Podcasts about docker api

John is one of the foremost experts in UEFI and joins us to talk about PK Fail! What happens when a vendor in the supply chain accidentally loses a key? It's one of the things that keeps me up at night. Well, now my nightmare scenario has come true as a key has been leaked. Learn how and why and what you can do about it in this segment! Hacking traffic lights (for real this time), the Docker API strikes again, access Github deleted data, using EDR to elevate privileges on Windows, computers I need in my life, failed experiments and Raspberry PI access points, sitting ducks and TuDoor - its always DNS times 2, null sessions and a blast from the past, chaining UEFI vulnerabilities, pirates exposed, revoking SSL certificates, and using AI to analyze your brain: Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent! Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw-837

Hacking traffic lights (for real this time), the Docker API strikes again, access Github deleted data, using EDR to elevate privileges on Windows, computers I need in my life, failed experiments and Raspberry PI access points, sitting ducks and TuDoor - its always DNS times 2, null sessions and a blast from the past, chaining UEFI vulnerabilities, pirates exposed, revoking SSL certificates, and using AI to analyze your brain: Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw-837

John is one of the foremost experts in UEFI and joins us to talk about PK Fail! What happens when a vendor in the supply chain accidentally loses a key? It's one of the things that keeps me up at night. Well, now my nightmare scenario has come true as a key has been leaked. Learn how and why and what you can do about it in this segment! Hacking traffic lights (for real this time), the Docker API strikes again, access Github deleted data, using EDR to elevate privileges on Windows, computers I need in my life, failed experiments and Raspberry PI access points, sitting ducks and TuDoor - its always DNS times 2, null sessions and a blast from the past, chaining UEFI vulnerabilities, pirates exposed, revoking SSL certificates, and using AI to analyze your brain: Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent! Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw-837

Hacking traffic lights (for real this time), the Docker API strikes again, access Github deleted data, using EDR to elevate privileges on Windows, computers I need in my life, failed experiments and Raspberry PI access points, sitting ducks and TuDoor - its always DNS times 2, null sessions and a blast from the past, chaining UEFI vulnerabilities, pirates exposed, revoking SSL certificates, and using AI to analyze your brain: Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw-837

