Podcasts about Armed Career Criminal Act

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?    The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle applies to both facts that increase the maximum sentence and facts that increase the minimum sentence.  In Erlinger's case, determining whether his prior offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions (as required by the Armed Career Criminal Act) involved finding facts that increased both his minimum and maximum potential sentences. Therefore, this determination should have been made by a jury, not a judge. This factual determination does not fall under the narrow Almendarez-Torres exception, which allows judges to find only the fact of a prior conviction. The occasions inquiry requires going beyond simply identifying prior convictions and their elements. While there may be practical concerns about prejudicing defendants by presenting evidence of prior crimes to juries, these can be addressed through procedural tools like bifurcated trials. Constitutional requirements cannot be set aside for efficiency or practicality reasons. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined in part. Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Brown v United States.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense? The case was decided on May 23, 2024. The Supreme Court held that a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, Precedent and statutory context support the Government's interpretation—that the federal and state definitions of a drug must match when the state crime was committed. ACCA is a recidivist statute that looks backward at a defendant's prior convictions to gauge their culpability and dangerousness. Treating state and federal drug offenses differently based on later changes to drug schedules would lead to strange results. Second, the Government's interpretation best fulfills ACCA's objectives. A defendant's prior serious drug convictions indicate a risk of future dangerousness, even if the drug is later considered less dangerous. The fact of the earlier conviction, not the legislature's subsequent judgment, is what matters for ACCA's purposes. Jackson's reliance on the reference canon and the principle that the law setting the penalty is the law in place when the crime was committed is misplaced. ACCA's reference to the Controlled Substances Act is specific, not general, and treating Jackson's prior convictions as ACCA predicates is consistent with the current law. Additionally, Brown's textual argument based on ACCA's use of the present tense, noting that this was likely a stylistic choice. Brown's reliance on the Schooner Peggy principle is misplaced because ACCA itself has not changed during the litigation. While the Government's interpretation may have some limitations, such as not capturing pre-1970 drug convictions, this is not absurd given the comprehensive regulatory scheme introduced by the Controlled Substances Act in 1970. The rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is not grievously ambiguous after considering context, precedent, and statutory design. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in full and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that, notwithstanding the majority's contrary contention, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) definitively answers the question presented here, establishing that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearms offense that triggers ACCA's potential application. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Melissa, Kate, and Leah recap the oral arguments in the case challenging the FDA's approval of mifepristone, one of the drugs used in medication abortion. They also recap arguments in cases about the Armed Career Criminal Act and Indian Health Services, and give some updates on cases they're watching in the lower courts, ranging from immigration, to guns, to Title IX.Get your tickets to Strict Scrutiny Live HERE, or head to crooked.com/events for more info.ICYMI, we did a quick reaction episode on Tuesday right after the mifepristone case was argued  Follow us on Instagram, Twitter, Threads, and Bluesky

Criminal Procedure: Must a jury find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another" to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act? - Argued: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 9:5:22 EDT

QUESTION PRESENTED:Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

A case in which the Court will decide whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Yes, I enjoy listening to SCOTUS Oral Arguments on my walks….. Enjoy - efdBrown v. U.S., No. 22-6389 [Arg: 11.27.2023] Issue(s): Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense. Gene Douglass for Congress, NC #2 Battle Good v Evil is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. If you wish to donate to my campaign here is the link below: To Donate to my campaign for the US House NC #2. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit efdouglass.substack.com/subscribe

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum. The question presented is: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach? The Armed Career Criminal Act mandates fifteen years in prison for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment often years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Four circuits have unanimously held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense to which the ACCA applies. In the decision below, however, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the government's express invitation to reject those circuit decisions. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) instead incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the defendant's prior state drug offense. The question presented is: Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).1 1 A related question is presented in Altman, et al. v. United States (No. 22-5877) (response requested Nov. 16, 2022) and Brown v. United States (No. 22-6389) (docketed Dec. 23, 2022).

