Podcasts about three people

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

A stabbing attack at Hamburg's main train station has left 17 people injured, including three in critical condition. Police say the assailant, a 39-year-old German woman, acted alone and was arrested without incident. Investigators do not currently suspect political extremism as the motive, but rather believe a mental health issue is to blame.

A blaze at a former RAF base in Oxfordshire has killed two firefighters and a member of the public. Two more firefighters suffered serious injuries and are being treated in hospital. Also: The Hamas-run civil defence agency says that nearly 100 people have been killed in hours of intense Israeli strikes, focussed on northern Gaza. And a report has found the Scottish government failed to properly scrutinise lavish spending at the body which regulates Scottish Water.

Plus, an accused murderer is on the lose in Kaufman County, and the victim's family says it never should have happened. There's nothing better than a fan finding a crowd mic and taking advantage of the situation. And during a Sunday evening blitz of social media posts, Donald Trump demanded that one of the most notorious prisons in American history be reopened.

This is your All Local update on April 20, 2025.

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President Donald Trump has said that 'Millions are dead because of three people' as he pointed the finger at former US President Joe Biden, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Russia's Vladimir Putin for the three-year war prompted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Sean Bell, Former Fighter Pilot, Military Analyst and Co-Host of the Red Matrix Podcast for more on this.

President Donald Trump has said that 'Millions are dead because of three people' as he pointed the finger at former US President Joe Biden, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Russia's Vladimir Putin for the three-year war prompted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Sean Bell, Former Fighter Pilot, Military Analyst and Co-Host of the Red Matrix Podcast for more on this.

Overnight rain soaked southern California. Local officials have their eye on burn scar areas, bracing for moving mud. Three people face federal charges over false FEMA claims linked to the recent fires. Checking in on the night life during Ramadan. Plus, more.Support The L.A. Report by donating at LAist.com/join and by visiting https://laist.comSupport the show: https://laist.com

Golf returns to Wrigley Field, and more.

Golf returns to Wrigley Field, and more.

Golf returns to Wrigley Field, and more.

Janice Boylan, Sinn Féin Concillor for North Inner City Dublin and Ray MacAdam, Fine Gael Councillor for the North Inner City in Dublin

“Endowed with such a faith, he seeks favors of a particular demigod and obtains his desires. But in actuality these benefits are bestowed by Me alone.” (Lord Krishna, Bhagavad-gita, 7.22)

When three people eat bread together, they are required to recite the introductory Zimun before Birkat Ha'mazon. The Shulhan Aruch writes that it is a Misva to try to arrange that a Zimun will be required. This means that if two people eat together, it is a Misva for them to try to find a third person to join them so they can recite a Zimun. Of course, in such a case, this third individual must also eat. In order for a Zimun to be recited, it does not suffice for the third person to be present; he must also eat. There is a disagreement among the Halachic authorities as to what this third person must eat for a Zimun to be recited. The Shulhan Aruch writes that this third individual must eat bread, but the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1530-1572) maintained that he may eat other foods, as well, such as fruits, vegetables or "Mezonot" foods, or even drink a cup of wine. The Mishna Berura (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) cites numerous other Poskim who followed this view. And, the Keneset Ha'gedola (Rav Haim Benbenishti, Turkey, 1603-1673) writes that it was customary in his time to give the third fellow other foods – such as vegetables or "Mezonot" food – so a Zimun could be recited. Although this was not the position of the Shulhan Aruch, nevertheless, Hacham Ovadia Yosef (both in Yehaveh Da'at, vol. 4, and in Halichot Olam) asserted that nowadays, even the Shulhan Aruch would allow the third individual to eat other foods. He explained that in earlier generations, when a Zimun was conducted, the one who led the Zimun also recited Birkat Ha'mazon aloud on behalf of the others. The leader's role was not only to lead the Zimun, but also to be the only one in the group reciting Birkat Ha'mazon, while the others fulfilled their obligation by listening attentively to his recitation. Nowadays, of course, the accepted custom is for each individual to personally recite Birkat Ha'mazon, and today one may not fulfill the obligation of Birkat Ha'mazon by listening to its recitation by another person. Hacham Ovadia thus proposed that it was only in earlier generations, when a Zimun meant that only one person would recite Birkat Ha'mazon on behalf of the entire group, that three people needed to eat bread for a Zimun to take place. Nowadays, however, when a Zimun entails only the introduction to Birkat Ha'mazon, it suffices for the third individual to have eaten any food (or to have drunk wine), and he does not need to eat bread. Therefore, if two people ate together, they should try to find a third person and feed him any food, so a Zimun can be recited. One of the two who ate bread should recite the Zimun, after which those two recite Birkat Ha'mazon, and the third recites the appropriate Beracha Aharona. Summary: If two people ate bread together, they should, if possible, try to find a third person to join them so they can recite a Zimun. The third person does not have to eat bread to warrant a Zimun; it suffices for him to eat other foods or drink wine.

Marc O'Driscoll, North East Correspondent, reports that three people have been arrested in connection with a serious assault in Monaghan town that has left a man in a critical condition in hospital.

A sad update on that seaplane crash from WA, Justin Trudeau slaps down a wild suggestion from Donald Trump, and a Ch 7 star reveals how much she gets paid.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Three people from Colorado are missing. The search for suspects leads detectives to Mississippi as detectives say they are armed and dangerous. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

A shootout with police leaves a cop wounded and a suspect dead.....The man accused of killing three people in a random stabbing spree in Manhattan held without bail... Elton John's latest musical 'Tammy Faye' to close....Rita Moreno to get a Barbie doll full 555 Wed, 20 Nov 2024 10:59:43 +0000 dKqR0djG9ghTVyKFN5QvYhrIlx8vNMnX news 1010 WINS ALL LOCAL news A shootout with police leaves a cop wounded and a suspect dead.....The man accused of killing three people in a random stabbing spree in Manhattan held without bail... Elton John's latest musical 'Tammy Faye' to close....Rita Moreno to get a Barbie doll The podcast is hyper-focused on local news, issues and events in the New York City area. This podcast's purpose is to give New Yorkers New York news about their neighborhoods and shine a light on the issues happening in their backyard. 2024 © 2021 Audacy, Inc.

Miki and Joe from Morning Joe have mad fools of themselves for begging Trump to allow them back into the fold. Mark Interviews Bill O'Reilly: Mark and Bill talked about Kamala Harris spending donations to hire celebrities to appear at her rallies. Will Trump be able to convince Republicans to confirm Matt Gaetz.

This is the 1010 WINS Afternoon All Local.

City council rejected Mayor Johnson's property tax hike proposal; Family cat shot in Crystal Lake, and more.

City council rejected Mayor Johnson's property tax hike proposal; Family cat shot in Crystal Lake, and more.

Three People Died In The Woods Last Summer.  I'm Not Sure If I Can Tell Anyone The Truth About It!

The investigation continues into Liam Payne's tragic fall in Buenos Aries, as three people are detailed in connection to the One Direction member's death. Olympic break dancer Raygun announces she is officially retiring from breaking. Plus, Ariana Grande is opening up about her past relationships. Hosted and Produced by Zack Peter and Andy Lalwani - Find us online: https://instagram.com/justplainzack https://instagram.com/andylalwani Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Julian Druker, 5 News Correspondent & Presenter

Three people charged in connection to Liam Payne's death. This is your Daily Lowdown from HELLO! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chicago White Sox to hire Texas Ranger coach to be new manager; Indiana police warn of fraud Taylor Swift ticket scam; One teen shot after dispute in Naperville, and more.

Hour 1 – The Drive opened the show discussing how the success of DeAndre Hopkins is the job of three people with the Chiefs.

