Podcast appearances and mentions of robert citino

El ataque a Pearl Harbor el 7 de diciembre de 1941 hizo que EEUU entrase directamente en la II Guerra Mundial contra Japón y poco después contra Alemania e Italia. Los hechos son los que son, pero muchos misterios los rodean. Tanto es así que muchos aseguran que no fue ni mucho menos un ataque sorpresa y que la presidencia estaba perfectamente informada y no se hizo nada. Voy a enumerar los hechos y lo que se ha ido desvelando conforme los documentos fueron saliendo a la luz. Misterios de Pearl Harbor El 7 de diciembre de 1941, el mundo se estremeció ante el ataque sorpresa de Japón a la base naval estadounidense de Pearl Harbor, en Hawái. El bombardeo causó la muerte de más de 2.400 personas y el hundimiento o daño de 18 barcos y 300 aviones. Fue el detonante para que Estados Unidos entrara en la Segunda Guerra Mundial y se enfrentara al Eje formado por Alemania, Italia y Japón. Pero, ¿qué motivó a Japón a lanzar este ataque? ¿Qué sabía Estados Unidos sobre los planes japoneses? ¿Hubo algún error o conspiración que facilitara el éxito del ataque? Estas son algunas de las preguntas que han intrigado a historiadores, periodistas y aficionados durante décadas. A continuación, repasamos algunos de los misterios más fascinantes de Pearl Harbor. - La nota Hull: ¿un error de traducción que acabó con la diplomacia? Japón y Estados Unidos mantenían negociaciones diplomáticas para resolver sus diferencias sobre China y el Pacífico desde noviembre de 1941. Sin embargo, el 26 de noviembre, el secretario de Estado estadounidense, Cordell Hull, entregó a los embajadores japoneses una nota con diez puntos que exigía la retirada japonesa de China y el fin de sus alianzas con el Eje. La nota fue interpretada por Japón como un ultimátum y una declaración de guerra encubierta. Según el profesor Tosh Minohara, del Instituto Internacional de Estudios Asiáticos, la nota Hull fue mal traducida por los servicios de contraespionaje y los traductores estadounidenses, que omitieron o alteraron algunas palabras clave que suavizaban el tono y la intención de la nota. Esto provocó que Japón rompiera las negociaciones y decidiera atacar Pearl Harbor. - La advertencia y decisión: ¿se ignoraron las señales del ataque? Estados Unidos tenía indicios de que Japón planeaba un ataque contra sus intereses en el Pacífico, pero no sabía dónde ni cuándo. La historiadora Roberta Wohlstetter identificó hasta quince señales que apuntaban a Pearl Harbor como el objetivo japonés, pero que fueron desatendidas o desestimadas por las autoridades estadounidenses. Entre ellas se encuentran los informes de inteligencia que detectaron movimientos anormales de la flota japonesa, los mensajes interceptados que revelaban las intenciones beligerantes de Japón, o los avistamientos de submarinos enemigos cerca de Hawái. Según Wohlstetter, la falta de atención se debió a una combinación de desidia, excesiva confianza y priorización de otras amenazas, como la Alemania nazi. - La conspiración: ¿sabía Roosevelt del ataque y lo permitió? Algunos teóricos de la conspiración han sostenido que el presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt conocía con antelación el ataque a Pearl Harbor y lo dejó suceder para tener una excusa para entrar en la guerra y ayudar a Gran Bretaña contra el Eje. Esta hipótesis se basa en supuestas evidencias como el diario del secretario de Guerra Henry L. Stimson, que menciona una reunión con Roosevelt en la que se habló de un posible ataque japonés el lunes siguiente al 25 de noviembre; o el hecho de que los portaaviones estadounidenses no estuvieran en Pearl Harbor durante el ataque. Sin embargo, estas afirmaciones han sido refutadas por varias investigaciones oficiales del Congreso y por expertos como Robert Citino, del Museo Nacional de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que asegura que Roosevelt fue tomado por sorpresa y que no tenía motivos para sacrificar vidas y recursos estadounidenses. - Los fantasmas: ¿hay presencias paranormales en Pearl Harbor? Pearl Harbor no solo es un lugar histórico, sino también un lugar misterioso para los amantes de lo paranormal. Algunos visitantes y trabajadores han afirmado haber visto u oído fenómenos extraños en el lugar, como sombras, voces, ruidos o apariciones. Algunos creen que se trata de los espíritus de los caídos en el ataque, que siguen vagando por el lugar. Otros piensan que son alucinaciones o sugestiones provocadas por el ambiente y la memoria del lugar. Sea como sea, Pearl Harbor sigue siendo un lugar que despierta la curiosidad y el respeto de quienes lo visitan. Puedes leer más y comentar en mi web, en el enlace directo: https://luisbermejo.com/el-misterio-del-crucigrama-zz-podcast-05x31/ Puedes encontrarme y comentar o enviar tu mensaje o preguntar en: WhatsApp: +34 613031122 Paypal: https://paypal.me/Bermejo Bizum: +34613031122 Web: https://luisbermejo.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ZZPodcast/ X (twitters): https://x.com/LuisBermejo y https://x.com/zz_podcast Instagrams: https://www.instagram.com/luisbermejo/ y https://www.instagram.com/zz_podcast/ Canal Telegram: https://t.me/ZZ_Podcast Canal WhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Va89ttE6buMPHIIure1H Grupo Signal: https://signal.group/#CjQKIHTVyCK430A0dRu_O55cdjRQzmE1qIk36tCdsHHXgYveEhCuPeJhP3PoAqEpKurq_mAc Grupo Whatsapp: https://chat.whatsapp.com/FQadHkgRn00BzSbZzhNviThttps://chat.whatsapp.com/BNHYlv0p0XX7K4YOrOLei0

