Podcasts about halachic

There are those who have the practice to rise for Barechu, though this is not the generally accepted custom among Sepharadim. An exception is the recitation of Barechu on Friday night, when many Sepharadim are accustomed to standing, following the teachings of Kabbalah. Some have the custom to momentarily lift themselves off their seats when responding "Baruch Hashem Ha'meborach Le'olam Va'ed" to the Hazzan's declaration of Barechu. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) writes in his Od Yosef Hai that this was the common practice in Baghdad. He adds, however, that there seems to be no basis for such a practice in the Halachic sources. Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Israel, 1924-1998) opposed this custom, and ruled that one should simply remain seated without moving when responding to Barechu, without moving at all. He explained that it is improper to bow on occasions when there is no Halachic requirement to do so, as this undermines the significance of this gesture. Therefore, as there is no Halachic basis for bowing when responding to Barechu, this should not be done. Summary: Some have the custom to slightly lift their bodies off their seats when responding to Barechu, but some Poskim discourage this practice.

Sephardic practice allows one to remain seated during Kaddish, but if one had been standing when Kaddish begins, then he must remain standing. If somebody sees his fellow about to sit down during Kaddish, then he should remind him of the Halachic requirement to remain standing. Sometimes a person enters the synagogue in the middle of the prayer service, and, seeing that people are sitting, he goes to sit down in his seat, not realizing that the Hazzan is reciting Kaddish. One who sees his fellow about to make this mistake should remind him that he must stand. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef writes that if one fears that this might embarrass his fellow, then he should not say anything. There is a minority view among the Poskim – that of the Pekudat Elazar – that one is required to remain standing during Kaddish only if the entire synagogue is standing. According to this view, if one enters the synagogue in the middle of the Kaddish, and the congregation is sitting, then he is allowed to sit. Although Halacha does not follow this opinion, it may be relied upon to avoid the risk of making one's fellow uncomfortable by pointing out his mistake. Therefore, if one has reason to fear that the person who is mistakenly sitting might feel slightly embarrassed, it is better to remain silent and not say anything. Summary: If a person who had been standing before Kaddish begins sitting down after Kaddish began, his fellow should point out to him that Halacha requires him to remain standing, unless this would make him uncomfortable, in which case it is preferable to remain silent.

Ashkenazic custom requires standing during Kaddish, whereas Sephardic practice allows sitting during Kaddish (unless one had been standing before Kaddish began). Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) writes that if a Sepharadi is praying in an Ashkenazic Minyan, he must abide by the Ashkenazic custom and stand during Kaddish. If he remains seated, Hacham Bension writes, this would violate the prohibition of "Lo Titgodedu," which forbids following divergent religious practices in the same place. Hacham Bension makes an exception in a case where there are others in the Minyan sitting during Kaddish, such as elderly congregants who have difficulty standing and are thus permitted to sit during Kaddish even according to Ashkenazic practice. Since there are already some people sitting, a Sepharadi is permitted to sit, as well. Hacham Ovadia Yosef disagreed. He argued that the law of "Lo Titgodedu" does not apply when the divergent practices involve a Minhag (custom), as opposed to a strict Halachic obligation. It is thus not relevant to the issue of sitting or standing during Kaddish, and so a Sepharadi is allowed to sit during Kaddish in an Ashkenazic Minyan. Nevertheless, Hacham Ovadia added, if the Sepharadi has reason to suspect that sitting would cause tension and controversy – which we must always try to avoid – then he should certainly stand in the interest of maintaining peaceful relations among Jews. Summary: A Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazic Minyan is allowed to sit during Kaddish, despite the fact that Ashkenazic custom requires standing. If, however, he suspects that sitting would cause tension and strife, then he should follow the local custom and stand.

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The Rebbe discusses why a sea embankment may not qualify as a partition according to the Alter Rebbe. He advises against publishing a manual on Eruvin in America, warning it could lead to halachic breaches, and provides deep insights into the nature of Rabbinic mitzvos https://www.torahrecordings.com/rebbe/igroskodesh/016/005/6084

Parashat Teruma begins with G-d's command, "Ve'yikhu Li Teruma" – that Beneh Yisrael should donate materials toward the construction of the Mishkan. Surprisingly, Hashem here commands that the people donate toward this project with the word "Ve'yikhu," which means "They shall take." Instead of saying that the people should give, that they should donate, Hashem commands them to "take" a donation. This highlights a basic truism about charity – that by giving, we receive. When we give charity, when we donate toward a worthy cause, we receive far more than we give. We lose nothing, and we gain an incalculable amount. The merits earned through charitable donations are worth far more, and are infinitely more secure, than any financial asset. The rewards are both inestimable and guaranteed. But this understanding of the word "Ve'yikhu" actually runs even deeper. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin speaks of an exceptional case where a bride can be betrothed by giving, instead of receiving. The Halachic mechanism of Kiddushin, whereby a woman becomes formally betrothed to a man, requires the man to give the woman something of value. Of course, this is commonly done by giving the bride a ring. Normally, Kiddushin cannot be effectuated in the opposite manner, through the bride giving something to the groom. If the bride wishes to give the groom a gift, this must not be done as part of the Huppa ceremony, because it must be perfectly clear that the betrothal takes effect through the groom giving the ring to the bride. However, the Gemara establishes that if the groom is a distinguished person, such as a member of the royal court, then his bride can become betrothed to him through her giving him a gift. The reason, the Gemara explains, is that when an ordinary person gives a gift to a person of distinction, the giver derives great benefit by the recipient's acceptance of the gift. The satisfaction that comes from the distinguished person's consent to receive the gift outweighs the value of the gift. Therefore, if the groom is a man of distinction, the bride can become betrothed through the benefit she receives by the groom's acceptance of her gift, because by giving, the bride is actually receiving. This Halacha sheds new light on the command "Ve'yikhu Li Teruma." When we donate for a Misva purpose, we are, in essence, donating to Hashem, as it were. We are so-to-speak giving something to Hashem. Whether it's assisting a family in need, contributing to a charity fund, or supporting a synagogue of yeshiva, we are giving a gift to Hashem – who is, quite obviously, far more "distinguished" than any dignitary or prominent figure. And in this sense, we receive when we give. Anytime we have the opportunity to donate, we are given the privilege of giving a gift to Hashem. This is a privilege we should celebrate – and an opportunity that we should eagerly and enthusiastically seize as often as we can.

