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The Fox News Supreme Court is a political weapon, and it's being wielded to wreck what remains of American democracy. What happens if Trump declares martial law?  This week on Gaslit Nation, Andrea interviews Leah Litman, a constitutional law professor at the University of Michigan Law School, co-host of the award-winning Strict Scrutiny podcast, and author of the new book LAWLESS: How the Supreme Court Runs on Conservative Grievance, Fringe Theories, and Bad Vibes. This Court is a multi-decade effort by conservatives to seize power they couldn't win through democratic means. Litman warns about what the Fox News Court is up to. If you thought things were bad, we're staring down a term packed with cases that could fundamentally rewrite public education, religious liberty, and basic civil rights. Take Oklahoma Charter Board v. Drummond. This case actually asks whether the Constitution requires states to allow religious public charter schools. Yes, you read that right: requires. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from funding religious education. But now, thanks to the conservative justices' persecution complex, where white Christian nationalism is the most oppressed identity in America, obviously, the Court may rule that denying public funding to religious schools is unconstitutional discrimination. Then there's the challenge to a Maryland school district's decision to include LGBTQ+ inclusive books in elementary schools. A group of religious parents is arguing that merely exposing children to stories with queer characters violates their religious freedom. If the Court agrees, it could hand conservative parents a veto power over what public schools teach, effectively outlawing inclusive education if it makes anyone clutch their pearls. What Litman makes clear is that these cases are about redefining public life, turning schools into vehicles for a theocratic agenda. And let's be honest: they're not talking about funding schools for Wiccans or the Church of Satan. This is about establishing a Christian nationalism dictatorship. Yes, it can happen here. Yes, it's happening here. But we are not powerless. Reform is not a fantasy. Term limits. Ethics rules. Court expansion. These are tools, if we find the courage to use them. Because democracy doesn't die in darkness. It's strangled in broad daylight by men in robes, funded by billionaires, and broadcast live on C-SPAN. And if we don't fight back? We're just letting them get away with it. EVENTS AT GASLIT NATION: May 26 4pm ET – Book club discussion of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Stride Toward Freeom: The Montgomery Story Indiana-based listeners launched a Signal group for others in the state to join, available on Patreon.  Florida-based listeners are going strong meeting in person. Be sure to join their Signal group, available on Patreon.  Have you taken Gaslit Nation's HyperNormalization Survey Yet? Gaslit Nation Salons take place Mondays 4pm ET over Zoom and the first ~40 minutes are recorded and shared on Patreon.com/Gaslit for our community The recent storms have devastated so many in St. Louis, and the Urban League needs our help now more than ever. Please donate what you can to support their relief efforts and help communities rebuild: https://www.ulstl.com/#/   What's as gratifying as a Tesla Takedown protest? A Fox News Takedown protest! https://www.foxtakedown.com/

1UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISIONIn re:INTRUM AB, et al.,1Debtors.Chapter 11Case No. 24-90575 (CML)(Jointly Administered)NOTICE OF APPEALPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 and 8003,notice is hereby given that the Ad Hoc Committee of holders of 2025 notes issued by Intrum AB(the “AHC”) hereby appeals to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texasfrom (i) the Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262) (the “Motion to Dismiss Order”) and (ii) theOrder (I) Approving Disclosure Statement and (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor (Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263) (the“Confirmation Order”). A copy of the Motion to Dismiss Order is attached as Exhibit A and acopy of the Confirmation Order is attached as Exhibit B. Additionally, the transcript of theBankruptcy Court's oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and ConfirmationOrder (ECF No. 275) is attached as Exhibit C.Below are the names of all parties to this appeal and their respective counsel:1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors'service address in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, Ste 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 62I. APPELLANTA. Name of Appellant:The members of the AHC include:Boundary Creek Master Fund LP; CF INT Holdings Designated Activity Company; CaiusCapital Master Fund; Diameter Master Fund LP; Diameter Dislocation Master Fund II LP; FirTree Credit Opportunity Master Fund, LP; MAP 204 Segregated Portfolio, a segregated portfolioof LMA SPC; Star V Partners LLC; and TQ Master Fund LP.Attorneys for the AHC:QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLPChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comB. Positions of appellant in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that isthe subject of this appeal:CreditorsCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 2 of 63II. THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEALA. Judgment, order, or decree appealed from:The Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262); the Order (I) Approving Disclosure Statementand (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor(Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263); and the December 31, 2024 Transcript of OralRuling Before the Honorable Christopher M. Lopez United States Bankruptcy Court Judge (ECFNo. 275).B. The date on which the judgment, order, or decree was entered:The Motion to Dismiss Order and the Confirmation Order were entered on December 31,2024. The Court issued its oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and theConfirmation Order on December 31, 2024.III. OTHER PARTIES TO THIS APPEALIntrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLCMILBANK LLPDennis F. Dunne (admitted pro hac vice)Jaimie Fedell (admitted pro hac vice)55 Hudson YardsNew York, NY 10001Telephone: (212) 530-5000Facsimile: (212) 530-5219Email: ddunne@milbank.comjfedell@milbank.com–and–Andrew M. Leblanc (admitted pro hac vice)Melanie Westover Yanez (admitted pro hac vice)1850 K Street, NW, Suite 1100Washington, DC 20006Telephone: (202) 835-7500Facsimile: (202) 263-7586Email: aleblanc@milbank.commwyanez@milbank.com–and–PORTER HEDGES LLPJohn F. Higgins (SBN 09597500)Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 3 of 64Eric D. Wade (SBN 00794802)M. Shane Johnson (SBN 24083263)1000 Main Street, 36th FloorHouston TX 77002Telephone: (713) 226-6000Facsimile: (713) 226-6248Email: jhiggins@porterhedges.comewade@porterhedges.comsjohnson@porterhedges.comIV. OTHER PARTIES THAT MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THIS APPEALThe following chart lists certain parties that are not parties to this appeal, but that may havean interest in the outcome of the case. These parties should be served with notice of this appealby the Debtors who are aware of their identities and best positioned to provide notice.All Other Creditors of the Debtors, Including, But Not Limited To:• Certain funds and accounts managed by BlackRock Investment Management (UK)Limited or its affiliates;• Capital Four;• Davidson Kempner European Partners, LLP;• Intermediate Capital Managers Limited;• Mandatum Asset Management Ltd;• H.I.G. Capital, LLC;• Spiltan Hograntefond; Spiltan Rantefond Sverige; and Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil;• The RCF SteerCo Group;• Swedbank AB (publ).Any Holder of Stock of the Debtors• Any holder of stock of the Debtors, including their successors and assigns.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 4 of 65Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 2025.QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &SULLIVAN, LLP/s/ Christopher D. PorterChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comCOUNSEL FOR THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OFINTRUM AB 2025 NOTEHOLDERSCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 5 of 6CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI, Christopher D. Porter, hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 2025, a copy ofthe foregoing document has been served via the Electronic Case Filing System for the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas./s/ Christopher D. PorterBy: Christopher D. PorterCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 6 of 6EXHIBIT ACase 24-90575 Document 296-1 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 31IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB, et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))Jointly AdministeredDebtors. ))ORDER DENYING MOTION OF THE AD HOCCOMMITTEE OF HOLDERS OF INTRUM AB NOTES DUE 2025TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASES PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 1112(B) ANDFEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1017(F)(1)(Related to Docket No. 27)This matter, having come before the Court upon the Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee ofHolders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) [Docket No. 27] (the “Motion toDismiss”); and this Court having considered the Debtors' Objection to the Motion of the Ad HocCommittee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (the “Objection”) andany other responses or objections to the Motion to Dismiss; and this Court having jurisdiction overthis matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the Amended Standing Order; and this Court havingfound that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having foundthat it may enter a final order consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution; and thisCourt having found that the relief requested in the Objection is in the best interests of the Debtors'1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f2 32estates; and this Court having found that the Debtors' notice of the Objection and opportunity fora hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and Objection were appropriate and no other notice need beprovided; and this Court having reviewed the Motion to Dismiss and Objection and havingheard the statements in support of the relief requested therein at a hearing before this Court; andthis Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Objectionestablish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had beforethis Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is HEREBYORDERED THAT:1. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied for the reasons stated at the December 31, 2024 hearing.2. This Court retains exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive venue with respect to allmatters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.DAeucegmubste 0r 23,1 2, 0210294CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f2 3EXHIBIT BCase 24-90575 Document 296-2 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 135IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))(Jointly Administered)Debtors. ))ORDER (I) APPROVINGDISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND(II) CONFIRMING JOINT PREPACKAGED CHAPTER 11PLAN OF INTRUM AB AND ITS AFFILIATEDDEBTOR (FURTHER TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS)The above-captioned debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, the“Debtors”), having:a. entered into that certain Lock-Up Agreement, dated as of July 10, 2024 (asamended and restated on August 15, 2024, and as further modified,supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time in accordance with itsterms, the “the Lock-Up Agreement”) and that certain Backstop Agreement,dated as of July 10, 2024, (as amended and restated on November 15, 2024 andas further modified, supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time inaccordance with its terms), setting out the terms of the backstop commitmentsprovided by the Backstop Providers to backstop the entirety of the issuance ofNew Money Notes (as may be further amended, restated, amended and restated,modified or supplemented from time to time in accordance with the termsthereof, the “Backstop Agreement”) which set forth the terms of a consensualfinancial restructuring of the Debtors;b. commenced, on October 17, 2024, a prepetition solicitation (the “Solicitation”)of votes on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of IntrumAB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (asthe same may be further amended, modified and supplemented from time totime, the “Plan”), by causing the transmittal, through their solicitation andballoting agent, Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC (“Kroll”), to theholders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of, among other things: (i) the1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these chapter 11 cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2102, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f1 133452Plan, (ii) the Disclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate (as the same may befurther amended, modified and supplemented from time to time, the“Disclosure Statement”), and (iii) the Ballots and Master Ballot to vote on thePlan (the “Ballots”), (iv) the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7];c. commenced on November 15, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), these chapter 11 cases(these “Chapter 11 Cases”) by filing voluntary petitions in the United StatesBankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”or the “Court”) for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code(the “Bankruptcy Code”);d. Filed on November 15, 2024, the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7] (the “Solicitation Affidavit”);e. Filed, on November 16, 2024 the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 16] and theDisclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB andits Debtor Affiliate [Docket No. 17];f. Filed on November 16, 2024, the Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of ofthe Debtors' Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions [Docket No. 14] (the“First Day Declaration”);g. Filed on November 17, 2024, the Declaration of Alex Orchowski of KrollRestructuring Administration LLC Regarding the Solicitation of Votes andTabulation of Ballots Case on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code [Docket No. 18] (the “Voting Declaration,” andtogether with the Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Ballots, and theSolicitation Affidavit, the “Solicitation Materials”);h. obtained, on November 19, 2024, the Order(I) Scheduling a Combined Hearingon (A) Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and (B) Confirmation of the Plan,(II) Approving Solicitation Procedures and Form and Manner of Notice ofCommencement, Combined Hearing, and Objection Deadline, (III) FixingDeadline to Object to Disclosure Statement and Plan, (IV) Conditionally (A)Directing the United States Trustee Not to Convene Section 341 Meeting ofCreditors and (B) Waiving Requirement to File Statements of Financial Affairsand Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, and (V) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 71] (the “Scheduling Order”), which, among other things: (i)approved the prepetition solicitation and voting procedures, including theConfirmation Schedule (as defined therein); (ii) conditionally approved theDisclosure Statement and its use in the Solicitation; and (iii) scheduled theCombined Hearing on December 16, 2024, at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing CentralCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f1 133453Time) to consider the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and theconfirmation of the Plan (the “Combined Hearing”);i. served, through Kroll, on November 20, 2025, on all known holders of Claimsand Interests, the U.S. Trustee and certain other parties in interest, the Noticeof: (I) Commencement of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases; (II) Hearing on theDisclosure Statement and Confirmation of the Plan, and (III) Certain ObjectionDeadlines (the “Combined Hearing Notice”) as evidence by the Affidavit ofService [Docket No. 160];j. caused, on November 25 and 27, 2024, the Combined Hearing Notice to bepublished in the New York Times (national and international editions) and theFinancial Times (international edition), as evidenced by the Certificate ofPublication [Docket No. 148];k. Filed and served, on December 10, 2024, the Plan Supplement for the Debtors'Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization [Docket 165];l. Filed on December 10, 2024, the Declaration of Jeffrey Kopa in Support ofConfirmation of the Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum ABand its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [DocketNo. 155];m. Filed on December 14, 2024, the:i. Debtors' Memorandum of Law in Support of an Order: (I) Approving, on aFinal Basis, Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement; (II) Confirming theJoint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization; and (III) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 190] (the “Confirmation Brief”);ii. Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of Confirmation of the JointPrepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate.[Docket No. 189] (the “Confirmation Declaration”); andiii. Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and itsDebtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (FurtherTechnical Modifications) [Docket No. 191];n. Filed on December 18, 2024, the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Further Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 223];CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 3 4 o of f1 133454WHEREAS, the Court having, among other things:a. set December 12, 2024, at 4:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) as the deadlinefor Filing objection to the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and/orConfirmation2 of the Plan (the “Objection Deadline”);b. held, on December 16, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) [andcontinuing through December 17, 2024], the Combined Hearing;c. heard the statements, arguments, and any objections made at the CombinedHearing;d. reviewed the Disclosure Statement, the Plan, the Ballots, the Plan Supplement,the Confirmation Brief, the Confirmation Declaration, the SolicitationAffidavit, and the Voting Declaration;e. overruled (i) any and all objections to approval of the Disclosure Statement, thePlan, and Confirmation, except as otherwise stated or indicated on the record,and (ii) all statements and reservations of rights not consensually resolved orwithdrawn, unless otherwise indicated; andf. reviewed and taken judicial notice of all the papers and pleadings Filed(including any objections, statement, joinders, reservations of rights and otherresponses), all orders entered, and all evidence proffered or adduced and allarguments made at the hearings held before the Court during the pendency ofthese cases;NOW, THEREFORE, it appearing to the Bankruptcy Court that notice of theCombined Hearing and the opportunity for any party in interest to object to the DisclosureStatement and the Plan having been adequate and appropriate as to all parties affected or to beaffected by the Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, and the legal and factual bases setforth in the documents Filed in support of approval of the Disclosure Statement and Confirmationand other evidence presented at the Combined Hearing establish just cause for the relief grantedherein; and after due deliberation thereon and good cause appearing therefor, the BankruptcyCourt makes and issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and orders for thereasons stated on the record at the December 31, 2024 ruling on plan confirmation;2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have meanings given to them in the Plan and/or theDisclosure Statement. The rules of interpretation set forth in Article I.B of the Plan apply to this CombinedOrder.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 4 5 o of f1 133455I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWIT IS HEREBY FOUND AND DETERMINED THAT:A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1. The findings and conclusions set forth herein and in the record of theCombined Hearing constitute the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law underRule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rules7052 and 9014. To the extent any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact,or vice versa, they are adopted as such.B. Jurisdiction, Venue, Core Proceeding.2. This Court has jurisdiction over these Chapter 11 Cases pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue of these proceedings and the Chapter 11 Cases in this district is properpursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 157(b)(2) and this Court may enter a final order hereon under Article III of the United StatesConstitution.C. Eligibility for Relief.3. The Debtors were and continue to be entities eligible for relief under section109 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Debtors were and continue to be proper proponents of thePlan under section 1121(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.D. Commencement and Joint Administration of the Chapter 11 Cases.4. On the Petition Date, the Debtors commenced the Chapter 11 Cases. OnNovember 18, 2024, the Court entered an order [Docket No. 51] authorizing the jointadministration of the Chapter 11 Case in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b). The Debtorshave operated their businesses and managed their properties as debtors in possession pursuant toCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 5 6 o of f1 133456sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee, examiner, or statutory committeehas been appointed in these Chapter 11 Cases.E. Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement.5. The Disclosure Statement and the exhibits contained therein (i) containssufficient information of a kind necessary to satisfy the disclosure requirements of applicablenonbankruptcy laws, rules and regulations, including the Securities Act; and (ii) contains“adequate information” as such term is defined in section 1125(a)(1) and used in section1126(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, with respect to the Debtors, the Plan and the transactionscontemplated therein. The Filing of the Disclosure Statement satisfied Bankruptcy Rule 3016(b).The injunction, release, and exculpation provisions in the Plan and the Disclosure Statementdescribe, in bold font and with specific and conspicuous language, all acts to be enjoined andidentify the Entities that will be subject to the injunction, thereby satisfying Bankruptcy Rule3016(c).F. Solicitation.6. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, the Solicitationand the transmittal and service of the Solicitation Materials were: (i) timely, adequate, appropriate,and sufficient under the circumstances; and (ii) in compliance with sections 1125(g) and 1126(b)of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules 3017 and 3018, the applicable Local Bankruptcy Rules,the Scheduling Order and all applicable nonbankruptcy rules, laws, and regulations applicable tothe Solicitation, including the registration requirements under the Securities Act. The SolicitationMaterials, including the Ballots and the Opt Out Form (as defined below), adequately informedthe holders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of the procedures and deadline for completingand submitting the Ballots.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 6 7 o of f1 1334577. The Debtors served the Combined Hearing Notice on the entire creditormatrix and served the Opt Out Form on all Non-Voting Classes. The Combined Hearing Noticeadequately informed Holders of Claims or Interests of critical information regarding voting on (ifapplicable) and objecting to the Plan, including deadlines and the inclusion of release, exculpation,and injunction provisions in the Plan, and adequately summarized the terms of the Third-PartyRelease. Further, because the form enabling stakeholders to opt out of the Third-Party Release (the“Opt Out Form”) was included in both the Ballots and the Opt Out Form, every known stakeholder,including unimpaired creditors was provided with the means by which the stakeholders could optout of the Third-Party Release. No further notice is required. The period for voting on the Planprovided a reasonable and sufficient period of time and the manner of such solicitation was anappropriate process allowing for such holders to make an informed decision.G. Tabulation.8. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, (i) the holders ofClaims in Class 3 (RCF Claims) and Class 5 (Notes Claims) are Impaired under the Plan(collectively, the “Voting Classes”) and have voted to accept the Plan in the numbers and amountsrequired by section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) no Class that was entitled to vote on thePlan voted to reject the Plan. All procedures used to tabulate the votes on the Plan were in goodfaith, fair, reasonable, and conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of theBankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules, the Disclosure Statement, theScheduling Order, and all other applicable nonbankruptcy laws, rules, and regulations.H. Plan Supplement.9. On December 10, 2024, the Debtors Filed the Plan Supplement with theCourt. The Plan Supplement (including as subsequently modified, supplemented, or otherwiseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 7 8 o of f1 133458amended pursuant to a filing with the Court), complies with the terms of the Plan, and the Debtorsprovided good and proper notice of the filing in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, theBankruptcy Rules, the Scheduling Order, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases.All documents included in the Plan Supplement are integral to, part of, and incorporated byreference into the Plan. No other or further notice is or will be required with respect to the PlanSupplement. Subject to the terms of the Plan and the Lock-Up Agreement, and only consistenttherewith, the Debtors reserve the right to alter, amend, update, or modify the Plan Supplementand any of the documents contained therein or related thereto, in accordance with the Plan, on orbefore the Effective Date.I. Modifications to the Plan.10. Pursuant to section 1127 of the Bankruptcy Code, the modifications to thePlan described or set forth in this Combined Order constitute technical or clarifying changes,changes with respect to particular Claims by agreement with holders of such Claims, ormodifications that do not otherwise materially and adversely affect or change the treatment of anyother Claim or Interest under the Plan. These modifications are consistent with the disclosurespreviously made pursuant to the Disclosure Statement and Solicitation Materials, and notice ofthese modifications was adequate and appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the Chapter11 Cases. In accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 3019, these modifications do not require additionaldisclosure under section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code or the resolicitation of votes under section1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and they do not require that holders of Claims or Interests beafforded an opportunity to change previously cast acceptances or rejections of the Plan.Accordingly, the Plan is properly before this Court and all votes cast with respect to the Plan priorto such modification shall be binding and shall apply with respect to the Plan.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 8 9 o of f1 133459J. Objections Overruled.11. Any resolution or disposition of objections to Confirmation explained orotherwise ruled upon by the Court on the record at the Confirmation Hearing is herebyincorporated by reference. All unresolved objections, statements, joinders, informal objections,and reservations of rights are hereby overruled on the merits.K. Burden of Proof.12. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have met their burden of provingthe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code by a preponderance of theevidence, the applicable evidentiary standard for Confirmation. Further, the Debtors have proventhe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) by clear and convincing evidence. Each witness whotestified on behalf of the Debtors in connection with the Confirmation Hearing was credible,reliable, and qualified to testify as to the topics addressed in his testimony.L. Compliance with the Requirements of Section 1129 of the BankruptcyCode.13. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of section 1129 of theBankruptcy Code as follows:a. Section 1129(a)(1) – Compliance of the Plan with Applicable Provisions of theBankruptcy Code.14. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122 and 1123, as required by section 1129(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.i. Section 1122 and 1123(a)(1) – Proper Classification.15. The classification of Claims and Interests under the Plan is proper under theBankruptcy Code. In accordance with sections 1122(a) and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,Article III of the Plan provides for the separate classification of Claims and Interests at each Debtorinto Classes, based on differences in the legal nature or priority of such Claims and Interests (otherCaCsaes e2 42-49-09507557 5 D oDcoucmumenetn 2t 9266-32 FFiilleedd iinn TTXXSSBB oonn 1021//3113//2245 PPaaggee 91 0o fo 1f 3143510than Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, and Priority Tax Claims, which areaddressed in Article II of the Plan and Unimpaired, and are not required to be designated asseparate Classes in accordance with section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code). Valid business,factual, and legal reasons exist for the separate classification of the various Classes of Claims andInterests created under the Plan, the classifications were not implemented for any improperpurpose, and the creation of such Classes does not unfairly discriminate between or among holdersof Claims or Interests.16. In accordance with section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, each Class ofClaims or Interests contains only Claims or Interests substantially similar to the other Claims orInterests within that Class. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of sections 1122(a),1122(b), and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Codeii. Section 1123(a)(2) – Specifications of Unimpaired Classes.17. Article III of the Plan specifies that Claims and Interests in the classesdeemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan. Holders of Intercompany Claims andIntercompany Interests are either Unimpaired and conclusively presumed to have accepted thePlan, or are Impaired and deemed to reject (the “Deemed Rejecting Classes”) the Plan, and, ineither event, are not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan. In addition, Article II of the Planspecifies that Administrative Claims and Priority Tax Claims are Unimpaired, although the Plandoes not classify these Claims. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 101 o of f1 1334511iii. Section 1123(a)(3) – Specification of Treatment of Voting Classes18. Article III.B of the Plan specifies the treatment of each Voting Class underthe Plan – namely, Class 3 and Class 5. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.iv. Section 1123(a)(4) – No Discrimination.19. Article III of the Plan provides the same treatment to each Claim or Interestin any particular Class, as the case may be, unless the holder of a particular Claim or Interest hasagreed to a less favorable treatment with respect to such Claim or Interest. Accordingly, the Plansatisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.v. Section 1123(a)(5) – Adequate Means for Plan Implementation.20. The Plan and the various documents included in the Plan Supplementprovide adequate and proper means for the Plan's execution and implementation, including: (a)the general settlement of Claims and Interests; (b) the restructuring of the Debtors' balance sheetand other financial transactions provided for by the Plan; (c) the consummation of the transactionscontemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement, the Restructuring Implementation Deed andthe Agreed Steps Plan and other documents Filed as part of the Plan Supplement; (d) the issuanceof Exchange Notes, the New Money Notes, and the Noteholder Ordinary Shares pursuant to thePlan; (e) the amendment of the Intercreditor Agreement; (f) the amendment of the FacilityAgreement; (g) the amendment of the Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement; (h) theconsummation of the Rights Offering in accordance with the Plan, Rights Offering Documentsand the Lock-Up Agreement; (i) the granting of all Liens and security interests granted orconfirmed (as applicable) pursuant to, or in connection with, the Facility Agreement, the ExchangeNotes Indenture, the New Money Notes Indenture, the amended Intercreditor Agreement and theCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 112 o of f1 1334512Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement pursuant to the New Security Documents (including anyLiens and security interests granted or confirmed (as applicable) on the Reorganized Debtors'assets); (j) the vesting of the assets of the Debtors' Estates in the Reorganized Debtors; (k) theconsummation of the corporate reorganization contemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement,the Agreed Steps Plan and the Master Reorganization Agreement (as defined in the RestructuringImplementation Deed); and (l) the execution, delivery, filing, or recording of all contracts,instruments, releases, and other agreements or documents in furtherance of the Plan. Accordingly,the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Codevi. Section 1123(a)(6) – Non-Voting Equity Securities.21. The Company's organizational documents in accordance with the SwedishCompanies Act, Ch. 4, Sec 5 and the Plan prohibit the issuance of non-voting securities as of theEffective Date to the extent required to comply with section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.vii. Section 1123(a)(7) – Directors, Officers, and Trustees.22. The manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee (or any successorto and such officer, director, or trustee) of the Reorganized Debtors will be determined inaccordance with the existing organizational documents, which is consistent with the interests ofcreditors and equity holders and with public policy. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies therequirements of section 1123(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.b. Section 1123(b) – Discretionary Contents of the Plan23. The Plan contains various provisions that may be construed as discretionarybut not necessary for Confirmation under the Bankruptcy Code. Any such discretionary provisionCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 123 o of f1 1334513complies with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and is not inconsistent with the applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan satisfies section 1123(b).i. Section 1123(b)(1) – Impairment/Unimpairment of Any Class of Claims orInterests24. Article III of the Plan impairs or leaves unimpaired, as the case may be,each Class of Claims or Interests, as contemplated by section 1123(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.ii. Section 1123(b)(2) – Assumption and Rejection of Executory Contracts andUnexpired Leases25. Article V of the Plan provides for the assumption of the Debtors' ExecutoryContracts and Unexpired Leases as of the Effective Date unless such Executory Contract orUnexpired Lease: (a) is identified on the Rejected Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease List;(b) has been previously rejected by a Final Order; (c) is the subject of a motion to reject ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases that is pending on the Confirmation Date; or (4) is subject to amotion to reject an Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease pursuant to which the requestedeffective date of such rejection is after the Effective Date. Thus, the Plan satisfies section1123(b)(2).iii. Compromise and Settlement26. In accordance with section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code andBankruptcy Rule 9019, and in consideration for the distributions and other benefits provided underthe Plan, the provisions of the Plan constitute a good-faith compromise of all Claims, Interests,and controversies relating to the contractual, legal, and subordination rights that all holders ofClaims or Interests may have with respect to any Allowed Claim or Interest or any distribution tobe made on account of such Allowed Claim or Interest. Such compromise and settlement is theproduct of extensive arm's-length, good faith negotiations that, in addition to the Plan, resulted inCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 134 o of f1 1334514the execution of the Lock-Up Agreement, which represents a fair and reasonable compromise ofall Claims, Interests, and controversies and entry into which represented a sound exercise of theDebtors' business judgment. Such compromise and settlement is fair, equitable, and reasonableand in the best interests of the Debtors and their Estates.27. The releases of the Debtors' directors and officers are an integral componentof the settlements and compromises embodied in the Plan. The Debtors' directors and officers: (a)made a substantial and valuable contribution to the Debtors' restructuring, including extensive preandpost-Petition Date negotiations with stakeholder groups, and ensured the uninterruptedoperation of the Debtors' businesses during the Chapter 11 Cases; (b) invested significant timeand effort to make the restructuring a success and maximize the value of the Debtors' businessesin a challenging operating environment; (c) attended and, in certain instances, testified atdepositions and Court hearings; (d) attended and participated in numerous stakeholder meetings,management meetings, and board meetings related to the restructuring; (e) are entitled toindemnification from the Debtors under applicable non-bankruptcy law, organizationaldocuments, and agreements; (f) invested significant time and effort in the preparation of the Lock-Up Agreement, the Plan, Disclosure Statement, all supporting analyses, and the numerous otherpleadings Filed in the Chapter 11 Cases, thereby ensuring the smooth administration of the Chapter11 Cases; and (g) are entitled to all other benefits under any employment contracts existing as ofthe Petition Date. Litigation by the Debtors or other Releasing Parties against the Debtors'directors and officers would be a distraction to the Debtors' business and restructuring and woulddecrease rather than increase the value of the estates. The releases of the Debtors' directors andofficers contained in the Plan have the consent of the Debtors and the Releasing Parties and are inthe best interests of the estates.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 145 o of f1 1334515iv. Debtor Release28. The releases of claims and Causes of Action by the Debtors, ReorganizedDebtors, and their Estates described in Article VIII.C of the Plan in accordance with section1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Debtor Release”) represent a valid exercise of the Debtors'business judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuitof any such claims against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates' variousconstituencies because the costs involved would outweigh any potential benefit from pursuingsuch claims. The Debtor Release is fair and equitable and complies with the absolute priority rule.29. The Debtor Release is (a) an integral part of the Plan, and a component ofthe comprehensive settlement implemented under the Plan; (b) in exchange for the good andvaluable consideration provided by the Released Parties; (c) a good faith settlement andcompromise of the claims and Causes of Action released by the Debtor Release; (d) materiallybeneficial to, and in the best interests of, the Debtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and isimportant to the overall objectives of the Plan to finally resolve certain Claims among or againstcertain parties in interest in the Chapter 11 Cases; (e) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (f) given andmade after due notice and opportunity for hearing; and (g) a bar to any Debtor asserting any claimor Cause of Action released by the Debtor Release against any of the Released Parties. Theprobability of success in litigation with respect to the released claims and Causes of Action, whenweighed against the costs, supports the Debtor Release. With respect to each of these potentialCauses of Action, the parties could assert colorable defenses and the probability of success isuncertain. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuit of any such claims or Causes ofAction against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates or the Debtors' variousCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 156 o of f1 1334516constituencies because the costs involved would likely outweigh any potential benefit frompursuing such claims or Causes of Action30. Holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote have overwhelmingly votedin favor of the Plan, including the Debtor Release. The Plan, including the Debtor Release, wasnegotiated before and after the Petition Date by sophisticated parties represented by able counseland advisors, including the Consenting Creditors. The Debtor Release is therefore the result of ahard fought and arm's-length negotiation process conducted in good faith.31. The Debtor Release appropriately offers protection to parties thatparticipated in the Debtors' restructuring process, including the Consenting Creditors, whoseparticipation in the Chapter 11 Cases is critical to the Debtors' successful emergence frombankruptcy. Specifically, the Released Parties, including the Consenting Creditors, madesignificant concessions and contributions to the Chapter 11 Cases, including, entering into theLock-Up Agreement and related agreements, supporting the Plan and the Chapter 11 Cases, andwaiving or agreeing to impair substantial rights and Claims against the Debtors under the Plan (aspart of the compromises composing the settlement underlying the revised Plan) in order tofacilitate a consensual reorganization and the Debtors' emergence from chapter 11. The DebtorRelease for the Debtors' directors and officers is appropriate because the Debtors' directors andofficers share an identity of interest with the Debtors and, as previously stated, supported and madesubstantial contributions to the success of the Plan, the Chapter 11 Cases, and operation of theDebtors' business during the Chapter 11 Cases, actively participated in meetings, negotiations, andimplementation during the Chapter 11 Cases, and have provided other valuable consideration tothe Debtors to facilitate the Debtors' successful reorganization and continued operation.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 167 o of f1 133451732. The scope of the Debtor Release is appropriately tailored under the factsand circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases. In light of, among other things, the value provided bythe Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and the critical nature of the Debtor Release to thePlan, the Debtor Release is appropriate.v. Release by Holders of Claims and Interests33. The release by the Releasing Parties (the “Third-Party Release”), set forthin Article VIII.D of the Plan, is an essential provision of the Plan. The Third-Party Release is: (a)consensual as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object or properly optout from the Third-Party Release; (b) within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334; (c) in exchange for the good and valuable consideration provided by theReleased Parties; (d) a good faith settlement and compromise of the claims and Causes of Actionreleased by the Third-Party Release; (e) materially beneficial to, and in the best interests of, theDebtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and is important to the overall objectives of the Planto finally resolve certain Claims among or against certain parties in interest in the Chapter 11Cases; (f) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (g) given and made after due notice and opportunity forhearing; (h) appropriately narrow in scope given that it expressly excludes, among other things,any Cause of Action that is judicially determined by a Final Order to have constituted actual fraud,willful misconduct, or gross negligence; (i) a bar to any of the Releasing Parties asserting anyclaim or Cause of Action released by the Third-Party Release against any of the Released Parties;and (j) consistent with sections 105, 524, 1123, 1129, and 1141 and other applicable provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code.34. The Third-Party Release is an integral part of the agreement embodied inthe Plan among the relevant parties in interest. Like the Debtor Release, the Third-Party ReleaseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 178 o of f1 1334518facilitated participation in both the Debtors' Plan and the chapter 11 process generally. The Third-Party Release is instrumental to the Plan and was critical in incentivizing parties to support thePlan and preventing significant and time-consuming litigation regarding the parties' respectiverights and interests. The Third-Party Release was a core negotiation point in connection with thePlan and instrumental in developing the Plan that maximized value for all of the Debtors'stakeholders and kept the Debtors intact as a going concern. As such, the Third-Party Releaseappropriately offers certain protections to parties who constructively participated in the Debtors'restructuring process—including the Consenting Creditors (as set forth above)—by, among otherthings, facilitating the negotiation and consummation of the Plan, supporting the Plan and, in thecase of the Backstop Providers, committing to provide new capital to facilitate the Debtors'emergence from chapter 11. Specifically, the Notes Ad Hoc Group proposed and negotiated thepari passu transaction that is the basis of the restructuring proposed under the Plan and provideda much-needed deleveraging to the Debtors' business while taking a discount on their Claims (inexchange for other consideration).35. Furthermore, the Third-Party Release is consensual as to all parties ininterest, including all Releasing Parties, and such parties in interest were provided notice of thechapter 11 proceedings, the Plan, the deadline to object to confirmation of the Plan, and theCombined Hearing and were properly informed that all holders of Claims against or Interests inthe Debtors that did not file an objection with the Court in the Chapter 11 Cases that included anexpress objection to the inclusion of such holder as a Releasing Party under the provisionscontained in Article VIII of the Plan would be deemed to have expressly, unconditionally,generally, individually, and collectively consented to the release and discharge of all claims andCauses of Action against the Debtors and the Released Parties. Additionally, the release provisionsCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 189 o of f1 1334519of the Plan were conspicuous, emphasized with boldface type in the Plan, the DisclosureStatement, the Ballots, and the applicable notices. Except as set forth in the Plan, all ReleasingParties were properly informed that unless they (a) checked the “opt out” box on the applicableBallot or opt-out form and returned the same in advance of the Voting Deadline, as applicable, or(b) timely Filed an objection to the releases contained in the Plan that was not resolved beforeentry of this Confirmation Order, they would be deemed to have expressly consented to the releaseof all Claims and Causes of Action against the Released Parties.36. The Ballots sent to all holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote, aswell as the notice of the Combined Hearing sent to all known parties in interest (including thosenot entitled to vote on the Plan), unambiguously provided in bold letters that the Third-PartyRelease was contained in the Plan.37. The scope of the Third-Party Release is appropriately tailored under thefacts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases, and parties in interest received due and adequatenotice of the Third-Party Release. Among other things, the Plan provides appropriate and specificdisclosure with respect to the claims and Causes of Action that are subject to the Third-PartyRelease, and no other disclosure is necessary. The Debtors, as evidenced by the VotingDeclaration and Certificate of Publication, including by providing actual notice to all knownparties in interest, including all known holders of Claims against, and Interests in, any Debtor andpublishing notice in international and national publications for the benefit of unknown parties ininterest, provided sufficient notice of the Third-Party Release, and no further or other notice isnecessary. The Third-Party Release is designed to provide finality for the Debtors, theReorganized Debtors and the Released Parties regarding the parties' respective obligations underthe Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary, anyparty who timely opted-out of the Third-Party Release is not bound by the Third-PartyRelease.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 290 o of f1 133452038. The Third-Party Release is specific in language, integral to the Plan, andgiven for substantial consideration. The Releasing Parties were given due and adequate notice ofthe Third-Party Release, and thus the Third-Party Release is consensual under controllingprecedent as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object. In light of,among other things, the value provided by the Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and theconsensual and critical nature of the Third-Party Release to the Plan, the Third-Party Release isappropriatevi. Exculpation.39. The exculpation described in Article VIII.E of the Plan (the “Exculpation”)is appropriate under applicable law, including In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 48 F. 4th 419(5th Cir. 2022), because it was supported by proper evidence, proposed in good faith, wasformulated following extensive good-faith, arm's-length negotiations with key constituents, and isappropriately limited in scope.40. No Entity or Person may commence or continue any action, employ anyprocess, or take any other act to pursue, collect, recover or offset any Claim, Interest, debt,obligation, or Cause of Action relating or reasonably likely to relate to any act or commission inconnection with, relating to, or arising out of a Covered Matter (including one that alleges theactual fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct of a Covered Entity), unless expresslyauthorized by the Bankruptcy Court after (1) it determines, after a notice and a hearing, such Claim,Interest, debt, obligation, or Cause of Action is colorable and (2) it specifically authorizes suchEntity or Person to bring such Claim or Cause of Action. The Bankruptcy Court shall have soleand exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether any such Claim, Interest, debt, obligation or Causeof Action is colorable and, only to the extent legally permissible and as provided for in Article XI,CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 201 o of f1 1334521shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such underlying colorable Claim, Interest, debt, obligation, orCause of Action.vii. Injunction.41. The injunction provisions set forth in Article VIII.F of the Plan are essentialto the Plan and are necessary to implement the Plan and to preserve and enforce the discharge,Debtor Release, the Third-Party Release, and the Exculpation provisions in Article VIII of thePlan. The injunction provisions are appropriately tailored to achieve those purposes.viii. Preservation of Claims and Causes of Action.42. Article IV.L of the Plan appropriately provides for the preservation by theDebtors of certain Causes of Action in accordance with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.Causes of Action not released by the Debtors or exculpated under the Plan will be retained by theReorganized Debtors as provided by the Plan. The Plan is sufficiently specific with respect to theCauses of Action to be retained by the Debtors, and the Plan and Plan Supplement providemeaningful disclosure with respect to the potential Causes of Action that the Debtors may retain,and all parties in interest received adequate notice with respect to such retained Causes of Action.The provisions regarding Causes of Action in the Plan are appropriate and in the best interests ofthe Debtors, their respective Estates, and holders of Claims or Interests. For the avoidance of anydoubt, Causes of Action released or exculpated under the Plan will not be retained by theReorganized Debtors.c. Section 1123(d) – Cure of Defaults43. Article V.D of the Plan provides for the satisfaction of Cure Claimsassociated with each Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease to be assumed in accordance withsection 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Any monetary defaults under each assumed ExecutoryCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 212 o of f1 1334522Contract or Unexpired Lease shall be satisfied, pursuant to section 365(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode, by payment of the default amount in Cash on the Effective Date, subject to the limitationsdescribed in Article V.D of the Plan, or on such other terms as the parties to such ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases may otherwise agree. Any Disputed Cure Amounts will bedetermined in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article V.D of the Plan, and applicablebankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law. As such, the Plan provides that the Debtors will Cure, orprovide adequate assurance that the Debtors will promptly Cure, defaults with respect to assumedExecutory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in accordance with section 365(b)(1) of theBankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan complies with section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.d. Section 1129(a)(2) – Compliance of the Debtors and Others with the ApplicableProvisions of the Bankruptcy Code.44. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have complied with all applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code as required by section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, and 1128, and Bankruptcy Rules 3017, 3018,and 3019.e. Section 1129(a)(3) – Proposal of Plan in Good Faith.45. The Debtors have proposed the Plan in good faith, in accordance with theBankruptcy Code requirements, and not by any means forbidden by law. In determining that thePlan has been proposed in good faith, the Court has examined the totality of the circumstancesfiling of the Chapter 11 Cases, including the formation of Intrum AB of Texas LLC (“IntrumTexas”), the Plan itself, and the process leading to its formulation. The Debtors' good faith isevident from the facts and record of the Chapter 11 Cases, the Disclosure Statement, and the recordof the Combined Hearing and other proceedings held in the Chapter 11 CasesCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 223 o of f1 133452346. The Plan (including the Plan Supplement and all other documents necessaryto effectuate the Plan) is the product of good faith, arm's-length negotiations by and among theDebtors, the Debtors' directors and officers and the Debtors' key stakeholders, including theConsenting Creditors and each of their respective professionals. The Plan itself and the processleading to its formulation provide independent evidence of the Debtors' and such other parties'good faith, serve the public interest, and assure fair treatment of holders of Claims or Interests.Consistent with the overriding purpose of chapter 11, the Debtors Filed the Chapter 11 Cases withthe belief that the Debtors were in need of reorganization and the Plan was negotiated and proposedwith the intention of accomplishing a successful reorganization and maximizing stakeholder value,and for no ulterior purpose. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(3) of the BankruptcyCode are satisfied.f. Section 1129(a)(4) – Court Approval of Certain Payments as Reasonable.47. Any payment made or to be made by the Debtors, or by a person issuingsecurities or acquiring property under the Plan, for services or costs and expenses in connectionwith the Chapter 11 Cases, or in connection with the Plan and incident to the Chapter 11 Cases,has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the Court as reasonable. Accordingly, thePlan satisfies the requirements of section 1129(a)(4).g. Section 1129(a)(5)—Disclosure of Directors and Officers and Consistency with theInterests of Creditors and Public Policy.48. The identities of or process for appointment of the Reorganized Debtors'directors and officers proposed to serve after the Effective Date were disclosed in the PlanSupplement in advance of the Combined Hearing. Accordingly, the Debtors have satisfied therequirements of section 1129(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 234 o of f1 1334524h. Section 1129(a)(6)—Rate Changes.49. The Plan does not contain any rate changes subject to the jurisdiction of anygovernmental regulatory commission and therefore will not require governmental regulatoryapproval. Therefore, section 1129(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the Plan.i. Section 1129(a)(7)—Best Interests of Holders of Claims and Interests.50. The liquidation analysis attached as Exhibit D to the Disclosure Statementand the other evidence in support of the Plan that was proffered or adduced at the CombinedHearing, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases are (a) reasonable, persuasive,credible, and accurate as of the dates such analysis or evidence was prepared, presented orproffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c) have not beencontroverted by other evidence; and (d) establish that each holder of Allowed Claims or Interestsin each Class will recover as much or more value under the Plan on account of such Claim orInterest, as of the Effective Date, than the amount such holder would receive if the Debtors wereliquidated on the Effective Date under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or has accepted the Plan.As a result, the Debtors have demonstrated that the Plan is in the best interests of their creditorsand equity holders and the requirements of section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.j. Section 1129(a)(8)—Conclusive Presumption of Acceptance by UnimpairedClasses; Acceptance of the Plan by Certain Voting Classes.51. The classes deemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan andare deemed to have accepted the Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. EachVoting Class voted to accept the Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, however, even if section1129(a)(8) has not been satisfied with respect to all of the Debtors, the Plan is confirmable becausethe Plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to the Voting Classesand thus satisfies section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to such Classes as describedCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 245 o of f1 1334525further below. As a result, the requirements of section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code are alsosatisfied.k. Section 1129(a)(9)—Treatment of Claims Entitled to Priority Pursuant to Section507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.52. The treatment of Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, andPriority Tax Claims under Article II of the Plan satisfies the requirements of, and complies in allrespects with, section 1129(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.l. Section 1129(a)(10)—Acceptance by at Least One Voting Class.53. As set forth in the Voting Declaration, all Voting Classes overwhelminglyvoted to accept the Plan. As such, there is at least one Voting Class that has accepted the Plan,determined without including any acceptance of the Plan by any insider (as defined by theBankruptcy Code), for each Debtor. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) of theBankruptcy Code are satisfied.m. Section 1129(a)(11)—Feasibility of the Plan.54. The Plan satisfies section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thefinancial projections attached to the Disclosure Statement as Exhibit D and the other evidencesupporting the Plan proffered or adduced by the Debtors at or before the Combined Hearing: (a)is reasonable, persuasive, credible, and accurate as of the dates such evidence was prepared,presented, or proffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c)has not been controverted by other persuasive evidence; (d) establishes that the Plan is feasibleand Confirmation of the Plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for furtherfinancial reorganization; (e) establishes that the Debtors will have sufficient funds available tomeet their obligations under the Plan and in the ordinary course of business—including sufficientamounts of Cash to reasonably ensure payment of Allowed Claims that will receive CashCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 256 o of f1 1334526distributions pursuant to the terms of the Plan and other Cash payments required under the Plan;and (f) establishes that the Debtors or the Reorganized Debtors, as applicable, will have thefinancial wherewithal to pay any Claims that accrue, become payable, or are allowed by FinalOrder following the Effective Date. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code.n. Section 1129(a)(12)—Payment of Statutory Fees.55. Article XII.C of the Plan provides that all fees payable pursuant to section1930(a) of the Judicial Code, as determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing inaccordance with section 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code, will be paid by each of the applicableReorganized Debtors for each quarter (including any fraction of a quarter) until the Chapter 11Cases are converted, dismissed, or closed, whichever occurs first. Accordingly, the Plan satisfiesthe requirements of section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code.o. Section 1129(a)(13)—Retiree Benefits.56. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code, and as provided inArticle IV.K of the Plan, the Reorganized Debtors will continue to pay all obligations on accountof retiree benefits (as such term is used in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code) on and after theEffective Date in accordance with applicable law. As a result, the requirements of section1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.p. Sections 1129(a)(14), (15), and (16)—Domestic Support Obligations, Individuals,and Nonprofit Corporations.57. The Debtors do not owe any domestic support obligations, are notindividuals, and are not nonprofit corporations. Therefore, sections 1129(a)(14), 1129(a)(15), and1129(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to the Chapter 11 Cases.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 267 o of f1 1334527q. Section 1129(b)—Confirmation of the Plan Over Nonacceptance of VotingClasses.58. No Classes rejected the Plan, and section 1129(b) is not applicable here,but even if it were, the Plan may be confirmed pursuant to section 1129(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode because the Plan is fair and equitable with respect to the Deemed Rejecting Classes. ThePlan has been proposed in good faith, is reasonable, and meets the requirements and all VotingClasses have voted to accept the Plan. The treatment of Intercompany Claims and IntercompanyInterests under the Plan provides for administrative convenience does not constitute a distributionunder the Plan on account of suc

