Minnesota Supreme Court Oral Arguments

On July 28, 2017, D.H. was shot to death in an alley/parking lot area behind a townhouse complex in Minneapolis where D.H.’s sister and his children lived. Surveillance video evidence depicted a man in a hoodie who drew a gun, approached D.H., put the gun to the back of his head, and pulled the trigger. A number of witnesses described the shooter as a light-skinned African-American man with a gray hoodie and long hair in braids or dreadlocks, a description that matched appellant James Andre Woodard. Two of Woodard’s daughters, aged 10 and 11, identified Woodard as the shooter. The 10-year old also mentioned Woodard’s gold teeth as an identifying characteristic. In addition, an adult witness testified to talking with Woodard shortly prior to the shooting and witnessing Woodard commit the shooting. Woodard was arrested and charged with second-degree murder, with intent-not premeditated. A grand jury then indicted him of first-degree premeditated murder. A 12-day trial was held. At the trial, Woodard sought to submit evidence that another individual who shares his general description (without the gold teeth) may have committed the murder. Specifically, Woodard sought to introduce evidence that the potential alternative perpetrator may have been angry at D.H. due to a prior shooting; that he lived near the site of the murder; and that he disappeared after the murder and no one could find him. The trial court refused to allow the evidence to be admitted, concluding that Woodard had not introduced any evidence connecting the potential alternative perpetrator to the scene of the crime. In its instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it need not consider the lesser included charge of second-degree murder if it found Woodard guilty of first-degree murder, contrary to the decision in State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 317 (Minn. 2010). Neither party objected to the instruction. The jury convicted Woodard on the first-degree murder charge, and he was given a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to admit appellant’s alternative-perpetrator evidence; and (2) whether the erroneous jury instruction affected appellant’s substantial rights. (Hennepin County) On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether multiple sentences for OFP violations arising from a single incident may be permitted under the multiple-victim rule. (Crow Wing County)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant James Martin Alger, Sr., pleaded guilty to two counts of violating an order for protection (OFP). As part of his factual basis, Alger admitted that he violated the OFP by having contact with his ex-girlfriend and their minor son. He also agreed that he would receive two sentences, which would be served consecutively. The district court imposed sentences that were consistent with the parties’ agreement. On appeal, Alger argued that the imposition of two sentences was unlawful under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2018). The court of appeals affirmed the sentences, relying on the multiple-victim rule. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether multiple sentences for OFP violations arising from a single incident may be permitted under the multiple-victim rule. (Crow Wing County)

Cindi Ali participates in the Section 8 housing choice voucher program, a federal program administered by the Scott County Community Development Agency. Ali has a developmentally disabled child and also participates in a state program known as the Consumer Directed Community Supports (CDCS) program. Her child is eligible for home and community-based services through the Developmental Disabilities waiver. The County determined that the money that Ali receives for care that she personally provides for her child (the parent-allocated portion) must be included when calculating her household’s annual income for purposes of determining eligibility for the Section 8 program under 24 C.F.R. § 5.609 (2018). Ali challenged that determination. A hearing officer determined that the parent-allocated portion of the CDCS benefits constitutes annual income under the federal regulation for purposes of the Section 8 program. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) excludes, for purposes of calculating a family’s Section 8 household annual income, the parent-allocated portion of the CDCS benefits. (Scott County Community Development Agency)

In 1996, respondent James Bergman was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault. In 2007, Bergman filed a petition to expunge his conviction. The district court found Bergman did not qualify for statutory expungement, but the court used its inherent authority and granted Bergman expungement of judicial records related to his misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction. Starting in 2008, Bergman was granted a permit to carry a pistol (carry permit). “[A] sheriff must issue a permit” to carry “to an applicant if the person” meets certain criteria. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(b) (2018). One criterion is that the person “is not prohibited from possessing a firearm under . . . any federal law.” Id., subd. 2(b)(4)(ix). Federal law prohibits a person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). However, “[a] person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012). In December 2017, Bergman applied to renew his carry permit. Appellant Isanti County Sheriff Christopher Caulk (“the Sheriff”) denied Bergman’s application because of his 1996 domestic-assault conviction. Bergman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff to issue him a carry permit. The district court denied Bergman’s petition. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Bergman’s conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault disqualifies him from obtaining a permit to carry a firearm when judicial records related to that prior conviction have been sealed but executive branch records have not been sealed. (Isanti County)

An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Unless a statutory exception applies, Minn. Stat. § 259.52, subd. 8(1) (2018) bars a putative father who is not married to a child’s mother and who fails to register with the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry within 30 days after the birth of the child “from bringing or maintaining an action to assert any interest in the child during the pending adoption proceeding concerning the child.” One such statutory exception applies to a putative father who, with the mother of the child, has signed a recognition of parentage (ROP) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (2018) that has not been revoked. See Minn. Stat. §§ 259.49, subd. 1(a)(7); 259.52, subds. 6, 8 (2018). An ROP may not be revoked after “the date of an administrative or judicial hearing relating to the child in which the revoking party is a party to the related action.” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 2. Appellant T.G.G. (“father”) and respondent H.E.S. (“mother”) had sexual intercourse in March of 2017, and mother gave birth to a child in January of 2018. Two days after the birth, the child was placed for adoption with respondents A.F.K. and N.D.K. (“adoptive parents”). Father became aware of the birth and, 37 days after the birth, requested a paternity test. Fifty-two days after the birth the results indicated that father was the child’s biological father. Father asked mother to allow him to raise the child and to stop the adoption process, but mother refused. Sixty-eight days after the birth mother signed a voluntary recognition of parentage (ROP), which had the effect of recognizing father as the child’s biological father. On that same day father registered with the Fathers’ Adoption Registry. Seventy days after the birth, father filed this paternity action, seeking to be adjudicated the father of the child and naming mother as a party, and sought injunctive relief prohibiting the adoption. Three days later, without the presence of any party, the district court issued an order enjoining any adoption. Meanwhile, between the 68th and 75th days, mother signed an ROP revocation form, which was received and processed by the Department of Health (as required by statute). Father moved for summary judgment in the paternity action, and three days later, the adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt the child in Ramsey County, and moved to intervene in the paternity action and to dismiss that action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The district court granted the adoptive parents’ motions, dismissing the paternity action based on section 259.52, subdivision 8(1). The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues are (1) whether section 259.52, subdivision 8(1) requires dismissal of a first-filed paternity action when the putative father registers with the Fathers’ Adoption Registry before an adoption petition is filed but more than 30 days after the child’s birth; (2) whether mother’s attempted revocation of the ROP was effective when it occurred after the district court had issued a temporary order restraining the adoption proceeding; and (3) whether section 259.52, subdivision 8 violates constitutional protections of due process and equal protection as applied to the facts of this case. (Isanti County)