Welcome to a new season of the Oracle University Podcast, where we delve deep into the world of OCI Container Engine for Kubernetes. Join hosts Lois Houston and Nikita Abraham as they ask senior OCI instructor Mahendra Mehra about the transformative power of containers in application deployment and why they're so crucial in today's software ecosystem.   Uncover key differences between virtualization and containerization, and gain insights into Docker components and commands.   Getting Started with Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: https://oracleuniversitypodcast.libsyn.com/getting-started-with-oracle-cloud-infrastructure-1   Networking in OCI: https://oracleuniversitypodcast.libsyn.com/networking-in-oci   OCI Identity and Access Management: https://oracleuniversitypodcast.libsyn.com/oci-identity-and-access-management   OCI Container Engine for Kubernetes Specialist: https://mylearn.oracle.com/ou/course/oci-container-engine-for-kubernetes-specialist/134971/210836   Oracle University Learning Community: https://education.oracle.com/ou-community   LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/oracle-university/   X (formerly Twitter): https://twitter.com/Oracle_Edu   Special thanks to Arijit Ghosh, David Wright, Radhika Banka, and the OU Studio Team for helping us create this episode.   ---------------------------------------------------------   Episode Transcript:   00:00 Welcome to the Oracle University Podcast, the first stop on your cloud journey. During this series of informative podcasts, we'll bring you foundational training on the most popular Oracle technologies. Let's get started! 00:26 Lois: Hello and welcome to the Oracle University Podcast! I'm Lois Houston, Director of Innovation Programs with Oracle University, and with me is Nikita Abraham, Principal Technical Editor.  Nikita: Hi everyone! Welcome to a new season of the Oracle University Podcast. This time around, we're going to delve into the world of OCI Container Engine for Kubernetes, or OKE. For the next couple of weeks, we'll cover key aspects of OKE to help you create, manage, and optimize Kubernetes clusters in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure. 00:58 Lois: So, whether you're a cloud native developer, Kubernetes administrator and developer, a DevOps engineer, or site reliability engineer who wants to enhance your expertise in leveraging the OCI OKE service for cloud native application solutions, you'll want to tune in to these episodes for sure. And if that doesn't sound like you, I'll bet you will find the season interesting even if you're just looking for a deep dive into this service. Nikita: That's right, Lois. In today's episode, we'll focus on concepts of containerization, laying the foundation for your journey into the world of containers. And taking us through all this is Mahendra Mehra, a senior OCI instructor with Oracle University. 01:38 Lois: Hi Mahendra! We're so glad to start our look at containerization with you today. Could you give us an overview? Why is it important in today's software world? Mahendra: Containerization is a form of virtualization, operates by running applications in isolated user spaces known as containers.  All these containers share the same underlying operating system. The container engine, pivotal in containerization technologies and container orchestration platforms, serves as the container runtime environment. It effectively manages the creation, deployment, and execution of containers. 02:18 Lois: Can you simplify this for a novice like me, maybe by giving us an analogy?  Mahendra: Imagine a container as a fully packaged and portable computing environment. It's like a digital suitcase that holds everything an application needs to run—binaries, libraries, configuration files, dependencies, you name it. And the best part, it's all encapsulated and isolated within container. 02:46 Nikita: Mahendra, how is containerization making our lives easier today?  Mahendra: In olden days, running an application meant matching it with your machine's operating system. For example, Windows software required a Windows machine. However, containerization has rewritten this narrative. Now, it's ancient history. With containerization, you create a single software package, a container that gracefully runs on any device or operating systems. What's fascinating is that these containers seamlessly run while sharing the host operating system. The container engine is like a shadow abstracted from the host operating system with limited access to underlying resources. Think of it as a super lightweight virtual machine. The beauty of this, the containerized application becomes a globetrotter, seamlessly running on bare metal within VMs or on the cloud platforms without needing tweaks for each environment. 03:52 Nikita: How is containerization different from traditional virtualization? Mahendra: On one side, we have traditional virtualization. It's like having multiple houses on a single piece of land, and each house or virtual machine has its complete setup—wall, roofs, and utilities. This setup, while providing isolation, can be resource-intensive with each virtual machine carrying its entire operating system. Now, let's shift gears to containerization, the modern day superhero. Imagine a high-rise building where each floor represents a container. These containers share the same building or host operating system, but have their private space or isolated user space. Here's the magic. They are super lightweight, don't carry extra baggage of a full operating system and can swiftly move between different floors. 04:50 Lois: Ok, gotcha. That sounds pretty efficient! So, what are the direct benefits of containerization?  Mahendra: With containerization technology, there's less overhead during startup and no need to set up a separate guest OS for each application since they all share the same OS kernel. Because of this high efficiency, containerization is commonly used for packing up the many individual microservices that make up modern applications. Containerization unfolds a spectrum of benefits, delivering unparalleled portability as containers run uniformly across diverse platforms. This agility, fostered by open source container engines, empowers developers with cross-platform flexibility. The speed of containerized applications known for their lightweight nature reduces cost, boosts efficiency, and accelerates start times. Fault isolation ensures robustness, allowing independent operations without affecting others. Efficiency thrives as containers share the OS kernel and reusable layers, optimizing server utilization. The ease of management is achieved through orchestration platforms like Kubernetes automating essential tasks. Security remains paramount as container isolation and defined permissions fortify the infrastructure against malicious threats. Containerization emerges not just as a technology but as a transformative force, redefining how we build, deploy, and manage applications in the digital landscape. 06:37 Lois: It sure makes deployment efficient, scalability, and seamless! Mahendra, various components of Docker architecture work together to achieve containerization goals, right? Can you walk us through them? Mahendra: A developer or a DevOps professional communicates with Docker engine through the Docker client, which may be run on the same computer as Docker engine in case of development environments or through a remote shell. So whenever a developer fires a Docker command, the client sends them to the Docker Daemon which carries them out. The communication between the Docker client and the Docker host is usually taken place through REST APIs. The Docker clients can communicate with more than one Daemon at a time.  Docker Daemon is a persistent background process that manages Docker images, containers, networks, and storage volumes. The Docker Daemon constantly listens to the Docker API request from the Docker clients and processes them. Docker registries are services that provide locations from where you can store and download Docker images. In other words, a Docker registry contains repositories that host one or more Docker images. Public registries include Docker Hub and Docker Cloud and private registries can also be used. Oracle Cloud Infrastructure offers you services like OCIR, which is also called a container registry, where you can host your own private or public registry. 08:02 Do you want to stay ahead of the curve in the ever-evolving AI landscape? Look no further than our brand-new OCI Generative AI Professional course and certification. For a limited time only, we're offering both the course and certification for free. So, don't miss out on this exclusive opportunity to get certified on Generative AI at no cost. Act fast because this offer is valid only until July 31, 2024. Visit https://education.oracle.com/genai to get started. That's https://education.oracle.com/genai. 08:39 Nikita: Welcome back! Mahendra, I'm wondering how virtual machines are different from containers. How do virtual machines work? Mahendra: A hypervisor or a virtual machine monitor is a software, firmware, or hardware that creates and runs virtual machines. It is placed between the hardware and the virtual machines, and is necessary to virtualize the server. Within each virtual machine runs a unique guest operating system. VMs with different operating systems can run on the same physical server. A Linux VM can sit alongside a Windows VM and so on. Each VM has its own binaries, libraries, and application that it services. And the VM may be many gigabytes in size. 09:22 Lois: What kind of benefits do we see from virtual machines? Mahendra: This technique provides a variety of benefits like the ability to consolidate applications into a single system, cost savings through reduced footprints, and faster server provisioning. But this approach has its own drawbacks. Each VM includes a separate operating system image, which adds overhead in memory and storage footprint. As it turns out, this issue adds complexity to all the stages of software development lifecycle, from development and test to production and disaster recovery as well. It also severely limits the portability of applications between different cloud providers and traditional data centers. And this is where containers come to the rescue.  10:05 Lois: OK…how do containers help in this situation? Mahendra: Containers sit on top of a physical server and its host operating system—typically, Linux or Windows. Each container shares the host OS kernel and usually the binaries and libraries as well. But the shared components are read only. Sharing OS resources such as libraries significantly reduces the need to reproduce the operating system code. A server can run multiple workloads with a single operating system installation. Containers are thus exceptionally lightweight. They are only megabytes in size and take just seconds to start. What this means in practice is you can put two or three times as many applications on a single server with containers than you can put on a virtual machine. Compared to containers, virtual machines take minutes to run and are order of magnitude larger than an equivalent container measured in gigabytes versus megabytes. 11:01 Nikita: So then, is there ever a time you should use a virtual machine? Mahendra: You should use a virtual machine when you want to run applications that specifically require a new OS, also when isolation and security are your priority over everything else. In most scenarios, a container will provide a lighter, faster, and more cost-effective solution than the virtual machines. 11:22 Lois: Now that we've discussed containerization and the different Docker components, can you tell us more about working with Docker images? We first need to know what a Dockerfile is, right?  Mahendra: A Dockerfile is a text file that defines a Docker image. You'll use a Dockerfile to create your own custom Docker image. In other words, you use it to define your custom environment to be used in a Docker container. You'll want to create your own Dockerfile when existing images won't meet your project needs to different runtime requirements, which means that learning about Docker files is an essential part of working with Docker. Dockerfile is a step-by-step definition of building up a Docker image. It provides a set of standard instructions to be used in Dockerfile that Docker will execute when you issue a Docker build command. 12:09 Nikita: Before we wrap up, can you walk us through some Docker commands? Mahendra: Every Dockerfile must start with a FROM instruction. The idea behind this is that you need a starting point to build your image. It can be from scratch or from an existing image available in the Docker registry.  The RUN command is used to execute a command and will wait till the command finishes its execution. Since most of the images are Linux-based, a good practice is to set up a directory you will work in. That's the purpose of work directory line. It defines a directory and moves you in. The COPY instruction helps you to copy your source code into the image. ENV provides default values for variables that can be accessed within the containers. If your app needs to be reached from outside the container, you must open its listening port using the EXPOSE command. Once your application is ready to run, the last thing to do is to specify how to execute it. You must add the CMD line with the same command with all the arguments you used locally to launch your application. This command can also be used to execute commands at runtime for the containers, but we can be more flexible using the ENTRYPOINT command. Labels are used in Dockerfile to help organize your Docker images.   13:20 Lois: Thank you, Mahendra, for joining us today. I learned a lot! And if you want to learn more about working with Docker images, go to mylearn.oracle.com and search for the OCI Container Engine for Kubernetes Specialist course. The course is free so you can get started right away. Nikita: Yeah, a fundamental understanding of core OCI services, like Identity and Access Management, networking, compute, storage, and security, is a prerequisite to the course and will certainly serve you well when leveraging the OCI OKE service. And the quickest way to gain this knowledge is by completing the OCI Foundations Associate learning path on MyLearn and getting certified. You can also listen to episodes from our first season, called OCI Made Easy, where we discussed these topics. We'll put a few links in the show notes so you can easily find them.  Lois: We're looking forward to having Mahendra join us again next week when we'll talk about container registries. Until next time, this is Lois Houston… Nikita: And Nikita Abraham signing off! 14:24 That's all for this episode of the Oracle University Podcast. If you enjoyed listening, please click Subscribe to get all the latest episodes. We'd also love it if you would take a moment to rate and review us on your podcast app. See you again on the next episode of the Oracle University Podcast.

