Practical Wisdom

“When an official came to see him, Epictetus, after making some special enquiries about other matters, asked him if he had children and a wife, and when the other replied that he had, Epictetus asked the further question, What, then, is your experience with marriage? — Wretched, he said. — To which Epictetus, How so? For men do not marry and beget children just for this surely, to be wretched, but rather to be happy. — And yet, as for me, the other replied, I feel so wretched about the little children, that recently when my little daughter was sick and was thought to be in danger, I could not bear even to stay by her sick bed, but I up and ran away, until someone brought me word that she was well again. — What then, do you feel that you were acting right in doing this? — I was acting naturally, he said. …This is the way, said the man, all, or at least most, of us fathers feel. — And I do not contradict you either, answered Epictetus, and say that it is not done, but the point at issue between us is the other, whether it is rightly done.”(Discourses, 1.11)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“If we philosophers had applied ourselves to our own work as zealously as the old men at Rome have applied themselves to the matters on which they have set their hearts, perhaps we too should be accomplishing something. I know a man older than myself who is now in charge of the grain supply at Rome. When he passed this place on his way back from exile, I recall what a tale he told as he inveighed against his former life and announced for the future that, when he had returned to Rome, he would devote himself solely to spending the remainder of his life in peace and quiet, ‘For how little is yet left to me!' — And I told him, ‘You will not do it, but when once you have caught no more than a whiff of Rome you will forget all this.' …Well, now, what did he do? Before he reached Rome, letters from Caesar met him; and as soon as he received them, he forgot all those resolutions of his, and ever since he has been piling up one property after another. I wish I could stand by his side now and remind him of the words that he uttered as he passed by here, and remark, ‘How much more clever a prophet I am than you.'”(Discourses, 1.10)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“If what is said by the philosophers regarding the kinship of Nature and people be true, what other course remains for us but that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never to say ‘I am an Athenian,' or ‘I am a Corinthian,' but ‘I am a citizen of the universe'? For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning merely that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth? …As soon as you have had your fill to-day, you sit lamenting about the morrow, by which means you shall be fed. Man, if you get it, you will have it; if you do not get it, you will depart; the door stands open. Why grieve? Where is there yet room for tears? What occasion for flattery? Why shall one person envy another? Why shall we admire those who have great possessions, or those who are stationed in places of power, especially if they be prone to anger? For what will they do to us? …How did Socrates feel with regard to these matters? … ‘If you tell me now,' says he, ‘We will acquit you on these conditions, namely, that you will no longer engage in these discussions which you have conducted hitherto, nor trouble either the young or the old among us,' I will answer, ‘You make yourselves ridiculous.' …We, however, think of ourselves as though we were mere bellies, entrails, and genitals, just because we have fear, because we have appetite, and we flatter those who have power to help us in these matters, and these same people we fear.”(Discourses, 1.9)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Was not Plato a philosopher? Yes, and was not Hippocrates a physician? But you see how eloquently Hippocrates expresses himself. Does Hippocrates, then, express himself so eloquently by virtue of his being a physician?Why, then, do you confuse things that for no particular reason have been combined in the same man? Now if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I to sit down and strive to become handsome, or become strong, on the assumption that this is necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time both handsome and a philosopher?Are you not willing to observe and distinguish just what that is by virtue of which men become philosophers, and what qualities pertain to them for no particular reason?Come now, if I were a philosopher, ought you to become lame like me? What then? Am I depriving you of these faculties? Far be it from me! No more than I am depriving you of the faculty of sight.Yet, if you enquire of me what is humanity's good, I can give you no other answer than that it is a kind of moral purpose.”(Discourses, 1.8)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Most people are unaware that the handling of arguments which involve equivocal and hypothetical premisses, and, further, of those which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation, and, in general, the handling of all such arguments, has a bearing upon the duties of life. For our aim in every matter of inquiry is to learn how the good and excellent person may find the appropriate course through it and the appropriate way of conducting themselves in it. …For what is the professed object of reasoning? To state the true, to eliminate the false, to suspend judgement in doubtful cases. …[Therefore] one must learn in what way a thing follows as a consequence upon certain other things. …There has consequently arisen among us, and shown itself to be necessary, a science which deals with inferential arguments and with logical figures and trains people therein. …Why are we still indolent and easy-going and sluggish, seeking excuses whereby we may avoid toiling or even late hours, as we try to perfect our own reason? — If, then, I err in these matters, I have not murdered my own father, have I? — Slave, pray where was there in this case a father for you to murder? What, then, have you done, you ask? You have committed what was the only possible error in the matter. Indeed this is the very remark I made to Rufus when he censured me for not discovering the one omission in a certain syllogism. ‘Well,' said I, ‘it isn't as bad as if I had burned down the Capitol.' But he answered, ‘Slave, the omission here is the Capitol.'”