Join Pastor Brent Purvis for a special message entitled: "The Three People You Want Out of Your Life".

Join Pastor Brent Purvis for a special message entitled: "The Three People You Want Out of Your Life".

Hour 1 – The Drive opened the show explaining how the game tonight is massive moment for three people. Salvador Perez, Bobby Witt Jr. and Royals fans.

Andrew C.M. Cooper: The Ethical Imperative Andrew C.M. Cooper is an executive leader and apologist for compassionate business practices. He led as a history-making first Millennial and Black executive to serve as General Counsel of UPS Airlines, the world's largest logistics airline with over 20,000 employees. His team was essential to the success of Operation Warp Speed, the United States' pandemic vaccine relief effort. He's the author of The Ethical Imperative: Leading with Conscience to Shape the Future of Business*. We all know the power of relationships to help us grow. However, we don't always seek out some of the non-traditional relationships that might help most. In this conversation, Andrew and I discuss three types of people we often overlook that will help us grow. Key Points Many of us invest in organic, traditional relationships. Those are important, but not sufficient in such a dynamic world. Invest 30% of your time into relationships that will add skills, knowledge, or insights you can't develop yourself. Shifters observe well, read between the lines, and help us adapt in uncertain and changing situations. Connectors will help your expand professional affiliations. Having a connector in your corner can be as helpful as being a connector yourself. People who first appear as sharks may be benevolent antagonists. Listen for what others around them say to determine who might challenge you in healthy ways. Resources Mentioned The Ethical Imperative: Leading with Conscience to Shape the Future of Business* by Andrew C.M. Cooper Interview Notes Download my interview notes in PDF format (free membership required). Related Episodes How to Strengthen Your Network, with Marissa King (episode 525) How to Build a Network While Still Doing Everything Else, with Ruth Gotian (episode 591) How to Recognize Remarkable People, with Guy Kawasaki (episode 671) Production Credit Coaching for Leaders is edited by Andrew Kroeger. Production support is provided by Sierra Priest. Discover More Activate your free membership for full access to the entire library of interviews since 2011, searchable by topic. To accelerate your learning, uncover more inside Coaching for Leaders Plus.

This is the All Local afternoon update for September 20, 2024

This is your 4 p.m. All Local on September 17, 2024. 