The Rebbe clarifies that while remembering Amalek is a Biblical duty, reading it on the Shabbos before Purim is a Rabbinic institution. Beyond the Halachic mechanics, the Rebbe emphasizes the spiritual goal: erasing the "Amalek" of apathy and coldness by serving Hashem with constant enthusiasm and warmth. https://www.torahrecordings.com/shulchan_menachem/orach_chayim/344_002

The Rebbe provides a halachic perspective on cases where doctors warn that pregnancy may pose a danger. He cites the Tzemach Tzedek and other authorities who are lenient in specific circumstances, emphasizing that one should follow the guidance of the Chabad Rebbes and consult with a local Rav who is an expert in these laws. https://www.torahrecordings.com/rebbe/004_igros_kodesh/av/1122

Tracing the journey of Wine, from Roman times and the laws of Yayin Nesech, to Lead Poisoning, wine dilution and Rashi's momentous ruling.   Spanning medieval France, Italy's Rishonim, Provencal responsa and Egyptian challenges, the podcast reveals the halachic debate in times of evolving technology, commerce and travel. As well as instructions for a Seder night without wine.     Timestamps: - 00:00:33 — Podcast intro  - 00:01:09 — Sponsor dedication (Five Towns Central) and contact info.   - 00:01:50 — Series announcement: new multi-part “wine” series; guests planned for week two.   - 00:03:34 — Origins: Georgia and ancient Egyptian wine (Tutankhamun jars).   - 00:05:33 — Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans: amphorae, dilution, and wine practices.   - 00:08:44 — Roman recipes/additives, Posca/Eora, and medicinal uses; Gemara liability notes.   - 00:16:00 — Lead/metal use in wine, health risks, and later glass bottles enabling long aging.   - 00:17:30 — Halachic introduction: yayin nesech and stam yeinam explained.   - 00:20:00 — Ashkenaz/France: cash shortages, wine-as-debt, Rashi's leniencies and barrel-sealing debate.   - 00:30:00 — Provence/Languedoc: stringencies, piquet (second-press), and transport sealing practices.   - 00:32:47 — England: wine shortages and instructions for Kiddush/Seder without wine.   - 00:36:04 — Muslim/Ottoman lands: limited production, taxes/bans, and examples of covert trade.   - 00:42:09 — Italy: Teshuvot hesitancy, later Padua rulings, and varied local customs.   - 00:46:32 — Closing: recap of wine's household role, upcoming guests (Nathan “Yochi” Herzog + halachic expert), and call for listener questions.

A Special Shiur Given to The Community in DetroitParshas Mishpatim 5786This shiur is in: EnglishTo sponsor a weekly shiur⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ click here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠To make a donation to the Minchas Asher Foundation ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠click here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠To subscribe to the Minchas Asher mailing list ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠click here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠For the entire online collection of shiurim from HaGaon Rav Asher Weiss shlit"a please visit ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠www.minchasasher.com⁠⁠

Ten men form a Minyan only if they are all assembled in the same room. If the ten are interspersed among two rooms, then even if there is no door between the two adjoining rooms, and they can all see each other, they do not form a Minyan. (However, if ten men are situated together in one room, then others who are situated in the adjoining room are considered to pray with a Minyan.) The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, 1269-1340) cites his father, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327), as making an interesting exception to this rule. He asserts that if five men are in one room, and five others are in an adjoining room, they combine to form a Minyan if the Hazzan stands in the doorway between the two rooms. As long as all ten men can see the Hazzan – even if they cannot see each other – they are considered a Minyan, as the Hazzan in this case combines them together. Several Poskim extended this Halacha to apply in a case where nine people are in a room, and the Hazzan stands in the entranceway to the room. Normally, a man who stands in the doorway cannot be counted toward the Minyan together with those inside the room. However, if it is the Hazzan standing in the doorway, then, according to this opinion, he combines with nine men inside to form a Minyan. This view is advanced by Rabbi Akiva Eger (1761-1837), who argued that if a Hazzan standing in a doorway between two rooms can combine the men in the two rooms to form a Minyan, then certainly he himself can combine with the nine men of the room when he stands in the doorway. This is the view also of the Perisha (Rav Yehoshua Falk, d. 1614). By contrast, the Peri Megadim (Rav Yosef Teomim, 1727-1792) argued that the Rosh's ruling cannot be extended to the case of a Hazzan standing in the doorway with nine men in the room. The Mishna Berura accepts the lenient ruling of Rabbi Akiva Eger and the Perisha. This is the conclusion also of Hacham David Yosef, in Halacha Berura, who noted that different views exist regarding the status of a person standing in a doorway. Although Halacha follows the opinion that he cannot be counted together with the people standing in the room, nevertheless, the opposing view creates a "Sefek Sefeka" – a situation where two Halachic uncertainties are at play. To begin with, there are those who allow counting a person standing in the doorway, and even according to the stringent opinion, some Poskim allow counting him if he is the Hazzan. Hence, we can rely on this leniency, and allow nine men to form a Minyan with a tenth man in the doorway if that tenth man is the Hazzan. Summary: If ten men are together in two adjoining rooms, with some in one room and some in the other, they do not form a Minyan, unless the Hazzan stands in the doorway connecting the two rooms, and everyone in both rooms can see him. Similarly, if nine men are in a room and a tenth man is in the doorway, the tenth man can be counted if he is the Hazzan.