(Discourses, 1.7)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“‘Shall we assume, then, that … the bad is akin to the bad; the good to the good; and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad?'They said they thought it was so: each was akin to its counterpart.‘In that case, boys,' I said, ‘haven't we fallen back into those first statements of ours about friendship, which we rejected, since one unjust man will be a friend to another unjust man, a bad man to another bad man, no less than one good man to another good man?'‘It would appear so,' they said. …‘Then I don't know what more to say.'With that I was intending to provoke another of the older men into speaking. Just then, like evil spirits, Lysis's and Menexenus's tutors came over with the boys' brothers, called to them, and told them to come home; it was already late. …However, I did say, just as they were leaving, ‘Lysis and Menexenus, we've now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think that we're friends of one another – for I consider myself one of your number – though we were not as yet able to find out precisely what a friend is.'”(Lysis, 222c-223b) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“‘All right then,' I said. ‘Now that we've got as far as this, boys, let's be careful not to be deceived.' …‘Let's consider the following case: medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health.'‘Yes.'‘Is health a friend too, then?'‘Of course.'‘If it is a friend, it is so for the sake of something.'‘Yes.'‘And that something is a friend, if it is to be consistent with what we admitted earlier.'‘Of course.'‘And that too, in its turn, will be a friend for the sake of a friend?'‘Yes.'‘Well then, aren't we bound to get tired going on like that and give up, or else arrive at some point of origin which will not refer us to yet another friend, but which will constitute the first thing that is a friend, for the sake of which we say that all the others too are friends?'‘We are.' …“Admittedly, we do often say that we value gold and silver highly, but that hardly comes any nearer the truth. What we value most highly is that thing (whatever it may reveal itself as being) for the sake of which both gold and everything else that is procured are procured. Shall we settle for that?'‘Of course.'”(Lysis, 219c-220a)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“‘That's why we'd say that those who are already wise, whether they are gods or men, no longer love wisdom, and that those who are so ignorant that they are bad do not love wisdom either, because no bad or stupid man loves wisdom.So, we're left with those who possess that bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been rendered foolish or stupid by it, in that they still believe they don't know what they don't know.Consequently those who are still neither good nor bad do, in fact, love wisdom; whereas all those who are bad, as well as all those who are good, do not, because, as we decided earlier in our discussion, neither is opposite the friend of opposite, nor like of like. Don't your remember?'‘Of course,' they said.‘So now, Lysis and Menexenus,' I said, ‘we've done it! We've discovered what a friend is and what it is not. We say that in the soul, in the body and anywhere else, it is what is neither bad nor good that is the friend of the good because of the presence of bad.'The two of them agreed wholeheartedly, admitting that it was so.”(Lysis, 218a-218c)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“‘Have you come across the writings of our wisest men, which say that like must always be friend to like? These are, of course, the men who discuss and write about nature and the universe.'‘That's true,' he said.‘Well,' I said, ‘are they right?'‘Possibly,' he replied. …[But] ‘We think that the closer one wicked man gets to another wicked man and the more he associates with him, the more he becomes hated by him, because he wrongs him; and it is, of course, impossible for wronger and wronged to be friends, isn't it?'‘Yes,' he replied. …‘Well then, in my opinion, Lysis, this is what people mean when they say, in their cryptic way, that like is friend to like: friendship exists only between good men, whereas the bad man never achieves true friendship with either a good or a bad man. Do you agree?'He nodded assent.”(Lysis, 214b-214d)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“The justice that seeks nature's goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed.Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. …Justice was never an entity in itself. It is a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed.It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape.In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specific application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.If somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice.”(Leading Doctrines, 31-38)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole man, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.It is the same judgment that has made us feel confident that nothing fearful is of long duration or everlasting, and that has seen personal security during our limited span of life most nearly perfected by friendship.”(Leading Doctrines, 27-28)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“It is necessary to take into account both the actual goal of life and the whole body of clear and distinct perceptions to which we refer our judgments. If we fail to do this, everything will be in disorder and confusion.If you reject all sensations, you will not have any point of reference by which to judge even the ones you claim are false. …If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature's standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed.”(Leading Doctrines, 22-25) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Bodily pleasure is not enlarged once the pains brought on by need have been done away with; it is only diversified. And the limit of mental pleasure is established by rational reflection on pleasures themselves and those kindred emotions that once instilled extreme fear in human minds.Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than does finite time, if one determines the limits of pleasure rationally. …One who understands the limits of the good life knows that what eliminates the pains brought on by need and what makes the whole of life perfect is easily obtained, so that there is no need for enterprises that entail the struggle for success.”