*** VIDEO EN NUESTRO CANAL DE YOUTUBE **** 📺 https://youtube.com/live/PwTfEi5mNcE 📺 +++++ Hazte con nuestras camisetas en https://www.bhmshop.app +++++ #historia #historiamilitar #ww2 Gracias José Antonio Peña Artero, autor de "Detras del Mito: El puño acorazado de Stalin" ** https://amzn.to/3nKtI0N ** conocermos el proceso de formación, desequilibrio y recuperación de las unidades acorazadas soviéticas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial: algo con una seña de identidad propio (como diría Robert Citino, un “modo ruso de hacer la guerra”) y no únicamente, como hasta ahora se defendía, producto de las enseñanzas alemanas aprendidas con sangre. No os perdáis el anterior programa con José Antonio sobre “LA BATALLA DEL KURSK, la marca de la marea panzer” https://youtu.be/g3cFUFX6mz8 y “LA FUERZA ACORAZADA ESTADOUNIDENSE EN LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL” https://youtu.be/QGPsjcVzYuQ "TANQUES DE SU MAJESTAD" https://youtube.com/live/wnag6EDYOgY ----------------- BELLUMARTIS PREMIUM ------------------------ Código descuento "BELLUMARTISHM" para acceder a todos los servcios de @elrinconmilitar407 en Enlace de suscripción: https://rinconmilitar.com/cuenta-de-membresia/pago-de-membresia/?level=1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMPRA EN AMAZON CON EL ENLACE DE BHM Y AYUDANOS ************** https://amzn.to/3ZXUGQl ************* 💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲 Si queréis apoyar a Bellumartis Historia Militar e invitarnos a un café o u una cerveza virtual por nuestro trabajo, podéis visitar nuestro PATREON https://www.patreon.com/bellumartis o en PAYPALhttps://www.paypal.me/bellumartis o en BIZUM 656/778/825 💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲💲 No olvidéis suscribiros al canal, si aún no lo habéis hecho. Si queréis ayudarnos, dadle a “me gusta” y también dejadnos comentarios. De esta forma ayudaréis a que los programas sean conocidos por más gente. Y compartidnos con vuestros amigos y conocidos. SIGUENOS EN TODAS LAS REDES SOCIALES ¿Queréis contactar con nosotros? Puedes escribirnos a bellumartispublicidad@hotmail.com como por WHATSAP o en BIZUM 656/778/825 Nuestra página principal es: https://bellumartishistoriamilitar.blogspot.com

In this episode, Dr. Luke Truxal joins me again to talk Air Power in 1943 – this time we talk about Operation Tidal Wave, an air raid against Romanian oil refineries. The operation was not just a failure on many levels but it had a negative impact on our ability to employ our air assets during the remainder of the Sicily Campaign and going into Italy as a result of significant losses and damage to the bombers. Links   Uniting Against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe – Dr. Luke Truxal (https://amzn.to/3Qp2I31)   Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil – LTC Jay Stout, USMC Ret. (https://amzn.to/3DNyuzb) (Jay A. Stout https://www.jayastout.com/)   Enlisted Personnel of Operation Tidal Wave (https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AFEHRI/documents/WarsConflicts/fodor.pdf)   The Airmen Heritage Series: Operation “Tidal Wave” (https://media.defense.gov/2016/May/18/2001540805/-1/-1/0/AFD-160518-001-011.PDF)   1943 – Operation Tidal Wave: The Low-Level Bombing of the Ploesti Oil Refineries (https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/459003/1943-operation-tidalwave-the-low-level-bombing-of-the-ploesti-oil-refineries-1/)   Operation Tidal Wave (https://www.americanairmuseum.com/archive/mission/operation-tidal-wave)   On Thie Day (1 Aug 1943): Operation Tidal Wave (https://www.mightyeighth.org/operation-tidal-wave/)   Romania's Holy War: Soldiers, Motivation, and the Holocaust – Dr. Grant Harward (https://amzn.to/3Kwp4vI)   Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940 – Dr. Robert Citino (https://amzn.to/3Oqv1v7)   For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (https://amzn.to/45jsSbp)   http://www.motheroftanks.com/ads-sponsors-and-affiliate-links/ --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/mother-of-tanks/message

