Podcasts about three people

The jury at the Central Criminal Court sitting in Limerick has been discharged, for what they were told were legal reasons around disclosure. Father-of-one Gerard Kennelly was found with fatal stab injuries at Knockanure outside Listowel, in the early hours of Monday, May 27th, 2024. The three accused are Kieran Brady, who is in his mid-30s, from Upper Athea, Co. Limerick, 24-year-old Abigail Lynch of Woodview Place, Tarbert, and 29-year-old Kane Hornyak, of Doon Road, Ballybunion. Jerry spoke to Kerryman journalist Sinéad Kelleher.

In day 139 of the Jewish Inspiration Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe concludes the Gate of Slander in Orchos Tzaddikim by discussing the sixth and final dimension: speaking Lashon Hara about honest charity collectors and distributors. He explains how such slander is especially devastating because it discourages donations, harms the poor, drives away righteous fundraisers, and ultimately interferes with the holy work of tzedakah.Rabbi Wolbe shares inspiring personal examples of meticulous financial accountability from his grandfather during the Holocaust and his own work with TORCH. He emphasizes that Lashon Hara “kills three people” (speaker, listener, and subject), warns against associating with habitual speakers of slander, and teaches the dangers of even seemingly positive speech when said in the wrong context (such as praising someone to their competitor). The class closes with a powerful reminder about the tremendous value of every human being and the need for extreme caution with our words._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by Peter & Becky BotvinRecorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on January 26, 2026, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on May 28, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Hey Rabbi! Podcast: https://heyrabbi.transistor.fm/episodesPrayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.orgv_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #lashonhara, #guardyourtongue, #chofetzchaim, #Slander, #Gossip, #ShmirasHaLashon, #teshuvah, #judgefavorably, #dignity, #powerofspeech, #repentance ★ Support this podcast ★

In day 139 of the Jewish Inspiration Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe concludes the Gate of Slander in Orchos Tzaddikim by discussing the sixth and final dimension: speaking Lashon Hara about honest charity collectors and distributors. He explains how such slander is especially devastating because it discourages donations, harms the poor, drives away righteous fundraisers, and ultimately interferes with the holy work of tzedakah.Rabbi Wolbe shares inspiring personal examples of meticulous financial accountability from his grandfather during the Holocaust and his own work with TORCH. He emphasizes that Lashon Hara “kills three people” (speaker, listener, and subject), warns against associating with habitual speakers of slander, and teaches the dangers of even seemingly positive speech when said in the wrong context (such as praising someone to their competitor). The class closes with a powerful reminder about the tremendous value of every human being and the need for extreme caution with our words._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by Peter & Becky BotvinRecorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on January 26, 2026, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on May 28, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Hey Rabbi! Podcast: https://heyrabbi.transistor.fm/episodesPrayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.orgv_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #lashonhara, #guardyourtongue, #chofetzchaim, #Slander, #Gossip, #ShmirasHaLashon, #teshuvah, #judgefavorably, #dignity, #powerofspeech, #repentance ★ Support this podcast ★

Cops looking for three suspects - wanted for shooting three people in the Bronx... The City Council is pushing the mayor to add a fifth person to FDNY trucks... Art work made from dog food on display in NYC full 463 Wed, 27 May 2026 09:51:24 +0000 YMnnMA37qslq0PjWL0hxD6YXoljvy2iL news 1010 WINS ALL LOCAL news Cops looking for three suspects - wanted for shooting three people in the Bronx... The City Council is pushing the mayor to add a fifth person to FDNY trucks... Art work made from dog food on display in NYC The podcast is hyper-focused on local news, issues and events in the New York City area. This podcast's purpose is to give New Yorkers New York news about their neighborhoods and shine a light on the issues happening in their backyard. 2024 © 2021 Audacy, Inc.

