherpleadings Filed in the Chapter 11 Cases, thereby ensuring the smooth administration of the Chapter11 Cases; and (g) are entitled to all other benefits under any employment contracts existing as ofthe Petition Date. Litigation by the Debtors or other Releasing Parties against the Debtors'directors and officers would be a distraction to the Debtors' business and restructuring and woulddecrease rather than increase the value of the estates. The releases of the Debtors' directors andofficers contained in the Plan have the consent of the Debtors and the Releasing Parties and are inthe best interests of the estates.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 145 o of f1 1334515iv. Debtor Release28. The releases of claims and Causes of Action by the Debtors, ReorganizedDebtors, and their Estates described in Article VIII.C of the Plan in accordance with section1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Debtor Release”) represent a valid exercise of the Debtors'business judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuitof any such claims against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates' variousconstituencies because the costs involved would outweigh any potential benefit from pursuingsuch claims. The Debtor Release is fair and equitable and complies with the absolute priority rule.29. The Debtor Release is (a) an integral part of the Plan, and a component ofthe comprehensive settlement implemented under the Plan; (b) in exchange for the good andvaluable consideration provided by the Released Parties; (c) a good faith settlement andcompromise of the claims and Causes of Action released by the Debtor Release; (d) materiallybeneficial to, and in the best interests of, the Debtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and isimportant to the overall objectives of the Plan to finally resolve certain Claims among or againstcertain parties in interest in the Chapter 11 Cases; (e) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (f) given andmade after due notice and opportunity for hearing; and (g) a bar to any Debtor asserting any claimor Cause of Action released by the Debtor Release against any of the Released Parties. Theprobability of success in litigation with respect to the released claims and Causes of Action, whenweighed against the costs, supports the Debtor Release. With respect to each of these potentialCauses of Action, the parties could assert colorable defenses and the probability of success isuncertain. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuit of any such claims or Causes ofAction against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates or the Debtors' variousCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 156 o of f1 1334516constituencies because the costs involved would likely outweigh any potential benefit frompursuing such claims or Causes of Action30. Holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote have overwhelmingly votedin favor of the Plan, including the Debtor Release. The Plan, including the Debtor Release, wasnegotiated before and after the Petition Date by sophisticated parties represented by able counseland advisors, including the Consenting Creditors. The Debtor Release is therefore the result of ahard fought and arm's-length negotiation process conducted in good faith.31. The Debtor Release appropriately offers protection to parties thatparticipated in the Debtors' restructuring process, including the Consenting Creditors, whoseparticipation in the Chapter 11 Cases is critical to the Debtors' successful emergence frombankruptcy. Specifically, the Released Parties, including the Consenting Creditors, madesignificant concessions and contributions to the Chapter 11 Cases, including, entering into theLock-Up Agreement and related agreements, supporting the Plan and the Chapter 11 Cases, andwaiving or agreeing to impair substantial rights and Claims against the Debtors under the Plan (aspart of the compromises composing the settlement underlying the revised Plan) in order tofacilitate a consensual reorganization and the Debtors' emergence from chapter 11. The DebtorRelease for the Debtors' directors and officers is appropriate because the Debtors' directors andofficers share an identity of interest with the Debtors and, as previously stated, supported and madesubstantial contributions to the success of the Plan, the Chapter 11 Cases, and operation of theDebtors' business during the Chapter 11 Cases, actively participated in meetings, negotiations, andimplementation during the Chapter 11 Cases, and have provided other valuable consideration tothe Debtors to facilitate the Debtors' successful reorganization and continued operation.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 167 o of f1 133451732. The scope of the Debtor Release is appropriately tailored under the factsand circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases. In light of, among other things, the value provided bythe Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and the critical nature of the Debtor Release to thePlan, the Debtor Release is appropriate.v. Release by Holders of Claims and Interests33. The release by the Releasing Parties (the “Third-Party Release”), set forthin Article VIII.D of the Plan, is an essential provision of the Plan. The Third-Party Release is: (a)consensual as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object or properly optout from the Third-Party Release; (b) within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334; (c) in exchange for the good and valuable consideration provided by theReleased Parties; (d) a good faith settlement and compromise of the claims and Causes of Actionreleased by the Third-Party Release; (e) materially beneficial to, and in the best interests of, theDebtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and is important to the overall objectives of the Planto finally resolve certain Claims among or against certain parties in interest in the Chapter 11Cases; (f) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (g) given and made after due notice and opportunity forhearing; (h) appropriately narrow in scope given that it expressly excludes, among other things,any Cause of Action that is judicially determined by a Final Order to have constituted actual fraud,willful misconduct, or gross negligence; (i) a bar to any of the Releasing Parties asserting anyclaim or Cause of Action released by the Third-Party Release against any of the Released Parties;and (j) consistent with sections 105, 524, 1123, 1129, and 1141 and other applicable provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code.34. The Third-Party Release is an integral part of the agreement embodied inthe Plan among the relevant parties in interest. Like the Debtor Release, the Third-Party ReleaseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 178 o of f1 1334518facilitated participation in both the Debtors' Plan and the chapter 11 process generally. The Third-Party Release is instrumental to the Plan and was critical in incentivizing parties to support thePlan and preventing significant and time-consuming litigation regarding the parties' respectiverights and interests. The Third-Party Release was a core negotiation point in connection with thePlan and instrumental in developing the Plan that maximized value for all of the Debtors'stakeholders and kept the Debtors intact as a going concern. As such, the Third-Party Releaseappropriately offers certain protections to parties who constructively participated in the Debtors'restructuring process—including the Consenting Creditors (as set forth above)—by, among otherthings, facilitating the negotiation and consummation of the Plan, supporting the Plan and, in thecase of the Backstop Providers, committing to provide new capital to facilitate the Debtors'emergence from chapter 11. Specifically, the Notes Ad Hoc Group proposed and negotiated thepari passu transaction that is the basis of the restructuring proposed under the Plan and provideda much-needed deleveraging to the Debtors' business while taking a discount on their Claims (inexchange for other consideration).35. Furthermore, the Third-Party Release is consensual as to all parties ininterest, including all Releasing Parties, and such parties in interest were provided notice of thechapter 11 proceedings, the Plan, the deadline to object to confirmation of the Plan, and theCombined Hearing and were properly informed that all holders of Claims against or Interests inthe Debtors that did not file an objection with the Court in the Chapter 11 Cases that included anexpress objection to the inclusion of such holder as a Releasing Party under the provisionscontained in Article VIII of the Plan would be deemed to have expressly, unconditionally,generally, individually, and collectively consented to the release and discharge of all claims andCauses of Action against the Debtors and the Released Parties. Additionally, the release provisionsCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 189 o of f1 1334519of the Plan were conspicuous, emphasized with boldface type in the Plan, the DisclosureStatement, the Ballots, and the applicable notices. Except as set forth in the Plan, all ReleasingParties were properly informed that unless they (a) checked the “opt out” box on the applicableBallot or opt-out form and returned the same in advance of the Voting Deadline, as applicable, or(b) timely Filed an objection to the releases contained in the Plan that was not resolved beforeentry of this Confirmation Order, they would be deemed to have expressly consented to the releaseof all Claims and Causes of Action against the Released Parties.36. The Ballots sent to all holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote, aswell as the notice of the Combined Hearing sent to all known parties in interest (including thosenot entitled to vote on the Plan), unambiguously provided in bold letters that the Third-PartyRelease was contained in the Plan.37. The scope of the Third-Party Release is appropriately tailored under thefacts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases, and parties in interest received due and adequatenotice of the Third-Party Release. Among other things, the Plan provides appropriate and specificdisclosure with respect to the claims and Causes of Action that are subject to the Third-PartyRelease, and no other disclosure is necessary. The Debtors, as evidenced by the VotingDeclaration and Certificate of Publication, including by providing actual notice to all knownparties in interest, including all known holders of Claims against, and Interests in, any Debtor andpublishing notice in international and national publications for the benefit of unknown parties ininterest, provided sufficient notice of the Third-Party Release, and no further or other notice isnecessary. The Third-Party Release is designed to provide finality for the Debtors, theReorganized Debtors and the Released Parties regarding the parties' respective obligations underthe Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary, anyparty who timely opted-out of the Third-Party Release is not bound by the Third-PartyRelease.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 290 o of f1 133452038. The Third-Party Release is specific in language, integral to the Plan, andgiven for substantial consideration. The Releasing Parties were given due and adequate notice ofthe Third-Party Release, and thus the Third-Party Release is consensual under controllingprecedent as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object. In light of,among other things, the value provided by the Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and theconsensual and critical nature of the Third-Party Release to the Plan, the Third-Party Release isappropriatevi. Exculpation.39. The exculpation described in Article VIII.E of the Plan (the “Exculpation”)is appropriate under applicable law, including In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 48 F. 4th 419(5th Cir. 2022), because it was supported by proper evidence, proposed in good faith, wasformulated following extensive good-faith, arm's-length negotiations with key constituents, and isappropriately limited in scope.40. No Entity or Person may commence or continue any action, employ anyprocess, or take any other act to pursue, collect, recover or offset any Claim, Interest, debt,obligation, or Cause of Action relating or reasonably likely to relate to any act or commission inconnection with, relating to, or arising out of a Covered Matter (including one that alleges theactual fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct of a Covered Entity), unless expresslyauthorized by the Bankruptcy Court after (1) it determines, after a notice and a hearing, such Claim,Interest, debt, obligation, or Cause of Action is colorable and (2) it specifically authorizes suchEntity or Person to bring such Claim or Cause of Action. The Bankruptcy Court shall have soleand exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether any such Claim, Interest, debt, obligation or Causeof Action is colorable and, only to the extent legally permissible and as provided for in Article XI,CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 201 o of f1 1334521shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such underlying colorable Claim, Interest, debt, obligation, orCause of Action.vii. Injunction.41. The injunction provisions set forth in Article VIII.F of the Plan are essentialto the Plan and are necessary to implement the Plan and to preserve and enforce the discharge,Debtor Release, the Third-Party Release, and the Exculpation provisions in Article VIII of thePlan. The injunction provisions are appropriately tailored to achieve those purposes.viii. Preservation of Claims and Causes of Action.42. Article IV.L of the Plan appropriately provides for the preservation by theDebtors of certain Causes of Action in accordance with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.Causes of Action not released by the Debtors or exculpated under the Plan will be retained by theReorganized Debtors as provided by the Plan. The Plan is sufficiently specific with respect to theCauses of Action to be retained by the Debtors, and the Plan and Plan Supplement providemeaningful disclosure with respect to the potential Causes of Action that the Debtors may retain,and all parties in interest received adequate notice with respect to such retained Causes of Action.The provisions regarding Causes of Action in the Plan are appropriate and in the best interests ofthe Debtors, their respective Estates, and holders of Claims or Interests. For the avoidance of anydoubt, Causes of Action released or exculpated under the Plan will not be retained by theReorganized Debtors.c. Section 1123(d) – Cure of Defaults43. Article V.D of the Plan provides for the satisfaction of Cure Claimsassociated with each Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease to be assumed in accordance withsection 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Any monetary defaults under each assumed ExecutoryCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 212 o of f1 1334522Contract or Unexpired Lease shall be satisfied, pursuant to section 365(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode, by payment of the default amount in Cash on the Effective Date, subject to the limitationsdescribed in Article V.D of the Plan, or on such other terms as the parties to such ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases may otherwise agree. Any Disputed Cure Amounts will bedetermined in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article V.D of the Plan, and applicablebankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law. As such, the Plan provides that the Debtors will Cure, orprovide adequate assurance that the Debtors will promptly Cure, defaults with respect to assumedExecutory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in accordance with section 365(b)(1) of theBankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan complies with section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.d. Section 1129(a)(2) – Compliance of the Debtors and Others with the ApplicableProvisions of the Bankruptcy Code.44. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have complied with all applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code as required by section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, and 1128, and Bankruptcy Rules 3017, 3018,and 3019.e. Section 1129(a)(3) – Proposal of Plan in Good Faith.45. The Debtors have proposed the Plan in good faith, in accordance with theBankruptcy Code requirements, and not by any means forbidden by law. In determining that thePlan has been proposed in good faith, the Court has examined the totality of the circumstancesfiling of the Chapter 11 Cases, including the formation of Intrum AB of Texas LLC (“IntrumTexas”), the Plan itself, and the process leading to its formulation. The Debtors' good faith isevident from the facts and record of the Chapter 11 Cases, the Disclosure Statement, and the recordof the Combined Hearing and other proceedings held in the Chapter 11 CasesCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 223 o of f1 133452346. The Plan (including the Plan Supplement and all other documents necessaryto effectuate the Plan) is the product of good faith, arm's-length negotiations by and among theDebtors, the Debtors' directors and officers and the Debtors' key stakeholders, including theConsenting Creditors and each of their respective professionals. The Plan itself and the processleading to its formulation provide independent evidence of the Debtors' and such other parties'good faith, serve the public interest, and assure fair treatment of holders of Claims or Interests.Consistent with the overriding purpose of chapter 11, the Debtors Filed the Chapter 11 Cases withthe belief that the Debtors were in need of reorganization and the Plan was negotiated and proposedwith the intention of accomplishing a successful reorganization and maximizing stakeholder value,and for no ulterior purpose. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(3) of the BankruptcyCode are satisfied.f. Section 1129(a)(4) – Court Approval of Certain Payments as Reasonable.47. Any payment made or to be made by the Debtors, or by a person issuingsecurities or acquiring property under the Plan, for services or costs and expenses in connectionwith the Chapter 11 Cases, or in connection with the Plan and incident to the Chapter 11 Cases,has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the Court as reasonable. Accordingly, thePlan satisfies the requirements of section 1129(a)(4).g. Section 1129(a)(5)—Disclosure of Directors and Officers and Consistency with theInterests of Creditors and Public Policy.48. The identities of or process for appointment of the Reorganized Debtors'directors and officers proposed to serve after the Effective Date were disclosed in the PlanSupplement in advance of the Combined Hearing. Accordingly, the Debtors have satisfied therequirements of section 1129(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 234 o of f1 1334524h. Section 1129(a)(6)—Rate Changes.49. The Plan does not contain any rate changes subject to the jurisdiction of anygovernmental regulatory commission and therefore will not require governmental regulatoryapproval. Therefore, section 1129(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the Plan.i. Section 1129(a)(7)—Best Interests of Holders of Claims and Interests.50. The liquidation analysis attached as Exhibit D to the Disclosure Statementand the other evidence in support of the Plan that was proffered or adduced at the CombinedHearing, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases are (a) reasonable, persuasive,credible, and accurate as of the dates such analysis or evidence was prepared, presented orproffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c) have not beencontroverted by other evidence; and (d) establish that each holder of Allowed Claims or Interestsin each Class will recover as much or more value under the Plan on account of such Claim orInterest, as of the Effective Date, than the amount such holder would receive if the Debtors wereliquidated on the Effective Date under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or has accepted the Plan.As a result, the Debtors have demonstrated that the Plan is in the best interests of their creditorsand equity holders and the requirements of section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.j. Section 1129(a)(8)—Conclusive Presumption of Acceptance by UnimpairedClasses; Acceptance of the Plan by Certain Voting Classes.51. The classes deemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan andare deemed to have accepted the Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. EachVoting Class voted to accept the Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, however, even if section1129(a)(8) has not been satisfied with respect to all of the Debtors, the Plan is confirmable becausethe Plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to the Voting Classesand thus satisfies section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to such Classes as describedCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 245 o of f1 1334525further below. As a result, the requirements of section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code are alsosatisfied.k. Section 1129(a)(9)—Treatment of Claims Entitled to Priority Pursuant to Section507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.52. The treatment of Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, andPriority Tax Claims under Article II of the Plan satisfies the requirements of, and complies in allrespects with, section 1129(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.l. Section 1129(a)(10)—Acceptance by at Least One Voting Class.53. As set forth in the Voting Declaration, all Voting Classes overwhelminglyvoted to accept the Plan. As such, there is at least one Voting Class that has accepted the Plan,determined without including any acceptance of the Plan by any insider (as defined by theBankruptcy Code), for each Debtor. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) of theBankruptcy Code are satisfied.m. Section 1129(a)(11)—Feasibility of the Plan.54. The Plan satisfies section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thefinancial projections attached to the Disclosure Statement as Exhibit D and the other evidencesupporting the Plan proffered or adduced by the Debtors at or before the Combined Hearing: (a)is reasonable, persuasive, credible, and accurate as of the dates such evidence was prepared,presented, or proffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c)has not been controverted by other persuasive evidence; (d) establishes that the Plan is feasibleand Confirmation of the Plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for furtherfinancial reorganization; (e) establishes that the Debtors will have sufficient funds available tomeet their obligations under the Plan and in the ordinary course of business—including sufficientamounts of Cash to reasonably ensure payment of Allowed Claims that will receive CashCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 256 o of f1 1334526distributions pursuant to the terms of the Plan and other Cash payments required under the Plan;and (f) establishes that the Debtors or the Reorganized Debtors, as applicable, will have thefinancial wherewithal to pay any Claims that accrue, become payable, or are allowed by FinalOrder following the Effective Date. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code.n. Section 1129(a)(12)—Payment of Statutory Fees.55. Article XII.C of the Plan provides that all fees payable pursuant to section1930(a) of the Judicial Code, as determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing inaccordance with section 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code, will be paid by each of the applicableReorganized Debtors for each quarter (including any fraction of a quarter) until the Chapter 11Cases are converted, dismissed, or closed, whichever occurs first. Accordingly, the Plan satisfiesthe requirements of section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code.o. Section 1129(a)(13)—Retiree Benefits.56. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code, and as provided inArticle IV.K of the Plan, the Reorganized Debtors will continue to pay all obligations on accountof retiree benefits (as such term is used in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code) on and after theEffective Date in accordance with applicable law. As a result, the requirements of section1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.p. Sections 1129(a)(14), (15), and (16)—Domestic Support Obligations, Individuals,and Nonprofit Corporations.57. The Debtors do not owe any domestic support obligations, are notindividuals, and are not nonprofit corporations. Therefore, sections 1129(a)(14), 1129(a)(15), and1129(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to the Chapter 11 Cases.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 267 o of f1 1334527q. Section 1129(b)—Confirmation of the Plan Over Nonacceptance of VotingClasses.58. No Classes rejected the Plan, and section 1129(b) is not applicable here,but even if it were, the Plan may be confirmed pursuant to section 1129(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode because the Plan is fair and equitable with respect to the Deemed Rejecting Classes. ThePlan has been proposed in good faith, is reasonable, and meets the requirements and all VotingClasses have voted to accept the Plan. The treatment of Intercompany Claims and IntercompanyInterests under the Plan provides for administrative convenience does not constitute a distributionunder the Plan on account of suc

