Podcasts about daily halacha

We have explained in a previous daily Halacha (see the Halacha entitled "Lag BaOmer- Cutting Hair, Weddings, Music, and More"), that Sephardim do not take hair cuts until the 34th day of the Omer. This is unlike the Ashkenazim who take hair cuts from the 33rd day of the Omer. So the question was asked about a case that is occurring this year 5765 (2005). Would it be permissible for a Sephardi to take a hair cut on the 33rd day of the Omer if the 34th day of the Omer falls out on Shabbat? Maran writes clearly in Shulchan Aruch that yes in deed, it is permissible for Sephardim to take a hair cut on the 33rd day of the Omer when the 34th day of the Omer falls out on Shabbat. One would not have to wait until Sunday. For that matter, Chacham Ovadia Yoseph writes in Yichaave Da'at in Helek 4, siman 32 that it is permissible to get a hair cut on Friday at any time. One does not have to wait until the afternoon. One can get a hair cut in the morning if he wants. As a mater of fact, Chacham Ovadia Yoseph says a person can even get a hair cut the night before (33rd of the Omer at night) if there is sufficient cause. For example, one can take a hair cut the night before if he has a business appointment the next morning, or if he can not get a hair cut appointment during the day, or if he needs to attend a Simcha. The question was asked about children and ladies and whether or not they may take hair cuts during the Omer. Well, we discussed this before in Daily Halacha (see the Halacha entitled "Lag BaOmer- Cutting Hair, Weddings, Music, and More"), but let's just repeat them again today for the purposes of review. Ladies are allowed to take hair cuts at any time during the Omer. As for children, they too may take hair cuts at any time during the Omer. Only once the boy becomes Bar Mitzvah he may not take hair cuts until the 34th (for Sephardim). But girls and ladies of all ages are not bound by this rule, and they may take a hair cut at any time during this period. The question was also asked about beards. Is it permissible to shave a beard on the 34th day of the Omer? More specifically, would it be permissible to allow Sephardim this year to shave on the 33rd? Chacham Ben Tzion Aba Shaul in his recently published book 'Or L'Tzion 3' discussed the Minhag of the Kabalists who do not take hair cuts for the 49 days of the Omer. The Arizal (Rabbi Yitzchak Luria, otherwise known as The Ari) also says this, however Chacham Ben Tzion holds that this restriction only applies to hair and not to beards. Therefore, even if someone wants to follow the Arizal and the Kabalists and refrain from taking a hair cut throughout all 49 days, he may however shave on the 34th day (the 33rd this year).

In an earlier edition of Daily Halacha, it was noted that if a person places small pieces of bread (less than a Ke'zayit) into a pot of hot soup, the bread is "downgraded" from the Beracha of "Ha'mosi" to the Beracha of "Mezonot." This Halacha is codified by the Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 168). The Halachic authorities debate the question of whether this would also apply if one poured soup from its original pot onto small pieces of bread. The question is whether "Irui Keli Rishon" – pouring hot liquid from its original pot onto food – has the effect of Halachically "cooking" the food. If it is considered cooking, then this case is no different from the case of placing small pieces of bread into the original pot, and one would recite "Mezonot" over the bread. If, however, "Irui" is not considered capable of Halachic "cooking," then the pieces of bread in this case are not considered to have undergone cooking, and they retain their status of "Ha'mosi." In light of this difference of opinion, the Mishna Berura (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) rules (168:52) that if one eats small pieces of bread upon which hot liquid had been poured from its original pot, he must first wash and recite "Ha'mosi" over proper bread. Otherwise, he puts himself into a situation of uncertainty, as it is unclear whether the proper Beracha over these pieces of bread is "Mezonot" or "Ha'mosi." This is the ruling codified in Yalkut Yosef – Berachot (p. 306; listen to audio recording for precise citation). Summary: If hot liquid was poured from its original pot onto small pieces of bread (less than a Ke'zayit), it is unclear whether they require "Mezonot" or "Ha'mosi," and therefore one should not eat them unless he first recites "Ha'mosi" over ordinary bread.

If a person recites Selihot privately, or if fewer than ten men came for Selihot and those who are in attendance must pray Selihot without a Minyan, what is the proper procedure to follow? As discussed in a previous edition of Daily Halacha, the section of the "Yag Midot" (the thirteen divine attributes of mercy) may not recited as prayer without a Minyan, because it has the status of "Dabar She'bikdusha" ("matter of holiness"), which requires a Minyan. One may, however, recite the "Yag Midot" privately if he reads it with the "Te'amim" (cantillation notes), such that he reads it like he reads any other section of Tanach. One who recites Selihot without a Minyan may recite the paragraph of "Kel Melech," which introduces the "Yag Midot." However, if it is expected that a Minyan will soon arrive, then the people present should preferably skip "Kel Melech" and the "Yag Midot" and recite them once there is a Minyan. Sections of the prayer that are recited in Aramaic should not be recited without the presence of a Minyan. The Gemara in Masechet Shabbat teaches that God's ministering angels do not understand Aramaic. Thus, when a person prays without a Minyan, he requires the assistance of angels who bring his prayers before God. One therefore should not recite Aramaic prayers in private, since the angels are unable to understand his prayer and thus the prayer has no means by which to come before God. When one prays with a Minyan, however, the prayer ascends directly to the Heavenly Throne without the assistance of the angels, and thus Aramaic prayers may be recited in the presence of a Minyan. Hence, when praying Selihot without a Minyan, one must omit the Aramaic sections, such as Rahamana, Maheh U'maseh, De'aneh La'aniya and Marana Di'bishmaya. If a person or group of people prays without a Minyan, he (or they) may recite the other sections of Selihot, such as Shebet Yehuda, Ribono Shel Olam, Lema'ancha, L'Hashem Ha'rahamim Ve'he'selihot, Hashem Melech, and all the Viduyim (confessionals). If a Minyan arrives afterward, the Hazan should recite the half-Kaddish normally recited before Selihot, and the congregation should then recite all the sections that had been omitted, including the "Yag Midot." Summary: If one prays Selihot without a Minyan, he must omit all Aramaic sections of the Selihot service, and may recite the section of the "Yag Midot" only if he reads those verses with the "Te'amim." He may recite all other sections of the Selihot. If a group recited these parts of the Selihot and then a Minyan arrived, they recite half-Kaddish followed by all the sections of the Selihot that had been omitted, including the "Yag Midot."