(Leading Doctrines, 18-21)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“The pleasure or pain that accompanies someone's deeds ought to be taken as a sign of his characteristics: he who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys this very abstention is moderate, but he who is vexed in doing so is licentious; he who endures terrifying things and enjoys doing so, or at any rate is not pained by it, is courageous, but he who is pained thereby is a coward. …For moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is on account of the pleasure involved that we do base things, and it is on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Thus one must be brought up in a certain way straight from childhood, as Plato asserts, so as to enjoy as well as to be pained by what one ought, for this is correct education. …That [virtue and vice] are concerned with the same things might become manifest to us also from these considerations: there being three objects of choice and three of avoidance—the noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant together with their three contraries, the shameful, the harmful, and the painful—in all these the good person is apt to be correct, the bad person to err, but especially as regards pleasure.”(Nicomachean Ethics, 2.3) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Ever since I was a boy I've always desired to acquire a certain thing. You know how different people desire different things: for example one man desires to acquire horses; another, to acquire dogs; another, gold; another, honors. I'm quite indifferent to those things, but I do passionately love acquiring friends. I'd rather get a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world. …When I see you two, you and Lysis, I'm amazed, and think you must be very happy because, though you are so young, you've been able to acquire that possession quickly and easily: you've acquired Lysis as a friend so quickly and firmly; and he, you. Whereas I'm so far from acquiring one that I don't even know how one man becomes the friend of another. That's what I want to ask you about, in view of your experience.Tell me, when a man loves someone, which is the friend of which? Is it the one who loves who is the friend of the one who is loved? Or is it the one who is loved who is the friend of the one who loves? Or is there no difference?[After a spirited back and forth, Socrates concludes:]Then, Menexenus, it would appear that what is loved is dear to what loves it whether it loves what loves it or whether it actually hates it. For example, some newly born children do not yet love, while others actually hate their mother or father when they are punished by them. None the less they are most dear to their parents at the time they actually hate them. …That will mean, then, that we must allow exactly what we allowed earlier in our discussion, that a man is often the friend of what is not his friend, and often of what is actually his enemy, when he either loves what doesn't love him, or loves what actually hates him; and that a man is often the enemy of what is not his enemy, or of what is actually his friend, when he either hates what does not hate him, or hates what actually loves him. …‘Heavens, Socrates,' he said, ‘I don't know what to say.'Can it be that we were not conducting our investigation properly at all, Menexenus?, I asked.”(Lysis, 211d-213d)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“The simplest means of procuring protection from other men (which is gained to a certain extent by deterrent force) is the security of quiet solitude and withdrawal from the mass of people. …Nature's wealth is restricted and easily won, while that of empty convention runs on to infinity. …Bad luck strikes the sophisticated man in a few cases, but reason has directed the big, essential things, and for the duration of life it is and will be the guide.”(Leading Doctrines, 14, 15, and 16) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Who is it, then, that has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? No one? Assuredly from the very structure of all made objects we are accustomed to prove that the work is certainly the product of some artificer, and has not been constructed at random. …And the male and the female, and the passion of each for intercourse with the other, and the faculty which makes use of the organs which have been constructed for this purpose, do these things not reveal their artificer either? …Else let them explain to us what it is that produces each of these results, or how it is possible that objects so wonderful and so workmanlike should come into being at random and spontaneously.”(Discourses, 1.6)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“This is the effect of philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls: it banishes all groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: but it has not the same influence over all people; it is of very great influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. …For how few philosophers will you meet with, whose life and manners are conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees. …For just as if one who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these people, because they blunder in the very particular with which they profess that they are well acquainted. So philosophers who err in the conduct of their life are the more infamous because they are erring in the very thing which they pretend to teach, and, while they lay down rules to regulate life by, they are irregular in their own life.”(Tusculan Disputations, 2.4)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Now, since the present subject is taken up, not for the sake of contemplation, as are others—for we are conducting an examination, not so that we may know what virtue is, but so that we may become good, since otherwise there would be no benefit from it—it is necessary to examine matters pertaining to actions, that is, how one ought to perform them. For these actions have authoritative control over what sorts of characteristics come into being, just as we have said. …This, then, is the first thing that must be contemplated. Such things [as the virtues] are naturally destroyed through deficiency and excess, just as we see in the case of strength and health. …Excessive as well as deficient gymnastic exercises destroy strength, and, similarly, both drink and food destroy health as they increase or decrease in quantity, whereas the proportionate amounts create, increase, and preserve health. So it is too with moderation, courage, and the other virtues: he who avoids and fears all things and endures nothing becomes a coward, and he who generally fears nothing but advances toward all things becomes reckless. Similarly, he who enjoys every pleasure and abstains from none becomes licentious; but he who avoids every pleasure, as the boorish do, is a sort of insensible person. Moderation and courage are indeed destroyed by excess and deficiency, but they are preserved by the mean.Strength comes into being as a result of taking much nourishment and enduring many exertions, and he who is strong would especially be able to do just these things. So too in the case of the virtues, for as a result of abstaining from pleasures, we become moderate; and by so becoming, we are especially able to abstain from them. Similar is the case of courage as well: by being habituated to disdain frightening things and to endure them, we become courageous, and by so becoming, we will be especially able to endure frightening things.”