Anydesk confirms a serious breach. Clorox and Johnson Controls file cyber incidents with the SEC. There's already a potential Apple Vision Pro kernel exploit. A $25 million deepfake scam. Akamai research hops on the FritzFrog botnet. The US sanctions Iranians for attacks on American water plants. Commando Cat targets Docker API endpoints. Pennsylvania courts fall victim to a DDoS attack. A new leader takes the reins at US Cyber Command and the NSA. Our guest is Dr. Heather Monthie from N2K Networks, with insights on the White House's recent easing of education requirements for federal contract jobs. And remembering one of the great cryptology communicators.  Remember to leave us a 5-star rating and review in your favorite podcast app. Miss an episode? Sign-up for our daily intelligence roundup, Daily Briefing, and you'll never miss a beat. And be sure to follow CyberWire Daily on LinkedIn. CyberWire Guest Guest Heather Monthie from N2K Networks shares some insight into the White House's recent easing of education requirements for federal contract jobs. You can find the background to that in our Selected Reading section.  Selected Reading AnyDesk, an enterprise remote software platform used by major firms including Raytheon and Samsung, suffered a security breach - here's what you need to know (IT Pro) Clorox and Johnson Controls Reveal $76m Cyber-Attack Bill (Infosecurity Magazine) MIT student claims to hack Apple Vision Pro on launch day (Cybernews) Finance worker pays out $25 million after video call with deepfake ‘chief financial officer' (CNN) FritzFrog botnet is exploiting Log4Shell bug now, experts say (The Record) US sanctions Iranian officials over cyber-attacks on water plants (BBC) The Nine Lives of Commando Cat: Analysing a Novel Malware Campaign Targeting Docker  (Cado Security) Pennsylvania court agency's website hit by disabling cyberattack, officials say (ABC News) Cyber Command, NSA usher in Haugh as new chief (The Record) White House moves to ease education requirements for federal cyber contracting jobs (CyberScoop) White House moves to ease education requirements for federal cyber contracting jobs (GAO) David Kahn, historian who cracked the code of cryptology, dies at 93 (Washington Post) Share your feedback. We want to ensure that you are getting the most out of the podcast. Please take a few minutes to share your thoughts with us by completing our brief listener survey as we continually work to improve the show.  Want to hear your company in the show? You too can reach the most influential leaders and operators in the industry. Here's our media kit. Contact us at cyberwire@n2k.com to request more info. The CyberWire is a production of N2K Networks, your source for strategic workforce intelligence. © 2023 N2K Networks, Inc. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In today's podcast we cover four crucial cyber and technology topics, including:  1.        CISA issues directive to disconnect Ivanti products 2.        Orange attack leads to credential theft, possibly ransomware 3.        Docker API endpoints attacked in cyrptojacking campaign 4.        Cloudflare says October Okta breach led to November attack    I'd love feedback, feel free to send your comments and feedback to  | cyberandtechwithmike@gmail.com

