Podcasts about halachic

Ten men form a Minyan only if they are all assembled in the same room. If the ten are interspersed among two rooms, then even if there is no door between the two adjoining rooms, and they can all see each other, they do not form a Minyan. (However, if ten men are situated together in one room, then others who are situated in the adjoining room are considered to pray with a Minyan.) The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, 1269-1340) cites his father, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327), as making an interesting exception to this rule. He asserts that if five men are in one room, and five others are in an adjoining room, they combine to form a Minyan if the Hazzan stands in the doorway between the two rooms. As long as all ten men can see the Hazzan – even if they cannot see each other – they are considered a Minyan, as the Hazzan in this case combines them together. Several Poskim extended this Halacha to apply in a case where nine people are in a room, and the Hazzan stands in the entranceway to the room. Normally, a man who stands in the doorway cannot be counted toward the Minyan together with those inside the room. However, if it is the Hazzan standing in the doorway, then, according to this opinion, he combines with nine men inside to form a Minyan. This view is advanced by Rabbi Akiva Eger (1761-1837), who argued that if a Hazzan standing in a doorway between two rooms can combine the men in the two rooms to form a Minyan, then certainly he himself can combine with the nine men of the room when he stands in the doorway. This is the view also of the Perisha (Rav Yehoshua Falk, d. 1614). By contrast, the Peri Megadim (Rav Yosef Teomim, 1727-1792) argued that the Rosh's ruling cannot be extended to the case of a Hazzan standing in the doorway with nine men in the room. The Mishna Berura accepts the lenient ruling of Rabbi Akiva Eger and the Perisha. This is the conclusion also of Hacham David Yosef, in Halacha Berura, who noted that different views exist regarding the status of a person standing in a doorway. Although Halacha follows the opinion that he cannot be counted together with the people standing in the room, nevertheless, the opposing view creates a "Sefek Sefeka" – a situation where two Halachic uncertainties are at play. To begin with, there are those who allow counting a person standing in the doorway, and even according to the stringent opinion, some Poskim allow counting him if he is the Hazzan. Hence, we can rely on this leniency, and allow nine men to form a Minyan with a tenth man in the doorway if that tenth man is the Hazzan. Summary: If ten men are together in two adjoining rooms, with some in one room and some in the other, they do not form a Minyan, unless the Hazzan stands in the doorway connecting the two rooms, and everyone in both rooms can see him. Similarly, if nine men are in a room and a tenth man is in the doorway, the tenth man can be counted if he is the Hazzan.

If ten men wish to make a Minyan in a room with a curtain that separates the room into two sections, must they all be together on one side of the curtain, or are they considered a Minyan even if some are on one side and some on the other? The Halacha in this case depends on the purpose of the curtain. If the curtain was hung for privacy purposes, so that people on one side would not see the people on the other, then we can disregard the curtain with respect to the formation of a Minyan. Such a curtain does not constitute a Halachic separation, and thus the men on the two different sides combine to form a Minyan. If, however, the curtain was hung for a halachic purpose, to separate the room into two distinct halachic areas, then these areas are treated as separate rooms with regard to the formation of a Minyan. An example would be a room with a Sefer Torah, where a curtain was hung to allow on the other side of the curtain activities which are not allowed in the presence of a Sefer Torah. Since the curtain was placed for the purpose of making a halachic partition, then the room is considered halachically divided, and thus ten men who wish to form a Minyan must assemble on one side of the curtain. (However, once ten men assemble on one side, those standing on the other side are considered participants in the Minyan.) Importantly, this Halacha applies only if the curtain reaches the ceiling. If it ends more than three Tefahim (handbreadths) from the ceiling, then it does not qualify as a separation, even if it was hung for halachic purposes. Additionally, this discussion pertains only to a cloth partition. If the partition is a solid wall, made from wood or some other firm material, then it constitutes a halachic partition regardless of the purpose for which it was placed, and therefore the ten men must assemble on one side of the partition. Summary: A curtain that reaches the ceiling is considered a halachic partition that divides a room into two separate rooms if it was hung for a halachic purpose, such as to make a separation from a Sefer Torah, allowing on the other side of the curtain activities which are forbidden in front of a Sefer Torah. In such a case, ten men who wish to form a Minyan in the room must gather on one side of the curtain. If the curtain does not extend to within three Tefahim (handbreadths) of the ceiling, or if it was hung for some other purpose, then men on both sides of the curtain can combine to form a Minyan. A solid partition divides the room regardless of its purpose, and thus the ten men must assemble on the same side of the partition.

If ten men wish to make a Minyan in a room with a curtain that separates the room into two sections, must they all be together on one side of the curtain, or are they considered a Minyan even if some are on one side and some on the other? The Halacha in this case depends on the purpose of the curtain. If the curtain was hung for privacy purposes, so that people on one side would not see the people on the other, then we can disregard the curtain with respect to the formation of a Minyan. Such a curtain does not constitute a Halachic separation, and thus the men on the two different sides combine to form a Minyan. If, however, the curtain was hung for a halachic purpose, to separate the room into two distinct halachic areas, then these areas are treated as separate rooms with regard to the formation of a Minyan. An example would be a room with a Sefer Torah, where a curtain was hung to allow on the other side of the curtain activities which are not allowed in the presence of a Sefer Torah. Since the curtain was placed for the purpose of making a halachic partition, then the room is considered halachically divided, and thus ten men who wish to form a Minyan must assemble on one side of the curtain. (However, once ten men assemble on one side, those standing on the other side are considered participants in the Minyan.) Importantly, this Halacha applies only if the curtain reaches the ceiling. If it ends more than three Tefahim (handbreadths) from the ceiling, then it does not qualify as a separation, even if it was hung for halachic purposes. Additionally, this discussion pertains only to a cloth partition. If the partition is a solid wall, made from wood or some other firm material, then it constitutes a halachic partition regardless of the purpose for which it was placed, and therefore the ten men must assemble on one side of the partition. Summary: A curtain that reaches the ceiling is considered a halachic partition that divides a room into two separate rooms if it was hung for a halachic purpose, such as to make a separation from a Sefer Torah, allowing on the other side of the curtain activities which are forbidden in front of a Sefer Torah. In such a case, ten men who wish to form a Minyan in the room must gather on one side of the curtain. If the curtain does not extend to within three Tefahim (handbreadths) of the ceiling, or if it was hung for some other purpose, then men on both sides of the curtain can combine to form a Minyan. A solid partition divides the room regardless of its purpose, and thus the ten men must assemble on the same side of the partition.

The period of Ben Ha'shemashot, which extends for a short while (approximately 10-13 minutes) after sunset, is regarded by Halacha as a time of "Safek" – uncertainty, as it is questionable whether this period is to be considered daytime or nighttime. This uncertainty affects many different areas of Halacha, including the date of a youngster's Bar-Misva, the day when he becomes obligated in Misvot. If a child was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have been born during the day, or born during the night. As the Halachic day begins in the nighttime, his birthday is uncertain. Thirteen years later, then, we are unsure which day is the day when he becomes a Bar-Misva and is obligated in Misva observance. Due to this uncertainty, he must begin strictly observing the Misvot on the first of these two days. Less obvious, however, is whether he may serve as a Hazzan in the synagogue on the first day. We would intuitively assume that since he might not be a Bar-Misva until the second day, he should not serve as Hazzan on the first day. However, Hacham David Yosef, in Oserot Yosef, asserts that the boy may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first of these two days. He notes that there is a view in the Gemara that conclusively regards Ben Ha'shemashot as daytime, and, additionally, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171) maintained that halachic sunset occurs 72 minutes after the moment that we consider sunset. According to both these opinions, this boy becomes a Bar-Misva on the first day, thus giving us room for leniency at least during Arbit, when there is no repetition of the Amida, and thus the Hazzan is not fulfilling any sort of obligation on behalf of the congregation. Hacham David goes even further and posits that there is a basis for leniency even during Shaharit and Minha on the first day. In conclusion, then, if a boy was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, and thus the precise date of his birthday is uncertain, he becomes obligated in Misvot on the first day, and may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first day. If he wishes to serve as Hazzan also at Shaharit and Minha on the first day, there is a basis for allowing him to do so.