If a person passes away without leaving a will, the distribution of his estate is subject to a very specific system outlined by Halacha, which generally differs from the state laws regarding inheritance. We briefly outline here the basic rules of inheritance that apply when a person passes on without leaving a will: 1) A wife does not inherit her husband. According to the terms of the Ketuba, she is given a sum of money from the estate for her basic needs, and this money is given to her before the estate is divided among the inheritors, but she does not inherit her husband's assets. 2) If a person left behind sons, they inherit the entire estate, including both real and moveable property, and even charitable accounts that the father may have had. (We do not discuss here the special rights of the firstborn, which deserves fuller elaboration in a separate context.) 3) If a person had a son who had since passed away, the estate is given to that son's children. If the deceased had one living son and another son that had died, 50% of the estate is given to the live son, and the other 50% is distributed among the sons of the deceased son. 4) Daughters do not receive a share in the estate if the deceased had a son; single daughters, however, are given a certain sum from the estate until they get married. If the deceased never had sons but had a daughter, she receives the estate. 5) If a person died without any children, then he is inherited by his father. If his father is no longer alive, then his (father's) children – the brothers or sisters of the deceased – receive the estate. If the father had no other children, then the estate is awarded to the grandfather; if the grandfather is no longer alive, then the estate is divided among his (grandfather's) children, meaning, the uncles of the deceased. If the grandfather had no other children, then the estate is awarded to the great-grandfather, and if he is no longer alive, then the estate is divided among his children, or the deceased's great-uncles. As mentioned, these laws apply only in a case where a person passed on without leaving a will; the laws governing wills will, please God, be discussed in a separate Daily Halacha. See Hoshen Mishpat, siman 276. See the book- "Pure Money" by Dayan Cohen, pages 215-218.

As discussed in a previous edition of Daily Halacha, it is forbidden to eat or drink anything from the time Shabbat begins on Friday afternoon until one recites (or hears) Kiddush. Even water is forbidden. This prohibition begins when a person accepts the onset of Shabbat, or at sundown, whichever comes first. We noted there the lenient ruling of Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Israel, 1923-1998) that this prohibition does not pertain to minors – boys or girls below the age of Misva obligation. In his view, parents are permitted to feed their children before Kiddush without restriction. It must be noted, however, that Hacham Ovadia Yosef disagreed with this position. He ruled that once children reach the age of Hinuch (training in Misvot), which is generally assumed to occur at around age six, their parents should train them not to eat or drink from the time Shabbat begins until Kiddush. If a need arises, and a child is hungry and thirsty and finds it very difficult to wait, then the child may be fed, but unless this is necessary, Hacham Ovadia maintains that children should not be given food or drink before Kiddush. Hacham Ovadia also addresses the case of a person who feels very thirsty during Ben Ha'shemashot – the 13.5-minute period immediately after sunset. He writes that if the person did not expressly accept the onset of Shabbat, then he may drink during this period to quench his thirst. The rationale for this ruling is that two Halachic uncertainties are involved. First, it is uncertain whether the period of Ben Ha'shemashot should be treated as nighttime – in which case Shabbat has begun and thus drinking is forbidden – or as daytime – in which case Shabbat has yet to begin, and drinking is still permissible. Secondly, this period may not even be Ben Ha'shemashot at all, as Rabbenu Tam (Rabbi Yaakob Ben Meir, France, 1100-1171) maintained that Ben Ha'shemashot begins later than this period. Given these two uncertainties ("Sefek Sefeka"), drinking may be allowed during this period when necessary. It must be emphasized, however, that if a person had accepted the onset of Shabbat, then he may not drink even during this time. Summary: There is a difference of opinion among the Halachic authorities as to whether one may feed children (who have reached the age of training in Misvot) before Kiddush once Shabbat has begun. According to all views, however, this is allowed in situations of need, such as if a child finds it very difficult to wait. Although eating and drinking are forbidden once Shabbat has begun before Kiddush, if one is very thirsty within 13.5 minutes after sundown on Friday afternoon, and he had not accepted the onset of Shabbat, then he may drink.

