Podcasts about Roosevelt

El historiador con más calle El Fokin Come sacó el cuaderno para contarnos los cuentos de la base Roosevelt Roads en Ceiba: desde la leyenda de "SEBA VIVE", hablar de cómo era el pueblo antes de la llegada de los militares, hasta revelar el porqué Rubén Berríos es el peor puertoriqueño de la isla. Nuestras redes sociales: Tío Macetaminofen Sol Guzabra El George El Come Siempre es Lunes

Subscribe for ad-free listening, early access, and all of our bonus content!The Constitution created what were supposed to be three coequal branches, and only Congress was given the authority to declare war. Yet we are living in the age of the imperial presidency — of endless war, executive orders, government secrecy, and a lack of accountability. These are all fit for a monarchy instead of a republic.How did we get here? What structures led to the rise of the imperial presidency? What decisions led to this unintended consequence undermining the American democratic experiment?Our guest is Jeremi Suri, who teaches history at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He's the author of The Impossible Presidency and co-host of This is Democracy podcast.Suri also writes the Democracy of Hope newsletter. Subscribe today to support our important work! Subscriptions begin at only $5 per month. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Do you sometimes feel your job is just too much for one person to handle?Then let me introduce you to Franklin Roosevelt.“FDR” was the 32nd president of the United States. By a quirk of history, he found himself leading the free world during a crippling economic meltdown…and a world war! His story is important, as we explore faith in God and country this week.No one understood more than Roosevelt the sacrifice needed to defeat evil on the battlefield. He said, “Those who have long enjoyed such privileges as we enjoy forget, in time, that men have died to win them.”He had to send young men and women into harm's way, all over the world.John 15:13 says, “Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends."More than 400,000 Americans died in World War 2. From the South Pacific to Europe, soldiers looked after each other, and in many cases died so that others could live.We should never forget that.Let's pray. Lord, we thank you for those who protect us. We will never forget them. In Jesus' name, amen. Change your shirt, and you can change the world! Save 15% Off your entire purchase of faith-based apparel + gifts at Kerusso.com with code KDD15.

How does a black minister change the racist attitudes of an all white congregation in the urban Midwest? Rev. Reginald Smith did it and then wrote the book Roosevelt Park Rising #PrattPodcasting

This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.volts.wtf/subscribeJane Flegal has worked inside philanthropy at the Hewlett Foundation, industrial emissions policy at the Biden White House, and carbon-removal market development at Frontier; she's now a senior fellow at the Searchlight Institute, writing some of the smartest climate policy analysis around. We cover a lot of ground: industrial policy versus market approaches, what the IRA got right and wrong, philanthropy's proper role, data centers and the case for an infrastructure fund, and behind-the-meter gas, among other things. This is a long one, and spicy!Chapters:00:00 – Introduction03:11 – Flegal's thesis: building a clean grid fast enough to power growth06:29 – Why she rejects degrowth09:27 – The Roosevelt essay: climate as more than a market failure13:30 – Why clean energy underuses its political muscle15:24 – Industrial policy and the green spiral theory of change20:40 – Was IRA the right approach?22:12 – Lily Bermel's paper and the fight over what survived23:21 – What she would have done differently under IRA30:11 – Philanthropy, Silicon Valley, and what government is for33:29 – The epistemic crisis inside environmental NGOs39:09 – The abundance movement and what each faction misses44:16 – What establishment Democrats get wrong on climate46:06 – Why issue polling misleads50:34 – Republicans and the Cold War analogy52:47 – Data centers and the American Grid Infrastructure Fund59:13 – Affordability politics and who pays for the grid1:08:14 – Emissions, behind-the-meter gas, and flexible load1:13:57 – The clean firm debate: storage plus transmission?1:20:14 – Capacity markets, ERCOT, and the case for planning1:24:32 – Utility incentives, public power, and affordability fixes1:35:55 – Permitting reform and the land footprint asymmetry1:41:05 – NEPA reform and the political window1:48:21 – Where fresh policy thinking comes from

Kuʻulei Agbayani and Paul Brecht recap Roosevelt's win over Kalaheo and take a look at the early OIA girls volleyball standings before turning back to football. Kyle Galdeira joins the show for the return of NFL Quick Picks, making picks against the spread for the Week 1 slate before sharing his prediction for Hawaiʻi vs. New Mexico State. Plus, Aloha Friday shout-outs and a look ahead to First Responders Night at the Clarence T.C. Ching Athletics Complex.