If ten men wish to make a Minyan in a room with a curtain that separates the room into two sections, must they all be together on one side of the curtain, or are they considered a Minyan even if some are on one side and some on the other? The Halacha in this case depends on the purpose of the curtain. If the curtain was hung for privacy purposes, so that people on one side would not see the people on the other, then we can disregard the curtain with respect to the formation of a Minyan. Such a curtain does not constitute a Halachic separation, and thus the men on the two different sides combine to form a Minyan. If, however, the curtain was hung for a halachic purpose, to separate the room into two distinct halachic areas, then these areas are treated as separate rooms with regard to the formation of a Minyan. An example would be a room with a Sefer Torah, where a curtain was hung to allow on the other side of the curtain activities which are not allowed in the presence of a Sefer Torah. Since the curtain was placed for the purpose of making a halachic partition, then the room is considered halachically divided, and thus ten men who wish to form a Minyan must assemble on one side of the curtain. (However, once ten men assemble on one side, those standing on the other side are considered participants in the Minyan.) Importantly, this Halacha applies only if the curtain reaches the ceiling. If it ends more than three Tefahim (handbreadths) from the ceiling, then it does not qualify as a separation, even if it was hung for halachic purposes. Additionally, this discussion pertains only to a cloth partition. If the partition is a solid wall, made from wood or some other firm material, then it constitutes a halachic partition regardless of the purpose for which it was placed, and therefore the ten men must assemble on one side of the partition. Summary: A curtain that reaches the ceiling is considered a halachic partition that divides a room into two separate rooms if it was hung for a halachic purpose, such as to make a separation from a Sefer Torah, allowing on the other side of the curtain activities which are forbidden in front of a Sefer Torah. In such a case, ten men who wish to form a Minyan in the room must gather on one side of the curtain. If the curtain does not extend to within three Tefahim (handbreadths) of the ceiling, or if it was hung for some other purpose, then men on both sides of the curtain can combine to form a Minyan. A solid partition divides the room regardless of its purpose, and thus the ten men must assemble on the same side of the partition.

If ten men wish to make a Minyan in a room with a curtain that separates the room into two sections, must they all be together on one side of the curtain, or are they considered a Minyan even if some are on one side and some on the other? The Halacha in this case depends on the purpose of the curtain. If the curtain was hung for privacy purposes, so that people on one side would not see the people on the other, then we can disregard the curtain with respect to the formation of a Minyan. Such a curtain does not constitute a Halachic separation, and thus the men on the two different sides combine to form a Minyan. If, however, the curtain was hung for a halachic purpose, to separate the room into two distinct halachic areas, then these areas are treated as separate rooms with regard to the formation of a Minyan. An example would be a room with a Sefer Torah, where a curtain was hung to allow on the other side of the curtain activities which are not allowed in the presence of a Sefer Torah. Since the curtain was placed for the purpose of making a halachic partition, then the room is considered halachically divided, and thus ten men who wish to form a Minyan must assemble on one side of the curtain. (However, once ten men assemble on one side, those standing on the other side are considered participants in the Minyan.) Importantly, this Halacha applies only if the curtain reaches the ceiling. If it ends more than three Tefahim (handbreadths) from the ceiling, then it does not qualify as a separation, even if it was hung for halachic purposes. Additionally, this discussion pertains only to a cloth partition. If the partition is a solid wall, made from wood or some other firm material, then it constitutes a halachic partition regardless of the purpose for which it was placed, and therefore the ten men must assemble on one side of the partition. Summary: A curtain that reaches the ceiling is considered a halachic partition that divides a room into two separate rooms if it was hung for a halachic purpose, such as to make a separation from a Sefer Torah, allowing on the other side of the curtain activities which are forbidden in front of a Sefer Torah. In such a case, ten men who wish to form a Minyan in the room must gather on one side of the curtain. If the curtain does not extend to within three Tefahim (handbreadths) of the ceiling, or if it was hung for some other purpose, then men on both sides of the curtain can combine to form a Minyan. A solid partition divides the room regardless of its purpose, and thus the ten men must assemble on the same side of the partition.

This episode explores the halachic guidance for someone who becomes lost—such as in a desert or captivity—and no longer knows which day is Shabbat. We cover how to count days, designate a “Shabbat” for remembrance through Kiddush and Havdalah, and the limits of work and travel under conditions of uncertainty. The discussion clarifies when work is forbidden, when minimal labor is permitted for survival, and why even doubtful Shabbat days are treated with seriousness. Practical principles of survival, ספק (doubt), and the balance between preserving life and honoring Shabbat are clearly outlined, setting the stage for the conclusion of the siman in the next episode.

This episode continues the laws governing a child's actions in matters of prohibition, with a focus on Shabbos and forbidden foods. It clarifies when a parent must actively stop a child, when others may intervene, and the limits of involving non-Jews. Key topics include feeding prohibited foods to children, special leniencies for a sick child (including on Pesach), restrictions on instructing children to perform Shabbos violations—even rabbinic ones—and how responsibility changes once a child reaches the age of understanding. The episode concludes with guidance on moral accountability, education, and corrective measures for harmful behavior, even when formal liability does not yet apply.