The Halacha of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda" establishes that one does not fulfill the obligation of Kiddush unless he has a "meal" after Kiddush. As we've discussed in earlier editions of Daily Halacha, one fulfills this requirement with a Ke'zayit of bread, or, as the Hid"a (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) notes in Birkeh Yosef, a Ke'zayit of "Mezonot" food, such as cakes and the like which are made from the five principal grains. The Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 273:5), based on the position of the Geonim, rules that drinking a Rebi'it of wine also suffices for "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda." The Halachic authorities address the question of whether rice suffices for this requirement. On the one hand, the Beracha over rice is "Mezonot," and it provides satiation like other "Mezonot" foods. In fact, the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) cites a view which maintains that although we recite "Boreh Nefashot" after eating rice, one who recited "Al Ha'mihya" fulfills his obligation. Thus, rice shares several properties with standard "Mezonot" food. On the other hand, as noted by Hacham Ovadia Yosef, there are two important distinctions between rice and other "Mezonot" foods. Namely, it is not one of the seven special species of Eretz Yisrael, and it can never yield an obligation of Birkat Ha'mazon. One who eats a very large quantity of other "Mezonot" foods is required to recite Birkat Ha'mazon, which is not the case when one eats a large quantity of rice. In light of these distinctions, Hacham Ovadia ruled that it does not suffice to eat rice after Kiddush. Although the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Israel, 1870-1939) ruled that eating rice fulfills the requirement of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda," Hacham Ovadia disagrees, and rules that rice does not suffice. The Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 1637-1682) ruled that one can fulfill the requirement of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda" by eating dates. Unlike other fruits, he says, dates provides satiation, and therefore if one recited Birkat Ha'mazon after eating dates, he has fulfilled his obligation of Beracha Aharona. Moreover, dates are included among the seven special species of Eretz Yisrael. As such, the Magen Abraham writes, they suffice for the requirement of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda." Hacham Ovadia Yosef, however, disagrees. He cites the Tosefet Shabbat who observed that the Gemara does not describe dates as providing satiation. The Gemara says that dates are "Zayni" – nourishing – but not satiating. And, the Shulhan Aruch explicitly rules that fruits do not suffice for "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda," without making an exception for dates. Therefore, eating dates does not suffice for the requirement of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda." Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Israel, 1923-1998), in Or Le'sion, discusses the question of whether eating noodles suffices for this requirement. Noodles differ from other "Mezonot" foods in that they are boiled, not baked, and, as such, eating a large quantity of noodles does not require one to recite Birkat Ha'mazon. Nevertheless, Hacham Bension concludes that one may eat noodles to fulfill the requirement of "Kiddush Bi'mkom Se'uda," because their Beracha is "Mezonot" and they are made from grains included among the seven special species of Eretz Yisrael. As mentioned in an earlier edition of Daily Halacha, when a Berit is performed in the synagogue after services on Shabbat, the one who recites the Beracha over wine – usually the Rabbi – should have in mind to fulfill the Kiddush obligation with this Beracha. He should then ensure to drink a Rebi'it of wine. The Ben Ish Hai mentions that this was the practice in Baghdad. If food is served after the Berit, then the Rabbi should have in mind that his recitation of the Beracha should fulfill the Kiddush obligation for the congregation, as well, and they must then eat a Ke'zayit of bread or of "Mezonot" food. Hacham Bension notes that this practice is acceptable despite the prohibition of "En Osin Misvot Habilot Habilot" – that we do not group Misvot together into a single act. Firstly, he explains, there is no actual requirement to have a cup of wine at a Berit Mila, so strictly speaking, there is only one Misva involved (Kiddush). Secondly, the Rambam (Rav Moshe Maimonides, Spain-Egypt, 1135-1204) maintained that the rule of "En Osin Misvot Habilot Habilot" applies only when performing two Biblical commands, and neither the cup of wine at Berit Mila nor the cup of wine for Kiddush is a Biblical requirement. Summary: Kiddush must be recited in the context of eating, and thus one must eat after Kiddush either a Ke'zayit of bread or of "Mezonot" food. It also suffices to drink a Rebi'it of wine. Although the Beracha of "Mezonot" is recited over rice, eating rice does not suffice to fulfill this requirement.

Generally speaking, when a piece of forbidden food falls into permissible food, we apply the rule of "Battel Be'shishim," which means that we consider the forbidden food "nullified" if it constitutes one-sixtieth or less of the mixture. If the proportion of permissible food to forbidden food is 60:1, or more, we may consider the forbidden food null and void, such that the entire mixture becomes permissible for consumption. When it comes to Pesah, however, this is not the case. The Shulhan Aruch, following the position of the Rif (Rav Yishak Alfasi, Morocco, 1013-1103), rules that if a piece of Hametz falls into non-Hametz food on Pesah, the mixture becomes forbidden regardless of how small a proportion the Hametz constitutes. Hametz in even the smallest proportion – a "Mashehu" – renders the entire mixture forbidden for consumption on Pesah. This is why special care must be taken on Pesah to ensure that not even a crumb or tiny morsel of Hametz comes in contact with our food or utensils. However, this Halacha applies only when Hametz falls into food during Pesah. If a small amount of Hametz falls into food before Pesah, then we apply the standard rule of "Battel Be'shishim," and we consider the mixture free of Hametz as long as there is a proportion of 60:1 or higher of non-Hametz food to Hametz. Accordingly, the Shulhan Aruch rules (Orah Haim 477:4) that such a mixture is permissible for consumption on Pesah. Since the Hametz fell into the food before Pesah, and it was "Battel" ("nullified"), the mixture is permissible on Pesah, and we do not say that the small amount of Pesah is "reawakened" ("Hozer Ve'ne'ur") when the Hametz prohibition take effect on Ereb Pesah. Curiously, however, the Shulhan Aruch earlier (442:4) appears to contradict his own ruling in this regard. Discussing the status of medications containing Hametz, the Shulhan Aruch writes that if medicine was prepared with Hametz before Pesah, even if the Hametz constitutes just one-sixtieth or less of the mixture, the medicine may not be ingested on Pesah. Although one may keep the Hametz in his possession on Pesah in such a case, the medicine may not be ingested. This ruling appears to directly contradict the Shulhan Aruch's aforementioned ruling that the concept of "Battel Be'shishim" applies to Hametz that is mixed with non-Hametz before Pesah. According to that ruling, there seems to be no reason to forbid taking the medicine on Pesah, since the Hametz was "nullified" before Pesah and is not "reawakened" with the onset of the holiday. Several different approaches have been taken to resolve this seeming contradiction. The Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) explains that in the case of medication, the Hametz was intentionally mixed with the non-Hametz ingredients. The Shulhan Aruch permits food that had been mixed with Hametz before Pesah only if the Hametz was mixed in unintentionally. But if one intentionally mixed Hametz with non-Hametz, even before Pesah, the mixture is forbidden for consumption on Pesah. The Tureh Zahab (Rav David Halevi Segal, 1586-1667) gives a different answer. He writes that in the case of medicine, the Hametz is the primary medicinal ingredient. As the Hametz substance is what gives the mixture its medicinal effect, it cannot be considered "negated," regardless of how small a proportion it constitutes. This resembles the case of a forbidden food used as a coagulating agent ("Dabar Ha'ma'amid"), which renders the product forbidden even if it comprises less than one-sixtieth of the mixture. Since the agent gives the food product its consistency, it cannot be considered "nullified." By the same token, a Hametz ingredient which produces a medicinal effect renders the medicine forbidden on Pesah even if the product was made before Pesah. Medications with Hametz may be permissible on Pesah for other reasons, as we will, please G-d, discuss in future editions of Daily Halacha, but for our purposes here, it suffices to note that, according to the Taz, the Shulhan Aruch's ruling concerning medications marks the exception to the rule. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, in his Yabia Omer (2:23), follows the Taz's approach. And thus, according to the Halacha, a mixture containing a small amount of Hametz is permissible on Pesah, as long as the mixture was prepared before Pesah, even if the Hametz was mixed in intentionally. Summary: If a piece of Hametz falls into non-Hametz food on Pesah, the entire mixture is forbidden for consumption regardless of how small a proportion the Hametz comprises. If the Hametz was mixed with the food before Pesah, then as long as the Hametz comprises no more than one-sixtieth of the mixture, the food is permissible on Pesah (with the possible exception of certain medications that contain Hametz, a subject which will be discussed in a separate context).