Each month, a panel of constitutional experts convenes to discuss the Court’s upcoming docket sitting by sitting. The cases covered in this preview are listed below. Brown v. United States (November 27) - Criminal Law; Whether the definition of “serious drug offense” in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect when the individual committed the firearm offense, or instead the schedules that were in effect at the time of the state drug offense. McElrath v. Georgia (November 28) - Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy; A challenge by a Georgia man who was found not guilty by reason of insanity on one charge arising from the stabbing death of his mother and guilty but mentally ill on another charge to the state’s ability to try him again on the charge on which he was acquitted. Wilkinson v. Garland (November 28) - Immigration; Whether federal courts have the power to review an agency’s determination that a noncitizen did not meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship requirement to cancel deportation. Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Jarkesy (November 29) - Administrative Law, Financial Services; A challenge to the SEC’s use of in-house judges. Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, L.P (December 4) - Whether the Bankruptcy Code gives a court the power to approve a release that extinguishes claims against third parties, without the consent of the individuals or entities holding the claims. Moore v. United States (December 5) Federalism & Separation of Powers - Whether a federal “mandatory repatriation tax” violates the 16th Amendment. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (December 6) - What protections does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide to employees who contend they were the victim of a discriminatory transfer? Featuring: Justin Aimonetti, Attorney, Dechert LLP Adi Dynar, Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation Prof. Jennifer Jenkins, Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law Prof. Lindsey Simon, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University Law School Moderator: Stephanie Maloney, Chief of Staff and Associate Chief Counsel, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center

QUESTION PRESENTED:Issue(s): Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense. ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

For its final sitting of 2023, the Supreme Court will hear cases on the Armed Career Criminal Act, double jeopardy, and whether the government is, well, constitutional. Leah, Melissa, and Kate preview those cases, and look into a hot mess of a voting rights case in the Eighth Circuit. Plus, US Representative Ro Khanna stops by to chat about SCOTUS ethics reform.Watch the Strict Scrutiny hosts on The Problem With Jon Stewart, previewing the horrors that await in Jarkesy v. SECRead Justice Jackson's powerful dissent from denial in the case of Michael Johnson, an Illinois inmate who was held in essentially complete isolation in a tiny, windowless cell, caked with human waste, for three years. Follow us on Instagram, Twitter, Threads, and Bluesky

A case in which the Court will decide whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense.

Bad Men Must Serve the Time for Crimes from Insurance Fraud to Murder After a multiple-count indictment against dozens of members of the Gangster Disciples five of them, Alonzo Walton, Kevin Clayton, Donald Glass, Antarious Caldwell, and Vancito Gumbs, appealed their convictions and sentences following a joint trial. Each raised several grounds for reversal contending they were overcharged and over-sentenced. Some argued that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violated the Sixth Amendment because the jury failed to find that the conspiracy involved murder. In United States Of America v. Antarious Caldwell, a.k.a. Fat, a.k.a. Phat, Kevin Clayton, Alonzo Walton, a.k.a. Spike, Vancito Gumbs, Donald Glass, a.k.a. Smurf, a.k.a. Dred, No. 19-15024, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (August 16, 2023) the Eleventh Circuit Affirmed all but one sentence and all convictions. BACKGROUND The Gangster Disciples began as a loosely affiliated network of street gangs in Chicago but later became a hierarchical national criminal organization. Its hierarchy consisted of a "Chairman" and "national board" for the country. The "Chief Enforcer" managed a team of "Enforcers" who exacted punishments for violations of the gang's rules, such as the prohibition against cooperating with the police. Relevant Crimes The indictment charged an array of criminal activities including carjacking and insurance fraud, attempted robbery of Eric Wilder, murder Pretrial and Trial Proceedings The principal charge against all the defendants was count one, which charged that the defendants conspired to conduct and participate directly and indirectly in the conduct of the Gangster Disciples through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). DISCUSSION The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its pretrial and trial procedural decisions and that the district court also did not abuse its discretion when it declined to ask questions during voir dire about unconscious bias. The District Court Did Not Impermissibly Depart from Neutrality When It Questioned a Witness. The trial judge is more than a referee to an adversarial proceeding. Consistent with the common-law tradition, the judge may comment on the evidence and question witnesses and elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented. This questioning is limited only by the principle that a judge must maintain neutrality between the parties. The district judge stayed well within these bounds. He asked a single question without commenting on the veracity or relevance of the witness's testimony. The district court did not err, let alone clearly err, when it asked a witness for that information. Caldwell's Conviction Under the Armed Career Criminal Act and His Sentence Must Be Vacated. The Supreme Court recently held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a "crime of violence" under section 924(c). 142 S.Ct. at 2020. So, the Eleventh Circuit must vacate Caldwell's conviction and it remand for the district court to re-sentence Caldwell for his remaining counts of conviction. All the other convictions and sentences were affirmed. ZALMA OPINION Insurance fraud is a serious crime. It is not as serious as murder. But when a group of men work together to commit murder and insurance fraud they are acting beyond reason and deserve as serious a sentence as the court can provide in accordance with the law. The appeal was their right and the Eleventh Circuit had the obligation and right to disavow them of their arguments and only changed a sentence because of a change in the law. (c) 2023 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://zalma.com/blog/insurance-claims-library --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