(Nicomachean Ethics, 2.2) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“I put my questions to Lysis: ‘I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother love you very much?'‘Of course,' he replied.‘Then they'd want you to be as happy as possible?'‘Naturally.'‘Do you think that a man is happy when he's a slave and allowed to do nothing he desires?'‘Heavens, no, I don't,' he said.‘Then if your father and mother love you and desire your happiness, it's absolutely clear that they must do their best to make you happy.'‘Of course,' he said.‘So they let you do what you want and don't scold you at all or stop you doing what you desire?'‘Heavens, no, Socrates, there are lots and lots of things they stop me doing.'…‘So your father deliberately sets lots and lots of bosses and masters over you. But when you go home to your mother, she lets you do what you want with her wool or her loom when she's weaving, so that she can see you perfectly content.'Lysis laughed and said, ‘Heavens, Socrates, not only does she stop me, but I'd actually be beaten if I touched any of that.'…‘Well then, what have you done to make them behave so oddly and stop you being happy and doing what you want, and bring you up by keeping you all day long in a state of constant subjection to someone else and in short doing virtually nothing you desire.'…‘It's because I'm not yet of age, Socrates,' he said.‘I'm not sure it's that that stops you, Lysis, since both your father, Democrates, and your mother trust you to some extent, I imagine, without waiting until you're of age. For example, when they want things read to them or written for them, I imagine they give that job to you before anyone else in the house. Don't they?'‘Of course,' he replied.…‘So, Lysis, what on earth can be the reason for their not stopping you in those cases, whereas they do stop you in the ones we were speaking of just now?'‘I suppose it's because I know about those things but not the others,' he replied.‘Well,' I said. ‘Excellent! So your father is not waiting for you to come of age to trust everything to you, but on the day he considers that you know better than himself, he'll trust both himself and his property to you.'‘I expect so,' he said.”(Lysis, 207d-209d)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“We would have no need for natural science unless we were worried by apprehensiveness regarding the heavenly bodies, by anxiety about the meaning of death, and also by our failure to understand the limitations of pain and desire.It is impossible to get rid of our anxieties about essentials if we do not understand the nature of the universe. … Hence it is impossible to enjoy our pleasures unadulterated without natural science. …There is no advantage in gaining security with regard to other people if phenomena occurring above and beneath the earth – in a word, everything in the infinite universe – are objects of anxiety.”(Leading Doctrines, 11, 12, and 13) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“If a man resists truths that are all too evident, in opposing him it is not easy to find an argument by which one may cause him to change his opinion. The reason for this is neither the man's ability nor the teacher's weakness; nay, when a man who has been trapped in an argument hardens to stone, how shall one any longer deal with him by argument? …Do your senses tell you that you are awake? ‘No,' he answers, ‘any more than they do when in dreams I have the impression that I am awake.' Is there, then, no difference between these two impressions? ‘None.' Can I argue with this man any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I apply to him, to make him realize that he is deadened. …One man does not notice the contradiction — he is in a bad way; another man notices it, indeed, but is not moved and does not improve — he is in a still worse state … and his reasoning faculty has been — I will not say cut away, but brutalized.”(Discourses, I.5)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“For my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few subjects; for philosophy is a matter in which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or all its branches.Philosophy would never have been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to this city.Let philosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment.”(Tusculan Disputations, II.1-2)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Virtue, then, is twofold, intellectual and moral. Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit, and so it is that moral virtue got its name [ēthikē] by a slight alteration of the term habit [ethos]. It is also clear, as a result, that none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature. …For as regards those things we must learn how to do, we learn by doing them—for example, by building houses, people become house builders, and by playing the cithara, they become cithara players. So too, then, by doing just things we become just; moderate things, moderate; and courageous things, courageous. …As a result of building houses well, people will be good house builders; but as a result of doing so badly, they will be bad ones. If this were not the case, there would be no need of a teacher, but everyone would come into being already good or bad. So too in the case of the virtues: by doing things in our interactions with human beings, some of us become just, others unjust; and by doing things in terrifying circumstances and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowards. …It makes no small difference, then, whether one is habituated in this or that way straight from childhood but a very great difference—or rather the whole difference.”