We are fortunate today to have the great Gaon Rabbi Shemuel Pinchasi from Israel deliver the Daily Halacha. The audio clip contains Rav Pinchasi's oration which was in Hebrew. The explanation appears below. The Mechilta (Halachic work on the Book of Shemot from the Tanna'im), commenting on the verse, "No work shall be performed on them [Yom Tov]" (Shemot 12:16), writes, "It shall not performed by a gentile." The Mechilta thus understood this verse to mean that the Torah forbids a Jew from not only performing Melacha (forbidden activity) on Shabbat or Yom Tov, but even asking a gentile to perform Melacha on his behalf on Shabbat or Yom Tov. On the basis of this comment in the Mechilta, the Sefer Yerei'im (by Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, France, 1115-1198) and the Semag ("Sefer Mitzvot Gadol" by Rabbi Moshe of Couchy, France-Spain, 13th century) ruled that Amira Le'nochri – asking a gentile to perform Melacha on one's behalf on Shabbat – constitutes a Torah prohibition. Other Rishonim, however, including Tosafot, Rashi and the Rambam, maintain that this prohibition was enacted by the Sages, and this is the accepted position. Different explanations have been offered as to why the Rabbis enacted this prohibition of Amira La'nochri. Rashi, both in Masechet Shabbat and in Masechet Avoda Zara, suggests two reasons. First, he explains this prohibition on the basis of Shelichut (literally, "agency"), the notion that an action performed on behalf of another can be attributed to that other person. Hence, when a gentile performs a Melacha on Shabbat at a Jew's behest, Halacha considers the Jew to have performed the Melacha. (Although generally speaking a gentile cannot act as a Shaliach – an agent – for a Jew in the Halachic sense, on the level of Rabbinic enactment a gentile can act as a Shaliach when this would yield a stringency.) Secondly, Rashi suggests that instructing a gentile on Shabbat to perform a Melacha on one's behalf violates the law of "Ve'daber Davar" (based on Yeshayahu 58:13), which forbids speaking in weekday matters on Shabbat. When a Jew asks a gentile to perform a Melacha, he in essence speaks about forbidden activity, in violation of "Ve'daber Davar." The Rambam posits yet a third explanation, claiming that if Jews would be allowed to ask gentiles to perform Melacha on their behalf on Shabbat, they would eventually begin taking the Shabbat prohibitions lightly. Ultimately, this would result in Jews themselves performing Melacha on Shabbat, and the Rabbis therefore found it necessary to forbid Amira Le'nochri. These different approaches to the reason underlying the prohibition of Amira Le'nochri yield practical Halachic ramifications. According to Rashi's first explanation, that the Sages forbade asking a gentile to perform Melacha because the action would then be attributed to the Jew, it would make no difference when the Jew requested that the gentile perform the given act. It would thus be forbidden to ask a gentile even early in the week to perform a Melacha on one's behalf on Shabbat, since the action the gentile performs will be seen as the Jew's action. According to Rashi's second understanding, however, that Amira Le'nochri is forbidden by virtue of the prohibition against speaking of weekday matters on Shabbat, this prohibition would apply only on Shabbat itself. Since this approach focuses on the speech, rather than the action performed, it would restrict the prohibition to instructions given to a gentile on Shabbat itself. By the same token, Rashi's second approach would yield a more stringent ruling regarding an instruction given to a gentile on Shabbat to perform a Melacha after Shabbat. If the issue at hand is speaking mundane matters on Shabbat, then it would be forbidden to ask a gentile on Shabbat to perform a Melacha even after Shabbat. According to Rashi's first approach, however, that the prohibition stems from the concept of Shelichut, the prohibition applies only to actions performed by a gentile on Shabbat. Many Poskim (Halachic authorities), including Rabbi Yaakov Emden (Germany, 1697-1776), the Chida (Rabbi Chayim Yosef David Azulai, Israel, 1724-1806) and the work "Erech Ha'shulchan," ruled that Halacha accepts the stringent conclusions of both approaches. Hence, it is forbidden to ask a gentile even before Shabbat to perform a Melacha on one's behalf on Shabbat, and it is likewise forbidden to ask a gentile on Shabbat to perform Melacha on his behalf at some point after Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (307:5) rules that for purposes of a Mitzva, one may ask a gentile to perform on Shabbat an activity classified as a "Shevut," meaning, that is forbidden only by force of Rabbinic enactment (as opposed to Torah law). For example, if a Shofar was caught in a tree on Rosh Hashanah, it would be permissible to ask a gentile to climb the tree and retrieve the Shofar so that one could fulfill the Mitzva of Shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah. Since climbing trees is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov only on the level of Rabbinic enactment, one may – for the purpose of a Mitzva – ask a gentile to perform this act on Shabbat or Yom Tov. The Shulchan Aruch here disagrees with the view of Tosafot, who held that this provision applies only for purposes involving the Mitzva of Berit Mila (circumcision), but not for other Mitzvot. Summary: One may not instruct a gentile to perform Melacha (forbidden activity) on his behalf on Shabbat. This applies even to instructing a gentile before Shabbat to perform Melacha on his behalf on Shabbat, as well as instructing a gentile on Shabbat to perform a Melacha on his behalf after Shabbat. For the purposes of facilitating the performance of a Mitzva, one may ask a gentile to perform an action forbidden on Shabbat only on the level of Rabbinic enactment.