In 2017, Randy Thompson was charged with first-degree driving while impaired (DWI) after a Red Lake tribal police officer at a hospital on the Red Lake Indian Reservation observed Thompson driving while impaired and took custody of him. Because Thompson is not a member of the Red Lake Band of the Chippewa Indians, the tribal police officer contacted the Beltrami County Sheriff’s Office and transferred custody of Thompson to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. Thompson filed a pretrial suppression motion arguing that his arrest by the tribal police officer was unlawful because the officer lacked any authority to arrest him for violating a Minnesota state law on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. The district court denied the suppression motion and Thompson was convicted. Although the court of appeals concluded that the tribal police officer did not qualify as a peace officer under Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 18 (2018), and there was no evidence in the record to show that the tribal police officer had concurrent jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 626.93 (2018), the court of appeals determined that the tribal police officer had inherent authority to detain Thompson and transfer custody to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed Thompson’s conviction. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the tribal police officer had authority to take custody of Thompson for violating a Minnesota state law on the Red Lake Indian Reservation and transfer custody of Thompson to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. (Beltrami County)

Appellant AIM Development (USA), LLC, purchased a former paper mill site and landfill in respondent City of Sartell in 2013. AIM’s predecessors-in-title had received permits from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) to operate an industrial solid waste land disposal facility. The City amended its zoning ordinance in 1989, which rendered industrial, non-hazardous landfills a non-permitted use of the land. However, the landfill continued to operate as a legal nonconforming use between 1989 and 2012, collecting waste generated by the paper mill operation. In 2014, AIM submitted an application to the MPCA, seeking authority to deposit waste generated from operations other than the paper mill into the landfill. After the City objected, AIM initiated a declaratory judgment action. The district court found that the “use of the landfill is limited to waste generated by the paper mill operation” and “the disposal of other wastes and wastes from other generators is an unpermitted expansion of the use.” The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “[a] landowner seeking to continue a prior permitted nonconforming use of property is bound by the uses allowed under the terms of the land-use permit in effect at the time of the property transfer.” On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that AIM’s nonconforming use rights are defined by the terms of the MPCA permit in effect when AIM purchased the landfill in 2013, rather than the zoning ordinances and circumstances when the use became nonconforming in 1989; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it concluded that “AIM’s proposal to accept waste from other waste sources constitutes an impermissible expansion of the prior nonconforming use.” (Stearns County)

Save Lake Calhoun filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in Ramsey County District Court, claiming that the Commissioner of Natural Resources had exceeded her statutory authority in changing the name of Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Save Lake Calhoun failed to establish an ongoing act necessary to obtain quo warranto relief. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Save Lake Calhoun, concluding that the district court erred by denying the petition for writ of quo warranto because Save Lake Calhoun had presented “a sufficient claim for the ongoing exercise of power” by the Department of Natural Resources. The court of appeals also addressed the merits of the claim and determined that the Commissioner of Natural Resources lacks authority under Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.015–.07 (2018), to change a lake name that has existed for more than 40 years. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the Legislature gave the Commissioner of Natural Resources authority to change the name of a lake that has been known by its current name for more than 40 years; (2) whether a writ of quo warranto is appropriate; and (3) whether Minnesota should abolish or limit the common-law writ of quo warranto. (Ramsey County)

In 1992, appellant Edward Martin was convicted in California of sexual batterAppellant Ronnie Bila Shaka was charged with violating a domestic abuse no-contact order that prohibited him from having contact with his wife. When Shaka’s wife failed to appear for the jury trial, the State moved to admit her out-of-court statements to a law enforcement officer regarding Shaka’s contact with her, arguing that the statements were admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause. In support of its motion, the State submitted recordings of telephone calls Shaka made while in jail awaiting trial. The district court granted the State’s motion and the jury found Shaka guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Shaka’s conviction. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State established that Shaka forfeited his right to confront his wife. (Hennepin County)y. Martin eventually moved to Minnesota. In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) informed Martin that he was required to register for life as a predatory offender in Minnesota because of his California conviction. In August 2016, Martin registered with the BCA as homeless. In February 2017, respondent the State of Minnesota charged Martin with failing to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. The State alleged that Martin had failed to comply with a requirement to check in with law enforcement on a weekly basis. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2018). After a court trial based on stipulated evidence, the district court found Martin guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State proved that Martin was required to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. (Hennepin County)

In 1992, appellant Edward Martin was convicted in California of sexual battery. Martin eventually moved to Minnesota. In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) informed Martin that he was required to register for life as a predatory offender in Minnesota because of his California conviction. In August 2016, Martin registered with the BCA as homeless. In February 2017, respondent the State of Minnesota charged Martin with failing to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. The State alleged that Martin had failed to comply with a requirement to check in with law enforcement on a weekly basis. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2018). After a court trial based on stipulated evidence, the district court found Martin guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State proved that Martin was required to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. (Hennepin County)

Appellant Assata Kenneh brought an action against her former employer, Homeward Bound, Inc., which included a claim for sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.44 (2018). The district court granted summary judgment to Kenneh’s employer, concluding that the conduct alleged “does not constitute pervasive, hostile conduct that changes the terms of employment and exposes an employer to liability” for a hostile work environment under the MHRA. On appeal, Kenneh argued that the district court erred by failing to make factual inferences in her favor and applying the incorrect legal standard. Kenneh also asked the court of appeals to abandon the “severe or pervasive” standard for sexual harassment claims based on a hostile work environment. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minnesota should abandon the “severe or pervasive” standard for sexual harassment claims under the MHRA; (2) alternatively, whether Kenneh experienced severe or pervasive sexual harassment; (3) whether Kenneh’s employer took sufficient remedial action such that summary judgment was proper; and (4) whether Kenneh’s employer should be subject to a heightened standard of liability under the employer’s harassment and offensive behavior policy. (Hennepin County)