Constitutional Law Lecture 1 – Structure of Government and Separation of Powers Source: Excerpts from "Constitutional Law Lecture 1: The Structure of Government and Separation of Powers" I. Foundational Overview I begin by noting that the U.S. Constitution creates a structure of government designed to prevent tyranny. The three branches—Congress (legislative), the President (executive), and the courts (judicial)—operate under a system of separation of powers. This arrangement is complemented by checks and balances, whereby each branch can restrain the others. Federalism further divides power between the federal government and the states. Key Themes: Separation of Powers: This doctrine ensures that no single branch amasses unchecked authority. “Separation of powers is … the bedrock of the American constitutional system.” Checks and Balances: Each branch has devices (like vetoes or judicial review) to limit the other branches. “These interlocking mechanisms create a dynamic tension that fosters a balance of power.” Federalism: The Constitution specifies certain powers (enumerated) for the federal government and reserves others for the states. Judicial Review: Established in Marbury v. Madison, it empowers courts to strike down unconstitutional laws or actions. “Without Marbury, the checks and balances system would lack a critical enforcement mechanism.” Supremacy Clause: Federal law preempts conflicting state law, unifying legal standards throughout the nation. II. Constitutional Foundations Articles I, II, III, and VI Article I defines Congress's powers, including the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article II vests executive power in the President, granting authority as Commander-in-Chief and in foreign affairs. Article III establishes the judiciary, anchored by the Supreme Court. Article VI contains the Supremacy Clause, ensuring federal law supremacy. Federalism and Division of Power Enumerated Powers: Taxation, regulation of interstate commerce, defense. Reserved Powers: Those retained by states (e.g., police powers, education). Key Cases: McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) upheld implied federal powers. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) expanded Congress's reach over interstate commerce. III. Separation of Powers Doctrine Legislative Powers (Congress) Commerce Clause: Broad authority over interstate activities, yet subject to judicial limits (United States v. Lopez). Taxing and Spending: Congress can attach conditions to federal funds (South Dakota v. Dole). Necessary and Proper Clause: Permits laws essential to carrying out enumerated powers. Nondelegation Doctrine: Congress must not transfer its core legislative function to another branch (INS v. Chadha). Executive Powers (President) Commander-in-Chief: Authority over military decisions. Appointment: Nominates judges and officials (with Senate approval). Veto: Power to reject legislation. Foreign Affairs: Treaties, diplomacy; recognized as broad in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. Key Cases: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) – limited executive power over private property without legislative authorization. United States v. Nixon (1974) – limited executive privilege in criminal investigations. Judicial Powers Judicial Review: Power to invalidate unconstitutional statutes (Marbury v. Madison). Justiciability: Requires standing, ripeness, and mootness for a federal court to hear a case (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife). Federal Question Jurisdiction: Authority over federal issues; example: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) advanced civil rights jurisprudence. IV. Checks and Balances in Practice Interbranch Conflicts Congress → Executive: Impeachment, budgetary control. Executive → Congress: Veto power, executive orders. Judiciary → Both: Judicial review of legislative acts and executive actions (Cooper v. Aaron). Balancing National Security and Civil Liberties Key examples include Korematsu v. United States (1944) and Ha --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/law-school/support