(Nicomachean Ethics, II.1)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, could you explain it to us again from the beginning? You know we started our discussion by considering bravery as a part of goodness?NICIAS: Yes, I do.SOCRATES: So you did agree with our answer that it's a part, and hence that there are other parts, which are known collectively as goodness, didn't you?NICIAS: Yes, of course.SOCRATES: Now, you mean the same by these parts as I do, don't you? For me, besides bravery, the list includes self-control, fairness and other similar qualities. Isn't it the same for you?NICIAS: Certainly. …SOCRATES: [But] bravery can't only be knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, because like other kinds of knowledge it understands not only the future stages of good and evil, but also the present and the past.NICIAS: Apparently so.SOCRATES: So the answer you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of bravery, whereas we asked what bravery is as a whole. And so now, it seems, on your own admission, bravery is knowledge not only of what is fearful and what is encouraging, but according to the way you describe it now, of pretty well the whole subject of good and evil, regardless of time. Does that reflect your change of mind, or would you put it differently, Nicias?NICIAS: No, That's how it seems to me, Socrates. …SOCRATES: So, What you're now describing, Nicias, won't be a part of goodness, but goodness in its entirety.NICIAS: So it seems.SOCRATES: But we did say that bravery is only one of the parts of goodness.NICIAS: Yes, we did.SOCRATES: But what you're now describing appears not to be so.NICIAS: No, it seems not.SOCRATES: So we've not discovered what bravery is, Nicias.NICIAS: No, apparently not.”(Laches, 198a-199e) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“What is the work of virtue? Serenity. Who, then, is making progress? The man who has read many treatises of Chrysippus? What, is virtue no more than this — to have gained a knowledge of Chrysippus? For if it is this, progress is confessedly nothing else than a knowledge of many of the works of Chrysippus. …And where is your work? In desire and aversion, that you may not miss what you desire and encounter what you would avoid; in choice and in refusal, that you may commit no fault therein; in giving and withholding assent of judgement, that you may not be deceived. …Suppose, for example, that in talking to an athlete I said, ‘Show me your shoulders,' and then he answered, ‘Look at my jumping-weights.' Go hang, you and your jumping-weights! What I want to see is the effect of the jumping-weights. …And so never look for your work in one place and your progress in another.”(Discourses, I.4) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other people is a natural good.Some people have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from others. If the lives of such people are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.”(Leading Doctrines, 6, 7, and 8)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“The opinion of Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Crito how he would be buried, ‘I have taken a great deal of pains,' said he, ‘my friends, to no purpose, for I have not convinced our Crito that I shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Crito, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown away from hence.'That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about anything of this kind.Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. And when his friends replied, ‘What! to the birds and beasts?' ‘By no means,' said he; ‘place my staff near me, that I may drive them away.' ‘How can you do that,' they answer, ‘for you will not perceive them?' ‘How am I then injured by being torn by those animals, if I have no sensation?' …With regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul live or die, it has no sensation.”(Tusculan Disputations, I.43)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Of the non-rational [component of the soul], one part seems to be that which is held in common and vegetative—I mean that which causes nutrition and growth. For someone could posit that such a capacity of the soul is in all things that are nourished. …A certain virtue belonging to this capacity, then, appears to be common and not distinctive of a human being. …Yet there seems to be also a certain other nature of the soul that is non-rational, although it does share in reason in a way. For in the case of the self-restrained person and of the one lacking self-restraint, we praise their reason and that part of their soul possessing reason, since it correctly exhorts them toward the best things. But there appears to be something else in them that is by nature contrary to reason, which does battle with and strains against reason. …It appears, therefore, that the non-rational part is twofold, for the vegetative part has nothing in common with reason; but that part characterized by desire, and by longing in general, shares somehow in reason inasmuch as it heeds it and is apt to be obedient to its commands.”(Nicomachean Ethics, I.13)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, tell me – or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are sharing the discussion between us – your argument is that bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, isn't it?NICIAS: Yes.SOCRATES: And this isn't something everyone is aware of … unless they supplement their own knowledge with this particular kind. Isn't that what you said?NICIAS: Yes, it was.SOCRATES: So, it's actually not something any pig would know, as the saying goes, and a pig couldn't be brave.NICIAS: No, I think not. …SOCRATES: I think that if one puts forward this theory, one is forced to deny that any animal whatsoever is brave. …NICIAS: ‘Brave' is not a word I use to describe animals, or anything else that's not afraid of danger because of its own lack of understanding; I prefer ‘fearless' and ‘foolish.' Or do you suppose I call every little child brave because it doesn't understand, and so is not afraid of anything? No, I think to be unafraid and to be brave are two quite different things. Bravery and foresight are, in my opinion, things a very small number of people possess; whereas being reckless, daring, fearless and blind to consequences is the norm for the vast majority of men, women, children and animals. So you see, what you and most people call brave, I call reckless: brave actions are those coupled with wisdom, as I said.