The period of Ben Ha'shemashot, which extends for a short while (approximately 10-13 minutes) after sunset, is regarded by Halacha as a time of "Safek" – uncertainty, as it is questionable whether this period is to be considered daytime or nighttime. This uncertainty affects many different areas of Halacha, including the date of a youngster's Bar-Misva, the day when he becomes obligated in Misvot. If a child was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have been born during the day, or born during the night. As the Halachic day begins in the nighttime, his birthday is uncertain. Thirteen years later, then, we are unsure which day is the day when he becomes a Bar-Misva and is obligated in Misva observance. Due to this uncertainty, he must begin strictly observing the Misvot on the first of these two days. Less obvious, however, is whether he may serve as a Hazzan in the synagogue on the first day. We would intuitively assume that since he might not be a Bar-Misva until the second day, he should not serve as Hazzan on the first day. However, Hacham David Yosef, in Oserot Yosef, asserts that the boy may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first of these two days. He notes that there is a view in the Gemara that conclusively regards Ben Ha'shemashot as daytime, and, additionally, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171) maintained that halachic sunset occurs 72 minutes after the moment that we consider sunset. According to both these opinions, this boy becomes a Bar-Misva on the first day, thus giving us room for leniency at least during Arbit, when there is no repetition of the Amida, and thus the Hazzan is not fulfilling any sort of obligation on behalf of the congregation. Hacham David goes even further and posits that there is a basis for leniency even during Shaharit and Minha on the first day. In conclusion, then, if a boy was born during Ben Ha'shemashot, and thus the precise date of his birthday is uncertain, he becomes obligated in Misvot on the first day, and may serve as Hazzan for Arbit on the night of the first day. If he wishes to serve as Hazzan also at Shaharit and Minha on the first day, there is a basis for allowing him to do so.

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The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis. If it is known that a young man has not yet reached this stage of physical development, then he is not considered a Bar-Misva even though his thirteenth birthday has passed. In fact, even if he is older than thirteen, he is not considered a Bar-Misva if it has been determined that he does not have the physical properties required to establish halachic adulthood. If, Heaven forbid, a man does not physically develop until the age of 35, at that point he is considered a "Saris" – an adult man who will never experience physical maturity, and he may thus be counted toward a Minyan. Until then, however, he cannot be considered an adult and may thus not be counted toward a Minyan.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis. If it is known that a young man has not yet reached this stage of physical development, then he is not considered a Bar-Misva even though his thirteenth birthday has passed. In fact, even if he is older than thirteen, he is not considered a Bar-Misva if it has been determined that he does not have the physical properties required to establish halachic adulthood. If, Heaven forbid, a man does not physically develop until the age of 35, at that point he is considered a "Saris" – an adult man who will never experience physical maturity, and he may thus be counted toward a Minyan. Until then, however, he cannot be considered an adult and may thus not be counted toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested that a Sepharadi who finds himself in this situation should answer by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen." This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

The Gemara (Berachot 48a) brings the view of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi that an Ebed – a non-Jewish servant, who is obligated in some Misvot – may be counted as the tenth men for a Minyan. The Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, 13 th century) cites Rabbenu Simha as concluding on the basis of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that a woman may be counted toward a Minyan. Since non-Jewish servants are obligated in the same Misvot that women are, it follows that if a servant can be counted, then a woman may be counted, as well. The Bet Yosef observes that this also seems to have been the position of Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171). However, Rabbenu Tam did not act upon this position, and this practice never became accepted. At first glance, we might have assumed that this position would affect the status of an Androginus (hermaphrodite, somebody with both male and female biological features) with respect to a Minyan. In general, the Halachic status of such a person is a Safek – one of uncertainty, and it is unknown whether to treat this individual as a male or female. Seemingly, when an Androginus is needed for a Minyan, we should apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka," which allows acting leniently when two uncertainties are at stake. There is one question whether this person should be treated as a man or a woman, and even if an Androginus is regarded as a woman, perhaps Halacha follows the view of Rabbenu Tam that a woman may be counted as a Minyan. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that Rabbenu Tam's position does not even come under consideration, and therefore we cannot apply the rule of "Sefek Sefeka" in this case. Hence, an Androginus is not counted toward a Minyan. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi is cited also as allowing counting a minor – a boy under the age of Bar-Misva – toward a Minyan. The Gemara (Berachot 47b) brings Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling that an infant cannot be counted as the third person for a Zimun, but he can be counted as the tenth person for a Minyan. Tosafot cite Rabbenu Tam as accepting this position, and ruling that a child – even an infant – can count as the tenth person for a Minyan. (This is the basis for the Bet Yosef's aforementioned theory that Rabbenu Tam likely allowed counting a woman for a Minyan, as well, as he accepted Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi's ruling.) Later Rishonim explain Rabbenu Tam's surprising ruling based on the verse from which the Sages derived the concept of a Minyan: "Ve'nikdashti Be'toch Beneh Yisrael" – "I shall be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel" (Vayikra 22:32). Even infants are considered part of Beneh Yisrael, and thus they qualify to create the conditions in which these special portions of the Tefila may be recited. The Sefer Ha'manhig (Rabbi Abraham Ben Natan, d. 1215) brings Rabbenu Tam's ruling without making any further comments, strongly implying that he accepted this lenient position. By contrast, numerous Rishonim write that Rabbenu Tam never apply this ruling as a practical matter, and never actually permitted counting minors toward a Minyan. (This is why the Bet Yosef, as cited earlier, writes that Rabbenu Tam did not allow counting a woman toward a Minyan.) Nevertheless, there were those who maintained that when necessary, a congregation may rely on Rabbenu Tam's opinion and count a child toward a Minyan. The Orhot Haim tells that Rabbenu Shimshon decreed excommunication upon a village that, in defiance of his strict ruling, counted minors toward a Minyan, but the Orhot Haim adds that this may be done when absolutely necessary, if the town is very small and otherwise will not have a Minyan. In fact, the Orhot Haim writes, the Ra'abad wrote that this was the custom in many communities. By contrast, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) cites Rabbenu Yishak as disputing Rabbenu Tam's position, noting that the Gemara brings Mor Zutra as disagreeing with Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, and asserting that Halacha follows the view of Mor Zutra. The Bet Yosef lists numerous Rishonim who concurred with this stringent ruling of Rabbenu Yishak, and indeed, in the Shulhan Aruch, he writes that a minor may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if otherwise there will not be a Minyan. This is the Halacha for Sepharadim. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) ruled that since some Rishonim allowed counting minors toward a Minyan, this can be done when necessary. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) accepted this ruling as normative Ashkenazic practice, and thus writes that if a congregation has no other option for praying with a Minyan, they may count a boy who has yet to reach the age of Bar-Misva. Other Ashkenazic Poskim, however, disagreed. The Mishna Berura brings several Poskim who concurred with the Shulhan Aruch's stringent ruling, and disputed the Rama's leniency. Likewise, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) ruled that a child may not be counted toward a Minyan under any circumstances, even if this means that the nine adults will stop coming to synagogue because they will assume there will not be a Minyan. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings those who claimed that if a child holds a Humash in his hands, then he may be counted toward a Minyan. The Bet Yosef cites Rabbenu Tam as ridiculing this view, noting that holding a Humash makes no difference and has no impact upon a child's status. In any event, Halacha does not follow this opinion. If a Sepharadi finds himself together with eight other Sepharadim who want to include a minor as the tenth person for the Minyan, he should leave in order to prevent them from doing so. Since this is not allowed according to accepted Sephardic custom, it is proper to walk away so that the others do not make this mistake which will result in the recitation of Berachot in vain. If a Sepharadi is with eight other Ashkenazim who, in accordance with the Rama's ruling, wish to count a minor as the tenth person in a Minyan, it is questionable whether he should answer "Amen" to the Berachot. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that one may not answer "Amen" to a Beracha which, according to his custom, is recited in vain, even if the person recites it legitimately, following his community's custom. A common example is a Sepharadi praying in an Ashkenazi Minyan on Rosh Hodesh, when Ashkenazim recite a Beracha over the recitation of Hallel but Sepharadim do not. According to Hacham Ovadia, the Sepharadi may not answer "Amen" to this Beracha. Another example is the Ashkenazic custom to recite a Beracha before placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh ("Al Misvat Tefillin"). Hacham Ovadia ruled that a Sepharadi who hears an Ashkenazi recite this blessing should not answer "Amen." According to this opinion, a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim who count a child toward the Minyan may not answer "Amen" to the Berachot of the Hazara (repetition of the Amida). By contrast, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998) maintained that if an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha legitimately, following Ashkenazic practice, then a Sepharadi may answer "Amen," even though this Beracha is not recited according to Sephardic custom. Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested that a Sepharadi who finds himself in this situation should answer by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen." This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions. The Hacham Sevi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) addresses the question as to the status of a human being created with the Sefer Ha'yesira – a mystical book written by Abraham Abinu. This book contains secrets including the way one can create living creatures using certain Names of G-d. (Some explain on this basis how Abraham served his guests meat and butter – suggesting that the animal was created with the Sefer Ha'yesira, such that it wasn't actually an animal, and thus its meat was not Halachically-defined "Basar.") The Hacham Sevi writes that such a creature does not possess a human soul, and thus is not defined by Halacha as a Jewish person who can count toward a Minyan.