Hacham Ovadia Yosef ZT"L is of the opinion that under extenuating circumstances, one may fulfill the obligation of Shabbat candle lighting through the use of electric lighting. Thus, for example, a person who must spend Shabbat in a hospital may fulfill this Misva by turning on an electric light in his room before Shabbat. (Hacham Ovadia argues in this regard with Hacham Ben Sion Abba Shaul, who held that electric lights cannot fulfill the obligation of Shabbat candles.) This ruling gives rise to the question of how, or whether, a woman can recite a Beracha when lighting Shabbat candles if the room already receives ample illumination from electric lighting. Since the room already contains light which, strictly speaking, satisfies the requirement to illuminate one's home on Shabbat, the candles that the woman lights do not appear to bear any Halachic significance. Once the Misva is fulfilled through electric lighting, the candle lighting does not contribute anything as far as this obligation is concerned. How, then, can a woman recite a Beracha when lighting Shabbat candles in an illuminated room? (We addressed this question in a previous Daily Halacha, without reaching a definitive conclusion; see "Using Electric Lights as Shabbat Candles," dated June 19, 2008.) Hacham Ovadia discusses this issue in his work Hazon Ovadia (Laws of Shabbat, p. 215), where he makes reference to a debate recorded in the Bet Yosef (Orah Haim, Siman 263). The case under discussion is a situation where many women light Shabbat candles in the same room, and the question thus becomes whether or not they all recite the Beracha. The first woman who lights candles certainly recites a Beracha, as she provides light in the room. The other women, however, light in a room that already has illumination, and it is therefore uncertain whether they should recite the Beracha. In fact, the Or Zarua (Rabbi Yishak of Vienna, 12th-13th century) left this question unresolved. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Israel, 1910-1995), however, as recorded in the work Shulhan Shelomo, held that in the case of electric illumination, one may recite the Beracha over the Shabbat candles despite the presence of electric lights. Since the electric lights are not turned on specifically in honor of Shabbat, the candles that the woman lights indeed contribute an entirely new dimension – light in honor of Shabbat – and thus fulfill the Misva. As such, the woman may recite the Beracha. This ruling is in contrast to the position of Rabbi Eliyahu Mani (Baghdad-Israel, 1824-1899), who held that a woman should first extinguish the other lights in the room before kindling the Shabbat lights, as otherwise the Shabbat lights would not fulfill the Misva. As for the final Halacha, Hacham Ovadia rules (listen to audio recording for precise citation) that a woman should preferably extinguish the lights in the room before lighting the Shabbat candles, and then turn them back on immediately after lighting. Of course, this is on condition that she does not accept Shabbat as she lights the Shabbat candles. Furthermore, the woman should have in mind while reciting the Beracha that the Beracha applies also to the electric lights that will be turned on immediately after the kindling of the Shabbat lights. Summary: Before a woman lights the Shabbat candles, it is preferable for her to turn off the electric lights in the room where she lights. She should have in mind while reciting the Beracha that it should apply also to the electric lights, which should be turned on immediately after she lights the Shabbat candles.

In an earlier edition of Daily Halacha (see "Customs for When One Arrives Home From the Synagogue on Friday Night", dated Dec. 7th 2009), we discussed some of the customary procedures performed before the recitation of the Friday night Kiddush, based on the teachings of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in Parashat Bereshit (Shana Sheniya, 29). We noted the custom to smell Hadasim with a Beracha and to encircle the table twice, before returning to one's place and preparing for Kiddush. In preparing for Kiddush, the Ben Ish Hai writes, one should receive the Kiddush cup from somebody else at the table with both hands, and bring it near his chest. At that point, he should remove his left hand from the cup, such that he holds it with only his right hand. Then, some water should be poured into the Kiddush cup to dilute the wine, a process called "Meziga." This should preferably be done by somebody else at the table, but if this is not possible, then the one reciting Kiddush should perform the Meziga with his left hand. Meziga is performed by pouring three drops into the Kiddush cup, in three separate stages. The water should not be poured all at once, but rather in three separate drops. The Ben Ish Hai emphasizes that this is the proper custom to follow, and those who observe this practice are worthy of blessing. After the Meziga, one should look into the Kiddush cup. The Ben Ish Hai mentions profound Kavanot (Kabbalistic insights) that scholars of Kabbala would have while looking into the cup. For us, though, it suffices to have in mind to look at the wine with the right eye, and think of the numerical value of the word "Ayin" ("eye") – 130 – which is five times the numerical value of the Divine Name of "Havaya" , and also the left eye. It is also customary to look at the "Mesah" {forehead}, and think of the numerical value of this word (138), which is the same as the numerical value of the word "Haslaha" ("success"). The Ben Ish Hai adds several "Le'shem Yihud" and "Yehi Rason" prayers to be recited at the various stages of this process, several of which are found in the Siddurim. One should endeavor to observe as many of these practices as possible. More importantly, however, these customs reflect the great stature afforded to Kiddush, how every stage in the process of preparing for Kiddush has the capacity to bring sanctity and blessing down from the heavens onto everyone at the table.