In the first game in the brand new Roosevelt High School gym, the Rough Riders took down the Mustangs in four sets, 25-16, 25-20, 21-25, 25-18, in OIA girls volleyball action. Kaycie Garnett led the Rough Riders with a match-high 21 kills and six aces to earn Fun Factory VIP of the Game honors. Kamelehone Trueman paced Kalaheo with 13 kills. 

THE WORLD THAT NEEDED HIMSomething changed in Western democratic politics over the past two to three decades.Blair's New Labor is not Wilson's Labor. Clinton's Democrats are not Roosevelt's Democrats. Then came Citizens United and with it a flood of money and even greater corrosion of democratic politics.And then something even more revealing happened.In 2012, Barack Obama won re-election on hope and change. In 2016, roughly one in eight Trump voters, between seven and nine million people, had voted for Obama four years earlier.That is not contradiction. That is the same wound voting twice.Each disappointment priming the next surrender. Each failure making the soma more appealing.Curtis Yarvin's philosophy is the third expression of that wound at the philosophical level. Not a vote for a person. A vote for a different kind of system entirely. The logical conclusion of two consecutive failed bets on the existing one.For nearly two decades he wrote under a pseudonym, Mencius Moldbug, arguing that democracy is a failed experiment that should be replaced by a CEO monarch. No elections. No independent civil service. No press the monarch can't remove.Almost no one read his blog. Then Peter Thiel read it. Then JD Vance. Then Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen.In January 2025, Curtis Yarvin was a guest of honor at Donald Trump's Coronation Ball.The pseudonymous blogger is now in the room where power is exercised.That isn't a coincidence. That is the mechanism arriving at its destination. THE SOMAYarvin's offer isn't primarily intellectual. It's emotional. And it lands on one of the most legitimate emotions available right now.Exhaustion.And what he offers in response to that exhaustion is more sophisticated than anything Aldous Huxley imagined in 1932 when he named it soma in Brave New World. A gram is better than a damn.This episode shows you exactly what the offer is. And why it feels, to millions of people, like relief rather than surrender. THE ESC ANALYSISThe twelve-year-old who couldn't meet the peer criteria grew up. And built something.Yarvin grew up moving. Portugal. Cyprus. Dominican Republic. Serial displacement. Serial belonging failures. In Cyprus he was three grades ahead of his peers. When he returned to the US he described himself as a twelve-year-old sophomore and described that twelve-year-old, in his own words, as "a little arrogant asshole."The formal systems rewarded his intelligence. The peer systems did not.This episode shows you what the wound produced when it was given two decades, a philosophy blog, and eventually the ear of the most powerful people in the current administration.And in January 2025, he was in the room where those same people were seeking his counsel.In Dov Baron's ESC reading, that moment is not healing. It's validation. And those two can look the same, but they are psychologically universes apart. THE QUESTION TO CARRYWhere in your life have you accepted the needle, the soma, because the alternative was feeling everything?And who handed the numbing drug to you? NEXT WEEK: THE SERIES FINALEFour episodes have shown you the mechanism operating in other people.Episode 5 is the episode where Dov turns the lens on himself.And on you.The question he's going to answer is not theoretical. It comes from the bottom of a hundred and twenty foot fall.And it's the question this entire series has been building toward.You need to be there for it. IN THIS EPISODE00:00 Disappointment to Surrender00:45 Comfortably Numb Shift03:37 Show Framework and Lenses04:48 Politics Converge and Abandonment06:47 Obama to Trump Wound09:21 Meet Curtis Yarvin10:58 Exhaustion and Soma Offer13:57 Yarvin Origin Story17:02 Pseudonym and Validation19:19 Turning the Lens Inward21:18 Soma Question and Outro THE SERIES: WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO BELIEVE TO BELIEVE THAT?Episode 1: You Didn't Think It. It Was Thought For You. [https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-dov-baron-show/id272512829?i=1000784372760]Episode 2: The Wound the Framework Needs [https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-dov-baron-show/id272512829?i=1000785947055]Episode 3: The Man Who Documented His Own Wound [https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-dov-baron-show/id272512829?i=1000787315154]Episode 4: The Philosopher They Needed (this episode) ABOUT DOV BARONThe analysis in this series is not theoretical.Dov Baron has spent thirty years in the rooms where the most consequential decisions get made. Not observing. Being the person that founders and senior executives call when the external success has arrived and something essential is still missing.Most people who find this series want to know one thing.How do I get access to that room?His work sits at the intersection of the Emotional Source Code and the Emotional Meaning Architecture: the psychological frameworks that reveal what is actually driving behavior, identity, and meaning before it reaches the level of conscious examination. The same frameworks that produce the analysis you've been listening to.He has worked exclusively by referral for twenty years. He has personally interviewed every client. And he has said no to at least as many as he has said yes to.If you are a founder or senior executive who has built something real and arrived at the quiet place where the winning has stopped being the thing, reach out directly at dov@dovbaron.com with the subject line: The Room.Not to buy anything. To find out whether you belong in it. ABOUT THE POLYMATHIC PERSPECTIVEThe Polymathic Perspective examines the emotional logic beneath power, culture, identity, and meaning. Together, we discover how psychological, cultural, and geopolitical patterns drive behaviors, not just in people, but in systems. If you've been told your curiosity is a liability, it's your greatest asset. RATE, REVIEW, SUBSCRIBEIf this episode changed how you look at your own political exhaustion and who benefits from it, please rate and review The Polymathic Perspective on Apple Podcasts. Share it with one person who has quietly folded the newspaper and stopped expecting anything different. Connect with Dov Baron:https://DovBaron.comdov@dovbaron.comRate, review, and send this episode to the most thoughtful builder you know. That is how the algorithm finds the people who still ask why. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