Sarah Kellen Vickers, Jeffrey Epstein's longtime assistant and one of the women named in his 2007 non-prosecution agreement as a potential co-conspirator, reportedly told congressional investigators that she was not an accomplice in Epstein's abuse operation but one of his victims. In closed-door testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Kellen denied helping Epstein traffic or abuse girls and instead described herself as someone who was sexually and psychologically abused by Epstein for more than a decade. She claimed Epstein manipulated, controlled, and “gaslit” her, and she pushed back against the long-standing public portrayal of her as a key operator inside his network. Her account attempts to recast her role from suspected facilitator to exploited subordinate, arguing that she lacked real power inside Epstein's orbit and was trapped by dependence, coercion, and abuse.The testimony is significant because Kellen has long been treated as one of the most important unanswered figures in the Epstein case: she worked close to Epstein, was accused by victims of helping arrange encounters, and was shielded from federal prosecution by the controversial Florida deal that protected named and unnamed potential co-conspirators. According to the reporting, Kellen also gave investigators names of additional people allegedly connected to Epstein's abuse network, which lawmakers described as a potentially important lead. But her testimony also creates a central tension for investigators and the public: whether Kellen's claims of victimization explain her conduct, or whether they collide with years of allegations that she helped keep Epstein's machinery running. Either way, her appearance before Congress puts one of Epstein's most scrutinized former insiders back at the center of the investigation.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Here is who Epstein's longtime assistant accused of sexual abuse | CNN PoliticsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

Sarah Kellen Vickers, Jeffrey Epstein's longtime assistant and one of the women named in his 2007 non-prosecution agreement as a potential co-conspirator, reportedly told congressional investigators that she was not an accomplice in Epstein's abuse operation but one of his victims. In closed-door testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Kellen denied helping Epstein traffic or abuse girls and instead described herself as someone who was sexually and psychologically abused by Epstein for more than a decade. She claimed Epstein manipulated, controlled, and “gaslit” her, and she pushed back against the long-standing public portrayal of her as a key operator inside his network. Her account attempts to recast her role from suspected facilitator to exploited subordinate, arguing that she lacked real power inside Epstein's orbit and was trapped by dependence, coercion, and abuse.The testimony is significant because Kellen has long been treated as one of the most important unanswered figures in the Epstein case: she worked close to Epstein, was accused by victims of helping arrange encounters, and was shielded from federal prosecution by the controversial Florida deal that protected named and unnamed potential co-conspirators. According to the reporting, Kellen also gave investigators names of additional people allegedly connected to Epstein's abuse network, which lawmakers described as a potentially important lead. But her testimony also creates a central tension for investigators and the public: whether Kellen's claims of victimization explain her conduct, or whether they collide with years of allegations that she helped keep Epstein's machinery running. Either way, her appearance before Congress puts one of Epstein's most scrutinized former insiders back at the center of the investigation.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Here is who Epstein's longtime assistant accused of sexual abuse | CNN Politics

Sarah Kellen Vickers, Jeffrey Epstein's longtime assistant and one of the women named in his 2007 non-prosecution agreement as a potential co-conspirator, reportedly told congressional investigators that she was not an accomplice in Epstein's abuse operation but one of his victims. In closed-door testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Kellen denied helping Epstein traffic or abuse girls and instead described herself as someone who was sexually and psychologically abused by Epstein for more than a decade. She claimed Epstein manipulated, controlled, and “gaslit” her, and she pushed back against the long-standing public portrayal of her as a key operator inside his network. Her account attempts to recast her role from suspected facilitator to exploited subordinate, arguing that she lacked real power inside Epstein's orbit and was trapped by dependence, coercion, and abuse.The testimony is significant because Kellen has long been treated as one of the most important unanswered figures in the Epstein case: she worked close to Epstein, was accused by victims of helping arrange encounters, and was shielded from federal prosecution by the controversial Florida deal that protected named and unnamed potential co-conspirators. According to the reporting, Kellen also gave investigators names of additional people allegedly connected to Epstein's abuse network, which lawmakers described as a potentially important lead. But her testimony also creates a central tension for investigators and the public: whether Kellen's claims of victimization explain her conduct, or whether they collide with years of allegations that she helped keep Epstein's machinery running. Either way, her appearance before Congress puts one of Epstein's most scrutinized former insiders back at the center of the investigation.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Here is who Epstein's longtime assistant accused of sexual abuse | CNN PoliticsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