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The period of Ben Ha'shemashot, which extends for a short while (approximately 10-13 minutes) after sunset, is regarded by Halacha as a time of "Safek" – uncertainty, as it is questionable whether this period is to be considered daytime or nighttime. This uncertainty affects many different areas of Halacha, including the date of a youngster's Bar-Misva, the day when he becomes obligated in Misvot. If a child was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have been born during the day, or born during the night. As the Halachic day begins in the nighttime, his birthday is uncertain. Thirteen years later, then, we are unsure which day is the day when he becomes a Bar-Misva and is obligated in Misva observance. Due to this uncertainty, he must begin strictly observing the Misvot on the first of these two days. Less obvious, however, is whether he may serve as a Hazzan in the synagogue on the first day. We would intuitively assume that since he might not be a Bar-Misva until the second day, he should not serve as Hazzan on the first day. However, Hacham David Yosef, in Oserot Yosef, asserts that the boy may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first of these two days. He notes that there is a view in the Gemara that conclusively regards Ben Ha'shemashot as daytime, and, additionally, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171) maintained that halachic sunset occurs 72 minutes after the moment that we consider sunset. According to both these opinions, this boy becomes a Bar-Misva on the first day, thus giving us room for leniency at least during Arbit, when there is no repetition of the Amida, and thus the Hazzan is not fulfilling any sort of obligation on behalf of the congregation. Hacham David goes even further and posits that there is a basis for leniency even during Shaharit and Minha on the first day. In conclusion, then, if a boy was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, and thus the precise date of his birthday is uncertain, he becomes obligated in Misvot on the first day, and may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first day. If he wishes to serve as Hazzan also at Shaharit and Minha on the first day, there is a basis for allowing him to do so.

The period of Ben Ha'shemashot, which extends for a short while (approximately 10-13 minutes) after sunset, is regarded by Halacha as a time of "Safek" – uncertainty, as it is questionable whether this period is to be considered daytime or nighttime. This uncertainty affects many different areas of Halacha, including the date of a youngster's Bar-Misva, the day when he becomes obligated in Misvot. If a child was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have been born during the day, or born during the night. As the Halachic day begins in the nighttime, his birthday is uncertain. Thirteen years later, then, we are unsure which day is the day when he becomes a Bar-Misva and is obligated in Misva observance. Due to this uncertainty, he must begin strictly observing the Misvot on the first of these two days. Less obvious, however, is whether he may serve as a Hazzan in the synagogue on the first day. We would intuitively assume that since he might not be a Bar-Misva until the second day, he should not serve as Hazzan on the first day. However, Hacham David Yosef, in Oserot Yosef, asserts that the boy may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first of these two days. He notes that there is a view in the Gemara that conclusively regards Ben Ha'shemashot as daytime, and, additionally, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171) maintained that halachic sunset occurs 72 minutes after the moment that we consider sunset. According to both these opinions, this boy becomes a Bar-Misva on the first day, thus giving us room for leniency at least during Arbit, when there is no repetition of the Amida, and thus the Hazzan is not fulfilling any sort of obligation on behalf of the congregation. Hacham David goes even further and posits that there is a basis for leniency even during Shaharit and Minha on the first day. In conclusion, then, if a boy was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, and thus the precise date of his birthday is uncertain, he becomes obligated in Misvot on the first day, and may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first day. If he wishes to serve as Hazzan also at Shaharit and Minha on the first day, there is a basis for allowing him to do so.

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The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis. If it is known that a young man has not yet reached this stage of physical development, then he is not considered a Bar-Misva even though his thirteenth birthday has passed. In fact, even if he is older than thirteen, he is not considered a Bar-Misva if it has been determined that he does not have the physical properties required to establish halachic adulthood. If, Heaven forbid, a man does not physically develop until the age of 35, at that point he is considered a "Saris" – an adult man who will never experience physical maturity, and he may thus be counted toward a Minyan. Until then, however, he cannot be considered an adult and may thus not be counted toward a Minyan.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis. If it is known that a young man has not yet reached this stage of physical development, then he is not considered a Bar-Misva even though his thirteenth birthday has passed. In fact, even if he is older than thirteen, he is not considered a Bar-Misva if it has been determined that he does not have the physical properties required to establish halachic adulthood. If, Heaven forbid, a man does not physically develop until the age of 35, at that point he is considered a "Saris" – an adult man who will never experience physical maturity, and he may thus be counted toward a Minyan. Until then, however, he cannot be considered an adult and may thus not be counted toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested that a Sepharadi who finds himself in this situation should answer by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen." This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested that a Sepharadi who finds himself in this situation should answer by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen." This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