An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Appellants own property in Lake County between Silver Bay and Little Marais on both sides of Highway 61. The State, by its Commissioner of Transportation (MNDOT), filed a petition to condemn permanent and temporary easements over appellants’ property for improvements to Highway 61. The rights described in the petition made no explicit mention to rights of access, permanent or temporary. The district court approved the petition and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained. The commissioners determined that the total damages should be nearly $400,000, with $305,000 being due to lost access to the property. Both parties appealed the commissioners’ determination to the district court and moved for partial summary judgment regarding lack-of-access damages. Appellants argued that during the construction period, MNDOT had the ability to utilize the easements and completely prevent access across the easement area to the remainder of their property. Appellants also argued that they are entitled to recover for construction interferences caused by MNDOT. The district court denied appellants’ motion and granted MNDOT’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because MNDOT did not seek and appellants did not prove a taking of their right of access, they cannot obtain damages for the right of access under any theory. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minnesota should adopt the “fullest extent” rule, under which damages may be based on the government’s fullest possible use of the easement; and (2) whether appellants are entitled to construction interference damages. (Lake County)

Appellant Luis Cruz Montanez was charged with attempted second-degree murder and second-degree assault. Montanez, represented by a public defender, does not speak English and requires the assistance of a Spanish-language interpreter during court appearances. Montanez filed an ex parte application under Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (2018), requesting $2,000 for interpreter services to facilitate communication with his attorney outside of the courtroom. In support of the application, Montanez included affidavits from the chief public defender for the district and the chief administrator for the State Board of Public Defense indicating that the Ninth District Public Defender’s Office no longer had funds available to hire experts, secure transcripts, hire interpreters, or undertake other costs contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 611.21 for the remainder of 2019. The chief judge denied the application. Montanez appealed and his criminal case proceeded in district court while the appeal of his application was pending. The Ninth District Public Defender made arrangements with an interpreter for a delayed payment following resolution of the appeal or after the start of the new fiscal year. As a result, Montanez received interpreter services when he communicated with his attorney outside of the courtroom. About a week before Montanez pleaded guilty to second-degree assault, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of his application. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) does Minn. Stat. § 611.21 require the county to pay for interpreter services needed to facilitate out of court attorney-client communication if the district public defender no longer has funds available to pay for such services; and (2) is this appeal moot. (Pennington County)

Respondents Andrew Cilek and Minnesota Voters Alliance (collectively Alliance) brought an action claiming that the Secretary of State unlawfully refused to disclose certain voter registration data requested under the Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.90 (2018). The Alliance requested access to “non-private government data” contained in the Statewide Voter Registration System, but the Secretary of State refused to provide access to data that was not part of the “public information list” under Minn. Stat. § 201.091 (2018). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Alliance. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “data on (1) registered voter status, (2) reason for a challenge, and (3) voter history are public data” under the Data Practices Act and Minn. Stat. § 201.091. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether voter registration data other than data in the “public information list” is accessible as public data. (Ramsey County)

The Washington County District Court issued a search warrant for the home office of appellant K.M., an attorney who handles, among other matters, criminal defense cases. Officers of the Burnsville Police Department executed the warrant, seizing a number of electronic devices that contain files covering K.M.’s entire law practice. K.M. filed a motion in Dakota County District Court under Minn. Stat. § 626.04(a) (2018), asking for the return of her property, arguing that a search of an attorney’s office and seizure of attorney-client communications is unconstitutional. Following an ex parte hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding the search and seizure proper and the seized property was held in good faith as potential evidence in an uncharged matter. K.M. filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking the return of the seized property, which the court of appeals denied in appeal No. A19-0414. The supreme court granted her petition for review, also granting the intervention motion and petition for review filed by K.M.’s clients, appellants John Does 1–4. K.M. also filed an appeal of the district court’s decision under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103 in appeal No. A19-0714. On its own motion, the supreme court granted review of appeal No. A19-0714, and ordered the two appeals consolidated. Finally, the supreme court granted the State’s intervention motion to participate in the consolidated appeals. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether all of K.M.’s seized property, including the seized client files, should be returned and all copies destroyed; and (2) whether further orders are justified to protect attorney-client privileged information. (Dakota County)

In 2017, Savonte Townsend was charged with simple robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2018). An employee at a liquor store reported to law enforcement that Townsend concealed bottles of liquor in her bag and attempted to leave the store, but when she was confronted by the employee, a physical altercation ensued and Townsend relinquished the bottles of liquor. The case proceeded to a court trial and the district court found Townsend guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Townsend’s conviction, concluding that the phrase “carrying away” in the simple-robbery statute means the act of moving personal property from the location of the taking. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the language of the simple-robbery statute. (Hennepin County)

Appellant Amanda Grace Visser was driving a 2000 Pontiac that was owned by her mother when the driver of an underinsured truck failed to obey a stop sign. Visser claims she sustained more than $150,000 in damages in connection with the resulting accident. The insurance policy for the driver’s truck provided only $50,000 in liability coverage. Visser’s mother had insurance coverage on two vehicles through respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company: the 2000 Pontiac that Visser was driving and a 1998 Chevrolet. The Pontiac policy provided underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits with an upper limit of $100,000 per person; the Chevrolet policy provided UIM benefits with an upper limit of $250,000 per person. State Farm paid Visser $100,000 in UIM benefits under the Pontiac policy. Visser filed this declaratory judgment action against State Farm, claiming she was entitled to additional UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Visser is entitled to additional UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy. (Hennepin County)

In 2016, appellant/cross-respondent James Poehler was charged with third-degree driving while impaired after a law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of his vehicle for a cracked windshield violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1 (2018), and a seatbelt violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2018). Poehler filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his impairment, arguing the stop of his vehicle was unlawful. The district court denied the suppression motion, finding that the stop was lawful based on the cracked windshield. Poehler was convicted following a stipulated-facts court trial. The court of appeals affirmed Poehler’s conviction. It disagreed with the district court that the officer conducted a lawful traffic stop based on a cracked windshield because there was no evidence in the record that the crack in the windshield limited or obstructed Poehler’s vision. However, the court of appeals upheld the traffic stop based on the seatbelt violation. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the law enforcement officer had a lawful basis to conduct a traffic stop of Poehler’s vehicle. (Isanti County)

These cases present the same issues and have been consolidated for oral argument. Relator Avis Budget Car Rental LLC and relator Enterprise Leasing Co. of Minnesota have each entered into an agreement with the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) that allows them to provide car-rental services at the airport; they also rent space from MAC for those operations. In their challenges to the County’s tax assessment on the leasehold interest, see Minn. Stat. § 272.01, subd. 2 (2018), relators did not disclose financial information on the concession fee paid to MAC because, they asserted, the fee is not rent, it is an access payment. In separate cases, the tax court dismissed relators’ petitions, concluding that the concession fee was rent within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 278.05, subd. 6 (2018), and MAC’s disclosure of that information to respondent Hennepin County did not satisfy relators’ obligations under the statute. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the tax court erred when it concluded the concession fee was rent, (2) whether the tax court misconstrued the record when it found no evidence that MAC disclosed the financial information to Hennepin County, and (3) whether the tax court erred when it held that notwithstanding Hennepin County’s undisputed possession of all financial information it deemed necessary to make its assessment, only relators could provide this information to the county assessor. (Minnesota Tax Court)