We discuss foods that may have the Halachic status of drinks.

I once encountered a fascinating Halachic question while praying in an airport before boarding. A group of nine Ashkenazim approached me and said they needed a tenth man so they could make a Minyan for Minha, and I of course happily agreed. During the Hazara (repetition of the Amida), an announcement was made that it was time to board. Six of us knew we had time to finish Minha before we needed to get on line to board, but four of the men were worried, and left to board. The remaining six were unsure what to do, and I told them that the Hazzan may continue the repetition of the Amida, since there was a Minyan in attendance when it began. If a section of the service requiring a Minyan began when ten or more men were present, it may be completed even if the Minyan was lost, as long as at least six men remain. The problem, however, arose when the time came to recite the Kaddish Titkabal after the Hazara. Ashkenazic custom views the Kaddish Titkabal as integrally connected to the Hazara, and therefore, just as the Hazara may be completed after the Minyan was lost, the Kaddish Titkaba after the Hazara may likewise be recited. Sephardic custom, however, views Kaddish Titkabal as separate from the Hazara, and thus according to Sephardic practice, if the Minyan was lost during the Hazara, then the Kaddish Titkabal may not be recited after the Hazzan completes the Hazara. I was thus unsure what to do in this situation, as a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim after four of the ten men left. Their Halachic tradition mandated reciting the Kaddish Titkabal after the repetition of the Amida, but according to my Halachic tradition, this Kaddish should not be recited. I did not know whether I should answer to their recitation of Kaddish. I later sent a message to Rav Yisrael Bitan asking this question, and he promptly replied with a detailed, six-page Teshuba (responsum) on this subject. He noted Hacham Ovadia Yosef's ruling that when a person hears a Beracha which according to his tradition is unwarranted, and thus recited in vain, he may not answer "Amen." One example is a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite the Beracha of "Al Misvat Tefillin" over the Tefillin Shel Rosh. Although this Ashkenazi obviously acts correctly by reciting this Beracha, which is required according to Ashkenazic custom, the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen," since according to Sephardic practice, this Beracha constitutes a Beracha Le'batala (blessing recited in vain). This would apply also in the case of a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite a Beracha over Hallel on Rosh Hodesh – a Beracha required by Ashkenazi custom but not according to Sephardic custom. Since Sephardic tradition regards this blessing as a "Beracha Le'batala," the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to this blessing. Many other Poskim dispute Hacham Ovadia's ruling, and maintain that since the Ashkenazi recites this blessing legitimately, in accordance with Ashkenazic practice, there is no problem for a Sefaradi to answer "Amen." Rabbi Bitan considers the possibility that Hacham Ovadia might agree that in the case of Kaddish, a Sefaradi may respond even if the Kaddish should not be recited according to Sephardic custom. One might distinguish between answering to an unwarranted blessing, which constitutes a "Beracha Le'batala," and answering to Kaddish, which is not a blessing. Rav Bitan concludes, however, that Hacham Ovadia likely applied his ruling even to Kaddish, and thus, in his view, a Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to Kaddish if the Kaddish is not valid according to Sephardic custom. He may, however, answer "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" even according to Hacham Ovadia's position, as this is merely an expression of praise, and differs from the response of "Amen." Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested avoiding this problem by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen" to the Kaddish. This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions.

I once encountered a fascinating Halachic question while praying in an airport before boarding. A group of nine Ashkenazim approached me and said they needed a tenth man so they could make a Minyan for Minha, and I of course happily agreed. During the Hazara (repetition of the Amida), an announcement was made that it was time to board. Six of us knew we had time to finish Minha before we needed to get on line to board, but four of the men were worried, and left to board. The remaining six were unsure what to do, and I told them that the Hazzan may continue the repetition of the Amida, since there was a Minyan in attendance when it began. If a section of the service requiring a Minyan began when ten or more men were present, it may be completed even if the Minyan was lost, as long as at least six men remain. The problem, however, arose when the time came to recite the Kaddish Titkabal after the Hazara. Ashkenazic custom views the Kaddish Titkabal as integrally connected to the Hazara, and therefore, just as the Hazara may be completed after the Minyan was lost, the Kaddish Titkaba after the Hazara may likewise be recited. Sephardic custom, however, views Kaddish Titkabal as separate from the Hazara, and thus according to Sephardic practice, if the Minyan was lost during the Hazara, then the Kaddish Titkabal may not be recited after the Hazzan completes the Hazara. I was thus unsure what to do in this situation, as a Sepharadi praying with Ashkenazim after four of the ten men left. Their Halachic tradition mandated reciting the Kaddish Titkabal after the repetition of the Amida, but according to my Halachic tradition, this Kaddish should not be recited. I did not know whether I should answer to their recitation of Kaddish. I later sent a message to Rav Yisrael Bitan asking this question, and he promptly replied with a detailed, six-page Teshuba (responsum) on this subject. He noted Hacham Ovadia Yosef's ruling that when a person hears a Beracha which according to his tradition is unwarranted, and thus recited in vain, he may not answer "Amen." One example is a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite the Beracha of "Al Misvat Tefillin" over the Tefillin Shel Rosh. Although this Ashkenazi obviously acts correctly by reciting this Beracha, which is required according to Ashkenazic custom, the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen," since according to Sephardic practice, this Beracha constitutes a Beracha Le'batala (blessing recited in vain). This would apply also in the case of a Sefaradi who hears an Ashkenazi recite a Beracha over Hallel on Rosh Hodesh – a Beracha required by Ashkenazi custom but not according to Sephardic custom. Since Sephardic tradition regards this blessing as a "Beracha Le'batala," the Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to this blessing. Many other Poskim dispute Hacham Ovadia's ruling, and maintain that since the Ashkenazi recites this blessing legitimately, in accordance with Ashkenazic practice, there is no problem for a Sefaradi to answer "Amen." Rabbi Bitan considers the possibility that Hacham Ovadia might agree that in the case of Kaddish, a Sefaradi may respond even if the Kaddish should not be recited according to Sephardic custom. One might distinguish between answering to an unwarranted blessing, which constitutes a "Beracha Le'batala," and answering to Kaddish, which is not a blessing. Rav Bitan concludes, however, that Hacham Ovadia likely applied his ruling even to Kaddish, and thus, in his view, a Sefaradi should not answer "Amen" to Kaddish if the Kaddish is not valid according to Sephardic custom. He may, however, answer "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" even according to Hacham Ovadia's position, as this is merely an expression of praise, and differs from the response of "Amen." Given the different views on this subject, Rav Bitan suggested avoiding this problem by reciting the verse, "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" (Tehillim 89:53), attempting to conclude the verse just when the others respond "Amen" to the Kaddish. This way, the Sefaradi answers "Amen" but says this word as part of a verse, which is always acceptable, thus satisfying all opinions.

The Menorah was the most adopted symbol in the Jewish world. But where is the original?   We know of a Menorah in Rome in 70CE. The Talmud tells us it was examined. But what follows is centuries of silence    What does History tell us? What do eyewitnesses report? What has the Church said? And what role does the 2nd Temple Menorah have, in the redemption of the Jewish People?   This episode is the outcome of the most up-to-date research and analysis and includes a recently recorded conversation with a Rabbi who entered the Vatican cellars 55 years ago accompanied by Pope John Paul II.   Timestamps: - 0:00 — Opening:    - 0:38 — Podcast intro (host & Rabbi Hersh).   - 1:14 — Memorial/announcements.   - 2:17 — Episode topic introduced: “Where is the menorah?”   - 4:00 — Menorah as Jewish symbol; historical significance.   - 8:00 — Arch of Titus / Josephus / early Roman display.   - 10:00 — Fire in 191 CE and disappearance possibilities.   - 15:00 — Jews in ancient Rome / social context.   - 20:00 — Constantine/Byzantine period and relocation theories (312 CE).   - 25:00 — Christian adoption/use of menorah imagery.   - 30:00 — Vatican holdings, openness, and inventories.   - 34:30 — Eyewitness claims overview; Rabbi Stencil letter exchange.   - 40:00 — Oscar Goldman 1962 account (electrician shown items).   - 41:30 — 1970s rabbi's underground Vatican visit description.   - 52:40 — Testimony analysis: credibility issues and scholarly skepticism.   - 1:03:47 — Theological point: first‑ vs. second‑Temple vessels and redemption.   - 1:10:00 — Halachic notes on making/holding menorah replicas; closing.