I once encountered a fascinating Halachic question while praying in an airport before boarding. A group of nine Ashkenazim approached me and said they needed a tenth man so they could make a Minyan for Minha, and I of course happily agreed. During the Hazara (repetition of the Amida), an announcement was made that it was time to board. Six of us knew we had time to finish Minha before we needed to get on line to board, but four of the men were worried, and left to board. The remaining six were unsure what to do, and I told them that the Hazzan may continue the repetition of the Amida, since there was a Minyan in attendance when it began. If a section of the service requiring a Minyan began when ten or more men were present, it may be completed even if the Minyan was lost, as long as at least six men remain. The problem, however, arose when the time came to recite the Kaddish Titkabal after the Hazara. Ashkenazic custom views the Kaddish Titkabal as integrally connected to the Hazara, and therefore, just as the Hazara may be completed after the Minyan was lost, the Kaddish Titkaba after the Hazara may likewise be recited. Sephardic custom, however, views Kaddish Titkabal as separate from the Hazara, and thus according to Sephardic practice, if the Minyan was lost during the Hazara, then the Kaddish Titkabal may not be recited after the Hazzan completes the Hazara. I was thus unsure what to do in this situation, as a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim after four of the ten men left. Their Halachic tradition mandated reciting the Kaddish Titkabal after the repetition of the Amida, but according to my Halachic tradition, this Kaddish should not be recited. I did not know whether I should answer to their recitation of Kaddish. I later sent a message to Rav Yisrael Bitan asking this question, and he promptly replied with a detailed, six-page Teshuba (responsum) on this subject. He noted Hacham Ovadia Yosef's ruling that when a person hears a Beracha which according to his tradition is unwarranted, and thus recited in vain, he may not answer "Amen." One example is a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite the Beracha of "Al Misvat Tefillin" over the Tefillin Shel Rosh. Although this Ashkenazi obviously acts correctly by reciting this Beracha, which is required according to Ashkenazic custom, the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen," since according to Sephardic practice, this Beracha constitutes a Beracha Le'batala (blessing recited in vain). This would apply also in the case of a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite a Beracha over Hallel on Rosh Hodesh – a Beracha required by Ashkenazi custom but not according to Sephardic custom. Since Sephardic tradition regards this blessing as a "Beracha Le'batala," the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to this blessing. Many other Poskim dispute Hacham Ovadia's ruling, and maintain that since the Ashkenazi recites this blessing legitimately, in accordance with Ashkenazic practice, there is no problem for a Sefaradi to answer "Amen." Rabbi Bitan considers the possibility that Hacham Ovadia might agree that in the case of Kaddish, a Sefaradi may respond even if the Kaddish should not be recited according to Sephardic custom. One might distinguish between answering to an unwarranted blessing, which constitutes a "Beracha Le'batala," and answering to Kaddish, which is not a blessing. Rav Bitan concludes, however, that Hacham Ovadia likely applied his ruling even to Kaddish, and thus, in his view, a Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to Kaddish if the Kaddish is not valid according to Sephardic custom. He may, however, answer "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" even according to Hacham Ovadia's position, as this is merely an expression of praise, and differs from the response of "Amen." Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested avoiding this problem by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen" to the Kaddish. This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions.

I once encountered a fascinating Halachic question while praying in an airport before boarding. A group of nine Ashkenazim approached me and said they needed a tenth man so they could make a Minyan for Minha, and I of course happily agreed. During the Hazara (repetition of the Amida), an announcement was made that it was time to board. Six of us knew we had time to finish Minha before we needed to get on line to board, but four of the men were worried, and left to board. The remaining six were unsure what to do, and I told them that the Hazzan may continue the repetition of the Amida, since there was a Minyan in attendance when it began. If a section of the service requiring a Minyan began when ten or more men were present, it may be completed even if the Minyan was lost, as long as at least six men remain. The problem, however, arose when the time came to recite the Kaddish Titkabal after the Hazara. Ashkenazic custom views the Kaddish Titkabal as integrally connected to the Hazara, and therefore, just as the Hazara may be completed after the Minyan was lost, the Kaddish Titkaba after the Hazara may likewise be recited. Sephardic custom, however, views Kaddish Titkabal as separate from the Hazara, and thus according to Sephardic practice, if the Minyan was lost during the Hazara, then the Kaddish Titkabal may not be recited after the Hazzan completes the Hazara. I was thus unsure what to do in this situation, as a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim after four of the ten men left. Their Halachic tradition mandated reciting the Kaddish Titkabal after the repetition of the Amida, but according to my Halachic tradition, this Kaddish should not be recited. I did not know whether I should answer to their recitation of Kaddish. I later sent a message to Rav Yisrael Bitan asking this question, and he promptly replied with a detailed, six-page Teshuba (responsum) on this subject. He noted Hacham Ovadia Yosef's ruling that when a person hears a Beracha which according to his tradition is unwarranted, and thus recited in vain, he may not answer "Amen." One example is a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite the Beracha of "Al Misvat Tefillin" over the Tefillin Shel Rosh. Although this Ashkenazi obviously acts correctly by reciting this Beracha, which is required according to Ashkenazic custom, the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen," since according to Sephardic practice, this Beracha constitutes a Beracha Le'batala (blessing recited in vain). This would apply also in the case of a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite a Beracha over Hallel on Rosh Hodesh – a Beracha required by Ashkenazi custom but not according to Sephardic custom. Since Sephardic tradition regards this blessing as a "Beracha Le'batala," the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to this blessing. Many other Poskim dispute Hacham Ovadia's ruling, and maintain that since the Ashkenazi recites this blessing legitimately, in accordance with Ashkenazic practice, there is no problem for a Sefaradi to answer "Amen." Rabbi Bitan considers the possibility that Hacham Ovadia might agree that in the case of Kaddish, a Sefaradi may respond even if the Kaddish should not be recited according to Sephardic custom. One might distinguish between answering to an unwarranted blessing, which constitutes a "Beracha Le'batala," and answering to Kaddish, which is not a blessing. Rav Bitan concludes, however, that Hacham Ovadia likely applied his ruling even to Kaddish, and thus, in his view, a Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to Kaddish if the Kaddish is not valid according to Sephardic custom. He may, however, answer "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" even according to Hacham Ovadia's position, as this is merely an expression of praise, and differs from the response of "Amen." Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested avoiding this problem by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen" to the Kaddish. This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions.