 Mark 6:14–29This week we walk into one of the darkest and most sobering passages in Scripture: the beheading of John the Baptist. But this message is about far more than one man's death. It is about what happens when people repeatedly ignore the voice of God until conviction grows quiet.In this message we will examine:The danger of a hardened heartHow bitterness destroys lives and families The consequences of hidden sin and compromiseWhy conviction is actually the mercy of GodThe terrifying reality of silencing your conscienceHerod heard truth but refused to surrender.Herodias allowed offense to become bitterness.Salome became collateral damage in sinful dysfunction.And John the Baptist stood boldly for truth no matter the cost.This sermon speaks directly to:✔️ Spiritual compromise✔️ Unforgiveness✔️ Pride and rebellion✔️ Conviction of sin✔️ Repentance and salvation through Jesus ChristIf you have ever struggled with guilt, bitterness, conviction, or wondering whether God is still speaking to your heart, this message is for you.#Sermon #Mark6 #JohnTheBaptist #BiblicalPreaching #ChristianLiving #Repentance #Conviction #Forgiveness #Faith #JesusChrist #Church #BibleStudy #GospelTruth #ChristianEncouragement #Preaching #SpiritualGrowth #BaptistChurch #SundayService #ChristianFaith #BiblePreaching

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

A ceasefire is supposed to be in place in Ukraine and Russia, with US President Donald Trump hoping it can be extended and end the four year old war. However, Ukrainian officials say that at least three people have been killed over the past 24-hours by Russian drone strikes. Paul was joined by Emmanuelle Chaze from Kharkiv for the latest.

A British doctor is among three people who've been airlifted from the cruise ship hit by an outbreak of a deadly virus. Also: An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson says officials are reviewing a new US proposal to end the war. And the American media mogul Ted Turner, who launched CNN, has died at the age of 87.

For the latest developments Cliodhna O'Flynn, Journalist based in Tenerife.

Sarah Morris, freelance journalist in Spain; Christine Loscher, Professor of Immunology at DCU; Nick Pisa, reporter with The Daily Mail in Zurich; and Nyka Alexander, Manager of Communications on Emergencies at the World Health Organisation

Most people think their "team" is just the people they work with. It's not. In this episode, Jake breaks down the three roles every artist and entrepreneur needs in their corner — mentors, teammates, and cheerleaders — and why confusing them is costing you.Your team is bigger than your business. In this episode of Move Faster, Jake breaks down the three types of people every creative needs in their life — and why mixing them up will slow you down.He draws a clear line between coaches (you pay for skill) and mentors (you earn through action), and shares how he's found mentors not in classrooms, but through YouTube rabbit holes, working alongside entrepreneurs on set, and just learning to shut up and ask better questions.Then there's your teammates — the people in the trenches with you, pushing toward the same level. And finally, your cheerleaders — the ones who may not be playing your game, but always want to see you win. Jake makes the case that knowing which role someone fills changes everything about how you show up in that relationship.In this episode:Why mentors aren't coaches — and what you actually owe themHow to find mentors without a traditional networkThe difference between teammates and cheerleaders (and why it took Jake years to stop confusing them)Why your spouse needs to be your number one cheerleader — minimumWhen it's time to become the mentor yourself

Your meetings aren't broken. They're designed to reward the wrong behavior. In this episode, Lisa Goldenthal puts a bold leadership experiment to the test: removing slide decks entirely—just like Bezos. What followed? Three people quit. Not the quiet ones—the polished performers. This conversation goes straight to the fault line inside most executive teams: Are your meetings driving real thinking… or just showcasing confidence? Are you promoting clarity… or rewarding presentation theater? Lisa unpacks why 71% of executive meetings fail, how slide culture silences your sharpest minds, and the simple pre-meeting shift that reveals what actually matters—before anyone walks into the room. This is not about better meetings. It's about better decisions. Now the move: Before your next leadership meeting, send this question: "In two sentences—what is the most important problem we need to solve?" Then watch what changes.

The Macomb County Sheriff's Office confirms three people needed to be saved from the water this afternoon in Lake St. Clair. WWJ's Tracey McCaskill have the afternoon's top news stories.

This is the evening All Local for April 11, 2026.