About EllEll, former SysAdmin, cloud builder, podcaster, and container advocate, has always been a security enthusiast. This enthusiasm and driven curiosity have helped her become an active member of the InfoSec community, leading her to explore the exciting world of Genetic Software Mapping at Intezer.Links: Intezer: https://www.intezer.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/Ell_o_Punk TranscriptAnnouncer: Hello, and welcome to Screaming in the Cloud with your host, Chief Cloud Economist at The Duckbill Group, Corey Quinn. This weekly show features conversations with people doing interesting work in the world of cloud, thoughtful commentary on the state of the technical world, and ridiculous titles for which Corey refuses to apologize. This is Screaming in the Cloud.Corey: It seems like there is a new security breach every day. Are you confident that an old SSH key, or a shared admin account, isn't going to come back and bite you? If not, check out Teleport. Teleport is the easiest, most secure way to access all of your infrastructure. The open source Teleport Access Plane consolidates everything you need for secure access to your Linux and Windows servers—and I assure you there is no third option there. Kubernetes clusters, databases, and internal applications like AWS Management Console, Yankins, GitLab, Grafana, Jupyter Notebooks, and more. Teleport's unique approach is not only more secure, it also improves developer productivity. To learn more visit: goteleport.com. And not, that is not me telling you to go away, it is: goteleport.com.Corey: This episode is sponsored by our friends at Oracle Cloud. Counting the pennies, but still dreaming of deploying apps instead of "Hello, World" demos? Allow me to introduce you to Oracle's Always Free tier. It provides over 20 free services and infrastructure, networking, databases, observability, management, and security. And—let me be clear here—it's actually free. There's no surprise billing until you intentionally and proactively upgrade your account. This means you can provision a virtual machine instance or spin up an autonomous database that manages itself all while gaining the networking load, balancing and storage resources that somehow never quite make it into most free tiers needed to support the application that you want to build. With Always Free, you can do things like run small scale applications or do proof-of-concept testing without spending a dime. You know that I always like to put asterisks next to the word free. This is actually free, no asterisk. Start now. Visit snark.cloud/oci-free that's snark.cloud/oci-free.Corey: Welcome to Screaming in the Cloud. I'm Corey Quinn. If there's one thing we love doing in the world of cloud, it's forgetting security until the very end, going back and bolting it on as if we intended to do it that way all along. That's why AWS says security is job zero because they didn't want to remember all of their slides once they realized they forgot security. Here to talk with me about that today is Ell Marquez, security research advocate at Intezer. Ell, thank you for joining me.Ell: Of course.Corey: So, what does a security research advocate do, for lack of a better question, I suppose? Because honestly, you look at that, it's like, security research advocate, it seems, would advocate for doing security research. That seems like a good thing to do. I agree, but there's probably a bit more nuance to it, then I can pick up just by the [unintelligible 00:01:17] reading of the title.Ell: You know, we have all of these white papers that you end up getting, the pen test reports that are dropped on your desk that nobody ever gets to, they become low priority, my job is to actually advocate that you do something with the information that you get. And part of that just involves translating that into plain English, so anyone can go with it.Corey: I've got to say, if you want to give the secrets of the universe and make sure that no one ever reads them, make sure that it has a whole bunch of academic-style citations at the beginning, and ideally put it behind some academic paywall, and it feels like people will claim to have read it but never actually read the thing.Ell: Don't forget charts.Corey: Oh yes, with the charts. In varying shades of blue. Apparently that's the only color you're allowed to do some of these charts in; despite having a full universe of color palettes out there, we're just going to put it in varying shades of corporate blue and hope that people read it.Ell: Yep, that sounds about security there. [laugh].Corey: So, how much of, I guess, modern security research these days is coming out of academia versus coming out of industry?Ell: In my experience in, you know, research I've done in researching researchers, it all really revolves around actual practitioners these days, people who are on the front lines, you know, monitoring their honey pots, and actually reporting back on what they're seeing, not just theoretical.Corey: Which I guess brings us to the question of, I wind up watching all of the keynotes that all the big cloud providers put on and they simultaneously pat me on the head and tell me that their side of security is just fine with their shared responsibility model and the rest, whereas all of the breaches I'm ever going to deal with and the only way anyone can ever see my data is if I make a mistake in configuring something. And honestly, does that really sound like something I would do? Probably not, but let's face it, they claim that they are more or less infallible. How accurate is that?Ell: I wish that I could find the original person that said this, but I've heard it so many times. And it's actually the ‘cloud irresponsibility model.' We have this blind faith that if we're paying somebody for it, it's going to be done correctly. I think you may have seen this with billing. How many people are paying for redundant security services with a cloud provider?Corey: I've once—well, more than once have noticed that if you were to configure every AWS security service that they have and enable it in your account, that the resulting bill would be larger than the cost of the data breach it was preventing. So, on some level, there is a point at which it just becomes ridiculous and it's not necessarily worth pursuing further. I honestly used to think that the shared responsibility model story was a sales pitch, and then I grew ever more cynical. And now my position on it is that it's because if you get breached, it's your fault is what they're trying to say. But if you say it outright to someone who just got breached, they're probably not going to give you money anymore. So, you need to wrap that in this whole involved 45-minute presentation with slides, and charts, and images and the rest because people can't refute one of those quite the way that they can a—it's in a tweet sentence of, “It's your fault.”Ell: I kind of have to agree with them in the end that it is your fault. Like, the buck stops with you, regardless. You are the one that chose to trust that cloud provider was going to do everything because your security team might make a mistake, but the cloud provider is made up of humans as well who can make just as many mistakes. At the end of the day, I don't care what cloud provider you used; I care that my data was compromised.Corey: One of the things that irks me the most is when I read about a data breach from a vendor that I had either trusted knowingly with my data or worse, never trusted but they somehow scraped it somewhere and then lost it, and they said, “Oh, a third-party contractor that we hired.” It's, “Yeah, look, I'm doing business with you, ideally, not the people that you choose to do business with in turn. I didn't select that contractor. You did, you can pass out the work and delegate that. You cannot delegate the responsibility.” So no, Verizon, when you talk about having a third-party contractor have a data breach of customer data, you lost the data by not vetting your contractors appropriately.Ell: Let's go back in time to hopefully something everybody remembers: Target. Target being compromised because of their HVAC provider. Yet how many people—you know this is being recorded in the holiday season—are still shopping at Target right now? I don't know if people forget or they just don't care.Corey: A year later, their stock price was higher than it was before the breach. Sure they had a complete turnover of their C-suite at that point; their CSO and CEO were forced out as a result, but life went on. And they continue to remain a going concern despite quite literally having a bull's eye painted on the building. You'd think that would be a metaphor for security issues. But no, no, that is something they actually do.Ell: You know, when you talk about, you know, the CEO being let go or, you know, being run out, but what part did he honestly have to do with it? They're talking about, oh, well, they made the decisions and they were responsible. What because they got that, you know, list of just 8000 papers with the charts on it?Corey: As I take a look at a lot of the previous issues that we've seen with I've been doing my whole S3 Bucket Negligence Awards for a while, but once I actually had a bucket engraved and sent to a company years ago, the Pokémon Company, based upon a story that I read in the Wall Street Journal, how they declined to do business with a prospective vendor because going through their onboarding process, they noticed among other things, insufficient security controls around a whole bunch of things including S3 buckets, and it's holy crap, a company actually making a meaningful decision based upon security. And say what you will about the Pokémon Company, their audience is—at least theoretically—children and occasionally adults who believe they're children—great, not here to shame—but they understand that this is not something you can afford to be lax in and they kiboshed the entire deal. They didn't name the vendor, obviously, but that really took me aback. It was such a rarity to see that, and it's why I unfortunately haven't had to make a bucket like that since. I wish I did. I wish more companies did things like this. But no it's just a matter of, well, we claim to do the right thing, and we checked all the boxes and called it good, and oops, these things happen.Ell: Yes, but even when it goes that way, who actually remembers what happened, and did you ever follow up if there were any consequences to not going, “Okay, third-party. You screwed up, we're out. We're not using you.” I can't name a single time that happened.Corey: Over at The Duckbill Group, we have large enterprise customers. We have to be respectful and careful with their data, let's be very clear here. We have all of their AWS billing data going back for some fixed period of time. And it worries me what happens if that data gets breached. Now, sure, I've done the standard PR crisis comms thing, I have statements and actions prepared to go in the event that it happens, but I'm also taking great pains to make sure it doesn't.It's the idea of okay, let's make sure that we wind up keeping these things not just distinct from the outside world, but distinct from individual clients so we're not mixing and matching any of this stuff. It's one of those areas where if we wind up having a breach, it's not because we didn't follow the baseline building blocks of doing this right. It's something that goes far beyond what we would typically expect to see in an environment like this. This, of course, sets aside the fact that while a breach like that would be embarrassing, it isn't actually material to anyone's business. This is not to say that I'm not taking it seriously because we have contractual provisions that we will not disclose a lot of this stuff, but it does not mean the end of someone's business if this stuff were to go public in the same way that, for example, back when I worked at Grindr many years ago, in the event that someone's data had been leaked there, people could theoretically been killed. There's a spectrum of consequences here, but it still seems like you just do the basic block-and-tackling to make sure that this stuff isn't publicly exposed, then you start worrying about the more advanced stuff. But with all these breaches, it seems like people don't even do that.Ell: You have Tesla, right, who's working on going to Mars, sending people there who had their S3 buckets compromised. At that point, if we've got this technology, just giant there, I think we're safe to do that whole, “Hey, assume breach, assume compromise.” But when I say that, it drives me up the wall how many people just go, “Okay, well, there's nothing we can do. We should just assume that there's going to be an issue,” and just have this mentality where they give up. No, that gives you a starting point to work from, but that's not the way it's being seen.Corey: One of the things that I've started doing as I built up my new laptop recently has been all right, how do I work with this in such a way that I don't have credentials that are going to grant access to things in any long-lived way ever residing on disk? And so that meant with AWS, I started using SSO to log into a bunch of things. It goes through a website, and then it gives a token and the rest that lasts for 12 hours. Great.Okay, SSH keys, how do I handle that? Historically, I would have them encrypted with a passphrase, but then I found for Mac OS an app called Secretive that stores it in the Secure Enclave. I have to either type in a password or prove it with a biometric Touch ID nonsense every time something tries to access the key. It's slightly annoying when I'm checking out five or six Git repos at once, but it also means that nothing that I happen to have compromised in a browser or whatnot is going to be able to just grab the keys, send it off somewhere, and then I'll never realize that I've been compromised throughout. It's the idea of at least theoretically defense in depth because it's me, it's my personal electronics, in all likelihood, that are going to be compromised, more so than it is configured, locked-down S3 buckets, managed properly. And if not me, someone else in my company who has access to these things.Ell: I'm going to give you the best advice you're ever going to get, and people are going