The Menorah was the most adopted symbol in the Jewish world. But where is the original?   We know of a Menorah in Rome in 70CE. The Talmud tells us it was examined. But what follows is centuries of silence    What does History tell us? What do eyewitnesses report? What has the Church said? And what role does the 2nd Temple Menorah have, in the redemption of the Jewish People?   This episode is the outcome of the most up-to-date research and analysis and includes a recently recorded conversation with a Rabbi who entered the Vatican cellars 55 years ago accompanied by Pope John Paul II.   Timestamps: - 0:00 — Opening:    - 0:38 — Podcast intro (host & Rabbi Hersh).   - 1:14 — Memorial/announcements.   - 2:17 — Episode topic introduced: “Where is the menorah?”   - 4:00 — Menorah as Jewish symbol; historical significance.   - 8:00 — Arch of Titus / Josephus / early Roman display.   - 10:00 — Fire in 191 CE and disappearance possibilities.   - 15:00 — Jews in ancient Rome / social context.   - 20:00 — Constantine/Byzantine period and relocation theories (312 CE).   - 25:00 — Christian adoption/use of menorah imagery.   - 30:00 — Vatican holdings, openness, and inventories.   - 34:30 — Eyewitness claims overview; Rabbi Stencil letter exchange.   - 40:00 — Oscar Goldman 1962 account (electrician shown items).   - 41:30 — 1970s rabbi's underground Vatican visit description.   - 52:40 — Testimony analysis: credibility issues and scholarly skepticism.   - 1:03:47 — Theological point: first‑ vs. second‑Temple vessels and redemption.   - 1:10:00 — Halachic notes on making/holding menorah replicas; closing.

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Certain portions of the prayer service cannot be recited without the presence of a Minyan. These include Nakdishach, Kaddish, Barechu, Birkat Kohanim, the repetition of the Amida, the congregational reading of the Torah and the Haftara, and the Yag Middot (thirteen attributes of mercy). A "Minyan" is defined as a group of ten Jewish males who have reached the age of Bar-Misva. Nobody and nothing other than Jewish males above Bar-Misva age count toward a Minyan. If nine men are present in the synagogue, they cannot count the Sefer Torah, or the Teba or the Hechal, as the tenth "person" for the Minyan. Tradition teaches that Eliyahu Ha'nabi attends every Berit Mila. One should not think, however, that because of this tradition, a group of nine men at a Berit can be considered a Minyan given that Eliyahu is present and can thus be considered the tenth man. A Minyan requires the presence of ten men, and Eliyahu attends a Berit as an angel, not a man. Therefore, he cannot be counted. Stories are told of how Eliyahu appeared in the form of a human being, and when this happens, he can be counted toward a Minyan. However, when he arrives in the form of an angel, he does not count toward a Minyan. This applies also to the Gemara's teaching that the righteous are considered "alive" even after their passing. Some people mistakenly allow on this basis reciting Kaddish at a cemetery even without the presence of ten men, figuring that the Sadikim buried in the cemetery are considered "alive" and can thus be counted toward a Minyan. They draw proof from the Gemara's description (Ketubot 103) of how Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi would join his family every Friday night after his passing and recite Kiddush for them. If Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi could recite Kiddush for his family after his passing, this might indicate that Sadikim are truly considered alive with respect to Halacha even after their death. This inference, however, is incorrect. Firstly, there is a rule that we cannot reach Halachic conclusions based on the Aggadic sections of the Talmud, such as stories told of the Talmudic sages. Additionally, the Gemara describes Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi arriving in his home in the form of a living person, and so he could be halachically regarded as a human being. This cannot be said of the souls of the departed which cannot be seen. Therefore, Kaddish may not be recited in a cemetery without a Minyan, even if there are Sadikim known to be buried there. If somebody recites Kaddish in a cemetery in the presence of fewer than ten men, others should not answer "Amen," since the Kaddish is being recited inappropriately.

Certain portions of the prayer service cannot be recited without the presence of a Minyan. These include Nakdishach, Kaddish, Barechu, Birkat Kohanim, the repetition of the Amida, the congregational reading of the Torah and the Haftara, and the Yag Middot (thirteen attributes of mercy). A "Minyan" is defined as a group of ten Jewish males who have reached the age of Bar-Misva. Nobody and nothing other than Jewish males above Bar-Misva age count toward a Minyan. If nine men are present in the synagogue, they cannot count the Sefer Torah, or the Teba or the Hechal, as the tenth "person" for the Minyan. Tradition teaches that Eliyahu Ha'nabi attends every Berit Mila. One should not think, however, that because of this tradition, a group of nine men at a Berit can be considered a Minyan given that Eliyahu is present and can thus be considered the tenth man. A Minyan requires the presence of ten men, and Eliyahu attends a Berit as an angel, not a man. Therefore, he cannot be counted. Stories are told of how Eliyahu appeared in the form of a human being, and when this happens, he can be counted toward a Minyan. However, when he arrives in the form of an angel, he does not count toward a Minyan. This applies also to the Gemara's teaching that the righteous are considered "alive" even after their passing. Some people mistakenly allow on this basis reciting Kaddish at a cemetery even without the presence of ten men, figuring that the Sadikim buried in the cemetery are considered "alive" and can thus be counted toward a Minyan. They draw proof from the Gemara's description (Ketubot 103) of how Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi would join his family every Friday night after his passing and recite Kiddush for them. If Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi could recite Kiddush for his family after his passing, this might indicate that Sadikim are truly considered alive with respect to Halacha even after their death. This inference, however, is incorrect. Firstly, there is a rule that we cannot reach Halachic conclusions based on the Aggadic sections of the Talmud, such as stories told of the Talmudic sages. Additionally, the Gemara describes Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi arriving in his home in the form of a living person, and so he could be halachically regarded as a human being. This cannot be said of the souls of the departed which cannot be seen. Therefore, Kaddish may not be recited in a cemetery without a Minyan, even if there are Sadikim known to be buried there. If somebody recites Kaddish in a cemetery in the presence of fewer than ten men, others should not answer "Amen," since the Kaddish is being recited inappropriately.