In Charleston, West Virginia, there's a monthly live storytelling event called “Three Things” that invites three highly-visible members of the community to talk about their careers. The guests are asked to follow a simple prompt: tell the audience about their First, their Favorite and their Future. Jeff Shirley, the producer and host of “Three Things,” says the freewheeling format “guarantees that we will get three unique approaches to the task from all of our guests.” It also allows the public a unique and barrier-breaking glimpse into the lives of people they may think they already know. On this episode of Us & Them, host Trey Kay shares a part of his story you might not know about, as does Valicia Leary, executive director of the Children's Therapy Clinic, and Maurice Cohn, music director of the West Virginia Symphony Orchestra.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Zhejiang. Chiang Kai-Shek kept the momentum going by invading Zhejiang after taking Jiangxi and Fujian. However Sun Chuanfang in desperation ran to an unlikely ally, Zhang Zuolin to form the National Pacification Army. Now the NPA would go to war with the NRA. The NRA also faced internal strife as strikes broke out in Guangzhou and Wuhan. After quelling the worker strikes, the NRA began to concentrate on the Zhejiang campaign performing strategic counter attacks against Sun Chuanfangs offensives. By early 1927 Sun Chuanfang's control over Zhejiang was being undermined by Zhejiang independence movement leaders who joined the KMT to overthrow him. Sun Chuanfang was served disastrous defeats, his armies began to rout with many plundering before they fled north. Those that still continued the fight fled for Shanghai, where Sun Chuanfang prepared to make a last stand to hold the NRA back before Zhejiang fell.   #113 The Northern Expedition Part 4: The taking of Shanghai & Nanking Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The NRA east route army had concentrated around Sungchiang just in front of Shanghai. They made it seem they were preparing for a major assault on the super city, yet up the Yangtze, half of the NRA were secretly preparing an offensive directed against Nanking. If the NRA captured Nanking and its strategic Tianjin-Pukou railway line, Sun Chuanfang's forces south of the Yangtze would be isolated and cut off from reinforcements and supplies. On February 19th of 1927, Sun Chuanfang pulled his battered armies out of Zhejiang as he awaited reinforcements from Zhang Zongchang's Shandong army. Meanwhile the KMT called upon their agents and allies within Shanghai to foment disorder. Going back to November of 1926, KMT and CCP members within Shanghai had been assembling recruits together to strengthen their first united front. Shanghai held a large part of China's modern factory workers, numbering in the several hundred of thousands. They represented a considerable percent of the Shanghai population. Following the formation of the NPA, Shanghai unions began attacking Sun Chuanfang for bringing Shandong mercenaries into Zhejiang and strongly disagreed with his alliance with the northerners. They had real grievances with the northerners, because they had ties to foreign powers like the Empire of Japan. Those in Shanghai sought to break the chains of foreign imperialism and wanted more autonomy. From 1926 onwards many unions, particularly those directed by the CCP organized demonstrations against Sun Chuanfang and the NPA. By February of 1927 the anti-Sun Chuanfang movement really heated up. The National General Labor Union of the CCP had ordered some assassinations to terrorize the Chinese and foreign industrialists. To bring even more Shanghai workers under their influence and hurt Sun Chuanfangs hold over the city the CCP organized a political strike, similar to what had occurred in Hong Kong the year prior. A general strike in Shanghai was planned for February 19th and it would include the foreign concession factories. The strikers had 5 political and 12 economic demands. A major aim of the strike was to seize power through the use of the masses, even against a well armed regime like Sun Chuanfangs. The CCP hoped to direct large crowds of workers against Sun Chuanfang's police stations and garrison posts where they could seize their weapons to arm some workers corps. They had acquired quite a bit of experience during the Hong Kong and Guangzhou strikers when it came to arming workers. However the response of Sun Chuanfangs regime would be vastly different than the KMT in Guangzhou.  Sun Chuanfangs garrison commander at Shanghai responded violently and quickly. He dispatched broadsword carrying executioners and soldiers through the city grabbing and beheading any strikers on sight. Heads were placed on lamp posts at street corners and on spikes all around. Its estimated out of perhaps 100,000 to 350,000 workers who striked, the headcount ranged between 100-500. The CCP continued its efforts to attack police stations, but the general strike died out on the third day. In a form of retaliation the Shanghai workers held a mass trial and execution of at least one police officer. A new garrison commander was sent to Sahnghai, Pi Shucheng in an effort to reinforce the city. By the point he showed up the CCP gave up and told the strikers to get back to work to end the bloodshed. What became known as the second shanghai uprising failed to achieve much.  Despite its failure, the second uprising in Shanghai displayed disunity under Sun Chuanfangs rule. By mid February Sun Chuanfangs Shanghai navy had begun to act suspiciously. On the 22nd as the CCP led sorties against the Shanghai Police, shells from the warships Chienkang and Chienwei fll over the Jiangnan arsenal. Thinking not much of it, Sun Chuanfang blamed a few young officers for the bombardment and gave his Admiral Yang Shuchuang a demerit. Sun Chuanfang was of course reluctant at this point to penalize his subordinates for fear they mutiny. The bombardment did not knock out the aresnal but a fire began mysteriously on the 28th blowing up 40 crates of artillery shells. The uprising did little to weaken Sun Chuanfangs hold over Shanghai, so the NRA shifted strategy. Over in Hangzhou, NRA units advance to the Sungchiang front while NRA units in Jiangxi advance downriver towards Nanking. The 6th and 7th NRA armies advance along the Jiangxi-Anhui border as the eastern route command dug in near Shanghai. Back in December, at the Nanchang conference Chiang Kai-Shek and Borodin had managed to smooth the tension between the CCP and KMT. Borodin agreed to curtain some union disorder that were interfering with the war effort so the First United Front would not collapse. However within the new conquered territories, many that contained enormous industrial potential, strikes and labor violence kept breaking out. This was quite dangerous for the stability of the NRA as they performed the northern expedition. But from the CCP point of view they were simply organizing the enormous untapped power of Chinese workers. The CCP began to really grow in power at Wuhan and were becoming less cooperative with Chiang Kai-Shek. They believed Chiang Kai-Shek was dependent and at the mercy of Soviet aid. They also believed, since he had left Guangdong, a more malleable KMT military figure would better suit their interests. Thus a concerted effort was made to replace Chiang Kai-Shek. You could call it a anti-Chiang movement sprang up and it was taking an effect on the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kai-Shek had just wired the Wuhan administration three times for funds to pay some disgruntled 7th army troops. The administration at Wuhan created by a joint council of the party and government, by insistence of Borodin, were generally compliant to Chiang Kai-Sheks demands. One of their leaders was Xu Chen, the current minister of justice. According to a group close to Wang Jingwei, it seemed the CCP, Chiang Kai-Sheks inner circle and the new Joint Council at Wuhan between January and February of 1927 were becoming quite dependent on Soviet advice. Early in January the CCP were attacking Chiang Kai-Shek with propaganda aimed to make it seem he was in bed with other warlords and the Japanese, thus a betrayer to Dr Sun Yat-Sens movement. Xu Chen the current commander of the 8th NRA army became a potential replacement for Chiang Kai-Shek, but the CCP were still afraid to risk open strife with the KMT. Borodin and CCP leaders like Mao Zedong were encouraged by the CCP membership growth in the countryside and within military units around Wuhan. As the NRA advance through Hunan, CCP membership increased as they spread through peasant associations. It was a similar case in Hubei. The Hunanese commander of the 2nd NRA army brought up the issue at a KMT meeting warning his colleagues “not to neglect the dangers of internal strife. Many of our members have become sidetracked by… ideas … not indicated in Sun Yat-sen's instructions,… not belittle the enemy. Our enemies are now uniting together and gathering to attack us. We should concentrate the power of the Party and obey its orders strictly