to go, “Duh,” but it's happening right now: Don't get complacent, don't get lazy, how many of us are, “Okay, we're just going to put the key over here for a second.” Or, “We're just going to do this for a minute,” and then we forget. I recently, you know, did some research into Emotet and—you know, the new virus and the group behind it—you know how they got caught? When they were raided, everything was in plain text. They forgot to use their VPN for a while, all the files that they'd gotten no encryption. These were the people that that's what they were looking for, but you get lazy.Corey: I've started treating at least the security credential side of doing weird things, even one off bash scripts, as if they were in production. I stuff the credentials into something like AWS's parameter store, and then just have a one line snippet of code that retrieves them at runtime to wind up retrieving those. Would it be easier to just slap it in there in the code? Absolutely, of course it would. But I also look at my newsletter production pipeline, and I count the number of DynamoDB tables that are in active use that are labeled Test or Dev, and I realized, huh, I'm actually kind of bad at taking something that was in Dev and getting it ready for production. Very often, I just throw a load at it and call it good. So, if I never get complacent around things like that, it's a lot harder for me to get yelled at for checking secrets into Git, for example.Ell: Probably not the first time that you've heard this but, Corey, I'm going to have to go with you're abnormal because that is not what we're seeing in a day-to-day production environment.Corey: Oh, of course not. And the reason I do this is because I was a grumpy old sysadmin for so long, and have gotten burned in so many weird ways of messing things up. And once it's in Git, it's eternal—we all know that—and I don't ever want to be in a scenario where I open-source something and surprise, surprise, come to find out in the first two days of doing something, I had something on disk. It's just better not to go down that path if at all possible.Ell: Being a former sysad as well, I must say, what you're able to do within your environment, your computer is almost impossible within a corporate environment. Because as a sysad, I'm looking at, “What did the devs do again? Oh, man, what's the security team going to do?” And you're stuck in the middle trying to figure out how to solve a problem and then manage it through that entire environment.Corey: I never really understood intrinsically the value of things like single-sign-on, until I wound up starting this company. Because first, it was just me for a few years. And yeah, I can manage my developer environments and my AWS environments in such a way that if they get compromised, it's not going to be through basic, “Oops, I forgot that's how computers work,” type of moment. It's going to be at least something a little bit more difficult, I would imagine. Because if you—all right, if you managed to wind up getting my keys and the passphrase, and in some cases, the MFA device, great, good, congratulations, you've done something novel and probably deserve the data.Whereas as soon as I started bringing other people in who themselves were engineers, I sort of still felt the same way. Okay, we're all responsible adults here, and by and large, since I wasn't working with junior people, that held true. And then I started bringing in people who did not come from a deeply computer-y technical background, doing things like finance, and doing things like sales, and doing things like marketing, all of which are themselves deeply technical in their own way, but data privacy and data security are not really something that aligns with that. So, it got into the weeds of, “How do I make sure that people are doing responsible things on their work computers like turning on disk encryption, and forcing a screensaver, and a password and the rest.” And forcing them to at least do some responsible things like having 1Password for everyone was great until I realized a couple people weren't even using it for something, and oh dear. It becomes a much more difficult problem at scale when you have to deal with people who, you know, have actual work to do rather than sitting around trying to defend the technology against any threat they can imagine.Ell: In what you just said though, there is one flaw is we tend to focus on, like you said, marketing and finance and all these organizations who—don't get phished, don't click on this link. But we kind of give the just the openness that your security team, your sysads, your developers, they're going to know best practices. And then we focus on Windows because that's what the researchers are doing. And then we focus on Windows because that's what marketing is using, that's what finance is using. So, what there's no way to compromise a Mac or Linux box? That's a huge, huge open area that you're allowing for attackers.Corey: Let's be very clear here. We don't have any Windows boxes—of which I'm aware—in the company. And yeah, the technical folk we have brought in, most of them I'd worked—or at least the early folks—I'd worked with previously. And we had a shared understanding of security. At least we all said the right things.But yeah, as you—right, as you grow, as you scale, this becomes a big deal. And it's, I also think there's something intrinsically flawed about a model where the entire instruction set is, it all falls on you to not click the link or you're going to doom us all. Maybe if someone can click a link and doom us all, the problem is not with them; it's the fact that we suck at building secure systems that respect defense in depth.Ell: Something that we do wrong, though, is we split it up. We have endpoint protection when we're talking about, you know, our Windows boxes, our Linux boxes, our Mac boxes. And then we have server-side and cloud security. Those connect. Think about, there's a piece of malware called EvilGNOME. You go in on a Linux box, you have access to my camera, keylogging, and watching exactly what I'm doing. I'm your sysad. I then cat out your SSH keys, I go into your box, they now have the password, but we don't look for that. We just assume that those two aren't really that connected, and if we monitor our network and we monitor these devices, we'll be fine. But we don't connect the two pieces.Corey: One thing that I did at a consulting client back in 2012, or so that really raised eyebrows whenever I told people about it was that we wound up going to some considerable trouble building a allow list within Squid—a proxy server that those of us in Linux-land are all too familiar with in some cases—so everything in production could only talk to the outside world via that proxy; it was not allowed to establish any outbound connections other than through that proxy. So, it was at that point only allowed to talk to specify update servers, specified third-party APIs and the rest, so at least in theory, I haven't checked back on them since, I don't imagine that the log4yay nonsense that we've seen recently would necessarily work there. I mean, sure, you have the arbitrary execution of code—that's bad—but reaching out to random endpoints on the internet would not have worked from within that environment. And I liked that model, but oh my God, was it a pain in the butt to set up properly because it turns out, even in 2012, just to update a Linux system reasonably, there's a fair number of things it needs to connect to, from time-to-time, once you have all the things like New Relic instrumentation in, and the app repository you're talking to, and whatever container source you're using, and, and, and. Then you wind up looking at challenges like, oh, I don't know, if you're looking at an AWS-style environment, like most modern things are, okay, we're only going to allow it to talk to AWS endpoints. Well, that's kind of the entire internet now. The goalposts move, the rules change, the game marches on.Ell: On an even simpler point, with that you're assuming only outbound traffic through those devices. Are they not connected to anything within the internal network? Is there no way for an attacker to pivot between systems? I pivot over to that, I get the information, and I make an outbound connection on something that's not configured that way.Corey: We had—you're allowed to talk outbound to the management subnet, which was on its own VLAN, and that could make established connections into other things, but nothing else was allowed to connect into that. There was some defense in depth and some thought put into this. I didn't come up with most of this to be clear, it was—this was smart people sitting around. And yeah, if I sit here and think about this for a while, of course there's going to be ways to do it. This was also back in the days of doing it in physical data centers, so you could have a pretty good idea of what was connect to the outside world just by looking at where the cables went. But there was also always the question of how does this–does this do what I think it's doing or what have I overlooked? Security's job is never done.Ell: Or what was misconfigured in the last update. It's an assumption that everything goes correctly.Corey: Oh, there is that. I want to talk though, about the things I had to worry about back then, it seems like in many cases get kicked upstairs to the cloud providers that we're using these days. But then we see things like Azurescape where security researchers were able to gain access to the Azure control plane where customers using Cosmos DB—Azure's managed database service, one of them—could suddenly have their data accessed by another customer. And Azure is doing its clam up thing and not talking about this publicly other than a brief disclosure, but how is this even possible from security architecture point of view? It makes me wonder if it hadn't been disclosed publicly by the researcher, would they have ever said something? Most assuredly not.Ell: I've worked with several researchers, in Intezer and outside of Intezer, and the amount of frustration that I see within reasonable disclosure, it just blows my mind. You have somebody threatening to sue the researcher if they bring it out. You have a company going, “Okay, well, we've only had six weeks. Give us three more weeks.” And next thing we know, it's six months.There is just this pushback about what we can actually bring out to the public on why they're vulnerable in organizations. So, we're put in this catch-22 as researchers. At what point is my responsibility to the public, and at what point is my responsibility to protect myself, to keep myself from getting sued personally, to keep my company from going down? How can we win when we have small research groups and these massive cloud providers?Corey: This episode is sponsored in part by something new. Cloud Academy is a training platform built on two primary goals. Having the highest quality content in tech and cloud skills, and building a good community the is rich and full of IT and engineering professionals. You wouldn't think those things go together, but sometimes they do. Its both useful for individuals and large enterprises, but here's what makes it new. I don't use that term lightly. Cloud Academy invites you to showcase just how good your AWS skills are. For the next four weeks you'll have a chance to prove yourself. Compete in four unique lab challenges, where they'll be awarding more than $2000 in cash and prizes. I'm not kidding, first place is a thousand bucks. Pre-register for the first challenge now, one that I picked out myself on Amazon SNS image resizing, by visiting cloudacademy.com/corey. C-O-R-E-Y. That's cloudacademy.com/corey. We're gonna have some fun with this one!Corey: For a while, I was relatively confident that we had things like Google's Project Zero, but then they started softening their disclosure timelines and the rest, and it was, we had the full disclosure security distribution list that has been shuttered to my understanding. Increasingly, it's become risky to—yourself—to wind up publishing something that has not been patched and blessed by the providers and the rest. For better or worse, I don't have those problems, just because I'm posting about funny implications of the bill. Yeah, worst case, AWS is temporarily embarrassed, and they can wind up giving credits to people who were affected and be mad at me for a while, but there's no lasting harm in the way that there is with well, people were just able to look at your data for six months, and that's our bad oops-a-doozy. Especially given the assertions that all of these providers have made to governments, to banks, to tax authorities, to all kinds of environments where security really, really matters.Ell: The last statistic that I heard, and it was earlier this year, that it takes over 200 days for compromise even to be detected. How long is it going to take for them to backtrack, figure out how it got in, have they already patched those systems and that vulnerability is gone, but they managed to establish persistence somehow, the layers that go into actually doing your digital forensics only delay the amount of time that any of that is going to come out where that they have some information to present to you. We keep going, “Oh, we found this vulnerability. We're working on patches. We have it fixed.” But does every single vendor already have it pitched? Do they know how it actually interacted within one customer's environment that allowed that breach to happen? It's just ridiculous to think that's actually occurring, and every company is now protected because that patch came out.Corey: As I take a look at how companies respond to these things, you're right, the number one concern most of them have is image control, if I'm being honest with you. It's the reputational management of we are still good at security, even though we've had a lapse here. Like, every breach notification starts out with, “Your security is important to us.” Well, clearly not that important because look at the email you had to send. And it's almost taken on aspects of a comedy piece where it [grips 00:23:10] with corporate insincerity. On some level, when you tell a company that they have a massive security vulnerability, their first questions are not