Mike Davis of the Article III Project joins me on today's shows to unpack a variety of issues. The electoral college certified the election, making Donald Trump officially the 47th President of the United States. Mike is eagerly anticipating the incoming DOJ led by Pam Bondi. Bondi served as Florida's attorney general and has a rockstar team by her side in Todd Blanche, Emil Bove, John Sauer and Harmeet Dhillon to get the justice department back to delivering justice. More questions unfold about January 6th as it is confirmed that there were 26 FBI hired contractors at the capitol that day. Davis hopes Trump pardons those involved in non-violent incidents. Davis and Article III have an effective game plan to crush the lawfare posed against president Trump with U.S. Code Section 241. Section 241 makes it unlawful for two or more persons to agree to injure, threaten, or intimidate a person in the United States in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States or because of his or her having exercised such a right. Guy Taylor closes us out to give us insight into the real threat these mystery drones pose. New article in my substack, sign up and become a VIP today! PLUS if you're looking for tickets to Trump's inauguration, I got all the info you need: https://www.seanspicer.com/p/exclusive-polling-on-most-effective Featuring: Mike Davis Founder & President | The Article III Project https://www.article3project.org/ Guy Taylor National Security Editor | The Washington Times Host & Editor | Threat Status Podcast & Newsletter https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/threat-status/ -- Sponsors: Ramp Want $250?? Ramp has easy-to-use cards, spend limits, approval flows, vendor payments, and more. Ramp makes all your spending smarter with seamless integration! Join Ramp now and get $250 upon sign-up. Just go to https://ramp.com/SPICER 120/Life Do you suffer from high blood pressure? Has your doctor warned you that you are a candidate for hypertension? Has the ONLY solution offered to you been a pill? Well the folks at 120/Life have created a natural alternative to lower your blood pressure. 120/Life guarantees to lower your blood pressure in 2 weeks or they'll give you your money back. You have nothing to lose, but those high blood pressure numbers! Just goto https://www.120life.com/ and use code: SPICER to save 15% PLUS free shipping. Wired 2 Fish Do you want to drink coffee from the finest coffee beans in the world? Wired 2 Fish sources directly from Mexico and Guatemala to bring you the freshest arabica coffee beans in the world. Wired 2 Fish cares so much about the earth that they give back 25% of their net profits to faith-based organizations and clean water initiatives. If you're a coffee lover and want to support a great company doing great work head to https://www.wired2fishcoffee.com/ use code: WECARE for 15% off your first order. -- Trump may never do another rally so this may be your last chance to experience it for yourself! Front Row Joes: https://frontrowjoes.movie/ -- Subscribe and ring the bell for new videos: https://youtube.com/seanmspicer?sub_confirmation=1 Listen to the full audio show on all platforms: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-sean-spicer-show/id1701280578 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/32od2cKHBAjhMBd9XntcUd iHeart: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-the-sean-spicer-show-120471641/ Become a part of The Sean Spicer Show community: https://www.seanspicer.com/ Follow The Sean Spicer Show on social media: Facebook: https://facebook.com/seanspicershow Twitter: https://twitter.com/seanspicershow Instagram: https://instagram.com/seanspicershow Stay in touch with Sean on social media: Facebook: https://facebook.com/seanmspicer Twitter: https://twitter.com/seanspicer Instagram: https://instagram.com/seanmspicer/ #politics #news #theseanspicershow #seanspicer #conservativemedia #podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Axon and Jarkesy have renewed scrutiny of the constitutionality and fairness of FTC’s administrative litigation. For example, the President cannot remove Administrative Law Judges nor FTC Commissioners, and FTC Commissioners both vote to issue the complaint and decide its merits in proceedings. Parties before the DOJ-Antitrust Division, on the other hand, go directly before an Article III judge, and avoid administrative litigation altogether. This panel, featuring the former FTC Acting Chairman, Commission advisors, and administrative law experts, discussed these and other constitutional challenges to FTC’s administrative litigation. If the courts ultimately uphold constitutionality, is Congressional reform warranted? Should FTC’s administrative tribunal be abolished altogether? Or are internal process reforms sufficient to afford fairer process? Keith Klovers' article, "Three Options for Reforming Part 3 Administrative Litigation at the Federal Trade Commission," as referenced in the discussion.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U-S Constitution?    The case was decided on June 27, 2024. The Supreme Court held that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to this SEC enforcement action. The claims are "legal in nature" and closely resemble common law fraud actions. The substance of the claim matters more than its statutory origin or which branch of government brings the action. Moreover, the civil penalties sought are punitive in nature, which is a type of remedy traditionally provided by courts of law rather than courts of equity. Second, the "public rights" exception to the Seventh Amendment does not apply here because this case does not fall within the narrow categories of matters that have historically been exclusively determined by the executive and legislative branches. The mere facts that Congress assigned the matter to an agency and that the government is the plaintiff do not change this outcome. Unlike the novel regulatory scheme in Atlas Roofing, these SEC fraud claims have close analogues in traditional common law actions that were historically adjudicated by courts with juries. Because this action is essentially a common law fraud suit seeking punitive remedies, it must be heard by an Article III court with a jury, despite Congress assigning it to an administrative proceeding. This conclusion preserves the constitutional separation of powers and the role of juries in adjudicating traditional legal claims. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