The Torah in the Book of Vayikra says that after a boy is born, "U'bayom Ha'shemini Yimol Besar Orlato" – he undergoes circumcision on his eighth day. The Gemara notes that the verse could have just as easily written, "on the eighth he shall be circumcised," without using the entire phrase, "U'bayom Ha'shemini" ("on the eighth day"). The word "U'bayom" was added, the Gemara explains, to instruct that this command applies even on Shabbat. If a newborn boy's eighth day falls on Shabbat, the Berit Mila is performed that day despite the fact that several aspects of circumcision – such as cutting the foreskin and drawing blood – ordinarily constitute acts of Shabbat desecration. The Torah makes a special exception allowing Berit Mila on Shabbat despite the prohibitions entailed, provided that Shabbat is the child's eighth day. If the child was not circumcised on his eighth day, and the Berit is being performed sometime later, the Berit may not be performed on Shabbat.The entire process of removing the foreskin is permitted on Shabbat in such a case, including those parts of the process which are not indispensable to the performance of the Misva. It goes without saying that all three basic stages of the Berit – the Mila (removal of the foreskin), the Peri'a (removing the thin membrane underneath the foreskin) and the Mesisa (drawing blood from the wound) – are performed when the eighth day falls on Shabbat. However, Halacha even allows a Mohel to remove small pieces of skin that would not disqualify the circumcision if they would remain. As long as the Mohel is still involved in the act of circumcision, and has not stopped, he may remove even these pieces of skin which are removed only as an enhancement, so the Berit will be perfect and complete. One might have assumed that when a Berit takes place on Shabbat, the Mohel should remove only the minimum amount of skin that must be removed for the circumcision to be valid. In truth, however, Halacha allows removing the entire foreskin, even small pieces of skin whose presence would not invalidate the Berit, as long as the Mohel is still involved in the circumcision process and had not stopped.Furthermore, Halacha allows the Berit to be performed on Shabbat even by two Mohalim. One might have assumed that we should not allow more than one Mohel to circumcise on Shabbat, but Halacha in fact permits inviting two Mohalim to share the Misva by one starting the process and the other completing it. The Mishna Berura (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) adds that if a second Mohel takes over in the middle of the process, to perform the stage of Peri'a, and the first Mohel – who had removed the foreskin – then notices that he had mistakenly left over some pieces of skin, the first Mohel may go ahead and remove those pieces of skin. Even though he had stopped circumcising, nevertheless, since a second Mohel immediately took over, the first Mohel is considered as still being in the process of circumcising, and so he may complete his stage of the process by removing the small pieces of skin that he mistakenly left.As we will discuss in future editions of Daily Halacha, it is only the Berit Mila itself which overrides Shabbat. Preparatory stages, such as carrying the knife or the baby through a public domain, do not override the Shabbat prohibitions, even on the child's eighth day.Summary: A child is circumcised on his eighth day even if that day is Shabbat. The Mohel performing the circumcision in such a case removes the entire foreskin, and if he sees that he left over some pieces of skin whose presence does not invalidate the circumcision, he may then remove them, too, as long as he is still in the process of circumcising and had not stopped. If one Mohel removed the foreskin and a second Mohel took over for the second stage of the Mila (removing the membrane underneath the foreskin), the first Mohel is still considered to be involved in the process, such that he may return to remove pieces of skin which were mistakenly missed.

*** This Halacha deals with topic of Yichud. Yichud is the concept that a man may not be secluded with a forbidden woman. Please read all the Halachot on this topic as there are conditions and exclusions that must be fully understood before accepting Lema'ase. ***Is there an amount of time that is considered the minimum, whereby being alone with someone for a shorter period would then not constitute Yichud? Would it be considered Yichud, if a man and lady are alone together for 3 seconds? What about 20 seconds, or what about 90 seconds? Is there a set minimum amount of time, and if so, then what is that Shiur (amount?)There are many opinions that are offered in the Gemara on this. Rav Eliyashiv, may he live and be well, basically says that the minimum amount of time needed to constitute Yichud is one minute and a half. However, as explained by the Minchat Shlomo, (Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach), one must be careful as it is forbidden to be alone with someone if the seclusion potential is greater than a minute and a half. So if the seclusion is temporary for 1.5 minutes or less, than it is permissible, but if the seclusion can continue longer than it is not permissible.The question is asked about elevators. Is it a problem of Yichud for a man to be alone with a lady on an elevator? To answer this, we refer to the opinion above regarding minimum time required to constitute Yichud. In most cases, it would take less than 1.5 minutes to ride an elevator from floor A to floor B, and there is strong probability of a stop within that time where others may additionally get on to the elevator. So therefore, you would not have a problem of Yichud in most elevators because it's highly unlikely that a man would be alone with a woman for more than 1.5 minutes. Now this applies to most elevators, but there are lifts in sky scrapers that are called express elevators that ride from the ground floor to the top floor which take more than 1.5 minutes to make the trip. We will discuss these types of elevators in an upcoming Daily Halacha. So again, for most elevators, it would be permissible because it would take less than 1.5 minutes to travel from floor A to floor B, and additionally, it would be probable that additional stops would bring additional people who would serve as protectors against Yichud.I want to point out that some of the Acharonim bring down that even though a man may be allowed to ride an elevator alone with a woman, it nevertheless would be improper. This is something that the Halacha would call ‘Mechoar', meaning that it is just not right. According to the letter of the law it is not forbidden, but some men are careful from an ethical standpoint not to be alone with a lady. The seclusion may be for less than 1.5 minutes, but it would be respectable to avoid such an awkward encounter.

*** This Halacha deals with topic of Yichud. Yichud is the concept that a man may not be secluded with a forbidden woman. Please read all the Halachot on this topic as there are conditions and exclusions that must be fully understood before accepting Lema'ase. ***We have learned that there is a leniency in the laws of Yichud, which is called the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir. This is a leniency that gives permission to a married lady to be secluded with another man so long as her husband is nearby in town. But there is a condition to this leniency. A woman may rely on the leniency of Ba'Al Ba'Ir under the condition that she does not have a close bond with the other man. The Gemara refers to this bond as ‘Libo Gasba.'What is Libo Gasba? Rashi explains this as a relationship whereby there is a close friendship, interactions, considerable communication, etc. This type of relationship can exist among friends, and more likely even among relatives. And it is such a relationship that invalidates the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir, for there is concern and suspicion that friendship of this nature might lead to transgression. So one may use the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir only when the seclusion is with a stranger, or with a neighbor, or with any person who is not a close associate, relative, or friend. One must judge for themself when faced with the question of ‘Libo Gasba.' One must ask himself if the other person is a close friend or not. Friendship can lead to transgression, so one must be very careful and side with caution when analyzing the relationship. One example that is commonly discussed and evaluated is when a father in-law is faced being secluded with his daughter in-law. It can easily happen where the husband is late, or not present, and the daughter in-law finds herself being alone with her father in-law. Is this permissible or not? Well, if the relationship between father in-law and daughter in-law is healthy and in good favor, then there would definitely be a problem and they may not rely on the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir. And conversely, if the relationship between the two is not so good, then there would be no problem, and they would be able to rely on the leniency. So, bottom line is that one has to judge the situation and determine if there a relationship of ‘Gasba' or not.Another example that is commonly at question are relationships in the work place. It is quite common that colleagues develop a close relationship and friendship. And therefore, one must be careful in the workplace and not rely on the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir if there is a close relationship with his/her peer. Now, there are ways to alleviate the Yichud issues when engaged in meetings. One way is to keep the door open, and another way is to keep the door unlocked, with the logic being in both solutions that others have the ability to walk in at any time. **Please see the Daily Halacha entitled "Yichud- How The Laws of Yichud Apply In An Office" for more details of Yichud in the work place as there are many restrictions in this regard.The question was asked in this regard about an adopted child. Can an adopted son be secluded with his step mother? On this, there is a great Machloket among the Poskim. And on this one must turn to his own Rabbi for guidance. Normally mothers and fathers may be alone with their children, grandchildren, etc., but here in this case the son is not the natural child of the mother. Now of course mother and adopted son develop a ‘Gasba' relationship, so the question is asked if they can be secluded together. This is a heavy question and there is Machloket on this question among the Poskim, and so again, one should check with their Rabbi.To review, the leniency of Ba'Ala Ba'Ir does not apply and a married lady may not be secluded with another man, if she has a close relationship with that man even though her husband is nearby in town.

Different companies produce cornflakes in different ways, and this difference may affect the cornflakes' status vis-à-vis Berachot. Kellogg's produces its cornflakes by smashing pieces of corn into a flake (after removing some portions of the corn) and then adding several additional ingredients. With respect to Berachot, then, Kellogg's Cornflakes resembles mashed potatoes, which require the Beracha of "Ha'adama" just like the potato itself, since it is still a potato which has just undergone a change in form. Another example is a mashed apricot, which requires the Beracha of "Ha'etz" just like an ordinary apricot, for the same reason. Thus, according to all opinions, the Beracha for Kellogg's Cornflakes is "Ha'adama."Other companies, however, such as General Mills, produce cornflakes by grinding corn into flour and then reconstituting the flour into flakes. We might compare cornflakes produced in this fashion to Pringles potato chips, which are produced from potato flour. The Beracha over Pringles (as discussed in a previous edition of Daily Halacha) is "She'hakol," because many other ingredients are added to the potato flour, and the flour comprises less than half of the chip. The Halachic authorities discuss the status of cornflakes made from corn flour with respect to Berachot, and the general consensus is that one should recite "She'hakol," but if one recited "Ha'adama" he has fulfilled his requirement and does not recite a new Beracha. If a person is served cornflakes and does not know whether it was made from corn flour or from whole corn, he must try to determine how it was produced. If this is not possible, then he should recite "She'hakol."(Based on Rabbi Bitan's discussion in Yalkut Yosef – Berachot, vol. 3, p. 63)Summary: The Beracha over Kellogg's Cornflakes is "Ha'adama," since they are made by mashing whole corn. Cornflakes produced from corn flour, however, require "She'hakol," though one who recited "Ha'adama" has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation and does not recite a new Beracha.

In a previous edition of Daily Halacha, we saw that if two people ate bread together, and a third person joined them after they had completed their meal, the three of them can make a Zimun if several conditions are met. Specifically, the first two must not have washed Mayim Aharonim or said, "Hab Lan Nibrich"; they must be willing to delay Birkat Hamazon until the third person finishes eating; and they must have enough room for some more food if it were served.What must the third person eat to allow for a Zimun? Must he eat bread, or does it suffice for him to eat other foods?In general, there is a debate among the Rishonim (Medieval Halachic scholars) as to which foods the third person must have eaten to require a Zimun if the other two ate bread. Some Rishonim maintain that the third person must have eaten either bread or Mezonot food, which resembles bread. (If a person eats a very large quantity of Mezonot food, he is required to recite Birkat Hamazon, and it thus resembles bread.) Others, however, maintain that he may eat even other foods. As for the final Halacha, Rabbi Moshe Halevi (Israel, 1961-2001) writes in Birkat Hashem that it is preferable for all three people to eat bread, but if the third person ate other foods, or even drank something other than water, they have an obligation of Zimun. However, he adds, this applies only if the three ate together and they must now determine whether they must recite a Zimun. But in the case described earlier, where two people ate together and were joined by a third person after they finished eating, they should not allow the third person to join them unless he will be eating bread or Mezonot. If he eats other foods, they are putting themselves in a situation of Safek (Halachic uncertainty), and they should therefore avoid this situation by insisting that the third person join them only if he will eat bread or Mezonot food. This is different from a case where three people happened to eat together and must now determine whether to recite a Zimun, as there they did not from the outset knowingly create a situation of Halachic doubt. In the case of a third person who joins two people, he should be allowed to join only if he will eat foods that will require them to recite a Zimun according to all opinions. Rabbi Moshe Halevi notes that this is the view of the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806), in his Haim Sha'al, and of the Kaf Ha'haim (197:21).Hacham Ovadia Yosef, however, disagrees. In his work Yehaveh Da'at (4:13, p. 66), he writes that this situation is not actually one of Safek, and therefore the third person may join the first two even if he will not be eating bread or Mezonot food. As long as the aforementioned conditions are met, the third person may join the first two and eat something, and they then recite a Zimun before Birkat Hamazon.Summary: If three people ate together, two of whom ate bread while the third ate other foods, they must recite a Zimun, though it is preferable for the third to also eat bread or Mezonot food so they may recite a Zimun according to all views. If two people ate together and before they washed Mayim Aharonim or expressed their intent to recite Birkat Hamazon they were joined by a third, the third may join them and make a Zimun even if he eats foods other than bread or Mezonot food.

In a previous edition of Daily Halacha, we discussed the situation of ten people who ate a meal together, nine of whom ate bread, whereas the tenth ate other foods or drank. The Halacha in this case, as established in the Gemara and Shulhan Aruch, is that the ten men may recite a Zimun with Hashem's Name ("Nebarech L'Elokenu She'achalnu Mi'shelo"). Even though only nine people ate bread, the tenth can count toward the Minyan if he ate a Ke'zayit of other food, or drank a Rebi'it of a beverage other than water. (Since water does not provide any nourishment, its consumption does not suffice for one to be included in the meal.) Thus, for example, if nine men ate bread, and a tenth who was with them ate a Ke'zayit of vegetables, such as a salad, or ate "Mezonot" food, and even if he just drank a Rebi'it of juice or wine, they may recite a Zimun with "Elokenu."The question arises as to whether this Halacha would apply if fewer than nine of the ten men ate bread. Suppose only eight, seven or six men ate bread, and the rest ate other foods or just drank. Does the group recite a Zimun with "Elokenu," or is this allowed only if just one person did not eat bread?The Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 197:2; listen to audio recording for precise citation) writes that a group of ten may recite the Zimun with "Elokenu" as long as at least seven men in the group ate bread, and the rest ate or drank something other than water. Zimun differs in this respect from Kaddish, which a group of ten people may recite even if only six – the majority of a Minyan – are responding. When it comes to Zimun with "Elokenu," the Shulhan Aruch explains, Halacha requires that a recognizable majority had eaten bread. This is defined as seven people, and thus if six or fewer people in the group ate bread, "Elokenu" is not recited in the Zimun. But if at least seven people ate bread, "Elokenu" is recited, provided that the other three either ate a Ke'zayit of a different food or drank a Rebi'it of a beverage other than water.It should be noted that, as the Shulhan Aruch rules, only a person who ate bread may lead the Zimun. In cases when fewer than ten people at bread but the Zimun is recited with "Elokenu," the person who leads the Zimun must have eaten bread.Summary: If ten people ate together, they recite a Zimun with "Elokenu" if at least seven of them ate bread, and all the rest either ate a Ke'zayit of other food or drank at least a Rebi'it of a beverage other than water. The one who leads the Zimun, however, must have eaten bread.

If a person is approached by two different people in need of a loan, and he is able to lend to only one of them, to whom should he afford precedence?Rabbi Moshe Halevi addresses this issue in his work "Milveh Hashem," and rules that if a person is approached by a poor person and a wealthy person, priority is given to the poor individual (as discussed in a previous Daily Halacha). If the two people's financial statuses are roughly equal, but one of them is related to the lender, then the relative is awarded precedence. If neither are related to the lender, but one of them resides in the same town as the lender, then the fellow townsman is given preference. (See Rabbi Moshe Halevi's "Milveh Hashem," pages 14-15.)If a person is approached for loans by a Jew and a gentile, then he must grant the Jew precedence. Even though the gentile offers to pay interest on the loan, while from the Jew, of course, the lender cannot receive interest, he should forego on the potential profit and give the Jew an interest-free loan. This is the explicit ruling of the Gemara in Masechet Bava Mesia (71A). (Ibid page 26)In introducing the obligation to lend money, the Torah speaks of lending money to "Ahicha" – "your brother" (Devarim 15:7). The Sages understood this term to mean "Ahicha Be'misvot" – "your brother with regard to Misvot" – thus indicating that the obligation to lend money applies only to those who are Torah observant; one bears no obligation to lend to Jews who are not Torah observant. (Y"D siman 251:1.) Nevertheless, as Rabbi Moshe Halevi rules, it is permissible to lend money to non-observant Jews who transgress the Torah not as an expression of rebellion or contempt for Judaism, but simply because they were not raised and educated along the path of Torah observance. By and large, all non-observant Jews nowadays fall into this category (which in Halachic terminology is called "Tinokot She'nishbu" – "children who had been taken captive" and were not given a religious education). Thus, although there is no strict obligation to lend money to non-observant Jews nowadays, it is certainly permissible to do so. (See Rabbi Moshe Halevi's "Milveh Hashem," page 22.)Summary: One who is approached by two people in need of loans should give precedence to a poor individual over a wealthy person. If both have a similar financial status, priority is given to the lender's relative; if both are either related or not related to the lender, priority is given to the lender's townsman. A Jew takes precedence over a gentile, even though the gentile offers to pay interest. The obligation to lend money does not apply to lending to non-observant Jews, though it is certainly permissible to do so.

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha

Daily Halacha