Does the historical concept of oblivion offer a way out of our ruptured political life? "For centuries, legislative acts of oblivion were declared in times when betrayal, war, and tyranny had usurped and undermined the very foundations of law; when a household or nation had been torn apart, its citizens pitted against one another; when identifying, investigating, trying, and sentencing every single guilty party threatened to redouble the harm, to further fracture already divided societies," writes the scholar Linda Kinstler. In this episode, Kinstler delves into the history of oblivion as well as its limitations, as Donald Trump prepares to return to the presidency having gotten away with his attempt to subvert democracy on Jan. 6, 2021. Further reading: Jan. 6, America's Rupture, and the Strange, Forgotten Power of Oblivion by Linda Kinstler (New York Times) Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends by Linda Kinstler (2022)  

Today Jim Garrity tackles the topic of narrative objections, which are objections that go beyond a simple "Form!" or "Objection!" and provide a concise explanation of the grounds for the objection. Some litigators see anything beyond a single word as a speaking objection or as coaching, but that's not so. Jim untangles the spaghetti in this episode.(By the way, there are two cases and rules listed in the show notes. If you don't see them all, click through to our podcast page, and you'll find them there. Some hosting sites truncate show notes to save space. And, if you have a moment, would you please leave us a 5-star rating wherever you're listening to us? It takes less than 30 seconds, but it's a huge incentive for us to put these episodes together. We offer critical expert insights in this podcast, as well as the research to back it up, and it's all free. The 5-star ratings are a great way to send us a thank you back. Thanks!)SHOW NOTESB.P. v. City of Johnson City, No. 2:23-CV-71-TRM-JEM, 2024 WL 3461408 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2024) (statement that pages were out of order or missing, following objection, wasn't improper “speaking objection” but, rather, articulated basis for objection; court also found no basis to limit defending lawyers to word “objection” during deposition, as lawyer must state basis for it)Dino Antolini, Plaintiff, v. Amy McCloskey, et al., Defendants., No. 1:19-CV-09038-GBD-SDA, Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2021 WL 5411176, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2021) (citing cases for proposition that objections should be made using the single word “Objection” unless the basis for the objection is requested; providing numerous examples of alleged speaking objections)R.D. v. Shohola, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-01056, Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2019 WL 6134731 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019) (in context of pretrial rulings, court declined to grant motion in limine barring speaking objections, saying, “However, because “we deem the question of what constitutes an improper speaking objection, an inappropriate comment on excluded evidence, or an improper ad hominem exchange to be fact bound matters which cannot be determined wholly in the abstract, we will defer further rulings on these motions pending proper objections at trial”)Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2) requiring objections to “be stated concisely in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner”)Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments (stating that new paragraph (1) at the time provides that “that any objections during a deposition must be made concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner;” rule does not tell us how to make an objection, such as by word “objection”)Brent v. Cramer, et al., No. CV JKB-22-1349, 2024 WL 3878145 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2024), fn. 4 (providing examples of alleged speaking objections)Christie v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd, No. 20-22349, 2021 WL 2940251 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2021) (examples of speaking objections)State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Dowdy, 445 F. Supp.2d 1289 (N. D. Oklahoma July 21, 2006)In re Stratosphere Corporation Securities Litigation, 182 F. R. D. 614 (D. Nevada 1998) (“This Court can find no better or more succinct definition or description of what is and is not a valid deposition objection than that found in Rule 30(d)(1): “Any objection to evidence during the deposition shall be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner”)Mitnor v. Club Condominiums, et al., 339 F.R.D. 312, 317-318 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (describing some of the essential characteristics of an improper speaking objection)Fed. R. Evid. 103 (providing that in order to preserve and objection, a party must timely object or move to strike and state the specific ground for the objection, and less it is apparent by context)Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(d) (Waiver of Objections)