about the data privacy; it's about how do we spend this to make ourselves come out of this with the least damage possible. And I understand it, but it's still crappy.Ell: Us tech folk talk to each other. When we have security and developers speaking to each other, we're a lot more honest than when we're talking to the public, right? We don't try to hold that PR umbrella over ourselves. I was recently on a panel speaking with developers, head SRE folk—what was there? I think there was a CISO on there—and one of the developers just honestly came out and said, “At the end, my job is to say, ‘How much is that breach going to cost, versus how much money will the company lose if I don't make that deployment?'” The first thing that you notice there is that whole how much money you'll lose? The second part is why is the developer the one looking at the breach?Corey: Yeah. The work flows downward. One of the most depressing aspects to me of the CISO role is that it seems like the job is to delegate everything, sign binding contracts in your name, and eventually get fired when there's a breach and your replacement comes in to sign different papers. All the work gets delegated, none of the responsibility does, ideally—unless you're SolarWinds and try and blame it on an intern; I mean, I wish I had an ablative intern or two around here to wind up a casting blame they don't deserve on them. But that's a separate argument—there is no responsibility-taking as I look at this. And that's really a depressing commentary on the state of the world.Ell: You say there's no responsibility taken, but there is a lot of blame assigned. I love the concept of post-mortems to why that breach happened, but the only people in the room are the security team because they had that much control over anything. Companies as a whole need a scapegoat, and more and more, security teams are being blamed for every single compromised as more and more responsibility, more and more privileges, and visibility into what's going on is being taken away from them. Those two just don't balance. And I think it's causing a lot of just complacency and almost giving up from our security teams.Corey: To be clear, when we talk about blameless post-mortems for things like this, I agree with it wholeheartedly within the walls of a company. However, externally as someone whose data has been taken in some of these breaches, oh, I absolutely blame the company. As I should, especially when it's something like well, we have inadvertently leaked your browsing history. Why were you collecting that in the first place? Is sort of the next logical question.I don't believe that my ISP needs that to serve me better. But now you have Verizon sending out emails recently—as of this recording—saying that unless anyone opts out, all the lines in our cell account are going to wind up being data mined effectively, so they can better target advertisements and understand us better. It's no, I absolutely do not want you to be doing that on my phone. Are you out of your mind? There are a few things in this world that we consider more private than our browsing histories. We ask the internet things we wouldn't ask our doctors in many cases, and that is no small thing as far as the level of trust that we place in our ISPs that they are now apparently playing fast and loose with.Ell: I'm going to take this step back because you do a lot of work with cloud providers. Do you think that we actually know what information is being collected about our companies and what we have configured internally and externally by the cloud provider?Corey: That's a good question. I've seen this before, where people will give me the PDF exploded view of last month's AWS bill, and they'll laugh because what information can I possibly get out of that. It just shows spend on services. But I could do that to start sketching out a pretty good idea of what their architecture looks like from that alone. There's an awful lot of value in the metadata.Now, I want to be clear, I do not believe on any provider—except possibly Azure because who knows at this point—that if you encrypt the data, using their encryption facilities—with AWS, I know it's KMS, for example—I do not believe that they can arbitrarily decrypt it and then scan for whatever it is they're looking for. I do not believe that they are doing that because as soon as something like that comes out, it puts the lie to a whole bunch of different audit attestations that they've made and brings the entire empire crumbling down. I don't think they're going to get any useful data from that. However, if I'm trying to build something like Amazon Prime Video, and I can just look at the bill from the Netflix account. Well, that tells me an awful lot about things that they might be doing internally; it's highly suggestive. Could that be used to give them an unfair advantage? Absolutely.I had a tweet a while back that I don't believe that Google's Gmail division is scanning inboxes for things that look like AWS invoices to target their sales teams, but I sure would feel better if they would assure me that was the case. No one was able to ever assure me of that. It's I don't mean to be sitting here slinging mud, but at the same time, it's given that when you don't explicitly say you're not doing something as a company, there's a great chance you might be doing it, that's the sort of stuff that worries me, it's a bunch of unfair dirty trick style stuff.Ell: Maybe I'm just cynical, or maybe I just focus on these topics too much, but after giving a presentation on cloud security, I had two groups, both, you know, from three letter government agencies, come up to me and say, “How do I have these conversations with the cloud provider?” In the conversation, they say, “We've contacted them several times; we want to look at this data; we want to see what they've collected, and we get ghosted, or we end up talking to attorneys. And despite over a year of communication, we've yet to be able to sit down with them.”Corey: Now, that's an interesting story. I would love to have someone come to me with that problem. I don't know how I would solve that yet. But I have a couple ideas.Ell: Hey, maybe they're listening, and they'll reach out to you. But—Corey: You know, if you're having that problem of trying to understand what your cloud provider is doing, please talk to me. I would love to go a little more in depth on that conversation, under an NDA or six.Ell: I was at a loss because the presentation that I was giving was literally about the compromise of managed service providers, whether that be an outsourced security group, whether that be your cloud provider, we're seeing attack groups going after these tar—think about how juicy they are. Why do I need to compromise your account or your company if I can compromise that managed service provider and have access to 15 companies?Corey: Oh, yeah. It's why would someone spend time trying to break into my NetApp when they could break into S3 and get access to everyone's data, theoretically? It's a centralization of security model risk.Ell: Yeah, it seems to so many people as just this crazy idea. It's so far out there. We don't need to worry about it. I mean, we've talked about how Azure Functions has been compromised. We talked about all of these cloud services that people are specifically going after and being able to make traction in these attacks.It's not just this crazy idea. It's something that's happening now, and with the progress that attackers are making, criminal groups are making, this is going to happen pretty soon.Corey: Sometimes when I'm out for a meal with someone who works with AWS in the security org, there'll be an appetizer where, “Oh, there's two of you. I'm going to bring three of them,” because I guess waitstaff love to watch people fight like that. And whenever I want the third one, all I have to do is say, “Can you imagine a day in which, just imagine hypothetically, IAM failed open and allowed every request to go through regardless of everything else?” Suddenly, they look sick, lose their appetite, and I get the third one. But it's at least reassuring to know that even the idea of that is that disgusting to them, and it's not the, “Oh, that happened three weeks ago, but don't tell anyone.” Like, there's none of that going on.I do believe that the people working on these systems at the cloud providers are doing amazingly good work. I believe they are doing far better than I would be able to do in trying to manage all those things myself, by a landslide. But nothing is ever perfect. And it makes me wonder that if and when there are vulnerabilities, as we've already seen—clearly—with Azure, how forthcoming and transparent would they really be? And that's the thing that keeps me up at night.Ell: I keep going back during this talk, but just the interaction with the people there and the crowd was just so eye-opening. And I don't want to be that person, but I keep getting to these moments of, “I told you so.” And I'm not going to go into SolarWinds. Lord, that has been covered, but shortly after that, we saw the same group going through and trying to—I'm not sure if they successfully did it, but they were targeting networks for cloud computing providers. How many companies focused outside of that compromise at that moment to see what it was going to build out to?Corey: That's the terrifying thing is if you can compromise a cloud service provider at this point, it's well, you could sell that exploit on the dark web to someone. Yeah, that is a—if you can get a remote code execution be able to look into any random Cloud account, there's almost no amount of money that is enough for something like that. You could think of the insider trading potential of just compromising Slack. A single company, but everyone talks about everything there, and Slack retains data in perpetuity. Think at the sheer M&A discussions you could come up with? Think of what you could figure out with a sort of a God's eye view of something like that, and then realize that they run on AWS, as do an awful lot of other companies. The damage would be incalculable.Ell: I am not an attacker, nor do I play one on TV, but let's just, kind of, build this out. If I was to compromise a cloud provider, the first thing I would do is lay low. I don't want them to know that I'm there. The next thing I would do is start getting into company environments and scanning them. That way I can see where the vulnerabilities are, I can compromise them that way, and not give out the fact that I came in through that cloud provider. Look, I'm just me sitting here. I'm not a nation state. I'm not somebody who is paid to do this from nine to five, I can only imagine what they would come up with.Corey: It really feels like this is no longer a concern just for those folks who manage have gotten on the bad side of some country's secret service. It seems like APTs, Advanced Persistent Threats, are now theoretically something almost anyone has to worry about.Ell: Let me just set the record straight right now on what I think we need to move away from: The whole APTs are nation states. Not anymore. And APT is anyone who has advanced tactics, anyone who's going to be persistent—because you know what, it's not that they're targeting you, it's that they know that they eventually can get in. And of course, they're a threat to you. When I was researching my work into Advanced Persistent Threats, we had a group named TNT that said, “Okay, you know what? We're done.”So, I contacted them and I said, “Here's what I'm presenting on you. Would you mind reviewing it and tell me if I'm right?” They came back and said, “You know what? We're not in APT because we target open Docker API ports. That's how easy it is.” So, these big attack groups are not even having to rely on advanced methods anymore. The line onto what that is just completely blurring.Corey: That's the scariest part to me is we take a look at this across the board. And the things I have to worry about are no longer things that are solely within my arena of control. They used to be, back when it was in my data center, but now increasingly, I have to extend trust to a whole bunch of different places. Because we're not building anything ourselves. We have all kinds of third-party dependencies, and we have to trust that they're doing the right things as they go, too, and making sure that they're bound so that the monitoring agent that I'm using can't compromise my entire environment. It's really a good time to be professionally paranoid.Ell: And who is actually responsible for all this? Did you know that 70% of the vulnerabilities on our systems right now are on the application level? Yet security teams have to protect it? That doesn't make sense to me at all. And yet, developers can pull in any third-party repository that they need in order to make that application work because hey, we're on a deadline. That function needs to come out.Corey: Ell, I want to thank you for taking the time to speak with me. If people want to learn more about how you see the world and what kind of security research you're advocating for, where can they find you?Ell: I live on Twitter to the point where I'm almost embarrassed to say, but you can find me at @Ell_o_Punk.Corey: Excellent. And we will wind up putting a link to that in the [show notes 00:35:37], as we always do. Thanks so much again for your time. I appreciate it.Ell: Always. I'd be happy to come again. [laugh].Corey: Ell Marquez, security research advocate at Intezer. I'm Cloud Economist Corey Quinn and this is Screaming in the Cloud. If you've enjoyed this podcast, please leave a five-star review on your podcast platform of choice, whereas if you've hated this podcast, please leave a five-star review on your podcast platform of choice, along with an angry comment that ends in a link that begs me to click it that somehow it looks simultaneously suspicious and frightening.Corey: If your AWS bill keeps rising and your blood pressure is doing the same, then you need The Duckbill Group. We help companies fix their AWS bill by making it smaller and less horrifying. The Duckbill Group works for you, not AWS. We tailor recommendations to your business and we get to the point. Visit duckbillgroup.com to get started.Announcer: This has been a HumblePod production. Stay humble.