In Part Two of LikeWar, we focus on how technology and war first came to be linked. Before the internet, the printing press, the telegram and the radio all transformed from means of communication to essential weapons for fighting - and winning - wars.   This episode features the expertise of Dr. Robert Citino, Senior Historian at the World War II Museum in New Orleans.  This series is adapted from the book LikeWar, written by series narrator Peter Singer and series contributor Emerson Brooking. To learn more about their research and defense work, you can find them on Twitter @peterwsinger and @etbrooking.   Get the book at LikeWarBook.com.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Dr. Robert Citino, Senior Historian, at the National WWII Museum in New Orleans talks to host Jim Fausone about the museum, its history, its collections, and its relevance in today's society.  The museum has survived near bankruptcy and Hurricane Katrina.  It is twenty years old and running strong, notwithstanding a pandemic.  Citino talks about the strong online presence and teaching that has been done during shut down.  The museum seeks to rebuild its customer traffic and Citino entices you down to New Orleans on that next road trip.

As portions of the country remove or tear down Generals, Confederate symbols, Christopher Columbus, Abe Lincoln and other so called offensive public art, you have to ask about the role of history or war museums in the United States.  Here is a thoughtful conversation with Dr Robert Citino, Sr. Historian , at The National WWII Museum in New Orleans.  He talks about the diffences and the need to have a deeper understanding of history with Jim Fausone 

On the eve of the 76th anniversary of D-Day, Robert Citino, historian at the National World War II Museum in New Orleans, joins "CBS This Morning" co-host Anthony Mason to discuss lessons gleaned from history as thousands of people take to the streets to protest police brutality and systemic racism amid the global coronavirus pandemic. Citino says Americans have the ability to come together in difficult and trying times, despite the nation's rugged individualism.

On the eve of the 76th anniversary of D-Day, Robert Citino, historian at the National World War II Museum in New Orleans, joins "CBS This Morning" co-host Anthony Mason to discuss lessons gleaned from history as thousands of people take to the streets to protest police brutality and systemic racism amid the global coronavirus pandemic. Citino says Americans have the ability to come together in difficult and trying times, despite the nation's rugged individualism.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

So much of our history has been weaponized by politics -- especially the Mughal period. Manimugdha Sharma joins Amit Varma in episode 173 of The Seen and the Unseen to shed light on the tug of war around Emperor Akbar -- and why that history remains relevant even today.   Also check out: 1. Allahu Akbar: Understanding the Great Mughal in Today's India -- Manimugdha Sharma. 2. Parthian Shot -- Manimugdha Sharma's column archives. 3. Manimugdha Sharma's reporting in Times of India. 4. Who Broke Our Republic? -- Episode 163 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Kapil Komireddi). 5. The Ideas of Our Constitution -- Episode 164 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Madhav Khosla), 6. The Many Cities of Delhi -- Episode 172 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rana Safvi). 7. Women in Indian History -- Episode 144 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ira Mukhoty). 8. Jahangir the Curious -- Episode 147 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Parvati Sharma). 9. Our Colorful Past -- Episode 127 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Manu Pillai). 10. The BJP's Magic Formula -- Episode 45 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Prashant Jha). 11. Essential Kabir -- Arvind Krishna Mehrotra. 12. White Mughals -- William Dalrymple. 13. Empress: The Astonishing Reign of Nur Jehan -- Ruby Lal. 14. The Bhagvad Gita in Urdu, recited by Ahmed Rashid Shervani at Manthan Samvaad. 15. The Early History of India -- Vincent Smith. 16. The Mughal Empire -- JF Richards. 17. The Agrarian System of Mughal India -- Irfan Habib. 18. Akbar and His India -- Irfan Habib. 19. The Western Way of War -- Victor Davis Hanson. 20. The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India -- Randolph GS Cooper. 21. Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India -- Iqtidar Alam Khan. 22. The Millennial Sovereign -- A Azfar Moin. 23. The German Way of War -- Robert Citino 24. When Titans Clashed -- David M Glantz & Jonathan M House.