(Laches, 196d-197e)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“‘Come then, Epictetus, shave off your beard.' If I am a philosopher, I answer, ‘I will not shave it off' ‘But I will take off your neck.' If that will do you any good, take it off. …Only consider at what price you sell your freedom of will. If you must sell it, man, at least do not sell it cheap. But the great and pre-eminent deed, perhaps, befits others, Socrates and men of his stamp.— Why then, pray, if we are endowed by nature for such greatness, do not all men, or many, become like him? What, do all horses become swift, all dogs keen to follow the scent? What then?Because I have no natural gifts, shall I on that account give up my discipline? Far be it from me! Epictetus will not be better than Socrates; but if only I am not worse, that suffices me.For I shall not be a Milo, either, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, is there any other field in which we give up the appropriate discipline merely from despair of attaining the highest.” (Discourses, 1.2)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence, because these are found where there is lack of strength.Death means nothing to us, because that which has been broken down into atoms has no sensation and that which has no sensation is no concern of ours.The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly.” (Leading doctrines, 1-5)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Away, then, with those follies, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. …Because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for.Aristotle said there is a kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest.Compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.39)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“Those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one's blessedness, for they both inflict pains and impede many activities.Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many great misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is wellborn and great souled. …For we suppose that someone who is truly good and sensible bears up under all fortunes in a becoming way and always does what is noblest given the circumstances, just as a good general makes use, with the greatest military skill, of the army he has. …And if this is so, the happy person would never become wretched. … He would not be unstable and subject to reversals either, for he will not be easily moved from happiness, and then not by any random misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones.” (Nicomachean Ethics, I.10)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

“It is to be expected, then, that we do not say that either a cow or a horse or any other animal is at all happy, for none of them are able to share in such an activity.It is because of this too that a child is not happy either: he is not yet apt to do such things, on account of his age. …As we said, both complete virtue and a complete life are required: many reversals and all manner of fortune arise in the course of life, and it is possible for someone who is particularly thriving to encounter great disasters in old age, just as the myth is told about Priam in the Trojan tales.Nobody deems happy someone who deals with fortunes of that sort and comes to a wretched end.” (Nicomachean Ethics, I.9) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“The good Epicurean believes that certain events occur deterministically, that others are chance events, and that still others are in our own hands.He sees also that necessity cannot be held morally responsible and that chance is an unpredictable thing, but that what is in our own hands, since it has no master, is naturally associated with blameworthiness and the opposite.Actually it would be better to subscribe to the popular mythology than to become a slave by accepting the determinism of the natural philosophers, because popular religion underwrites the hope of supplicating the gods by offerings, but determinism contains an element of necessity, which is inexorable.” (Letter to Menoeceus, II) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“[Socrates] First of all, then, let's try to say what bravery is, Laches; and after that we'll investigate any ways of adding it to young men, in so far as it may be possible to do so by means of various activities and disciplines. So, as I say, try to put into words what bravery is.[Laches] My word, Socrates, that's not difficult! If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, you can be sure that he's brave. …[Socrates] But what about another man, a man who still fights the enemy, but runs away and doesn't make a stand?[Laches] How do you mean, ‘runs away'?[Socrates] Well, I suppose just like the Scythians are said to fight every bit as much in retreat as in pursuit. …[Laches] Your point about the Scythians applies to cavalry – that's the way cavalry go into action, but infantry operate as I described.[Socrates] With the possible exception, Laches, of the Spartan infantry. At the battle of Plataea, so the story goes, the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, but weren't willing to stand and fight, and fell back. The Persians broke ranks in pursuit; but then the Spartans wheeled round fighting like cavalry and so won that part of the battle.[Laches] That's true.[Socrates] Well, this is what I meant just now when I said it was my fault you didn't give a proper answer, because I didn't phrase the question properly; you see, I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but also as a cavalryman, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just what it is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; and I wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the face of poverty, and in public life; and what's more not just what it is to be brave in resisting pain or fear, but also in putting up stern opposition to temptation and indulgence – because I'm assuming, Laches, that there are people who are brave in all these situations.[Laches] Very much so, Socrates.[Socrates] … So try again, and tell me with respect to bravery first of all what the constant factor in all these situations is – or do you still not understand what I mean?” (Laches, 190d-191d) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Happiness manifestly requires external goods in addition, just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it were—through friends, wealth, and political power.Those who are bereft of some of these (for example, good birth, good children, or beauty) disfigure their blessedness, for a person who is altogether ugly in appearance, or of poor birth, or solitary and childless cannot really be characterized as happy; and he is perhaps still less happy, if he should have altogether bad children or friends or, though he did have good ones, they are dead.Just as we said, then, happiness seems to require some such external prosperity in addition.