regardless of our own opinions.” Chiang Kai-Shek of course was not oblivious to the danger all around him. He launched his own sort of counterattack. He began claiming the CCP strategy and those who were following them, threatened the all-class union of the KMT. On February 19th he urged a KMT audience during a speech to “look to … the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and nothing else.” The anti Chiang Kai-Shek sentiment was felt in crowds at Wuhan. On February 24th, a crowd of 50,000 assembled at the party HQ parade ground where they made fiery speeches against Chiang Kai-Shek and against the Northern Expedition. “All we have seen is military power, but no Party power; individual will but not Party will…. Old degenerate counterrevolutionaries have caused these pathetic facts of the Party. That is why we must… knock down the feudal influences.” After this several people began chanting “Down with the Old and Degenerate!” Then another man made a speech stating “a few individuals could not do the work…. Now the old, rotten feudal thinking members manipulate the KMT, we must therefore knock them down.” Then the chant turned to “Down with Chang Ching-chiang,Oppose the Military Dictatorship.” Then the head of the NRA's Political Departments, Teng Yenta stated “democratic centralization was the way to achieve the ideals of the Three People's Principles, but now our leadership has been occupied by the old, ignorant, and the incompetent …, and we must overthrow personal dictatorship … and bring the military under control….” Chiang Kai-Shek was enraged by all of this of course and he refuted the charges made against him. He singled out Xu Chen who had just made himself chairman of the new Joint Council without KMT party authorization. Chiang Kai-Shek began a little investigation and concluded it was Borodin's doing so he telegrammed Moscow on February 26th requesting Borodin be sent back to the USSR. The next day at a KMT meeting, Chiang Kai-Shek told his colleagues he felt despite the fact the NRA advanced into new territories, while the people saw them as KMT members, they only heard propaganda from the CCP. By March the anti-Chiang cabal now sought to replace him with General Tang Shengchih, the Hunanese defector made commander of the 8th NRA army. According to one soviet report written on the 5th of March, Tang Shengchih was seen to be much more dependent on Soviet aid and a lot more cooperative in helping the anti-chiang effort amongst the other generals. A new anti-chiang alliance would require the support of other high ranking generals such as Chang Fakuai new corps, Chen Mingshu's 11th army, Chu Peitehs 3rd army and the 9th and 10th armies. According to the same Soviet report, Tang Shenchih managed to turn Li Tsungjen against Chiang Kai-Shek and this hampered Chiang Kai-Sheks ability to obtain funds from Wuhan to pay Li Tsunjens 7th army.  Spring of 1927 brought more disunity to the First United Front and thus hurt the Northern Expedition. Although the NRA were clearly on a roll in Zhejiang and Fujian, their progress north of Wuhan and downriver from Jiangxi lost steam. Chiang Kai-Shek still held confidence of the men in the eastern route army concentrating along the Jiangsu-Anhui border, but their offensive was also halted. In southern Honan where the NRA were facing the remnants of Wu Peifu's army, winter's chill was beginning to slow down the expedition.  The offensive kicked back up with a bunch of defections amongst Sun Chuanfang's forces in Anhui. Chen Tiaoyuan, Sun Chuanfangs commander in Chief for his Anhui forces, had became dissatisfied with him and how he was ruling the 5 province empire…which I guess is now more like 2. Chen Tiaoyuan was demoralized, who could blame him. Back on December 5th of 1926, Chen Tiaoyuan began secret negotiations by dispatching some of his subordinates such as Fan Shao-kai over to the KMT hoping to defect and gain a decent position. Simultaneously, Sun Chuanfang maintained hope of holding his frontline in Anhui by promoting subordinates. Sun Chuanfang appointed Chen Tiaoyuan to be the director of defenses over the province on December 21st. On February 20th of 1927, one of Chen Tiaoyuans divisions, led by Liu Paoti defected to the NRA when he was guarding a strategic pass known as the Chimen gateway. This was a 5000 foot high range leading into Anhui. Now the NRA held a mountain side door leading directly into Anhui. The mountain range in question also happened to be the last natural barrier that Sun Chuanfang's troops were utilizing to defend the lower Yangtze area, including of course Shanghai. After that Chen Tiaoyuang tossed the towel to the inevitable and defected to the NRA. Chen Tiaoyuan proved his defection by turning his defensive sector along the Yangtze over on March 2nd. He brought with him the mixed brigade of Wang Pu and elements of the Hunan Army led by Yue Kaixin. The NRA proceeded to advance over the Yellow Mountain and down it to seize Taiping in Anhui on march 3rd. Pretty much unopposed the NRA marched upon Nanking through Anhui taking several routes. By March 17th, the 17th Division of Cheng Chens 6th NRA Army had advanced 200 miles downstream using river steamboats and was only 70 miles away from Nanking. Over the north banks of the Yangtze the NRA formed a spearhead and thrusted it into the soft midsection of the north-south railway. By mid march the NRA captured Hofei in northern Anhui. At this point Sun Chuanfangs relationship with his navy was greatly waning and he was becoming more and more dependent on the Tsinpu railway as an escape option to head north rather than via the sea. Thus March of 1927 saw the NRA effectively begin trapping Sun Chuanfang into the Yangtze delta around Shanghai.  The NRA southern forces were now advancing out of Zhejiang into the delta region. One pincer was heading north along the shores of Lake Tai aiming for the Shanghai-Nanking railway at Changzhou. Meanwhile in Anhui the 6th army was attacking Wuhu on the 6th of March. Anti-foreign disorder broke out at Wuhu as NRA political agents raillied crowds of civilians and soldiers to mob the foreigners maritime customs office and clubhouse. This sent the foreigners to flee downriver to Shanghai by ship carrying more tales of anti-foreign abuse with them. The eastern route force facing Shanghai was met with heavy artillery bombardment as more and more NPA troops from Shandong arrived. Several NRA attacks north of Shanghai against railway links were made, threatening the city's defensive capabilities. By mid march many forces defending Shanghai began evacuating for Nanking. On March 15th the eastern route army had its first major breakthrough over the hills that overlooked Lake Tai. NRA forces managed to outflank the enemy artillery placements and erected a real blockade by march 16th. Now a new NRA pincer moved west against Lishui, 40 miles from Nanking. Along the east shore of said lake, the NRA was effectively blocked by Shandong troops who held an advantage in heavy artillery. By mid march many Shandong reinforcements arrived at Changzhou along the Nanking-Shanghai railway, but were simply turned back to Nanking. Not a good look.  From Wuhu the NRA kept the advance towards Tangtu which was outflanked and captured on the 17th, while the east route force took up a position 50 miles from Nanking on some ridges where Sun Chuanfang had once headquartered. On the 18th, north of the Yangtze the 7th NRA army just captured Hofei and its railway link. The delta area's defenses were falling apart everywhere one looked. The Dogmeat General took one look and ordered a general withdrawal of all the Shandong forces from the Shanghai area to some positions north of the Yangtze. With that Shanghai defenses fell apart. Over at the Sungchiang front the forces of Pi Shucheng retreated into the city towards the railway station, but did not high tail it to Nanking despite being ordered to do so. According to foreign and Chinese journalists, Pi Shucheng had been waiting for the opportune moment to defect to the NRA and had been secretly negotiating to turn Shanghai over. Thus it seemed the NRA had managed to capture the city without provoking the foreigners. On the 20th the NRA managed to flank the railroad artillery position still manned by some White Russian forces. They managed this through more defections, this time from Shanghai police. The Shanghai police controlled the waterways and aided the NRA in navigating them so they could advance more rapidly. Simultaneously Suzhou, Changzhou and Henglin were captured. Sun Chuanfang was receiving zero aid from the sea for over a week by this point as AdmiralYang Shuchuang had taken the fleet upriver to join the NRA's river fleet. Of course Admiral Yang Shuchuangs defection had been in the works for well over a year, but his timing could not have been worse for Sun Chuanfang. On March 21st a bloodless seizure of Shanghai proceeded. Now going back to our conversation about the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement, there had been a lot of development during this time period. In January of 1927, Wang Jingwei with his