One of them got Forrest Gump'd, See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Your doctor, your lawyer, and your clergyman -- three people you can say anything to. It ties into yesterday's Supreme Court ruling. Chris Conley explains on the WSAU Wisconsin Morning News.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

 Three detainees held by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) died within a four-day period between late February and early March, raising fresh concerns about medical care and oversight in detention facilities.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Patrick Bet-David reacts to a viral moment where a restaurant robot malfunctions and starts acting unpredictably, raising serious concerns about safety and control. The panel discusses the risks of robotics, potential hacking threats, and what happens when machines become stronger and more autonomous than humans.

Today, we look at the Blessings and Woes in the book of Luke, and ask what does this say to me depending on who I am?

No one succeeds alone. Behind every spotlight are people introducing, guiding, and amplifying. Show Notes In this episode of Shark Theory, Baylor shifts the focus from life on stage to the people behind the scenes who make everything possible. After a recent Call it Closed Realty conference, he reflected on how many pivotal roles are played by individuals most people never see. And from that reflection came a powerful framework: there are three types of people you need in your corner. First, you need someone who introduces you. Doors rarely open themselves. Someone has to believe in you enough to mention your name in rooms you're not in. Those introductions can change careers, trajectories, and opportunities. But they only matter if you perform once you get there. Appreciate the people who, like Cathleen Lewis, open doors for you and be that person for someone else.  Second, you need someone who guides you. Literal guidance. Emotional guidance. Strategic guidance. In large arenas or complex seasons of life, it's easy to get lost. The right guide, like Ally Kidman, brings clarity, direction, and energy. They help you navigate the space and elevate your confidence. And just as important, you must strive to be that source of energy and direction for others. Third, you need someone who amplifies you. Behind every polished performance are people running audio, video, logistics, and unseen systems. Without amplification, even the strongest message goes unheard. In your life, this could be someone who shares your work, champions your ideas, or supports your visibility. Amplifiers make impact scalable. The deeper lesson isn't just to look for these people. It's to become them. Growth isn't a solo sport. Introduce others. Guide others. Amplify others. That's how momentum multiplies. What You'll Learn in This Episode Why no one grows alone The power of strategic introductions The value of guidance and positive energy Why amplification determines reach How to identify these three people in your life Why becoming these three roles accelerates growth Featured Quote "Behind every spotlight are people introducing, guiding, and amplifying."

For the latest our Crime Correspondent Paul Reynolds.

Thursday 2/19/26

Wednesday 2/18/26

A first-time buyer shares how early planning, relocating for affordability, and buying with a family member helped three roommates become homeowners in California. Eric, his partner, and their cousin Alex were priced out of San Jose and chose to explore Bakersfield after realizing it fit their budget and lifestyle goals. They spent time learning the city firsthand (including a smart Uber/Lyft approach that doubled as income and neighborhood research) while working through job changes and loan qualification. Eric explains how pre-planning with a mortgage pro reduced last-minute stress, and how they protected themselves by backing out of an escrow when a solar loan complication became too costly. The story ends with their team finding a better home quickly—one that met their must-haves—and a reminder that the process can be a stop-and-go emotional rollercoaster. “My biggest tip was pro. It's like starts as early as possible. Even if you don't think you're quite ready yet.” - Eric HighlightsHow early should a first-time homebuyer talk to a mortgage broker and realtor to avoid last-minute stress? What's the smartest way to “learn a new city” before buying—while also earning extra income? How can two people qualify for a mortgage even when a third household member isn't ready to be on the loan yet? When should a buyer walk away from a deal in escrow—and how do you do it without losing your deposit? Check out our updated 2026 First Time Homebuyer's Episode Guide - Over 100 of our BEST Episodes of Detailed Homebuying Knowledge, Interviews, and MORE! Connect with me to find a trusted realtor in your area or to answer your burning questions!Subscribe to our YouTube Channel @HowToBuyaHomeInstagram @HowtoBuyAHomePodcastTik Tok @HowToBuyAHomeVisit our Resource Center to "Ask David" AND get your FREE Home Buying Starter Kit!David Sidoni, the "How to Buy a Home Guy," is a seasoned real estate professional and consumer advocate with two decades of experience helping first-time homebuyers navigate the real estate market. His podcast, "How to Buy a Home," is a trusted resource for anyone looking to buy their first home. It offers expert advice, actionable tips, and inspiring stories from real first-time homebuyers. With a focus on making the home-buying process accessible and understandable, David breaks down complex topics into easy-to-follow steps, covering everything from budgeting and financing to finding the right home and making an offer. Subscribe for regular market updates, and leave a review to help us reach more people. Ready for an honest, informed home-buying experience? Viva la Unicorn Revolution - join us!