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“LACHES: I take courage to be a certain endurance present in one's character, if I have to mention the element essentially present in all cases.SOCRATES: Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, can appear to you to be bravery. So endurance accompanied by wisdom would be both fine and good, wouldn't it?LACHES: Certainly.SOCRATES: But what of it when accompanied by foolishness? Surely it's quite the opposite, damaging and detrimental?LACHES: Yes.SOCRATES: So, according to your account, wise endurance will be bravery.LACHES: So it seems.SOCRATES: Let's see now: wise, but wise in what respect? Perhaps in every respect, great or small? Suppose, for instance, someone showed endurance in spending his money wisely, because he realized that if he spent it, he'd make a profit: would you call him brave?LACHES: Good heavens, I certainly wouldn't!SOCRATES: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, and that he'll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position – now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him?LACHES: I'd say the man in the opposing camp, Socrates.SOCRATES: But surely his endurance is more foolish than that of the other?LACHES: Yes, you're right.SOCRATES: Now, we've previously shown that without knowledge endurance and daring are disgraceful and damaging, haven't we?LACHES: Certainly.SOCRATES: But now we're claiming, on the contrary, that this disgraceful thing, endurance without knowledge, is bravery.LACHES: Apparently so.SOCRATES: Then do you think we've given a good account?LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, I certainly don't. I'm not prepared to give up too soon, Socrates. I'm really annoyed because I can't find the words to say what I'm thinking – I'm sure I can see what Bravery is, but somehow or other she has escaped me for the moment, so I can't find the words to catch her and actually say what she is!SOCRATES: Then do you mind if we invite Nicias here to join the hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.LACHES: Of course I don't mind.SOCRATES: Come on then, Nicias, your friends are floundering in a sea of words! We've got ourselves hopelessly confused, so you'd better give us some help, if there's anything you can do. The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think bravery is, you'll get us out of this hopeless state, and you'll also confirm your own thoughts by putting them into words.” (Laches, 192c-194c) Get full access to Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“When I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean the pleasures of libertines or the pleasures inherent in positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in agreement with it or who interpret it perversely.I mean, on the contrary, the pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental agitation. The pleasant life is not the product of one drinking party after another or of sexual intercourse with women and boys or of the seafood and other delicacies afforded by a luxurious table.On the contrary, it is the result of sober thinking – namely, investigation of the reasons for every act of choice and aversion and elimination of those false ideas about the gods and death which are the chief source of mental disturbances.” (Letter to Menoeceus, II) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“But should we grant them even this, that people are by death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? …Can those who do not exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this — they had, but they have not; they regret, they look back upon, they want.Such are, I suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Are they deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. Are they destitute of children? not to have them is misery.These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no existence. …‘To want,' then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead. …When such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.36) Get full access to Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond at figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Helvidius Priscus saw this, too, and acted on the insight.When Vespasian told him not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he replied, ‘You have the power to disqualify me as a senator, but as long as I am one, I'm obliged to attend meetings.'‘All right, then, attend the meeting,' says Vespasian, ‘but don't say anything.' ‘Don't ask me for my opinion and I'll keep quiet.'‘But I'm bound to ask you.' ‘And I'm bound to say what seems right.'‘But if you speak, I'll have you killed.' ‘Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You do your job and I'll do mine. Yours is to put me to death and mine to die fearlessly. Yours is to send me into exile and mine to leave without grieving.'” (Discourses, 1.2.19)Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“The case of our friend Pompey was something better: once, when he had been very ill at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate him—it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still, it is a sign of good fortune.But the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil?Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law; he would not have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors.Did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life?” (Tusculan Disputations, 1.35)Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to discuss their sons, because they're anxious for the boys' characters to develop in the best way possible. So, what we must do, if we claim we can, is to point out to them teachers who are known firstly to have been upstanding men in their own right and to have cared for many young men's characters, and secondly to have taught us also. …I'll be the first to explain my position, then, Lysimachus and Melesias, and I may say I've not had any instruction on the subject, although it's true that it has been a passionate interest of mine ever since I was a boy. But I've never been able to pay fees to the sophists – the only ones who professed to be able to make a good and honest man of me – and I can't discover the art for myself even now. …I have in consequence a request to make of you in return, Lysimachus. …I urge you not to let Laches or Nicias slip away, but to ask them some questions. Say to them, ‘Socrates says he doesn't understand this subject in the slightest and isn't competent to decide which of you is right: he hasn't been taught, or discovered for himself, anything about that kind of thing at all. And now you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us if you've met anyone who was highly skilled in bringing up the young, and whether you learnt what you know from someone else or discovered it for yourselves. If you learnt it, could you tell us who taught each of you, and who is in the same profession?” (Laches, 186a-186e) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“[Lysimachus] ‘I am asking you, Socrates, because it seems as if our council needs someone to act as umpire.'