Sean “Diddy” Combs is facing seven new civil lawsuits, with two of the plaintiffs alleging that they were minors when they were drugged and sexually assaulted by the music mogul. These recent filings, submitted in federal and state courts in New York, detail allegations of sexual misconduct spanning from 2000 to 2022, further compounding Combs' ongoing legal battles. One of the lawsuits, filed by a woman identified as Jane Doe, alleges that she was only 13 years old when she was assaulted at an afterparty following the MTV Video Music Awards in 2000. According to the lawsuit, Doe was invited to the party by a limo driver, where she consumed a drink and soon began feeling drowsy. In search of a place to rest, she entered a bedroom. It was then, according to the complaint, that Combs, along with an unnamed male and female celebrity, entered the room. “You are ready to party!” Combs allegedly said to her, according to the lawsuit. The unnamed male celebrity then allegedly raped Doe while Combs and the female celebrity watched. The lawsuit further alleges that Combs then raped her as well. When asked for comment on these new allegations, Combs' representatives pointed to a prior statement from his legal team denying all accusations. “Mr. Combs and his legal team have full confidence in the facts, their legal defenses, and the integrity of the judicial process,” the statement read. “In court, the truth will prevail: Mr. Combs has never sexually assaulted anyone — adult or minor, man or woman.” The new lawsuits, five of which were filed in federal court and two in New York Superior Court, accuse Combs of a range of offenses, including rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiffs allege that these incidents occurred during parties hosted by Combs in New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas over the past two decades. The plaintiffs include three women and four men, all of whom claim that they were drugged before the alleged assaults took place. Another accuser, identified as John Doe, claims that he was 17 years old in 2022 when he was drugged and sexually assaulted by Combs. The lawsuit states that Combs offered the young aspiring artist a drink and assured him that he could help launch his music career. John Doe alleges that after consuming the drink, he was assaulted. These lawsuits follow a series of legal actions brought against Combs last week by Houston-based attorney Tony Buzbee and co-counsel Andrew Van Arsdale, who now represent more than 120 individuals accusing the music producer of abuse. The two lawyers have stated that many of their clients were minors at the time of the alleged assaults. Federal prosecutors have also accused Combs of running a “criminal enterprise” through his business ventures, alleging that he engaged in sex trafficking, forced labor, and years of physical abuse. Combs has pleaded not guilty to federal charges of sex trafficking and racketeering and is currently being held in custody in New York. His trial is scheduled to begin in May 2025. In response to the growing number of lawsuits and allegations, Combs' legal team has requested a gag order from the court to prevent potential witnesses and their lawyers from making public statements. “This Court should exercise its discretion in issuing an order requiring all potential witnesses and their counsel to refrain from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood to interfere with Mr. Combs's trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice,” the motion read. Since November 2023, more than 25 civil lawsuits have been filed against Combs, alleging sexual misconduct and assault. The first lawsuit, filed by his former girlfriend Cassie Ventura, was settled within a day, but many of the remaining cases are still active. Federal prosecutors have indicated that their investigation is ongoing, and additional charges or defendants may be added in the coming months. Want to listen to ALL of our podcasts AD-FREE? Subscribe through APPLE PODCASTS, and try it for three days free: https://tinyurl.com/ycw626tj Follow Our Other Cases: https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com The latest on The Downfall of Diddy, The Trial of Karen Read, The Murder Of Maddie Soto, Catching the Long Island Serial Killer, Awaiting Admission: BTK's Unconfessed Crimes, Delphi Murders: Inside the Crime, Chad & Lori Daybell, The Murder of Ana Walshe, Alex Murdaugh, Bryan Kohberger, Lucy Letby, Kouri Richins, Malevolent Mormon Mommys, The Menendez Brothers: Quest For Justice, The Murder of Stephen Smith, The Murder of Madeline Kingsbury, The Murder Of Sandra Birchmore, and much more! Listen at https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com

Sean “Diddy” Combs is facing seven new civil lawsuits, with two of the plaintiffs alleging that they were minors when they were drugged and sexually assaulted by the music mogul. These recent filings, submitted in federal and state courts in New York, detail allegations of sexual misconduct spanning from 2000 to 2022, further compounding Combs' ongoing legal battles. One of the lawsuits, filed by a woman identified as Jane Doe, alleges that she was only 13 years old when she was assaulted at an afterparty following the MTV Video Music Awards in 2000. According to the lawsuit, Doe was invited to the party by a limo driver, where she consumed a drink and soon began feeling drowsy. In search of a place to rest, she entered a bedroom. It was then, according to the complaint, that Combs, along with an unnamed male and female celebrity, entered the room. “You are ready to party!” Combs allegedly said to her, according to the lawsuit. The unnamed male celebrity then allegedly raped Doe while Combs and the female celebrity watched. The lawsuit further alleges that Combs then raped her as well. When asked for comment on these new allegations, Combs' representatives pointed to a prior statement from his legal team denying all accusations. “Mr. Combs and his legal team have full confidence in the facts, their legal defenses, and the integrity of the judicial process,” the statement read. “In court, the truth will prevail: Mr. Combs has never sexually assaulted anyone — adult or minor, man or woman.” The new lawsuits, five of which were filed in federal court and two in New York Superior Court, accuse Combs of a range of offenses, including rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiffs allege that these incidents occurred during parties hosted by Combs in New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas over the past two decades. The plaintiffs include three women and four men, all of whom claim that they were drugged before the alleged assaults took place. Another accuser, identified as John Doe, claims that he was 17 years old in 2022 when he was drugged and sexually assaulted by Combs. The lawsuit states that Combs offered the young aspiring artist a drink and assured him that he could help launch his music career. John Doe alleges that after consuming the drink, he was assaulted. These lawsuits follow a series of legal actions brought against Combs last week by Houston-based attorney Tony Buzbee and co-counsel Andrew Van Arsdale, who now represent more than 120 individuals accusing the music producer of abuse. The two lawyers have stated that many of their clients were minors at the time of the alleged assaults. Federal prosecutors have also accused Combs of running a “criminal enterprise” through his business ventures, alleging that he engaged in sex trafficking, forced labor, and years of physical abuse. Combs has pleaded not guilty to federal charges of sex trafficking and racketeering and is currently being held in custody in New York. His trial is scheduled to begin in May 2025. In response to the growing number of lawsuits and allegations, Combs' legal team has requested a gag order from the court to prevent potential witnesses and their lawyers from making public statements. “This Court should exercise its discretion in issuing an order requiring all potential witnesses and their counsel to refrain from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood to interfere with Mr. Combs's trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice,” the motion read. Since November 2023, more than 25 civil lawsuits have been filed against Combs, alleging sexual misconduct and assault. The first lawsuit, filed by his former girlfriend Cassie Ventura, was settled within a day, but many of the remaining cases are still active. Federal prosecutors have indicated that their investigation is ongoing, and additional charges or defendants may be added in the coming months. Want to listen to ALL of our podcasts AD-FREE? Subscribe through APPLE PODCASTS, and try it for three days free: https://tinyurl.com/ycw626tj Follow Our Other Cases: https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com The latest on The Downfall of Diddy, The Trial of Karen Read, The Murder Of Maddie Soto, Catching the Long Island Serial Killer, Awaiting Admission: BTK's Unconfessed Crimes, Delphi Murders: Inside the Crime, Chad & Lori Daybell, The Murder of Ana Walshe, Alex Murdaugh, Bryan Kohberger, Lucy Letby, Kouri Richins, Malevolent Mormon Mommys, The Menendez Brothers: Quest For Justice, The Murder of Stephen Smith, The Murder of Madeline Kingsbury, The Murder Of Sandra Birchmore, and much more! Listen at https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com

Sean “Diddy” Combs is facing seven new civil lawsuits, with two of the plaintiffs alleging that they were minors when they were drugged and sexually assaulted by the music mogul. These recent filings, submitted in federal and state courts in New York, detail allegations of sexual misconduct spanning from 2000 to 2022, further compounding Combs' ongoing legal battles. One of the lawsuits, filed by a woman identified as Jane Doe, alleges that she was only 13 years old when she was assaulted at an afterparty following the MTV Video Music Awards in 2000. According to the lawsuit, Doe was invited to the party by a limo driver, where she consumed a drink and soon began feeling drowsy. In search of a place to rest, she entered a bedroom. It was then, according to the complaint, that Combs, along with an unnamed male and female celebrity, entered the room. “You are ready to party!” Combs allegedly said to her, according to the lawsuit. The unnamed male celebrity then allegedly raped Doe while Combs and the female celebrity watched. The lawsuit further alleges that Combs then raped her as well. When asked for comment on these new allegations, Combs' representatives pointed to a prior statement from his legal team denying all accusations. “Mr. Combs and his legal team have full confidence in the facts, their legal defenses, and the integrity of the judicial process,” the statement read. “In court, the truth will prevail: Mr. Combs has never sexually assaulted anyone — adult or minor, man or woman.” The new lawsuits, five of which were filed in federal court and two in New York Superior Court, accuse Combs of a range of offenses, including rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiffs allege that these incidents occurred during parties hosted by Combs in New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas over the past two decades. The plaintiffs include three women and four men, all of whom claim that they were drugged before the alleged assaults took place. Another accuser, identified as John Doe, claims that he was 17 years old in 2022 when he was drugged and sexually assaulted by Combs. The lawsuit states that Combs offered the young aspiring artist a drink and assured him that he could help launch his music career. John Doe alleges that after consuming the drink, he was assaulted. These lawsuits follow a series of legal actions brought against Combs last week by Houston-based attorney Tony Buzbee and co-counsel Andrew Van Arsdale, who now represent more than 120 individuals accusing the music producer of abuse. The two lawyers have stated that many of their clients were minors at the time of the alleged assaults. Federal prosecutors have also accused Combs of running a “criminal enterprise” through his business ventures, alleging that he engaged in sex trafficking, forced labor, and years of physical abuse. Combs has pleaded not guilty to federal charges of sex trafficking and racketeering and is currently being held in custody in New York. His trial is scheduled to begin in May 2025. In response to the growing number of lawsuits and allegations, Combs' legal team has requested a gag order from the court to prevent potential witnesses and their lawyers from making public statements. “This Court should exercise its discretion in issuing an order requiring all potential witnesses and their counsel to refrain from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood to interfere with Mr. Combs's trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice,” the motion read. Since November 2023, more than 25 civil lawsuits have been filed against Combs, alleging sexual misconduct and assault. The first lawsuit, filed by his former girlfriend Cassie Ventura, was settled within a day, but many of the remaining cases are still active. Federal prosecutors have indicated that their investigation is ongoing, and additional charges or defendants may be added in the coming months. Want to listen to ALL of our podcasts AD-FREE? Subscribe through APPLE PODCASTS, and try it for three days free: https://tinyurl.com/ycw626tj Follow Our Other Cases: https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com The latest on The Downfall of Diddy, The Trial of Karen Read, The Murder Of Maddie Soto, Catching the Long Island Serial Killer, Awaiting Admission: BTK's Unconfessed Crimes, Delphi Murders: Inside the Crime, Chad & Lori Daybell, The Murder of Ana Walshe, Alex Murdaugh, Bryan Kohberger, Lucy Letby, Kouri Richins, Malevolent Mormon Mommys, The Menendez Brothers: Quest For Justice, The Murder of Stephen Smith, The Murder of Madeline Kingsbury, The Murder Of Sandra Birchmore, and much more! Listen at https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com

Sean “Diddy” Combs is facing seven new civil lawsuits, with two of the plaintiffs alleging that they were minors when they were drugged and sexually assaulted by the music mogul. These recent filings, submitted in federal and state courts in New York, detail allegations of sexual misconduct spanning from 2000 to 2022, further compounding Combs' ongoing legal battles. One of the lawsuits, filed by a woman identified as Jane Doe, alleges that she was only 13 years old when she was assaulted at an afterparty following the MTV Video Music Awards in 2000. According to the lawsuit, Doe was invited to the party by a limo driver, where she consumed a drink and soon began feeling drowsy. In search of a place to rest, she entered a bedroom. It was then, according to the complaint, that Combs, along with an unnamed male and female celebrity, entered the room. “You are ready to party!” Combs allegedly said to her, according to the lawsuit. The unnamed male celebrity then allegedly raped Doe while Combs and the female celebrity watched. The lawsuit further alleges that Combs then raped her as well. When asked for comment on these new allegations, Combs' representatives pointed to a prior statement from his legal team denying all accusations. “Mr. Combs and his legal team have full confidence in the facts, their legal defenses, and the integrity of the judicial process,” the statement read. “In court, the truth will prevail: Mr. Combs has never sexually assaulted anyone — adult or minor, man or woman.” The new lawsuits, five of which were filed in federal court and two in New York Superior Court, accuse Combs of a range of offenses, including rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiffs allege that these incidents occurred during parties hosted by Combs in New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas over the past two decades. The plaintiffs include three women and four men, all of whom claim that they were drugged before the alleged assaults took place. Another accuser, identified as John Doe, claims that he was 17 years old in 2022 when he was drugged and sexually assaulted by Combs. The lawsuit states that Combs offered the young aspiring artist a drink and assured him that he could help launch his music career. John Doe alleges that after consuming the drink, he was assaulted. These lawsuits follow a series of legal actions brought against Combs last week by Houston-based attorney Tony Buzbee and co-counsel Andrew Van Arsdale, who now represent more than 120 individuals accusing the music producer of abuse. The two lawyers have stated that many of their clients were minors at the time of the alleged assaults. Federal prosecutors have also accused Combs of running a “criminal enterprise” through his business ventures, alleging that he engaged in sex trafficking, forced labor, and years of physical abuse. Combs has pleaded not guilty to federal charges of sex trafficking and racketeering and is currently being held in custody in New York. His trial is scheduled to begin in May 2025. In response to the growing number of lawsuits and allegations, Combs' legal team has requested a gag order from the court to prevent potential witnesses and their lawyers from making public statements. “This Court should exercise its discretion in issuing an order requiring all potential witnesses and their counsel to refrain from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood to interfere with Mr. Combs's trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice,” the motion read. Since November 2023, more than 25 civil lawsuits have been filed against Combs, alleging sexual misconduct and assault. The first lawsuit, filed by his former girlfriend Cassie Ventura, was settled within a day, but many of the remaining cases are still active. Federal prosecutors have indicated that their investigation is ongoing, and additional charges or defendants may be added in the coming months. Want to listen to ALL of our podcasts AD-FREE? Subscribe through APPLE PODCASTS, and try it for three days free: https://tinyurl.com/ycw626tj Follow Our Other Cases: https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com The latest on The Downfall of Diddy, The Trial of Karen Read, The Murder Of Maddie Soto, Catching the Long Island Serial Killer, Awaiting Admission: BTK's Unconfessed Crimes, Delphi Murders: Inside the Crime, Chad & Lori Daybell, The Murder of Ana Walshe, Alex Murdaugh, Bryan Kohberger, Lucy Letby, Kouri Richins, Malevolent Mormon Mommys, The Menendez Brothers: Quest For Justice, The Murder of Stephen Smith, The Murder of Madeline Kingsbury, The Murder Of Sandra Birchmore, and much more! Listen at https://www.truecrimetodaypod.com