The importance of judicial selection and confirmation is now a point of emphasis for all presidential administrations. In 2025 and going forward, what principles and considerations will govern judicial selection (and confirmation) in a new administration, with a new Senate majority. These and other important Article III issues will be considered by our panel of experts.Featuring:Mr. Michael Fragoso, Chief Counsel, Office of the Republican Minority LeaderMr. David Lat, Founder, Above the LawProf. Robert Luther III, Distinguished Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason UniversityProf. Carl Tobias, Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of LawModerator: Hon. Michael B. Brennan, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Josh Hammer analyzes Matt Gaetz's abrupt withdrawal from consideration as Donald Trump's attorney general. Was this the plan all along? And regardless, who would be a better pick for attorney general? Also, an update on the Judicial Conference of the United States's planned Article III power grab, Chuck Schumer and John Thune reach a deal on federal judges, and more. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the federal government's request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users' First Amendment rights?    The case was decided on June 26, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Respondents—two States and five individual social-media users who sued Executive Branch officials and agencies, alleging that the Government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment—lack Article III standing to seek an injunction. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing for two main reasons: First, the plaintiffs failed to establish a clear causal link between their past social media restrictions and the actions of the government defendants. Most of the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that their content was restricted due to government pressure rather than the platforms' independent moderation policies. Even for Jill Hines, who made the strongest case, the connections were tenuous and did not clearly show that her restrictions were likely traceable to government coercion rather than Facebook's own judgment. Second, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a substantial risk of future injury traceable to the defendants' actions. By the time of the lawsuit, most of the government's communications with social media platforms about COVID-19 and election misinformation had significantly decreased. Without evidence of ongoing pressure from the government, it was speculative to assume that future content moderation decisions would be attributable to the defendants rather than the platforms' independent policies. The Court also found that an injunction against the government was unlikely to affect the platforms' content moderation decisions, creating a redressability problem. The Court emphasized that at the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must make a clear showing that they are likely to establish each element of standing, which the petitioners failed to do based on the evidence presented. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Standing as a Gatekeeper of Justice Source: Lecture: "Standing: A Gatekeeper of Justice in the Legal System" Main Themes: Standing as a Threshold Requirement: The lecture emphasizes that standing is not just a procedural hurdle but a fundamental principle determining access to the court system. It ensures courts address genuine disputes involving parties with a direct stake in the outcome, preventing hypothetical or abstract litigation. Elements of Standing: The three core elements – injury in fact (concrete and particularized), causation (linking the injury to the defendant's conduct), and redressability (a favorable court decision can remedy the harm) – are thoroughly explained with examples. Purposes and Policy: The lecture highlights the importance of standing in ensuring judicial efficiency, promoting separation of powers by limiting judicial overreach into policy matters, and safeguarding legal rights by focusing on individuals with genuine interests at stake. Challenges and Limitations: The complexities of standing, particularly regarding abstract grievances, third-party standing, speculative harm, difficulty proving causation, and political questions, are discussed, revealing potential barriers to accessing justice. Landmark Cases: Key cases like Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Massachusetts v. EPA, and Clapper v. Amnesty International are analyzed to demonstrate the practical application and evolution of standing doctrine in various contexts, including environmental and national security law. Broader Implications: The lecture concludes by examining the far-reaching impact of standing on access to justice, particularly for marginalized groups, the balance between judicial activism and restraint, and how standing decisions shape public policy debates. Most Important Ideas and Facts: Definition: "Standing refers to the legal principle that a party must have a personal and direct stake in the outcome of a lawsuit to bring a case before a court." This ensures courts handle actual disputes, not hypothetical scenarios. Constitutional Basis: Standing is rooted in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which limits judicial power to "cases and controversies," meaning real disputes with concrete issues. Injury In Fact - Concrete and Particularized: "The injury must be real and tangible—not abstract, hypothetical, or speculative," and must affect the plaintiff personally, not just the public in general. Causation - Direct Link: A clear link between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's actions is crucial. "[C]ausation prevents courts from being used as a means to air grievances where the defendant's actions may not be directly implicated." Redressability - Effective Remedy: The court's decision must be able to provide a solution to the plaintiff's injury. "The goal is to ensure that the courts are providing meaningful, actionable relief." Separation of Powers: Standing "keeps courts from overstepping their constitutional role by preventing them from addressing broad policy issues" better suited for the legislative or executive branches. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992): This landmark case set a high bar for standing, emphasizing concrete injury and direct causation, particularly in environmental lawsuits. Massachusetts v. EPA (2007): This case broadened standing for states, recognizing their "quasi-sovereign interests" in protecting their citizens and environment, especially from federal inaction. Access to Justice Concerns: While standing promotes judicial efficiency, it can "restrict access to justice, particularly for marginalized groups or public interest cases where harm may be diffuse but substantial." Quotes: "Standing is more than a procedural hurdle; it is fundamental to the functioning of our legal system." "By delineating who can sue, standing maintains focus on real disputes and ensures the judiciary does not become an arena for generalized grievances or policy debates." --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/law-school/support

In this season finale, host Dr. Katie Crawford Lackey and producer Adam Belmar reflect on key conversations from the first season of Consider the Constitution Podcast. They revisit notable discussions with constitutional scholars about Article III, judicial review, Madison's vision for managing political diversity, and the evolution of constitutional rights. Highlights include insights on voting rights, the legacy of Reconstruction, privacy in the digital age, and George Washington's approach to the presidency. The episode emphasizes how the Constitution continues to shape American democracy while underscoring the importance of civic engagement and education.Scholars in this episode:1. Dr. Lauren Bell - discussing Article III2. F. Michael Higginbotham - on judicial review3. Dr. Jay Cost - on Madison's vision for political diversity4. Dr. Beau Breslin - on constitutional endurance and Jefferson's views5. Dr. Lynn Uzzell - on the Bill of Rights6. Professor Kendra Johnson - on privacy rights and technology7. Jade Ryerson - on the right to assembly8. Dr. Pippa Holloway - on voting rights9. Professor Julie Suk - on women's suffrage10. Dr. DeAnza Cook - on the 13th Amendment and mass incarceration11. Dr. Hasan Jeffries - on Reconstruction and originalism12. Dr. Lindsay Chervinsky - on George Washington's presidency13. David O. Stewart - on Washington at the Constitutional Convention14. Dr. John Ragosta - on early political divisions15. Professor Michael Gerhardt - on impeachment