A first-time buyer shares how early planning, relocating for affordability, and buying with a family member helped three roommates become homeowners in California. Eric, his partner, and their cousin Alex were priced out of San Jose and chose to explore Bakersfield after realizing it fit their budget and lifestyle goals. They spent time learning the city firsthand (including a smart Uber/Lyft approach that doubled as income and neighborhood research) while working through job changes and loan qualification. Eric explains how pre-planning with a mortgage pro reduced last-minute stress, and how they protected themselves by backing out of an escrow when a solar loan complication became too costly. The story ends with their team finding a better home quickly—one that met their must-haves—and a reminder that the process can be a stop-and-go emotional rollercoaster. “My biggest tip was pro. It's like starts as early as possible. Even if you don't think you're quite ready yet.” - Eric HighlightsHow early should a first-time homebuyer talk to a mortgage broker and realtor to avoid last-minute stress? What's the smartest way to “learn a new city” before buying—while also earning extra income? How can two people qualify for a mortgage even when a third household member isn't ready to be on the loan yet? When should a buyer walk away from a deal in escrow—and how do you do it without losing your deposit? Check out our updated 2026 First Time Homebuyer's Episode Guide - Over 100 of our BEST Episodes of Detailed Homebuying Knowledge, Interviews, and MORE! Connect with me to find a trusted realtor in your area or to answer your burning questions!Subscribe to our YouTube Channel @HowToBuyaHomeInstagram @HowtoBuyAHomePodcastTik Tok @HowToBuyAHomeVisit our Resource Center to "Ask David" AND get your FREE Home Buying Starter Kit!David Sidoni, the "How to Buy a Home Guy," is a seasoned real estate professional and consumer advocate with two decades of experience helping first-time homebuyers navigate the real estate market. His podcast, "How to Buy a Home," is a trusted resource for anyone looking to buy their first home. It offers expert advice, actionable tips, and inspiring stories from real first-time homebuyers. With a focus on making the home-buying process accessible and understandable, David breaks down complex topics into easy-to-follow steps, covering everything from budgeting and financing to finding the right home and making an offer. Subscribe for regular market updates, and leave a review to help us reach more people. Ready for an honest, informed home-buying experience? Viva la Unicorn Revolution - join us!

Three people arrested over separate hate-related incidents in Sydney, United States envoys urge Israel to enter second phase of ceasefire, Carlos Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner set to dominate at Australian Open.

Police search for three people as bushfires continue to burn and heatwave conditions sweep the country; Writers & academics pull out of Adelaide Writer's Festival after board dump only Palestinian speaker booked; Immigration officer shoot two people just one day after fatally shooting a woman in the United States; Meghan Trainor & Mandy Moore break their silence following Ashley Tisdale fuelled 'mum group drama'. THE END BITS Support independent women's media Check out The Quicky Instagram here GET IN TOUCHShare your story, feedback, or dilemma! Send us a voice note or email us at thequicky@mamamia.com.au CREDITS Host: Taylah Strano Audio Producer: Lu Hill Become a Mamamia subscriber: https://www.mamamia.com.au/subscribeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Devastating fires in Victoria destroy properties and livestock, while other parts of the country swelter through another day of a heatwave.

Devastating fires in Victoria destroy properties and livestock, while other parts of the country swelter through another day of a heatwave.

Devastating fires in Victoria destroy properties and livestock, while other parts of the country swelter through another day of a heatwave.

In this episode, Ben reveals the 3-day science-backed protocol that rapidly reverses fatty liver — one of the most overlooked drivers of weight gain, fatigue, bloating, cravings, and insulin resistance. One in three people have fatty liver and don't know it, but research shows you can transform your liver and metabolism in as little as 72 hours with a simple, free, strategic approach. Ben breaks down three powerful human studies showing how fasting switches the liver into fat-burning mode within hours, activates AMPK to reduce inflammation, improves insulin sensitivity, and lowers liver fat fast. He also shares the step-by-step daily plan: Day 1: Choose your fasting level, break your fast with the Liver Flush Plate, and follow the circadian liver reset Day 2: Morning ACV protocol, post-meal walks, and zero fructose Day 3: Liver Reset Meal and inflammation control You'll learn the exact foods that stimulate bile flow, the nutrients that repair liver cells, what to avoid, and how to sync your meals with your circadian rhythm for maximum healing. This simple 3-day fix leads to less bloating, better digestion, improved liver enzymes, increased energy, deeper sleep, and noticeable fat loss — all by working with your body's innate healing ability. If you've struggled with stubborn belly fat or unexplained metabolic issues, this episode gives you the blueprint to take back control in just 72 hours. FREE GUIDE: The World's Easiest Breakfast Diet - https://bit.ly/4pGKrfW 

What a whirlwind of emotions we've experienced the past 72 hours.

Sheil is joined by The Ringer's own Austin Gayle to talk about some of the most polarizing NFL personalities this season who are in danger of losing all the clout they've earned over their careers if they don't finish 2025 successfully. (00:00) Who has the most at stake in the 2025 NFL season?(1:31) Mike Tomlin(10:57) C.J. Stroud(19:35) Daniel Jones(26:26) The Hurry Up: Raiders fire Chip Kelly This episode is sponsored by State Farm®️. Don't settle for just any insurance when there's State Farm. https://www.statefarm.com/lp/trainer The Ringer is committed to responsible gaming. Please visit ⁠www.rg-help.com⁠ to learn more about the resources and helplines available. Host: Sheil KapadiaGuest: Austin GayleProducer: Chris SuttonSocial: Kiera Givens and Brian WatersProduction Supervision: Conor Nevins and Arjuna Ramgopowell Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

A man who reported the alleged sexual assault of his daughter was tragically shot and killed.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

HOUR 2: Could you live on an island with only three people? full 2030 Fri, 10 Oct 2025 20:00:00 +0000 g1qB0AhXGCFsczH4kqlxuGSZyRmcSdsU news The Dana & Parks Podcast news HOUR 2: Could you live on an island with only three people? You wanted it... Now here it is! Listen to each hour of the Dana & Parks Show whenever and wherever you want! © 2025 Audacy, Inc. News False https://player.amperwavepodcastin

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Kia ora e te whānau.We had a particularly nice time on this week's AidStation podcast, celebrating one year of Ali and Andrew jumping on board. Matt had the opportunity to ask them a mix of longer-form and quick-fire style questions about the last 12 months, and what they were looking forward to in the next 12 months and beyond.If you are after an under-the-hood look at what makes the two “new” co-hosts of Dirt Church Radio tick, then dive in. Plus, Andrew from the future grabs interviews with 24 Hours of Blue Lake RD, Sarah Sunshine, and Sue Hunter.Excellent stuff.Dirt Church Radio – Best Enjoyed Running.--- --- ---Episode LinksSign up for the DCR AidStation newsletterThe Squadrun 4-Week Training Trial for DCR Listeners!Dirt Church Radio on InstagramDirt Church Radio on FacebookFurther Faster New ZealandEnjoy!Music by Andrew McDowall, Digicake

In this episode of First Round's On Me, we unpack the lost art of making and keeping friendships in adulthood. From the three people everyone needs in their life — the Anchor, the Expander, and the Mirror — to why adult friendships feel harder than dating, we explore how connection has shifted in the age of social media.We talk about connection fatigue vs. connection famine, why the disappearance of “third spaces” (cafes, bars, community hubs) has made us lonelier, and how friendships mirror the same awkward first hangs and overthinking that come with dating.If you've ever wondered why your social life feels stagnant, or you're craving deeper connections, this episode is your reminder: quality beats quantity.