left wing allies, members of the CCP and Borodin had transferred the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to Wuhan. On March 1st the KMT government then reorganized the military commission and placed Chiang Kai-Shek under its jurisdiction with the secret intent to arrest him. As the NRA was about to storm Shanghai, a major opportunity presented itself to the CCP. Most of the Northern Chinese defenders still stuck in Shanghai were simply looking to surrender. Thus on March 21st, CCP leaders Zhou Enlai and Chen Duxiu launched an armed uprising. The CCP seized weapons, created a general strike and seized most of the city. This caused many of Sun Chuanfangs soldiers to flee to the railway station or coasts, looting as they did. Major battle took place between armed workers and soldiers, causing fires and damaged to heavily populated areas of the city. For example in the northern suburb of Zhapei, armed workers burnt down 3000 homes. By the night of the 22nd Bai Chongxi's NRA troops were gradually occupying the city, however the general strike was disrupting their efforts. General Bai Chongxi' ordered the CCP to call off the general strike on the 24th, but for over 4 days 322 Chinese were killed and over 2000 were wounded. As the NRA consolidated their authority over the city, their top spokesmen, Chiang Kai-SHek, Ho Yingqin and Bai Chongxi tried to alleviate the foreign community who were ridden with frightened refugees in the international settlement. The settlement was a literal warzone, fitted with barbed wire, gates, marines and soldiers behind sandbag trenches and such. Very real and many false stories were spread of anti-foreign atrocities. The NRA put out notices stating “The purpose of the military operations of the Northern Expedition is to establish a nation governed by the people and to get rid of the warlords. Our army occupied Hunan, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhui, and other provinces and the unification of the entire nation will be accomplished soon. The Party Army's success is the victory of the people…. In accordance with international morality we shall guard the lives and property of foreigners. We have occupied Shanghai by more than force. We request that consuls inform your nationals to carry on your activities as usual and order the marines not to misunderstand our motives and not to carry out means to obstruct our revolutionary cause'. And now we come to a large and confusing part of the story. At Nanking and Shanghai major events would unfold, seeing the end of the first United Front. After a few days, anti-foreign actions would follow the capture of Nanking requiring more and more public assurances from the KMT. The last demoralized rear guard crossed the Yangtze to get to the safer northern bank. By doing this, now the NPA's most southern position was the rail terminal at Pukou. The NRA vanguard entered Nanking on March 24th, with units of the 6th army and countless NPA Anhui defectors alongside them. Chiang Kai-Shek loyalists in the KMT then charged the head of the 6th NRA army's political department, a CCP member named Lin Xuhan with masterminding attacks upon foreigners. These attacks provoked the foreign powers to then attack Chiang Kai-Shek, diverting his attention from the northern expedition and weakening his authority over the new Wuhan government. Elements of the 6th army had stirred up anti-foreign attitudes amongst their troops and civilians within Nanking. Yet the foreign community in the city would go on to say the attacks they witnessed were not made by civilian mobs. Whatever motivations, the situation that unfolded at Nanking signified a giant breach of soldier discipline. For Chiang Kai-Shek to have permitted such actions to take place was inconsistent with his strategy of avoiding any provocation upon the foreign powers. Yet over 25,000 Nanking refugees flooded over to Shanghai as 25,000 foreign marines and soldiers began defending the concessions, assuring the NRA they were ready for a fight. Going back in time somewhat, the March 20th coup was something akin to a patient zero. Back on January 3rd of 1927 elements of the KMT at Wuhan had triggered mobs to attack the British concessions until they gave back authority at Hankou and Kiukiang to the Chinese. Yet the KMT had never given such orders to do so. It seemed the CCP were pushing these actions. Between March 7th to the 17th, the new Joint Council at Wuhan was openly being defiant towards Chiang Kai-Shek and they held their first plenary session to work against him. They met with KMT leftists and CCP members and agreed to appoint CCP members, Su Chaocheng and Tan Pingshan as ministers; promoted CCP peasant and labour groups and dispatched three representatives to the Third Communist International to discuss China's role in the would be world revolution. It did not seem the CCP intended to keep their promise to the KMT about China not going communist. All of this authority at Wuhan undermined Chiang Kai-Sheks authority and those loyal to him. They immediately voted to take direct control of military funds which had been previously handled by the minister of Finance, T.V Soong, obviously considered a loyal supporter to Chiang Kai-Shek. In order to gain more influence in the NRA, the Wuhan guys began creating a parallel military chain of command and recruited CCP members into major officer positions. They hoped such actions would see more military types defect over to their cause. Now by this point the NRA really had become a giant beast. When the northern expedition launched in July of 1926 the were 8 armies, by March of 1927 they were now 40. Wuhans fiscal and political control over said armies would clearly undermine and probably be capable of getting rid of Chiang Kai-Shek, so it was a no brainer to attempt seizing them for the CCP. The Wuhan cabal hoped to incorporate some of the new armies, made mostly of defectors, whose alliances were probably flimsy to be under their control. Chiang Kai-Shek tried to counter these attacks, but anything he did would be seen as censorship or anti-communist, thus shattering the first united front, from which he still depended….or did he?  Now technically the Wuhan Cabal was only able to do what they were doing because leading KMT figures were not present such as Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus lesser members like Xu Chen and Teng Yenta were able to make some big decisions. Both men were CCP aligned and worked to abolish Chiang Kai-Sheks posts that he held such as ministry of the military which was replaced by the Wuhan Military council. The Wuhan cabal was able to reduce Chiang Kai-Sheks role as commander in chief and give various tasks to other military commanders. Likewise the military education programs at the KMT academics removed Chiang Kai-Sheks supervisory role, depriving him of obtaining the loyalty of the new junior officer corps. Appointment, promotions and dismissals of commanders would be done by the Military council, ie: Xu CHen and Teng Yenta. They first relieved Chen Mingshu, a known Chiang Kai-Shek loyalist and replaced him with a Moscow certified star Tang Shengchih. It became very obvious what they were trying to do. Thus as the Wuhan cabal tore apart Chiang Kai-Sheks authority piece by piece, the NRA's war against Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang began to collapse. Without a high degree of coordination and leadership, the NRA was finding it difficult to fight the numerically superior NPA forces. In March of 1927, Wuhan proclaimed all regulations ordered by Chiang Kai-Sheks HQ to be nullified. This meant although he retained authority over troops at the frontlines, Wuhan now claimed authority over all the other troops. All of these attacks upon Chiang Kai-Shek caused massive confusion in the ranks. Many within the KMT believed and rightfully so that the CCP was trying to take leadership over the movement. As the northern expedition took the NRA into Jiangsu, the momentum of their previous victories had pushed them across the Yangtze. This was heavily aided by the recent Shanghai Navy defectors who eased the crossing using their vessels. Those already operating north of the Yangtze such as the 3rd, 7th and 10th armies were pressing past Hofei towards Pengpu by early April. Pengpu was the capital of Anhui, forming a sort of bridgehead over the Huai river with a railway depot for Zhang Zongchang's armies. Thus its capture would open a door to the invasion of North China. Yet the NRA's momentum died in confusion over which direction they were to take, because of the Wuhan cabal-Chiang Kai-Shek fighting, and their logistical support was falling apart. It seemed to all like the northern expedition might never make it to the north.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The NRA managed to seize the super cities of Shanghai and Nanking. The NRA now dominated most of south China and were about to begin invading the north, when internal problems arose. The CCP and Chiang Kai-Shek were not seeing eye to eye and now a civil war seemed to be breaking out in the first united front.