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Certain portions of the prayer service cannot be recited without the presence of a Minyan. These include Nakdishach, Kaddish, Barechu, Birkat Kohanim, the repetition of the Amida, the congregational reading of the Torah and the Haftara, and the Yag Middot (thirteen attributes of mercy). A "Minyan" is defined as a group of ten Jewish males who have reached the age of Bar-Misva. Nobody and nothing other than Jewish males above Bar-Misva age count toward a Minyan. If nine men are present in the synagogue, they cannot count the Sefer Torah, or the Teba or the Hechal, as the tenth "person" for the Minyan. Tradition teaches that Eliyahu Ha'nabi attends every Berit Mila. One should not think, however, that because of this tradition, a group of nine men at a Berit can be considered a Minyan given that Eliyahu is present and can thus be considered the tenth man. A Minyan requires the presence of ten men, and Eliyahu attends a Berit as an angel, not a man. Therefore, he cannot be counted. Stories are told of how Eliyahu appeared in the form of a human being, and when this happens, he can be counted toward a Minyan. However, when he arrives in the form of an angel, he does not count toward a Minyan. This applies also to the Gemara's teaching that the righteous are considered "alive" even after their passing. Some people mistakenly allow on this basis reciting Kaddish at a cemetery even without the presence of ten men, figuring that the Sadikim buried in the cemetery are considered "alive" and can thus be counted toward a Minyan. They draw proof from the Gemara's description (Ketubot 103) of how Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi would join his family every Friday night after his passing and recite Kiddush for them. If Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi could recite Kiddush for his family after his passing, this might indicate that Sadikim are truly considered alive with respect to Halacha even after their death. This inference, however, is incorrect. Firstly, there is a rule that we cannot reach Halachic conclusions based on the Aggadic sections of the Talmud, such as stories told of the Talmudic sages. Additionally, the Gemara describes Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi arriving in his home in the form of a living person, and so he could be halachically regarded as a human being. This cannot be said of the souls of the departed which cannot be seen. Therefore, Kaddish may not be recited in a cemetery without a Minyan, even if there are Sadikim known to be buried there. If somebody recites Kaddish in a cemetery in the presence of fewer than ten men, others should not answer "Amen," since the Kaddish is being recited inappropriately.

Certain portions of the prayer service cannot be recited without the presence of a Minyan. These include Nakdishach, Kaddish, Barechu, Birkat Kohanim, the repetition of the Amida, the congregational reading of the Torah and the Haftara, and the Yag Middot (thirteen attributes of mercy). A "Minyan" is defined as a group of ten Jewish males who have reached the age of Bar-Misva. Nobody and nothing other than Jewish males above Bar-Misva age count toward a Minyan. If nine men are present in the synagogue, they cannot count the Sefer Torah, or the Teba or the Hechal, as the tenth "person" for the Minyan. Tradition teaches that Eliyahu Ha'nabi attends every Berit Mila. One should not think, however, that because of this tradition, a group of nine men at a Berit can be considered a Minyan given that Eliyahu is present and can thus be considered the tenth man. A Minyan requires the presence of ten men, and Eliyahu attends a Berit as an angel, not a man. Therefore, he cannot be counted. Stories are told of how Eliyahu appeared in the form of a human being, and when this happens, he can be counted toward a Minyan. However, when he arrives in the form of an angel, he does not count toward a Minyan. This applies also to the Gemara's teaching that the righteous are considered "alive" even after their passing. Some people mistakenly allow on this basis reciting Kaddish at a cemetery even without the presence of ten men, figuring that the Sadikim buried in the cemetery are considered "alive" and can thus be counted toward a Minyan. They draw proof from the Gemara's description (Ketubot 103) of how Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi would join his family every Friday night after his passing and recite Kiddush for them. If Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi could recite Kiddush for his family after his passing, this might indicate that Sadikim are truly considered alive with respect to Halacha even after their death. This inference, however, is incorrect. Firstly, there is a rule that we cannot reach Halachic conclusions based on the Aggadic sections of the Talmud, such as stories told of the Talmudic sages. Additionally, the Gemara describes Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi arriving in his home in the form of a living person, and so he could be halachically regarded as a human being. This cannot be said of the souls of the departed which cannot be seen. Therefore, Kaddish may not be recited in a cemetery without a Minyan, even if there are Sadikim known to be buried there. If somebody recites Kaddish in a cemetery in the presence of fewer than ten men, others should not answer "Amen," since the Kaddish is being recited inappropriately.

This insightful series explores practical, thoughtful guidance for those navigating the shidduchim stage. Covering perspectives from Rabbonim, Mashpi'im, therapists, and women who have been there, this series is sure to give you or your child the confidence to move through the dating world with clarity and confidence.

Why does Israel release live Arab terrorists (who admit they will kill again if they can!) in exchange for the corpses of Jewish dead? Is this a Halachic thing? A Zionist thing?

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The Mitzva of Living in Israel: Zionist Propaganda, Messianic Dream or Halachic Imperative - Rabbi Karlinsky by Shapell's Rabbeim

In this class Rabbi Breitowitz discussed the history of organ transplants, the American vs Halachic qualifications of death, & their implications regarding organ donation.

In some editions of the Siddur, several words are added to the text of Baruch She'amar on Shabbat. However, these additions are incorrect. The text of Baruch She'amar – which, according to tradition, was revealed to the Ansheh Kenesset Ha'gedola (Men of the Great Assembly) on a piece of paper that fell from the heavens – contains precisely 87 words, and this is the exact text that we should recite. There are some editions of the Siddur in which additions for Shabbat appear before Baruch She'amar. One may recite these additions, though he should ensure to have in mind that they are not said as part of Baruch She'amar, but rather comprise a separate text. The custom is to stand during the recitation of Baruch She'amar. However, since standing is required only by force of custom, and not as a strict Halachic obligation, one who is ill or otherwise frail may sit. Our custom is to hold the front two Sisit of the Tallit in our hand during the recitation of Baruch She'amar. This is based on a Kabbalistic teaching mentioned in the Sha'ar Ha'kavanot (a work based on the teachings of Rav Haim Vital, 1542-1620), according to which there is a deep connection between Baruch She'amar and Sisit. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) adds that one should kiss the Sisit upon concluding Baruch She'amar, as an expression of love and affection for the Misva of Sisit. In the phrase "Ha'mehulal Be'feh Amo," there are some who say "Be'fi" instead of "Be'feh." However, this is incorrect. The proper text is "Be'feh." Significantly, the word "Be'feh" in Gematria equals 87 – the number of words in Baruch She'amar. The correct pronunciation of the final word of Baruch She'amar is "Ba'tishbahot," and not "Ba'tushbahot." One who arrives in the synagogue late, and skips Pesukeh De'zimra in order to recite the Amida together with the congregation, does not recite Baruch She'amar afterward. This Beracha is to be recited only before the Amida. (This applies also to Yishtabah, the concluding Beracha of Pesukeh De'zimra.) The first four words of Baruch She'amar are "Baruch She'amar Ve'haya Ha'olam," the first letters of which (Bet, Shin, Vav, Heh) spell the word "Be'shaveh" – "equal." This has been understood as alluding that reciting Baruch She'amar properly earns us rewards equal to the rewards granted to the angels for serving G-d. Moreover, these four words express praise to Hashem for bringing the world into existence – and so reciting this blessing properly helps us tap into G-d's creative powers. So often, we need Hashem to bring us a salvation, to "create" a solution for us. People frequently approach me asking how they can earn something that they so desperately need. One thing we can do is to recite Baruch She'amar properly, slowly, from the Siddur, and with concentration, thinking about how Hashem created the world from sheer nothingness, and in this merit we will, please G-d, be worthy of Him "creating" the solutions that we all need in our lives.

This episode discusses the Halachic principles of saving lives. In addition, the topics of bone marrow transplants, health risks and financial loss are covered.

Rabbi Breitowitz discusses the intricate Halachot relating to releasing captives, specifically mentioning the current Halachic rulings about the release of the hostages in Gaza.

Rabbi Breitowitz discusses the foundations for medical Halachot in the Torah. He elaborates on Judaism's command for one to seek medical care as best as possible and discusses the Halachic rulings for the donation of specific organs.

