Podcasts about article ii

From April 12, 2019: Julian Mortenson, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, is the author of a remarkable new article entitled "Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative," forthcoming in the Columbia Law Review and available on SSRN.Recently, Benjamin Wittes spoke with the professor about the article, which Mortenson has been working on for years—as long as the two have known each other. The article explores the history of exactly three words of the U.S. Constitution—the first three words of Article II, to be precise: "the executive power."Huge claims about presidential power have rested on a conventional understanding of these three words. Julian argues that this conventional understanding is not just partially wrong, or mostly wrong, but completely wrong, as a matter of history. And, he tries to supplant it with a new understanding that he argues is actually a very old understanding of what those words mean.To receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/lawfare-institute. Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The United States Constitution is efficient in its division of power between the three branches of government.  Articles I, II and III create the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches, respectively.  Within Article II, Section II gives the President certain powers to function as our chief diplomat with other countries.  Just what are these powers?  What is the check on this power from the other branches?  What is a treaty, and what is the difference between treaties and executive orders?  To guide our discussion on Article II, Section II, Clause II we are delighted to welcome Dr. Heather Yates as our guest this week.  Dr. Yates is a professor of American politics.

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its latest Term. And over the past few weeks, the Trump administration has continued to duke it out with its adversaries in the federal courts.To tackle these topics, as well as their intersection—in terms of how well the courts, including but not limited to the Supreme Court, are handling Trump-related cases—I interviewed Professor Pamela Karlan, a longtime faculty member at Stanford Law School. She's perfectly situated to address these subjects, for at least three reasons.First, Professor Karlan is a leading scholar of constitutional law. Second, she's a former SCOTUS clerk and seasoned advocate at One First Street, with ten arguments to her name. Third, she has high-level experience at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), having served (twice) as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ.I've had some wonderful guests to discuss the role of the courts today, including Judges Vince Chhabria (N.D. Cal.) and Ana Reyes (D.D.C.)—but as sitting judges, they couldn't discuss certain subjects, and they had to be somewhat circumspect. Professor Karlan, in contrast, isn't afraid to “go there”—and whether or not you agree with her opinions, I think you'll share my appreciation for her insight and candor.Show Notes:* Pamela S. Karlan bio, Stanford Law School* Pamela S. Karlan bio, Wikipedia* The McCorkle Lecture (Professor Pamela Karlan), UVA Law SchoolPrefer reading to listening? For paid subscribers, a transcript of the entire episode appears below.Sponsored by:NexFirm helps Biglaw attorneys become founding partners. To learn more about how NexFirm can help you launch your firm, call 212-292-1000 or email careerdevelopment at nexfirm dot com.Three quick notes about this transcript. First, it has been cleaned up from the audio in ways that don't alter substance—e.g., by deleting verbal filler or adding a word here or there to clarify meaning. Second, my interviewee has not reviewed this transcript, and any transcription errors are mine. Third, because of length constraints, this newsletter may be truncated in email; to view the entire post, simply click on “View entire message” in your email app.David Lat: Welcome to the Original Jurisdiction podcast. I'm your host, David Lat, author of a Substack newsletter about law and the legal profession also named Original Jurisdiction, which you can read and subscribe to at davidlat dot Substack dot com. You're listening to the seventy-seventh episode of this podcast, recorded on Friday, June 27.Thanks to this podcast's sponsor, NexFirm. NexFirm helps Biglaw attorneys become founding partners. To learn more about how NexFirm can help you launch your firm, call 212-292-1000 or email careerdevelopment at nexfirm dot com. Want to know who the guest will be for the next Original Jurisdiction podcast? Follow NexFirm on LinkedIn for a preview.With the 2024-2025 Supreme Court Term behind us, now is a good time to talk about both constitutional law and the proper role of the judiciary in American society. I expect they will remain significant as subjects because the tug of war between the Trump administration and the federal judiciary continues—and shows no signs of abating.To tackle these topics, I welcomed to the podcast Professor Pamela Karlan, the Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law and Co-Director of the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic at Stanford Law School. Pam is not only a leading legal scholar, but she also has significant experience in practice. She's argued 10 cases before the Supreme Court, which puts her in a very small club, and she has worked in government at high levels, serving as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice during the Obama administration. Without further ado, here's my conversation with Professor Pam Karlan.Professor Karlan, thank you so much for joining me.Pamela Karlan: Thanks for having me.DL: So let's start at the beginning. Tell us about your background and upbringing. I believe we share something in common—you were born in New York City?PK: I was born in New York City. My family had lived in New York since they arrived in the country about a century before.DL: What borough?PK: Originally Manhattan, then Brooklyn, then back to Manhattan. As my mother said, when I moved to Brooklyn when I was clerking, “Brooklyn to Brooklyn, in three generations.”DL: Brooklyn is very, very hip right now.PK: It wasn't hip when we got there.DL: And did you grow up in Manhattan or Brooklyn?PK: When I was little, we lived in Manhattan. Then right before I started elementary school, right after my brother was born, our apartment wasn't big enough anymore. So we moved to Stamford, Connecticut, and I grew up in Connecticut.DL: What led you to go to law school? I see you stayed in the state; you went to Yale. What did you have in mind for your post-law-school career?PK: I went to law school because during the summer between 10th and 11th grade, I read Richard Kluger's book, Simple Justice, which is the story of the litigation that leads up to Brown v. Board of Education. And I decided I wanted to go to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and be a school desegregation lawyer, and that's what led me to go to law school.DL: You obtained a master's degree in history as well as a law degree. Did you also have teaching in mind as well?PK: No, I thought getting the master's degree was my last chance to do something I had loved doing as an undergrad. It didn't occur to me until I was late in my law-school days that I might at some point want to be a law professor. That's different than a lot of folks who go to law school now; they go to law school wanting to be law professors.During Admitted Students' Weekend, some students say to me, “I want to be a law professor—should I come here to law school?” I feel like saying to them, “You haven't done a day of law school yet. You have no idea whether you're good at law. You have no idea whether you'd enjoy doing legal teaching.”It just amazes me that people come to law school now planning to be a law professor, in a way that I don't think very many people did when I was going to law school. In my day, people discovered when they were in law school that they loved it, and they wanted to do more of what they loved doing; I don't think people came to law school for the most part planning to be law professors.DL: The track is so different now—and that's a whole other conversation—but people are getting master's and Ph.D. degrees, and people are doing fellowship after fellowship. It's not like, oh, you practice for three, five, or seven years, and then you become a professor. It seems to be almost like this other track nowadays.PK: When I went on the teaching market, I was distinctive in that I had not only my student law-journal note, but I actually had an article that Ricky Revesz and I had worked on that was coming out. And it was not normal for people to have that back then. Now people go onto the teaching market with six or seven publications—and no practice experience really to speak of, for a lot of them.DL: You mentioned talking to admitted students. You went to YLS, but you've now been teaching for a long time at Stanford Law School. They're very similar in a lot of ways. They're intellectual. They're intimate, especially compared to some of the other top law schools. What would you say if I'm an admitted student choosing between those two institutions? What would cause me to pick one versus the other—besides the superior weather of Palo Alto?PK: Well, some of it is geography; it's not just the weather. Some folks are very East-Coast-centered, and other folks are very West-Coast-centered. That makes a difference.It's a little hard to say what the differences are, because the last time I spent a long time at Yale Law School was in 2012 (I visited there a bunch of times over the years), but I think the faculty here at Stanford is less focused and concentrated on the students who want to be law professors than is the case at Yale. When I was at Yale, the idea was if you were smart, you went and became a law professor. It was almost like a kind of external manifestation of an inner state of grace; it was a sign that you were a smart person, if you wanted to be a law professor. And if you didn't, well, you could be a donor later on. Here at Stanford, the faculty as a whole is less concentrated on producing law professors. We produce a fair number of them, but it's not the be-all and end-all of the law school in some ways. Heather Gerken, who's the dean at Yale, has changed that somewhat, but not entirely. So that's one big difference.One of the most distinctive things about Stanford, because we're on the quarter system, is that our clinics are full-time clinics, taught by full-time faculty members at the law school. And that's distinctive. I think Yale calls more things clinics than we do, and a lot of them are part-time or taught by folks who aren't in the building all the time. So that's a big difference between the schools.They just have very different feels. I would encourage any student who gets into both of them to go and visit both of them, talk to the students, and see where you think you're going to be most comfortably stretched. Either school could be the right school for somebody.DL: I totally agree with you. Sometimes people think there's some kind of platonic answer to, “Where should I go to law school?” And it depends on so many individual circumstances.PK: There really isn't one answer. I think when I was deciding between law schools as a student, I got waitlisted at Stanford and I got into Yale. I had gone to Yale as an undergrad, so I wasn't going to go anywhere else if I got in there. I was from Connecticut and loved living in Connecticut, so that was an easy choice for me. But it's a hard choice for a lot of folks.And I do think that one of the worst things in the world is U.S. News and World Report, even though we're generally a beneficiary of it. It used to be that the R-squared between where somebody went to law school and what a ranking was was minimal. I knew lots of people who decided, in the old days, that they were going to go to Columbia rather than Yale or Harvard, rather than Stanford or Penn, rather than Chicago, because they liked the city better or there was somebody who did something they really wanted to do there.And then the R-squared, once U.S. News came out, of where people went and what the rankings were, became huge. And as you probably know, there were some scandals with law schools that would just waitlist people rather than admit them, to keep their yield up, because they thought the person would go to a higher-ranked law school. There were years and years where a huge part of the Stanford entering class had been waitlisted at Penn. And that's bad for people, because there are people who should go to Penn rather than come here. There are people who should go to NYU rather than going to Harvard. And a lot of those people don't do it because they're so fixated on U.S. News rankings.DL: I totally agree with you. But I suspect that a lot of people think that there are certain opportunities that are going to be open to them only if they go here or only if they go there.Speaking of which, after graduating from YLS, you clerked for Justice Blackmun on the Supreme Court, and statistically it's certainly true that certain schools seem to improve your odds of clerking for the Court. What was that experience like overall? People often describe it as a dream job. We're recording this on the last day of the Supreme Court Term; some hugely consequential historic cases are coming down. As a law clerk, you get a front row seat to all of that, to all of that history being made. Did you love that experience?PK: I loved the experience. I loved it in part because I worked for a wonderful justice who was just a lovely man, a real mensch. I had three great co-clerks. It was the first time, actually, that any justice had ever hired three women—and so that was distinctive for me, because I had been in classes in law school where there were fewer than three women. I was in one class in law school where I was the only woman. So that was neat.It was a great Term. It was the last year of the Burger Court, and we had just a heap of incredibly interesting cases. It's amazing how many cases I teach in law school that were decided that year—the summary-judgment trilogy, Thornburg v. Gingles, Bowers v. Hardwick. It was just a really great time to be there. And as a liberal, we won a lot of the cases. We didn't win them all, but we won a lot of them.It was incredibly intense. At that point, the Supreme Court still had this odd IT system that required eight hours of diagnostics every night. So the system was up from 8 a.m. to midnight—it stayed online longer if there was a death case—but otherwise it went down at midnight. In the Blackmun chambers, we showed up at 8 a.m. for breakfast with the Justice, and we left at midnight, five days a week. Then on the weekends, we were there from 9 to 9. And they were deciding 150 cases, not 60 cases, a year. So there was a lot more work to do, in that sense. But it was a great year. I've remained friends with my co-clerks, and I've remained friends with clerks from other chambers. It was a wonderful experience.DL: And you've actually written about it. I would refer people to some of the articles that they can look up, on your CV and elsewhere, where you've talked about, say, having breakfast with the Justice.PK: And we had a Passover Seder with the Justice as well, which was a lot of fun.DL: Oh wow, who hosted that? Did he?PK: Actually, the clerks hosted it. Originally he had said, “Oh, why don't we have it at the Court?” But then he came back to us and said, “Well, I think the Chief Justice”—Chief Justice Burger—“might not like that.” But he lent us tables and chairs, which were dropped off at one of the clerk's houses. And it was actually the day of the Gramm-Rudman argument, which was an argument about the budget. So we had to keep running back and forth from the Court to the house of Danny Richman, the clerk who hosted it, who was a Thurgood Marshall clerk. We had to keep running back and forth from the Court to Danny Richman's house, to baste the turkey and make stuff, back and forth. And then we had a real full Seder, and we invited all of the Jewish clerks at the Court and the Justice's messenger, who was Jewish, and the Justice and Mrs. Blackmun, and it was a lot of fun.DL: Wow, that's wonderful. So where did you go after your clerkship?PK: I went to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, where I was an assistant counsel, and I worked on voting-rights and employment-discrimination cases.DL: And that was something that you had thought about for a long time—you mentioned you had read about its work in high school.PK: Yes, and it was a great place to work. We were working on great cases, and at that point we were really pushing the envelope on some of the stuff that we were doing—which was great and inspiring, and my colleagues were wonderful.And unlike a lot of Supreme Court practices now, where there's a kind of “King Bee” usually, and that person gets to argue everything, the Legal Defense Fund was very different. The first argument I did at the Court was in a case that I had worked on the amended complaint for, while at the Legal Defense Fund—and they let me essentially keep working on the case and argue it at the Supreme Court, even though by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, I was teaching at UVA. So they didn't have this policy of stripping away from younger lawyers the ability to argue their cases the whole way through the system.DL: So how many years out from law school were you by the time you had your first argument before the Court? I know that, today at least, there's this two-year bar on arguing before the Court after having clerked there.PK: Six or seven years out—because I think I argued in ‘91.DL: Now, you mentioned that by then you were teaching at UVA. You had a dream job working at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. What led you to go to UVA?PK: There were two things, really, that did it. One was I had also discovered when I was in law school that I loved law school, and I was better at law school than I had been at anything I had done before law school. And the second was I really hated dealing with opposing counsel. I tell my students now, “You should take negotiation. If there's only one class you could take in law school, take negotiation.” Because it's a skill; it's not a habit of mind, but I felt like it was a habit of mind. And I found the discovery process and filing motions to compel and dealing with the other side's intransigence just really unpleasant.What I really loved was writing briefs. I loved writing briefs, and I could keep doing that for the Legal Defense Fund while at UVA, and I've done a bunch of that over the years for LDF and for other organizations. I could keep doing that and I could live in a small town, which I really wanted to do. I love New York, and now I could live in a city—I've spent a couple of years, off and on, living in cities since then, and I like it—but I didn't like it at that point. I really wanted to be out in the country somewhere. And so UVA was the perfect mix. I kept working on cases, writing amicus briefs for LDF and for other organizations. I could teach, which I loved. I could live in a college town, which I really enjoyed. So it was the best blend of things.DL: And I know, from your having actually delivered a lecture at UVA, that it really did seem to have a special place in your heart. UVA Law School—they really do have a wonderful environment there (as does Stanford), and Charlottesville is a very charming place.PK: Yes, especially when I was there. UVA has a real gift for developing its junior faculty. It was a place where the senior faculty were constantly reading our work, constantly talking to us. Everyone was in the building, which makes a huge difference.The second case I had go to the Supreme Court actually came out of a class where a student asked a question, and I ended up representing the student, and we took the case all the way to the Supreme Court. But I wasn't admitted in the Western District of Virginia, and that's where we had to file a case. And so I turned to my next-door neighbor, George Rutherglen, and said to George, “Would you be the lead counsel in this?” And he said, “Sure.” And we ended up representing a bunch of UVA students, challenging the way the Republican Party did its nomination process. And we ended up, by the student's third year in law school, at the Supreme Court.So UVA was a great place. I had amazing colleagues. The legendary Bill Stuntz was then there; Mike Klarman was there. Dan Ortiz, who's still there, was there. So was John Harrison. It was a fantastic group of people to have as your colleagues.DL: Was it difficult for you, then, to leave UVA and move to Stanford?PK: Oh yes. When I went in to tell Bob Scott, who was then the dean, that I was leaving, I just burst into tears. I think the reason I left UVA was I was at a point in my career where I'd done a bunch of visits at other schools, and I thought that I could either leave then or I would be making a decision to stay there for the rest of my career. And I just felt like I wanted to make a change. And in retrospect, I would've been just as happy if I'd stayed at UVA. In my professional life, I would've been just as happy. I don't know in my personal life, because I wouldn't have met my partner, I don't think, if I'd been at UVA. But it's a marvelous place; everything about it is just absolutely superb.DL: Are you the managing partner of a boutique or midsize firm? If so, you know that your most important job is attracting and retaining top talent. It's not easy, especially if your benefits don't match up well with those of Biglaw firms or if your HR process feels “small time.” NexFirm has created an onboarding and benefits experience that rivals an Am Law 100 firm, so you can compete for the best talent at a price your firm can afford. Want to learn more? Contact NexFirm at 212-292-1002 or email betterbenefits at nexfirm dot com.So I do want to give you a chance to say nice things about your current place. I assume you have no regrets about moving to Stanford Law, even if you would've been just as happy at UVA?PK: I'm incredibly happy here. I've got great colleagues. I've got great students. The ability to do the clinic the way we do it, which is as a full-time clinic, wouldn't be true anywhere else in the country, and that makes a huge difference to that part of my work. I've gotten to teach around the curriculum. I've taught four of the six first-year courses, which is a great opportunityAnd as you said earlier, the weather is unbelievable. People downplay that, because especially for people who are Northeastern Ivy League types, there's a certain Calvinism about that, which is that you have to suffer in order to be truly working hard. People out here sometimes think we don't work hard because we are not visibly suffering. But it's actually the opposite, in a way. I'm looking out my window right now, and it's a gorgeous day. And if I were in the east and it were 75 degrees and sunny, I would find it hard to work because I'd think it's usually going to be hot and humid, or if it's in the winter, it's going to be cold and rainy. I love Yale, but the eight years I spent there, my nose ran the entire time I was there. And here I look out and I think, “It's beautiful, but you know what? It's going to be beautiful tomorrow. So I should sit here and finish grading my exams, or I should sit here and edit this article, or I should sit here and work on the Restatement—because it's going to be just as beautiful tomorrow.” And the ability to walk outside, to clear your head, makes a huge difference. People don't understand just how huge a difference that is, but it's huge.DL: That's so true. If you had me pick a color to associate with my time at YLS, I would say gray. It just felt like everything was always gray, the sky was always gray—not blue or sunny or what have you.But I know you've spent some time outside of Northern California, because you have done some stints at the Justice Department. Tell us about that, the times you went there—why did you go there? What type of work were you doing? And how did it relate to or complement your scholarly work?PK: At the beginning of the Obama administration, I had applied for a job in the Civil Rights Division as a deputy assistant attorney general (DAAG), and I didn't get it. And I thought, “Well, that's passed me by.” And a couple of years later, when they were looking for a new principal deputy solicitor general, in the summer of 2013, the civil-rights groups pushed me for that job. I got an interview with Eric Holder, and it was on June 11th, 2013, which just fortuitously happens to be the 50th anniversary of the day that Vivian Malone desegregated the University of Alabama—and Vivian Malone is the older sister of Sharon Malone, who is married to Eric Holder.So I went in for the interview and I said, “This must be an especially special day for you because of the 50th anniversary.” And we talked about that a little bit, and then we talked about other things. And I came out of the interview, and a couple of weeks later, Don Verrilli, who was the solicitor general, called me up and said, “Look, you're not going to get a job as the principal deputy”—which ultimately went to Ian Gershengorn, a phenomenal lawyer—“but Eric Holder really enjoyed talking to you, so we're going to look for something else for you to do here at the Department of Justice.”And a couple of weeks after that, Eric Holder called me and offered me the DAAG position in the Civil Rights Division and said, “We'd really like you to especially concentrate on our voting-rights litigation.” It was very important litigation, in part because the Supreme Court had recently struck down the pre-clearance regime under Section 5 [of the Voting Rights Act]. So the Justice Department was now bringing a bunch of lawsuits against things they could have blocked if Section 5 had been in effect, most notably the Texas voter ID law, which was a quite draconian voter ID law, and this omnibus bill in North Carolina that involved all sorts of cutbacks to opportunities to vote: a cutback on early voting, a cutback on same-day registration, a cutback on 16- and 17-year-olds pre-registering, and the like.So I went to the Department of Justice and worked with the Voting Section on those cases, but I also ended up working on things like getting the Justice Department to change its position on whether Title VII covered transgender individuals. And then I also got to work on the implementation of [United States v.] Windsor—which I had worked on, representing Edie Windsor, before I went to DOJ, because the Court had just decided Windsor [which held Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional]. So I had an opportunity to work on how to implement Windsor across the federal government. So that was the stuff I got to work on the first time I was at DOJ, and I also obviously worked on tons of other stuff, and it was phenomenal. I loved doing it.I did it for about 20 months, and then I came back to Stanford. It affected my teaching; I understood a lot of stuff quite differently having worked on it. It gave me some ideas on things I wanted to write about. And it just refreshed me in some ways. It's different than working in the clinic. I love working in the clinic, but you're working with students. You're working only with very, very junior lawyers. I sometimes think of the clinic as being a sort of Groundhog Day of first-year associates, and so I'm sort of senior partner and paralegal at a large law firm. At DOJ, you're working with subject-matter experts. The people in the Voting Section, collectively, had hundreds of years of experience with voting. The people in the Appellate Section had hundreds of years of experience with appellate litigation. And so it's just a very different feel.So I did that, and then I came back to Stanford. I was here, and in the fall of 2020, I was asked if I wanted to be one of the people on the Justice Department review team if Joe Biden won the election. These are sometimes referred to as the transition teams or the landing teams or the like. And I said, “I'd be delighted to do that.” They had me as one of the point people reviewing the Civil Rights Division. And I think it might've even been the Wednesday or Thursday before Inauguration Day 2021, I got a call from the liaison person on the transition team saying, “How would you like to go back to DOJ and be the principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Civil Rights Division?” That would mean essentially running the Division until we got a confirmed head, which took about five months. And I thought that this would be an amazing opportunity to go back to the DOJ and work with people I love, right at the beginning of an administration.And the beginning of an administration is really different than coming in midway through the second term of an administration. You're trying to come up with priorities, and I viewed my job really as helping the career people to do their best work. There were a huge number of career people who had gone through the first Trump administration, and they were raring to go. They had all sorts of ideas on stuff they wanted to do, and it was my job to facilitate that and make that possible for them. And that's why it's so tragic this time around that almost all of those people have left. The current administration first tried to transfer them all into Sanctuary Cities [the Sanctuary Cities Enforcement Working Group] or ask them to do things that they couldn't in good conscience do, and so they've retired or taken buyouts or just left.DL: It's remarkable, just the loss of expertise and experience at the Justice Department over these past few months.PK: Thousands of years of experience gone. And these are people, you've got to realize, who had been through the Nixon administration, the Reagan administration, both Bush administrations, and the first Trump administration, and they hadn't had any problem. That's what's so stunning: this is not just the normal shift in priorities, and they have gone out of their way to make it so hellacious for people that they will leave. And that's not something that either Democratic or Republican administrations have ever done before this.DL: And we will get to a lot of, shall we say, current events. Finishing up on just the discussion of your career, you had the opportunity to work in the executive branch—what about judicial service? You've been floated over the years as a possible Supreme Court nominee. I don't know if you ever looked into serving on the Ninth Circuit or were considered for that. What about judicial service?PK: So I've never been in a position, and part of this was a lesson I learned right at the beginning of my LDF career, when Lani Guinier, who was my boss at LDF, was nominated for the position of AAG [assistant attorney general] in the Civil Rights Division and got shot down. I knew from that time forward that if I did the things I really wanted to do, my chances of confirmation were not going to be very high. People at LDF used to joke that they would get me nominated so that I would take all the bullets, and then they'd sneak everybody else through. So I never really thought that I would have a shot at a judicial position, and that didn't bother me particularly. As you know, I gave the commencement speech many years ago at Stanford, and I said, “Would I want to be on the Supreme Court? You bet—but not enough to have trimmed my sails for an entire lifetime.”And I think that's right. Peter Baker did this story in The New York Times called something like, “Favorites of Left Don't Make Obama's Court List.” And in the story, Tommy Goldstein, who's a dear friend of mine, said, “If they wanted to talk about somebody who was a flaming liberal, they'd be talking about Pam Karlan, but nobody's talking about Pam Karlan.” And then I got this call from a friend of mine who said, “Yeah, but at least people are talking about how nobody's talking about you. Nobody's even talking about how nobody's talking about me.” And I was flattered, but not fooled.DL: That's funny; I read that piece in preparing for this interview. So let's say someone were to ask you, someone mid-career, “Hey, I've been pretty safe in the early years of my career, but now I'm at this juncture where I could do things that will possibly foreclose my judicial ambitions—should I just try to keep a lid on it, in the hope of making it?” It sounds like you would tell them to let their flag fly.PK: Here's the thing: your chances of getting to be on the Supreme Court, if that's what you're talking about, your chances are so low that the question is how much do you want to give up to go from a 0.001% chance to a 0.002% chance? Yes, you are doubling your chances, but your chances are not good. And there are some people who I think are capable of doing that, perhaps because they fit the zeitgeist enough that it's not a huge sacrifice for them. So it's not that I despise everybody who goes to the Supreme Court because they must obviously have all been super-careerists; I think lots of them weren't super-careerists in that way.Although it does worry me that six members of the Court now clerked at the Supreme Court—because when you are a law clerk, it gives you this feeling about the Court that maybe you don't want everybody who's on the Court to have, a feeling that this is the be-all and end-all of life and that getting a clerkship is a manifestation of an inner state of grace, so becoming a justice is equally a manifestation of an inner state of grace in which you are smarter than everybody else, wiser than everybody else, and everybody should kowtow to you in all sorts of ways. And I worry that people who are imprinted like ducklings on the Supreme Court when they're 25 or 26 or 27 might not be the best kind of portfolio of justices at the back end. The Court that decided Brown v. Board of Education—none of them, I think, had clerked at the Supreme Court, or maybe one of them had. They'd all done things with their lives other than try to get back to the Supreme Court. So I worry about that a little bit.DL: Speaking of the Court, let's turn to the Court, because it just finished its Term as we are recording this. As we started recording, they were still handing down the final decisions of the day.PK: Yes, the “R” numbers hadn't come up on the Supreme Court website when I signed off to come talk to you.DL: Exactly. So earlier this month, not today, but earlier this month, the Court handed down its decision in United States v. Skrmetti, reviewing Tennessee's ban on the use of hormones and puberty blockers for transgender youth. Were you surprised by the Court's ruling in Skrmetti?PK: No. I was not surprised.DL: So one of your most famous cases, which you litigated successfully five years ago or so, was Bostock v. Clayton County, in which the Court held that Title VII does apply to protect transgender individuals—and Bostock figures significantly in the Skrmetti opinions. Why were you surprised by Skrmetti given that you had won this victory in Bostock, which you could argue, in terms of just the logic of it, does carry over somewhat?PK: Well, I want to be very precise: I didn't actually litigate Bostock. There were three cases that were put together….DL: Oh yes—you handled Zarda.PK: I represented Don Zarda, who was a gay man, so I did not argue the transgender part of the case at all. Fortuitously enough, David Cole argued that part of the case, and David Cole was actually the first person I had dinner with as a freshman at Yale College, when I started college, because he was the roommate of somebody I debated against in high school. So David and I went to law school together, went to college together, and had classes together. We've been friends now for almost 50 years, which is scary—I think for 48 years we've been friends—and he argued that part of the case.So here's what surprised me about what the Supreme Court did in Skrmetti. Given where the Court wanted to come out, the more intellectually honest way to get there would've been to say, “Yes, of course this is because of sex; there is sex discrimination going on here. But even applying intermediate scrutiny, we think that Tennessee's law should survive intermediate scrutiny.” That would've been an intellectually honest way to get to where the Court got.Instead, they did this weird sort of, “Well, the word ‘sex' isn't in the Fourteenth Amendment, but it's in Title VII.” But that makes no sense at all, because for none of the sex-discrimination cases that the Court has decided under the Fourteenth Amendment did the word “sex” appear in the Fourteenth Amendment. It's not like the word “sex” was in there and then all of a sudden it took a powder and left. So I thought that was a really disingenuous way of getting to where the Court wanted to go. But I was not surprised after the oral argument that the Court was going to get to where it got on the bottom line.DL: I'm curious, though, rewinding to Bostock and Zarda, were you surprised by how the Court came out in those cases? Because it was still a deeply conservative Court back then.PK: No, I was not surprised. I was not surprised, both because I thought we had so much the better of the argument and because at the oral argument, it seemed pretty clear that we had at least six justices, and those were the six justices we had at the end of the day. The thing that was interesting to me about Bostock was I thought also that we were likely to win for the following weird legal-realist reason, which is that this was a case that would allow the justices who claimed to be textualists to show that they were principled textualists, by doing something that they might not have voted for if they were in Congress or the like.And also, while the impact was really large in one sense, the impact was not really large in another sense: most American workers are protected by Title VII, but most American employers do not discriminate, and didn't discriminate even before this, on the basis of sexual orientation or on the basis of gender identity. For example, in Zarda's case, the employer denied that they had fired Mr. Zarda because he was gay; they said, “We fired him for other reasons.”Very few employers had a formal policy that said, “We discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.” And although most American workers are protected by Title VII, most American employers are not covered by Title VII—and that's because small employers, employers with fewer than 15 full-time employees, are not covered at all. And religious employers have all sorts of exemptions and the like, so for the people who had the biggest objection to hiring or promoting or retaining gay or transgender employees, this case wasn't going to change what happened to them at all. So the impact was really important for workers, but not deeply intrusive on employers generally. So I thought those two things, taken together, meant that we had a pretty good argument.I actually thought our textual argument was not our best argument, but it was the one that they were most likely to buy. So it was really interesting: we made a bunch of different arguments in the brief, and then as soon as I got up to argue, the first question out of the box was Justice Ginsburg saying, “Well, in 1964, homosexuality was illegal in most of the country—how could this be?” And that's when I realized, “Okay, she's just telling me to talk about the text, don't talk about anything else.”So I just talked about the text the whole time. But as you may remember from the argument, there was this weird moment, which came after I answered her question and one other one, there was this kind of silence from the justices. And I just said, “Well, if you don't have any more questions, I'll reserve the remainder of my time.” And it went well; it went well as an argument.DL: On the flip side, speaking of things that are not going so well, let's turn to current events. Zooming up to a higher level of generality than Skrmetti, you are a leading scholar of constitutional law, so here's the question. I know you've already been interviewed about it by media outlets, but let me ask you again, in light of just the latest, latest, latest news: are we in a constitutional crisis in the United States?PK: I think we're in a period of great constitutional danger. I don't know what a “constitutional crisis” is. Some people think the constitutional crisis is that we have an executive branch that doesn't believe in the Constitution, right? So you have Donald Trump asked, in an interview, “Do you have to comply with the Constitution?” He says, “I don't know.” Or he says, “I have an Article II that gives me the power to do whatever I want”—which is not what Article II says. If you want to be a textualist, it does not say the president can do whatever he wants. So you have an executive branch that really does not have a commitment to the Constitution as it has been understood up until now—that is, limited government, separation of powers, respect for individual rights. With this administration, none of that's there. And I don't know whether Emil Bove did say, “F**k the courts,” or not, but they're certainly acting as if that's their attitude.So yes, in that sense, we're in a period of constitutional danger. And then on top of that, I think we have a Supreme Court that is acting almost as if this is a normal administration with normal stuff, a Court that doesn't seem to recognize what district judges appointed by every president since George H.W. Bush or maybe even Reagan have recognized, which is, “This is not normal.” What the administration is trying to do is not normal, and it has to be stopped. So that worries me, that the Supreme Court is acting as if it needs to keep its powder dry—and for what, I'm not clear.If they think that by giving in and giving in, and prevaricating and putting things off... today, I thought the example of this was in the birthright citizenship/universal injunction case. One of the groups of plaintiffs that's up there is a bunch of states, around 23 states, and the Supreme Court in Justice Barrett's opinion says, “Well, maybe the states have standing, maybe they don't. And maybe if they have standing, you can enjoin this all in those states. We leave this all for remind.”They've sat on this for months. It's ridiculous that the Supreme Court doesn't “man up,” essentially, and decide these things. It really worries me quite a bit that the Supreme Court just seems completely blind to the fact that in 2024, they gave Donald Trump complete criminal immunity from any prosecution, so who's going to hold him accountable? Not criminally accountable, not accountable in damages—and now the Supreme Court seems not particularly interested in holding him accountable either.DL: Let me play devil's advocate. Here's my theory on why the Court does seem to be holding its fire: they're afraid of a worse outcome, which is, essentially, “The emperor has no clothes.”Say they draw this line in the sand for Trump, and then Trump just crosses it. And as we all know from that famous quote from The Federalist Papers, the Court has neither force nor will, but only judgment. That's worse, isn't it? If suddenly it's exposed that the Court doesn't have any army, any way to stop Trump? And then the courts have no power.PK: I actually think it's the opposite, which is, I think if the Court said to Donald Trump, “You must do X,” and then he defies it, you would have people in the streets. You would have real deep resistance—not just the “No Kings,” one-day march, but deep resistance. And there are scholars who've done comparative law who say, “When 3 percent of the people in a country go to the streets, you get real change.” And I think the Supreme Court is mistaking that.I taught a reading group for our first-years here. We have reading groups where you meet four times during the fall for dinner, and you read stuff that makes you think. And my reading group was called “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” and it started with the Albert Hirschman book with that title.DL: Great book.PK: It's a great book. And I gave them some excerpt from that, and I gave them an essay by Hannah Arendt called “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” which she wrote in 1964. And one of the things she says there is she talks about people who stayed in the German regime, on the theory that they would prevent at least worse things from happening. And I'm going to paraphrase slightly, but what she says is, “People who think that what they're doing is getting the lesser evil quickly forget that what they're choosing is evil.” And if the Supreme Court decides, “We're not going to tell Donald Trump ‘no,' because if we tell him no and he goes ahead, we will be exposed,” what they have basically done is said to Donald Trump, “Do whatever you want; we're not going to stop you.” And that will lose the Supreme Court more credibility over time than Donald Trump defying them once and facing some serious backlash for doing it.DL: So let me ask you one final question before we go to my little speed round. That 3 percent statistic is fascinating, by the way, but it resonates for me. My family's originally from the Philippines, and you probably had the 3 percent out there in the streets to oust Marcos in 1986.But let me ask you this. We now live in a nation where Donald Trump won not just the Electoral College, but the popular vote. We do see a lot of ugly things out there, whether in social media or incidents of violence or what have you. You still have enough faith in the American people that if the Supreme Court drew that line, and Donald Trump crossed it, and maybe this happened a couple of times, even—you still have faith that there will be that 3 percent or what have you in the streets?PK: I have hope, which is not quite the same thing as faith, obviously, but I have hope that some Republicans in Congress would grow a spine at that point, and people would say, “This is not right.” Have they always done that? No. We've had bad things happen in the past, and people have not done anything about it. But I think that the alternative of just saying, “Well, since we might not be able to stop him, we shouldn't do anything about it,” while he guts the federal government, sends masked people onto the streets, tries to take the military into domestic law enforcement—I think we have to do something.And this is what's so enraging in some ways: the district court judges in this country are doing their job. They are enjoining stuff. They're not enjoining everything, because not everything can be enjoined, and not everything is illegal; there's a lot of bad stuff Donald Trump is doing that he's totally entitled to do. But the district courts are doing their job, and they're doing their job while people are sending pizza boxes to their houses and sending them threats, and the president is tweeting about them or whatever you call the posts on Truth Social. They're doing their job—and the Supreme Court needs to do its job too. It needs to stand up for district judges. If it's not willing to stand up for the rest of us, you'd think they'd at least stand up for their entire judicial branch.DL: Turning to my speed round, my first question is, what do you like the least about the law? And this can either be the practice of law or law as a more abstract system of ordering human affairs.PK: What I liked least about it was having to deal with opposing counsel in discovery. That drove me to appellate litigation.DL: Exactly—where your request for an extension is almost always agreed to by the other side.PK: Yes, and where the record is the record.DL: Yes, exactly. My second question, is what would you be if you were not a lawyer and/or law professor?PK: Oh, they asked me this question for a thing here at Stanford, and it was like, if I couldn't be a lawyer, I'd... And I just said, “I'd sit in my room and cry.”DL: Okay!PK: I don't know—this is what my talent is!DL: You don't want to write a novel or something?PK: No. What I would really like to do is I would like to bike the Freedom Trail, which is a trail that starts in Montgomery, Alabama, and goes to the Canadian border, following the Underground Railroad. I've always wanted to bike that. But I guess that's not a career. I bike slowly enough that it could be a career, at this point—but earlier on, probably not.DL: My third question is, how much sleep do you get each night?PK: I now get around six hours of sleep each night, but it's complicated by the following, which is when I worked at the Department of Justice the second time, it was during Covid, so I actually worked remotely from California. And what that required me to do was essentially to wake up every morning at 4 a.m., 7 a.m. on the East Coast, so I could have breakfast, read the paper, and be ready to go by 5:30 a.m.I've been unable to get off of that, so I still wake up before dawn every morning. And I spent three months in Florence, and I thought the jet lag would bring me out of this—not in the slightest. Within two weeks, I was waking up at 4:30 a.m. Central European Time. So that's why I get about six hours, because I can't really go to bed before 9 or 10 p.m.DL: Well, I was struck by your being able to do this podcast fairly early West Coast time.PK: Oh no, this is the third thing I've done this morning! I had a 6:30 a.m. conference call.DL: Oh my gosh, wow. It reminds me of that saying about how you get more done in the Army before X hour than other people get done in a day.My last question, is any final words of wisdom, such as career advice or life advice, for my listeners?PK: Yes: do what you love, with people you love doing it with.DL: Well said. I've loved doing this podcast—Professor Karlan, thanks again for joining me.PK: You should start calling me Pam. We've had this same discussion….DL: We're on the air! Okay, well, thanks again, Pam—I'm so grateful to you for joining me.PK: Thanks for having me.DL: Thanks so much to Professor Karlan for joining me. Whether or not you agree with her views, you can't deny that she's both insightful and honest—qualities that have made her a leading legal academic and lawyer, but also a great podcast guest.Thanks to NexFirm for sponsoring the Original Jurisdiction podcast. NexFirm has helped many attorneys to leave Biglaw and launch firms of their own. To explore this opportunity, please contact NexFirm at 212-292-1000 or email careerdevelopment at nexfirm dot com to learn more.Thanks to Tommy Harron, my sound engineer here at Original Jurisdiction, and thanks to you, my listeners and readers. To connect with me, please email me at davidlat at Substack dot com, or find me on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn, at davidlat, and on Instagram and Threads at davidbenjaminlat.If you enjoyed today's episode, please rate, review, and subscribe. Please subscribe to the Original Jurisdiction newsletter if you don't already, over at davidlat dot substack dot com. This podcast is free, but it's made possible by paid subscriptions to the newsletter.The next episode should appear on or about Wednesday, July 23. Until then, may your thinking be original and your jurisdiction free of defects. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit davidlat.substack.com/subscribe