On March 7, 2022 the Supreme Court decided Wooden v. United States, holding that William Dale Wooden's ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court Reversed and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on March 7, 2022. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B. Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Sotomayor joined as to Part II, III, and IV.Joining today to discuss this decision is Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.

SCOTUS Decision on Armed Career Criminal Act The Supreme Court ruled on Monday that William Dale Wooden's ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). John examines Wooden v. United States and what “occasion” means for ACCA. Rhode Island Arbitrarily Shuts Down Medical Facility After Ignoring Natural Immunity Mark discusses NCLA's most recent Lunch & Law speaker series: “When Bureaucrats Won't Let Doctors Practice Medicine.” NCLA has filed a lawsuit on behalf of Dr. Skoly, a highly experience oral maxillofacial surgeon, challenging Rhode Island's irrational policies that violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dr. Skoly made the decision not to receive a COVID-19 vaccination due to the uncertainty regarding the risks involved because of a medical condition. He retains antibodies after recovering from a previous COVID-19 infection. At the Lunch & Law, NCLA's Brian Rosner and Jenin Younes sat down with Dr. Skoly to discuss his case against the state for arbitrarily shutting down his practice. You can watch the event at NCLA's YouTube page: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gNHt9iTrzTk See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We begin this October term with Wooden v. United States, argued October 4, 2021, a case which concerned the Armed Career Criminal Act. Nine justices convened, in person, to examine the issue of whether offenses that were committed as part of a single criminal spree, but sequentially in time, were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement. With me today to discuss this case is Jennifer Barrow, Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School. Ms. Barrow is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Harvard Law School, and has served as a Supreme Court Fellow, placed at the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

On June 10th, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Borden v. United States. The issue before the Court was whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Gorsuch joined, reversing the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, concluding that, quote, “a criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA's elements clause.” Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, Alito, and Barrett joined. Joining us today to discuss this decision is Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel at the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, and author of over 150 briefs in cases in the Supreme Court.

A case in which the Court will decide whether, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, offenses that were committed as part of a single criminal spree but sequentially in time were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.

The case concerns the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and how predicate offenses are considered and classified under the Armed Career Criminal Act. A predicate offense is a crime that may be or may be considered a component of a larger crime.QUESTION PRESENTED: Did the warrantless entry and search of petitioner's home violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure? Did the Sixth Circuit err by expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1) in the absence of clear statutory definition with regard to the vague term 'committed on occasions different from one another'?"[1] ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Kate, Melissa, and Leah get together to discuss Justice Kagan's approach to statutory interpretation. We got two opinions this week, Sanchez v. Mayorkas, another unanimous immigration case, and the big ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act, not Affordable Care Act) opinion we've been waiting for-- Borden v. US. They identify an important parallel between Justice Kagan and Taylor Swift and lay out the evidence that the Justices are reading their tweets (and everyone else's too). Finally, they are joined by three former law clerks to Judge Katzmann (Professors Rachel Bayefsky, Bernie Meyler, and Lindsay Nash) to remember the late judge.