Jeremi meets with Dr. Gordon H. “Nick” Mueller and Dr. Robert Citino to discuss lessons and legacies on the 75th anniversary of the end of WWII. Zachary sets the scene with his poem, “And to Dust, We Shall Return”. Dr. Gordon H. “Nick” Mueller is a distinguished historian and former Vice Chancellor at the University […]

This is episode 12 of the podcast Eagles, Globes, and Anchors from the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) featuring our host, Dr. James Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College. Dr. Lacey’s guest is Dr. Robert Citino, the Samuel Zemurray Stone Senior Historian at the National World War II Museum. Dr. Lacey’s guest discusses multiple topics related to German strategy during World War II. Eagles, Globes, and Anchors is the strategically-minded podcast of the Marine Corps War College, covering the intersection of strategy, security, and warfare. The Marine Corps War College, as the senior PME institution of the Marine Corps, educates selected military and civilian professionals in order to develop critical thinkers, military strategists, joint warfighters and strategic leaders who are prepared to meet the challenges of a complex and dynamic security environment. The views expressed in this podcast reflect those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of the United States Marine Corps or Department of Defense. You can follow the Marine Corps War College on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook at @mcwarcollege.(Podcast created by: US Air Force Lt Col Jason Palma)

When military historians study battles or campaigns, what purpose does it serve? To immerse oneself deeply in the period and master the details, or to connect events of the past to the present? These and other questions are addressed in this conversation between two renowned military historians--Robert Citino of the World War II Museum and Michael Neiberg of the U.S. Army War College. They also address questions of what constitutes good historical writing and why it is especially important to develop such writing skills today.

National WWII Museum in New Orleans Did you know the National WWII Museum is in New Orleans? What's the connection to WWII and New Orleans? Come along as we explore the museum and learn the answers to these questions and more! Today's guest is Dr. Robert Citino, Senior Historian at the National WWII Museum. Dr. Citino is an award-winning military historian and scholar. He published ten books and numerous articles about WWII and 20th century military history. Dr. Citino also taught at West Point for one year and for two years at the U.S. Army War College. In this episode we talk about the museum's founding, and its placement in New Orleans. We discuss Stephen Ambrose (Band of Brothers, and Eisenhower biographer) and Nick Mueller, the two who led the charge to create the National WWII Museum. We learn about Andrew Higgins and his landing craft. Dr. Citino takes us on an audio tour of the museum where we learn about exhibits including: The Arsenal of Democracy Road to Tokyo Road to Berlin The D-Day Invasion of Normandy We also discuss the 4D movie Beyond All Boundaries, and discuss ways to approach your visit to the museum Trip Advisor ranks as the #2 museum in the world. All this and more on today's show. I hope you'll join us for this discussion! Resources To plan your visit to the National WWII Museum, be sure to visit their website. Be sure to visit their profiles page to read some of the stories of the brave men and women who were a part of what Tom Brokaw coined as the Greatest Generation. You can  follow the National WWII Museum on Twitter (@WWIImuseum). For information about Dr. Citino's books, check out the museum bookstore. Thank You Thank you to Dr. Rob Citino for sharing his knowledge and enthusiasm about telling the stories of WWII, D-Day, the home front and the Greatest Generation. A special thanks to Mr. Keith Darcey, Public Relations Manager. Keith showed me around the museum, arranged the interview with Dr. Citino, and offered insights and suggestions that helped bring the discussion to life. Sponsor: The Old 77 Hotel and Chandlery When you're ready to make your plans to visit the National WWII Museum in New Orleans, you'll need a place to stay! The Old 77 is ideally situated in the Warehouse District, just a short walk to the museum. It features a variety of pet-friendly rooms, the award-winning Compere Lapin restaurant, and more. You'll love the location, the rooms, and the food, but the details and the service are what you'll fall in love with! To book your room, click here or use code BBOLD77 to save 25% off their regular rates. You'll also get a bit of lagniappe, a little something extra. In this case, you'll receive a $10 credit to be used at Tout La in the hotel lobby - your stop for coffee and a quick bite to eat as you head out to explore New Orleans. Lagniappe, part II - email a copy of your reservation to mark@beyondbourbonst.com and I'll send you my pdf guide of what to eat, see and do in the Warehouse District. Subscribe to the Podcast If you enjoy the show, please listen to the podcast on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, Google Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts. If you do enjoy listening, please share Beyond Bourbon Street with someone who shares our love of New Orleans. Contact Us Got an idea for an episode, have some feedback or just want to say hi? Leave us a message at 504-475-7632 or send an email to mark@beyondbourbonst.com Thanks for listening! Mark

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn's book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine.