More Democrat Violence? Sniper Shoots Three People At Texas ICE Facility, Takes Own Life

Why Did Three People Help the Quadruple Murder Suspect Austin Drummond HIDE? After four people were found dead in Lake County, Tennessee, and a baby was abandoned in a stranger's yard, authorities launched a manhunt for Austin Robert Drummond. But Drummond wasn't hiding alone. Prosecutors say three people — Tanaka Brown, Dearrah Sanders, and Giovonte Thomas — helped him along the way. They allegedly gave him shelter, clothing, phones, and rides, keeping him ahead of police for days. Each now faces their own charges for aiding a fugitive. But here's the question: did they believe his bizarre FBI informant story? Or were they simply protecting a fugitive no matter what? In this segment, retired FBI Special Agent Robin Dreeke joins Tony Brueski to break down the psychology of accomplices. Robin explains how manipulation works, how people with chaotic personal histories can still recruit others to their cause, and why loyalty, fear, or desperation can override common sense. Were these three co-conspirators? Or were they victims of manipulation themselves — convinced by Drummond's narrative that they were helping someone on a covert mission? Robin explores both sides and exposes how violence radiates outward, pulling people into the destruction long after the crime itself is committed. Watch as we dissect the accomplice angle, and uncover what it tells us about Drummond's power to manipulate, deceive, and control those around him. #AustinDrummond #TrueCrime #HiddenKillers #RobinDreeke #CourtCase #MurderCase #CrimeAnalysis #Accomplices #DeathPenalty #TrueCrimeCommunity Want to comment and watch this podcast as a video? Check out our YouTube Channel. https://www.youtube.com/@hiddenkillerspod Instagram https://www.instagram.com/hiddenkillerspod/ Facebook https://www.facebook.com/hiddenkillerspod/ Tik-Tok https://www.tiktok.com/@hiddenkillerspod X Twitter https://x.com/tonybpod Listen Ad-Free On Apple Podcasts Here: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/true-crime-today-premium-plus-ad-free-advance-episode/id1705422872

Why Did Three People Help the Quadruple Murder Suspect Austin Drummond HIDE? After four people were found dead in Lake County, Tennessee, and a baby was abandoned in a stranger's yard, authorities launched a manhunt for Austin Robert Drummond. But Drummond wasn't hiding alone. Prosecutors say three people — Tanaka Brown, Dearrah Sanders, and Giovonte Thomas — helped him along the way. They allegedly gave him shelter, clothing, phones, and rides, keeping him ahead of police for days. Each now faces their own charges for aiding a fugitive. But here's the question: did they believe his bizarre FBI informant story? Or were they simply protecting a fugitive no matter what? In this segment, retired FBI Special Agent Robin Dreeke joins Tony Brueski to break down the psychology of accomplices. Robin explains how manipulation works, how people with chaotic personal histories can still recruit others to their cause, and why loyalty, fear, or desperation can override common sense. Were these three co-conspirators? Or were they victims of manipulation themselves — convinced by Drummond's narrative that they were helping someone on a covert mission? Robin explores both sides and exposes how violence radiates outward, pulling people into the destruction long after the crime itself is committed. Watch as we dissect the accomplice angle, and uncover what it tells us about Drummond's power to manipulate, deceive, and control those around him. #AustinDrummond #TrueCrime #HiddenKillers #RobinDreeke #CourtCase #MurderCase #CrimeAnalysis #Accomplices #DeathPenalty #TrueCrimeCommunity Want to comment and watch this podcast as a video? Check out our YouTube Channel. https://www.youtube.com/@hiddenkillerspod Instagram https://www.instagram.com/hiddenkillerspod/ Facebook https://www.facebook.com/hiddenkillerspod/ Tik-Tok https://www.tiktok.com/@hiddenkillerspod X Twitter https://x.com/tonybpod Listen Ad-Free On Apple Podcasts Here: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/true-crime-today-premium-plus-ad-free-advance-episode/id1705422872

This is the All Local for August 17, 2025.

Students who build a support system early are more likely to succeed—and stay—in college. That's why Alma Modern created the Three Connections Challenge: a simple way for students to build meaningful relationships in their first few weeks on campus. In ... Read More » The post 589: The Three People Students Need to Succeed in College appeared first on The College Prep Podcast.

Federal judges on the district level can no longer issue nationwide injunctions for the Supreme Court but they can certify class action lawsuits against the Trump administration. Plus, MAGA world remains outraged over the Trump Justice Department's efforts to seemly try to close the case on Jeffrey Epstein and those who were his clients.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.