Special Counsel Jack Smith has filed an appeal with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, urging them to REVERSE Judge Aileen Cannon's dismissal of Trump's classified documents/obstruction of justice/espionage case.Jack Smith made clear that Cannon's dismissal has no legal support and is contrary to all precedent, including precedent from the Supreme Court dating back to the Nixon/Watergate era. As Smith writes, Judge Cannon's dismissal of Trump's case "conflicts with an otherwise unbroken course of decisions, including by the Supreme Court, that the Attorney General has such authority, and it is at odds with widespread and longstanding appointment practices in the Department of Justice and across the government. This Court should reverse."Glenn goes over the next steps in the process and discusses what happens if Jack Smith wins the appeal and what happens in the (unlikely) event Donald Trump wins the appeal.If you're interested in supporting our all-volunteer efforts, you can become a Team Justice patron at: / glennkirschner If you'd like to support us and buy Team Justice and Justice Matters merchandise visit:https://shop.spreadshirt.com/glennkir...Check out Glenn's website at https://glennkirschner.com/Follow Glenn on:Threads: https://www.threads.net/glennkirschner2Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/glennkirschner2Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/glennkirschner2Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/glennkirsch...See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Special Counsel Jack Smith has filed an appeal with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, urging them to REVERSE Judge Aileen Cannon's dismissal of Trump's classified documents/obstruction of justice/espionage case.Jack Smith made clear that Cannon's dismissal has no legal support and is contrary to all precedent, including precedent from the Supreme Court dating back to the Nixon/Watergate era. As Smith writes, Judge Cannon's dismissal of Trump's case "conflicts with an otherwise unbroken course of decisions, including by the Supreme Court, that the Attorney General has such authority, and it is at odds with widespread and longstanding appointment practices in the Department of Justice and across the government. This Court should reverse."Glenn goes over the next steps in the process and discusses what happens if Jack Smith wins the appeal and what happens in the (unlikely) event Donald Trump wins the appeal.If you're interested in supporting our all-volunteer efforts, you can become a Team Justice patron at: / glennkirschner If you'd like to support us and buy Team Justice and Justice Matters merchandise visit:https://shop.spreadshirt.com/glennkir...Check out Glenn's website at https://glennkirschner.com/Follow Glenn on:Threads: https://www.threads.net/glennkirschner2Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/glennkirschner2Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/glennkirschner2Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/glennkirsch...See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The U.S. Supreme Court declined taking up the cases challenging Illinois' gun ban, saying they aren't ready yet but also criticizing an appeals court's rationale for denying a preliminary injunction. Tuesday, Justice Clarence Thomas denied writs of certiorari for the six cases challenging gun bans in Illinois. “Petitioners sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law, arguing that the law violates their Second Amendment right to ‘keep and bear Arms.'” Thomas wrote. “This Court is rightly wary of taking cases in an interlocutory posture. But, I hope we will consider the important issues presented by these petitions after the cases reach final judgment.”

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/jewish-studies

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/genocide-studies

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/israel-studies

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

In 1965, five years after the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, one of his Mossad abductors was sent back to South America to kill another fugitive Nazi, the so-called “butcher of Riga,” Latvian Herberts Cukurs. Cukurs was shot. On his corpse, the assassins left pages from the closing speech of the chief British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: “After this ordeal to which mankind has been submitted, mankind itself . . . comes to this Court and cries: ‘These are our laws—let them prevail!'” Years later, the Latvian prosecutor general began investigating the possibility of redeeming Cukurs for his past actions. Researching the case, Dr. Linda Kinstler discovered that her grandfather, Boris, had served in Cukurs's killing unit and was rumored to be a double agent for the KGB. The proceedings, which might have resulted in Cukurs's pardon, threw into question supposed “facts” about the Holocaust at the precise moment its last living survivors—the last legal witnesses—were dying. Rich with scholarly detective work and personal reflection, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends (PublicAffairs, 2023) (Public Affairs, 2023) is a fearlessly brave examination of how history can become distorted over time, how easily the innocent are forgotten, and how carelessly the guilty are sometimes reprieved. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day

Why do some courts and lawyers instinctively react to examinations under oath (EUOs), also called sworn statements, as if they're "secret depositions?" When conducted properly, they clearly aren't. But the issue still arises from time to time. In this episode Garrity talks about two recent court rulings. One is from a Florida federal judge that rejected an effort to have the court treat EUOs and depositions as one and the same. The other, from South Carolina, sanctioned a defendant for taking an EUO that the court said in essence was the very deposition the court had forbidden. Garrity offers some fantastic thoughts and tips for conducting EUOs in a way that mnimizes the risk a court will confuse them with depositions, which are an intellectually and procedurally different animal.SHOW NOTESFed. R. Civ. P. 30, Depositions by Oral Examination (main federal deposition rule, outlining the procedural requirements for an oral examination to constitute a deposition)Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Strike Sworn Statement, etc. Jett v. Del Toro, Case No. 5:22-cv-90-MW-MJF, Docket No. 46, (N. D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2023) (rejecting argument that a sworn statement taken with a court reporter under oath is a deposition; further, “The traditional practice of securing affidavits for use in support of summary judgment often involves a statement written by counsel specifically for that purpose, which is then presented to and signed by the affiant. This Court fails to see how an unedited transcription of the witness's own words, is not, if anything, substantially more reliable than the traditional alternative”)Defendant's Motion to Strike, etc., Jett v. Del Toro, Case No. 5:22-cv-90-MW-MJF, Docket No. 38, (N. D. Fla. filed August 11, 2023) (unsuccessfully arguing that sworn statements or EUO's “are simply unnoticed depositions”)Reed v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 1995) (rejecting motion to strike statement of plaintiff conducted by plaintiff's counsel under oath and before a court reporter; rejecting arguments that statement could not be considered because it wasn't signed by the plaintiff, contained leading questions, and was taken without defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, saying defendant was in the same position it would have been if an affidavit by the witness had been filed, as the defendant would not have been able to cross-examine the affidavit, either)Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that statement made under oath before court reporter was inadmissible for summary judgment purposes because it was neither signed nor taken in the presence of defendants lawyers to allow cross-examination; held, “We reject this argument. Sworn statements given before court reporters or at least as reliable as signed affidavits and are properly considered on summary judgment”)Glenn v. 3M Co., 440 S.C. 34, 95, 890 S.E.2d 569, 602 (Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied (Aug. 10, 2023) (sanctioning counsel for taking “sworn statement” of witness whose deposition court had prohibited, where statement was under oath, was “in the question-and-answer format typical of a deposition,” and taken before a reporter and at the same day and time as the proposed deposition the court has prohibited; held, “. . . Fisher Controls wholly disregarded this [c]ourt's order prohibiting Dr. Timothy Oury's deposition. Although Fisher Controls labeled the deposition a “sworn statement,” the statement is clearly a deposition submitted under a label which would not immediately invoke the [c]ourt's ire. The statement was transcribed by an official [c]ourt [r]eporter on the day and at the time that Fisher Controls had originally scheduled Dr. Oury's deposition—a deposition prohibited by an Order of Protection from this [c]ourt.”)Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Protective Order, Zorn v. Principal Life Insurance Company, No. 6:09-CV-00081-BAE-GRS, 2010 WL 4253299 (S.D.Ga. July 22, 2010) (“Plaintiff also asserts that because he underwent an examination under oath (EUO) during the claims process, he should somehow be exempt from a deposition in his own, subsequent lawsuit. Plaintiff cites no authority for this position, and the case law is to the contrary. See Kamin v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (denying motion for protective order to preclude depositions on the grounds that EUOs had been taken); Oreman Sales, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 1991 WL 87936 (E.D. La. May 23, 1991) (same); Sentry Ins. v. Shivers, 164 F.R.D. 255, 256 (D. Kan. 1996) (“Taking a statement of a party, sworn or unsworn, pursuant to investigating a claim or potential lawsuit, does not equate with deposing him or her.”); Joe's Market Fish, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 1998 WL 851504 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1998) (“an examination under oath does not immunize an individual from a later deposition”); Jones v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 129 F.R.D. 170 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 1990)(“Undoubtedly State Farm now has information which was not available at the time of the examination under oath.”)St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Grp. Hosp. Serv., 598 P.2d 238, 240–41 (Okla. 1979) (saying a “[d]eposition has been defined by various jurisdictions as being confined to the written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing, upon oral examination or in response to written interrogatories where an opportunity for cross-examination is given”)Brooks v. Tate, No. 1:11-CV-01503 AWI, 2013 WL 4049053, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013) (“By definition , “a ‘deposition' is the examination under oath by ‘oral questions' of a party or deponent.” Paige v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 275 (C.D.Cal.2008). A party who wants to depose a person by oral questions must give written notice to every other party, stating the time and place of the deposition. Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(1). “Where a deponent is not a party to the action, he can be compelled to appear at a deposition examination only by issuance of a subpoena” pursuant to Rule 45. Cleveland v. Palmby, 75 F.R.D. 654, 656 (W.D.Okl.1977). “Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, a deposition must be conducted before an officer appointed or designated under Rule 28.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(5)(A).”)Paige v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 275 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Considering Rule 30 as a whole, and affording the words in that rule their plain meaning, as we must, see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540, 111 S.Ct. 922, 928, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991) (“ ‘We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.' ” (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123, 110 S.Ct. 456, 458, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989))); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th Cir.2002) (“As a rule of construction, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are given their plain meaning.”), it is clear that a deposition is the examination under oath by “oral questions” of a party or deponent. In other words, a party who merely appears for a deposition that does not take place has not “been deposed” since he has not been examined by oral questions”)Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 8 Pa. D. & C. 420, 420–21 (Com. Pl. 1926) (“The definition of a deposition will be found in 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 848, as follows: “The testimony of a witness reduced to writing, in due form of law, by virtue of a commission or other authority of a competent tribunal, or according to the provisions of some statute law, to be used on the trial of some question of fact in a court of justice”)

On August 9, 2023, a three-judge Federal Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed the conviction of Patrick Daniels, a habitual marijuana user who at trial had been found guilty of violating a federal statute making it a felony for unlawful users of drugs to be in possession of firearms.Daniels had been found with a pistol and rifle in his vehicle during a traffic stop. Following his conviction Daniels was sentenced to nearly four years in federal prison.This Court of Appeals found in this 3-0 decision that the relevant statute, §922(g)(3), as applied to Daniels, violated the Second Amendment of the US Constitution. Accordingly the court reversed his conviction and even dismissed the indictment against him.Today's show is largely a straight-through reading of US v. Daniels.Enjoy!RESOURCESUnited States v. Daniels, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20870 (USCA 5th 2023)Become a Law of Self Defense Member for JUST 99 CENTS!Not yet a Law of Self Defense Member? WHY NOT? Try our two-week trial membership, unlimited access to our show content, for just 99¢! Stay a member after that and it's still just ~30¢ a day, less than $10 a month! Get the 99¢ trial membership by clicking on the image or link below:https://lawofselfdefense.com/trialBecome a Platinum Member for ONLY 82 CENTS A DAY!PLUS get EVERY class & book we offer, for FREE!We ONLY consult on legal cases for our Platinum members!BE HARD TO CONVICT, become a Law of Self Defense Platinum member TODAY! http://lawofselfdefense.com/82centsFREE BOOK! "Law of Self Defense: Principles"Get a copy of our best-selling book, "The Law of Self Defense: Principles," for FREE--we only ask that you cover the cost of getting the book to you, the S&H, but we eat the $25 cost of the book itself. https://lawofselfdefense.com/freebookAMERICAN LAW COURSESGet a law-school level education in typical first-year (1L) law classes, including criminal law, constitutional law, evidence, property, and more, at a fraction of the cost and time of law school, and without any of the political toxicity of today's law schools. Spring semester starts soon with Constitutional Law!Learn more at: americanlawcourses.comamericanlawcourses.com/conlawDisclaimer - Content is for educational purpose only.Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use.

Growing up, Linda Kinstler knew that her Latvian grandfather had mysteriously disappeared after World War II. But she didn't think much about it."That was a very common fate from this part of the world," says Kinstler, a Ph.D. candidate in rhetoric at UC Berkeley. "It didn't strike me as totally unusual. It was only later when I began looking into it more that I realized there was probably more to the story."What she discovered was too big for her to walk away.In 2022, she published her first book, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends. It follows her family's story in Eastern Europe through the war and its aftermath, and queries all the ways we've been told that justice was conducted for those responsible for the genocide of European Jews during the war.It then moves into the present, and asks: What position do we find ourselves in now? And how can we truly remember the Holocaust — a systematic murder that some are trying to erase — when the last living witnesses are dying? Is this how the Holocaust ends?"It's not a prescription, but rather a warning: an effort to call attention to the fact that we are in this moment of endings, where survivors are no longer with us," she says. "Undeniably, we are entering a new period of memory. ... We need to think more seriously about what we do with this memory."Listen to the episode and read the transcript on Berkeley News (news.berkeley.edu).Photo by Pete Kiehart.Music by Blue Dot Sessions. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

District courts have discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute mandates otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii) of Title 18 includes such a mandate, but only for sentences imposed "under this subsection." Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under a different subsection, Section 924(j), which does not include such a mandate. Lora therefore argued that the district court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences because Section 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii); yet the Second Circuit ruled that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because Section 924(j) counts as "under" Section 924(c). This Court, however, has held that provisions like Sections 924(c) and 924(j) define separate offenses, not the same offense, because they set forth different potential punishments based on different elements. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 100 (2013). Four circuit courts have agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion, although for distinct reasons (the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth). At least two circuits have disagreed (the Tenth and Eleventh). In addition to the numerous appellate decisions, this issue recurs in district courts frequently, because Section 924 is one of the most frequently charged federal criminal statutes. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii), which provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed ... under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment," is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-49.html

Under§ 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, when a district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the party seeking arbitration may file an immediate interlocutory appeal. This Court has held that an appeal "divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). The question presented is: Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court's jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal, as the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held, or does the district court retain discretion to proceed with litigation while the appeal is pending, as the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-105.html