A Minneapolis ordinance establishes minimum requirements for “sick and safe time” for employees who perform work in the City, requiring employers whose employees perform work within the geographic boundaries of the City for at least eighty (80) hours in a year to provide those employees with one hour of sick and safe time for every 30 hours worked, up to a maximum of 48 hours per year. Leave may be taken for the employee’s or family member’s identified needs. In March 2018, the ordinance was amended to clarify that sick/safe time is accrued only for time worked within the geographic boundaries of the City. Appellants—the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce, two employers, and two employment agencies—challenged the ordinance, asserting that the ordinance’s leave requirements are preempted by state law and that the ordinance has an impermissible extraterritorial impact. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court first concluded that field preemption did not preclude enforcement of the ordinance under Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 143 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1966). Then, the district court concluded that notwithstanding the 2018 amendment to the ordinance, the ordinance remained too broad, and thus the City was enjoined from enforcing it against any employers that reside outside the geographic boundaries of the City. The City appealed from the decision on the geographic reach of the ordinance, and the Chamber filed a related appeal on the preemption issue. The court of appeals affirmed on the preemption issue and reversed on the geographic-reach issue. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) by imposing specific leave obligations on employers, does the City’s ordinance conflict with state law, and (2) does the City’s leave ordinance impermissibly extend beyond the City’s borders. (Hennepin County)

Minneapolis passed an ordinance that establishes minimum-wage requirements for employees who perform work in the City. The ordinance has different wage standards depending on the employer’s size, which is calculated by an average number of persons working for the employer in a calendar year. Employees who are based outside of the city but perform work in the city on an occasional basis are entitled to the minimum wage if the employee works at least 2 hours in the city. Appellant Graco Inc. challenged the ordinance in district court, asserting that the minimum-wage ordinance conflicts with and is preempted by implication by state law, specifically the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 177 (2018). Following a period of discovery, a court trial was held. The district court denied Graco’s claims for relief, concluding that the ordinance is in harmony with and complementary to state law, because state law does not establish a ceiling for minimum wage rates, and there was no legislative intent to preclude local regulation of minimum wages. Graco appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the lower courts erred in determining that the Minneapolis minimum-wage ordinance does not conflict with state law. (Hennepin County)

In 1992, relator Galen T. Block settled a claim for a work-related injury. Twenty-four years later, in 2016, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) granted Block’s petition to vacate the 1992 settlement. The WCCA concluded that there was no mutual mistake of fact that required vacating the settlement, but the substantial change in Block’s condition warranted doing so. Respondents Exterior Remodelers, Inc. and RTW Group claimed that they were entitled to a credit for the previously paid settlement, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 176.179 (1988), did not apply to payments that were not made under a mistake of fact or law. The compensation judge concluded that respondents were entitled to a 100 percent credit for the previously paid settlement, and the WCCA affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Minn. Stat. § 176.179 applies to payments made by insurers pursuant to stipulations that are later vacated, (2) whether the payment in this case is “mistaken compensation” as that term is used in Minn. Stat. § 176.179, and (3) whether the compensation judge erred by awarding a 100 percent credit for the previously paid settlement. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals).

Appellant State of Minnesota filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jennifer Ann Culver, alleging that she violated Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3) (2018), which makes it a felony when a person intentionally does any of the following acts: “takes, obtains, retains, or fails to return a minor child from or to the parent in violation of a court order, where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of rights to parenting time or custody.” A jury found Culver guilty as charged. The court of appeals reversed her conviction, concluding there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction because the circumstances proved supported a reasonable hypothesis that she “did not intend substantial deprivation.” On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals erred when it concluded there was insufficient evidence to support Culver’s conviction. (Ramsey County)

Proposed Amendments to Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Proposed Amendments to Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, ADM09-8006, ADM10-8049

Respondent Frederick Fish was employed by Albany Manufacturing, Inc. and Wells Concrete Productions Company, to which Albany had “loaned” Fish at the time that Fish suffered a workplace injury. The injury occurred while Fish was working aboard a flatbed trailer being pulled by a semi-tractor driven by an employee of appellant Ramler Trucking, Inc. Albany’s insurer paid Fish’s workers’ compensation benefits. Fish then sued Ramler for negligence, and Ramler brought third-party claims against Albany and Wells. Albany, its insurer, and Ramler settled their claims against each other in a “reverse-Naig” settlement in which Ramler’s claim for contribution against Albany was extinguished, as were any subrogation claims by Albany and its insurer against Ramler. A jury found Wells, Ramler, and Fish causally negligent, and it apportioned fault 75% to Wells, 20% to Ramler, and 5% to Fish. Because the Workers’ Compensation Act provides an employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer for workplace injuries, see Minn. Stat. § 176.031 (2018), however, an employee (here, Fish) may not recover from an employer (here, Wells) the employer’s share of fault. In computing the judgment against Ramler, the district court followed the procedure in the comparative fault statute, Minn. Stat. § 604.02 (2018): it reduced the jury’s damage figure by applicable workers’ compensation benefits that Fish had already received and multiplied the resulting figure by 20% (Ramler’s percentage of fault). Fish appealed, arguing that the district court should instead have followed the procedure described in Lambertson v. Cincinnati Welding Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Minn. 1977), and Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 11 (2018), under which the employee recovers full damages from a third-party tortfeasor, which has a limited right to recover from the employer. The court of appeals agreed in a unanimous, published decision. It therefore reversed and remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment against Ramler in the full amount of the jury verdict, subject to appropriate offsets and reduced by the 5% of fault the jury allocated to Fish. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the comparative fault statute, Minn. Stat. § 604.02, applies to the facts of this case. (Stearns County)

In 2015, John Leonard was charged with two counts of check forgery after law enforcement officers conducting hotel interdictions reviewed guest registration records at a local hotel and discovered that Leonard had paid cash for a short-term room rental. Based on Leonard’s criminal history, the officers knocked on the hotel room door and a subsequent search of the room revealed evidence related to check forgery. Leonard filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the statute allowing law enforcement officers to inspect hotel registration records, Minn. Stat. § 327.12 (2018), is an unconstitutional violation of his expectation of privacy. The district court denied the suppression motion, finding that Leonard does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he voluntarily provides information to third parties, such as a hotel. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the hotel registry statute in Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 327.12, is an unconstitutional violation of individual privacy. (Hennepin County)

Appellant David Stay and D.T. spent the evening of May 13, 2016, at a bar. After closing time, the men got into an altercation outside of the bar. Stay punched D.T. once in the face. D.T. fell to the ground and was unresponsive. D.T. died later than night. Respondent the State of Minnesota charged Stay with first-degree manslaughter based on misdemeanor assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.20(2) (2018), and other offenses. During trial, Stay requested that the district court instruct the jury that first-degree manslaughter requires that death or great bodily harm be reasonably foreseeable when the predicate offense is fifth-degree assault. The district court denied the request. The jury found Stay guilty of first-degree manslaughter and fifth-degree assault. The court of appeals affirmed Stay’s conviction. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the first-degree manslaughter statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.20(2), requires the State to prove that death or great bodily harm was reasonably foreseeable when the underlying crime is misdemeanor assault. (Mille Lacs County)

Appellant/cross-respondent Housing Partners III-Lofts LLC (“Housing Partners”) was the developer of a condominium development in Minneapolis consisting of two buildings, A and B. The general contractor was appellant/cross-respondent Kraus-Anderson Construction Company. Respondent/cross-appellant Village Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Association (“Association”) is the condominium association representing the owners of units in the finished development. During the construction of the development, Building A was completed, and units therein were sold, before the corresponding steps were taken with respect to Building B. Respondent Kenneth Kendle, P.E. (“Kendle”) was a subcontractor with respect to Building B only. The Association learned of defects in the HVAC system in Building A, and then in Building B. It proceeded to repair the defects in every unit in both buildings, at substantial cost. In August of 2015 it commenced a lawsuit that eventually encompassed Housing Partners, Kraus-Anderson, Kendle, and other defendants. The Association asserted two types of claims: common-law claims against all defendants, and statutory warranty claims under Chapter 327A of Minnesota Statutes against Housing Partners and Kraus-Anderson. Housing Partners filed cross-claims against its co-defendants for contribution and indemnity. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants based on the statutes of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2018). The Association appealed. In a unanimous, published opinion, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded in part that Building A and Building B were separate “improvement[s] to real property” for purposes of the 10-year statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), and it therefore affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the statutes of repose had run for both buildings with respect to the common-law claims. Addressing the statutory warranty claims, the court of appeals concluded that for condominium developments, the “warranty date” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 327A.02, subd. 1 (2018) and the statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 4, is to be determined with respect to each condominium unit, rather than each building as the district court had concluded. It therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the development in this case was one or two “improvements to real property” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a); and (2) how the “warranty date,” as that term is used in Minn. Stat. § 327A.02, subd. 1 and Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 4, is to be determined for condominium developments. (Hennepin County)

Appellant William DeRosa was a member of the board of Dakota Plains Holdings, Inc. Respondent Craig McKenzie was Dakota Plains’ CEO and board chairman. DeRosa eventually resigned from the board. Dakota Plains sued DeRosa, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and DeRosa counterclaimed. That litigation was eventually settled. In the meantime, Dakota Plains issued a press release stating that DeRosa violated his fiduciary duties, committed unlawful acts, and would “stand trial in court for his” alleged misconduct. Dakota Plains refused to retract the statement. Later, Dakota Plains went bankrupt. DeRosa then sued McKenzie personally on theories of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress for allegedly “directing and publishing” the press release. DeRosa amended his complaint to allege that McKenzie “authorized and approved” the press release and “had control over” its publication. The district court granted McKenzie’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that DeRosa could not prevail without alleging (and eventually proving) that McKenzie himself made the allegedly defamatory statements in the press release. The court of appeals affirmed in a unanimous, unpublished decision, rejecting DeRosa’s arguments that a defendant may be liable for another person or entity’s defamatory speech. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a corporate officer may be personally liable for the defamatory statements of the corporation when the officer authorized and approved those statements. (Hennepin County)

Respondent Town of Duluth granted a zoning variance to Charles Bille and Carol Danielson-Bille, which allowed them to build a residence on their property. Neighboring property owners—appellants John Schulz, et al.—opposed the variance and sought to commence a district court action to obtain judicial review of the decision. Appellants ultimately admitted that their action against the Billes had to be dismissed due to untimely service of the summons and complaint. After the district court dismissed the Billes from the action, the district court granted the Township’s motion to dismiss the action in its entirety on the basis that the Billes are necessary and indispensable parties under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19. The district court reasoned that the challenged variance relates to the Billes’ property and that a “determination of the validity of the variance directly affects their interest and property.” The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether it was necessary to serve the summons and complaint on the property owners who obtained the variance; and (2) whether Minn. R. Civ. P. 19 applies when persons aggrieved by a decision of a township seek review of that decision in the district court. (St. Louis County)

A grand jury indicted appellant Chance Adams for first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery and several other felonies. During voir dire, respondent the State of Minnesota used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 9, who was African-American. Adams raised a Batson challenge to this strike, arguing the State had removed Juror 9 because of her race. The district court denied the challenge. Following a jury trial, Adams was convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred by overruling Adams’ Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of Juror 9. (Hennepin County)

Damon Ewing suffered a work-related injury while working for Pine Craft, Inc. Pine Craft admitted liability for Ewing’s ankle-sprain injury. Ewing alleged other injuries as a result of the ankle injury. The compensation judge found that these other injuries were not casually related to the work injury and that the ankle sprain was resolved by April 20, 2016. The compensation judge denied all benefits after April 20, 2016, including rehabilitation benefits. The qualified rehabilitation consultant (QRC), Optimal Recovery, Inc. and its owner Ann Brown, appealed the denial of rehabilitation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. Relying on Minn. Stat. § 176.102, subd. 8 (2018), it concluded that an employer is liable for rehabilitation services until the employer files a plan amendment with a request to terminate those services. Because Pine Craft did not file that request until April 2017, the WCCA held that Pine Craft was liable for the QRC’s services from April 2016 through April 2017. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the WCCA erred in reversing the compensation judge, who denied the QRC’s bills once the temporary injury resolved and there was no primary liability for all other ailments and body parts; (2) whether the WCCA erred in applying Minn. Stat. § 176.102 (2018), and Minn. Rules 5220.0510 (2017), and in holding that an employer is required to pay for QRC services, even when those services were for denied ailments and body parts; and (3) whether the QRC forfeited and/or waived the arguments she made on appeal regarding an alleged violation of the statute or rule. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Appellant State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company insured a home owned by respondents Sheila and William Oliver. The home was damaged by a fire. The parties were not able to agree on the measurement of the loss, and the Olivers demanded an appraisal under the terms of their insurance policy. They did not request preaward interest. The appraisal panel issued an award in favor of the Olivers in the amount of $1,143,778. State Farm promptly paid the appraisal award. More than one year later, the Olivers demanded $94,000 in preaward interest on the appraisal award under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (2018). State Farm refused to pay preaward interest. The Olivers filed a motion in district court, requesting that the court confirm the appraisal award under the Uniform Arbitration Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 572B.01–.31 (2018), and grant preaward interest. The district court confirmed the appraisal award, but denied preaward interest, concluding that the request for preaward interest was a request to modify the appraisal award, and was untimely. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that “an appraisal panel lacks authority to grant preaward interest,” and the 90-day deadline to file a motion to modify an arbitration award under Minn. Stat. § 572B.24(a) does not apply to a motion for preaward interest. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether an appraisal panel may consider preaward interest, and if not, when and how an insured should request that interest be added to an appraisal award; and (2) whether the 90-day window under Minn. Stat. § 572B.24(a) applies to an insured’s request for preaward interest on an appraisal award. (Hennepin County)

Appellant Peter Butler submitted a citizen-initiated petition, which contained over 7,600 signatures, to the Ramsey County Elections Office in support of a proposed amendment to the Saint Paul City Charter. After comparing the voter information on the petition to the voter information in the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), election officials determined that the petition did not contain the requisite number of signatures of registered voters in Saint Paul. See Minn. Stat. § 410.12 (2018). Butler filed a petition in Ramsey County District Court under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2018), which provides for the correction of “errors, omissions, or wrongful acts” in election matters. Among other arguments, Butler claimed that election officials should have accepted the signatures and associated residence addresses on the charter-amendment petition at face value. The district court granted summary judgment to respondents City of Saint Paul, et al., and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that “a signatory’s residence is presumptively determined by where the person is registered” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 410.12. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) when determining if a charter-amendment “petition is signed by a sufficient number of voters” under Minn. Stat. § 410.12, subd. 3, whether a signatory’s residence in the local government unit is determined by the place of residence recited on the face of the petition or the place of residence listed in the SVRS; and (2) whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists when a signatory identifies his or her residence on the face of the petition as being in the local government unit, but the SVRS lists a registration address outside of the local government unit. (Ramsey County)

The City of Saint Paul had an open solid-waste collection system, in which individual households contracted independently with collection haulers, for many years. The Saint Paul City Council passed a resolution in July 2017 to implement an organized solid waste collection program, under which the City contracts with collection haulers to provide waste-collection services. The July 2017 resolution authorized the City to enter into negotiations with collectors under Minn. Stat. § 115A.94 (2018), and in November 2017, the City signed a contract with a consortium of collectors, establishing the terms and conditions for organized waste collection, which was approved by the City Council. In September 2018, the City Council enacted an ordinance governing organized solid-waste collection in the city, which began on October 1, 2018. On October 16, 2018, the City Clerk received a petition from residents seeking a referendum on the ordinance governing solid-waste collection. The City Council passed a resolution declining to allow a referendum on the ordinance, concluding that the referendum authority provided in the City Charter was preempted by state laws governing organized waste collection, and that a successful referendum would unconstitutionally impair the City’s contract with the trash collectors. In February 2019, the residents filed a petition in district court under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2018), for correction of a ballot error, asserting that the referendum on the ordinance was about to be wrongfully omitted from the ballot for the November 2019 municipal election. The district court granted the petition and directed the City to place the referendum on the November 2019 ballot, or call a special election before the November general election. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) is the referendum authority in the City Charter preempted by state statutes governing organized waste collection; (2) would the City’s contract with waste collection haulers be unconstitutionally impaired by a referendum on the City’s ordinance governing organized waste-collection. (Ramsey County)

The City of Bloomington decided to adopt a system for “organized collection” of solid waste, under which a city contracts with a specific collector or group of collectors to remove trash in defined areas. After a statutorily-required notice and hearing process, the City in 2015 adopted an ordinance, effective December 31 of that year, implementing organized collection. The City also executed a 5-year contract with a consortium of trash collectors to provide trash collection services. Prior to adoption of the organized collection ordinance, the City had used “open collection,” in which residents were free to privately contract with any licensed collector. Residents of the City who oppose organized collection proposed a charter amendment that would require voter approval prior to the adoption of an organized-collection system; the proposed charter amendment stated that it “shall supersede any ordinances, ordinance amendments, or charter amendments related to solid waste adopted by the City Council in 2015-2016.” The City refused to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot, reasoning among other things that the proposed amendment impaired the City’s existing contract with the consortium of collectors, interfered with the City’s legislative process, and was preempted by the Minnesota Waste Management Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 115A.01–.99 (2018) (the “Act”). The residents sued the City in an effort to compel it to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, reasoning that the Act occupied the field of “the process a municipality must follow in order to implement organized collection.” The district court rejected the City’s argument that the proposed charter amendment unconstitutionally impaired the City’s contract with the consortium and did not address the City’s argument that the proposed amendment was an improper referendum. The residents appealed the preemption issue, the City cross‑appealed the impairment-of-contracts and improper-referendum issues, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals ruled that the Act preempted the residents’ proposed charter amendment, without addressing the other issues. The supreme court reversed with respect to the preemption issue and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues. Jennissen v. City of Bloomington, 913 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2018). On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that the proposed charter amendment was in fact an improper referendum. The court of appeals also rejected the City’s contention that the proposed charter amendment impaired the obligation of contracts, reasoning that the City’s contract with the consortium had terminated by its own terms. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the proposed charter amendment is an improper referendum; and (2) whether the proposed charter amendment unconstitutionally impairs the City’s contract with the consortium. (Hennepin County)

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Michael Jaros with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and false imprisonment for a June 2016 incident. During a jury trial, a detective testified that a forensic analysis of Jaros’s cell phone was performed. The detective stated that Jaros’s cell phone contained a number of pornographic photographs that showed violence towards women and “some of which corroborated [the complainant’s] story about what had happened.” Jaros did not object to this testimony, but he later asked for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion for a mistrial but struck the testimony. The district court provided immediate curative and cautionary instructions to the jury. In the final jury instructions, the district court instructed the jurors that if the court had asked them to disregard something they had seen or heard, they must do so. The jury found Jaros guilty of all counts. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the test announced in State v. Cox, 332 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. 1982), applies to the denial of a motion for a mistrial based on improper evidence being presented to the jury; and (2) whether Jaros is entitled to a new trial based on the detective’s testimony about the pornographic images found on Jaros’s cell phone. (Otter Tail County)

Appellant Nathan McGuire was the head coach for the girls’ basketball program at Woodbury High School. After his coaching contract was not renewed, McGuire brought defamation claims against several parents of his former players. The district court ultimately dismissed all of the defamation claims on summary judgment. The district court concluded that “McGuire, by virtue of his coaching position, is a public official” under Minnesota law and that he failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to actual malice. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether McGuire is a “public official” for purposes of his defamation claims. (Washington County)

Respondent Donald Strobel was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance in connection with conduct that occurred after the effective date of the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA). Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, §§ 1-22, 2016 Minn. Laws 576, 576-92. In calculating Strobel’s criminal-history score, the district court added half a felony point for a 2012 conviction of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Strobel challenged the district court’s calculation of his criminal history score. Concluding that the 2012 conviction could not be classified as a felony if it qualified as a gross misdemeanor under subdivision 4(a) of the DSRA-amended version of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2018), the court of appeals reversed Strobel’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether Strobel’s 2012 conviction may be classified as a felony if it qualifies as a gross misdemeanor under subdivision 4(a) of the DSRA-amended version of section 152.025. (Wabasha County)

An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Respondent Chadd Smith, a former deputy sheriff for the Carver County Sheriff’s Office, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Smith alleged that he had developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his employment. See Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) (2018) (defining “post-traumatic stress disorder”). Relators Carver County and Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust denied primary liability. The matter proceeded to a formal hearing where the compensation judge found that Smith failed to establish that he sustained a compensable injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further consideration. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the WCCA erred in holding that Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d), limits the fact-finder’s authority to evaluate the credibility of diagnosing experts and to choose between conflicting expert opinions; (2) whether the WCCA exceeded the proper scope of review by reversing the compensation judge’s determinations regarding the persuasiveness and credibility of the parties’ expert opinions; and (3) whether the WCCA exceeded the proper scope of review by reversing the compensation judge’s denial of compensation. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Appellant Matthew Thornton and respondent Jessica Bosquez are the parents of a child born in 2014. When the parties’ relationship ended, Thornton commenced a custody proceeding. Following a 2-day trial, the district court found that Bosquez had engaged in domestic abuse against Thornton, as defined in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2018), but that the statutory presumption against joint custody had been rebutted with respect to joint physical custody. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (2018) (stating that “the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents”). After considering the best interests of the child, the district court awarded the parties joint physical custody and awarded Bosquez sole legal custody. Thornton appealed. Among other arguments, he asserted that the district court had misapplied the presumption against joint custody in cases involving domestic abuse. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court erred in applying the rebuttable presumption in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9); and (2) whether the district court’s findings of fact are in accord with the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law. (Ramsey County)

On March 22, 2012, respondent Jason Fagin was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired. The deputies brought Fagin to the sheriff’s department and read him the implied-consent advisory. A deputy asked Fagin to submit to a blood or a urine test. Fagin refused. Appellant State of Minnesota charged Fagin with, among other offenses, first‑degree test refusal. In July 2012, Fagin pleaded guilty to the test-refusal charge. After he was convicted, Fagin did not pursue a direct appeal. In May 2017, Fagin filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the rule announced in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and applied in State v Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1338 (2017) (the “Birchfield rule”) applied retroactively to his test-refusal conviction. Fagin argued that under the Birchfield rule, the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because he refused a warrantless blood and urine test, and the deputies did not demonstrate that exigent circumstances existed. The district court summarily denied the postconviction petition. The court of appeals reversed. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) which party bears the burden of proof with respect to exigent circumstances when a defendant challenges a final test-refusal conviction based on the retroactive application of the Birchfield rule; and (2) whether the district court properly denied Fagin’s postconviction petition without a hearing because Fagin did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that police could not compel him to submit to a blood or urine test. (Washington County)

Following a trial, a jury found Brian Barthman guilty of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. All counts involved the same complainant. The jury also found that the complainant had a chromosomal defect and a cognitive developmental delay, that Barthman was aware of these vulnerabilities, and that Barthman subjected the complainant to multiple forms of sexual penetration and sexual contact. The district court sentenced Barthman to consecutive sentences of 360 months, the statutory maximum, for two of his first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, counts 1 and 2. The court of appeals affirmed the greater-than-double durational departure on count 1 and the imposition of consecutive sentences, but it reversed the greater-than-double durational departure on count 2. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court erred in imposing sentences on both counts 1 and 2 because they are part of the same behavioral incident; (2) whether the State failed to give proper notice of the alleged grounds for a durational departure in its pretrial notice; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing durational departures because the facts of this case and the reasons cited by the district court are not atypical for this type of offense; (4) whether the court should modify the rule from State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981), for when a district court may impose a greater-than-double durational departure; (5) whether the aggravating factors justify greater-than-double durational departures and consecutive sentences; and (6) whether the imposition of greater-than-double durational departures and consecutive sentences unduly exaggerates Barthman’s criminal conduct. (St. Louis County).

In 2015, appellant City of Brainerd restructured its fire department and eliminated all full-time fire-equipment operator (FEO) positions. After the restructuring, the fire department used paid on-call firefighters for the provision of fire services. Respondent Firefighters Union Local 4725, which represented the FEOs, and its president sued the City in district court. Among other claims, the Union asserted that the City had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01–.25 (2016). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to the City and dismissed all of the Union’s claims. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the PELRA claim. The court of appeals concluded that the City had violated the prohibition against interfering with the existence or administration of an employee organization, Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2), “when, during the midst of an operating bargaining agreement, [the City] unilaterally eliminated all FEO positions, effectively dissolving [the] Union.” The court of appeals further concluded that “it is not an ‘inherent managerial policy’ for an employer to reorganize a department when the reorganization interferes with the existence and administration of a union.” See Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 1 (“A public employer is not required to meet and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial policy.”). On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the City’s restructuring of the fire department constitutes an unfair labor practice under PELRA or whether the restructuring constitutes an authorized exercise of a public employer’s inherent managerial authority. (Crow Wing County)