As a convicted felon, Charles Borden Jr. was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) when caught at a traffic stop with a pistol. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, Borden was sentenced to nine years and seven months imprisonment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee relied on the 6th Circuit Court's decision in United States v. Verwiebe as precedent; however, Borden argued that his due process protections were violated in the application of Verwiebe. Borden argued that one of his previous felonies - reckless aggravated assault - did not qualify as a violent felony under the use of force clause. The 6th Circuit retroactively applied the precedent that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent crime, and classified Borden as an armed career criminal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Featuring: -- Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

On November 3, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bordev v. United States. The question before the court was whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.Joining us to discuss this case’s oral argument is Kent Scheidegger. Mr. Scheidegger is the Legal Director & General Counsel at Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

A case in which the Court reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit's decision holding that the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness.

A case in which the Court will decide whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness.

With Mental Strength Health being a theme of the Podcast; This Podcast takes to the next level. Gregory Welch of southern Florida was sentenced to fifteen years in prison after being convicted under a federal law that the Court struck down in the Johnson case as too vague. That provision is the so-called “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Act enhances a sentence for illegal possession of a gun by a felon from the ordinary maximum of ten years to a minimum of fifteen years if the individual had previously been convicted of three violent crimes or serious drug crimes. Welch had pleaded guilty to the gun possession charge, on condition that he be allowed to challenge the use of one of his prior convictions as a basis for increasing his sentence. After the Johnson ruling came out late last June, he sought to reopen his sentence but failed in district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to grant permission for him to appeal. He then took his case on to the Supreme Court, as did lawyers for at least a half-dozen other inmates seeking to take advantage of the Johnson ruling. The federal government last month picked out one of those cases as a proper one for the Court to consider, but the Court did not choose that one. Instead, it chose Welch’s petition — apparently because it was not complicated by rules barring multiple habeas petitions and had resulted in a final ruling at the appeals court level. Although the Justice Department had originally opposed review by the Supreme Court of Welch’s case, although it suggested he should be allowed to raise the question in lower courts, Welch’s lawyers filed a new brief after the Justice Department took the position in the other case that the rule of the Johnson decision was a new “substantive” rule of law and, as such, should apply to cases that had been closed before the date of that decision. With the Justice Department on Welch’s side on the retroactivity question; The Supreme Court Ruled in Welch's favor

On Feb. 26, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Shular v. United States, rejecting the defense argument that Florida’s unique drug laws cannot be used to enhance a federal sentence. At issue was a federal statute known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). ACCA imposes a mandatory 15-year sentence on defendants convicted of federal firearms-related felonies if they have 3 or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses” or “violent felonies.” In 2017, local law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the Florida home of Eddie Shular who was the target of a drug trafficking investigation being conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). During the search, the officers seized a firearm from a bedroom closet. Because Shular was a convicted felon, he was charged under federal law with the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 USC section 922(g)(1)). He pled guilty to that offense and because he had more than three prior convictions for serious drug offenses, he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison under the applicable federal statute. He appealed his sentence arguing that because, under Florida law, none of his state convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the relevant state laws did not require that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” and the Florida crimes were, therefore, broader than the generic drug offense analogs under federal law. The Eleventh Circuit upheld his conviction and sentence, rejecting the application of the “categorical approach” to defining “serious drug offenses, and holding that the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involves certain activities related to controlled substances.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “serious drug offense” requires only that the state offense involves the conduct specified in the statute, and does not require that the state offense in question match certain generic drug offenses under federal law. The opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. To discuss the case, we have Gregory A. Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck.

On Feb. 26, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Shular v. United States, rejecting the defense argument that Florida’s unique drug laws cannot be used to enhance a federal sentence. At issue was a federal statute known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). ACCA imposes a mandatory 15-year sentence on defendants convicted of federal firearms-related felonies if they have 3 or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses” or “violent felonies.” In 2017, local law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the Florida home of Eddie Shular who was the target of a drug trafficking investigation being conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). During the search, the officers seized a firearm from a bedroom closet. Because Shular was a convicted felon, he was charged under federal law with the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 USC section 922(g)(1)). He pled guilty to that offense and because he had more than three prior convictions for serious drug offenses, he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison under the applicable federal statute. He appealed his sentence arguing that because, under Florida law, none of his state convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the relevant state laws did not require that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” and the Florida crimes were, therefore, broader than the generic drug offense analogs under federal law. The Eleventh Circuit upheld his conviction and sentence, rejecting the application of the “categorical approach” to defining “serious drug offenses, and holding that the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involves certain activities related to controlled substances.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “serious drug offense” requires only that the state offense involves the conduct specified in the statute, and does not require that the state offense in question match certain generic drug offenses under federal law. The opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. To discuss the case, we have Gregory A. Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck.

QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the determination of a "serious drug offense" under the Armed Career Criminal Act requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a "violent felony'' under the Act? --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

A case in which the Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “serious drug offense” definition requires only that a state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses.

A case in which the Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “serious drug offense” definition requires only that a state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses.

In the second summer episode, Leah, Melissa and Jaime keep things light with a discussion of the Court's death penalty docket, the Armed Career Criminal Act cases from this past term, and Justice Kavanaugh's opinion in Flowers v. Mississippi. Kate also joins them to reflect on her time clerking for Justice John Paul Stevens. Last episode was our testing pancake, and this one is B-A-N-A-N-A-S.

A case in which the Court held that Michigan’s third-degree home-invasion statute substantially corresponds to or is narrower than generic burglary for purposes of qualifying for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

A case in which the Court held that Michigan’s third-degree home-invasion statute substantially corresponds to or is narrower than generic burglary for purposes of qualifying for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

A case in which the Court held that a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), even though that offense requires only slight force to overcome resistance.

A case in which the Court held that residential burglary under Arkansas law and aggravated burglary under Tennessee law are the same as “general burglary” such that convictions for those crimes can serve as predicate crimes for the purpose of the enhanced sentencing provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.

Burglary can include mobile residences and or vehicles adapted for sleeping.

This week's episode takes a deep dive into the Armed Career Criminal Act, a Federal Sentencing Enhancement Statute that is regularly before the Supreme Court on interpretation issues.  Brett and Nazim discuss U.S. v. Stitt (Is Burglary of a Mobile Home rreeeeaaallllyyyy burglary?) and Stokeling v. U.S. (Are gentle robberies rrreeaaallllyy robberies??).  Law starts at (5:00).

On this episode I discuss a few cases on the Court's current docket.Madison v. Alabama - does the 8th Amendment prevent a state from executing an inmate if the inmate is unable to remember the crime for which he is to be executed;Gamble v. United States - should the Court overrule the separate sovereign exception of the double jeopardy rule);Nielsen v. Preap - Whether the government can require that certain people are detained for the duration of their deportation proceedings — without a hearing — because they have past criminal records.Three cases that dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act. The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who previously has been convicted of three “violent” felonies.Flowers v. Mississippi - well known case from Mississippi that questions if the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the Batson rule correctly. For more information on this case, please listen to the podcast, In the Dark.Sources:http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-preview-justices-once-again-consider-proper-scope-of-immigration-laws-mandatory-detention-provision/http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/09/criminal-cases-in-the-october-2018-term-a-law-professors-dream/https://www.aclu.org/cases/nielsen-v-preaphttps://www.oyez.org/cases/2018Follow RTB on social mediaIG: @1RTBpodcastFacebook: @1RTBpodcastwww.rtbpodcast.com

Greg Stohr, Bloomberg News Supreme Court reporter, discusses Brett Kavanaugh’s first day as a Supreme Court Justice, where he heard oral arguments in two cases involving the U.S. Armed Career Criminal Act. Plus, Alberto Gonzales, former U.S attorney general, former White House counsel, and dean of the Belmont University School of Law, discusses the expected departure of President Trump’s White House counsel, Don McGahn, now that Brett Kavanaugh has been confirmed as a Supreme Court justice. They speak with Bloomberg’s June Grasso. 