The Rich Zeoli Show- Hour 2: 4:05pm- Listeners react to the Trump Administration's decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Is there concern that Iran and its allies—China, Russia, and terror organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—could retaliate? 4:30pm- John Yoo—The Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley—joins The Rich Zeoli Show and dismisses Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio Cortez's (D-NY) suggestion that President Donald Trump violated Article II of the Constitution and should be impeached for authorizing strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. 4:50pm- While appearing on Fox News, Senator John Fetterman (D-PA) praised the U.S. military's strikes on Iran and President Trump's decision—explaining “it was a very limited military exercise” and did not amount to a declaration of war.

The Rich Zeoli Show- Full Episode (06/23/2025): 3:05pm- On Saturday night, seven U.S. B-2 bombers dropped a total of fourteen 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs on Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. In a press conference following the strategic strike, President Donald Trump called the mission a “spectacular military success.” 3:10pm- On Monday, Iran responded to U.S. strikes on key nuclear development facilities by launching missiles at an American base in Qatar—the largest American military installation in the Middle East. The Defense Department has said the air defense systems intercepted the missiles and there were no U.S. casualties. 3:20pm- During a press conference Sunday night, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Dan Caine revealed that Iranian air defense never spotted the American B-2 bombers over Iranian airspace and, consequently, never fired a single shot during Saturday night's strategic bombing. 3:30pm- Deputy Head of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called America's strike on Iranian nuclear facilities a “dangerous escalation” and suggested other countries may supply Iran with a nuclear weapon—though, he did not say which nations. 3:40pm- Secretary of State Marco Rubio has warned Iran not to shut down the Strait of Hormuz with mines. China, an ally of Iran, has echoed a similar sentiment. According to estimates 84% of the crude oil that moves through the Strait goes to Asian markets. 4:05pm- Listeners react to the Trump Administration's decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Is there concern that Iran and its allies—China, Russia, and terror organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—could retaliate? 4:30pm- John Yoo—The Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley—joins The Rich Zeoli Show and dismisses Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio Cortez's (D-NY) suggestion that President Donald Trump violated Article II of the Constitution and should be impeached for authorizing strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. 4:50pm- While appearing on Fox News, Senator John Fetterman (D-PA) praised the U.S. military's strikes on Iran and President Trump's decision—explaining “it was a very limited military exercise” and did not amount to a declaration of war. 5:00pm- Dr. EJ Antoni—Chief Economist at the Heritage Foundation—joins The Rich Zeoli Show to breakdown potential financial repercussions related to the strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Could Iran respond by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, and what would that mean for oil prices globally? 5:20pm- While appearing on Fox News, Trump Administration Border Czar Tom Homan discussed potential Iranian sleeper cells in the United States—explaining that the Biden Administration's relaxed border security policies resulted in “1,272 nationals of Iran released” into the U.S. 5:40pm- Breaking News: The Supreme Court has stayed a lower court order and will allow the Trump Administration to deport illegal migrants swiftly to countries where they don't have citizenship. 5:50pm- Did Mel Gibson and Pierce Brosnan turn down the role of Batman? 6:05pm- Dr. Victoria Coates—Former Deputy National Security Advisor & the Vice President of the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation—joins The Rich Zeoli Show and reacts to the United States's strategic strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Plus, BREAKING NEWS: Israel and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire. Dr. Coates is the author of the book: “The Battle for the Jewish State: How Israel—and America—Can Win.” 6:30pm- In a post to Truth Social, Preside Donald Trump wrote: “CONGRATULATIONS TO EVERYONE! It has been fully agreed by and between Israel and Iran that there will be a Complete and Total CEASEFIRE (in approximately 6 hours from now, when Israel and Iran have wound down and completed their in progress, final missions!), for 12 hours, at which point the War will be considered, E ...

LA: ARTICLE II. @ANDREWCMCCARTHY @NRO @THADMCCOTTER @THEAMGREATNESS.   1944 C IN C, PEARL HARBOR

In this interview with Dr. James Renihan we discuss a particular criticism in regards to the 1646 revision of the second article, having to do with the doctine of the Trinity, found in the of the First London Baptist Confession of Faith.

- In part three of our new series on the 39 Articles, Jon gets to Article 2 - "Of Christ the Son of God"

In episode NINE of One, Holy, Christian, and Apostolic, Wade continues to discuss Chapter 3 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, wrapping up Section 1, looking at Article II. Why is it important that I remember that not only do I believe, but we believe. What is the church's role in my faith? In what way can the church be understood as a mother. What is the importance of the creeds and how does the Apostles' Creed relate to the Nicene Creed? We hope you enjoy the episode and look forward to exploring the One, Holy, Christian, and Apostolic faith together more in episodes to come. If you want to read the Catechism of the Catholic Church online, you can find it here and here. Show Notes: Support 1517 Podcast Network 1517 Podcasts 1517 on Youtube 1517 Podcast Network on Apple Podcasts 1517 Events Schedule 1517 Academy - Free Theological Education What's New from 1517: Celebrate 2,000 Episodes of Christian History Almanac! The Impossible Prize: A Theology of Addiction by Donavan Riley Ditching the Checklist by Mark Mattes Broken Bonds: A Novel of the Reformation, Book 1 of 2 by Amy Mantravadi More from the hosts Michael Berg @ 1517 Wade Johnston @ 1517 Let the Bird Fly! website Thanks for listening!

Where do our presidents get their powers? Are those powers enumerated in the Constitution? Or are those powers bestowed by Congress? For our Founders, was the presidency essentially an instrument of legislative agenda? Or did they believe that the president possesses some sovereign right distinct and separate from Congress? In this interview, I discuss the following with my guest: ►Is it possible to compare a modern president, e.g., Pres. Trump, with one of our Founding presidents, e.g., Pres. Washington? Would this be like comparing apples to oranges? ►What was George Washingtons' presidency like? ►Is studying America's founding period important for history's sake, or does it provide some legal structure for our current constitutional framework? ►If the past truly is a foreign country, i.e., so different than our present, then what values can we derive from studying it? ►What is originalism? ►What is pluralism? ►What are a president's process powers? ►What are president's enumerated powers? ►What are the clear exceptions to the president's Article II powers? ►Do statutes increase presidential power? Can they take away presidential power? ►What is a unitary executive? ►What agency and institutional hurdles do presidents face? ►Why is terminating federal employees such an important and controversial issue? ►Do statutes empower presidents or constrain them?

The Pope is dead which means it's Pope Picking season. We've got all the top contenders for fanciest hat in the land. The Judicial Branch of government is trying to impose on Article II. Which is to say judges think they have more power than the president. We uncover the judicial coup.The Karmelo Anthony/Austin Metcalf case has taken a new turn. As Anthony accumulates allies and advocates, the media refuses to do due diligence. So here's everything you need to know about the twists and turns of the Karmelo Anthony case.GUEST: Josh FirestineLet American Financing help you regain control of your finances. Go to https://americanfinancing.net/crowder or call 1-800-974-6500. NMLS 182334, http://nmlsconsumeraccess.org/Link to today's sources: https://www.louderwithcrowder.com/sources-april-22-2025DOWNLOAD THE RUMBLE APP TODAY: https://rumble.com/our-appsJoin Rumble Premium to watch this show every day! http://louderwithcrowder.com/PremiumGet your favorite LWC gear: https://crowdershop.com/Bite-Sized Content: https://rumble.com/c/CrowderBitsSubscribe to my podcast: https://rss.com/podcasts/louder-with-crowder/FOLLOW ME: Website: https://louderwithcrowder.com/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/scrowder Instagram: http://www.instagram.com/louderwithcrowder Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/stevencrowderofficialMusic by @Pogo

From January 26, 2021: Jack Goldsmith sat down with Michael McConnell, the Richard and Frances Mallery Professor and director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of the new book, "The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the Constitution." They discussed McConnell's textual historical approach to interpreting presidential power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the many novel elements of executive power embodied in Article II and the proper understanding of Article II's Vesting Clause. They also talked about contemporary implications of Michael's reading of Article II for war powers, the unitary executive and late impeachments.To receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/lawfare-institute.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode, we dive into the latest clash between the judiciary and President Donald Trump's administration. Maryland v. Dept. of Agriculture pits an Obama-appointed federal judge, James Bredar, against Trump's Article II executive authority. At issue? Trump's firing of thousands of federal workers, which a coalition of states claims causes them "inconvenience." Judge Bredar ordered Trump to re-hire all the fired employees, but Trump's team has appealed to the Court of Appeals—and may take it all the way to the Supreme Court to defend his constitutional right to fire executive branch staff.  Fresh off a SCOTUS stay in a similar California case (keeping 16,000 fired employees out of work for now), the White House is pushing back hard. Today, they sent the Court of Appeals a clear message: follow SCOTUS' lead and respect Trump's executive power. Join us as we break down the White House's argument, the legal showdown, and what this means for the balance of power in Washington.  Don't miss it—hit that like button, subscribe, and ring the bell for more updates on this unfolding story!  #Trump #FederalJudge #SCOTUS #ExecutivePower #MarylandvDeptofAgriculture  

This Day in Legal History: Senate Approves Alaska PurchaseOn April 9, 1867, the United States Senate voted to ratify the Treaty with Russia for the Purchase of Alaska, approving the acquisition of the territory for $7.2 million. The deal, championed by Secretary of State William H. Seward, added over 586,000 square miles to U.S. territory. At the time, many Americans viewed the icy, remote land as a barren wasteland, mocking the transaction as “Seward's Folly” or “Seward's Icebox.” Despite public ridicule, Seward pursued the deal partly to prevent British expansion from neighboring Canada and to extend American commercial interests into the Pacific. Russia, for its part, saw little strategic or economic value in Alaska and feared it might lose the territory without compensation in a future conflict.The treaty passed in the Senate by a vote of 37 to 2, reflecting support among lawmakers despite popular skepticism. Legal authority for the purchase came through the treaty-making power of the executive branch, with Senate ratification required under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Once finalized, the transfer of sovereignty occurred in October 1867 in Sitka, with a formal ceremony marking Russia's departure.Criticism of the purchase subsided decades later following the Klondike Gold Rush and, eventually, the discovery of significant oil reserves. These developments drastically changed the public's perception of Alaska from frozen liability to strategic asset. The purchase also helped lay the groundwork for America's growing influence in the Pacific and Arctic regions.President Donald Trump announced that major law firms pledging $340 million in pro bono work would assist his administration with coal industry initiatives and international tariff negotiations. Speaking at a White House event, Trump said these firms—such as Paul Weiss, Skadden, Milbank, and Willkie—would provide legal support for leasing and regulatory issues in coal mining, as well as in talks with foreign countries on trade. While he didn't specify which firms would take on specific tasks, Trump emphasized their legal talent and claimed they were offering services “for the right price.”The announcement coincided with Trump signing executive orders invoking the Defense Production Act to increase coal mining and directing investments into advanced coal technology. He also said the Department of Justice would be tasked with challenging state and local regulations he views as harmful to miners. The law firm agreements came after Trump targeted several legal firms with directives that threaten their business, prompting lawsuits from Perkins Coie, WilmerHale, and Jenner & Block. Trump posted the agreements on Truth Social, stating the firms would work on causes like veterans' rights and combating antisemitism, although details on how their roles will be determined remain unclear.Trump Says He'll Enlist Big Law Dealmakers for Coal, TariffsA group of 67 former top legal executives from companies like Microsoft, Intel, and Eli Lilly filed a legal brief condemning President Trump's executive orders targeting several major law firms. They argue that the orders violate the Constitution and threaten the independence of corporate legal counsel by coercing political loyalty through federal contract threats. The brief supports a lawsuit by Perkins Coie, one of the firms impacted by the orders, which claims the directives bar its attorneys from government buildings and jeopardize its clients' federal contracts.The former general counsels contend that Trump's actions don't just punish individual firms, but undermine the principle that companies should be free to choose their legal representation without fear of political retaliation. The brief highlights how the orders signal to businesses that hiring lawyers linked to Trump's critics could lead to government sanctions. Trump issued similar orders against WilmerHale and Jenner & Block, and all three firms have secured temporary legal blocks against the measures.While some firms like Paul Weiss struck deals with Trump to avoid penalties—agreeing to provide pro bono work for causes aligned with his administration—others have pushed back. Four days prior, hundreds of law firms submitted their own brief supporting Perkins Coie. Trump's administration defends the orders as efforts to stop perceived political bias in Big Law.Former top lawyers at major companies decry Trump orders against law firms | ReutersAn immigration judge has given the U.S. government through today to present evidence justifying the deportation of Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia University student and lawful permanent resident. Khalil was arrested in New York and transferred to a detention facility in rural Louisiana, sparking concern over due process and free speech rights. At Tuesday's hearing, Judge Jamee Comans made it clear that if the government cannot prove Khalil is deportable, she will dismiss the case by Friday. She also criticized delays in sharing evidence and emphasized the importance of Khalil's due process rights.Khalil's lawyer, Marc Van Der Hout, claims the deportation effort is politically motivated and violates the First Amendment, suggesting that Khalil is being targeted for speaking out in support of Palestinians. The government argues Khalil should be deported under a Cold War-era law that allows removal if an immigrant is deemed a threat to U.S. foreign policy, and also accuses him of omissions on his green card application—charges he denies.The case has drawn national attention, including a crowded virtual courtroom. A separate habeas petition is also under consideration in federal court, and Khalil cannot be deported while that process plays out. His wife, a U.S. citizen who is expecting their child this month, has been unable to visit him due to her pregnancy.US given one day to show evidence for deporting Columbia University protester Khalil | ReutersA federal judge has ordered President Trump's White House to temporarily lift access restrictions on the Associated Press (AP) while a lawsuit challenging the ban moves forward. The Trump administration had barred AP journalists from events like Oval Office briefings and Air Force One trips after the agency refused to adopt Trump's preferred term, "Gulf of America," instead continuing to refer to the "Gulf of Mexico." U.S. District Judge Trevor McFadden, a Trump appointee, ruled that the First Amendment prohibits the government from excluding journalists based on viewpoint.The ruling, which takes effect Sunday to allow time for appeal, restores the AP's access to White House press events. McFadden emphasized that if some journalists are granted access, others cannot be denied for their editorial stance. The AP sued three senior Trump aides in February, claiming the restrictions were unconstitutional retaliation against protected speech and lacked due process.AP reporters testified that the ban hindered their ability to cover the president, while Justice Department lawyers argued that access to presidential spaces is a privilege, not a right. Press freedom groups and the White House Correspondents' Association welcomed the decision, calling it a win for independent journalism. The case remains ongoing, with a final ruling expected in the coming months.Judge lifts Trump White House restrictions on AP while lawsuit proceeds | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

This episode began as a dedication to Lysander Spooner. The more I learned about him, the more relevant he appeared to the current constitutional crisis facing the nation which involves partisan, hack, Democrat, activist federal, circuit court judges who are violating President Trump's Article II powers by anointing themselves commander-in-chief, chief magistrate and chief executive by issuing nationwide restraining orders against numerous Trump executive actions. Using Spooner's writings as the foundation, we provide a quick refresher course on the Constitution and offer some constitutionally-sound methods that should be employed to end this constitutional crisis once and for all.  Show Notes Instagram | Truth Social | GETTR | Twitter | GAB | Apple | Rumble | BitChute -------------------------------- Spooner: We Didn't Consent to the Constitution Lysander Spooner's Strategy to Stop Unconstitutional Acts The Real Forgotten Enforcement Mechanism of the Constitution Truth Quest Podcast Episodes Anti-Federalist episode: Episode #75 - The Truth About the Anti-Federalists Federalist Papers episodes: Episode #43 - The Truth About the Federalist Papers - Part I Episode #44 - The Truth About the Federalist Papers - Part II Episode #45 - The Truth About the Federalist Papers - Part III Truth Quest Podcast secession episodes: EPIC RANT - How to Save America From Itself Episode #192 - A Practical Guide to State Secession Episode #128 - The Truth About Opposition to Secession Episode #88 - The Truth About Secession - Part II Episode #87 - The Truth About Secession - Part I -------------------------------- Support the podcast by shopping at the Truth Quest Shirt Factory. With each shirt design there will be an explanation of what to expect from those inquisitive or brave enough to ask you about it. In most cases there are links to podcast episodes that will deepen your understanding of the importance of each phrase. We hope you take the challenge of wearing these shirts in public. Rest assured that you will be well-equipped with the rhetorical tools to engage in conversation and/or debate.  Good luck! And thanks for supporting the Truth Quest Podcast!

President Trump's White House Deputy Chief of Staff terrorizes the corporate media with facts, knowledge of the law, the Constitution, and the President's scope of power under Article II... and HE DESTROYS THEIR ARGUMENTS on live television. Stephen Miller's ability to match wits and facts with any Trump doubter underscores today's theme: Republicans are simply kicking the Democrats' butts. CNN's Harry Enten delivers the TKO as multiple polls now show democrats with their lowest approval in modern history.

This week host Mark Call welcomes back special Guest Harmon Taylor, of Legal Reality, for a discussion of the first six weeks of the new Trump Administration, and in particular, some of the implications of what may finally be a 'turn-around' against what he calls "anti-Scriptural morality." DOGE, for example, is uncovering incredible amounts of graft, bribery, corruption, and outright treason. And yet, the implications of AI, and the use of tracking technology for what certainly appear to be "good purposes," are also "fraught with peril." Likewise, an attack on "Lawfare," and the corruption of the court system beyond all reason, but by means of admittedly encouraging use of "executive power" (Article II of the cnostitution) is encouraging, since it moves in the right direction, and helps to "open peoples' eyes" to the level of Evil we have been subjected to, but is still a "double-edged sword." The implications are both encouraging, and a strong warning. Don't miss this discussion! https://hebrewnationonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CooH-13-Mar-2025-Special-Guest-Harmon-Taylor-podcast-xxx.mp3

Alan's Soaps https://www.AlansArtisanSoaps.comUse coupon code TODD to save an additional 10% off the bundle price.Bioptimizers https://Bioptimizers.com/toddEnter promo code TODD to get 10% off any order.Bonefrog https://BonefrogCoffee.com/toddCelebrate St. Patrick's Day with an Irish Bag of coffee and a “Lucky” gift box from BoneFrog Coffee.  Use code TODD at checkout to receive 10% off your first purchase and 15% on subscriptions.Bulwark Capital Bulwark Capital Management (bulwarkcapitalmgmt.com)Don't miss the next live Webinar Thursday March 20th at 3:30pm pacific.  Sign up today by calling 866-779-RISK or go to KnowYourRiskRadio.com.Renue Healthcare https://Renue.Healthcare/ToddYour journey to a better life starts at Renue Healthcare. Visit Renue.Healthcare/Todd.You probably saw this “unprecedented scene” as the media calls it, where James Dennehy leaves the FBI building in a parade of bagpipes and crying associates. Truly, there is a ghost in the Democrat fraud machine…Episode Links:New York FBI field office head James Dennehy leaves the FBI building to the sound of *bagpipes* after he says he was forced to resign.“ActBlue, the Democratic Fund-Raising Powerhouse, Faces Internal Chaos”Whoever Controlled The Autopen Controlled The Overthrow Of The U.S. GovernmentNASA: Turns out Elon Musk was telling the truth. Biden refused to let the stranded astronauts to come home last year for political reasons.Article II of the Constitution states that the executive power shall be vested in @POTUS. No court may take over that rule. No court may define or limit the scope of the duties of an official within the Executive Office of the President.Trump wants 'activist' groups that sue the government to put up money if they lose; The White House said the order will rein in 'activist judges' and keep 'litigants accountable'Rep. Al Green on the Breakfast Podcast claims he was removed from Trump speech due to 'racism'Democrat Women want you to know they are fighting!The clerk of the House changed Mary Miller's words in the record. This is absolutely UNACCEPTABLE!!! Rep Miller recognized Rep McBride as “gentleman” and “Mr.” NOT as “gentlewoman” and “Ms.”McBride is a MAN!!! No one should change Rep Miller's words!! Are we not Republican controlledThis Democrat Rep. accidentally let the truth slip out about what Democrats plan to do after President Trump's State of the Union: "We're gonna continue to speak lies to his truth" This is a real quote. Absolutely incredible

This lecture defines Presidential Executive Orders as directives issued by the President to manage federal government operations, carrying the force of law without congressional approval. Executive orders enable Presidents to direct federal agencies and respond to national issues. They have played a role in shaping civil rights, military policy, and economic regulations.The President's authority to issue executive orders stems from Article II of the U.S. Constitution:The Take Care Clause (Art. II, §3) ensures the President oversees the execution of federal laws and policies.The Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2) grants the President authority over the military.The Executive Power Clause (Art. II, §1) vests executive power in the President.Statutory Authority: Congress can delegate specific powers to the President through legislation.Executive orders are binding on federal agencies and do not require congressional approval, but they are subject to judicial review and can be repealed by a successor. Presidents use executive orders in various contexts:Administrative OrganizationForeign Policy and National SecurityRegulatory and Economic PolicyCivil Rights and Social IssuesEmergency ResponsePublic Health MeasuresEnergy and Environmental PolicyTechnology and CybersecurityCriminal Justice and Law EnforcementExecutive orders must derive authority from the Constitution or statute. Courts can invalidate executive orders that exceed constitutional or statutory authority. Congress can limit the effect of an executive order or refuse to fund initiatives enacted by it. Executive orders may face political resistance, public opinion, lawsuits, or congressional action. States may challenge executive orders that infringe upon state sovereignty. Executive orders do not have permanent legal standing and can be revoked or modified by future Presidents.Examples of executive orders include:Emancipation Proclamation (1863)Executive Order 9066 (1942)Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948)Creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (1970)DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) (2012)Immigration Ban (2017)Equal Pay Initiative (1963)Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection (2013)Climate Action Plan (2013)The “Buy American, Hire American” Order (2017)Other Presidential actions include presidential memoranda, presidential proclamations, national security directives, signing statements, presidential determinations, and presidential directives. Executive orders provide the President with a mechanism for efficient action, but their use is subject to constitutional and legal constraints.

Truth Be Told with Booker Scott – Activist judges and liberal attorney generals are blocking Trump's executive authority, defying Article II of the Constitution. A DHS audit by Elon Musk's team uncovered $59 million spent on luxury hotels for illegal immigrants. With lawsuits piling up, should Trump ignore the courts like Biden did? Matt Palumbo weighs in on ‘Truth Be Told.'

1UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISIONIn re:INTRUM AB, et al.,1Debtors.Chapter 11Case No. 24-90575 (CML)(Jointly Administered)NOTICE OF APPEALPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 and 8003,notice is hereby given that the Ad Hoc Committee of holders of 2025 notes issued by Intrum AB(the “AHC”) hereby appeals to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texasfrom (i) the Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262) (the “Motion to Dismiss Order”) and (ii) theOrder (I) Approving Disclosure Statement and (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor (Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263) (the“Confirmation Order”). A copy of the Motion to Dismiss Order is attached as Exhibit A and acopy of the Confirmation Order is attached as Exhibit B. Additionally, the transcript of theBankruptcy Court's oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and ConfirmationOrder (ECF No. 275) is attached as Exhibit C.Below are the names of all parties to this appeal and their respective counsel:1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors'service address in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, Ste 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 62I. APPELLANTA. Name of Appellant:The members of the AHC include:Boundary Creek Master Fund LP; CF INT Holdings Designated Activity Company; CaiusCapital Master Fund; Diameter Master Fund LP; Diameter Dislocation Master Fund II LP; FirTree Credit Opportunity Master Fund, LP; MAP 204 Segregated Portfolio, a segregated portfolioof LMA SPC; Star V Partners LLC; and TQ Master Fund LP.Attorneys for the AHC:QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLPChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comB. Positions of appellant in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that isthe subject of this appeal:CreditorsCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 2 of 63II. THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEALA. Judgment, order, or decree appealed from:The Order Denying Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (ECF No. 262); the Order (I) Approving Disclosure Statementand (II) Confirming Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB and Its Affiliated Debtor(Further Technical Modifications) (ECF No. 263); and the December 31, 2024 Transcript of OralRuling Before the Honorable Christopher M. Lopez United States Bankruptcy Court Judge (ECFNo. 275).B. The date on which the judgment, order, or decree was entered:The Motion to Dismiss Order and the Confirmation Order were entered on December 31,2024. The Court issued its oral ruling accompanying the Motion to Dismiss Order and theConfirmation Order on December 31, 2024.III. OTHER PARTIES TO THIS APPEALIntrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLCMILBANK LLPDennis F. Dunne (admitted pro hac vice)Jaimie Fedell (admitted pro hac vice)55 Hudson YardsNew York, NY 10001Telephone: (212) 530-5000Facsimile: (212) 530-5219Email: ddunne@milbank.comjfedell@milbank.com–and–Andrew M. Leblanc (admitted pro hac vice)Melanie Westover Yanez (admitted pro hac vice)1850 K Street, NW, Suite 1100Washington, DC 20006Telephone: (202) 835-7500Facsimile: (202) 263-7586Email: aleblanc@milbank.commwyanez@milbank.com–and–PORTER HEDGES LLPJohn F. Higgins (SBN 09597500)Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 3 of 64Eric D. Wade (SBN 00794802)M. Shane Johnson (SBN 24083263)1000 Main Street, 36th FloorHouston TX 77002Telephone: (713) 226-6000Facsimile: (713) 226-6248Email: jhiggins@porterhedges.comewade@porterhedges.comsjohnson@porterhedges.comIV. OTHER PARTIES THAT MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THIS APPEALThe following chart lists certain parties that are not parties to this appeal, but that may havean interest in the outcome of the case. These parties should be served with notice of this appealby the Debtors who are aware of their identities and best positioned to provide notice.All Other Creditors of the Debtors, Including, But Not Limited To:• Certain funds and accounts managed by BlackRock Investment Management (UK)Limited or its affiliates;• Capital Four;• Davidson Kempner European Partners, LLP;• Intermediate Capital Managers Limited;• Mandatum Asset Management Ltd;• H.I.G. Capital, LLC;• Spiltan Hograntefond; Spiltan Rantefond Sverige; and Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil;• The RCF SteerCo Group;• Swedbank AB (publ).Any Holder of Stock of the Debtors• Any holder of stock of the Debtors, including their successors and assigns.Case 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 4 of 65Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 2025.QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &SULLIVAN, LLP/s/ Christopher D. PorterChristopher D. Porter (SBN 24070437)Joanna D. Caytas (SBN 24127230)Melanie A. Guzman (SBN 24117175)Cameron M. Kelly (SBN 24120936)700 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900Houston, TX 77002Telephone: (713) 221-7000Facsimile: (713) 221-7100Email: chrisporter@quinnemanuel.comjoannacaytas@quinnemanuel.commelanieguzman@quinnemanuel.comcameronkelly@quinnemanuel.com-and-Benjamin I. Finestone (admitted pro hac vice)Sascha N. Rand (admitted pro hac vice)Katherine A. Scherling (admitted pro hac vice)295 5th AvenueNew York, New York 10016Telephone: (212) 849-7000Facsimile: (212) 849-7100Email: benjaminfinestone@quinnemanuel.comsascharand@quinnemanuel.comkatescherling@quinnemanuel.comCOUNSEL FOR THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OFINTRUM AB 2025 NOTEHOLDERSCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 5 of 6CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI, Christopher D. Porter, hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 2025, a copy ofthe foregoing document has been served via the Electronic Case Filing System for the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas./s/ Christopher D. PorterBy: Christopher D. PorterCase 24-90575 Document 296 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 6 of 6EXHIBIT ACase 24-90575 Document 296-1 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 31IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB, et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))Jointly AdministeredDebtors. ))ORDER DENYING MOTION OF THE AD HOCCOMMITTEE OF HOLDERS OF INTRUM AB NOTES DUE 2025TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASES PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 1112(B) ANDFEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1017(F)(1)(Related to Docket No. 27)This matter, having come before the Court upon the Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee ofHolders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) [Docket No. 27] (the “Motion toDismiss”); and this Court having considered the Debtors' Objection to the Motion of the Ad HocCommittee of Holders of Intrum AB Notes Due 2025 to Dismiss Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to 11U.S.C. § 1112(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(1) (the “Objection”) andany other responses or objections to the Motion to Dismiss; and this Court having jurisdiction overthis matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the Amended Standing Order; and this Court havingfound that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having foundthat it may enter a final order consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution; and thisCourt having found that the relief requested in the Objection is in the best interests of the Debtors'1 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these Chapter 11 Cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2101, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f2 32estates; and this Court having found that the Debtors' notice of the Objection and opportunity fora hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and Objection were appropriate and no other notice need beprovided; and this Court having reviewed the Motion to Dismiss and Objection and havingheard the statements in support of the relief requested therein at a hearing before this Court; andthis Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Objectionestablish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had beforethis Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is HEREBYORDERED THAT:1. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied for the reasons stated at the December 31, 2024 hearing.2. This Court retains exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive venue with respect to allmatters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.DAeucegmubste 0r 23,1 2, 0210294CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29662-1 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f2 3EXHIBIT BCase 24-90575 Document 296-2 Filed in TXSB on 01/13/25 Page 1 of 135IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASHOUSTON DIVISION)In re: ) Chapter 11)Intrum AB et al.,1 ) Case No. 24-90575 (CML)))(Jointly Administered)Debtors. ))ORDER (I) APPROVINGDISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND(II) CONFIRMING JOINT PREPACKAGED CHAPTER 11PLAN OF INTRUM AB AND ITS AFFILIATEDDEBTOR (FURTHER TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS)The above-captioned debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, the“Debtors”), having:a. entered into that certain Lock-Up Agreement, dated as of July 10, 2024 (asamended and restated on August 15, 2024, and as further modified,supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time in accordance with itsterms, the “the Lock-Up Agreement”) and that certain Backstop Agreement,dated as of July 10, 2024, (as amended and restated on November 15, 2024 andas further modified, supplemented, or otherwise amended from time to time inaccordance with its terms), setting out the terms of the backstop commitmentsprovided by the Backstop Providers to backstop the entirety of the issuance ofNew Money Notes (as may be further amended, restated, amended and restated,modified or supplemented from time to time in accordance with the termsthereof, the “Backstop Agreement”) which set forth the terms of a consensualfinancial restructuring of the Debtors;b. commenced, on October 17, 2024, a prepetition solicitation (the “Solicitation”)of votes on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of IntrumAB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (asthe same may be further amended, modified and supplemented from time totime, the “Plan”), by causing the transmittal, through their solicitation andballoting agent, Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC (“Kroll”), to theholders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of, among other things: (i) the1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Intrum AB and Intrum AB of Texas LLC. The Debtors' serviceaddress in these chapter 11 cases is 801 Travis Street, STE 2102, #1312, Houston, TX 77002.United States Bankruptcy CourtSouthern District of TexasENTEREDDecember 31, 2024Nathan Ochsner, ClerkCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 2 o of f1 133452Plan, (ii) the Disclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate (as the same may befurther amended, modified and supplemented from time to time, the“Disclosure Statement”), and (iii) the Ballots and Master Ballot to vote on thePlan (the “Ballots”), (iv) the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7];c. commenced on November 15, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), these chapter 11 cases(these “Chapter 11 Cases”) by filing voluntary petitions in the United StatesBankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”or the “Court”) for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code(the “Bankruptcy Code”);d. Filed on November 15, 2024, the Affidavit of Service of Solicitation Materials[Docket No. 7] (the “Solicitation Affidavit”);e. Filed, on November 16, 2024 the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 16] and theDisclosure Statement for Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Intrum AB andits Debtor Affiliate [Docket No. 17];f. Filed on November 16, 2024, the Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of ofthe Debtors' Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions [Docket No. 14] (the“First Day Declaration”);g. Filed on November 17, 2024, the Declaration of Alex Orchowski of KrollRestructuring Administration LLC Regarding the Solicitation of Votes andTabulation of Ballots Case on the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code [Docket No. 18] (the “Voting Declaration,” andtogether with the Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Ballots, and theSolicitation Affidavit, the “Solicitation Materials”);h. obtained, on November 19, 2024, the Order(I) Scheduling a Combined Hearingon (A) Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and (B) Confirmation of the Plan,(II) Approving Solicitation Procedures and Form and Manner of Notice ofCommencement, Combined Hearing, and Objection Deadline, (III) FixingDeadline to Object to Disclosure Statement and Plan, (IV) Conditionally (A)Directing the United States Trustee Not to Convene Section 341 Meeting ofCreditors and (B) Waiving Requirement to File Statements of Financial Affairsand Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, and (V) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 71] (the “Scheduling Order”), which, among other things: (i)approved the prepetition solicitation and voting procedures, including theConfirmation Schedule (as defined therein); (ii) conditionally approved theDisclosure Statement and its use in the Solicitation; and (iii) scheduled theCombined Hearing on December 16, 2024, at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing CentralCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 3 o of f1 133453Time) to consider the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and theconfirmation of the Plan (the “Combined Hearing”);i. served, through Kroll, on November 20, 2025, on all known holders of Claimsand Interests, the U.S. Trustee and certain other parties in interest, the Noticeof: (I) Commencement of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases; (II) Hearing on theDisclosure Statement and Confirmation of the Plan, and (III) Certain ObjectionDeadlines (the “Combined Hearing Notice”) as evidence by the Affidavit ofService [Docket No. 160];j. caused, on November 25 and 27, 2024, the Combined Hearing Notice to bepublished in the New York Times (national and international editions) and theFinancial Times (international edition), as evidenced by the Certificate ofPublication [Docket No. 148];k. Filed and served, on December 10, 2024, the Plan Supplement for the Debtors'Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization [Docket 165];l. Filed on December 10, 2024, the Declaration of Jeffrey Kopa in Support ofConfirmation of the Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum ABand its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [DocketNo. 155];m. Filed on December 14, 2024, the:i. Debtors' Memorandum of Law in Support of an Order: (I) Approving, on aFinal Basis, Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement; (II) Confirming theJoint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization; and (III) Granting Related Relief[Docket No. 190] (the “Confirmation Brief”);ii. Declaration of Andrés Rubio in Support of Confirmation of the JointPrepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate.[Docket No. 189] (the “Confirmation Declaration”); andiii. Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Intrum AB and itsDebtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (FurtherTechnical Modifications) [Docket No. 191];n. Filed on December 18, 2024, the Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization of Intrum AB and its Debtor Affiliate Pursuant to Chapter 11of the Bankruptcy Code (Further Technical Modifications) [Docket No. 223];CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 3 4 o of f1 133454WHEREAS, the Court having, among other things:a. set December 12, 2024, at 4:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) as the deadlinefor Filing objection to the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement and/orConfirmation2 of the Plan (the “Objection Deadline”);b. held, on December 16, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) [andcontinuing through December 17, 2024], the Combined Hearing;c. heard the statements, arguments, and any objections made at the CombinedHearing;d. reviewed the Disclosure Statement, the Plan, the Ballots, the Plan Supplement,the Confirmation Brief, the Confirmation Declaration, the SolicitationAffidavit, and the Voting Declaration;e. overruled (i) any and all objections to approval of the Disclosure Statement, thePlan, and Confirmation, except as otherwise stated or indicated on the record,and (ii) all statements and reservations of rights not consensually resolved orwithdrawn, unless otherwise indicated; andf. reviewed and taken judicial notice of all the papers and pleadings Filed(including any objections, statement, joinders, reservations of rights and otherresponses), all orders entered, and all evidence proffered or adduced and allarguments made at the hearings held before the Court during the pendency ofthese cases;NOW, THEREFORE, it appearing to the Bankruptcy Court that notice of theCombined Hearing and the opportunity for any party in interest to object to the DisclosureStatement and the Plan having been adequate and appropriate as to all parties affected or to beaffected by the Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, and the legal and factual bases setforth in the documents Filed in support of approval of the Disclosure Statement and Confirmationand other evidence presented at the Combined Hearing establish just cause for the relief grantedherein; and after due deliberation thereon and good cause appearing therefor, the BankruptcyCourt makes and issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and orders for thereasons stated on the record at the December 31, 2024 ruling on plan confirmation;2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have meanings given to them in the Plan and/or theDisclosure Statement. The rules of interpretation set forth in Article I.B of the Plan apply to this CombinedOrder.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 4 5 o of f1 133455I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWIT IS HEREBY FOUND AND DETERMINED THAT:A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1. The findings and conclusions set forth herein and in the record of theCombined Hearing constitute the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law underRule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rules7052 and 9014. To the extent any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact,or vice versa, they are adopted as such.B. Jurisdiction, Venue, Core Proceeding.2. This Court has jurisdiction over these Chapter 11 Cases pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue of these proceedings and the Chapter 11 Cases in this district is properpursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 157(b)(2) and this Court may enter a final order hereon under Article III of the United StatesConstitution.C. Eligibility for Relief.3. The Debtors were and continue to be entities eligible for relief under section109 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Debtors were and continue to be proper proponents of thePlan under section 1121(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.D. Commencement and Joint Administration of the Chapter 11 Cases.4. On the Petition Date, the Debtors commenced the Chapter 11 Cases. OnNovember 18, 2024, the Court entered an order [Docket No. 51] authorizing the jointadministration of the Chapter 11 Case in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b). The Debtorshave operated their businesses and managed their properties as debtors in possession pursuant toCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 5 6 o of f1 133456sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee, examiner, or statutory committeehas been appointed in these Chapter 11 Cases.E. Adequacy of the Disclosure Statement.5. The Disclosure Statement and the exhibits contained therein (i) containssufficient information of a kind necessary to satisfy the disclosure requirements of applicablenonbankruptcy laws, rules and regulations, including the Securities Act; and (ii) contains“adequate information” as such term is defined in section 1125(a)(1) and used in section1126(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, with respect to the Debtors, the Plan and the transactionscontemplated therein. The Filing of the Disclosure Statement satisfied Bankruptcy Rule 3016(b).The injunction, release, and exculpation provisions in the Plan and the Disclosure Statementdescribe, in bold font and with specific and conspicuous language, all acts to be enjoined andidentify the Entities that will be subject to the injunction, thereby satisfying Bankruptcy Rule3016(c).F. Solicitation.6. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, the Solicitationand the transmittal and service of the Solicitation Materials were: (i) timely, adequate, appropriate,and sufficient under the circumstances; and (ii) in compliance with sections 1125(g) and 1126(b)of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules 3017 and 3018, the applicable Local Bankruptcy Rules,the Scheduling Order and all applicable nonbankruptcy rules, laws, and regulations applicable tothe Solicitation, including the registration requirements under the Securities Act. The SolicitationMaterials, including the Ballots and the Opt Out Form (as defined below), adequately informedthe holders of Claims entitled to vote on the Plan of the procedures and deadline for completingand submitting the Ballots.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 6 7 o of f1 1334577. The Debtors served the Combined Hearing Notice on the entire creditormatrix and served the Opt Out Form on all Non-Voting Classes. The Combined Hearing Noticeadequately informed Holders of Claims or Interests of critical information regarding voting on (ifapplicable) and objecting to the Plan, including deadlines and the inclusion of release, exculpation,and injunction provisions in the Plan, and adequately summarized the terms of the Third-PartyRelease. Further, because the form enabling stakeholders to opt out of the Third-Party Release (the“Opt Out Form”) was included in both the Ballots and the Opt Out Form, every known stakeholder,including unimpaired creditors was provided with the means by which the stakeholders could optout of the Third-Party Release. No further notice is required. The period for voting on the Planprovided a reasonable and sufficient period of time and the manner of such solicitation was anappropriate process allowing for such holders to make an informed decision.G. Tabulation.8. As described in and evidenced by the Voting Declaration, (i) the holders ofClaims in Class 3 (RCF Claims) and Class 5 (Notes Claims) are Impaired under the Plan(collectively, the “Voting Classes”) and have voted to accept the Plan in the numbers and amountsrequired by section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) no Class that was entitled to vote on thePlan voted to reject the Plan. All procedures used to tabulate the votes on the Plan were in goodfaith, fair, reasonable, and conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of theBankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules, the Disclosure Statement, theScheduling Order, and all other applicable nonbankruptcy laws, rules, and regulations.H. Plan Supplement.9. On December 10, 2024, the Debtors Filed the Plan Supplement with theCourt. The Plan Supplement (including as subsequently modified, supplemented, or otherwiseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 7 8 o of f1 133458amended pursuant to a filing with the Court), complies with the terms of the Plan, and the Debtorsprovided good and proper notice of the filing in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, theBankruptcy Rules, the Scheduling Order, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases.All documents included in the Plan Supplement are integral to, part of, and incorporated byreference into the Plan. No other or further notice is or will be required with respect to the PlanSupplement. Subject to the terms of the Plan and the Lock-Up Agreement, and only consistenttherewith, the Debtors reserve the right to alter, amend, update, or modify the Plan Supplementand any of the documents contained therein or related thereto, in accordance with the Plan, on orbefore the Effective Date.I. Modifications to the Plan.10. Pursuant to section 1127 of the Bankruptcy Code, the modifications to thePlan described or set forth in this Combined Order constitute technical or clarifying changes,changes with respect to particular Claims by agreement with holders of such Claims, ormodifications that do not otherwise materially and adversely affect or change the treatment of anyother Claim or Interest under the Plan. These modifications are consistent with the disclosurespreviously made pursuant to the Disclosure Statement and Solicitation Materials, and notice ofthese modifications was adequate and appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the Chapter11 Cases. In accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 3019, these modifications do not require additionaldisclosure under section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code or the resolicitation of votes under section1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, and they do not require that holders of Claims or Interests beafforded an opportunity to change previously cast acceptances or rejections of the Plan.Accordingly, the Plan is properly before this Court and all votes cast with respect to the Plan priorto such modification shall be binding and shall apply with respect to the Plan.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Filieledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 8 9 o of f1 133459J. Objections Overruled.11. Any resolution or disposition of objections to Confirmation explained orotherwise ruled upon by the Court on the record at the Confirmation Hearing is herebyincorporated by reference. All unresolved objections, statements, joinders, informal objections,and reservations of rights are hereby overruled on the merits.K. Burden of Proof.12. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have met their burden of provingthe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code by a preponderance of theevidence, the applicable evidentiary standard for Confirmation. Further, the Debtors have proventhe elements of sections 1129(a) and 1129(b) by clear and convincing evidence. Each witness whotestified on behalf of the Debtors in connection with the Confirmation Hearing was credible,reliable, and qualified to testify as to the topics addressed in his testimony.L. Compliance with the Requirements of Section 1129 of the BankruptcyCode.13. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of section 1129 of theBankruptcy Code as follows:a. Section 1129(a)(1) – Compliance of the Plan with Applicable Provisions of theBankruptcy Code.14. The Plan complies with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122 and 1123, as required by section 1129(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.i. Section 1122 and 1123(a)(1) – Proper Classification.15. The classification of Claims and Interests under the Plan is proper under theBankruptcy Code. In accordance with sections 1122(a) and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,Article III of the Plan provides for the separate classification of Claims and Interests at each Debtorinto Classes, based on differences in the legal nature or priority of such Claims and Interests (otherCaCsaes e2 42-49-09507557 5 D oDcoucmumenetn 2t 9266-32 FFiilleedd iinn TTXXSSBB oonn 1021//3113//2245 PPaaggee 91 0o fo 1f 3143510than Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, and Priority Tax Claims, which areaddressed in Article II of the Plan and Unimpaired, and are not required to be designated asseparate Classes in accordance with section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code). Valid business,factual, and legal reasons exist for the separate classification of the various Classes of Claims andInterests created under the Plan, the classifications were not implemented for any improperpurpose, and the creation of such Classes does not unfairly discriminate between or among holdersof Claims or Interests.16. In accordance with section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, each Class ofClaims or Interests contains only Claims or Interests substantially similar to the other Claims orInterests within that Class. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of sections 1122(a),1122(b), and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Codeii. Section 1123(a)(2) – Specifications of Unimpaired Classes.17. Article III of the Plan specifies that Claims and Interests in the classesdeemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan. Holders of Intercompany Claims andIntercompany Interests are either Unimpaired and conclusively presumed to have accepted thePlan, or are Impaired and deemed to reject (the “Deemed Rejecting Classes”) the Plan, and, ineither event, are not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan. In addition, Article II of the Planspecifies that Administrative Claims and Priority Tax Claims are Unimpaired, although the Plandoes not classify these Claims. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 101 o of f1 1334511iii. Section 1123(a)(3) – Specification of Treatment of Voting Classes18. Article III.B of the Plan specifies the treatment of each Voting Class underthe Plan – namely, Class 3 and Class 5. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1123(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.iv. Section 1123(a)(4) – No Discrimination.19. Article III of the Plan provides the same treatment to each Claim or Interestin any particular Class, as the case may be, unless the holder of a particular Claim or Interest hasagreed to a less favorable treatment with respect to such Claim or Interest. Accordingly, the Plansatisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.v. Section 1123(a)(5) – Adequate Means for Plan Implementation.20. The Plan and the various documents included in the Plan Supplementprovide adequate and proper means for the Plan's execution and implementation, including: (a)the general settlement of Claims and Interests; (b) the restructuring of the Debtors' balance sheetand other financial transactions provided for by the Plan; (c) the consummation of the transactionscontemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement, the Restructuring Implementation Deed andthe Agreed Steps Plan and other documents Filed as part of the Plan Supplement; (d) the issuanceof Exchange Notes, the New Money Notes, and the Noteholder Ordinary Shares pursuant to thePlan; (e) the amendment of the Intercreditor Agreement; (f) the amendment of the FacilityAgreement; (g) the amendment of the Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement; (h) theconsummation of the Rights Offering in accordance with the Plan, Rights Offering Documentsand the Lock-Up Agreement; (i) the granting of all Liens and security interests granted orconfirmed (as applicable) pursuant to, or in connection with, the Facility Agreement, the ExchangeNotes Indenture, the New Money Notes Indenture, the amended Intercreditor Agreement and theCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 112 o of f1 1334512Senior Secured Term Loan Agreement pursuant to the New Security Documents (including anyLiens and security interests granted or confirmed (as applicable) on the Reorganized Debtors'assets); (j) the vesting of the assets of the Debtors' Estates in the Reorganized Debtors; (k) theconsummation of the corporate reorganization contemplated by the Plan, the Lock-Up Agreement,the Agreed Steps Plan and the Master Reorganization Agreement (as defined in the RestructuringImplementation Deed); and (l) the execution, delivery, filing, or recording of all contracts,instruments, releases, and other agreements or documents in furtherance of the Plan. Accordingly,the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Codevi. Section 1123(a)(6) – Non-Voting Equity Securities.21. The Company's organizational documents in accordance with the SwedishCompanies Act, Ch. 4, Sec 5 and the Plan prohibit the issuance of non-voting securities as of theEffective Date to the extent required to comply with section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.vii. Section 1123(a)(7) – Directors, Officers, and Trustees.22. The manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee (or any successorto and such officer, director, or trustee) of the Reorganized Debtors will be determined inaccordance with the existing organizational documents, which is consistent with the interests ofcreditors and equity holders and with public policy. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies therequirements of section 1123(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.b. Section 1123(b) – Discretionary Contents of the Plan23. The Plan contains various provisions that may be construed as discretionarybut not necessary for Confirmation under the Bankruptcy Code. Any such discretionary provisionCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 123 o of f1 1334513complies with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and is not inconsistent with the applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan satisfies section 1123(b).i. Section 1123(b)(1) – Impairment/Unimpairment of Any Class of Claims orInterests24. Article III of the Plan impairs or leaves unimpaired, as the case may be,each Class of Claims or Interests, as contemplated by section 1123(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.ii. Section 1123(b)(2) – Assumption and Rejection of Executory Contracts andUnexpired Leases25. Article V of the Plan provides for the assumption of the Debtors' ExecutoryContracts and Unexpired Leases as of the Effective Date unless such Executory Contract orUnexpired Lease: (a) is identified on the Rejected Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease List;(b) has been previously rejected by a Final Order; (c) is the subject of a motion to reject ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases that is pending on the Confirmation Date; or (4) is subject to amotion to reject an Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease pursuant to which the requestedeffective date of such rejection is after the Effective Date. Thus, the Plan satisfies section1123(b)(2).iii. Compromise and Settlement26. In accordance with section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code andBankruptcy Rule 9019, and in consideration for the distributions and other benefits provided underthe Plan, the provisions of the Plan constitute a good-faith compromise of all Claims, Interests,and controversies relating to the contractual, legal, and subordination rights that all holders ofClaims or Interests may have with respect to any Allowed Claim or Interest or any distribution tobe made on account of such Allowed Claim or Interest. Such compromise and settlement is theproduct of extensive arm's-length, good faith negotiations that, in addition to the Plan, resulted inCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 134 o of f1 1334514the execution of the Lock-Up Agreement, which represents a fair and reasonable compromise ofall Claims, Interests, and controversies and entry into which represented a sound exercise of theDebtors' business judgment. Such compromise and settlement is fair, equitable, and reasonableand in the best interests of the Debtors and their Estates.27. The releases of the Debtors' directors and officers are an integral componentof the settlements and compromises embodied in the Plan. The Debtors' directors and officers: (a)made a substantial and valuable contribution to the Debtors' restructuring, including extensive preandpost-Petition Date negotiations with stakeholder groups, and ensured the uninterruptedoperation of the Debtors' businesses during the Chapter 11 Cases; (b) invested significant timeand effort to make the restructuring a success and maximize the value of the Debtors' businessesin a challenging operating environment; (c) attended and, in certain instances, testified atdepositions and Court hearings; (d) attended and participated in numerous stakeholder meetings,management meetings, and board meetings related to the restructuring; (e) are entitled toindemnification from the Debtors under applicable non-bankruptcy law, organizationaldocuments, and agreements; (f) invested significant time and effort in the preparation of the Lock-Up Agreement, the Plan, Disclosure Statement, all supporting analyses, and the numerous otherpleadings Filed in the Chapter 11 Cases, thereby ensuring the smooth administration of the Chapter11 Cases; and (g) are entitled to all other benefits under any employment contracts existing as ofthe Petition Date. Litigation by the Debtors or other Releasing Parties against the Debtors'directors and officers would be a distraction to the Debtors' business and restructuring and woulddecrease rather than increase the value of the estates. The releases of the Debtors' directors andofficers contained in the Plan have the consent of the Debtors and the Releasing Parties and are inthe best interests of the estates.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 145 o of f1 1334515iv. Debtor Release28. The releases of claims and Causes of Action by the Debtors, ReorganizedDebtors, and their Estates described in Article VIII.C of the Plan in accordance with section1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Debtor Release”) represent a valid exercise of the Debtors'business judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuitof any such claims against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates' variousconstituencies because the costs involved would outweigh any potential benefit from pursuingsuch claims. The Debtor Release is fair and equitable and complies with the absolute priority rule.29. The Debtor Release is (a) an integral part of the Plan, and a component ofthe comprehensive settlement implemented under the Plan; (b) in exchange for the good andvaluable consideration provided by the Released Parties; (c) a good faith settlement andcompromise of the claims and Causes of Action released by the Debtor Release; (d) materiallybeneficial to, and in the best interests of, the Debtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and isimportant to the overall objectives of the Plan to finally resolve certain Claims among or againstcertain parties in interest in the Chapter 11 Cases; (e) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (f) given andmade after due notice and opportunity for hearing; and (g) a bar to any Debtor asserting any claimor Cause of Action released by the Debtor Release against any of the Released Parties. Theprobability of success in litigation with respect to the released claims and Causes of Action, whenweighed against the costs, supports the Debtor Release. With respect to each of these potentialCauses of Action, the parties could assert colorable defenses and the probability of success isuncertain. The Debtors' or the Reorganized Debtors' pursuit of any such claims or Causes ofAction against the Released Parties is not in the best interests of the Estates or the Debtors' variousCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 156 o of f1 1334516constituencies because the costs involved would likely outweigh any potential benefit frompursuing such claims or Causes of Action30. Holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote have overwhelmingly votedin favor of the Plan, including the Debtor Release. The Plan, including the Debtor Release, wasnegotiated before and after the Petition Date by sophisticated parties represented by able counseland advisors, including the Consenting Creditors. The Debtor Release is therefore the result of ahard fought and arm's-length negotiation process conducted in good faith.31. The Debtor Release appropriately offers protection to parties thatparticipated in the Debtors' restructuring process, including the Consenting Creditors, whoseparticipation in the Chapter 11 Cases is critical to the Debtors' successful emergence frombankruptcy. Specifically, the Released Parties, including the Consenting Creditors, madesignificant concessions and contributions to the Chapter 11 Cases, including, entering into theLock-Up Agreement and related agreements, supporting the Plan and the Chapter 11 Cases, andwaiving or agreeing to impair substantial rights and Claims against the Debtors under the Plan (aspart of the compromises composing the settlement underlying the revised Plan) in order tofacilitate a consensual reorganization and the Debtors' emergence from chapter 11. The DebtorRelease for the Debtors' directors and officers is appropriate because the Debtors' directors andofficers share an identity of interest with the Debtors and, as previously stated, supported and madesubstantial contributions to the success of the Plan, the Chapter 11 Cases, and operation of theDebtors' business during the Chapter 11 Cases, actively participated in meetings, negotiations, andimplementation during the Chapter 11 Cases, and have provided other valuable consideration tothe Debtors to facilitate the Debtors' successful reorganization and continued operation.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 167 o of f1 133451732. The scope of the Debtor Release is appropriately tailored under the factsand circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases. In light of, among other things, the value provided bythe Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and the critical nature of the Debtor Release to thePlan, the Debtor Release is appropriate.v. Release by Holders of Claims and Interests33. The release by the Releasing Parties (the “Third-Party Release”), set forthin Article VIII.D of the Plan, is an essential provision of the Plan. The Third-Party Release is: (a)consensual as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object or properly optout from the Third-Party Release; (b) within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334; (c) in exchange for the good and valuable consideration provided by theReleased Parties; (d) a good faith settlement and compromise of the claims and Causes of Actionreleased by the Third-Party Release; (e) materially beneficial to, and in the best interests of, theDebtors, their Estates, and their stakeholders, and is important to the overall objectives of the Planto finally resolve certain Claims among or against certain parties in interest in the Chapter 11Cases; (f) fair, equitable, and reasonable; (g) given and made after due notice and opportunity forhearing; (h) appropriately narrow in scope given that it expressly excludes, among other things,any Cause of Action that is judicially determined by a Final Order to have constituted actual fraud,willful misconduct, or gross negligence; (i) a bar to any of the Releasing Parties asserting anyclaim or Cause of Action released by the Third-Party Release against any of the Released Parties;and (j) consistent with sections 105, 524, 1123, 1129, and 1141 and other applicable provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code.34. The Third-Party Release is an integral part of the agreement embodied inthe Plan among the relevant parties in interest. Like the Debtor Release, the Third-Party ReleaseCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 178 o of f1 1334518facilitated participation in both the Debtors' Plan and the chapter 11 process generally. The Third-Party Release is instrumental to the Plan and was critical in incentivizing parties to support thePlan and preventing significant and time-consuming litigation regarding the parties' respectiverights and interests. The Third-Party Release was a core negotiation point in connection with thePlan and instrumental in developing the Plan that maximized value for all of the Debtors'stakeholders and kept the Debtors intact as a going concern. As such, the Third-Party Releaseappropriately offers certain protections to parties who constructively participated in the Debtors'restructuring process—including the Consenting Creditors (as set forth above)—by, among otherthings, facilitating the negotiation and consummation of the Plan, supporting the Plan and, in thecase of the Backstop Providers, committing to provide new capital to facilitate the Debtors'emergence from chapter 11. Specifically, the Notes Ad Hoc Group proposed and negotiated thepari passu transaction that is the basis of the restructuring proposed under the Plan and provideda much-needed deleveraging to the Debtors' business while taking a discount on their Claims (inexchange for other consideration).35. Furthermore, the Third-Party Release is consensual as to all parties ininterest, including all Releasing Parties, and such parties in interest were provided notice of thechapter 11 proceedings, the Plan, the deadline to object to confirmation of the Plan, and theCombined Hearing and were properly informed that all holders of Claims against or Interests inthe Debtors that did not file an objection with the Court in the Chapter 11 Cases that included anexpress objection to the inclusion of such holder as a Releasing Party under the provisionscontained in Article VIII of the Plan would be deemed to have expressly, unconditionally,generally, individually, and collectively consented to the release and discharge of all claims andCauses of Action against the Debtors and the Released Parties. Additionally, the release provisionsCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 189 o of f1 1334519of the Plan were conspicuous, emphasized with boldface type in the Plan, the DisclosureStatement, the Ballots, and the applicable notices. Except as set forth in the Plan, all ReleasingParties were properly informed that unless they (a) checked the “opt out” box on the applicableBallot or opt-out form and returned the same in advance of the Voting Deadline, as applicable, or(b) timely Filed an objection to the releases contained in the Plan that was not resolved beforeentry of this Confirmation Order, they would be deemed to have expressly consented to the releaseof all Claims and Causes of Action against the Released Parties.36. The Ballots sent to all holders of Claims and Interests entitled to vote, aswell as the notice of the Combined Hearing sent to all known parties in interest (including thosenot entitled to vote on the Plan), unambiguously provided in bold letters that the Third-PartyRelease was contained in the Plan.37. The scope of the Third-Party Release is appropriately tailored under thefacts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases, and parties in interest received due and adequatenotice of the Third-Party Release. Among other things, the Plan provides appropriate and specificdisclosure with respect to the claims and Causes of Action that are subject to the Third-PartyRelease, and no other disclosure is necessary. The Debtors, as evidenced by the VotingDeclaration and Certificate of Publication, including by providing actual notice to all knownparties in interest, including all known holders of Claims against, and Interests in, any Debtor andpublishing notice in international and national publications for the benefit of unknown parties ininterest, provided sufficient notice of the Third-Party Release, and no further or other notice isnecessary. The Third-Party Release is designed to provide finality for the Debtors, theReorganized Debtors and the Released Parties regarding the parties' respective obligations underthe Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary, anyparty who timely opted-out of the Third-Party Release is not bound by the Third-PartyRelease.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 1 290 o of f1 133452038. The Third-Party Release is specific in language, integral to the Plan, andgiven for substantial consideration. The Releasing Parties were given due and adequate notice ofthe Third-Party Release, and thus the Third-Party Release is consensual under controllingprecedent as to those Releasing Parties that did not specifically and timely object. In light of,among other things, the value provided by the Released Parties to the Debtors' Estates and theconsensual and critical nature of the Third-Party Release to the Plan, the Third-Party Release isappropriatevi. Exculpation.39. The exculpation described in Article VIII.E of the Plan (the “Exculpation”)is appropriate under applicable law, including In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 48 F. 4th 419(5th Cir. 2022), because it was supported by proper evidence, proposed in good faith, wasformulated following extensive good-faith, arm's-length negotiations with key constituents, and isappropriately limited in scope.40. No Entity or Person may commence or continue any action, employ anyprocess, or take any other act to pursue, collect, recover or offset any Claim, Interest, debt,obligation, or Cause of Action relating or reasonably likely to relate to any act or commission inconnection with, relating to, or arising out of a Covered Matter (including one that alleges theactual fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct of a Covered Entity), unless expresslyauthorized by the Bankruptcy Court after (1) it determines, after a notice and a hearing, such Claim,Interest, debt, obligation, or Cause of Action is colorable and (2) it specifically authorizes suchEntity or Person to bring such Claim or Cause of Action. The Bankruptcy Court shall have soleand exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether any such Claim, Interest, debt, obligation or Causeof Action is colorable and, only to the extent legally permissible and as provided for in Article XI,CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 201 o of f1 1334521shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such underlying colorable Claim, Interest, debt, obligation, orCause of Action.vii. Injunction.41. The injunction provisions set forth in Article VIII.F of the Plan are essentialto the Plan and are necessary to implement the Plan and to preserve and enforce the discharge,Debtor Release, the Third-Party Release, and the Exculpation provisions in Article VIII of thePlan. The injunction provisions are appropriately tailored to achieve those purposes.viii. Preservation of Claims and Causes of Action.42. Article IV.L of the Plan appropriately provides for the preservation by theDebtors of certain Causes of Action in accordance with section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.Causes of Action not released by the Debtors or exculpated under the Plan will be retained by theReorganized Debtors as provided by the Plan. The Plan is sufficiently specific with respect to theCauses of Action to be retained by the Debtors, and the Plan and Plan Supplement providemeaningful disclosure with respect to the potential Causes of Action that the Debtors may retain,and all parties in interest received adequate notice with respect to such retained Causes of Action.The provisions regarding Causes of Action in the Plan are appropriate and in the best interests ofthe Debtors, their respective Estates, and holders of Claims or Interests. For the avoidance of anydoubt, Causes of Action released or exculpated under the Plan will not be retained by theReorganized Debtors.c. Section 1123(d) – Cure of Defaults43. Article V.D of the Plan provides for the satisfaction of Cure Claimsassociated with each Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease to be assumed in accordance withsection 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Any monetary defaults under each assumed ExecutoryCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 212 o of f1 1334522Contract or Unexpired Lease shall be satisfied, pursuant to section 365(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode, by payment of the default amount in Cash on the Effective Date, subject to the limitationsdescribed in Article V.D of the Plan, or on such other terms as the parties to such ExecutoryContracts or Unexpired Leases may otherwise agree. Any Disputed Cure Amounts will bedetermined in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article V.D of the Plan, and applicablebankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law. As such, the Plan provides that the Debtors will Cure, orprovide adequate assurance that the Debtors will promptly Cure, defaults with respect to assumedExecutory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in accordance with section 365(b)(1) of theBankruptcy Code. Thus, the Plan complies with section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.d. Section 1129(a)(2) – Compliance of the Debtors and Others with the ApplicableProvisions of the Bankruptcy Code.44. The Debtors, as proponents of the Plan, have complied with all applicableprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code as required by section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,including sections 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, and 1128, and Bankruptcy Rules 3017, 3018,and 3019.e. Section 1129(a)(3) – Proposal of Plan in Good Faith.45. The Debtors have proposed the Plan in good faith, in accordance with theBankruptcy Code requirements, and not by any means forbidden by law. In determining that thePlan has been proposed in good faith, the Court has examined the totality of the circumstancesfiling of the Chapter 11 Cases, including the formation of Intrum AB of Texas LLC (“IntrumTexas”), the Plan itself, and the process leading to its formulation. The Debtors' good faith isevident from the facts and record of the Chapter 11 Cases, the Disclosure Statement, and the recordof the Combined Hearing and other proceedings held in the Chapter 11 CasesCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 223 o of f1 133452346. The Plan (including the Plan Supplement and all other documents necessaryto effectuate the Plan) is the product of good faith, arm's-length negotiations by and among theDebtors, the Debtors' directors and officers and the Debtors' key stakeholders, including theConsenting Creditors and each of their respective professionals. The Plan itself and the processleading to its formulation provide independent evidence of the Debtors' and such other parties'good faith, serve the public interest, and assure fair treatment of holders of Claims or Interests.Consistent with the overriding purpose of chapter 11, the Debtors Filed the Chapter 11 Cases withthe belief that the Debtors were in need of reorganization and the Plan was negotiated and proposedwith the intention of accomplishing a successful reorganization and maximizing stakeholder value,and for no ulterior purpose. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(3) of the BankruptcyCode are satisfied.f. Section 1129(a)(4) – Court Approval of Certain Payments as Reasonable.47. Any payment made or to be made by the Debtors, or by a person issuingsecurities or acquiring property under the Plan, for services or costs and expenses in connectionwith the Chapter 11 Cases, or in connection with the Plan and incident to the Chapter 11 Cases,has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the Court as reasonable. Accordingly, thePlan satisfies the requirements of section 1129(a)(4).g. Section 1129(a)(5)—Disclosure of Directors and Officers and Consistency with theInterests of Creditors and Public Policy.48. The identities of or process for appointment of the Reorganized Debtors'directors and officers proposed to serve after the Effective Date were disclosed in the PlanSupplement in advance of the Combined Hearing. Accordingly, the Debtors have satisfied therequirements of section 1129(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 234 o of f1 1334524h. Section 1129(a)(6)—Rate Changes.49. The Plan does not contain any rate changes subject to the jurisdiction of anygovernmental regulatory commission and therefore will not require governmental regulatoryapproval. Therefore, section 1129(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the Plan.i. Section 1129(a)(7)—Best Interests of Holders of Claims and Interests.50. The liquidation analysis attached as Exhibit D to the Disclosure Statementand the other evidence in support of the Plan that was proffered or adduced at the CombinedHearing, and the facts and circumstances of the Chapter 11 Cases are (a) reasonable, persuasive,credible, and accurate as of the dates such analysis or evidence was prepared, presented orproffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c) have not beencontroverted by other evidence; and (d) establish that each holder of Allowed Claims or Interestsin each Class will recover as much or more value under the Plan on account of such Claim orInterest, as of the Effective Date, than the amount such holder would receive if the Debtors wereliquidated on the Effective Date under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or has accepted the Plan.As a result, the Debtors have demonstrated that the Plan is in the best interests of their creditorsand equity holders and the requirements of section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.j. Section 1129(a)(8)—Conclusive Presumption of Acceptance by UnimpairedClasses; Acceptance of the Plan by Certain Voting Classes.51. The classes deemed to accept the Plan are Unimpaired under the Plan andare deemed to have accepted the Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. EachVoting Class voted to accept the Plan. For the avoidance of doubt, however, even if section1129(a)(8) has not been satisfied with respect to all of the Debtors, the Plan is confirmable becausethe Plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to the Voting Classesand thus satisfies section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to such Classes as describedCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 245 o of f1 1334525further below. As a result, the requirements of section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code are alsosatisfied.k. Section 1129(a)(9)—Treatment of Claims Entitled to Priority Pursuant to Section507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.52. The treatment of Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, andPriority Tax Claims under Article II of the Plan satisfies the requirements of, and complies in allrespects with, section 1129(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.l. Section 1129(a)(10)—Acceptance by at Least One Voting Class.53. As set forth in the Voting Declaration, all Voting Classes overwhelminglyvoted to accept the Plan. As such, there is at least one Voting Class that has accepted the Plan,determined without including any acceptance of the Plan by any insider (as defined by theBankruptcy Code), for each Debtor. Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) of theBankruptcy Code are satisfied.m. Section 1129(a)(11)—Feasibility of the Plan.54. The Plan satisfies section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thefinancial projections attached to the Disclosure Statement as Exhibit D and the other evidencesupporting the Plan proffered or adduced by the Debtors at or before the Combined Hearing: (a)is reasonable, persuasive, credible, and accurate as of the dates such evidence was prepared,presented, or proffered; (b) utilize reasonable and appropriate methodologies and assumptions; (c)has not been controverted by other persuasive evidence; (d) establishes that the Plan is feasibleand Confirmation of the Plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for furtherfinancial reorganization; (e) establishes that the Debtors will have sufficient funds available tomeet their obligations under the Plan and in the ordinary course of business—including sufficientamounts of Cash to reasonably ensure payment of Allowed Claims that will receive CashCCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 256 o of f1 1334526distributions pursuant to the terms of the Plan and other Cash payments required under the Plan;and (f) establishes that the Debtors or the Reorganized Debtors, as applicable, will have thefinancial wherewithal to pay any Claims that accrue, become payable, or are allowed by FinalOrder following the Effective Date. Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code.n. Section 1129(a)(12)—Payment of Statutory Fees.55. Article XII.C of the Plan provides that all fees payable pursuant to section1930(a) of the Judicial Code, as determined by the Court at the Confirmation Hearing inaccordance with section 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code, will be paid by each of the applicableReorganized Debtors for each quarter (including any fraction of a quarter) until the Chapter 11Cases are converted, dismissed, or closed, whichever occurs first. Accordingly, the Plan satisfiesthe requirements of section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code.o. Section 1129(a)(13)—Retiree Benefits.56. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code, and as provided inArticle IV.K of the Plan, the Reorganized Debtors will continue to pay all obligations on accountof retiree benefits (as such term is used in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code) on and after theEffective Date in accordance with applicable law. As a result, the requirements of section1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.p. Sections 1129(a)(14), (15), and (16)—Domestic Support Obligations, Individuals,and Nonprofit Corporations.57. The Debtors do not owe any domestic support obligations, are notindividuals, and are not nonprofit corporations. Therefore, sections 1129(a)(14), 1129(a)(15), and1129(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to the Chapter 11 Cases.CCaassee 2 244-9-900557755 D Dooccuummeennt t2 29663-2 F Fileiledd i nin T TXXSSBB o onn 1 021/3/113/2/245 P Paaggee 2 267 o of f1 1334527q. Section 1129(b)—Confirmation of the Plan Over Nonacceptance of VotingClasses.58. No Classes rejected the Plan, and section 1129(b) is not applicable here,but even if it were, the Plan may be confirmed pursuant to section 1129(b)(1) of the BankruptcyCode because the Plan is fair and equitable with respect to the Deemed Rejecting Classes. ThePlan has been proposed in good faith, is reasonable, and meets the requirements and all VotingClasses have voted to accept the Plan. The treatment of Intercompany Claims and IntercompanyInterests under the Plan provides for administrative convenience does not constitute a distributionunder the Plan on account of suc

The Nation’s Jeet Heer explores why Trump is so eager to annex Canada. Senator Tammy Duckworth details her Article II responsibilities in confirming Trump’s cabinet.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Constitutional Law Lecture 1 – Structure of Government and Separation of Powers Source: Excerpts from "Constitutional Law Lecture 1: The Structure of Government and Separation of Powers" I. Foundational Overview I begin by noting that the U.S. Constitution creates a structure of government designed to prevent tyranny. The three branches—Congress (legislative), the President (executive), and the courts (judicial)—operate under a system of separation of powers. This arrangement is complemented by checks and balances, whereby each branch can restrain the others. Federalism further divides power between the federal government and the states. Key Themes: Separation of Powers: This doctrine ensures that no single branch amasses unchecked authority. “Separation of powers is … the bedrock of the American constitutional system.” Checks and Balances: Each branch has devices (like vetoes or judicial review) to limit the other branches. “These interlocking mechanisms create a dynamic tension that fosters a balance of power.” Federalism: The Constitution specifies certain powers (enumerated) for the federal government and reserves others for the states. Judicial Review: Established in Marbury v. Madison, it empowers courts to strike down unconstitutional laws or actions. “Without Marbury, the checks and balances system would lack a critical enforcement mechanism.” Supremacy Clause: Federal law preempts conflicting state law, unifying legal standards throughout the nation. II. Constitutional Foundations Articles I, II, III, and VI Article I defines Congress's powers, including the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article II vests executive power in the President, granting authority as Commander-in-Chief and in foreign affairs. Article III establishes the judiciary, anchored by the Supreme Court. Article VI contains the Supremacy Clause, ensuring federal law supremacy. Federalism and Division of Power Enumerated Powers: Taxation, regulation of interstate commerce, defense. Reserved Powers: Those retained by states (e.g., police powers, education). Key Cases: McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) upheld implied federal powers. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) expanded Congress's reach over interstate commerce. III. Separation of Powers Doctrine Legislative Powers (Congress) Commerce Clause: Broad authority over interstate activities, yet subject to judicial limits (United States v. Lopez). Taxing and Spending: Congress can attach conditions to federal funds (South Dakota v. Dole). Necessary and Proper Clause: Permits laws essential to carrying out enumerated powers. Nondelegation Doctrine: Congress must not transfer its core legislative function to another branch (INS v. Chadha). Executive Powers (President) Commander-in-Chief: Authority over military decisions. Appointment: Nominates judges and officials (with Senate approval). Veto: Power to reject legislation. Foreign Affairs: Treaties, diplomacy; recognized as broad in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. Key Cases: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) – limited executive power over private property without legislative authorization. United States v. Nixon (1974) – limited executive privilege in criminal investigations. Judicial Powers Judicial Review: Power to invalidate unconstitutional statutes (Marbury v. Madison). Justiciability: Requires standing, ripeness, and mootness for a federal court to hear a case (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife). Federal Question Jurisdiction: Authority over federal issues; example: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) advanced civil rights jurisprudence. IV. Checks and Balances in Practice Interbranch Conflicts Congress → Executive: Impeachment, budgetary control. Executive → Congress: Veto power, executive orders. Judiciary → Both: Judicial review of legislative acts and executive actions (Cooper v. Aaron). Balancing National Security and Civil Liberties Key examples include Korematsu v. United States (1944) and Ha --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/law-school/support

Executive Orders What are they? Presidential Executive Orders are official directives issued by the President of the United States to manage and direct the operations of the federal government. They instruct federal agencies on how to implement laws and policies, and are not meant to create new laws, but provide instructions on how existing laws are to be applied and enforced. Executive orders carry the force of law and are legally binding. Other Presidential Directives Proclamations: These are often ceremonial or symbolic and lack the legal weight of Executive Orders. Presidential Memoranda: These are generally less formal and typically address internal agency matters, rather than broad policy directives. Executive Agreements: Used for international relations and do not carry the force of law within the U.S.; they also do not require Senate approval like treaties. Constitutional and Statutory Basis The President's authority to issue Executive Orders stems from Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants the President broad executive power to ensure the laws are faithfully executed. This is an implied power, not explicitly stated. Congress often passes laws that delegate specific powers to the executive branch, empowering the President to take actions necessary to implement and enforce those laws. Range and Scope Executive Orders address a wide range of issues, from national security and environmental protection to immigration and economic policy. While they cannot create new laws, they can create new policies within the scope of existing legislation and modify or reverse existing policies set by prior administrations. Executive Orders often instruct federal agencies to take specific actions to ensure their operations align with the administration's objectives. Checks and Balances Presidents can revoke or modify their own or their predecessors' Executive Orders, allowing for policy shifts with changes in administration. Congress can pass legislation to counteract or restrict the impact of an Executive Order, as long as they are acting within their constitutional authority. Courts can strike down Executive Orders that are deemed unconstitutional or that exceed the President's authority. The US government's system of checks and balances prevents the misuse of Executive Orders, involving legislative, judicial, and public opinion elements. Impact on Daily Life Executive Orders have a tangible impact on everyday life, often in ways that are not immediately obvious. The document specifically notes the effects of Executive Orders on Environmental regulations, Immigration policies, Healthcare Access, and Economic regulations. Understanding executive orders is crucial for engaged citizenship, enabling people to hold their leaders accountable. Key Facts Executive Orders are legally binding presidential directives. They are a primary tool for Presidential management of federal agencies. Executive Orders do not create new laws but guide the implementation of existing ones. They can be revoked or modified by the President. They are subject to judicial review and congressional oversight. They have a wide-ranging impact on daily life. The US Constitution does not explicitly mention Executive Orders, but they are based on an interpretation of implied executive power. Executive Orders have been used throughout US history for a variety of issues ranging from declarations of freedom to the creation of government agencies. Conclusion Executive Orders are a significant and powerful tool that Presidents use to shape national policy and federal operations. Understanding how they work, their limitations, and the checks and balances in place to prevent abuse of power is essential for all citizens. The ability of the average person to access information on the specifics of Executive Orders, and to understand them, is crucial to engaging in the democratic process and exercising effective civic responsibility. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/law-school/support

Thomas Webster, a decorated US Marine Veteran, 20 Year NYPD Police Officer, Husband and Father of three turned himself in to authorities in October 2022 to serve the longest sentence that a Judge has handed to a J6 Defendant to date at that time – 10 Years!The Justice Department's handling of January 6th cases has been criticized for its heavy-handed tactics, perceived political bias, and disregard for civil liberties. As of today over 1,500 individuals had been arrested, including many non-violent offenders, raising concerns about the proportionality and fairness of the department's actions.Many of those arrested for January 6th-related charges face accusations of non-violent offenses, such as trespassing, unlawful entry, or disorderly conduct. Despite the absence of violence in their alleged actions, the Justice Department has deployed heavily armed SWAT teams to conduct arrests—measures typically reserved for high-risk individuals. These aggressive operations have disrupted families and communities, leading critics to accuse the DOJ of overreach and prioritizing political messaging over the principles of justice.Trennis Evans, is a January 6th Expert, he pled guilty to one misdemeanor charge of entering a restricted building & he is forced to serve out his sentence in jail where he is held in solitary confinement for a few days at a time. The cell where he is housed is where they put prisoners to punish them. All for walking around the Capitol for 10 mins, touching nothing. He is also an Author, Film Maker, Founder Condemned USA Legal Advocacy, Public Speaker, Lobbyist, Journalist, who has a new book out, “Call it Insurrection Comrade”Suzzanne Monk, a massive Trump supporter, and the force behind the J6Pardon Project.com has come to live and breathe our constitution, specifically Article II, Section II, Clause 1 “ The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject related to the Duties or their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses Against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”Follow Ann Vandersteel on Pickax: https://pickax.com/annvandersteelProtect your financial future with precious metals! Download your FREE Gold and Silver Guide from Genesis Gold when you use code VANDERSTEEL and take control of your financial destiny! https://pickaxgold.comElevate your meals with Freedom First Beef… even if you find yourself in the middle of the apocalypse! Use code FFN for 25% off and enjoy high-quality beef whenever you crave it – today or tomorrow! https://freedomfirstbeef.comBe ready for anything life throws your way with The Wellness Company's Medical Emergency Kit. Order today using code FFN for a 10% discount at https://twc.health/ffn.Unleash the spirit of liberty in every cup with Freedom First Coffee's Founders Blend. Order now using code RIGHTNOW and savor the unparalleled taste of freedom in every patriotic sip. https://freedomfirstcoffee.com

On this episode of Dave Does History, titled "Pardon Moi?", Dave Bowman takes us deep into the fascinating and often controversial history of presidential pardons. Starting with George Washington's groundbreaking decision to pardon rebels from the Whiskey Rebellion, Dave examines how this unique executive power—granted by Article II of the Constitution—has shaped American politics and justice. From acts of mercy meant to heal a divided nation to instances that sparked outrage over perceived favoritism, the pardon power has been wielded by every president, often with profound consequences. We'll discuss pivotal moments, such as Andrew Johnson's pardons after the Civil War, Gerald Ford's polarizing pardon of Richard Nixon, and more modern uses (and abuses) of clemency. Along the way, Dave explores the philosophical roots of pardons, the debates that raged in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and whether the power has become too political—or was it always that way? Join Dave and Bill Mick as they break down the historical context, legal foundations, and ongoing controversies surrounding one of the president's most significant—and debated—powers. Tune in for an engaging journey through history that still resonates in today's headlines!

Today's show opens with a return to a Friday favorite, Tara Bull's Top 10 News Items the Legacy/mainstream media didn't cover. I really enjoy being able to quickly run through several news stories before hitting my stack of stuff. The first item I dive into after the Top 10 is word that the Biden White House is busy on more pre-emptive pardons for Dr. Anthony Fauci, Sen.-elect Adam “Lying Piece of” Schiff and Liz “Love going to war” Cheney. This led me to pull up Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. Within that clause is power for reducing sentences and pardoning crimes committed against the United States. In fact, the exact line reads, “[The President]...he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” This leads me to ask, how can the President provide blanket immunity for unknown or unnamed offenses against the United States? Don't they have to be named? The first DOGE meeting took place and already the unhinged and angry lunatics on the Left are doing all they can to spin it into the worst fearporn they can envision. But, once you understand what is being suggested, all the fear subsides. Even Scott Jennings, CNN, says that's the feedback he is hearing. However, as Rep Tim Burchett (R-TN) notes, it's not a problem finding the fraud, waste and abuse. It's whether or not the Congress will do anything about it? Isn't that always the real question? Please take a moment to rate and review the show and then share the episode on social media. You can find me on Facebook, X, Instagram, GETTR and TRUTH Social by searching for The Alan Sanders Show. You can also support the show by visiting my Patreon page!!

3530 – December 6, 2024 – Interpretation or Perversion – Interpretation of the law, or perversion of the law Preemptive pardons? Somehow I don't believe the Constitution had such pardons in mind. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the president the power to issue pardons for offenses against the United States, with the exception of cases of impeachment: Pardon ... The post Interpretation or Perversion appeared first on CSC Talk Radio.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U-S Constitution?    The case was decided on June 27, 2024. The Supreme Court held that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to this SEC enforcement action. The claims are "legal in nature" and closely resemble common law fraud actions. The substance of the claim matters more than its statutory origin or which branch of government brings the action. Moreover, the civil penalties sought are punitive in nature, which is a type of remedy traditionally provided by courts of law rather than courts of equity. Second, the "public rights" exception to the Seventh Amendment does not apply here because this case does not fall within the narrow categories of matters that have historically been exclusively determined by the executive and legislative branches. The mere facts that Congress assigned the matter to an agency and that the government is the plaintiff do not change this outcome. Unlike the novel regulatory scheme in Atlas Roofing, these SEC fraud claims have close analogues in traditional common law actions that were historically adjudicated by courts with juries. Because this action is essentially a common law fraud suit seeking punitive remedies, it must be heard by an Article III court with a jury, despite Congress assigning it to an administrative proceeding. This conclusion preserves the constitutional separation of powers and the role of juries in adjudicating traditional legal claims. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

As Trump assembles his cabinet of dangerous cranks and far-right extremists—Tulsi Gabbard, Matt Gaetz, Pete Hegseth, Tom Homan, RFK Jr., Mike Huckabee, Chris Wright—his election is being openly celebrated by reigning fascists and arch-reactionaries from Russia to Hungary to Bosnia. The fascist world order that began to consolidate under his first term is poised to be cemented under a global triumvirate of tyranny—Trump, Putin and Xi. In this light, Biden's cooperation in the transfer of power is a shameful betrayal not only of the nation but of humanity—and Trump has still failed to sign the ethics pledge mandated by the protocol of presidential transition, making clear his ill intent. He has clearly stated his intention to set himself up as president for life. And evidence that the Kremlin directly hacked the vote on behalf of Trump (rather than merely using disinformation propaganda, as in 2016) warrants investigation. Furthermore, the Insurrection Clause of the 14th Amendment, under which Trump was impeached, should be invoked to bar him from office. There is still time to stop the fascist takeover of the United States through the Electoral College or in the certification process. Despite the Supreme Court decision upholding state laws against "faithless electors" who refuse to vote for the candidate they pledged for, this is by no means equivalent to the "fake electors" contrived by Trump's team to try to throw the 2020 election. On the contrary, it is a constitutional mechanism, as outlined by Hamilton in the Federalist Papers—and not explicitly barred (at least) in Article II, Section 1. It should also be noted that Trump himself is not cooperating in the legal protocols for the presidential transition, giving the forces of democracy an airtight position for non-cooperation with his ascendance to power. In Episode 252 of the CounterVortex podcast, Bill Weinberg makes the case for mass pressure to demand nullification of the election. The protests against Trump since Election Day are a good start. But a mass movement on the scale of the post-electoral protests now seen in the Republic of Georgia and Ecuador is urgently mandated. Listen on SoundCloud or via Patreon. https://www.patreon.com/countervortex Production by Chris Rywalt We ask listeners to donate just $1 per weekly podcast via Patreon -- or $2 for our new special offer! We now have 69 subscribers. If you appreciate our work, please become Number 70!

Richard Epstein reacts to the long list of appointees to Trump's cabinet, including his less-than-traditional selections for Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, and Attorney General. He also addresses the suggestion that Trump use Article II, Section 3 to recess-appoint his whole cabinet. Recorded on November 13th, 2024.

Donald Trump drops a nuclear bomb in Washington D.C. and the Liberal Left is in a panic. Tulsi Gabbard is nominated for Director of National Intelligence and Matt Gaetz is nominated for Attorney General and now I'm hearing that Trump could use Article II section 3 of the Constitution to get all of his picks appointed. Matt tells an interesting story about Dan Bongino and Patriot Propaganda Apparel. 

On the eve of the 2024 presidential election, join Jesse Wegman, author of Let the People Pick the President: The Case for Abolishing the Electoral College, and professor Robert Hardaway, author of Saving the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, for a program examining the history and current debate over the Electoral College. Jeffrey Rosen, president and CEO of the National Constitution Center, moderates. Resources:  Robert Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College Why the National Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy (2019)  Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President: The Case for Abolishing the Electoral College (2020)  Electoral College, Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 3, Interactive Constitution  National Popular Vote  Ranked Choice Voting  Article I, Section III, The Senate, Interactive Constitution  Cass Sunstein, “On Jan. 6, Will Vice President Harris Certify the Election?,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 2024  Gary Lawson and Jack Beerman, “Congressional Meddling In Presidential Elections: Still Unconstitutional After All These Years; A Comment On Sunstein,” April 2023  “The Very Real Scenario Where Trump Loses and Takes Power Anyway,” Politico, Oct. 20, 2024  Moore v. Harper (2023) Stay Connected and Learn More Questions or comments about the show? Email us at podcasts@constitutioncenter.org Continue the conversation by following us on social media @ConstitutionCtr. Sign up to receive Constitution Weekly, our email roundup of constitutional news and debate. Subscribe, rate, and review wherever you listen. Join us for an upcoming live program or watch recordings on YouTube. Support our important work. Donate

On the eve of the 2024 presidential election, Jesse Wegman, member of The New York Times editorial board and author of Let the People Pick the President: The Case for Abolishing the Electoral College, and Robert Hardaway, professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and author of Saving the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, join Jeffrey Rosen to debate the Electoral College and preview potential legal challenges that might arise in the aftermath of the election. This program was originally streamed live as part of the NCC's America's Town Hall series on October 29, 2024.   Resources:  Robert Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College Why the National Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy (2019)  Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President: The Case for Abolishing the Electoral College (2020)  Electoral College, Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 3, Interactive Constitution  National Popular Vote  Ranked Choice Voting  Article I, Section III, The Senate, Interactive Constitution  Cass Sunstein, “On Jan. 6, Will Vice President Harris Certify the Election?,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 2024  Gary Lawson and Jack Beerman, “Congressional Meddling In Presidential Elections: Still Unconstitutional After All These Years; A Comment On Sunstein,” April 2023  “The Very Real Scenario Where Trump Loses and Takes Power Anyway,” Politico, Oct. 20, 2024  Moore v. Harper (2023) Stay Connected and Learn More Questions or comments about the show? Email us at podcasts@constitutioncenter.org Continue the conversation by following us on social media @ConstitutionCtr. Sign up to receive Constitution Weekly, our email roundup of constitutional news and debate. Subscribe, rate, and review wherever you listen. Join us for an upcoming live program or watch recordings on YouTube. Support our important work. Donate

Learn how the mode of selecting the President was the result of a hard fought and contentious Constitutional Convention debate, resulting in the adoption of Article II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. Review that the idea of a popular, nationwide election was rejected because, among other things, there were serious concerns that the public would not have sufficient information, and the public would be swayed by bias to local candidates, passion, and celebrity. Understand that the idea of a Congressional election of the President was rejected because, among other things, of grave concerns about the independence of the President, as well as formation of cabals and corruption. The electoral college was intended to mediate the passions of the people as well as the dangers of elections by Congress by creating an independent body, whose sole function was to select the best candidate. Review how electors are chosen is determined by the Legislature of each state. Each State has the number of electors equal to the number of representatives in the House of Representatives and Senators. Learn the mistakes the Founding Fathers made in connection with the Presidential Election (for example, having the runner-up become Vice President) - and how paralyzed the nation during the election of 1800. The President and Vice President now run as a slate, and electors cast one vote for each. A person receiving an outright majority of electors becomes President and Vice President respectively. Otherwise, the House of Representatives chooses the President, selecting from the top three vote getters. Each State has one vote, chosen by a majority of its representatives. A similar process works for the Vice President, but he or she is chosen by the Senate out of the top two vote getters. Originally, most electors were chosen directly by the legislatures of the States. Over time, States determined to select their electors by popular election, with 48 of the 50 States choosing a winner takes all system. Highlights include James Madison, Constitutional Convention, George Washington, Articles of Confederation, Founding Fathers, Congress, Edmund Randolph, the Virginia Plan a/k/a Randolph Resolutions a/k/a Randolph Plan, the President, Abraham Baldwin, William Paterson, New Jersey Plan a/k/a Paterson Resolves a/k/a Paterson Plan, American Revolution, James Wilson, George Mason, Gouverneur Morris, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Sherman, Charles Pinckney, Elbridge Gerry, Alexander Hamilton, Hugh Williamson, John Dickinson, Luther Martin, Oliver Ellsworth,  Caleb Strong, Jonathan Blearly, Blearly Committee, Max Farrand, Abraham Baldwin, John Jay, Federalist Papers (Federalist Paper No. 39, Federalist Paper No. 48), Anti-Federalist Papers, presidential electors, United States Senate, United States House of Representatives, North Carolina Ratifying Convention, James Iredell, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of The Constitution of the United States, Aaron Burr, Vice President, Presidential Election of 1800, James A. Bayard, the Revolution of 1800, United States Constitution Article II, Section 1, 12th Amendment, Presidential Election of 1788, Presidential Election of 1792, electoral votes, Presidential Election of 1824, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Presidential Election of 1876, President Rutherford B. Hayes, Samuel Tilden, Presidential Election of 2000, President George W. Bush, Vice President Al Gore, Election of 2016, President Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, 23rd Amendment, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, Chiafalot v Washington (2020), 10th Amendment, Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, and many others. To learn more about the President and elections & Patriot Week, visit www.PatriotWeek.org. Our resources include videos, a TV series, blogs, lesson plans, and more. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/michael-warren9/support

Announcements Deadline to Register to Vote SC Constitutional Amendment The question reads: Must Section 4, Article II of the Constitution of this State, relating to voter qualifications, be amended so as to provide that only a citizen of the United States and of this State of the age of eighteen and…

Send us a textThis episode may give you pink eye.Jim, Jason, and Joseph salute some of their favorite fictional, cinematic Commander in Chiefs.Check out "The Girls" on Cinemax.Gentlemen, you can't fight in (the War Room)!It's a toupee of sorts.Delivering speeches to the House of Representin'We can only dream of what it would have been like to have another Eisenhower in office.Shark Sandwich!HOAPJason admits to choosing a second weekend of seeing the Hope Diamond over a weekend of watching Indiana Jones kicking butt on a plane.Which fictional president was so good that he had no name other than The President?Which fictional presidency violates Article II of the Constitution as well as a great Beatles song?

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in United States v Texas. In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security's Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law? 2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act? 3. Does 8 U-S-C § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U-S-C § 706(2)? The case was decided on June 23, 2023. The Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specific injury that was caused by the defendant and that the court can remedy. While the district court had concluded that the states would suffer an injury in the form of additional costs due to the arrest policy in question, the Supreme Court pointed out that the injury also has to be "legally and judicially cognizable"—in other words, that it should be a type of dispute that courts have traditionally been involved in resolving. The states failed to point to any precedent or historical practice that supported their claim to have standing in this particular issue. Second, the Court acknowledged that there are good reasons for federal courts to avoid these types of lawsuits, one of which is the Executive Branch's discretion in deciding whom to arrest or prosecute, which falls under its constitutional Article II powers. Additionally, the courts generally lack the standards to judge the appropriateness of such enforcement decisions, which can be influenced by various factors like resource constraints and public safety needs. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts can never handle cases involving the Executive Branch's decisions about arrests or prosecutions. Indeed, certain circumstances might warrant a different standing analysis; for instance, if there are claims of selective prosecution based on discrimination, or if Congress has explicitly made certain injuries legally recognizable. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the states lack standing not because of the “cognizable injury” aspect of standing, but because of the redressability requirement. Justice Barrett authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, also arguing that the case should be resolved on redressability grounds. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Texas does have standing. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

This Day in Legal History: Swiss Banks Settle with Holocaust SurvivorsOn August 12, 1998, a landmark settlement was reached when Swiss banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion to Holocaust survivors and their heirs. The settlement resolved lawsuits that accused the banks of withholding millions of dollars deposited by Holocaust victims before and during World War II. For decades, these accounts had been frozen, and the banks had been criticized for their lack of transparency and for making it difficult for survivors and their families to access the funds. The lawsuits brought to light the complex role that Swiss financial institutions played during the war, often prioritizing financial gain over moral responsibility. This settlement was seen as a significant acknowledgment of the wrongs committed and a step toward justice for the victims. The agreement also marked a broader recognition of the need to address the financial injustices faced by Holocaust survivors, setting a precedent for other restitution efforts globally. The $1.25 billion fund was distributed to survivors, heirs, and various Jewish organizations, symbolizing a long-overdue attempt to rectify the banks' wartime conduct. The settlement highlighted the intersection of financial institutions, moral responsibility, and historical accountability in the aftermath of one of history's greatest tragedies.The recent Supreme Court ruling in SEC v. Jarkesy has sent shockwaves through federal health agencies, significantly impacting their ability to impose civil penalties. The decision, which requires a jury trial for civil penalties in SEC cases, is expected to influence how agencies like the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) conduct enforcement actions. Legal experts suggest that this ruling could lead to increased legal challenges from healthcare entities, such as hospitals and drugmakers, against penalties imposed by these agencies. The ruling has raised questions about the constitutionality of administrative procedures, particularly those handled by administrative law judges, and may force agencies to reassess their enforcement strategies. The decision could also slow down current enforcement actions while agencies evaluate their legal standing. This ruling is likely to embolden those facing civil penalties to challenge the HHS and its agencies in court, especially in areas like Medicare, tobacco regulation, and the 340B Drug Pricing Program.By way of very brief background, in SEC v. Jarkasy, the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC's administrative enforcement of fraud claims without jury trials violated the Seventh Amendment, as such claims involve traditional common law matters warranting a jury. The court also ruled that the Dodd-Frank Act's broad delegation of authority to the SEC to choose between administrative proceedings and federal court without clear guidelines violated the nondelegation doctrine. Additionally, the protections against removal for administrative law judges (ALJs) were found to infringe on the President's duty under Article II. The Supreme Court later upheld the Seventh Amendment violation but did not address the other issues.Health Agency Approach on Civil Penalties Shaken by High CourtIsmael "El Mayo" Zambada, a prominent Mexican drug lord and co-founder of the Sinaloa Cartel, claimed he was deceived and forcibly taken to the United States last month. In a statement released by his lawyer, Zambada alleged that he was lured into a meeting by Joaquin Guzman Lopez, the son of his former partner Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, and state officials in Sinaloa. He recounted being ambushed, restrained, and flown to the U.S. under duress. Contrary to Zambada's account, Guzman Lopez's lawyer and U.S. authorities assert that Guzman Lopez surrendered voluntarily after negotiations. During the incident, Zambada claims that one of the officials involved, Hector Cuen, was killed, and his bodyguard has since disappeared. Both Zambada and Guzman Lopez have pleaded not guilty to drug-trafficking charges in the U.S.'El Mayo' says he was ambushed in new account of US arrest | ReutersA federal appeals court has extended an order blocking President Joe Biden's administration from implementing its student debt relief plan, which aimed to lower monthly payments and accelerate loan forgiveness for millions of borrowers. The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, responding to an appeal from seven Republican-led states, granted an injunction that halts further implementation of the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) Plan. This ruling follows a previous order that temporarily blocked parts of the plan. The court's decision means that while loans already forgiven won't be reversed, future implementations are on hold. The Biden administration criticized the ruling, arguing it would increase costs for borrowers, while the Republican-led states contend that the administration exceeded its legal authority with the plan. The SAVE Plan, which had partially taken effect, was projected to benefit over 20 million borrowers but now faces legal hurdles that may delay or alter its future. This development follows earlier challenges to Biden's broader $430 billion debt cancellation initiative, which was blocked by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2023.Federal court extends block on Biden's student debt relief plan | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in United States ex rel. Polansky v Executive Health Resources, Inc. In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the government have the authority to dismiss a False Claims Act lawsuit brought by an individual on behalf of the government if it initially declined to take over the case, and if so, what standard applies? The case was decided on June 16, 2023. The Supreme Court held that in a qui tam action filed under the False Claims Act, the United States may move to dismiss under 31 U-S-C § 3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on; in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator's objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. Section 3730(c)(2)(A) provides that “the Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the relator,” so long as the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Contrary to the government's contention in this case, this does not mean that the government may dismiss the action without ever intervening in the case. Neither the text or subparagraph (2)(A) nor the broader context supports this understanding. But Polanksy's contention—that the government may dismiss only if it intervenes during the seal period—also fails. Under § 3730(c)(3), the government can intervene either during the seal period or “at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” If the government successfully intervenes, then it becomes a party to the litigation with the attendant rights, including the right to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the default rules in civil litigation, and nothing warrants a departure from those rules here. Thus, in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator's objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Rule 41(a). Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, calling upon the Court to consider, in an appropriate case, whether the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II of the U-S Constitution. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the FCA does not permit the government to dismiss a qui tam action after it has declined to take over the action from the relator at the outset. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

NCLA has filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to hear Consumers' Research v. Consumer Product Safety Commission. This case presents a golden opportunity to overturn the 1935 Humphrey's Executor v. Federal Trade Commission decision and address the unconstitutional structure of the CPSC. Under current law, the President can only fire CPSC commissioners “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office,” insulating them from removal and violating the “Take Care” clause of Article II of the Constitution. The Fifth Circuit upheld this structure by invoking Humphrey's Executor, which wrongly supported FTC Commissioners' similar protections. In this episode, Senior Litigation Counsel Greg Dolin joins Mark and Vec to dive into the details and implications of this case.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In light of calls for President Joe Biden to step down because of cognition issues and the near assassination of President Donald Trump, its time to revisit the 25th Amendment. Learn about how the original, unamended Constitution addressed the death, removal, or incapacity of the President or Vice President and its three major defects. The original Constitution left gapping holes about under what circumstances, and in what way, power would flow between the President and Vice President. For many decades, the shortcomings of the original Article II, Section 1 provisions of the Constitution were laid bare — through deaths, illnesses, and incapacitations of Presidents and Vice Presidents. Explore how the country dealt with those flaws until the adoption of the 25th Amendment in 1967 with the illness, incapacity, disability, and grievous injures of Presidents Woodrow Wilson, James Garfield, Grover Cleveland, and others — which were hidden — and the implications for history.  Walk through the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (JFK) and the resignation of President Richard Nixon. Section 1 of the 25th Amendment makes clear that when a President dies, is removed, or resigns, that the Vice President becomes President. Section 2 of the 25th Amendment provides a process to replace the Vice President. Section 3 of the 25th Amendment provides a simple mechanism by which the President can temporarily cede power to the Vice President. Section 4 of the 25th Amendment provides a process by which a President incapable or unwilling to declare him or herself incapable of performing his or her duties to be replaced by a Vice President as acting President. If there is a dispute, Congress decides with a two-thirds threshold. Understand how the 25th Amendment was used by President Ronald Reagan and President George W. Bush when undergoing medical procedures.  Review the calls by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senator Chuck Schumer to replace President Donald Trump through the 25th Amendment.  Highlights include Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House Nanci Pelosi, Chuck Schumer, Vice President Mike Pence, January 6 Capitol Protest a/k/a January 6 Storming of the Capitol, President Donald Trump, President (and Vice President) Joe Biden, President William Henry Harrison death, President John Tyler, President Richard Nixon resignation, President Abraham Lincoln assassination (and assassination plot against Vice President Andrew Johnson, William Seward, and General Ulysses S. Grant), Succession Act of 1792, Vice President Spiro Agnew resignation, President Gerald Ford appointment as Vice President and ascension as President, John Dickinson, Saul K. Padover, James Madison, President James Garfield assassination attempt (and lingering illness and death), Thomas Neal, President Grover Cleveland secret surgeries, President Woodrow Wilson stroke and lingering illness, Secretary of State Robert Lansing convening cabinet meetings during Wilson's illness, President Dwight Eisenhower heart attack, Vice President temporarily acting as President (Vice President Nixon and Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ)), President John F. Kennedy (JFK) assassination, Birch Bay, passage by Congress and ratification of the 25th Amendment, presidential disability (including President George W. Bush (Vice President Dick Cheney) and President Ronald Reagan (Vice President Herbert Walker Bush)), invoking of 25th Amendment following January 6, by the House Judiciary Committee, impeachment, and many others. To learn more about the Constitution & Patriot Week, visit www.PatriotWeek.org. Our resources include videos, a TV series, blogs, lesson plans, and more. Check out Judge Michael Warren's book America's Survival Guide, How to Stop America's Impending Suicide by Reclaiming Our First Principles and History at www.AmericasSurvivalGuide.com, amazon, or other major on-line retailers. Join us! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/michael-warren9/support

On June 27, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued their opinion in SEC v. Jarkesy. The following three questions were presented in this case – (1) Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment; (2) Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine; (3) Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.The Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.Please join us in discussing the decision and its future implications.Featuring:Devin Watkins, Attorney, Competitive Enterprise Institute---To register, click the link above.

Mark Mix is President of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which has provided free legal aid to workers in dozens of cases involving the UAW, including at Nissan North America (Somerset, New Jersey) and NTN- Bower (Hamilton, Alabama). California Transportation Worker Files Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of National Labor Relations Board.  Lawsuit joins challenges by three other employees against NLRB on grounds that structure of agency violates Article II of the Constitution

This second part in our series on the Formula of Concord addresses the topic of free will in relation to the conversion of the sinner.

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From April 13, 2019: Julian Mortenson, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, is the author of a remarkable new article entitled "Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative," in the Columbia Law Review and available on SSRN.Recently, Benjamin Wittes spoke with the professor about the article, which Mortenson has been working on for years—as long as the two have known each other. The article explores the history of exactly three words of the U.S. Constitution—the first three words of Article II, to be precise: "the executive power."Huge claims about presidential power have rested on a conventional understanding of these three words. Julian argues that this conventional understanding is not just partially wrong, or mostly wrong, but completely wrong, as a matter of history. And, he tries to supplant it with a new understanding that he argues is actually a very old understanding of what those words mean.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

By the end of January every year, except for Inaugural years, the President fulfills his or her constitutional duty to “give to the Congress information on the State of the Union” (Article II, section 3 of the Constitution). So yes, today's podcast will focus on the infamous State of the Union address which generally includes […]

#BESTOF2021: The Constitution and the Removal Debate.  @RichardAEpstein @HooverInst https://www.hoover.org/research/bidens-latest-firings-are-unjustified "At this point, it is important to address the possible constitutional provisions that might give the president the power to dismiss individuals at will. That discussion begins with the so-called Appointments Clause in Article II, which applies to two kinds of public officers. First are principal officers of the United States, including cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, and most other federal judges. Their appointments require Senate confirmation. The secondary category includes so-called “inferior officers,” over whom Congress has discretion to insist on Senate confirmation or, alternatively, to allow these appointments to be made without Senate confirmation by the president, the judiciary, or the heads of departments." —Richard A Epstein 1909 White House

#Bestof2021: The Removal debate.  @RichardAEpstein @HooverInst https://www.hoover.org/research/bidens-latest-firings-are-unjustified "At this point, it is important to address the possible constitutional provisions that might give the president the power to dismiss individuals at will. That discussion begins with the so-called Appointments Clause in Article II, which applies to two kinds of public officers. First are principal officers of the United States, including cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, and most other federal judges. Their appointments require Senate confirmation. The secondary category includes so-called “inferior officers,” over whom Congress has discretion to insist on Senate confirmation or, alternatively, to allow these appointments to be made without Senate confirmation by the president, the judiciary, or the heads of departments." —Richard A Epstein 1883 the Clevelands