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in FDA v Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.      In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone's approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA's 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?   The case was decided on June 13, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The plaintiff doctors and medical associations, none of whom prescribe or use mifepristone, do not allege direct monetary injuries, property injuries, or physical injuries from FDA's actions relaxing the regulation of mifepristone. Rather, they have legal, moral, ideological, and policy concerns about abortion. While these concerns are legitimate, they do not suffice on their own to confer Article III standing to sue in federal court. Given the broad and comprehensive conscience protections guaranteed by federal law, the plaintiffs have not shown that FDA's actions will cause them to suffer any conscience injury. Additionally, the causal link between FDA's regulatory actions and the alleged monetary and related injuries (e.g., diverting resources, increased risk of liability suits, potentially increasing insurance costs) is too speculative or attenuated to establish standing. Finally, the medical associations have not demonstrated organizational standing. Thus, even if true that no one would be able to challenge FDA's actions if the plaintiffs cannot, the Court has long rejected this “if not us, who?" argument as a basis for standing. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion reiterating that associational (or organizational) standing is simply another form of third-party standing and that the Court should, in another case, explain just how the Constitution permits associational standing. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd.       In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution? The case was decided on May 16, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. The Appropriations Clause provides that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Article I, §9, cl. 7—in other words, government spending must be authorized by an act of Congress. Historically, the word “appropriation” requires identifying a source of public funds and authorizing the expenditure of those funds for designated purposes. The practices of the English Parliament after the Glorious Revolution, the American Colonies, early state legislatures, and the First Congress varied widely in their specificity, duration, and structure, but all met these basic requirements. The statute authorizing the CFPB's funding likewise contains the necessary elements of a valid appropriation under the Appropriations Clause. It identifies a source of funds (the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System), sets a maximum amount that can be drawn, and specifies the purpose for which the funds can be used (to pay the CFPB's expenses in carrying out its duties). Furthermore, the CFPB's funding mechanism is analogous to some of the broad, open-ended appropriations passed by the First Congress. Therefore, the CFPB's funding statute satisfies the requirements of the Appropriations Clause. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett joined, noting that CFPB's funding scheme would have been acceptable not only in the late-18th century, but also any other time in our Nation's history. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, endorsing judicial restraint. She pointed out that “when the Constitution's text does not provide a limit to a coordinate branch's power,” courts “should not lightly assume that Article III implicitly directs the Judiciary to find one.” Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Appropriations Clause imposes more stringent obligations on Congress to monitor and control the expenditure of public funds and the projects they finance. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Harrow v Department of Defense.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U-S-C § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling? The case was decided on May 16, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U-S-C § 7703(b)(1), is not jurisdictional. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. As a preliminary matter, procedural requirements are typically not treated as jurisdictional unless Congress clearly states otherwise. This sets a high bar for finding a procedural rule to be jurisdictional. The language of § 7703(b)(1) itself does not suggest that the 60-day deadline is jurisdictional. Although the deadline is stated in mandatory terms (“shall be filed”), the Court has repeatedly held that this is not enough to make a time bar jurisdictional. The provision does not mention the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction or authority to hear untimely claims. Nor does 28 U-S-C § 1295(a)(9), which grants the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1), automatically make the 60-day deadline jurisdictional. However, the Court found that the phrase "pursuant to" has multiple meanings and does not necessarily indicate strict compliance with every requirement of §7703(b)(1). Finally, this case is distinguishable from Bowles v Russell, which held that the deadline for filing an appeal from one Article III court to another is jurisdictional, because this case involves an appeal from an agency to a court, not from one court to another. Because Congress did not clearly state that the 60-day deadline in §7703(b)(1) is jurisdictional, and the language and context of the relevant statutes do not compel a jurisdictional reading, the deadline is a non-jurisdictional procedural requirement. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Acheson Hotels, LLC v Laufer. In this case, the court considered this issue: Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel? The case was decided on December 5, 2023. The Supreme Court vacated the case as moot because Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits in lower courts with prejudice due to serious misconduct by her lawyers. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the court vacating the case as moot and declining, despite Acheson's request to the contrary, to resolve the still-live circuit split on the question of standing. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment arguing that he would reach the standing issue and resolve that question in the negative. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson author an opinion concurring in the judgment, explaining that she concurs only because of the Court's precedent of vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals below “when mootness occurs through . . . the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.” In her view, however, vacatur is not appropriate in situations, as here, where the parties did not provide any equitable basis for vacatur. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Biden v Nebraska. In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do Nebraska and other states have judicial standing to challenge the student-debt relief program? 2. Does the student-debt relief program exceed the statutory authority of the U.S. Secretary of Education, or does it violate the Administrative Procedure Act? The case was decided on June 30, 2023. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Education does not have authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. First, the Court concluded that Missouri has standing to challenge the student-debt relief program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Here, the Secretary's plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees, and the harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is an injury to Missouri itself. Second, the Court determined that the HEROES Act's authorization of the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs under the Education Act does not extend to canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Act permits the Secretary to “modify” statutory provisions but only “moderately or in minor fashion” as the term is ordinarily used. The “modifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different loan forgiveness program that Congress could not have intended to permit. And the power to “waive” does not remotely resemble how such power has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used to nullify particular legal requirements. Third, the Court rejected the Secretary's argument that the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic justified the unprecedented nature of the the debt cancellation plan. Citing its recent decision in West Virginia v EPA, the Court expressed hesitance that Congress could have intended to confer such authority on the Secretary and not retain it for itself. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Department of Education v Brown. In this case, the court considered this issue: Do these two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's Student Loan Debt Relief Plan? In addition, is the Plan an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the Secretary of the Department of Education? The case was decided on June 30, 2023.  The Supreme Court held that Respondents lack Article III standing to assert a procedural challenge to the student-loan debt-forgiveness plan adopted by the Secretary of Education pursuant to Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act). Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. For a plaintiff to have standing, they must establish: (1) a concrete and particularized injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's action, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Here, the “fairly traceable” element fails. The respondents' injury is not “fairly traceable” to the plan enacted under the HEROES Act, as they have not established a direct link between the HEROES Act plan and their desired outcome of a more favorable loan-forgiveness program under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). Any link is too tenuous and speculative to establish standing. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In the News with Mike Dakkak www.itnshow.com Gianna Miceli joins ITN to discuss how Americans can escape the all-caps-name, legal entity matrix and how they can reclaim their Article III rights. Learn more about Gianna and Inalienable University at https://www.giannamiceli.com. Follow Gianna on Twitter at https://twitter.com/LegalFockery. Cue Streaming: Network + Premium Channels for $59.99/mo. No Contracts. https://Inthenews.mycuestreaming.com/apply. Purchase Dr. Stella Immanuel's products at https://marketplace.drstellamd.com. Use promo code ITN and save. We are financing the war against us. Give your money instead to companies that care about America and Americans. http://patriotsmade.com/itn. Shop Richardson Nutritional Center anti-cancer products now and save at https://rncstore.com/itn. Discount code for ITN viewers will be applied at checkout. Your support allows me to cover the news the MSM tries to suppress. https://www.buymeacoffee.com/itnshow.

What’s Trending: Guest host Josh Hammer is joined by Israeli philosopher Dr. Ronen Shoval to discuss his new book Holiness and Society: A Socio-Political Exploration of the Mosaic tradition. // LongForm: GUEST: Mike Davis of the Article III project gives his take on the DNC. // The Quick Hit: Director of the federal affairs for Gun Owners of America Aidan Johnston joins Josh Hammer to discuss the Democrats’ gun-grabbing agenda.

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in United States v Texas. In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security's Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law? 2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act? 3. Does 8 U-S-C § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U-S-C § 706(2)? The case was decided on June 23, 2023. The Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specific injury that was caused by the defendant and that the court can remedy. While the district court had concluded that the states would suffer an injury in the form of additional costs due to the arrest policy in question, the Supreme Court pointed out that the injury also has to be "legally and judicially cognizable"—in other words, that it should be a type of dispute that courts have traditionally been involved in resolving. The states failed to point to any precedent or historical practice that supported their claim to have standing in this particular issue. Second, the Court acknowledged that there are good reasons for federal courts to avoid these types of lawsuits, one of which is the Executive Branch's discretion in deciding whom to arrest or prosecute, which falls under its constitutional Article II powers. Additionally, the courts generally lack the standards to judge the appropriateness of such enforcement decisions, which can be influenced by various factors like resource constraints and public safety needs. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts can never handle cases involving the Executive Branch's decisions about arrests or prosecutions. Indeed, certain circumstances might warrant a different standing analysis; for instance, if there are claims of selective prosecution based on discrimination, or if Congress has explicitly made certain injuries legally recognizable. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the states lack standing not because of the “cognizable injury” aspect of standing, but because of the redressability requirement. Justice Barrett authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, also arguing that the case should be resolved on redressability grounds. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Texas does have standing. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