Last time we spoke about the Anti-Fengtian War. The Anti-Fengtian War included two major theaters, the Zhejiang-Fengtian War and the Guominjun-Fengtian War. Within China's north, Feng Yuxiang brokered many sneaky deals with other warlords, trying to bring down Zhang Zuolin. One of these warlords was the disgruntled Guo Songling who led a brave or some would say idiotic rebellion, striking at the heart of the Fengtian empire. Feng Yuxiang failed to really exploit Guo Songling's actions, and Wu Peifu ended up joining Zhang Zuolin, simply out of spite for Feng Yuxiang. The war between the Guominjun and Fengtian soon fell apart for Feng Yuxiang as his forces were gradually dislodged from the Beijing area into northwest China. In an ironic case of deja vu, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu found themselves again working together in Beijing. Little did they know, while they had been fighting in the north, it was the south where real danger lay.   #110 The Northern Expedition Part 1: Invading Hunan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we have now come to a point where the warlord era takes a sharp turn. While we have been talking about countless wars between numerous factions, this is basically the end game as they say. I have no idea how many episodes it will take, so I apologize in advance, but we are going to be covering the Northern Expedition. I've probably mentioned it a hundred times by this point, the northern expedition. Dr Sun Yat-Sens brainchild, put simply build an army and march north to reunify China. Sounds kind of insane given the disparity in strength between whose in the north and south eh?  Facing what can only be described as staggering odds, the Kuomintang over in their separate government based out of Guangzhou suddenly began the most incredible military expedition of the warlord era. On the verge of disintegration with inadequate materials, most of which were coming from the Soviets, the military campaign was a gamble to say the least. Chiang Kai-Shek was ultimately counting on the weakness of his enemies rather than his own NRA forces. His Soviet advisors all told him not to do it, that it would be a terrible blunder. Now if you open up text books, read contemporary buzzfeed like artiles or watch youtube shorts, they would have you believe the northern expedition was this easy sweep northward led by a vanguard of Communist propagandist forces. In reality it was a series of hard fought battles where either side could have knocked out the other completely.  Now for most of its life, this Guangzhou based cabal that the KMT were in control of, had always been on the defensive. For the most part their secure powerbase was Guangdong and from there they would gradually conquer region after region, one by one. Something that can truly be said about the KMT, unlike the other factions, take the Fengtian or Zhili for example was its strong sense of having an ideology and its charismatic strong man at the head of its army. There was of course personal armies within the NRA, they were more or less a confederation, but the ideology of the KMT glued them all together. The other factions, perhaps excluding the Guominjun, simply did not have this. There was a shared concern that the political make up of China needed to be democratic and not devolve into the traditional or imperial autocracies that had plagued China for so long.  The first region Chiang Kai-Shek would target would be the rich middle Yangtze provinces of Hubei and Hunan, both of which had recently come back under the dominion of the Jade Marshal Wu Peifu. The route the NRA would take would be through Hunan and Hubei, down the Yangtze and up into the North China plain before finally marching upon Beijing. Ironically it was an identical path, one Hong Xiuquan once took when he rallied the Taiping against the Qing Dynasty. To first invade Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a rather daunting task. He did not have the military power to simply defeat the warlords of the province. He needed to exploit the political scene within it. Prior to the northern expedition, Hunan was dominated by northern warlords who were alien to the southern province. This of course antagonized the local populations creating an unstable political environment. This was something the KMT could manipulate. The KMT's nationalistic ideology was something that could potentially win over allies or weaken petty warlords rule. The KMT could exploit local interests and provincialism, self rule movements and such. When the KMT looked at Hunan they could see an ongoing power struggle. The Hunanese gentry class was being kept alive purely upon a desire for provincial autonomy. The governor Chao Hengti, a Hunanese native was subordinate to Wu Peifu, a Shandong native. By 1926 a conflict had emerged between 4 Hunanese divisional commanders. Chao Hengti favored Yue Kaixin the strongest of them controlling the Hunanese 3rd division. Chao Hengti sought to weaken the rest and used Yue to weaken the second largest 4th division led by Tang Shengchih.Tang Shengchih dominated southwestern Hunan and went on the defensive when he figured out the Governor and Yue were after him. The KMT noticed this over in Guangdong. Now political intervention in Hunan required personal connections. Within the KMT party membership were Hunanese civilians and military officials. This was one of the great strengths of the KMT as a clique, how their political membership transcended provincial or regional bases. Similar to the CCP, who had those like Mao Zedong working with the rural masses in Hunan, the KMT had ties to those at some of the top echelons of the province's power structure. One leading KMT figure who pushed for the northern expedition was Tan Yenkai who also had been the governor of Hunan after the 1911 revolution. He had always maintained an interest in Hunan and while in Guangdong had rallied a 15,000 men strong force of Hunanese troops, now renamed the 2nd army of the NRA. Prior to 1926 Tan Yenkai had already led one military campaign to retake Hunan for Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Back in 1924, when Sun Yat-Sen was trying to form a coalition with northern powers, Tan Yenkai launched a rather ill-conceived and short lived campaign, trying to bolster Sun's position in Beijing. Another commander in Jiangxi had pushed Tan Yenkai's force back into Guangdong and the failure provided quite the lesson, that one should also exploit the political realm alongside the military.  By spring of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek and his top subordinates began planning an invasion of Hunan. Aside for the ex-governor Tan Yenkai, the KMT also had ties to Tang Shengchih. Liu Wentao and Chen Mingshu had been classmates of Tang Shengchih back at the Baoting Military academy in 1912. In 1925 they began reconnecting with the man, arranging a propaganda tour of the province. Liu Wentao, then a professor of political science, began touring China, lecturing all on the Three People's Principles of the KMT. Tang Shenchich went to one of these speeches and many of his men as well. There was also Pai Chungxi, another schoolmate of Tang Shenchih, the leader of the 7th Jiangxi Army of the NRA. The KMT also had loose connections with the hunan divisional commander Ho Yaotsu who was friends with Cheng Chien, a hunanese native and the commander of the 6th NRA army, primarily consisting of Hunanese troops. Now Chiang Kai-Shek began courting Governor Chao Hengti in June of 1926. He approached the man as a fellow member of the older Kuomintang party, pleading in a telegram that they should reunite into a new national movement. Obviously Chiang Kai-shek was making a powerplay to try and win over Hunan without shedding blood, he did not stop sending messages to the man even a week before the shells would fly. In southern Hunan at this time, Tang Shengchih was dominating the Hsiang valley with his 9000 man strong division. Tang Shengchih was a pretty intelligent player. He had numerous connections from his Baoting academy days and he managed to expand his domain to include 27 of Hunans 75 tax-collection districts. However by early 1926 Governor Chao had ordered all 4 Hunan divisional commanders to remit the local taxes they gathered to the provincial capital of Changsha. Obviously this was to centralize the power, and such revenue losses would strangle Tang Shengchih's power. So Tang Shengchih began talks with the KMT as early as february of 1926. It was a dangerous play, many had seen the numerous cases where inviting allies from another province only brought unwelcome guests. Perhaps Tang Shengchih believed by gaining some KMT support, he might be able to overpower Chao Hengti. But he was no idiot, he asked for KMT assurance he would fill the role of governorship and not someone like Tan Yenkai who indeed was lurking in the shadows. Tang Shengchih was given said assurance and signed an alliance treaty on February 24th. When Tang Shengchih unleashed his forces against Governor Chao Hengtai the same month, it was perfect timing. Wu Peifu was preoccupied in north China fighting Feng Yuxiang, thus the governor had no reinforcements. Threatened, Chao Hengti immediately fled Changsha, heading north. While this was occurring, Tang Shengchih labeled the governor nothing but a northern puppet of Wu Peifu. From February to March of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek was still struggling for authority over the KMT to launch the Northern Expedition. Thus Tang Shengchih's rebellion had preceded it, and was done without KMT resources. Still feeling confident Tang Shengchih began marching into northern Hunan. Back over in Guangzhou, the KMT commissioner of foreign affairs notified everyone that Tang was doing this all on his own, none of their resources had reached him yet. When Tang Shengchih secured Changsha in mid march, a lot of the hunanese gentry began supporting his cause to be governor. Tang Shengchih's forces then overran Yochou along Hunan's northern border. Tang Shengchih had not yet accepted the governorship position, in march he was still looking to see how the KMT alliance would pan out. Yet in March tensions emerged within the KMT over the northern expedition The March 20th coup certainly expedited aid to Tang Shengchih. 