Last December, a German court convicted a 97-year-old former Nazi camp secretary of complicity in the murder of more than 10,000 people in what the media called—once again—the last Nazi trial. After almost eight decades, the Holocaust is still being litigated, remembered, and all-too-often misremembered.Lawfare managing editor Tyler McBrien sat down with Linda Kinstler, author of the book, “Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends,” and Sam Moyn, a professor of both history and law at Yale University, to discuss Linda's book. They talked about Linda's stunning discovery in Latvia that led her to tell this story, the limits of the law in holding perpetrators of mass murder accountable, and whether the antonym of forgetting is not remembering, but justice.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A coalition consisting of twenty-two local, regional, and national news organizations has been formed with the intention of requesting that the court in the case against a man accused of killing four students at the University of Idaho reduce the scope of the gag order. The coalition, in which The Associated Press participates, maintains that allowing the press access to law enforcement officers and other officials involved in high-stakes criminal cases provides the general public with essential background information and a deeper comprehension of how the criminal justice system functions. In connection with the killings that occurred as a result of stabbings in Moscow, Idaho, Bryan Kohberger, age 28, has been charged with four counts of first-degree murder as well as burglary. The prosecuting attorneys have not said whether or not they intend to seek the death sentence at this time. According to Josh Hoffner, national news director for The Associated Press, “This order is unnecessarily sweeping and broad and severely impedes the public's understanding of a significant criminal investigation that profoundly impacted the community,” As a result of the case's extensive media attention, the Latah County Magistrate Judge Megan Marshall issued a gag order at the beginning of this month, which forbade attorneys, law enforcement agencies, and any other parties concerned with the case from discussing it. On Thursday, she expanded the scope of the gag order, making it illegal for any attorneys representing survivors, witnesses, or family members of victims to speak or write about the case. “There is a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial for all parties involved and the right to free expression as afforded under both the United States and Idaho Constitution,” Marshall wrote in the amended order. “To preserve the right to a fair trial some curtailment of the dissemination of information in this case is necessary and authorized under the law.” According to Dan Shelley, president of the Radio Television Digital News Association, there are alternative means to ensure that a trial is conducted fairly. The coalition includes the national association as a member organization. Courts all around the United States are frequently able, even in the most high-profile cases, to find methods to strike a balance between the rights of defendants and the rights of the public to have access to essential information. Shelley argued that there was no valid reason why the current court couldn't reach the same conclusion. The Idaho Statesman, BoiseDev, KHQ in Spokane, Washington, and KTVB in Boise, Idaho are some of the news organizations who are members of the media coalition. Other news organizations that are members of the media alliance include The Seattle Times, The New York Times, and BoiseDev. In the following days, the group is planning to oppose the gag order by filing court filings in opposition to it. As a result of such publicity, judges frequently find themselves in a difficult position as they attempt to uphold the right of the defendant to a fair trial. Courts are occasionally of the opinion that restricting the ability of persons engaged in a criminal case to discuss it and thereby controlling the flow of information around the case is an efficient strategy to reduce publicity and help protect the right to a fair trial. On the other hand, gag orders have the potential to violate the First Amendment rights of both the general public and the individuals concerned in the case. In their capacity as watchdogs, news organizations that cover the courts are responsible for keeping the general public informed about the functioning of the legal system. Betsy Russell, a member of the media coalition and the president of the Idaho Press Club, stated that having conversations with the officials involved in criminal cases helps journalists understand the nuances of legal arguments and the technical steps of court proceedings. This allows journalists to provide coverage that is both fair and comprehensive. “We're not lawyers for the most part, nor are our readers, and those explanations can help make sure that inaccurate information isn't spread about what's happening in our halls of justice,” Russell said. The United States Supreme Court has determined that gag orders do infringe on the public's right to know what is going on in the nation's courtrooms. However, the high court has also stated that certain gag orders are permissible, provided that they are the least restrictive way to ensure a fair trial and that they are narrowly tailored to achieve their purpose. The initial gag order that Marshall issued on January 3 did not include any stated reasons as to why she felt it was necessary to issue the gag order. It prohibited the parties involved in the criminal case from making any statements outside of court other than directly quoting actual court records that were filed in the case. This included investigators, law enforcement personnel, attorneys, and agents of the prosecuting attorney or defense attorney. Notably, both the attorneys for the prosecution and the defense had submitted a paper almost two hours earlier stating that they agreed to the establishment of a gag order and desired for it to include police officers and investigators. Kohberger's defense attorney Anne Taylor and the Latah County Prosecutor Bill Thompson said in their brief that the court “This Court has both a constitutional duty and the inherent authority to ‘minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity' and ‘to ensure the efficacious administration of justice,'” Marshall reinforced the prohibition in the updated gag order that was issued on Thursday. He added any attorneys who represent witnesses, victims, or family members of victims to the list of those who are prohibited from speaking. The amended order prohibits any statement that is not a direct quote from court documents and calls out a number of types of statements that are specifically prohibited. These types of statements include “any opinion as to the merits of the case or the claims or defense of a party,” Beginning on the 26th of June, Kohberger will have a preliminary hearing that will last for five days. Follow Tony Brueski on Twitter https://twitter.com/tonybpod 4 Killed For What is a production of True Crime Today; listen & sub to True Crime Today Here: https://availableon.com/truecrimetodayatruecrimepodcast Join our Facebook Discussion Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/834636321133023 If you have information about the Moscow, Idaho murders: Tip Line: 208-883-7180 Email: tipline@ci.moscow.id.us Digital Media: http://fbi.gov/moscowidah

It is a bedrock principle of federalism that a statute does not abrogate sovereign immunity unless Congress's intent to abrogate is "unmistakably clear'' in the statutory text. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). This Court and each of the other Circuits have held that a statute granting the federal courts jurisdiction over a category of claims without expressly addressing sovereign immunity does not abrogate. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 & n.4 (1991). The First Circuit nevertheless held, over a vigorous dissent, that 48 U.S.C. § 2126 (a) of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)-which grants federal jurisdiction over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising out of PROMESA, but says nothing about abrogation-eliminates the Board's immunity in its totality. While acknowledging that the statutory language "may not be as precise" as other instances of abrogation, the court held that certain provisions "impl[y]" that result. It did so even though jurisdiction was necessary for those claims not subject to immunity. The Question Presented is: Does 48 U.S.C.§ 2126(a)'s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Board and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-96.html

Chris Hani's widow wants the Constitutional Court to rescind its decision to give murderer Janusz Waluś parole, but this will be a tall order a law expert told News24. Limpho Hani and the South African Communist Party (SACP) have applied to the Constitutional Court to rescind its decision to give Walus parole. They want the case to be heard anew at a date to be determined by Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. Last week, the apex court ruled that Waluś be released from Kgosi Mampuru prison in Tshwane within 10 working days, after he had served his sentence for Hani's 1993 murder. On Tuesday, correctional services said an inmate stabbed Waluś. He is in a stable condition after receiving treatment in prison. On Wednesday, members of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu staged a protest outside the prison. Organisers said they wanted to express their anger and dissatisfaction that Waluś was set to be released. In her court papers, Hani argues that she was not "treated fairly by the court". She also says the judgment had "a patent error" because her submissions were not fully examined. She said only applications by Minister of Justice Ronald Lamola and Waluś were fully considered. She said the court "lacked independence" by not evaluating her submissions. In her affidavit, Hani said the decision by the court to grant Waluś parole by taking the power away from Lamola was an error. She said Waluś's South African citizenship was revoked in 2016, and the court should have considered this before granting the parole. "This Court denied the Minister an opportunity to deal with the most important aspect of parole in the present case, being the fact that the first respondent's citizenship has been revoked. "Given the importance, the citizenship status on parole matters, and the fact that the status of the first respondent has never been fully canvassed before this Court and less or no information is placed before this Court. The Minister is incapable of releasing the applicant on day parole and/or imposing parole conditions on him in circumstances where his release from prison to serve parole in South Africa shall itself be an offence," she said. Earlier this week, Home Affairs Minister Dr Aaron Motsoaledi said Waluś had been granted citizenship so he could serve his parole here and not in his native Poland. Constitutional law expert Professor Pierre de Vos said it was hard for the judgment to be rescinded. "Right now, it will be hard to say, but it will all depend on the arguments they bring. They have to bring something that is plausible for it to be successful." Waluś's lawyer, Julian Knight declined to comment on the application.

This Court has repeatedly made clear that a work of art is "transformative" for purposes of fair use under the Copyright Act if it conveys a different "meaning or message" from its source material. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 8. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021). In the decision below, the Second Circuit nonetheless held that a court is in fact forbidden from trying to "ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the works at issue." App. 22a-23a. Instead, the court concluded that even where a new work indisputably conveys a distinct meaning or message, the work is not transformative if it "recognizably deriv[es] from, and retain[s] the essential elements of, its source material." Id. at 24a. The question presented is: Whether a work of art is "transformative" when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material (as this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts of appeals have held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work where it "recognizably deriv[es] from" its source material (as the Second Circuit has held). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-869.html

Hosted by Andrew Keen, Keen On features conversations with some of the world's leading thinkers and writers about the economic, political, and technological issues being discussed in the news, right now. In this episode, Andrew is joined by Linda Kinstler, author of Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends. Linda Kinstler is a contributing writer for The Economist‘s 1843 Magazine and a PhD candidate in the Rhetoric Department at UC Berkeley. Her writing appears in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Atlantic, Wired, and elsewhere. She was previously a Marshall Scholar in the UK, where she covered British politics for the Atlantic and studied with Forensic Architecture. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Journalist Linda Kinstler grew up not knowing much about her Latvian grandfather, other than he'd disappeared after World War Two. It was only later, as an adult, that she learned her paternal grandfather, Boris Kinstler, had been a Nazi collaborator and member of the SS in Latvia. After the war, he became a KGB agent, and then vanished. In search of answers about her grandfather, Linda Kinstler uncovers his links to a man called Herbert Cukurs, known as the "Butcher of Riga", implicated in the murder of 30,000 Jews in Latvia. In researching her book, Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends, she unravels a tale of revisionism, ultra-nationalism and denialism - issues that are just as timely as ever.

When a Russian missile recently struck a TV tower in Kyiv, near Babyn Yar, the site of Nazi mass murders during the Holocaust, some saw the attack as a potent symbol of the tragic occurrence of violence in Ukraine. To talk through the historical significance of the attack, Lawfare Managing Editor Tyler McBrien sat down with Maksym Rokmaniko, an architect, designer, entrepreneur, and director at the Center for Spatial Technologies in Kyiv, and Linda Kinstler, a PhD candidate in the rhetoric department at UC Berkeley.In her recent New York times essay, the Bloody Echoes of Babyn Yar, Linda wrote, "the current war in Ukraine is so oversaturated with historical meaning, it is unfolding on soil that has absorbed wave after wave of the dead, where soldiers do not always have to dig trenches in the forest because the old ones remain."Linda's writing has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Atlantic and Jewish Currents, where she recently reported on the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial center. Linda is also the author of Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends, which is out in the U.S. on August 23rd, from Public Affairs.Tyler, Linda and Maksym discuss the history of Babyn Yar as a sight and symbol, the role of open source investigative techniques and forensic modeling in the documentation of war crimes, the battle over historical narratives, memorialization and memory, as well as the limits of the law in achieving justice for victims of negation and genocide.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Kenneth C. Davis joins Pat Thurston to discuss the SCOTUS ruling 6-3 that Maine's tuition assistance program must cover religious schools. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote: "This Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state that the Framers fought to build." What do you think of the ruling? Let Pat know on KGO's Facebook or Twitter. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Kenneth C. Davis joins Pat Thurston to discuss the SCOTUS ruling 6-3 that Maine's tuition assistance program must cover religious schools. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote: "This Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state that the Framers fought to build." What do you think of the ruling? Let Pat know on KGO's Facebook or Twitter. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Respondents are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Aleman Gonzalez's name—are natives and citizens of Mexico who were detained under §1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally. They filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that aliens detained under §1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months' detention. The District Court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 629. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 766. Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He likewise reentered the country illegally and was detained under §1231(a)(6). He filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that §1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing. The District Court certified a class, granted partial summary judgment against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Flores Tejada v. Godfrey, 954 F.3d 1245, 1247. This Court granted certiorari and instructed the parties to brief the threshold question whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive relief under the INA. Held: Section 1252(f )(1) of the INA deprived the District Courts of jurisdiction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Pp. 3–10. Credit: Justia U.S. Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-322/ --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support

Journalist and author Linda Kinstler's new book, "Come to This Court and Cry: How the Holocaust Ends", combines a deeply personal family history during World War II with the universal themes of collective memory, justice and national identity. The topics are all the more relevant as Europe grapples with its worst land war in decades. She joined us on Perspective to tell us more.

How do you put a ghost on trial? In Linda Kinstler's deeply personal new book, Come to This Court and Cry, she uncovers the atrocities of her Latvian grandfather's involvement in the Holocaust. In conversation with author, broadcaster and academic, Peter Pomerantsev, she asks how do we account for the brutality of historical events and our personal links to them, as the passage of time means they slip further beyond living memory? Linda and Peter also discuss whether the history of conflict is repeating itself through Russia's current War on Ukraine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjustment of status under 8 U. S. C. §1255, which would have made Patel and his wife lawful permanent residents. Because USCIS was aware that Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver's license application falsely stating that he was a United States citizen, it denied Patel's application for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence. §1255(i)(2)(A); see also §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a noncitizen “who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal law). Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “citizen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge disagreed, denied Patel's application for adjustment of status, and ordered that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel's appeal. Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Federal law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under §1255. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But see §1252(a)(2)(D) (exception where the judgment concerns “constitutional claims” or “questions of law”). The panel reasoned that the factual determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testified credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment. On rehearing, the en banc court agreed with the panel. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict as to the scope of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and the other provisions enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 6–17. Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-979/ --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support

Tyrannosaurus rex versus Triceratops. Savage predator versus staunch prey. But what if it was actually, savvy prosecutor versus stalwart defender? That's right, it's dinosaur court. The mightiest reptiles to walk the earth battling it out...within the proper confines and procedures of a court of law. Now take it away bailiff Brontosaurus! "All rise. This Court with the ferocious and Honorable Judge Supremeasaurus presiding, is now in session. Please enjoy the episode and go about whatever you were doing"

Our guest today is Mark Walters. Mark is the syndicated host of two national radio programs, Armed American Radio and Armed American Radio's Daily Defense with Mark Walters. Mark's voice can be heard on over 200 radio stations in hundreds of cities 6 days a week across America. He is the co-author of of three critically acclaimed books, Lessons from Armed America, Lessons from Unarmed America, and Grilling While Armed. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms. 1) Where did this passion to discuss our Constitutional Protections come from for you? It seems more personal to you than it does the average person - where does that come from? 2) You have the unique position, after the years of talking to others who spend their lives working to protect the 2A, of seeing where we have been, and where we are...what outlook or forecast do you see for the trajectory of our Rights? 3) There is an important court case in process as we speak. The State of MD is working on a Rifle Ban but 25 other states are pushing back on it...Let's unpack this. - The Second Amendment Foundation and Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms today expressed their sincere gratitude to the Attorneys General in 25 states for joining an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, supporting their challenge to a Maryland gun ban law and urging the high court to hear the case. - the 37-page amicus brief is loaded with strong legal arguments supporting the Maryland case, known as Bianchi et.al. v. Frosh. The Attorneys General are led by Arizona AG Mark Brnovich and West Virginia AG Patrick Morrisey. They are joined by their colleagues in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. - All four of this Court's Second Amendment precedents on arms bans—Heller, McDonald, Caetano, and Miller—eschewed means-ends balancing. This Court's approach has always been categorial. - The rifles at issue here are "in common use," as lower courts have acknowledged. "Common use" is not determined by how often a gun is fired in self-defense. "Common use" encompasses all lawful uses, including hunting and self-defense. Arms bans do not become constitutional if they slice protected classes of arms into smaller subclasses. Dick Heller's 9-shot .22 caliber revolver was not particularly common, but handguns are very common. - Maryland Attorney General Frosh initially waived his right to file a response to the petition, but on January 14 the Supreme Court called for a response. The Court granted Frosh (and consequently his amici) an extension of time for the response, which is due March 14. Source Article: https://reason.com/volokh/2022/02/11/maryland-rifle-ban-in-the-supreme-court/ 4) You like to say that more gun owners does not automatically equal more people engaged in protecting our Constitution. What CAN we do to wake people up and welcome them into Advocacy? 5) You will be one of our speakers for the 9th Annual Celebrate & Protect the 2nd Amendment Rally Event at the AZ State Capitol Building on Saturday, February 19th from 10:am – 2:pm. Why is it important for you to fly all the way from GA to AZ to talk about the same thing you discuss from the comfort of your studio every day?

On Tuesday's Mark Levin Show, the Supreme Court has institutionalized chaos and lawlessness. Just forty minutes after the last brief was filed the US Supreme Court denied the Pennsylvania case brought by Representative Mike Kelly and Congressional Candidate Sean Parnell. Similar to Justice Owen Roberts who served during President FDR’s administration, this Supreme Court is fearful of the media chaos. This Court could have stood up before the election compelling states to adhere to state election laws under the state and federal Constitutions. But of course, they did not. The campaign can still make a future request for certiorari. In effect, and as of now, any state supreme court can now legislate from the bench because of their cowardice to uphold the federal constitution. Then, there would be no coronavirus vaccine but for President Trump, operation warp speed and his administration. The nuance of his management style would be the topic of books if he were a Democrat. But the media will do anything to prop up Joe Biden's Administration as it aims to be the most radical leftist government in American history. Later, the Georgia Secretary of State is a coward and has agreed to a deal with Stacy Abrams to significantly weaken the signature requirements that the state's election law calls for. Afterward, China has made inroads with many Democrats. among them Rep. Eric Swalwell and based on a year-long investigation from Axios, Swalwell has some embarrassing spy problems fitting the mold of a useful idiot for China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On Tuesday's Mark Levin Show, the Supreme Court has institutionalized chaos and lawlessness. Just forty minutes after the last brief was filed the US Supreme Court denied the Pennsylvania case brought by Representative Mike Kelly and Congressional Candidate Sean Parnell. Similar to Justice Owen Roberts who served during President FDR’s administration, this Supreme Court is fearful of the media chaos. This Court could have stood up before the election compelling states to adhere to state election laws under the state and federal Constitutions. But of course, they did not. The campaign can still make a future request for certiorari. In effect, and as of now, any state supreme court can now legislate from the bench because of their cowardice to uphold the federal constitution. Then, there would be no coronavirus vaccine but for President Trump, operation warp speed and his administration. The nuance of his management style would be the topic of books if he were a Democrat. But the media will do anything to prop up Joe Biden's Administration as it aims to be the most radical leftist government in American history. Later, the Georgia Secretary of State is a coward and has agreed to a deal with Stacy Abrams to significantly weaken the signature requirements that the state's election law calls for. Afterward, China has made inroads with many Democrats. among them Rep. Eric Swalwell and based on a year-long investigation from Axios, Swalwell has some embarrassing spy problems fitting the mold of a useful idiot for China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Episode 14:  Calloway County personal injury attorney Jeff Roberts discusses his win at the Kentucky Supreme Court, in a workers' compensation case.  In a recent episode, we covered the fact that Jeff currently has several cases in front of the Kentucky Supreme Court.  This is the first of that group to be decided. The case we'll talk about today involved Steven Spillman, a former Calloway County sheriff's deputy who was injured on the job in 2007.  Murray attorney Michael (“Mike”) Pittman originally handled the deputy's claim.  It was resolved and later reopened in 2013 due to additional complications.  This issue was also successfully resolved.  However, in 2017 the deputy had to have an additional surgery, related to the original 2007 back injury.  There were medical complications and Mr. Spillman passed away from those complications. Kentucky worker's compensation law provides for a case to be reopened after the original case is resolved.  This special circumstance exists to ensure injured workers have adequate access to medical treatment for their injuries and future medical needs.  A new law was passed in 2018 that could impact this access. The complicating factor is that a case can be reopened, as long as it is within 4 years of a judge's order on the case.  The period between the 2013 surgery and the 2017 surgery is the basis for the legal challenge.  The spouse also had potential claims involved related to survivor benefits.  Attorney Pittman contacted Jeff to assist (“co-counsel”) with the case, at that point.  It turns out that the survivor benefits ended up being a key issue before the Court. In Kentucky, the workers' compensation system provides benefits to the surviving spouse, minor children or anyone who is dependent upon the deceased worker.  There is another provision which allows the estate to get a lump-sum death benefit, if the death occurs within 4 years of the work-related injury.  Jeff was able to win the case for survivor benefits, but did not prevail on the issue related to the estate. Going forward, Jeff's victory at the Kentucky Supreme Court will have a major impact for working families in Kentucky.  Current and future claims will be able to refer to (“cite”) the decision as a basis for their cases. Do Attorney's Fee Increase if an Attorney Uses Co-Counsel? Jeff explains that it depends.  If the attorneys are working on a contingency-fee basis, the fee will be a percentage of the amount recovered.  In the Spillman case, described above, the percentage did not change.  The fee was divided between the attorneys, but didn't cost the family an additional percentage or separate attorney's fee. In many Kentucky personal injury cases, such as a car wreck case, the percentage for attorney's fees is 1/3.  If the attorney decides to bring in another attorney, the fee doesn't suddenly increase to 2/3.  It remains at 1/3 and that percentage will be divided among the attorneys.  Each firm has the right to establish its own contract related to fees, but this is generally the cases. If the attorneys are working on an hourly-basis, instead of a contingency-fee basis, attorneys will generally charge the client for the billable hours based on their work.  Under this arrangement, it is possible to receive multiple fees from multiple attorneys (based upon their agreed up on hourly rates).  However, this typically isn't how an injury case works.  How Does a Workers Compensation Case Make It to the KY Supreme Court? Kentucky workers' compensation claims are considered administrative law (e.g. there's no jury trial).  Initially, the claim is tried before an administrative law judge.  After that decision is rendered, either side can appeal it, assuming there's a legitimate legal reason to do so. The decision would then go to the Workers' Compensation Board, which is made up of a 3-member panel.  This is considered the first appellate level.  It's still at the administrative level.  They look to see if the judge made an error of the la or an error in assessing or understanding the facts.  If they determine an error was made, the Board sends the case back to the judge to correct his/her error.  Again, either side can now allow the judge to revisit the case or they can appeal the case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The Kentucky Court of Appeals is the second appellate level.  This Court is looking to see if the Workers' Compensation Board commit an error or law in how it decided the appeal or if the decision resulted in a gross misjustice.  This is an even higher standard.  The case can be remanded back (returned) to the administrative law judge.  They can affirm the original decision by the judge.  They can affirm the Workers' Comp Board's decision in returning it to the judge.  They could also overrule the Workers' Comp Board's determination of an error and then specific a different error, remanding it back to the original judge. At this point, either side can then decide to appeal the workers' comp case to the Kentucky Supreme Court.  This is the third appellate level.  The KY Supreme Court cannot decide not to hear the case.  This is different from cases attempting to be heard before the US Supreme Court.  The Kentucky Constitution states that a party is entitled to at least one appeal from a lower court.  Remember, the Kentucky workers' comp system is handled as an administrative process.  The general understanding is that the first actual court hearing the workers' comp case is the KY Court of Appeals, so per the Kentucky Constitution, the party has a right to appeal to the KY Supreme Court. There are many factors to consider in deciding to appeal a case.  It can be a very emotional situation.  Because either side can appeal, the decision can be delayed much longer than initially expected.  The consideration of the time-line is a factor Jeff spends a lot of time discussing with his clients.  For more information, visit www.JeffRobertsLaw.com. This podcast is meant to provide information and is not legal advice.  Jeff's principal office is located at 509 Main Street, Murray, Kentucky.  Co-host Jim Ray is a non-attorney spokesperson.  This is an advertisement.  

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:QUESTION PRESENTED: To resolve disputes about use of the Pecos River, Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact. This Court subsequently entered an amended decree ordering New Mexico to comply with its Compact obligations and appointing a River Master to perform the annual calculations of New Mexico's water-delivery obligations. The Court's decree specifies exact procedures for objecting to the River Master's annual reports. In particular, a party must seek this Court's review of any final determination of the River Master within 30 days. Likewise, the decree allows modifying the manual governing the River Master's calculations only by specified procedures. In 2014 and 2015, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico impounded and held large amounts of flood waters dumped in the Pecos Basin by heavy rains. When the reservoir’s authority to hold the water for flood-control purposes expired, the reservoir began to release it. Texas did not use this water, nor could it. The downstream reservoir in Texas was already full from holding flood water, so Texas had to release water, wasted, to make room for the water flowing in from New Mexico. The River Master timely calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015. Neither report reduced Texas's rights to water delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico-water that Texas could not use. At the time, New Mexico lodged no objection, and the 30-day review period lapsed. But years later, in mid-2018, New Mexico filed a motion arguing that its delivery obligations should be reduced by the water that evaporated from the floodwaters stored in 2014 and 2015, giving New Mexico delivery credits for losses from water that neither State used. Rather than dismiss that untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual over Texas's objection to allow retroactive changes to final reports,gave that modification of the manual retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report toprovide New Mexico credits against its delivery obligations for most of the evaporative loss in 2015. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE: 1. Whether the River Master clearly erred in retroactively amending the River Master Manual and his final accounting for 2015 without Texas's consent and contrary to this Court's decree. 2. Whether the River Master clearly erred by charging Texas for evaporative losses without authority under the Compact.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 20A8 _________________ WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. DANIEL LEWIS LEE, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY OR VACATUR [July 14, 2020] PER CURIAM. The application for stay or vacatur presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICEand by him referred to the Court is granted. The District Court's July 13, 2020 order granting a preliminary injunction is vacated. The plaintiffs in this case are all federal prisoners who have been sentenced to death for murdering children. The plaintiffs committed their crimes decades ago and have long exhausted all avenues for direct and collateral review. The first of their executions was scheduled to take place this afternoon, with others to follow this week and next month. To carry out these sentences, the Federal Government plans to use a single drug—pentobarbital sodium—that “is widely conceded to be able to render a person fully insensate” and “does not carry the risks” of pain that some have associated with other lethal injection protocols. Zagorski v. Parker, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 2). Hours before the first execution was set to take place, the District Court preliminarily enjoined all four executions on the ground that the use of pentobarbital likely constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Vacatur of that injunction is appropriate because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs have not established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim. That claim faces an exceedingly high bar. “This Court has yet to hold that a State's method of execution qualifies as cruel and unusual.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 12). For good reason—“[f]ar from seeking to superadd terror, pain, or disgrace to their executions, the States have often sought more nearly the opposite,” developing new methods, such as lethal injection, thought to be less painful and more humane than traditional methods, like hanging, that have been uniformly regarded as constitutional for centuries. Ibid. The Federal Government followed this trend by selecting a lethal injection protocol—single-dose pentobarbital—that has become a mainstay of state executions. Pentobarbital: • Has been adopted by five of the small number of States that currently implement the death penalty. • Has been used to carry out over 100 executions, without incident. • Has been repeatedly invoked by prisoners as a less painful and risky alternative to the lethal injection protocols of other jurisdictions. • Was upheld by this Court last year, as applied to a prisoner with a unique medical condition that could only have increased any baseline risk of pain associated with pentobarbital as a general matter. See Bucklew, 587 U. S. ___. • Has been upheld by numerous Courts of Appeals against Eighth Amendment challenges similar to the one presented here. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Collier, 862 F. 3d 490 (CA5 2017); Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F. 3d 1089 (CA8 2015); Gissendaner v. Commissioner, 779 F. 3d 1275 (CA11 2015). --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

19-267 OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU The First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid government interference in a religious group's selection of its ministerial employees. The federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have long agreed that the key to determining ministerial status is whether an employee performed important religious functions. This Court's unanimous 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC was consistent with that existing analytical consensus, and other circuits and states since 2012 have continued to rely on it. Yet the Ninth Circuit has now twice ruled that, under Hosanna-Tabor, important religious functions alone can never suffice-those functions must always be accompanied by considerations such as a religious title or religious training in order to demonstrate ministerial status. The question presented is: Whether the Religion Clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, where the employee carried out important religious functions 19-348 ST. JAMES SCHOOL V. BIEL The First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid government interference in a religious group's selection of its ministerial employees. The federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have long agreed that the key to determining ministerial status is whether an employee performed important religious functions. This Court's unanimous 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC was consistent with that existing analytical consensus, and other circuits and states since 2012 have continued to rely on it. Yet the Ninth Circuit has now twice ruled that, under Hosanna-Tabor, important religious functions alone can never suffice-those functions must always be accompanied by considerations such as a religious title or religious training in order to demonstrate ministerial status. The question presented is: Whether the Religion Clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, where the employee carried out important religious functions. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

Politifact joins the "parade of the punked" - FAKE NEWS Deep State truth deniers continue to attack Dr. Corsi and other conservatives. Fauci appeared before Congress yesterday and amplified his assault on medications that worked and pleaded for the sick and dying to hold out in their bunkers for vaccines that will never work, but will be expensive...so at least BIG PHARMA and patent holders will reap in billions - a redo of Fauci's failed Aids approach. Gateway Pundit: Sidney Powell Hits Back Against Judge Sullivan’s Dirty Political Move to Delay Flynn Case, ‘Proposed Amicus Brief Has No Place in This Court’ https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/05/sidney-powell-hits-back-judge-sullivans-dirty-political-move-delay-flynn-case-proposed-amicus-brief-no-place-court/ Judge Emmet G. Sullivan made a dirty, political move on Tuesday that will delay justice for General Mike Flynn. It was revealed on Tuesday that Judge Emmet Sullivan was soliciting amicus briefs to allow for public comment on Flynn’s case. This is a highly unusual, purely political move aimed at dragging out Flynn’s case. It is important to note that Judge Sullivan in his order gave full discretion on which amicus briefs to approve to himself, which means he may likely approve ones critical to AG Bill Barr and General Flynn. Tune in Monday through Friday at 11:00am EDT for another show. Visit our sister website, http://www.theprayerfulpatriot.com dedicated to faith and prayer. https://www.patreon.com/jeromecorsi/ https://www.subscribestar.com/jerome_corsi/

Mr. Lawrence was charged with being a principal in the May 1998 first-degree murder of 18-year-old Jennifer Robinson, who was fatally shot. He pleaded guilty, the jury voted 11-1 to recommend a death sentence, and he was condemned. This Court upheld his sentence of death on direct appeal and subsequently affirmed the denial of his initial postconviction motion and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Lawrence then filed a successive postconviction motion in the trial court seeking a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State. The trial court vacated his death sentence and ordered a new penalty phase. He was sentenced to death on resentencing, and this direct appeal followed. Case history can be found here: http://onlinedocketssc.flcourts.org/DocketResults/CaseDocket?Searchtype=Case+Number&CaseTypeSelected=All&CaseYear=2018&CaseNumber=2061

Mr. Johnson appealed his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by not conducting the proper legal analysis in allowing a peremptory strike against an African-American juror. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mr. Johnson a new trial, certifying conflict with the Second, Third, and Fifth Districts concerning the proper procedure for peremptory challenges. This Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict among the district courts. You can find the case history here: http://onlinedocketssc.flcourts.org/DocketResults/CaseDocket?Searchtype=Case+Number&CaseTypeSelected=All&CaseYear=2019&CaseNumber=96

CHANGE IN CHILD CUSTODY (810) 235-1970 ATTORNEY BANKERT I OFTEN HAVE A CLIENT COME IN WITH THESE FACTS. The parties were given joint legal custody of their child, but plaintiff-mother had sole physical custody. HOW DOES DAD CHANGE THIS? Presented here by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert (810) 235-1970 #CHILDCUSTODY, #CUSTODYMODIFICATION, #FLINTATTORNEY, #FLINTLAWYER, #DIVORCE, #POSTDIVORCE YOU HAVE TO TELL THE COURT WHAT THE CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IS. Under MCL 722.27(1)(c), a party requesting a change must establish proper cause or a change in circumstances before the trial court may even hold a hearing to consider the requested change. See Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508-509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). IN A RECENT CASE I REVIEWED THE CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWS. Defendant later moved to change custody, alleging physical abuse, repeated exposure to different men, and the instability of plaintiff’s life as reasons to revisit custody. The court found that defendant’s “motion included allegations and evidence sufficient to establish—at the very least—that there were ‘contested factual issues that must be resolved’” for the trial court to make an informed decision. IN ADDITION THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT ADDITIONALLY THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. video evidence as well as “evidence that the child had begun to engage in self-injurious behavior and that she was struggling with frustration.” In addition, the court noted that Under MCL 722.27(1)(c), a party requesting a change must establish proper cause or a change in circumstances before the trial court may even hold a hearing to consider the requested change. See Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508-509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). “a change in disciplinary techniques to include corporal punishment may constitute a change in circumstances that has a significant effect on the child.” IN SUMMARY A Parent may not modify or amend a previous judgment or order involving custody except for “proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The Legislature established this burden to minimize disruptions to the child’s custody. See Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 576-577; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). Under MCL 722.27(1)(c), a party requesting a change must establish proper cause or a change in circumstances before the trial court may even hold a hearing to consider the requested change. See Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508-509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). The Court concluded that the phrase “change of circumstances” should be understood to require the movant “to prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have had or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.” Id. at 513. This Court stated that “not just any change” will suffice to justify revisiting custody—the “evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes” to rise to the level of a change of circumstances that would warrant revisiting custody. Id. at 513-514. [see Michigan Court of Appeals Unpublished, #72064 ] FLINT ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT 235-1970 WWW.ATTORNEYBANKERT.COM

QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal employees' rights are determined under statutes which require that "all personnel actions effecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies as defined in Title 5 ... shall be made free from any discrimination ... " See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-16(a) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (age). This Court, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), interpreted the private-sector statutory language "because" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and ''because of' in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), respectively, as requiring a private-sector plaintiff to prove but-for causation. The question presented is: Whether "shall be made free from any discrimination" permits federal-sector personnel actions that are not made free from any discrimination or retaliation, as long as discrimination or retaliation is not the but-for cause of the personnel action, or rather prohibits personnel actions where discrimination and retaliation is a factor. A subsidiary question is whether Title VII bans retaliation in federal employment. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

QUESTION PRESENTED: In serial litigation between two parties, time­ tested principles of claim preclusion and issue preclusion govern when parties may ­and may not­ litigate issues that were, or could have been, litigated in a prior case. This Court has held that, in a subsequent case between the same parties involving different claims from those litigated in the earlier case, the defendant is free to raise defenses that were not litigated in the earlier case, even though they could have been. The Federal Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have all held the same in recent years. Their reasoning is straightforward: Claim preclusion does not bar such defenses, because the claims in the second case arise from different transactions and occurrences from the first case, and issue preclusion does not bar them either, because they were never actually litigated. The Second Circuit, however, has now held the opposite. Under the Second Circuit's "defense preclusion" rule, defendants are barred from raising such defenses even if the plaintiff’s claims are distinct from those asserted in the prior case and the defenses were never actually litigated. The question presented is: Whether, when a plaintiff asserts new claims, federal preclusion principles can bar a defendant from raising defenses that were not actually litigated and resolved in any prior case between the parties. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