In this episode, we explore the detailed halachic principles surrounding the performance of Bris Milah (circumcision) on Shabbat. We discuss the sequence of procedures—cutting, folding back, and blood removal—along with permissible healing practices, and how these are integrated into Shabbat observance. Key topics include the handling of remaining skin strands, performing Bris on children born prematurely, and the parameters for children born during twilight or via Cesarean section. Medical, historical, and rabbinic perspectives are considered to clarify when and how the mitzvah may be performed while balancing Shabbat restrictions.

The proclamation "Hashem Melech, Hashem Malach, Hashem Yimloch Le'olam Va'ed," which we make each morning before Baruch She'amar, should be made while standing. On weekdays, "Hashem Melech" is recited just before Baruch She'amar, and so one remains standing until after Baruch She'amar. On Shabbat and holidays, however, when other chapters of Tehillim are recited in between "Hashem Melech" and Baruch She'amar, one must remain standing until he completes the verse recited right after "Hashem Melech" – "Ve'haya Hashem La'Melech…U'Shmo Ehad." The next paragraph – "Hoshi'enu" – may be recited sitting. If one has already prayed Shaharit, and, while learning Torah in the synagogue, he hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech," then he must stand. Preferably, he should also join them in the recitation. If, however, one hears an individual reciting "Hashem Melech," not with a Minyan, he has no obligation to stand. If a person is praying with a Minyan, and he is still reciting Hodu when the congregation reaches "Hashem Melech," then he should stand but not join the congregation in reciting "Hashem Melech." The Arizal taught that the sequence of the prayer service is vitally important, and so following the proper order takes precedence over the value of joining the congregation in reciting "Hashem Melech." Disrupting the sequence of the Tefila could adversely affect its impact, and so one should not recite "Hashem Melech" early, while he has yet to complete Hodu or the earlier parts of the service. This is the ruling of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) and the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939). This is in contrast to the view of the Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698), who felt that since we do not pray with all the deep intentions of the Arizal, the sequence of the prayers is not as critical, and thus one should interrupt an earlier part of the service for the sake of joining the recitation of "Hashem Melech." The Ben Ish Hai countered that we should follow the Arizal's practices despite not having all his deep Kavanot (intentions), and so the sequence must be maintained. It is worth noting that if Halacha discourages disrupting the Tefila with the recitation of a different part of the service, then certainly, and many times more so, it forbids interruptions such as reading text messages, checking notifications, and doing other things with one's device. Throughout the entire prayer service, we should try to remain as singularly focused on our Tefila as possible, and make a point of avoiding all distractions. "Hashem Melech" is recited also during the Selihot prayers, and the Ben Ish Hai writes that the aforementioned Halachot apply also when one hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech" during Selihot, and he is required to stand. Standing during "Hashem Melech" is the accepted custom, but not a strict Halachic requirement. Therefore, an elderly or infirm individual, who finds it difficult to stand, may remain seated for the recitation of "Hashem Melech." The Ben Ish Hai writes that standing is not required during the traditional recitation of "Hashem Melech" during the Hakafot on Simhat Torah. This custom is a relatively new development, and may thus be treated more leniently, such that standing is not required. Hacham Ovadia Yosef raises the question of how the Ben Ish Hai could write this, as standing is strictly required during Hakafot for an entirely different reason – because the Torah scrolls are being carried. Irrespective of the recitation of "Hashem Melech," standing is required in the synagogue when the Sefer Torah is being carried, which is of course happening during Hakafot. Some answer this question by suggesting that the Ben Ish Hai accepted the novel ruling of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) permitting one to sit during Hakafot. Rav Shlomo Zalman asserted that during Hakafot, the Torah scrolls are considered to be in their place, as they are meant to be danced with at this time. Standing for the Sefer Torah is required only when it is removed from its place, and therefore one may sit during Hakafot, when the Torah scrolls are, in a sense, in their place. For this reason, perhaps, the Ben Ish Hai permitted sitting while reciting "Hashem Melech" during the Hakafot. It is unlikely, however, that the Ben Ish Hai followed this novel position, and in fact, it is not accepted as Halacha. The story is told of Hacham Ezra Attieh (1885-1970), Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Porat Yosef, who, as an older man, felt weary during Hakafot on Simhat Torah, and so he left the room to sit down somewhere else. This is the generally accepted Halacha – that even those who feel weak or weary during Hakafot should leave the synagogue to sit. (It should be noted, however, that Hacham Ovadia permitted sitting when the Torah scrolls are stationary in the few moments between Hakafot.) It is more likely, then, that the Ben Ish Hai referred to the practice observed in many congregations to place the Torah scrolls on the Teba after dancing and recite the hymns, including "Hashem Melech," and he therefore wrote that sitting is permissible during that time. Summary: One must stand for the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Shaharit. If one had already prayed, and, while learning in the synagogue, he hears the congregation recite "Hashem Melech," he should stand and join their recitation. If one is reciting a different part of the prayer service, such as Hodu, then he should rise but not interrupt to recite "Hashem Melech." This applies also to the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Selihot. Standing is not required, however, for the recitation of "Hashem Melech" during Hakafot if the Torah scrolls are on the Teba and not being carried at that time. The elderly, infirm and others who find it difficult to stand may remain seated for the recitation of "Hashem Melech," even during Shaharit and Selihot.

On the night of a boy's 13 th birthday, when he becomes a Bar-Misva, he must – in principle – recite Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah. Generally, of course, a person's recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning covers all his Torah learning throughout the day and the following night. In the case of a Bar Misva boy, however, he recited Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning as a minor, who is not obligated in Misvot (except by virtue of his parents' obligation to train him in Misva observance). Therefore, his recitation that morning does not fulfill his obligation once he becomes a Halachic adult who now bears an obligation to recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Therefore, before the boy learns and speaks words of Torah on the night of his 13 th birthday, he is required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah. However, as there is some uncertainty as to whether this is necessary, Hacham Ovadia Yosef suggested two ways to avoid this question. One possibility is to recite Arbit before learning Torah, having in mind that the recitation of Ahabat Olam – the blessing immediately preceding Shema – will satisfy the obligation of Birkot Ha'Torah. As we have seen, this blessing discusses similar themes as those of Birkot Ha'Torah, and thus a person can fulfill his requirement of Birkot Ha'Torah by reciting this blessing. Hacham Ovadia adds, however, that if the boy chooses this option, he must ensure to recite Arbit after sundown, when he has already turned 13. The other option is for the boy to have in mind when he recites Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning that his recitation should remain in effect only until sundown. He can then recite Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown according to all opinions, without any concern. Incidentally, a similar Halacha applies to a convert. After undergoing conversion, a convert must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before he learns Torah, even if he had recited Birkot Ha'Torah that morning. His recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah as a gentile does not fulfill his obligation as a Jew, and so he must repeat Birkot Ha'Torah immediately after completing his conversion and assuming the formal status of a Jew. Summary: In principle, a boy must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before he learns Torah on the night he turns 13, even though he had recited Birkot Ha'Torah that morning. Preferably, he should have in mind when he recites Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning that his recitation should remain in effect only until sundown, so he can then repeat Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown according to all opinions. Alternatively, he can recite Arbit right after sundown and have in mind to fulfill his Birkot Ha'Torah obligation through the recitation of Ahabat Olam (the blessing preceding Shema), thus obviating the need to repeat Birkot Ha'Torah after sundown.