What You Need to Know is in the past two weeks Jack Posobiec exposed the record and background of previous vice presidential nominee, Josh Shapiro, virtually knocking him out of the running. Mike Cernovich exposed the now vice presidential nominee, Tim Walz, for stolen valor where he claimed to have engaged in combat which turned out not to be the case. Americans should be grateful like Mike Cernovich and Jack Posebiec who are exposing the insanity in the political realm.          Special guest Jeff Clark, former double U.S. Assistant Attorney General and respected attorney, joins Ed to talk about the legal battles he's embroiled in and the indictment against President Trump in Georgia. Plus, Joe Biden has proposed reforms to the Supreme Court, specifically to the amount of years a justice can serve. This proposition would allow a justice to serve 18 years before becoming a “senior justice” where they would not have a seat in appellate jurisdiction cases. Jeff points out that Article III of the Constitution gives Supreme Court Justices lifetime tenure.  Tiffany Justice, cofounder of Moms for Liberty, joins Ed to talk about the 40th Anniversary of Phyllis Schlafly's Child Abuse in the Classroom and how there is more and more social-emotional learning where students are being fed ideas that shouldn't be discussed in schools. Tiffany talks about how the Pupil Protections Act is being broken all the time in schools across the nation. Plus in a double-segment she discusses the Paris Olympic games, where an LGBT activist director used the opening Ceremonies to promote blatant anti-Christian mockery. Billions of people — families and kids — across the world love watching the Olympics, making this particularly damaging to children. Also, remember to take a look at the Moms for Liberty Summit August 29th-September 1st in Washington DC. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What You Need To Know is the Venezuelan election is largely recognized as rigged. Venezuela uses modern election systems similar to many other countries in the world and if it is an issue there, then it could be an issue anywhere that uses a similar system under a corrupt political elite. Also, presumptive Democratic nominee Kamala Harris is on the clock for deciding who her running mate will be. Eric Holder, the number one guy for Obama, is in charge of Kamala's VP vetting. Kamala is not the person making the final decision—it's Obama. Special guest Jeff Clark, former double U.S. Assistant Attorney General and respected attorney, joins Ed to talk about the legal battles he's embroiled in and the indictment against President Trump in Georgia. Plus, Joe Biden has proposed reforms to the Supreme Court, specifically to the amount of years a justice can serve. This proposition would allow a justice to serve 18 years before becoming a “senior justice” where they would not have a seat in appellate jurisdiction cases. Jeff points out that Article III of the Constitution gives Supreme Court Justices lifetime tenure.  Tiffany Justice, cofounder of Moms for Liberty, joins Ed to talk about the 40th Anniversary of Phyllis Schlafly's Child Abuse in the Classroom and how there is more and more social-emotional learning where students are being fed ideas that shouldn't be discussed in schools. Tiffany talks about how the Pupil Protections Act is being broken all the time in schools across the nation. Plus in a double-segment she discusses the Paris Olympic games, where an LGBT activist director used the opening Ceremonies to promote blatant anti-Christian mockery. Billions of people — families and kids — across the world love watching the Olympics, making this particularly damaging to children. Also, remember to take a look at the Moms for Liberty Summit August 29th-September 1st in Washington DC. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode, co-host Michael Dawson is joined by Noah Rosenblum, an assistant professor of law at NYU and former WilmerHale summer associate, to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. The case concerns whether the SEC has the authority to seek civil penalties against an individual before an administrative law judge rather than before an Article III-appointed judge and a jury of the individual's peers. As a result of the Court's decision, the SEC may no longer rely on its administrative forum to seek civil penalties for alleged violations of securities laws. Dawson and Rosenblum give a timeline of events that led up to the Supreme Court case, with Rosenblum breaking down how the majority and dissenting opinions diverge. Leveraging his background as a legal historian, Rosenblum provides historical context and explains how applying a traditional Constitutional interpretation to the case increases its complexity. Dawson and Rosenblum also discuss the long-term impact this case could have, highlighting how the final ruling leaves many unanswered questions that could pose challenges in interpreting future decisions. This episode is the latest installment of our miniseries examining notable decisions recently issued by the US Supreme Court. Previous episodes covering this year's term looked at the decisions in Cantero v. Bank of America and Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP.

This episode discusses article three of the Formula of Concord on the nature of the righteousness of God and justifying faith.

Host Gregg N. Sofer welcomes back to the podcast Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University Law School, and Steve Renau, Husch Blackwell's Head of Thought Leadership, to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. The Court held 6-3 that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial requires the SEC to pursue civil penalties for securities-fraud violations in federal court. No longer can the SEC rely on its own in-house tribunal to secure these penalties. Although Jarkesy applies only to the SEC, the Court's reasoning could have far-reaching implications across a number of federal agencies, particularly when “the ‘public rights' exception to Article III jurisdiction does not apply.”Our discussion highlights the administrative law history that was brought to bear upon the case and how it was that the adjudication of civil penalties came to be matters before non-Article III courts. We then pivot to some of the impacts Jarkesy could have in the future, including whether the Supreme Court will take up related issues of due process in future challenges to federal agency enforcement actions.Finally, we discuss Jarkesy in light of the Supreme Court's Loper Bright decision that ended the doctrine of Chevron deference and the implications of both decisions for administrative agencies and the private businesses they regulate.Gregg N. Sofer BiographyFull BiographyGregg counsels businesses and individuals in connection with a range of criminal, civil and regulatory matters, including government investigations, internal investigations, litigation, export control, sanctions, and regulatory compliance. Prior to entering private practice, Gregg served as the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas—one of the largest and busiest United States Attorney's Offices in the country—where he supervised more than 300 employees handling a diverse caseload, including matters involving complex white-collar crime, government contract fraud, national security, cyber-crimes, public corruption, money laundering, export violations, trade secrets, tax, large-scale drug and human trafficking, immigration, child exploitation and violent crime.Richard Epstein BiographyRichard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University Law School, a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago, and the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.Professor Epstein has published work on a broad range of constitutional, economic, historical, and philosophical subjects. He has taught administrative law, antitrust law, communications law, constitutional law, corporation criminal law, employment discrimination law, environmental law, food and drug law, health law, labor law, Roman law, real estate development and finance, and individual and corporate taxation.Epstein's most recent book publication is The Dubious Morality of Modern Administrative Law (2020). Other works include The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2014); Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of Law (2011); The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act (2009); Supreme Neglect: How to Revive the Constitutional Protection for Private Property (2008); How the Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (2006); Overdose (2006); and Free Markets under Siege: Cartels, Politics, and Social Welfare (2005).He received a BA degree in philosophy summa cum laude from Columbia in 1964; a BA degree in law with first-class honors from Oxford University in 1966; and an LLB degree cum laude, from the Yale Law School in 1968. Upon graduation he joined the faculty at the University of Southern California, where he taught until 1972. In 1972, he visited the University of Chicago and became a regular member of the faculty the following year.He has been a senior fellow at the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics since 1984 and was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1985. In 2011, Epstein was a recipient of the Bradley Prize for outstanding achievement. In 2005, the College of William & Mary School of Law awarded him the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize.Additional ResourcesThe Justice Insiders, “The Administrative State Is Not Your Friend: A Conversation with Professor Richard Epstein” (Episode 7), June 21, 2022The Justice Insiders, “SEC Plays Chicken with Jarkesy” (Episode 18), October 16, 2023U.S. Supreme Court, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, June 27, 2024Gregg N. Sofer and Joseph S. Diedrich, “Landmark Supreme Court Decisions Restrain Federal Administrative Agency Power,” June 28, 2024© 2024 Husch Blackwell LLP. All rights reserved. This information is intended only to provide general information in summary form on legal and business topics of the day. The contents hereof do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. Specific legal advice should be sought in particular matters.