Greg Stohr, Bloomberg News Supreme Court reporter, discusses Brett Kavanaugh's first day as a Supreme Court Justice, where he heard oral arguments in two cases involving the U.S. Armed Career Criminal Act. Plus, Alberto Gonzales, former U.S attorney general, former White House counsel, and dean of the Belmont University School of Law, discusses the expected departure of President Trump's White House counsel, Don McGahn, now that Brett Kavanaugh has been confirmed as a Supreme Court justice. They speak with Bloomberg's June Grasso.  Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had various felony convictions, was subsequently found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As a result he was subject to an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which deemed him a “career offender” whose firearm possession offense constituted a “crime of violence.” Applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Beckles to 360 months’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Beckles then sought habeas relief from his enhanced sentence, arguing that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was not a “crime of violence,” and that therefore he did not qualify as a “career offender” under the Guidelines. The district court denied his petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed. -- Beckles then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and while his petition was pending the Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the residual clause part of the “crime of violence” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act--the very same language that was applied to Beckles via the Sentencing Guidelines--was unconstitutionally vague. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment in Beckles’ case and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the Johnson decision. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed Beckles’ enhanced sentence, reasoning that Johnson simply did not address the Sentencing Guidelines or related commentary. The Supreme Court then again granted certiorari, to “resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to the residual clause in [the Guidelines.]” -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that [the Guidelines’] residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Carissa Hessick, who is the Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law.

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Welch v. United States. Gregory Welch pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed, arguing that his conviction for robbery in Florida state court did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purposes of ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a robbery conviction with a lower level of force than the federal law required to qualify as a predicate offense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the minimum elements for conviction under the Florida law established a “serious risk of physical injury to another” and therefore qualified it as a predicate offense for purposes of ACCA. Welch’s subsequent attempt to obtain habeas relief from the district court was denied, and the Eleventh Circuit rejected his appeal, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari. -- The two questions before the Supreme Court are: (1) Whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)—which held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague—announced a new “substantive” rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable in an initial motion to vacate a federal prisoner’s ACCA-enhanced sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a); and (2) Whether petitioner’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law qualifies as a violent felony that supports a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review, including Welch’s. The Court declined to address, however, whether Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida law qualified as a predicate for purposes of the ACCA enhancement, leaving the matter to the Court of Appeals on remand. -- Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard E. Myers II, who is the Henry Brandis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Welch v. United States. Police entered Gregory Welch’s apartment believing that a robbery suspect was on the premises, and after he consented to search they located a gun and ammunition that Welch later identified as his own. He was subsequently arrested and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed, arguing that his conviction for robbery in Florida state court did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purposes of ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a robbery conviction with a lower level of force than the federal law required to qualify as a predicate offense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the minimum elements for conviction under the Florida law established a “serious risk of physical injury to another” and, therefore, qualified it as a predicate offense for purposes of ACCA. Welch’s subsequent attempt to obtain habeas relief from the district court was denied, and the Eleventh Circuit rejected his appeal, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari. -- The two questions before the Supreme Court are: (1) Whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)—which held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague—announced a new “substantive” rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable in an initial motion to vacate a federal prisoner’s ACCA-enhanced sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a); and (2) Whether petitioner’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law qualifies as a violent felony that supports a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard E. Myers II, who is the Henry Brandis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.

The US Supreme Court just declared part of the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutional. Where does that leave federal criminal defendants going forward? Will it impact the Sentencing Guidelines? Will defendants whose cases are final be able to get some relief?

Asking federal judges to decide what past felonious "conduct" presents an immediate risk of harm to others is a bridge too far, according the U.S. Supreme Court. Mary Price of Families Against Mandatory Minimums comments. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

A case in which the Court held that a federal sentencing court must determine whether an offense under state law is a "serious drug offense" within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act by consulting the maximum sentence applicable at the time of the defendant's conviction.

A case in which the Court held that a conviction for resisting arrest counts as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.