10 Animals [Part 5]: Identifying Chayos; Domestication; Wild beheimos; Horn types; Halachic differences. See seforim by Rabbi Cohen at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠www.kashrushalacha.com

In a previous installment, we saw that just as Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning before verbally speaking words of Torah, one is similarly required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning before listening to words of Torah. This is based on the Halachic principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh," which equates listening with speaking. One who listens to words of Torah is considered to be speaking those words himself, and so he must recite Birkot Ha'Torah. This conclusion gives rise to the question of whether it is permissible to teach Torah to Jews who can be presumed not to have recited Birkot Ha'Torah. Many communities run Torah learning programs for non-observant Jews, who certainly do not recite the morning blessings, such as Birkot Ha'Torah. Seemingly, by teaching them Torah, one causes them to violate the prohibition of learning before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. How, then, is this allowed, given that one is not permitted to facilitate another Jew's violation of Halacha? The Poskim offer different reasons why this should be allowed. One theory is that the mechanism of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" works through Kavana (intent) – meaning, the speaker has in mind that his words should be considered as though they were spoken also by the listeners. When teaching Torah to a non-observant audience, one does not have this intention, since the listeners have not recited Birkot Ha'Torah, and so they are not considered as though they are speaking the words. However, as we saw in a previous installment, it is uncertain whether the process of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" indeed requires Kavana in the context of Torah study. Another possibility is that non-observant Jews have the same status as people who are incapable of reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. If one is practically unable to recite Birkot Ha'Torah – such as if he does not know Hebrew, or if he does not have Siddur and does not know the text from memory – then Halacha allows him to learn Torah without reciting the Berachot. Jews who are unfamiliar with Halacha observance may likely fall under this category, and so they are allowed to learn Torah without reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. Others suggest that it is preferable for non-observant Jews to learn Torah, despite not having recited Birkot Ha'Torah, as the exposure to Torah learning could lead them to embrace observance. It is better for them to violate this transgression, of learning before Birkot Ha'Torah, than never to be taught Torah, as they will hopefully be drawn to learn more and become observant. Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein (contemporary) cites his father-in-law, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (Jerusalem, 1910-2012), as advancing a different rationale. He noted that non-observant Jews who attend a Torah lecture have no intention to fulfill the Misva of Torah learning, but come merely for the sake of curiosity or intellectual engagement. This kind of study, Rav Elyashiv asserted, does not qualify as a fulfillment of the Misva of Torah learning, and thus does not require Birkot Ha'Torah. Others dispute this line of reasoning, claiming that this indeed fulfills the Misva despite the absence of intent for the Misva. Summary: Although one is required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah each day before learning Torah, including silently listening to a Torah class, the Poskim generally allow teaching Torah to non-observant Jews who do not recite the required daily blessings.

After waking in the morning, a person is not permitted to learn Torah before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. As we saw in earlier installments, however, this applies only to learning verbally. Merely thinking Torah in one's mind, without speaking, is allowed before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. (We saw, though, that reading a Torah book, even silently, might require the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah.) Intuitively, we might assume that silently listening to a Torah lecture should be no different than silently thinking about Torah. Seemingly, then, if a person attends a Torah class in the synagogue early in the morning, he does not need to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. However, the Halachot Ketanot (Rav Yisrael Yaakob Hagiz, 1680-1757) rules that listening to a Torah class differs from thinking about Torah in this regard. He applies to this situation the famous Halachic principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" – that listening to the recitation of a text is akin to reciting it oneself. Thus, for example, every Shabbat, one person recites Kiddush, and everyone else at the table fulfills his obligation by listening to the recitation. Accordingly, people who listen to a Torah class are considered to be saying the words spoken by the teacher. Hence, listening to a Torah class is akin to verbally speaking words of Torah, and requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Hacham Ovadia Yosef brought proof to this theory from the Gemara's inference of the Birkot Ha'Torah obligation from a verse in the Book of Debarim (32:3). The Gemara in Masechet Berachot (21a) cites as the Biblical source of this requirement the verse, "Ki Shem Hashem Ekra, Habu Godel L'Elokenu" – "When I call the Name of G-d, give praise to G-d." Moshe here was announcing that when he teaches Torah, the people should recite a blessing. Thus, the very source of Birkot Ha'Torah is a situation where people recite a Beracha before listening to words of Torah, clearly implying that even silently listening to a Torah lecture requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This is the ruling also of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909). Although several Poskim (including the Lebush and Hida) disagree, Halacha follows the opinion of the Halachot Ketanot. Therefore, those who attend a Torah class early in the morning must ensure to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Some addressed the question of how to reconcile the Halachot Ketanot's reasoning with the ruling of the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) that the person who receives an Aliya to the Torah must read along with the Ba'al Koreh (reader). Fundamentally, the obligation to read is upon the Oleh (person who was called to the Torah); the Ba'al Koreh reads the Torah on his behalf. Seemingly, the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" should allow the Oleh to silently listen to the reader and thereby discharge his obligation. Indeed, the Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) disputed the Rosh's ruling, and maintained that the Oleh does not need to read together with the reader. Halacha, however, follows the Rosh's ruling. If, as the Halachot Ketanot writes, listening to words of Torah is akin to reciting them, then why must the Oleh read along with the Ba'al Koreh? Several explanations were given for why the congregational Torah reading might be different, and is not subject to the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh." One theory is that "Shome'a Ke'oneh" applies only when there is a general obligation to recite a certain text. The congregational Torah reading is an obligation upon the congregation as a whole, and not on any particular individual, and it therefore is not included in the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh." Others explain that since the original format of Torah reading was that the Oleh reads the text, and the concept of a Ba'al Koreh was introduced later, the Oleh is required to read along, to preserve the initial arrangement. Yet another answer is that the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" does not allow for one person to recite the Beracha over a Misva and another person to perform the Misva. On Purim, for example, the one who reads the Megilla for the congregation also recites the Beracha. Never does someone from the congregation recite the Beracha, and then the Ba'al Koreh reads the Megilla. Therefore, the Oleh cannot recite the Beracha and then fulfill his obligation by listening to the Ba'al Koreh's reading. Interestingly, Rav Shlomo Kluger (1785-1869) asserted that this Halacha regarding Birkot Ha'Torah before listening a Torah class hinges on a debate among the Rishonim regarding a different issue. It often happens that somebody is still in the middle of the Amida prayer when the Hazzan begins the repetition, and reaches Nakdishach. Common practice follows the view of Rashi, that the person in this situation should stop and listen silently to Nakdishach in order to fulfill this Misva. Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171), however, disagreed with this ruling, arguing that in light of the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh," listening to Nakdishach in the middle of the Amida would constitute a Hefsek (forbidden interruption) in the Amida. This is no different than reciting Nakdishach in the middle of the Amida, which is of course not allowed. Seemingly, Rav Kluger writes, the ruling of the Halachot Ketanot, that listening to Torah is akin to speaking Torah, follows the view of Rabbenu Tam, that "Shome'a Ke'oneh" actually equates listening to speaking. According to Rashi, listening is not precisely the same as speaking, which is why he permits listening to Nakdishach during the Amida. By the same token, it would seem that Rashi would not require reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before listening to a Torah lecture. The question, then, becomes why we follow Rashi's opinion regarding listening to Nakdishach during the Amida, but we accept the Halachot Ketanot's ruling regarding Birkot Ha'Torah. These two rulings seem to contradict one another – as the first presumes that listening is not precisely like speaking, whereas the second presumes that listening is equivalent to speaking. Hacham Ovadia answers that when a person is reciting the Amida as the congregation reaches Nakdishach, he wants to fulfill the Misva of reciting Nakdishach, but he also does not wish to interrupt his Amida. Halacha therefore allows him to listen to Nakdishach – such that he will be credited with this Misva – without being considered in violation of disrupting the Amida. Since the person seeks to perform the Misva, an exception is made to allow him to do so. Even Rashi agrees that listening is equivalent to speaking, but in the specific instance where a person recites the Amida and hears Nakdishach, special permission is given to listen to Nakdishach. Hacham Ovadia cites in this context the Gemara's teaching (Kiddushin 39b) that a person's intention to transgress a sin is disregarded if he ends up being unable to commit the forbidden act. A person's thoughts are discounted as far as Halachic violations are concerned, and thus one cannot be considered guilty of disrupting his Amida by silently listening to Nakdishach. Another question that was asked regarding the Halachot Ketanot's ruling is whether the speaker and audience must have specific intention for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect. During Kiddush, the person reciting Kiddush must have in mind that his recitation will be effective in satisfying the listeners' obligation, and they must likewise intend to fulfill their obligation by hearing his recitation. Seemingly, then, if listening to a Torah class is akin to speaking words of Torah due to the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh," this should depend on whether or not the speaker and audience have this specific intention. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef, in his Yabia Omer (vol. 4, addendum to #8), writes that this specific intention is not necessary, and he draws proof to the fact that Torah study marks an exception to the general rule. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (38) infers the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" from the story of King Yoshiyahu, before whom a man named Shafan read the Torah, and Yoshiyahu was considered to have read it himself. There is no mention of either Yoshiyahu or Shafan having specific intention that Yoshiyahu should be considered to have read the text – indicating that such intention is not necessary. Although in general "Shome'a Ke'oneh" requires the intention of both the speaker and listener, Torah study marks an exception, where such intention is not needed for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect. Rav Yisrael Bitan offers two possible explanations for this distinction, for why the mechanism of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" does not require Kavana (intent) in the context of Torah study, but it does in the context of all other Misvot. First, the primary method of Torah learning is through a teacher and listeners; this is the most common way that Torah is studied. Therefore, the listeners fulfill their obligation by listening without having to create a connection to the speaker through Kavana. Alternatively, one could say that in the case of Torah learning, the intent is present by default. When a Rabbi or teacher stands up before a room to teach Torah, everyone's intention is clearly to fulfill the Misva of Torah learning, and there is no need to consciously think this. The fundamental difference between these two explanations is that according to the first, Kavana is not necessary for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect when teaching Torah, whereas according to the second, Kavana is necessary, but it is presumed even without consciously having it in mind. These different perspectives will affect the fascinating question of whether a distinction exists between attending a Torah class and listening to a recording. According to the first explanation, listening to Torah is equivalent to speaking Torah even without Kavana, and this would be true even when listening to a recording of a Torah class. According to the second approach, however, Kavana is necessary for the listener to be considered to be speaking, and the speaker and listener are presumed to have this intent – and thus this would not apply in the case of a recording. When listening to a recording, there is no speaker to supply the Kavana, and thus the listener is not considered to be speaking the words. It would then follow that one would not be required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before listening to a recorded Torah class in the morning. For example, if a person wishes to listen to a Torah class as he makes his way to the synagogue in the morning, he would not – according to this second explanation – be required to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. In practice, however, as this matter cannot be conclusively determined one way or another, we must be stringent and recite Birkot Ha'Torah even before listening to a recorded Torah class. Therefore, one who wishes to hear a Torah class in the morning – either in person or a recording – must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and the verses of Birkat Kohanim beforehand. Summary: One who wishes to hear a Torah class in the morning – either in person or a recording – must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and the verses of Birkat Kohanim beforehand.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:6) famously instructs, "Aseh Lecha Rav U'kneh Lecha Haber" – literally, "Make for yourself a Rabbi, and 'purchase' for yourself a friend." This is commonly understood to mean that that as important as it is to have a Rabbi, it is even more important to have a friend, and one should therefore go so far as to "purchase" a friend if necessary. The Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806), however, added a different interpretation, explaining "U'kneh Lecha Haber" to mean that the quill – "Kaneh" – should be one's "friend." One should make sure to learn from a knowledgeable Rabbi – and he should also grow accustomed to writing the Torah he learns as much as possible. There is immense value in writing the Torah that one studies, as this helps him retain the material and also preserves it. The question arises as to whether one who wishes to write words of Torah in the morning must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah in the morning, but (as we saw in a previous installment) a distinction exists between silently thinking about Torah and speaking words of Torah. Birkot Ha'Torah is required in the morning before verbally speaking words of Torah, but not – according to the consensus opinion – before silently thinking words of Torah. At first glance, we would assume that silently writing Torah material is no different from silently thinking about Torah, and thus this may be done before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Interestingly, however, the Shulhan Aruch distinguishes between thinking about Torah in one's mind and writing Torah. When it comes to thinking about Torah, the Shulhan Aruch follows the view of the Agur (Rav Yaakob Landau, 1410-1493) that silent Torah thoughts do not require Birkot Ha'Torah. However, the Shulhan Aruch rules that writing Torah indeed requires the recitation of the Birkot Ha'Torah. This is based on the position of the Abudarham (Rav David Abudarham, Spain, 14 th century) which Rav Yosef Karo – author of the Shulhan Aruch – brings in his Bet Yosef. Importantly, however, Rav Yosef Karo wrote a collection of notes to the Bet Yosef called Bedek Ha'bayit, in which he corrects or amends certain passages in the Bet Yosef. And in the Bedek Ha'bayit, commenting on his citation of the Abudarham's ruling concerning one who writes Torah, Rav Yosef Karo remarks: "See the words of the Agur" – a clear reference to the aforementioned ruling of the Agur that Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before thinking about Torah. It thus appears that the Bet Yosef retracted his opinion, and concluded that one does not, in fact, need to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before writing Torah. The question then becomes, what was Rav Yosef Karo's final ruling? In the Bet Yosef, he seems to have concluded that writing Torah does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, but in the Shulhan Aruch, he wrote that it does. The Poskim dispute the question of whether the Rav Yosef Karo wrote the Shulhan Aruch before or after he wrote his emendations to the Bet Yosef. Therefore, it is unclear which ruling reflects his final position – his ruling in Bedek Ha'bayit, or his ruling in the Shulhan Aruch. If we follow the Shulhan Aruch's ruling, which distinguishes between thinking about Torah and writing Torah, what's the rationale behind this distinction? Why would thinking about Torah not require Birkot Ha'Torah, but writing Torah would? Later commentators offered several explanations. One approach is that the obligation of Torah study is inherently linked to the obligation to teach Torah. Therefore, Birkot Ha'Torah – the blessing over the Misva to learn Torah – is recited only upon a kind of learning which could also facilitate the teaching of Torah. As Torah can be taught through speech and through the written word, these two forms of Torah learning require Birkot Ha'Torah, whereas silently thinking about Torah, which of course is not a way in which Torah can be disseminated, does not. Others explain that one must learn Torah with the goal of remembering the material. Therefore, the Beracha is recited only when one speaks or writes Torah, as one is more likely to remember material which he verbalizes or writes than material which he simply thinks in his mind. The Lebush (Rav Mordechai Yoffe, 1530-1612) answers, very simply, that writing, as opposed to thinking, is an action, and a Beracha is recited only before a Misva act. Finally, the Hayeh Adam (Rav Abraham Danzig, Vilna, 1748-1820) explains that people often tend to say the words as they write, and therefore Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before writing, given the likelihood that he will end up speaking words of Torah. As for the final Halacha, the Mishna Berura cites several Poskim who rule that due to the uncertainty surrounding this question, one who wishes to write Torah must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then recite verses from the Torah before proceeding to write. This is the ruling of Hacham Ovadia Yosef, as well. Verbally reading verses before writing satisfies all opinions and thus avoids this Halachic uncertainty. (Rabbi Yisrael Bitan notes that in one work, Hacham Ovadia is cited as ruling that a person in this situation must recite Birkot Ha'Torah and should then "preferably" recite verses before writing – indicating that this is a preference, but not a requirement. However, Rabbi Bitan shows that this is an inaccurate representation of Hacham Ovadia's position, as in truth he maintained that one must first verbally read verses in order to satisfy all opinions.) This Halacha applies also to a Sofer who wishes to do some work – writing a Sefer Torah, Tefillin or Mezuza – in the morning. Some Poskim maintained that since a Sofer merely copies the Torah text, and is not actually learning Torah, Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before such work. However, due to the different opinions that exist, a Sofer should ensure to recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read verses before writing. This applies also to somebody who is typing Torah material from a handwritten text, without any intention to learn as he types. Although one could argue that this does not qualify as Torah learning, nevertheless, given the uncertainty, the typist should first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, verbally read some verses, and then proceed to the typing. Summary: One who wishes to write Torah insights, commentaries, etc. in the morning should first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read some Torah text before writing, in order to satisfy all opinions. This applies also to a Sofer – he should recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read some verses before writing in the morning.