This insightful series explores practical, thoughtful guidance for those navigating the shidduchim stage. Covering perspectives from Rabbonim, Mashpi'im, therapists, and women who have been there, this series is sure to give you or your child the confidence to move through the dating world with clarity and confidence.

Why does Israel release live Arab terrorists (who admit they will kill again if they can!) in exchange for the corpses of Jewish dead? Is this a Halachic thing? A Zionist thing?

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In this class Rabbi Breitowitz discussed the history of organ transplants, the American vs Halachic qualifications of death, & their implications regarding organ donation.

In some editions of the Siddur, several words are added to the text of Baruch She'amar on Shabbat. However, these additions are incorrect. The text of Baruch She'amar – which, according to tradition, was revealed to the Ansheh Kenesset Ha'gedola (Men of the Great Assembly) on a piece of paper that fell from the heavens – contains precisely 87 words, and this is the exact text that we should recite. There are some editions of the Siddur in which additions for Shabbat appear before Baruch She'amar. One may recite these additions, though he should ensure to have in mind that they are not said as part of Baruch She'amar, but rather comprise a separate text. The custom is to stand during the recitation of Baruch She'amar. However, since standing is required only by force of custom, and not as a strict Halachic obligation, one who is ill or otherwise frail may sit. Our custom is to hold the front two Sisit of the Tallit in our hand during the recitation of Baruch She'amar. This is based on a Kabbalistic teaching mentioned in the Sha'ar Ha'kavanot (a work based on the teachings of Rav Haim Vital, 1542-1620), according to which there is a deep connection between Baruch She'amar and Sisit. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) adds that one should kiss the Sisit upon concluding Baruch She'amar, as an expression of love and affection for the Misva of Sisit. In the phrase "Ha'mehulal Be'feh Amo," there are some who say "Be'fi" instead of "Be'feh." However, this is incorrect. The proper text is "Be'feh." Significantly, the word "Be'feh" in Gematria equals 87 – the number of words in Baruch She'amar. The correct pronunciation of the final word of Baruch She'amar is "Ba'tishbahot," and not "Ba'tushbahot." One who arrives in the synagogue late, and skips Pesukeh De'zimra in order to recite the Amida together with the congregation, does not recite Baruch She'amar afterward. This Beracha is to be recited only before the Amida. (This applies also to Yishtabah, the concluding Beracha of Pesukeh De'zimra.) The first four words of Baruch She'amar are "Baruch She'amar Ve'haya Ha'olam," the first letters of which (Bet, Shin, Vav, Heh) spell the word "Be'shaveh" – "equal." This has been understood as alluding that reciting Baruch She'amar properly earns us rewards equal to the rewards granted to the angels for serving G-d. Moreover, these four words express praise to Hashem for bringing the world into existence – and so reciting this blessing properly helps us tap into G-d's creative powers. So often, we need Hashem to bring us a salvation, to "create" a solution for us. People frequently approach me asking how they can earn something that they so desperately need. One thing we can do is to recite Baruch She'amar properly, slowly, from the Siddur, and with concentration, thinking about how Hashem created the world from sheer nothingness, and in this merit we will, please G-d, be worthy of Him "creating" the solutions that we all need in our lives.