Neoborn Caveman gets real about some of the biggest issues facing our nation. Guest Joseph Kerner offers a straightforward analysis of the UN Agenda 2030 and its impact. Are these policies beneficial, or are they compromising our country's integrity?Joseph highlights the questionable relationships between government officials and large corporations, suggesting these partnerships could be undermining our Constitutional values. They discuss the delicate balance between preserving free speech and maintaining national security, emphasizing the critical role of the First Amendment.Why is America in a free fall? This episode shines a light on the noble spirit of the American people, contrasting it with the dubious actions of those in power. Joseph encourages everyone to stay informed and challenge policies that threaten our freedoms.Based on Article III, Section 3, there are traitors in the government. Reflecting on the influence of past leaders and the systemic issues in our political framework, the episode underscores the necessity for grassroots movements to restore our Constitutional roots. There is a battle for the soul of the nation. Who is actually in charge? The globalist overtake is almost complete unless freedom-loving patriots unite. It's a call for everyone to defend their rights and the nation's future. Time to rise for freedom and sovereignty.Support our show and research on our Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/TheNeobornCavemanShowJoin Neoborn Caveman for an honest discussion on the current state of America and what it takes to reclaim its greatness. This isn't just a podcast; it's a call to action for all who cherish liberty and want to uphold the principles that have made the United States a symbol of hope and justice............... Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This Day in Legal History: First US Income TaxOn July 1, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Tax Act of 1862 into law, marking a pivotal moment in American financial history. This legislation introduced a federal income tax to help fund the Civil War, imposing a 3% tax on incomes over $600 and a 5% tax on incomes above $10,000. Despite the pressing needs of the war, compliance with the act was notably poor, reflecting widespread resistance to the new tax.The Tax Act of 1862 was significant as it represented the first instance of income taxation by the federal government, setting a precedent for future taxation policies. However, after the Civil War, the constitutionality of the income tax came into question. In 1872, the federal income tax was repealed, and in 1895, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., arguing that direct taxes had to be apportioned among the states according to the Constitution.This ruling effectively halted federal income taxation until the early 20th century. The financial demands of the country, particularly during times of war and economic expansion, underscored the need for a reliable source of revenue. Consequently, the ratification of the 16th Amendment in 1913 granted Congress the explicit authority to levy income taxes without apportionment, fundamentally reshaping the American tax system.The Tax Act of 1862 laid the groundwork for this constitutional change and highlighted the ongoing challenges of implementing and enforcing income tax laws. Its passage and subsequent legal battles reflect the evolving relationship between the federal government and its citizens concerning taxation. Today, the income tax remains a cornerstone of federal revenue, illustrating the enduring impact of the Tax Act of 1862 on American fiscal policy.Today, the Supreme Court issued a decision addressing the scope of presidential immunity in the case of former President Donald J. Trump, who was indicted on charges related to his conduct during his presidency following the 2020 election. The Court held that a former President is entitled to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within the "conclusive and preclusive" scope of their constitutional authority. For other official acts, the President enjoys at least presumptive immunity. However, the Court affirmed that no immunity exists for unofficial acts. The decision kicks the major questions back to the lower court for a determination consistent with the holding. Trump v. United States - SCOTUSThe U.S. Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, has overturned the Chevron doctrine, fundamentally altering how courts review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The decision, issued in the case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, dismantles a precedent that has been in place since the 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. case.The Chevron doctrine mandated that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous laws, effectively allowing agencies to shape their regulatory authority. However, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that this deference undermines the judiciary's role as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution.Key Elements of the Decision:Judicial Responsibility: The Court emphasized that Article III of the Constitution assigns the judiciary the responsibility to interpret laws, not agencies. The ruling reinstates the principle that courts must use their independent judgment to resolve legal ambiguities.APA Compliance: The Administrative Procedure Act directs courts to "decide all relevant questions of law" and "interpret constitutional and statutory provisions." The Chevron doctrine's requirement for courts to defer to agency interpretations conflicted with this mandate.Historical Perspective: The decision drew on historical judicial practices, noting that while courts have often given weight to executive interpretations, ultimate interpretive authority has always rested with the judiciary.Inconsistencies and Ambiguity: The ruling criticized Chevron for its inherent inconsistencies and the difficulties it posed in defining statutory ambiguities. The Court argued that statutory interpretation is a core judicial function that does not change simply because an agency is involved.Separation of Powers: The Court's opinion underscored the importance of maintaining clear boundaries between legislative, executive, and judicial functions, rejecting the notion that agencies should have final interpretive authority over ambiguous statutes.Impact on Agencies: The decision suggests that agencies must now operate under increased judicial scrutiny and cannot rely on broad statutory interpretations to justify their actions.This landmark decision is expected to lead to more litigation as businesses and industry groups challenge government regulations without the deference previously afforded to agency interpretations under Chevron. It will fundamentally alter the landscape of regulatory law and may very well be the most impactful Supreme Court decision this term. 22-451 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (06/28/2024)Chevron Doctrine's Demise Would Mean Big Changes for Tax LawThe U.S. Justice Department plans to criminally charge Boeing with fraud over two fatal crashes and will offer a plea deal that includes a financial penalty and an independent monitor for three years. The Justice Department's decision follows a finding that Boeing violated a 2021 agreement shielding it from prosecution. The proposed plea deal, which Boeing must respond to by the end of the week, would require Boeing to plead guilty to conspiring to defraud the Federal Aviation Administration. The plea deal includes a $487.2 million penalty, three years of probation, and meetings between Boeing's board and victims' families. If Boeing rejects the deal, the case will go to trial. Victims' families, unhappy with the proposed plea deal, plan to oppose it in court, seeking more significant accountability and financial consequences for Boeing. This decision intensifies Boeing's ongoing crisis, affecting its financial standing and government contract eligibility.US to criminally charge Boeing, seek guilty plea, sources say | ReutersDOJ readying criminal charges against Boeing for prior deadly 737 MAX crashes - POLITICOSteve Bannon, a prominent ally of former President Donald Trump, is set to report to prison on Monday to serve a four-month sentence for defying a congressional subpoena related to the January 6th Capitol attack investigation. Bannon will serve his time at a low-security federal prison in Danbury, Connecticut. His prison term could extend almost to Election Day, complicating his communication with followers of his "War Room" podcast due to the lack of internet access for inmates.Bannon's attempt to delay his sentence while appealing his conviction was denied by the Supreme Court. He was convicted in 2022 on two misdemeanor counts of contempt of Congress for refusing to provide documents or testify before the House committee investigating the Capitol riot. Previously, Bannon had been a key figure in Trump's 2016 campaign and served as his chief strategist in the White House in 2017.Bannon is not the first former Trump official to face prison for non-cooperation with the January 6th committee; former trade adviser Peter Navarro also received a four-month sentence. Additionally, Bannon was pardoned by Trump in 2021 on separate federal charges of fraud related to a border wall fundraising campaign. He still faces state charges for the same issue and awaits trial.Trump ally Steve Bannon to report to prison following contempt conviction | ReutersA federal judge has ruled that most of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) lawsuit against Binance, the largest cryptocurrency exchange globally, can proceed. The lawsuit accuses Binance and its founder, Changpeng Zhao, of violating securities laws by inflating trading volumes, diverting customer funds, failing to restrict U.S. users, and misleading investors about market surveillance controls. The SEC also claims Binance unlawfully facilitated trading of unregistered securities. Judge Amy Berman Jackson's decision is a setback for Binance, which sought to dismiss the case. However, the ruling partially favors the cryptocurrency industry, as it supports a previous judgment that secondary sales of Binance's tokens by other sellers on exchanges are not securities. This legal challenge follows Binance's agreement in November to pay $4.3 billion to settle illicit finance breaches with the Department of Justice and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.Binance must face bulk of US SEC crypto lawsuit, judge rules | Reuters This is a public episode. 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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Reed v Goertz. In this case, the court considered this issue: When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U-S-C § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run? The case was decided on Apr 18, 2023. The Supreme Court held that when a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed's case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing. A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in this case, requires two elements: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) inadequate state process. Thus, a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” for a procedural due process violation not at the time of deprivation, but at the time the state fails to provide due process. In Reed's case, the State's alleged failure to provide him with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case for lack of standing. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case on the finding that Reed's action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that there are a number of points in the case at which the statute of limitations could begin to run—all before the denial by the Criminal Court of Appeals, and all leading to the conclusion that Reed's claim is time-barred. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

We update you on the developments at Alex Jones's two bankruptcy hearings last week and why they were a big win for the conspiracy theorist, with a special deep dive into Article I vs. Article III judges. Then, we discuss the latest from the Supreme court, before turning our attention to the myriad ways in which Donald Trump's lawyers are still takin' a dive before Aileen Cannon in the Southern District of Florida, just hoping that she'll throw that red card.   Links: 27 CFR Parts 447, 478, and 479 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-12-26/pdf/2018-27763.pdf Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17768408304219861886 Alex Jones personal bankruptcy docket https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/66583024/alexander-e-jones/ FSS bankruptcy docket https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/64868456/free-speech-systems-llc/ US v. Trump (SDNY Docket - Judge Cannon) https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67490071/united-states-v-trump/ US v. Trump, MTD for Surplusage https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/trump-motion-indictment-dismiss.pdf  US v. Trump, Order on MTD for Surplusage https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.flsd.648653/gov.uscourts.flsd.648653.608.0_1.pdf  US v. Trump, MTD for Spoliation https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.flsd.648653/gov.uscourts.flsd.648653.612.0_1.pdf    Show Links: https://www.lawandchaospod.com/ BlueSky: @LawAndChaosPod Threads: @LawAndChaosPod Twitter: @LawAndChaosPod Patreon: patreon.com/LawAndChaosPod

LeRoy Pernell, et al. v. Brian Lamb, et al. (consolidated with Adriana Novoa, et al. v. Commissioner of the Florida State Board of Education, et al.), argued before Judges Charles R. Wilson, Britt C. Grant, and Barbara Lagoa in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on June 14, 2024. Argued by Charles Cooper (on behalf of Brian Lamb, et al.) and Leah Watson (on behalf of Appellees LeRoy Pernell, et al.) and Greg Greubel (on behalf of Appellees Adriana Novoa, et al.). Issues Presented, from the Brief of Defendants-Appellants: (1) Whether Plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to each provision of Florida's Individual Freedom Act that regulates public universities; (2) Whether the Act's regulation of in-class instruction by public employees triggers First Amendment scrutiny; (3) Whether the Act is sufficiently tailored to advance the State's compelling interest in preventing invidious discrimination by public employees at public universities; (4) Whether the challenged provisions of the Act are unconstitutionally vague; (5) Whether any unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remainder of the Act; and (6) Whether equitable factors favor reversal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Resources: CourtListener case docket for LeRoy Pernell v. Commissioner of the FL State Board of Education (pre-consolidation name of one of the constituent cases) The Institute for Free Speech promotes and defends the political speech rights to freely speak, assemble, publish, and petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment. If you're enjoying the Free Speech Arguments podcast, please subscribe and leave a review on your preferred podcast platform. To support the Institute's mission or inquire about legal assistance, please visit our website: www.ifs.org