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Robert Citino is one of a handful of scholars working in German military history whose books I would describe as reliably rewarding. Even when one quibbles with some of the details of his argument, one is sure to profit from reading his work. When a Citino book appears in print, it automatically goes in my “to read” pile. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (UP of Kansas, 2007), which recently appeared in a paperback edition for the first time, was one of the first books I wanted to review for New Books in Military History. The book is operational history at its best. It is written with both clarity and drama, as good operational history should be; it adds to our understanding of the German war in the East through its careful synthesis of the best research in German and English on the subject in the last ten or fifteen years; it mines Wehrmacht military journals for insights into “the German Way of War” (a topic discussed in an early Citino book of that title – see the interview for more). Even avid readers on the subject will learn much that they did not know about Manstein in Crimea, Rommel in North Africa, Hoth approaching Stalingrad, and many of the other campaigns of 1942. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Robert Citino is one of a handful of scholars working in German military history whose books I would describe as reliably rewarding. Even when one quibbles with some of the details of his argument, one is sure to profit from reading his work. When a Citino book appears in print, it automatically goes in my “to read” pile. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (UP of Kansas, 2007), which recently appeared in a paperback edition for the first time, was one of the first books I wanted to review for New Books in Military History. The book is operational history at its best. It is written with both clarity and drama, as good operational history should be; it adds to our understanding of the German war in the East through its careful synthesis of the best research in German and English on the subject in the last ten or fifteen years; it mines Wehrmacht military journals for insights into “the German Way of War” (a topic discussed in an early Citino book of that title – see the interview for more). Even avid readers on the subject will learn much that they did not know about Manstein in Crimea, Rommel in North Africa, Hoth approaching Stalingrad, and many of the other campaigns of 1942. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Robert Citino is one of a handful of scholars working in German military history whose books I would describe as reliably rewarding. Even when one quibbles with some of the details of his argument, one is sure to profit from reading his work. When a Citino book appears in print, it automatically goes in my “to read” pile. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (UP of Kansas, 2007), which recently appeared in a paperback edition for the first time, was one of the first books I wanted to review for New Books in Military History. The book is operational history at its best. It is written with both clarity and drama, as good operational history should be; it adds to our understanding of the German war in the East through its careful synthesis of the best research in German and English on the subject in the last ten or fifteen years; it mines Wehrmacht military journals for insights into “the German Way of War” (a topic discussed in an early Citino book of that title – see the interview for more). Even avid readers on the subject will learn much that they did not know about Manstein in Crimea, Rommel in North Africa, Hoth approaching Stalingrad, and many of the other campaigns of 1942. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Robert Citino is one of a handful of scholars working in German military history whose books I would describe as reliably rewarding. Even when one quibbles with some of the details of his argument, one is sure to profit from reading his work. When a Citino book appears in print, it automatically goes in my “to read” pile. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (UP of Kansas, 2007), which recently appeared in a paperback edition for the first time, was one of the first books I wanted to review for New Books in Military History. The book is operational history at its best. It is written with both clarity and drama, as good operational history should be; it adds to our understanding of the German war in the East through its careful synthesis of the best research in German and English on the subject in the last ten or fifteen years; it mines Wehrmacht military journals for insights into “the German Way of War” (a topic discussed in an early Citino book of that title – see the interview for more). Even avid readers on the subject will learn much that they did not know about Manstein in Crimea, Rommel in North Africa, Hoth approaching Stalingrad, and many of the other campaigns of 1942. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Robert Citino is one of a handful of scholars working in German military history whose books I would describe as reliably rewarding. Even when one quibbles with some of the details of his argument, one is sure to profit from reading his work. When a Citino book appears in print, it automatically goes in my “to read” pile. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (UP of Kansas, 2007), which recently appeared in a paperback edition for the first time, was one of the first books I wanted to review for New Books in Military History. The book is operational history at its best. It is written with both clarity and drama, as good operational history should be; it adds to our understanding of the German war in the East through its careful synthesis of the best research in German and English on the subject in the last ten or fifteen years; it mines Wehrmacht military journals for insights into “the German Way of War” (a topic discussed in an early Citino book of that title – see the interview for more). Even avid readers on the subject will learn much that they did not know about Manstein in Crimea, Rommel in North Africa, Hoth approaching Stalingrad, and many of the other campaigns of 1942. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices