Podcasts about nationality act ina

In this week's episode of Parsing Immigration Policy podcast, Center for Immigration Studies analysts discuss the legal and policy implications of the Mahmoud Khalil case.Khalil, a Palestinian/Syrian/Algerian green card holder, was involved in pro-Hamas protests when a graduate student on a nonimmigrant visa at Columbia University. DHS charged Khalil under Section 237(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which renders deportable any noncitizen “whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.”CIS's Andrew Arthur and George Fishman review the facts of the case, analyze the constitutional and legal questions of what they predict will be a potential test for future efforts to remove noncitizens who support terrorism, and offer predictions. Four main questions are highlighted:Is this a free speech case? Can a noncitizen be removed for speech or action supporting a terrorist organization?Is this a foreign policy case? How does the government define “serious adverse foreign policy consequences”?What are the judicial precedents? How will courts balance foreign policy concerns against constitutional rights?Will this case set clearer lines on what a non-citizen can and cannot do? There is a need for the law to settle the spectrum of rights that apply to a spectrum of status. Will this be the case that will provide legal clarity?As the case moves through immigration court and on to federal district court and beyond, the Center for Immigration Studies will continue providing expert analysis on its broader implications for immigration enforcement and national security.HostMark Krikorian is the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration StudiesGuestsAndrew Arthur is a Resident Fellow in Law and Policy at the Center for Immigration Studies.George Fishman is a Senior Legal Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies.RelatedFor more analysis, see our topic page: The Case of Mahmoud KhalilIntro MontageVoices in the opening montage:Sen. Barack Obama at a 2005 press conference.Sen. John McCain in a 2010 election ad.President Lyndon Johnson, upon signing the 1965 Immigration Act.Booker T. Washington, reading in 1908 from his 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech.Laraine Newman as a "Conehead" on SNL in 1977.Hillary Clinton in a 2003 radio interview.Cesar Chavez in a 1974 interview.House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaking to reporters in 2019.Prof. George Borjas in a 2016 C-SPAN appearance.Sen. Jeff Sessions in 2008 comments on the Senate floor.Charlton Heston in "Planet of the Apes".

The latest episode of Parsing Immigration Policy highlights the diplomatic initiatives supporting U.S. border security that have been undertaken by the Trump administration. Phillip Linderman, a retired State Department senior Foreign Service Officer and a Center for Immigration Studies board member, discusses actions recently taken by President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio that promote structured and lawful migration and seek to put an end to the global migration chaos.Key points:International Cooperation on Deportations – Countries such as Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Mexico have agreed to accept the return of their citizens, signaling a shift in regional migration policies.Changing U.S. Policy – The U.S. has fundamentally changed its stance, no longer encouraging unchecked migration but instead promoting legal and orderly processes.Diplomatic Leverage – The threat of tariffs and the use of tools such as Section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows the U.S. to suspend visas for countries refusing to accept deportees, has proven effective in securing cooperation.Mexico's Role – Mexico has agreed to deploy 10,000 Mexican National Guard troops to combat human trafficking and drug smuggling at the border.El Salvador's Role – Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has offered to accept U.S. deportees of any nationality.Gitmo's Role – Trump will open Guantanamo Bay to alien detainees.Economic & Political Factors – Countries reliant on remittances, such as El Salvador and Venezuela, are having to balance economic interests with security cooperation.Global Implications – The discussion explores the idea of an international migration summit and the need for updated legal frameworks outside traditional organizations like the UN.HostJessica Vaughan is the Director of Policy Studies at the Center for Immigration Studies.GuestPhillip Linderman is a retired State Department senior Foreign Service Officer and a Center for Immigration Studies board member.RelatedEl Salvador, Guatemala deals key to Trump deportation promisesTrump Tariffs and Border SecurityMigrants Sent to Gitmo, India, and Potentially VenezuelaColombia's President Tests Trump on Migrant Returns, Quickly Backs DownTrump Dares to Send Criminal Aliens Back to Their New Home, Down by the (Guantanamo) BayState Department Can Lead on Fighting Illegal Immigration and Promoting Border SecurityIntro MontageVoices in the opening montage:Sen. Barack Obama at a 2005 press conference.Sen. John McCain in a 2010 election ad.President Lyndon Johnson, upon signing the 1965 Immigration Act.Booker T. Washington, reading in 1908 from his 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech.Laraine Newman as a "Conehead" on SNL in 1977.Hillary Clinton in a 2003 radio interview.Cesar Chavez in a 1974 interview.House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaking to reporters in 2019.Prof. George Borjas in a 2016 C-SPAN appearance.Sen. Jeff Sessions in 2008 comments on the Senate floor.Charlton Heston in "Planet of the Apes".

Immigration Law Basics I. Overview and Core Principles Immigration law regulates the entry, residency, work, naturalization, and removal of non-citizens in the U.S. It balances national security, economic growth, humanitarian values, and family unity. Key Principles: Sovereignty: Nations control their borders and immigration policies. Family Unity: Policies prioritize keeping families together through visas for immediate relatives. Economic Contribution: Programs like H-1B and EB-5 visas attract skilled workers and investors. Humanitarian Protection: Refugees and asylees are granted safety from persecution based on race, religion, or political opinion. II. Sources of Immigration Law Statutory Framework: Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Key Agencies: USCIS: Manages visas, green cards, and naturalization. ICE: Enforces immigration laws and removal operations. CBP: Secures borders and regulates entry. Judicial Role: Federal courts interpret statutory and constitutional issues. III. Immigration Classifications Nonimmigrant Visas: Temporary visas for tourism (B-2), work (H-1B), study (F-1), and exchange (J-1). Immigrant Visas and Green Cards: Family-Sponsored: For relatives of U.S. citizens. Employment-Based: Skilled workers and investors (EB categories). Diversity Visa Lottery: Enhances immigration diversity. Humanitarian Protections: Asylum and Refugee Status: For those fleeing persecution. Temporary Protected Status (TPS): Temporary relief for nationals from crisis-affected countries. IV. Naturalization Process Eligibility includes age (18+), residency (5 years for most), good moral character, and civics/language proficiency. Steps involve filing Form N-400, biometrics, an interview, and taking the Oath of Allegiance. V. Inadmissibility and Deportation Inadmissibility: Health issues, criminal conduct, security risks, and fraud may bar entry. Deportation: Non-citizens may be removed for overstaying visas, criminal activity, or immigration fraud. VI. Enforcement and Challenges Enforcement: ICE oversees detention and removal, CBP secures borders, and workplace investigations ensure compliance. Challenges: Backlogs, policy changes, and balancing enforcement with humanitarian concerns. VII. Conclusion Immigration law is a dynamic field balancing national interests, economic growth, and humanitarian responsibilities. Understanding its principles is vital for navigating this complex legal landscape.

In this podcast, Jamey Petri and Jeffrey Thomas discuss recently-issued guidance provided in a fact sheet from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on avoiding discriminatory employment practices when complying with U.S. export control laws. Jeff and Jamey unpack the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focusing on their anti-discrimination provisions as they relate to issues affecting employers, including hiring and retention practices, Form I-9 documentation and processes, and employee training.

Republican members of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security say they are continuing to produce evidence to support their claim that Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is derelict in his duty and should be removed from office. In July, the committee published its first report detailing the laws and court orders the committee says Mayorkas has “ignored, abused or failed to follow.” Members cite alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including an abuse of its parole program, detention and removal requirements, instituting mass parole programs, ignoring federal court orders, among other actions. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/america-in-focus/support

Criminal immigration matters make up some 70 percent of all federal cases charged.  But the statutes our government uses to prosecute and sentence undocumented human beings to serious prison time, was motivated by racism and discriminatory intent.  Therefore, a team of fearless lawyers mounted a massive undertaking to challenge these statutes in federal court -- and WON.   On August 16, 2022 Judge Du of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued a first-of-its-kind ruling, finding that Section 1326 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is unconstitutional because of its racist origin. Therefore, helping us get Set for Sentencing today, one of the aforementioned fearless advocates for justice, attorney Kara Hartzler.  Ms. Hartzler walks us through the fascinating and dark history of these laws, the arguments that took them to task, and what the future holds. IN THIS EPISODE: The racist history behind U.S. Immigration policy; How eugenics and the US policy of “final selection” became a precurser for much of the rationale and policy in place for Hitler's “final solution”; The Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929 and The Hart-Seller Act of 1965; The litigation challenging the statute as violating equal protection; The “Arlington Heights” test for discriminatory intent; How storytelling won the day in the Nevada constitutional challenge;  Parallels between immigration laws and the Major Crimes Act, giving the federal government jurisdiction over certain crimes on Indian Reservations (i.e. supposedly sovereign nations); The legal effect of the Nevada challenge and what happens next; How to use these arguments at sentencing RIGHT NOW; The importance of working with people outside of the legal community to broaden the perspective of the lawyer and the arguments she can make.   LINKS: We talked about an incredible organization, the Florence Project, which helps immigrants in ways big and small.  We would love for you to check it out, and maybe even hit the donate button on the home page:  Home - The Florence Project (firrp.org)   If you'd like to listen to Oral arguments at the Ninth Circuit, argued by renowned Constitutional Law Prof., Irwin Chemrinsky, click here:  https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/video/?20221208/21-10233/   As we discussed, regardless of the final outcome, fearless lawyers will continue to point out the racist origin of this statute at sentencing.  If you would like to download a fantastic sample sentencing memorandum raising these issues, please visit the shownotes at www.setforsentencing.com/racist1326      

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a noncitizen who is convicted of an "aggravated felony" is subject to mandatory removal and faces enhanced criminal liability in certain circumstances. One aggravated felony is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state offense-like petitioner's accessory-after-the-fact offense here- that does not involve interference with an existing official proceeding or investigation may constitute an "offense relating to obstruction of justice." 2. Whether, assuming that the phrase "offense relating to obstruction of justice" is deemed ambiguous, courts should afford Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of that phrase. THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-331 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT Whether dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, in violation of California law, is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice," 8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(43)(S). THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-23 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT.

Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act and LIFE Act Amendments of 2000 (Pub. L. 106-553 and -554), enables certain individuals who are present in the United States who would not normally qualify to apply for adjustment of status in the United States to obtain lawful permanent residence (get a Green Card) regardless of:

Respondents are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Aleman Gonzalez's name—are natives and citizens of Mexico who were detained under §1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally. They filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that aliens detained under §1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months' detention. The District Court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 629. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 766. Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He likewise reentered the country illegally and was detained under §1231(a)(6). He filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that §1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing. The District Court certified a class, granted partial summary judgment against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Flores Tejada v. Godfrey, 954 F.3d 1245, 1247. This Court granted certiorari and instructed the parties to brief the threshold question whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive relief under the INA. Held: Section 1252(f )(1) of the INA deprived the District Courts of jurisdiction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Pp. 3–10. Credit: Justia U.S. Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-322/ --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a child as a person who is both unmarried and under 21 years old. If someone applies for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status as a child but turns 21 before being approved for LPR status (also known as getting a Green Card), that person can no longer be considered a child for immigration purposes. This situation is commonly referred to as “aging out” and often means that these applicants would have to file a new petition or application, wait even longer to get a Green Card, or may no longer be eligible for a Green Card. Congress recognized that many children were aging out due to large USCIS processing backlogs, so it enacted the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) to protect certain children from aging out. The CSPA went into effect on August 6, 2002. CSPA does not change the definition of a child. Instead, CSPA provides a method for calculating a person's age to see if they meet the definition of a child for immigration purposes. The calculated age is the child's “CSPA age.” This allows some people to remain classified as children beyond their 21st birthday. However, CSPA does not change the requirement that you must be unmarried in order to remain eligible for classification as a child. To learn more about us or to request a consultation, please visit our website: https://visaserve.com/

A misdemeanor is any "lesser" criminal act in some common law legal systems. Misdemeanors are generally punished less severely than more serious felonies, but theoretically more so than administrative infractions (also known as minor, petty, or summary offences) and regulatory offences. Typically, misdemeanors are punished with monetary fines or community service. Distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. A misdemeanor is considered a crime of lesser seriousness, and a felony one of greater seriousness. The maximum punishment for a misdemeanor is less than that for a felony under the principle that the punishment should fit the crime. One standard for measurement is the degree to which a crime affects others or society. Measurements of the degree of seriousness of a crime have been developed. In the United States, the federal government generally considers a crime punishable with incarceration for not more than one year, or lesser penalty, to be a misdemeanor. All other crimes are considered felonies. Many states also employ the same or a similar distinction. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has been abolished by several common law jurisdictions, notably the UK and Australia. These jurisdictions have generally adopted some other classification (in the UK the substance of the original distinction remains, only slightly altered): in the Commonwealth nations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, the crimes are divided into summary offenses and indictable offenses. The Republic of Ireland, a former member of the Commonwealth, also uses these divisions. In some jurisdictions, those who are convicted of a misdemeanor are known as misdemeanants (as contrasted with those convicted of a felony who are known as felons). Depending on the jurisdiction, examples of misdemeanors may include: petty theft, prostitution, public intoxication, simple assault, disorderly conduct, trespass, shoplifting, vandalism, reckless driving, indecent exposure, and possession of cannabis for personal use. A summary offense or petty offense is a violation in some common law jurisdictions that can be proceeded against summarily, without the right to a jury trial and/or indictment (required for an indictable offence). In the law of the United States, petty offenses are typically those that carry the lightest maximum penalty. United States. In law of the United States, "there are certain minor or petty offenses that may be proceeded against summarily, and without a jury" These include criminal citations. Any offense that is punishable by the controlling law for more than six months of imprisonment must have some means for a jury trial. Some states, such as California, provide that all defendants are entitled to a jury trial (irrespective of the nature of their offenses). Some states provide that in all cases the defendant may demand a jury trial. Under section 316 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a person convicted of a petty offense can be naturalized as a citizen of the United States. Contempt of court is considered a prerogative of the court, as "the requirement of a jury does not apply to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States" There have been criticisms over the practice. In particular, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black wrote in a 1964 dissent, "It is high time, in my judgment, to wipe out root and branch the judge-invented and judge-maintained notion that judges can try criminal contempt cases without a jury." --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/law-school/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/law-school/support

Pereida v Wilkinson, (2021), was a United States Supreme Court (the Court) case in which the Court ruled that under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) an alien seeking to cancel a lawful removal order bears the burden of showing that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense. An alien has not carried that burden when the record shows he has been convicted under a statute limiting multiple offenses, some of which are disqualifying, and the record is ambiguous as to which crime formed the basis of his conviction. Background. Under the INA, certain nonpermanent residents may seek to cancel an order of removal and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence by applying to the United States Attorney General through the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a subagency of the United States Department of Justice. As part of their application, the alien must demonstrate that they (1) have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the application, (2) have been a person of good moral character during such period, (3) have not been convicted of an offense that would either render them inadmissible to be admitted to the United States or deportable from the United States, and (4) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's qualifying relative who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Clemente Avelino Pereida was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without authorization or inspection in approximately 1995. He relocated to Nebraska with his family, was gainfully employed and paid taxes, and with his wife raised three children, one a U.S. citizen and another a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipient. After an arrest, he was identified as an unlawfully present alien, and placed into removal proceedings in 2009. He did not contest his removability but instead applied to cancel his removal and adjust status to a lawful permanent resident. To demonstrate the requirements for cancellation of removal meant he had to produce records of his criminal history. But given his recent arrest, he was progressing through immigration proceedings in tandem with his criminal case. In his criminal case, state authorities charged him with attempted criminal impersonation for using a false Social Security card to seek employment at National Service Company of Iowa. The Nebraska Statute section 28-608 (2008) charged four different means in which a person could violate attempted criminal impersonation. Pereida was found guilty under the statute, he paid a fine and served no jail time for the offense. While Pereida identified his conviction for his cancellation of removal application, he declined to offer any evidence of his conviction. The United States Department of Homeland Security produced his criminal complaint but that document did not specify which of the four means he actually violated. That was problematic because three of the means were disqualifying offenses as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) that rendered him inadmissible or deportable while one (carrying a business without a license) did not. Pereida argued that such ambiguity meant that his prior conviction could not be construed as a disqualifying offense to bar eligibility for relief. The EOIR Immigration Judge presiding over his case determined that Pereida's attempted criminal impersonation conviction was a CIMT that disqualified him from cancellation of removal and ordered him removed from the United States. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

On June 16, 2021, a U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge ordered a U.S. Company to pay a former employee more than $400,000 in back wages and benefits, for multiple violations of the E-3 visa program as established by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).In this podcast we tell you how that happened, explain briefly what the E-3 visa program is and explain what you as an employer can do to prevent falling into a similar situation when you hire foreign nationals who need LCAs….this includes not just the E3 but the H1B and the H1B1 visas.

In Pereida v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court held 5-3 that an individual seeking relief from a lawful removal order under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) must “shoulder [the] heavy burden” of proving every element of eligibility for relief including the absence of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. Clemente Avelino Pereida argued on appeal that although he was recently convicted of a crime, he remained eligible for relief because he refused to disclose the nature of the crime so moral turpitude could not be proven. The Court disagreed with Pereida, siding with the Eight Circuit and finding Pereida must show the crime was not one of moral turpitude in order to be eligible for relief under the INA.Featuring:-- Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland

Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen today announced an Interim Final Rule declaring that those aliens who contravene a presidential suspension or limitation on entry into the United States through the southern border with Mexico issued under section 212(f) or 215(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) will be rendered ineligible for asylum. The Acting Attorney General and the Secretary issued the following joint statement: “Consistent with our immigration laws, the President has the broad authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens into the United States if he determines it to be in the national interest to do so. Today’s rule applies this important principle to aliens who violate such a suspension or restriction regarding the southern border imposed by the President by invoking an express authority provided by Congress to restrict eligibility for asylum.  Our asylum system is overwhelmed with too many meritless asylum claims from aliens who place a tremendous burden on our resources, preventing us from being able to expeditiously grant asylum to those who truly deserve it.  Today, we are using the authority granted to us by Congress to bar aliens who violate a Presidential suspension of entry or other restriction from asylum eligibility.”

On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

On May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. In 2009, Juan Esquivel-Quintana, who was then 21, pleaded no-contest to a California statutory rape offense after engaging in consensual sex with a 17-year old. California criminalizes “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” and for this purpose considers anyone under the age of 18 to be a minor. The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal proceedings against Esquivel-Quintana under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows for the removal of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony, including “sexual abuse of a minor”--though it does not define that phrase. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Esquivel-Quintana’s appeal, concluding that the age difference between Esquivel-Quintana and the minor was sufficiently meaningful for their sexual encounter to qualify as abuse of a minor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, deferring to the BIA’s interpretation, denied Esquivel-Quintana’s petition for further review. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the ages of the participants, the generic federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. Because the California statute of conviction did not fall categorically within that generic federal definition, Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction was not an aggravated felony under the INA. All other members joined in Justice Thomas’s opinion except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was used as grounds for the deportation of Juan Esquivel-Quintana, a permanent resident admitted to the U.S. in 2000, after he pled guilty to a California statute in 2009, making sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than the perpetrator a misdemeanor or felony. After the California ruling, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan where the Department of Homeland Security used INA to remove him from the country. INA states that a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony (ex: sexual abuse of a minor) may be removed from the United States. An immigration judge authorized Esquivel-Quintana’s removal from the country after finding him guilty of sexual abuse of a minor. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the decision without looking at the individual facts of the case; and the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision, establishing that BIA should be afforded deference considering an ambiguous statute under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Additionally, BIA found that the rule of lenity, which favors defendants in the face of ambiguous statutes, did not apply. -- Vikrant Reddy, a Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, discussed the potential impact of the recent Supreme Court ruling and the main question of the case: whether a California statute’s “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor” should be considered an aggravated felony (i.e. “sexual abuse of a minor”) under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and therefore, require mandatory removal. -- Featuring: Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute.

You can’t complete Form I-9 until after you’ve hired your employee. Form I-9 compliance is regulated by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE is the audit and enforcement agency for the provisions of section 274A, the Unlawful Employment of Aliens section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). You…