These cases involve separate appeals of separate decisions by the Minnesota Tax Court. However, both appeals involve similar issues involving the Minnesota Credit for Increasing Research Activities (“Minnesota R&D Credit”). The Minnesota R&D Credit is a formula set forth in Minn. Stat. § 290.068 (2018). It allows a credit based on the excess of a taxpayer’s Minnesota “qualified research expenses” over a “base amount.” A corresponding federal credit in the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. § 41(c) (2018), defines “base amount” in part as “the fixed-base percentage” times “the average annual gross receipts of the taxpayer for the 4 taxable years preceding” the credit year. In turn, “the fixed-base percentage is the percentage which the aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for” the 1984 to 1988 taxable years “is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such taxable years.” Id. § 41(c)(3). In Case No. A18-1160, General Mills, Inc. filed an amended Minnesota tax return for 2011, which calculated General Mills’ Minnesota R&D Credit, and sought a refund in the amount of $949,236 plus interest. In Case No. A18-1740, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) filed an amended Minnesota tax return for 2011, which calculated IBM’s Minnesota R&D Credit, and sought a refund in the amount of $4,395,399 plus interest. In each case, the taxpayer contended, first, that the Minnesota definition of the base amount did not include a federal provision that sets a minimum for the base amount, see 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2); and, second, that the appropriate divisor for the fixed-base percentage was the aggregate worldwide gross receipts for 1984 through 1988, rather than the aggregate Minnesota gross receipts for those years. The Commissioner denied both refund claims in their entirety. Both General Mills and IBM appealed. In each case, the taxpayer and Commissioner filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In each case, the Tax Court found in favor of the Commissioner with respect to the minimum base amount issue, but in favor of the taxpayer with respect to the fixed-base-percentage issue. In both cases, the taxpayer and the Commissioner appealed to the supreme court, where the issues are (1) whether the Minnesota R&D Credit incorporates the federal minimum base amount in its definition of “base amount,” and (2) whether the fixed-base percentage for the Minnesota R&D Credit is calculated based on aggregate worldwide receipts or aggregated Minnesota receipts. (Minnesota Tax Court)

These cases involve separate appeals of separate decisions by the Minnesota Tax Court. However, both appeals involve similar issues involving the Minnesota Credit for Increasing Research Activities (“Minnesota R&D Credit”). The Minnesota R&D Credit is a formula set forth in Minn. Stat. § 290.068 (2018). It allows a credit based on the excess of a taxpayer’s Minnesota “qualified research expenses” over a “base amount.” A corresponding federal credit in the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. § 41(c) (2018), defines “base amount” in part as “the fixed-base percentage” times “the average annual gross receipts of the taxpayer for the 4 taxable years preceding” the credit year. In turn, “the fixed-base percentage is the percentage which the aggregate qualified research expenses of the taxpayer for” the 1984 to 1988 taxable years “is of the aggregate gross receipts of the taxpayer for such taxable years.” Id. § 41(c)(3). In Case No. A18-1160, General Mills, Inc. filed an amended Minnesota tax return for 2011, which calculated General Mills’ Minnesota R&D Credit, and sought a refund in the amount of $949,236 plus interest. In Case No. A18-1740, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) filed an amended Minnesota tax return for 2011, which calculated IBM’s Minnesota R&D Credit, and sought a refund in the amount of $4,395,399 plus interest. In each case, the taxpayer contended, first, that the Minnesota definition of the base amount did not include a federal provision that sets a minimum for the base amount, see 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2); and, second, that the appropriate divisor for the fixed-base percentage was the aggregate worldwide gross receipts for 1984 through 1988, rather than the aggregate Minnesota gross receipts for those years. The Commissioner denied both refund claims in their entirety. Both General Mills and IBM appealed. In each case, the taxpayer and Commissioner filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In each case, the Tax Court found in favor of the Commissioner with respect to the minimum base amount issue, but in favor of the taxpayer with respect to the fixed-base-percentage issue. In both cases, the taxpayer and the Commissioner appealed to the supreme court, where the issues are (1) whether the Minnesota R&D Credit incorporates the federal minimum base amount in its definition of “base amount,” and (2) whether the fixed-base percentage for the Minnesota R&D Credit is calculated based on aggregate worldwide receipts or aggregated Minnesota receipts. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Appellant Daniel J. Engstrom filed this lawsuit alleging that after his mother’s death, respondents Whitebirch, Inc. and other entities associated with a particular timeshare community sent him a letter stating that his mother had added his name to the deed for a particular timeshare and had filed it with the county. They requested that Engstrom quitclaim his interest in the property to respondents or pay unpaid maintenance fees on the property. According to Engstrom’s complaint, respondents threatened to begin collection activities against him if he did not sign a quitclaim deed. Engstrom denied having any interest in the timeshare and alleged that respondents committed fraud with respect to the deed. Engstrom refused to either pay the maintenance fee or quitclaim the property to respondents; instead he hired a lawyer who sent a letter to respondents alleging fraud, slander of title, and violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. The letter also demanded that respondents cease contact with Engstrom and pay him $2,500 in damages. The eventual lawsuit included allegations of two counts of violations of the Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, Minn. Stat. § 325F.69 (2018), and sought a variety of relief including attorney fees under the private attorney general statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (2018). The district court granted respondents’ motions to dismiss the fraud claims, concluding that Engstrom had not alleged any injury. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that his alleged injury—attorney fees expended in responding to the fraud—did not support a private claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether attorney fees expended to investigate and respond to a fraudulent demand are a type of injury that may support a private claim alleging a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. (Crow Wing County)

Between 2011 and 2012, appellant Minnesota Sands acquired the rights to several leases with landholders in respondent Winona County to mine silica sand to be processed and used in hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas (“fracking”). Minnesota Sands did not immediately apply for a conditional use permit, but another company did in 2012 and the application was approved. In 2016, the County amended its zoning ordinance to change the treatment of sand mining. The amended ordinance imposes a county-wide ban on operations involving “industrial minerals,” but operations involving “construction minerals” remain a conditional use. The definition of “industrial minerals” specifically refers to “silica sand . . . used in industrial applications, but excludes construction minerals,” and the amendment’s definition of “silica sand” refers to sand used for fracking. The definition of “construction minerals” includes “gravel and sand that is produced and used for local construction purposes. . . .” Minnesota Sands sued the County, alleging that the amended ordinance violates the Takings Clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions and the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Minnesota Sands’ claims. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. On the Commerce Clause issue, the court of appeals reasoned that the ordinance did not favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests, and because Minnesota Sands had no interest in mining construction minerals, it had no standing to challenge the use of the word “local” in the ordinance’s definition of construction minerals. On the Takings Clause issue, the court of appeals concluded that Minnesota Sands had no right to mine under the leases because it failed to fulfill a condition precedent of the leases and/or apply for a conditional use permit. Because Minnesota Sands had no right to mine, the court of appeals concluded that it had no compensable property interest and therefore no taking occurred. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the County’s ordinance violates the Commerce Clause, and (2) whether the County has “taken” mineral rights belonging to Minnesota Sands and thus owes compensation under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. (Winona County)