[Socrates] ‘What, Lysimachus? Do you intend to follow whatever course the majority of us recommends?'[Lysimachus] ‘Yes, what alternative is there, Socrates?'[Socrates] ‘Imagine there was some discussion about the kind of athletic training your son should practice: would you be influenced by the majority of us, or by the man who happened to have trained and exercised under a good coach. … I think that if a decision is to be made properly, then it must be made on the basis of knowledge and not numbers.'‘So, what we should do now, first of all, is consider whether we have among us an expert in the subject we're discussing or not. If we have, we should take his advice and ignore other people; and if we haven't, we should look for somebody else.'” (Laches, 184c-185a) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“There are many who labor on the other side of the question, and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that it would escape their sight.Let those consider this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the body—a place which, as it were, does not belong to it—than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.22) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Saying that ‘happiness is best' is something manifestly agreed on, whereas what it is still needs to be said more distinctly. Now, perhaps this would come to pass if the work of the human being should be grasped. … So whatever, then, would this work be? For living appears to be something common even to plants, but what is peculiar [to human beings] is being sought. One must set aside, then, the life characterized by nutrition as well as growth.A certain life characterized by sense perception would be next, but it too appears to be common to a horse and cow and in fact to every animal. So there remains a certain active life of that which possesses reason. …We assert that the work of a given person is the same in kind as that of a serious person, just as it would be in the case of a cithara player. … For it belongs to a cithara player to play the cithara, but to a serious one to do so well. …If we posit the work of a human being as a certain life, and this is an activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason, the work of a serious man is to do these things well and nobly. …But, in addition, in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. And in this way, one day or a short time does not make someone blessed and happy either.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Which is preferable, death or life? Life, of course. Pain or pleasure? Pleasure, of course.‘But if I refuse to take part in the Emperor's show, I'll lose my head.' ‘Go ahead, then. Take part. But I won't.'‘Why me and not you?' ‘Because you're thinking of yourself as just one thread in the toga.' ‘Meaning what?'‘You're bound to care about how to be similar to other people, just as a thread too wants to be no different from all the other threads. But I'd like to be purple, the little bit of brightness that makes all the rest seem fair and lovely. So why are you telling me to conform to the majority? How, in that case, would I be purple?'” (Discourses, I.2.15-18) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“In order to determine what is and isn't reasonable, we not only take account of the values of external things, but each of us also takes his role into consideration. For one person it's reasonable to fetch someone else's chamber pot, because he's focused on the fact that, if he doesn't do it, he'll be flogged and denied food, while, if he does, nothing unpleasant or painful will happen to him.But another person not only considers it unbearable to do that but can't stand even the idea of someone else's doing it.So if you ask me, ‘Should I or shouldn't I fetch the chamber pot?' I'll reply that being fed is preferable to being denied food, and that being thrashed is less preferable than not being thrashed, and that therefore, if these are the criteria by which you measure what's in your interest, you should go and fetch it.‘But that's not the kind of person I am.' That's something for you, not me, to take into account in your deliberations. After all, you're the one who knows himself, which is to say you know how much you're worth to yourself and at what price you sell yourself. For different people sell themselves at different prices.” (Discourses, I.2.7-11) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and lately to Cato, and often to many others — in such a case, certainly every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light.For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death.” (Tusculan Disputations, 1.30) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe

“Because of the very fact that pleasure is our primary and congenital good we do not select every pleasure; there are times when we forgo certain pleasures, particularly when they are followed by too much unpleasantness. Furthermore, we regard certain states of pain as preferable to pleasures, particularly when greater satisfaction results from our having submitted to discomforts for a long period of time.Thus every pleasure is a good by reason of its having a nature akin to our own, but not every pleasure is desirable. In like manner every state of pain is an evil, but not all pains are uniformly to be rejected.At any rate, it is our duty to judge all such cases by measuring pleasures against pains, with a view to their respective assets and liabilities, inasmuch as we do experience the good as being bad at times and, contrariwise, the bad as being good.” (Letter to Menoeceus, 2) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit figsinwinter.substack.com/subscribe