Many people have the custom each morning to read "Hok Le'Yisrael" – a collection of texts that includes passages from the Tanach, Mishna, Halachic works, Zohar, and other sources. "Hok Le'Yisrael" follows a regimented schedule, with different pieces of texts being recited each day. Often, the people who read "Hok Le'Yisrael" do not understand the material they read. The question arises whether a person may read "Hok Le'Yisrael" in the morning before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah for the first time in the morning, but does this apply even if one reads Torah literature without understanding the text? Does this qualify as "learning" with respect to the obligation of Birkot Ha'Torah? Rav Schneur Zalman of Liadi (first Rebbe of Lubavitch, 1745-1812), in his Shulhan Aruch Ha'Rav, distinguishes in this regard between the Tanach and other texts. When one reads verses from the Torah, Nebi'im or Ketubim, this constitutes Torah learning regardless of whether or not he understands what he reads. When it comes to all other texts, however, reading them qualifies as Torah study only if one understands the material he reads. Similarly, the Mishna Berura cites the Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 1635-1683) as stating that if one reads "Ezehu Mekoman" – the chapter of Mishna which is customarily read during the "Korbanot" section each morning – without understanding the text, this is not considered Torah study. This is true also of "Rabbi Yishmael Omer," the paragraph which is customarily read in the morning, listing the thirteen methods by which the Sages extracted Halachot from the Biblical text. If a person does not understand this passage, reading it does not qualify as Torah learning. This rule has ramifications with regard to Ereb Pesach, when it is customary for firstborns to participate in a Siyum celebration in order to be absolved from the "fast of the firstborn" (Ta'anit Bechorot) on this day. Hacham Ovadia Yosef writes that a Siyum is effective in absolving the firstborns of their obligation only if the person making the Siyum truly understood all the material in the Masechet (tractate of Talmud) which he completes. Simply reading the words does not suffice. The exception to this rule is the Zohar, the reading of which qualifies as Torah learning even if one does not understand what he reads – and even if he does not read the words correctly. This is the ruling of the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) and of Rav Haim Palachi (Turkey, 1788-1868). The words of the Zohar have such power and potency that reading them has the effect of absorbing the content into one's being even if he does not understand what he reads. It is told that the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria, 1534-1572) once advised somebody to read five pages of Zohar each day as a Tikkun (rectification) for his soul. And many have the custom to read from the Zohar Hadash each day during the month of Elul, until Yom Kippur, because the reading itself brings great spiritual benefits, even if one does not understand the text. Therefore, one who reads Zohar in the morning must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. This exception is unique to the Zohar. Other Kabbalistic works – such as Sha'ar Ha'kavanot and the teachings of the Rashash (Rav Shalom Sharabi, 1720-1777) – elucidate and expound upon the teachings of the Zohar, and thus simply reading them without understanding what they say does not qualify as Torah learning. Returning the case of those who read "Hok Le'Yisrael," since this reading includes passages from the Tanach, one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before reading this text in the morning, even if he does not understand anything he reads. This applies also to somebody who wishes to read Tehillim in the morning – he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, even though he does not understand the verses he recites, because Tehillim is part of the Tanach. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that although reading Tanach and Zohar without understanding the text qualifies as Torah study, we should always aspire to understand to the best of our ability. The sin of "Bittul Torah" (neglecting Torah) is normally defined as wasting time which could have been used for Torah, but it includes also wasting one's capabilities which could have been used to understand Torah. G-d gave us intellectual skills, the ability to comprehend, and we must utilize these powers to understand as much Torah as we can to the greatest extent possible. Today, when virtually every Torah text is available with translations and commentaries, there is really no excuse for reading any part of Torah literature without understanding the material. Summary: If one wishes to read verses from the Torah – such as Tehillim – in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, even if he will not understand the text he will be reciting. This applies also to someone who wishes to read passages from the Zohar which he does not understand. Reading any other Torah text, however, does not qualify as Torah study unless one understands what he reads, and thus one who reads in the morning other Torah texts without understanding does not need to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah.