5 Days after, Tang Shengchih accepted governorship and with his new position he proceeded to purge his political enemies from the provinces administration while installing his friends. By late March 1926, Wu Peifu finally responded to the threat to his hegemony over Hunan. He began threatening to return south with his Honanese troops. Now Wu Peifu's armies were still facing Feng Yuxiang at this time, but the KMT aid also had not come yet so Tang Shengchih paused. Tang Shengchih began playing down his ties to the KMT in responding to Wu Peifu, posing as a mere neutral. In early april of 1926, Feng Yuxiang had been cast out of the North China plain and now Wu Peifu had a free hand to play against the rebellion in Hunan. Tang Shengchih now under real threat, began recalling his regiments from northern Hunan and evacuated his forces from Changsha as he built a defense in his home valley.  To deal with the menace, Wu Peifu looked to find a Hunanese local to manage the province for him. Wu Peifu turned to the Hunanese 3rd division commander, Yue Kaixin, to make him military governor and commander of the 1st division, with Ho Yaotsu to be civil governor. However the Hunanese gentry cried out immediately at this, stating they would not allow him to overturn their authority. Thwarted, Wu Peifu reverted to violence to pacify the troublesome province. In May, Tang Shengchih suffered a major defeat and was forced to fall back on the defense as Wu Peifu's Hunanese allies were battering him. Until NRA forces advanced into the province, there was little hope for Tang Shengchih and his crumbling defenses within the Xiang valley. Thousands of men from the NRA's 4th and 7th armies began to arrive in late May, but even so they were outnumbered in southern Hunan. It was not until June 2nd, when Tang Shengchih finally caved and accepted the offer from Chiang Kai-Shek to be the commander of the 8th NRA army. Thus Tang Shengchih went from leading a division to an army and his regimental commanders became division commanders. It was also of course a substantial pay raise. This was the type of model the NRA would adopt throughout the Northern Expedition. If you can't beat them, buy them. Just a few days later, the NRA forces within Hunan accepted Tang Shengchih as their front line commander. Tang Shengchih then proclaimed he would head a provisional Hunan government as its governor in the name of the KMT government.  The KMT had done a lot to win over the Hunanese people. The Hunanese people wanted autonomy, so the KMT flouted notions of provincial autonomy with a federal system. It was a marriage of convenience. Another major carrot was promising to end the tyranny of the northern warlords and the exploitation of the foreign imperialists. Some began to refer to the Northern Expedition as the “anti-north campaign” and clearly the first target would be the warlord controlling Hunan, Hubei and Honan, the Jade Marshal. In July the 4th army divisions led by Chang Fangkuei and Chen Mingshu arrived at the front, thus the defense changed to offense. At this point Wu Peifu's armies were still too far in North China and his Hunan allies were now becoming overwhelmed by the NRA swarming out of Guangdong. Under these dire circumstance, Wu Peifu's appointed governor, Chao Hengti made a stand along the north banks of the Xiang, the Lien and Lu rivers. From late June to early July the NRA prepared to ford the Lien river sitting west of the Xiang and the Lu river to its east. Down the Xiang was Changsha. Facing the Lu river were two 4th army divisions and Yue Tings independent regiment and another Hunanese regiment. Over at the Lien river were Jiangxi troops of the 7th army alongside the remainder of Tang Shengchihs 8th army. As the first major offensive kicked out, Tang Shengchih was at the front raising morale for the Hunanese, which was very important, as do remember, all these forces coming out of Guangdong were alien Cantonese to them. A breakthrough emerged along the two-river lines with the 7th and 8th NRA armies over on the left wing on the 5th of July. By the 10th the 4th NRA Army engaged the enemy towards Changsha. Over in the east where Hunan bordered Jiangxi, a subordinate of Sun Chuanfang who controlled the lower Yangtze region was completely undisturbed by the NRA forces. Chiang Kai-Shek and his subordinates had given specific orders not to molest Sun Chuanfang, trying to avoid bringing him into the fight to join Wu Peifu. The NRA also profited off a recent flood of the Yangtze that had backed water up the streams of northern Hunan, hindering enemy communications. Wu Peifu was awaited reinforcements over at his HQ in Wuhan while his generals in Hunan faced the real threat of being encircled and annihilated. To Wu Peifu's western flank, two Guizhou warlords were watching the tide of battle. Wu Peifu was very aware of this and it threatened his western defensives. The season had also been a poor harvest, reducing food stuff for Hunan, a province that was already quite dependent on exports north in places like Wuhan. Even with his riverine navy, Wu Peifu could not hope to move enough foodstuff to his southern front. Another issue he faced was the passive resistance of Hunan's peasantry class who began hiding their produce from suppliers. The loss of the Lien-Lu River line left Changsha completely defenseless, so on July 11th the defenders simply withdraw further north of the city.  With the Guangdong and Juangxi forces entering Hunan, the NRA had gained enough manpower to begin advancing north. From July 11th after taking Changsha until mid August the front moved north only 50 miles. Delays occurred because reinforcements and war materials for the NRA could only be moved halfway up from Guangzhou by rail. Afterwards they had to travel over back-breaking terrain by foot. Soldiers and their hired coolies had to hand carry supplies and arms and this in turn limited the largest weaponry they could move, such as small field cannons which took entire teams of carriers. For those of you who don't know, I specialize in the Pacific War and I can certainly say, the Japanese forces in isolated islands, take Guadalcanal for example, saw this exact type of situation. Japanese artillery teams would have to disassemble artillery pieces and carry them by hand through rough jungles, often under starvation conditions. Not fun. The NRA during these circumstance, much like the Japanese in the 1940's in jungle terrain islands would suffer from terrible ailments, not malaria like the Japanese, but cholera. Cholera was taking a toll on the overheated and exhausted soldiers and civilian coolies. One Chen Kungpo wrote in his memoirs “that hundreds died daily in one mountain town on the route going north”. By August, both sides were gathering in strength along a new front, established near the Milo River. A military advisor wrote “Sometimes there are no provisions, my colleagues tear off some sort of grass, chew it and are full.” However the northern forces could not launch counterattacks without the full support of the Jade Marshall's main army who were still stuck in North China aiding Zhang Zuolin against the treacherous Feng Yuxiang. To remedy the two front situation, Wu Piefu tried but failed to secure loans and aid from his former protege, Sun Chuanfang, who honestly was more foe than friend now. Sun Chuanfang had basically taken the mantle as the strong Zhili leader and certainly did not want to share any of his newfound limelight. Alongside this the British turned a cold shoulder to Wu Peifu and the Japanese never liked him to begin with.  Despite some local floods and the cholera outbreak, Chiang Kai-Shek was able to arrive to Hengyang with over 100,000 NRA troops. These numbers had been recently bolstered by Guizhou warlords such as Peng Hanchang and Wang Tienpei who had watched eagerly the battles of the Lien-Lu line before tossing their lot in with the NRA. The Guizhou forces had marched into western Hunan clearing out pockets of resistance as they did. During the northern expedition, smaller warlords tended to simply defect or join the NRA when the NRA was winning. The NRA now prepared an offensive to break the Milo river line, also emboldened by the peasantry class who were very willing to work. The local floods in northern Hunan, combined with the droughts in southern Hunan had destroyed the peasants' fields, thus they needed to make money. The NRA exploited this to recruit soldiers and coolies en masse and this greatly improved their mobility.  By contrast, Wu Peifu's forces were low on ammunition, rations were also beginning to dwindle and the majority of the soldiers had not been paid in quite some time. In the NRA controlled areas, the Hunanese peasants were selling what produce they could spare, but the NRA were also being supplemented by rice carried from Guangdong. The NRA also made sure to pay coolies properly instead of Shanghai'ing them and did not plunder peasants' foodstuffs. This of course led to wide scale cooperation from the local population, something quite rare for the warlord era. A final conference was held at Changsha on August 12th between Chiang Kai-Shek, the top NRA commanders and Soviet advisors. By the 15th orders were dispatched for a general offensive against the Moli line with the objective of reaching Hubei. The NRA right wing also prepared to defend the army in cause Sun Chuanfang finally extended help to Wu Peifu from Guanxi. Chiang Kai-Shek was filled with excitement, for if successful, the NRA offensive would capture Wuhan and her incredible Hanyang Arsenal. Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched word to his generals before the battle. “The importance of this fight is not only in that it will decide the fate of the warlords. But, whether or not the Chinese nation and race can restore their freedom and independence hangs in the balance. In other words, it is a struggle between the nation and the warlords, between the revolution and the anti-revolutionaries, between the Three People's Principles and imperialism. All are to be decided now in this time of battle … so as to restore independence and freedom to our Chinese race”. The general plan of attack was to breach the Milo river line and quickly capture Wuhan. Speed and timing were critical factors. It was all basically a huge gamle. The NRA needed to secure Wuhan before Wu Peifu or Sun Chuanfang entered the war, thus preventing the NRA incursion into the Yangtze Valley. At the moment the NRA and their immeidate adversary in northern Hunan were around equal number, but if Sun Chuanfang entered the mix he had nearly double what Chiang Kai-Shek had. The 4th and 6th NRA armies made their crossing over the Milo on August 17th, successfully outflanking the enemy line and easing the way for the left wing of the 7th and 8th NRA armies to advance. By the 19th, Wu Peifu's troops were forced out of their trenches and only provided sporadic resistance as they withdrew into southern Hubei. During the two day retreat the northern forces had divided in two with the western flank taking refuse in Wu Peifu's naval stronghold of Yuehzhou. Its port was heavily fortified, however the recent floods had caused water from Dongting lake and the Yangtze to meet, ruining many of the fortifications. The NRA cut across Yuehzhou's railway link to Wuhan and surrounded it. Wu Peifu had frantically orders troops to hold the naval base, until he could detach himself from the Hobei operations to take personal command of the shit storm in Hunan. However during a meeting with Zhang Zuolin at Baoding, Wu Peifu received word his subordinates had simply taken all the naval vessels, riverine vessels and even sampans to head downstream for Wuhan. Yuehzhou fell with ease by the 22nd and Hunan was practically cleared of Wu Peifu's regular forces. Wu Peifu's navy contuined to fight the enemy, but all they could really do is harass NRA units along th baks of Dongting lake or the Yangtze. In response the NRA simply tosses fire rafts at them, a classic and age old tactic.  As the NRA chased the enemy, the local railway workers on lines heading into Hubei cooperated. The workers began cutting railway lines and telegraph lines to obstruct the enemy retreating from Yuehzhou. Entire trainloads of troops and war materials fell directly into the hands of the NRA. The end of August saw Chiang Kai-Shek's gamble pay off. Although Sun Chuanfang could pounce at any moment from Juangxi, the NRA had succesfully given a bloody nose to one warlord. The victory of the NRA over Hunan did not go unnoticed by the surrounding provinces warlords. Guizhou generals began joining the KMT as the war raged and the Milo river line fight influenced some generals under Sun Chuanfang to reconsider their loyalites. It was quite remarkable that Sun Chuanfangs decision to stay out of the immediate fight lost him the easiest chance of ending the NRA altogether. If Sun Chuanfang had intervened in the Hunan war, almost 100% he would have defeated Chiang Kai-Shek and easily march upon Guangzhou to end the first United Front. Losing Guangdong the KMT would have withered away, perhaps the CCP, would cower into the shadows awaited the right moment to pounce. Chiang Kai-Shek would not have withstood such a defeat, his leadership role would have been shattered. But such was not the case, Chiang Kai-Shek took Hunan and proved himself a new formidable player on the board. The Hunan campaign cost the NRA, but now they had the perfect base of operations and springboard for further offensives. By the end of August the NRA's intelligence reported Wu Peifu was advancing south to reinforce Wuhan, thus Chiang Kai-Shek tossed the dice of fate again. Advancing north against the three-city stronghold, was regiments of Chen Mingshu and Chang Fakuei's 4th Army. The withdrawal from the Milo river line had allowed Wu Peifu's Hubei forces to form a new line. The Guangzhou-Hankou railway followed a narrow land route between the Yangtze and highland ranges, crossing over multiple flooded bridgeheads. To further hinder the NRA's advance, the Hunanese had breached nearby dikes of the Yangtze. Then they heavily fortified the Tingszu Brigde with barbed wire and machine gun nests over its northern riverbank. The NRA vanguard attacked the stronghold on August 26th, coming to a abrupt halt. The NRA's superior mobility, aided by local boatsmen allowing the NRA right wing to head upstream and get around the enemy's flank. Likewise the NRA 4th army threatened the railway to Wuhan, making Wu Peifu's forces more vulnerable. The forces defending Wuhan were mainly the same troops who had fled Hunan, exhausted and demoralized. When the first attacks came upon the bridgehead, joined by flank attacks, the defensive line collapsed. During the night of the 26th the NRA stormed several strongpoints and outposts. Here again Wu Peifu's forces jumped onto any vessel they could get away with, or fled aboard the last trains heading north. The Tingszu bridge was captured, but at a bloody cost that would limit the NRA's ability to pursue the fleeing enemy. Once again the floods slowed the advance, alongside Wu Peifu's riverine vessels that continued to fire upon any NRA troops that ventured too close to waterways. Yet Wu Peifu's troops were running low on food while the NRA were accumulating more of it. As the NRA soldiers marched across the Tingszu bridge, locals flocked over to sell them foodstuff as by this time word had spread far about how the NRA paid for what they needed. On August 28th the NRA forces captured Xienning, but further north came across the Hesheng bridge. The bridge was heavily fortified and defended by forces under the personal command of Wu Peifu. Back on August the 25th and Hankou, Wu Peifu received word that Tingszu bridge had fallen, thus he quickened his advance to the front. He was shocked by the fall of the bridge and blamed his subordinates, labeling them cowards. When he arrived at Hesheng, Wu Peifu gathered his officers as he executed the commanders who lost the Tingszu bridge. He had with him mercenaries of the Big Swords Corps functioning as the executioners. On August 29th, Wu Peifu then went on the offensive and attacked the NRA vanguard, elements of Li Tsungjen's 7th Army just a bit due south of the Hesheng Bridge. His attack devastated the vanguard until the main bulk of the 7th and 4th armies arrived. Just before dawn on the 30th, Wu Peifu attacked the NRA's line of defense south of the bridge, probing for a weak point. He hit the 4th and 7th armies sectors, but was gradually met by artillery and rifle fire that took a heavy toll. Wu Peifu then had the Big Swords executioners clip more officers of their heads to boost morale. However as Wu Peifu continued to press his offensive his men eventually routed under pressure. His troops fled right over the Hesheng bridge allowing the 7th army to flank them further upstream where they took another smaller bridge and threatened his lifeline, the railway line to Wuhan.  By noon on the 30th, Wu Peifu's Hunanese and Hubei forces were in a general retreat heading north. Wu Peifu had just lost southern Hubei in what was an absolute clumsy miscalculation. During the retreat the NRA flank attack against his railway line saw them capture 3 trains full loaded with troops and arms. Over the course of the past weeks he had lost two bridgeheads seeing 1000 deaths, 2000 wounded and 5000 captured alongside all their weaponry. After the entire debacle, Wu Peifu began frantically pleading with Sun Chuanfang to come down the Yangtze to help him. But Sun Chuanfang made ambiguous responses and dragged his feet. As he did so the NRA fortified their defenses facing Juangxi. In full retreat Wu Peifu began breaching dikes behind his forces to slow down the NRA as they approached Wuchang, the capital of Hubei. He left a force of 10,000 men to defend the city behind its sturdy walls as he ferried the rest of his men to Hankou. Once his forces landed on the other side of the Yangtze he had half of them take up positions to defend the Hanyang Arsenal, while the others defended Hankou, which served as his new HQ. By September his forces from Honan began to arrive.  On August 31st, Chen Mingshu's 4th army was in hot pursuit of the enemy. His vanguard took a vantage point near Wuchang as reconnaissance investigated the city. On September 2nd, the NRA unleashed frontal assaults to probe its defenses, but they lacked any heavy artillery to actually back up a real attack. As a result the NRA suffered heavy casualties before pulling back to establish a proper siege. Meanwhile by september 5th, Hanyang was also surrounded.  Defending Hanyang was a Hubei division led by Liu Tsolung who placed artillery on some fortified high points. When the NRA was just about to launch an assault, suddenly Liu Tsolung, overseeing the majority of Hanyangs defenses defected and helped capture the city and its arsenal. It was a tremendous blow to Wu Peifu as the NRA vanguard was now bypassing Hanyang to threaten his railway link to Honan. Wu Peifu tried to salvage the units he had left to mount a last ditch defensive line over the border hills between Hubei and Honan. Wu Peifu had now withdrawn to the Wushen pass lying on the border, hoping to hold out as more of his Honanese forces advanced south. Yet once again the NRA's superior mobility deprived Wu Peifu of enough time to dig into the pass. After a few assaults, Wu Peifu lost the pass and was driven further back into Honan. The walled city of Wuchang could not be taken as easily as Hanyang or Hankou. Wu Peifu and his men would defend it for well over a month. The NRA did not have proper siege weapons, and the threat of Sun Chuanfang loomed over them.Yet Wu Peifu had not expected Hunan and Hubei to fall so quickly and had not prepared his capital for a long siege. He had 10,000 soldiers, hundreds of thousands of civilians locked within its walls. There were also foreigners within the city and foreign gunboats. The threat of international intervention loomed upon the actions of the NRA. Chiang Kai-Shek telegrammed his foreign minister that a communique should be sent out to inform the world powers “… on the matter of protecting foreign nationals, I have already informed the armies to observe my prohibition against the military occupying or obstructing affairs in foreign-established churches, schools, and the like….” Chiang Kai-Shek personally overlooked the siege to make sure no foreigners were molested.  Just to clear up something that might be confusing some of you, Wuchang refers to one of the 13 urban districts of the capital of Hubei, Wuhan. Now back in mid August, Chiang Kai-Shek called for the capture of Wuhan at Changsha and he had made secret negotiations with Sun Chuanfang to get him to sit out the war. Sun Chuanfang had been quite ambiguous about what he would do, but it was known to NRA intelligence he was massing troops along the borders of Jiangxi and Fujian. Sun Chuanfang made up the excuse he was simply defending his territory from NRA aggression. Apparently Chiang Kai-Shek offered a nonaggression pact and an open invitation to join the KMT, but Sun Chuanfang did not want to give up his new found control over the 5 southeastern provinces for what was perceived to be a lesser role in the KMT. Sun Chuanfang then prepared a two pronged offensive to relieve Wuchang by driving west into KMT territory. Sun Chuanfang was sitting on 200,000 troops and Chiang Kai-Shek was well aware of the threat he posed. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek would go for broke, casting the dice of fate once more.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek rolled the dice of fate when he unleashed an offensive against Wu Peifu's holdings in Hunan and Hubei. The gambles paid off big time as the NRA swarmed their enemy, taking prisoners and war materials. However Sun Chuanfang was now entering the fray, a real fight would soon unfold.

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