The proclamation "Hashem Melech, Hashem Malach, Hashem Yimloch Le'olam Va'ed," which we make each morning before Baruch She'amar, should be made while standing. On weekdays, "Hashem Melech" is recited just before Baruch She'amar, and so one remains standing until after Baruch She'amar. On Shabbat and holidays, however, when other chapters of Tehillim are recited in between "Hashem Melech" and Baruch She'amar, one must remain standing until he completes the verse recited right after "Hashem Melech" – "Ve'haya Hashem La'Melech…U'Shmo Ehad." The next paragraph – "Hoshi'enu" – may be recited sitting. If one has already prayed Shaharit, and, while learning Torah in the synagogue, he hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech," then he must stand. Preferably, he should also join them in the recitation. If, however, one hears an individual reciting "Hashem Melech," not with a Minyan, he has no obligation to stand. If a person is praying with a Minyan, and he is still reciting Hodu when the congregation reaches "Hashem Melech," then he should stand but not join the congregation in reciting "Hashem Melech." The Arizal taught that the sequence of the prayer service is vitally important, and so following the proper order takes precedence over the value of joining the congregation in reciting "Hashem Melech." Disrupting the sequence of the Tefila could adversely affect its impact, and so one should not recite "Hashem Melech" early, while he has yet to complete Hodu or the earlier parts of the service. This is the ruling of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) and the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939). This is in contrast to the view of the Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698), who felt that since we do not pray with all the deep intentions of the Arizal, the sequence of the prayers is not as critical, and thus one should interrupt an earlier part of the service for the sake of joining the recitation of "Hashem Melech." The Ben Ish Hai countered that we should follow the Arizal's practices despite not having all his deep Kavanot (intentions), and so the sequence must be maintained. It is worth noting that if Halacha discourages disrupting the Tefila with the recitation of a different part of the service, then certainly, and many times more so, it forbids interruptions such as reading text messages, checking notifications, and doing other things with one's device. Throughout the entire prayer service, we should try to remain as singularly focused on our Tefila as possible, and make a point of avoiding all distractions. "Hashem Melech" is recited also during the Selihot prayers, and the Ben Ish Hai writes that the aforementioned Halachot apply also when one hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech" during Selihot, and he is required to stand. Standing during "Hashem Melech" is the accepted custom, but not a strict Halachic requirement. Therefore, an elderly or infirm individual, who finds it difficult to stand, may remain seated for the recitation of "Hashem Melech." The Ben Ish Hai writes that standing is not required during the traditional recitation of "Hashem Melech" during the Hakafot on Simhat Torah. This custom is a relatively new development, and may thus be treated more leniently, such that standing is not required. Hacham Ovadia Yosef raises the question of how the Ben Ish Hai could write this, as standing is strictly required during Hakafot for an entirely different reason – because the Torah scrolls are being carried. Irrespective of the recitation of "Hashem Melech," standing is required in the synagogue when the Sefer Torah is being carried, which is of course happening during Hakafot. Some answer this question by suggesting that the Ben Ish Hai accepted the novel ruling of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) permitting one to sit during Hakafot. Rav Shlomo Zalman asserted that during Hakafot, the Torah scrolls are considered to be in their place, as they are meant to be danced with at this time. Standing for the Sefer Torah is required only when it is removed from its place, and therefore one may sit during Hakafot, when the Torah scrolls are, in a sense, in their place. For this reason, perhaps, the Ben Ish Hai permitted sitting while reciting "Hashem Melech" during the Hakafot. It is unlikely, however, that the Ben Ish Hai followed this novel position, and in fact, it is not accepted as Halacha. The story is told of Hacham Ezra Attieh (1885-1970), Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Porat Yosef, who, as an older man, felt weary during Hakafot on Simhat Torah, and so he left the room to sit down somewhere else. This is the generally accepted Halacha – that even those who feel weak or weary during Hakafot should leave the synagogue to sit. (It should be noted, however, that Hacham Ovadia permitted sitting when the Torah scrolls are stationary in the few moments between Hakafot.) It is more likely, then, that the Ben Ish Hai referred to the practice observed in many congregations to place the Torah scrolls on the Teba after dancing and recite the hymns, including "Hashem Melech," and he therefore wrote that sitting is permissible during that time. Summary: One must stand for the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Shaharit. If one had already prayed, and, while learning in the synagogue, he hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech," he should stand and join their recitation. If one is reciting a different part of the prayer service, such as Hodu, then he should rise but not interrupt to recite "Hashem Melech." This applies also to the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Selihot. Standing is not required, however, for the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Hakafot if the Torah scrolls are on the Teba and not being carried at that time. The elderly, infirm and others who find it difficult to stand may remain seated for the recitation of "Hashem Melech," even during Shaharit and Selihot.

On the night of a boy's 13 th birthday, when he becomes a Bar-Misva, he must – in principle – recite Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah. Generally, of course, a person's recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning covers all his Torah learning throughout the day and the following night. In the case of a Bar Misva boy, however, he recited Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning as a minor, who is not obligated in Misvot (except by virtue of his parents' obligation to train him in Misva observance). Therefore, his recitation that morning does not fulfill his obligation once he becomes a Halachic adult who now bears an obligation to recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Therefore, before the boy learns and speaks words of Torah on the night of his 13 th birthday, he is required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah. However, as there is some uncertainty as to whether this is necessary, Hacham Ovadia Yosef suggested two ways to avoid this question. One possibility is to recite Arbit before learning Torah, having in mind that the recitation of Ahabat Olam – the blessing immediately preceding Shema – will satisfy the obligation of Birkot Ha'Torah. As we have seen, this blessing discusses similar themes as those of Birkot Ha'Torah, and thus a person can fulfill his requirement of Birkot Ha'Torah by reciting this blessing. Hacham Ovadia adds, however, that if the boy chooses this option, he must ensure to recite Arbit after sundown, when he has already turned 13. The other option is for the boy to have in mind when he recites Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning that his recitation should remain in effect only until sundown. He can then recite Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown according to all opinions, without any concern. Incidentally, a similar Halacha applies to a convert. After undergoing conversion, a convert must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before he learns Torah, even if he had recited Birkot Ha'Torah that morning. His recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah as a gentile does not fulfill his obligation as a Jew, and so he must repeat Birkot Ha'Torah immediately after completing his conversion and assuming the formal status of a Jew. Summary: In principle, a boy must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before he learns Torah on the night he turns 13, even though he had recited Birkot Ha'Torah that morning. Preferably, he should have in mind when he recites Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning that his recitation should remain in effect only until sundown, so he can then repeat Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown according to all opinions. Alternatively, he can recite Arbit right after sundown and have in mind to fulfill his Birkot Ha'Torah obligation through the recitation of Ahabat Olam (the blessing preceding Shema), thus obviating the need to repeat Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown.

When does chazanus cross into tircha d'tzibburah? Can a chazan use popular tunes, repeat words, or sing with a choir? Should a professional chazan be hired for the Yamim Noraim, or is simplicity preferred? Is chazanus an ideal form of avodas Hashem — or is it frowned upon? What are the qualifications required of a Yamim Noraim chazan? Host: Ari Wasserman, author of the newly published, revised and expanded book Making it Work, on workplace challenges and Halachic Q & A on the Job with Rabbi Isaac Rice – Mora De'asra of Congregation Anshei Chesed, Hewlitt NY – 12:35 with Rabbi Zev Leff – Posek, Author, Rosh Yeshiva & Rav of Moshav Matisyahu – 48:03 with Rabbi Moshe Walter – Rabbi of Woodside Synagogue Ahavas Torah and prolific author https://www.rabbimoshewalter.com/ – 1:13:00 with Chazan Nissim Saal – Chief Chazzan at Yeshurun Central Synagogue – 1:38:55 Conclusions and takeaways – 1:50:43 מראי מקומות