Before one learns Torah in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. The Gemara cites different opinions as to which particular subjects within the broad corpus of Torah may not be studied before the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Rav Huna maintained that only the study of Tanach requires Birkot Ha'Torah; in his view, one may study anything else before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Rabbi Elazar ruled that both Tanach and Midrash require Birkot Ha'Torah, because the Midrash explains the verses of the Tanach. The next opinion brought is that of Rabbi Yohanan, who held that even the study of Mishna must be preceded by Birkot Ha'Torah. However, Halacha follows the final view brought by the Gemara – that of Raba, who asserted that even Gemara requires Birkot Ha'Torah. Accordingly, the Rambam and Shulhan Aruch write that one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying either Tanach or any part of Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral law). Although the Shulhan Aruch does not specify the study of Midrash, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1520-1572) adds that Midrash also requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. The Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) writes that the Shulhan Aruch does not disagree with the Rama on this point, even though he did not specifically mention Midrash. The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rav Yehiel Michel Epstein of Nevardok, 1829-1908) notes the possibility of restricting this requirement to areas related to Halacha. It is possible, he writes, that Birkot Ha'Torah is required only before the study of texts that form the basis of Halacha. The Sages infer Halachot from the verses, and these inferences and their applications are discussed, elucidated and debated in the Midrash, Mishna and Gemara – and it might be for this reason that these texts are specified as the material requiring Birkot Ha'Torah. If so, then one would be permitted to study non-halachic portions of the Torah – such as the stories in Midrashic texts, Aggadic portions of the Gemara, and Zohar – before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. The Aruch Ha'shulhan remains uncertain about this matter. By contrast, the Kaf Ha'haim Sofer (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the study of the Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. He does not explain the reason for this ruling, but we may presume that he equated the study of Zohar with the study of Gemara, and, moreover, we occasionally determine practical Halacha based on teachings in the Zohar. The final Halacha is that even the study of non-halachic texts such as the Midrash and Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. The study of works of Mussar also requires Birkot Ha'Torah, because these works are based upon Torah sources. Texts such as Mesilat Yesharim and Michtab Me'Eliyahu, which guide and instruct how to live a religious life, are rooted entirely in Torah, and so they certainly qualify as parts of Torah requiring the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This applies to works of Hassidic teachings, as well. In principle, biographies of Sadikim, or story books that tell about the lives of great Sages, may be read before Birkot Ha'Torah, because reading these stories – despite being very valuable – does not qualify as the study of Torah. In practice, however, books about great Rabbis almost invariably contain Torah insights which they taught, and so they require Birkot Ha'Torah. One is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects, even those subjects which have great value and are important to learn. For example, one must study math in order to properly understand certain sections of the Gemara, such as those which deal with geometry (e.g. Sukka, Erubin and Kil'ayim). There are texts which address the dimensions and layout of the Bet Ha'mikdash which similarly cannot be understood without a background in mathematics. Scientific knowledge, too, is critically important for the understanding of certain sections of the Talmud – such as the Gemara's discussion about the volume of wine which a Nazir must drink to be liable for violating his vow, which touches upon the subject of volume displacement. This issue requires an understanding of how displacement works, and how the density of wine becomes a factor. One cannot understand the portions of the Talmud that deal with the Jewish calendar without basic knowledge of astronomy. An understanding of modern technology, too, is necessary for learning how Halacha applies in our time, and indeed, Hacham Ovadia Yosef studied the mechanics of boilers in order to determine the relevant Halachot. Nevertheless, the study of these subjects does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, since they are not actual Torah, but rather background information to help in the study of Torah. The Rambam writes that subjects such as mathematics and science are the "chefs" and "maidservants" of Torah, meaning, they are necessary for the understanding of Torah, but are not part of Torah. Therefore, one is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects. Summary: One may not learn any Torah subject before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. This includes Tanach, Midrash, Mishna, Gemara, Halachic texts, Zohar, Mussar and Hassidut. Biographies of Sadikim, too, require Birkot Ha'Torah since they usually incorporate Torah insights by the Sages whose lives and legacy they present. Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before the study of non-Torah subjects, even those which are necessary to learn to properly understand Torah.

When does chazanus cross into tircha d'tzibburah? Can a chazan use popular tunes, repeat words, or sing with a choir? Should a professional chazan be hired for the Yamim Noraim, or is simplicity preferred? Is chazanus an ideal form of avodas Hashem — or is it frowned upon? What are the qualifications required of a Yamim Noraim chazan? Host: Ari Wasserman, author of the newly published, revised and expanded book Making it Work, on workplace challenges and Halachic Q & A on the Job with Rabbi Isaac Rice – Mora De'asra of Congregation Anshei Chesed, Hewlitt NY – 12:35 with Rabbi Zev Leff – Posek, Author, Rosh Yeshiva & Rav of Moshav Matisyahu – 48:03 with Rabbi Moshe Walter – Rabbi of Woodside Synagogue Ahavas Torah and prolific author https://www.rabbimoshewalter.com/ – 1:13:00 with Chazan Nissim Saal – Chief Chazzan at Yeshurun Central Synagogue – 1:38:55 Conclusions and takeaways – 1:50:43 מראי מקומות   

Rabbi Berel Wein ZT”L – never published interview – educating our youth who don't want to listen with Rabbi Wein – Renowned Rov, Author and Lecturer – 1:42:14 The Headlines Quit Smoking Challenge – featuring David Kopciel, Stamford Hill, London with David Kopciel – 9:35   UnKosher Competition – The Four Halachic Red Lines in Business You Can't Cross When is it prohibited to interfere with someone else's pending transaction? (“Ani Hamehapech B'chararah”) When is it prohibited to capitalize on someone else's groundwork? (“Ani Hamenakef”) Beis Din in Action: • Outbidding someone for an apartment • Poaching a long-term client • Taking a business idea and running with it with Rabbi Mendy Weinberger – Sgan Rosh Bais Din, Bais Din Maysharim –16:03 with Rabbi Yitzhak Grossman – Rosh Chaburah and Senior Lecturer, Greater Washington Community Kollel – 41:42 with Rabbi Dovid Schoen – Av Bais Din, The Bais Din of Florida – 1:09:10 Conclusions and takeaways – 1:34:25 מראי מקומות