QUESTION PRESENTED: In the Clean Water Act (CWA), Congress differentiated between point source and nonpoint source pollution in controlling pollution of navigable waters. The CWA regulates point source pollution through permits, while nonpoint source pollution is controlled through federal oversight of state management programs and other non-CWA programs. This Court and several courts of appeals have read the CWA's line dividing point source and nonpoint source pollution to turn on whether pollutants are delivered to navigable waters by a point source. Parting with those cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that point source pollution also includes pollutants that reach navigable waters by nonpoint sources so long as the pollutants can be "traced" in more than "de minimis" amounts to a point source. This holding expands CWA permitting to millions of sources previously regulated as nonpoint source pollution. The questions presented are: Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. Whether the County of Maui had fair notice that a CWA permit was required for its underground injection control wells that operated without such a permit for nearly 40 years. https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-260_8mjp.pdf --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

The mere thought of a 401(k) lawsuit can send shivers down the spine of even the most experienced retirement plan fiduciary.  However, when you have a grasp on why workplace retirement plans are being sued, how the economics of a lawsuit work and what you can do to make the job of a plaintiff’s attorney harder, the risk can be a little easier to manage.  For answers to these and more questions, I thought it was time to invite Jerry Schlichter, the plaintiff’s attorney who has sued numerous 401(k) and 403(b) plans around the country and even successfully argued a 401(k) case before the US Supreme Court back to the podcast to share his thoughts.  I was also able to work in several questions from our listeners into the episode.  If you missed your opportunity to submit a question be sure are one of our email subscribers, we often send announcements out about future guests and give you the opportunity to share your questions in advance.  Go to 401kfridays.com/subscribe today to take care of that.  If after listening to this episode you feel like you need a little fiduciary refresher, check out last week’s episode with Jason Roberts.  Some good points there to help you sleep better and keep the boogeyman away.   Guest Bio Jerry is founding and managing partner of the firm. He has been repeatedly elected by his peers for inclusion in "Best Lawyers in America” and “Lawyer of the Year” and is listed in the 2019 edition. Jerry has been designated legal counsel for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for many years and is currently designated legal counsel for the United Transportation Union and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. He has represented railroad workers in trials in many states and has had record-setting jury verdicts in numerous jurisdictions. He obtained a verdict of $27 million for the widow and children of a St. Louis firefighter for a defective breathing apparatus which caused the firefighter's death. This verdict, which was increased to $40.4 million with pre and post judgment interest, was the highest jury verdict in Missouri in 2007 and one of the highest in the United States. The entire amount was collected after appeal. He has also obtained multiple precedent-setting judgments against railroads, including successfully requiring a railroad and the Federal Railroad Administration to modify rules on certification of railroad engineers; successfully obtaining a permanent injunction against the Union Pacific Railroad on behalf of all of its employees, which stopped the railroad's practice of interfering with employees' ability to pursue injury claims; and obtaining the first and only jury verdict in the United States in which a jury determined that a locomotive was not crashworthy, resulting in a jury verdict of $4.75 million, which was the highest verdict against that railroad by an injured employee in its history. Throughout his career, he has also handled major precedent-setting class action and mass tort cases on behalf of individuals. Jerry has been featured in numerous national publications, including the New York Times, Reuters, Bloomberg, USA Today, and the Wall Street Journal, for his and the firm’s success in pioneering claims of excessive fees in 401(K) plans and obtaining precedent-setting results involving claims of excessive fees against large employers, and for the reduction in fees his cases have caused throughout the 401(k) industry. He and the firm have obtained settlements in these 401(k) excessive fee cases of more than $300 million for employees and retirees, in addition to significant improvements in their 401(k) plans; in total, this relief has been valued at more than $1.5 billion. He also was lead attorney for the firm in the first and only full trial of an excessive fee case in the country, resulting in a verdict of $36 million. In recent rankings of the most influential people in the 401(k) industry by 401kWire.com, Jerry has repeatedly ranked in the top 5. According to a recent article published in Reuters, the CEO of Brightscope, an independent company which evaluates 401(k) plans, stated, speaking of Mr. Schlichter’s national impact on 401(k) plan fees, that “[h]is impact has been humongous." The New York Times has referred to Jerry as “a Lone Ranger of the 401(k)’s,” and he has been referred to by Investment News as “public enemy no. 1 for 401(k) profiteers” and by Chief Investment Officer as “the industry’s most feared attorney.” In describing the effect of his work on behalf of employees in 401(k) plans, the Wall Street Journal referred to it as being “Schlicterized”. In 2014 and 2015, Mr. Schlichter’s firm obtained the two largest 401(k) excessive fee settlements in history. The first was a settlement for $62 million against Lockheed Martin on behalf of Lockheed Martin employees, which included significant changes to the Lockheed Martin 401(k) plan. The second was a settlement for $57 million from Boeing, which likewise included significant non-monetary relief. Also in 2015, Mr. Schlichter won a unanimous 9-0 decision in the U.S. Supreme Court in Tibble v. Edison, the first U.S. Supreme Court case to consider fees in 401(k) plans. In an order in the case of Nolte v. Cigna Corporation in 2013, the U.S. District Court judge stated: “As the preeminent firm in 401(k) fee litigation, Schlichter, Bogard & Denton has achieved unparalleled results on behalf of its clients. Jerome Schlichter and Schlichter, Bogard & Denton’s work throughout this litigation stands as yet another example of the firm’s acting as a private attorney general, risking breathtaking amounts of time and money while overcoming many obstacles for the benefit of employees and retirees. . . . Mr. Schlichter and the Schlichter, Bogard & Denton firm’s actions have led to dramatic changes in the 401(k) industry, which have benefited employees and retirees throughout the country by bringing sweeping changes to fiduciary practices.” The U.S. District Court in Tussey v. ABB similarly found of “special importance . . . the significant, national contribution” made by the team led by Mr. Schlichter, which has “educated plan administrators, the Department of Labor, the courts and retirement plan participants” about the fiduciary obligations of 401(k) plan administrators. Another example of his work on behalf of individuals is his representation of a class of African-American employment applicants in the case of Mister v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, a case in which he obtained an extraordinary Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the court stated: "One could not imagine a stronger case of discrimination short of an announcement of it." This resulted in a $10 million settlement. In the Mister case, the U.S. District Court judge described his work stating: "The Court is unaware of any comparable achievement of public good by a private lawyer in the face of such obstacles and enormous demand of resources and finances." The judge also stated: "This Court finds that Mr. Schlichter's experience, reputation, and ability are of the highest caliber." Jerry handled the nationally-recognized Times Beach dioxin case in which he represented a group of people in the community of Times Beach, Missouri who were exposed to dioxin when their streets were sprayed with the chemical. He obtained a record setting $19 million settlement on behalf of the residents against a chemical company in that case. Jerry handled a national employment discrimination class action case on behalf of all women employees of Rent-a-Center. In that case, he confronted for the first time in a national employment discrimination class action a "reverse auction" in which the defendant attempted to destroy the case by an inadequate settlement with others. Jerry successfully defeated this attempt and obtained a $47 million settlement for the class as well as a complete revamping of company policies. This is one of the largest class action settlements for women in the United States and the U.S. District Court judge stated: "In essence, it is an example of advocacy at its highest and noblest purpose, and Class Counsel accomplished a great public good." The judge further stated: "I have never seen an effort like that effort put forth by the plaintiffs' counsel' – it's beyond an extraordinary effort." Jerry is a past national President of the Academy of Rail Labor Attorneys and is a member of the Million Dollar Advocates. He has authored articles in the field of personal injury litigation and has spoken at numerous seminars on trial techniques, mass torts, class actions, and complex litigation. He has taught trial techniques as an adjunct professor at Washington University School of Law. Jerry has also been recognized for his involvement in community initiatives. He and his wife founded Mentor St. Louis, Inc., a not-for-profit organization which obtains adult mentors for disadvantaged elementary students in the St. Louis Public Schools, which has become the largest volunteer program in the St. Louis Public Schools and has been nationally recognized. He also successfully initiated and spearheaded the passage of a law, "The Missouri State Historic Tax Credit," which has been widely acknowledged for its role in revitalizing St. Louis and the State of Missouri, and which is the national model for legislation aimed at revitalizing older communities. He has also spearheaded and led the effort to pass the Missouri "Rebuilding Communities Act" designed to attract businesses to distressed communities and the "Neighborhood Preservation Act" to develop housing in distressed communities. Jerry has received numerous awards, such as the Levee Stone Award and "What's Right with the Region Award" for his contributions to revitalization of the city of St. Louis and the state of Missouri. In December 2013, Jerry was honored with the prestigious St. Louis Award, given to the person who has accomplished the most in the prior years for the development of St. Louis. Jerry spearheaded the founding and development of another St. Louis not for profit, Arch Grants, which is a global competition for startup businesses in which winning entrepreneurs come to St. Louis, receive $50,000.00 and a broad package of support services including business mentoring, discounts on office space, and free legal, accounting, and marketing services. Arch Grants has provided grants of $50,000.00 to 114 startups since its founding in 2012, and has been the subject of numerous national articles describing its building of entrepreneurial businesses in St. Louis. Education: University of Illinois, B.S., Business Administration, 1969, (in 3 years) with honors; James Scholar. University of California at Los Angeles, J.D. 1972; Associate Editor, UCLA Law Review. Admitted: California (1972); Illinois (1973); Missouri (1982). 401(k) Fridays Podcast Overview Struggling with a fiduciary issue, looking for strategies to improve employee retirement outcomes or curious about the impact of current events on your retirement plan? We've had conversations with retirement industry leaders to address these and other relevant topics! You can easily explore over one hundred prior on-demand audio interviews here. Don't forget to subscribe as we release a new episode each Friday!

This item discusses C-131/12 Google Spain; Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union's long awaited "right to be forgotten" case which examined the rights of individuals mentioned in public domain material indexed on Google search. This Court decision enunciated both the scope and breadth of data protection obligations in an even more expansive way than argued by the Agencia Espanola de Protection de Datos itself. It implies that Google acquires data protection obligations as soon as it collects information from the web and not just after it receives a request for deindexing. Moreover, Google appears to have absolute obligations to remove material in a variety of circumstances even if this is causing the individual mentioned no prejudice. It is particularly unclear how such obligations will operate vis-à-vis so-called sensitive data such as that concerning criminality, political opinion or health. The norms the Court articulated conflict markedly with those which are now mainstream online. Effective implementation will, therefore, depend less on legal technicalities than on how powerful such data protection norms are when placed alongside the vast cultural, political and economic power of "internet freedom". A further article on this subject was written on OpenDemocracy by Dr Erdos: http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-erdos/mind-gap-is-data-protection-catching-up-with-google-search David Erdos is University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society in in the Faculty of Law and a Fellow in Law at Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. David's current research explores the nature of Data Protection especially as it intersects with the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of research. For more information about Dr Erdos, please refer to his staff profile: http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/d-o-erdos/5972 Law in Focus is a collection of short videos featuring academics from the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, addressing legal issues in current affairs and the news. These issues are examples of the many which challenge researchers and students studying undergraduate and postgraduate law at the Faculty.This entry provides an audio source for iTunes U.

This item discusses C-131/12 Google Spain; Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union's long awaited "right to be forgotten" case which examined the rights of individuals mentioned in public domain material indexed on Google search. This Court decision enunciated both the scope and breadth of data protection obligations in an even more expansive way than argued by the Agencia Espanola de Protection de Datos itself. It implies that Google acquires data protection obligations as soon as it collects information from the web and not just after it receives a request for deindexing. Moreover, Google appears to have absolute obligations to remove material in a variety of circumstances even if this is causing the individual mentioned no prejudice. It is particularly unclear how such obligations will operate vis-à-vis so-called sensitive data such as that concerning criminality, political opinion or health. The norms the Court articulated conflict markedly with those which are now mainstream online. Effective implementation will, therefore, depend less on legal technicalities than on how powerful such data protection norms are when placed alongside the vast cultural, political and economic power of "internet freedom". A further article on this subject was written on OpenDemocracy by Dr Erdos: http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-erdos/mind-gap-is-data-protection-catching-up-with-google-search David Erdos is University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society in in the Faculty of Law and a Fellow in Law at Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. David's current research explores the nature of Data Protection especially as it intersects with the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of research. For more information about Dr Erdos, please refer to his staff profile: http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/d-o-erdos/5972 Law in Focus is a collection of short videos featuring academics from the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, addressing legal issues in current affairs and the news. These issues are examples of the many which challenge researchers and students studying undergraduate and postgraduate law at the Faculty. This entry provides an audio source for iTunes U.

This item discusses C-131/12 Google Spain; Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union's long awaited "right to be forgotten" case which examined the rights of individuals mentioned in public domain material indexed on Google search. This Court decision enunciated both the scope and breadth of data protection obligations in an even more expansive way than argued by the Agencia Espanola de Protection de Datos itself. It implies that Google acquires data protection obligations as soon as it collects information from the web and not just after it receives a request for deindexing. Moreover, Google appears to have absolute obligations to remove material in a variety of circumstances even if this is causing the individual mentioned no prejudice. It is particularly unclear how such obligations will operate vis-à-vis so-called sensitive data such as that concerning criminality, political opinion or health. The norms the Court articulated conflict markedly with those which are now mainstream online. Effective implementation will, therefore, depend less on legal technicalities than on how powerful such data protection norms are when placed alongside the vast cultural, political and economic power of "internet freedom". A further article on this subject was written on OpenDemocracy by Dr Erdos: http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-erdos/mind-gap-is-data-protection-catching-up-with-google-search David Erdos is University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society in in the Faculty of Law and a Fellow in Law at Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. David's current research explores the nature of Data Protection especially as it intersects with the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of research. For more information about Dr Erdos, please refer to his staff profile: http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/d-o-erdos/5972 Law in Focus is a collection of short videos featuring academics from the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, addressing legal issues in current affairs and the news. These issues are examples of the many which challenge researchers and students studying undergraduate and postgraduate law at the Faculty.

This item discusses C-131/12 Google Spain; Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union's long awaited "right to be forgotten" case which examined the rights of individuals mentioned in public domain material indexed on Google search. This Court decision enunciated both the scope and breadth of data protection obligations in an even more expansive way than argued by the Agencia Espanola de Protection de Datos itself. It implies that Google acquires data protection obligations as soon as it collects information from the web and not just after it receives a request for deindexing. Moreover, Google appears to have absolute obligations to remove material in a variety of circumstances even if this is causing the individual mentioned no prejudice. It is particularly unclear how such obligations will operate vis-à-vis so-called sensitive data such as that concerning criminality, political opinion or health. The norms the Court articulated conflict markedly with those which are now mainstream online. Effective implementation will, therefore, depend less on legal technicalities than on how powerful such data protection norms are when placed alongside the vast cultural, political and economic power of "internet freedom". A further article on this subject was written on OpenDemocracy by Dr Erdos: http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-erdos/mind-gap-is-data-protection-catching-up-with-google-search David Erdos is University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society in in the Faculty of Law and a Fellow in Law at Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. David's current research explores the nature of Data Protection especially as it intersects with the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of research. For more information about Dr Erdos, please refer to his staff profile: http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/d-o-erdos/5972 Law in Focus is a collection of short videos featuring academics from the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, addressing legal issues in current affairs and the news. These issues are examples of the many which challenge researchers and students studying undergraduate and postgraduate law at the Faculty.This entry provides an audio source for iTunes U.

FDR's stated New Deal purpose was to keep work weeks short and to extend minimum wages which were extremely high. But, production is what makes demand possible and what increases purchasing power, not federal mandates. FDR's policies created ceaseless tax increases, suffocating regulations and inane projects like slaughtering animals and destroying crops. WPA money seemed to be spread in areas for political reasons of getting electoral votes. The West got considerably more money. In 1937 FDR schemes to pack the Supreme Court were presented as ways to help the Court. This Court later said that a farmer growing wheat on his own property for his own consumption was part of interstate commerce and subject to federal regulation. The biggest myth is that an economy is helped by war. Did war end the Great Depression? No. War lends a stimulus to certain sectors of the economy, but it is overall destructive of things that are not seen and things that are lost opportunities to civilian producers. Lecture 6 of 10 from Thomas Woods' The Truth About American History: An Austro-Jeffersonian Perspective.