Meet Judge Roy K. Altman, a U.S. District Court judge in the Southern District of Florida. Judge Altman was born in Caracas, Venezuela and immigrated with his family to Miami. After growing up in Miami, he graduated from Columbia University where he quarterbacked the football team and pitched on the baseball team. Following Columbia, Judge Altman went on to study at Yale Law where he served as Projects Editor for the Yale Law Journal.After Yale, Judge Altman went on to serve as a federal prosecutor, twice receiving the Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys' Award for Superior Performance. After several years as a partner in a law firm, on April 4, 2019, Judge Altman was confirmed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. At 36 years old, Judge Altman became the youngest federal district court judge in the country and the youngest federal judge ever appointed in the Southern District of Florida.In my opinion, you are about to meet a generational mind. Born in 1982, Judge Altman is technically a millennial. Forget millennials, few Boomers or Gen Xers have reached the heights Judge Altman has obtained. To put it into context, in the United States, there are 1.35 million lawyers, and 30,000 of them are judges. Of that 30,000, only 870 are Article III judges. This means that after graduating law school, a lawyer has a 0.064% chance of becoming an Article III judge.It isn't an overstatement to say that Judge Altman is one of the most accomplished individuals in America. But this achievement isn't what is most impressive about him. What makes Judge Altman outstanding is his moral leadership.An example of his moral leadership is highlighted in a recent article in Bloomberg.In my view, Judge Altman is setting the type of example Americans should follow. He is pursuing an honest and fact-based discussion about the conflict while refusing to cower to the mob of moral relativism.When I think about Judge Altman and his actions after October 7, I recall a quote from the late Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks as he analyzed Esther's plea: “How can I stand and watch disaster befall my people?” To this, Rabbi Sacks said, “To be moral is to live with and for others, sharing their responsibility, participating in their suffering, protesting their wrongs, arguing their cause.”Thankfully, because of Judge Altman, we have one of the great legal minds of the 21st century arguing the cause of Israel, the Jewish people, and all of Western civilization.

When a federal judge accedes to an agency's interpretation of the law, it essentially deprives the non-governmental party involved in the litigation of due process. Moreover, such deference undermines the judge's Article III mandate to uphold judicial independence. The notion of Chevron deference becomes particularly untenable when considering these significant drawbacks. NCLA is actively challenging Chevron in the case of Relentless v. DOC, staunchly advocating for judicial independence. In this episode, Vec, Mark, and Jenin delve into a recent Law and Liberty article titled "Constitutional Government After Chevron?" which examines how the cessation of Chevron deference might impact our constitutional institutions holistically.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Generally, when Congress strips courts of jurisdiction, it does so by implementing broad, forward-looking, statutory bars that insulate agency decisions or foreclose appeal. In response to the protracted litigation surrounding construction and operation of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, Congress passed a unique statutory provision which (1) granted all required approvals for the pipeline to proceed and (2) stripped every court's jurisdiction to review the pipeline's permit approvals. Simultaneously, the amendment granted the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all constitutional challenges to the jurisdiction stripping provision.The case-specific impact of this legislation prompted much public concern and Supreme Court review. Petitioners unsuccessfully argued that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority by intervening to effect a specific outcome in a specific case Respondents prevailed on the counterargument that Congress merely made new underlying law without directing any decision of an Article III court. In this panel, academic commentators and amici from the case discussed the careful distinctions between amendments to substantive law and case-specific jurisdiction stripping, sharing insights on the separation-of-powers questions both behaviors raise.

Article III of the Constitution establishes the Supreme Court and the Constitutional framers also gave Congress the authority to establish the federal court system. This hierarchical structure of courts makes up the judicial branch of government that we still have today. All federal judges are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The Judges who oversee the federal courts are intended to be nonpartisan and shielded away from politics.Show NotesArticle III | Resources | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of CongressDavis, J. E., Fernlund, P. F., & Woll, P. (2005). Civics: Government and Economics in Action. Pearson Prentice Hall.Federal Courts & the Public | United States CourtsUnderstanding the Federal Courts | USCourts.govWhat is the Supreme Court and why does it have so much power? | CNN PoliticsFollow us on Instagram and TikTok

The Feminist Buzzkills were at SCOTUS for the abortion pill, AKA Mifepristone, oral arguments with the Abortion Access Front team and some dope-ass volunteers! We took to the streets of DC with rage, force, and Beyoncé on full blast. If you haven't heard us rant about it a million times already, our beloved LIFE-SAVING Mifepristone pill is being challenged, even though it has been FDA-approved and safely used for over 20 years!!Didn't get a chance to hear yesterday's arguments? Need some clarity on WTF it all means? Well, that's what your Feminist Buzzkills are for! Let Lizz, Moji, Dooks, and a special guest spill about all of the things that went down inside AND outside of the Supreme Court during the oral arguments. SPECIAL GUEST ALERT! We brought in the best in the biz - brilliant author, constitutional law scholar, and Abortion Access Front board member Dr. Michele Goodwin. She sits down with us to recap the good, the bad, and the cringey of yesterday's oral arguments. What did Justice Amy Coney Barrett say? How many slam dunks did Justice Jackson gift us? Are they going after EMTALA next? We explain that and so much more! Times are heavy, but knowledge is power, y'all. We gotchu.  OPERATION SAVE ABORTION: You can still join the 10,000+ womb warriors fighting the patriarchy by listening to our five-part OpSave pod series and Mifepristone Panel by clicking HERE for episodes, your toolkit, marching orders, and more. HOSTS:Lizz Winstead @LizzWinsteadMoji Alawode-El @MojiLocks SPECIAL GUESTS: Alyssa Al-Dookhi @TheDooknessDr. Michele Goodwin @MicheleBGoodwin EPISODE LINKS:Oral Arguments Audio + TranscriptWashingtonian PHOTOS: Outside the Supreme Court as Justices Hear Case About Abortion Pill AccessACLU WebsiteAidAccess WebsiteLook at AAF's SCOTUS heads!Dr. Michele Goodwin WebsiteSLATE: The Current Attack on Abortion Pills Will Fail. The Next One Will Be So Much Worse.NY Mag: The Supreme Court Conservatives' Victorian Fantasy on Abortion4/4 VIRTUAL ACTION: Expose Fake Clinics: College Action HourSIGN: Mifepristone PetitionBUY: Reproductive Rights Wall Art!EMAIL your abobo questions to The Feminist BuzzkillsAAF's Abortion-Themed Rage Playlist FOLLOW US:Listen to us ~ FBK Podcast Instagram ~ @AbortionFrontTwitter ~ @AbortionFrontTikTok ~ @AbortionFrontFacebook ~ @AbortionFrontYouTube ~ @AbortionAccessFrontTALK TO THE CHARLEY BOT FOR ABOBO OPTIONS & RESOURCES HERE!PATREON HERE! Support our work, get exclusive merch and more! DONATE TO AAF HERE!ACTIVIST CALENDAR HERE!VOLUNTEER WITH US HERE!ADOPT-A-CLINIC HERE!EXPOSE FAKE CLINICS HERE!GET ABOBO PILLS FROM PLAN C PILLS HERE!When BS is poppin', we pop off!

Today, we arrive, with Fr. Mike, at the In Brief section for Article III. Together, we revisit eight of the main ideas or “nuggets” from the readings of the past six days. Fr. Mike concludes this section by reminding us of the importance of the unity between and veneration of the 46 books of the Old Testament and the 27 of the New. Today's readings are Catechism paragraphs 134-141. This episode has been found to be in conformity with the Catechism by the Institute on the Catechism, under the Subcommittee on the Catechism, USCCB. For the complete reading plan, visit ascensionpress.com/ciy Please note: The Catechism of the Catholic Church contains adult themes that may not be suitable for children - parental discretion is advised.

Joe talks Hunter Biden and the NY Fraud case against Donald Trump with Article III co-founder Mike Smith. And who is the dumbest person in NYC? Joe has a social media poll with your choice of Mayor Eric Adams, or United States House Representatives Jerry Nadler and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.

Rep. Eli Crane slams Colorado Supreme Court over kicking former President Donald Trump off the state ballot for 2024. The Arizona Congressman calls the Supreme Court's unprecedented action, mostly a “PR role” but is “republic ending behavior.” Additional interviews with President & Founder of ‘Article III' Mike Davis gives his legal analysis on the Colorado Supreme Court ruling that former President Donald Trump can be taken off the state ballot in 2024 and AMAC Spokesman Bobby Charles discusses Biden's failing international diplomacy.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Democrats know that Donald Trump can win in 2024, and the odds of him doing so are rising every day. So rather than try to beat Trump fairly, they're escalating their efforts to simply keep Trump off the ballot as an "insurrectionist." Mike Davis of the Article III project discusses a major bid to take out Trump in Colorado, which could soon be copied nationwide. Plus, Rep. Jim Jordan helps lay out the latest findings from James Comer exposing foreign oligarch's payments to "the Big Guy."Support the show: http://www.charliekirk.com/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.