This week in the Security News: NPM hijacked again, hardcoding your keys, PAN-ODay, more Nmap in your python or python in your nmap, put your Docker API to rest, Busybox will own your box, Microsoft says its a feature not a vulnerability, SBDCs, TIPC Linux kernel vulnerability, patches that don't fix everything, truckloads of GPUs and testing if your high!   Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw718

This week in the Security News: NPM hijacked again, hardcoding your keys, PAN-ODay, more Nmap in your python or python in your nmap, put your Docker API to rest, Busybox will own your box, Microsoft says its a feature not a vulnerability, SBDCs, TIPC Linux kernel vulnerability, patches that don't fix everything, truckloads of GPUs and testing if your high!   Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw718

This week, we kick off the show with an interview featuring Lodrina Cherne, and Martijn Grooten join to discuss the Realworld capabilities of Stalkerware! Then, Sachin Mahajan from Inguardians joins to delve MAVSH!! In the Security News: NPM hijacked again, hardcoding your keys, PAN-ODay, more Nmap in your python or python in your nmap, put your Docker API to rest, Busybox will own your box, Microsoft says its a feature not a vulnerability, SBDCs, TIPC Linux kernel vulnerability, patches that don't fix everything, truckloads of GPUs and “are you high”?   Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw718 Segment Resources: http://mav.sh/ https://github.com/0xkayn/Valkyrie https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJZ2gCLopyU   Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Visit https://securityweekly.com/acm to sign up for a demo or buy our AI Hunter! Follow us on Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/securityweekly Like us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/secweekly

This week, we kick off the show with an interview featuring Lodrina Cherne, and Martijn Grooten join to discuss the Realworld capabilities of Stalkerware! Then, Sachin Mahajan from Inguardians joins to delve MAVSH!! In the Security News: NPM hijacked again, hardcoding your keys, PAN-ODay, more Nmap in your python or python in your nmap, put your Docker API to rest, Busybox will own your box, Microsoft says its a feature not a vulnerability, SBDCs, TIPC Linux kernel vulnerability, patches that don't fix everything, truckloads of GPUs and “are you high”?   Show Notes: https://securityweekly.com/psw718 Segment Resources: http://mav.sh/ https://github.com/0xkayn/Valkyrie https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJZ2gCLopyU   Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/psw for all the latest episodes! Visit https://securityweekly.com/acm to sign up for a demo or buy our AI Hunter! Follow us on Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/securityweekly Like us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/secweekly

Assaf Morag and Ehud Amiri from Aqua Security join me on the Tech Talks Daily Podcast to discuss finding from Aqua's 2021 Security Report, which assesses cloud infrastructure risks. During 12 months, Aqua Security conducted an in-depth analysis of Aqua Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) usage data and found that 40% of users had at least one misconfigured Docker API. But, overall, 84% of users were able to detect and remediate misconfiguration issues using CSPM, which would otherwise have gone unnoticed without manual involvement. Although cloud-native applications have many benefits, such as allowing more agility by giving more people access to define the environment, it means that many organizations are moving away from a centralized approach to security. Where once there was only a small, highly skilled team of security practitioners making all configuration changes, we now have a modern, decentralized approach. Indeed, a recent IDC survey showed that almost 80% of respondents had at least one cloud security breach over the preceding 18 months. We talk about Aqua's 2021 Security Report findings, explore the complexity of cloud environments, and discuss some solutions to help mitigate these risks.

Neste episódio, fizemos um lab para demonstração de como os cibercriminosos estão explorando Dockers API desprotegidas, escapando do container e implantando códigos maliciosos no host. Entenda também quais rastros este tipo de vetor de entrada pode deixar e como deve ser feita a devida proteção da API. O MorphusCast também está disponível nas plataformas: - YouTube: https://youtu.be/gYI9ITo2G2w - Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/br/podcast... - Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0... ------------ Links de referência: Campanha Doki: https://www.intezer.com/container-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/ Habilitando modo debug do Docker deamon: https://success.docker.com/article/how-do-i-enable-debug-logging-of-the-docker-daemon Proteção adequada do Docker API: https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/https/ -------- ACOMPANHE OS NOSSOS CANAIS: https://www.linkedin.com/company/morphusecurity https://www.instagram.com/morphusecurity https://www.facebook.com/morphustecnologia NOSSOS CONTEÚDOS: Morphus Labs: https://morphuslabs.com/ Morphus Blog: https://www.medium.com/morphusblog -------- INFORMAÇÕES: https://www.morphus.com.br

A one-liner exploit for X, the danger of searching for Chrome in Bing, exposing your Docker API, you can find sensitive data in the cloud, exploit users by embedded videos in Word documents, dead web apps, hacking BGP routes, a new DHCP vulnerability and hacking your brain! Full Show Notes: https://wiki.securityweekly.com/HNNEpisode195 Visit http://hacknaked.tv to get all the latest episodes!

This week, A one-liner exploit for X, the danger of searching for Chrome in Bing, exposing your Docker API, you can find sensitive data in the cloud, exploit users by embedded videos in Word documents, dead web apps, hacking BGP routes, a new DHCP vulnerability and hacking your brain! Jason Wood from Paladin Security joins us for expert commentary to discuss twelve malicious Python libraries found and removed from PyPI!   Full Show Notes: https://wiki.securityweekly.com/HNNEpisode195 Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/hnn for all the latest episodes! Visit https://www.activecountermeasures/hnn to sign up for a demo or buy our AI Hunter!!   Follow us on Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/securityweekly Like us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/secweekly

This week, A one-liner exploit for X, the danger of searching for Chrome in Bing, exposing your Docker API, you can find sensitive data in the cloud, exploit users by embedded videos in Word documents, dead web apps, hacking BGP routes, a new DHCP vulnerability and hacking your brain! Jason Wood from Paladin Security joins us for expert commentary to discuss twelve malicious Python libraries found and removed from PyPI!   Full Show Notes: https://wiki.securityweekly.com/HNNEpisode195 Visit https://www.securityweekly.com/hnn for all the latest episodes! Visit https://www.activecountermeasures/hnn to sign up for a demo or buy our AI Hunter!!   Follow us on Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/securityweekly Like us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/secweekly