CAPTION  1934 KIROV AND STALINStalin's Geopolitical Exploitation of Lend-LeaseSean McMeekin, author of Stalin's War: A New History of World War II, Part One: This interview details how Joseph Stalin manipulated Western powers to recover and expand Soviet territory. Through FDR and Harry Hopkins, the U.S.provided massive Lend-Lease aid, military equipment, and proprietary technology without demanding anything in return. Roosevelt consistently appeased Stalin, ignoring massive Soviet crimes like the Katyn massacre and enabling the sidelining of democratic forces in Yugoslavia and China. This massive, unrestricted U.S. aid ultimately helped establish the Soviet Union as a formidable global superpower. (3)

After last week's disappointing marathon loss in their season opener, East Central had a lot to prove as they took on the visiting Roosevelt Roughriders on Friday. The Hornets came out firing in all three phases of the game on their way to a convincing 40-14 win in their home opener at Hornet Stadium, to bring their season record to 1-1. Head Coach Joe Hubbard's squad got things off on the right foot early on. The swarming Hornets defense forced the first of their three turnovers on the night on Roosevelt's opening drive. Taking possession deep into Roughrider territory, senior... Article Link

CAPTION USS OGLALA CAPSIZED, PEARL HARBORChristmas 1941 to July 1944: Calculated Risk and the Rebuilding of Pacific CommandCraig Symonds, author of Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, Part One: This interview segment details Admiral Chester Nimitz's leadership during the first half of the Pacific War. Arriving at a devastated Pearl Harbor in late 1941, Nimitz was selected by President Roosevelt despite Admiral Ernest King's initial skepticism. Relying on a calm, humble demeanor, Nimitz managed intense interservice rivalries, including "brown shoe" aviators and "black shoe" ship drivers. He introduced the strategic concept of "calculated risk," balancing potential benefits against military exposure. Trusting intelligence officers Edwin Layton and Joseph Rochefort, Nimitz leveraged decrypted Japanese radio traffic to orchestrate defensive positions. This intelligence setup led to the historic carrier-clash Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, where he appointed Raymond Spruance to command. Nimitz navigated resource shortages during the grueling Guadalcanal campaign, eventually replacing Admiral Ghormley with the aggressive William Halsey, and handled complex diplomatic relations with General Douglas MacArthur. He also maintained strict personal routines, including power walking, to survive the extreme pressures of supreme theater command. (1)

He wore his U.S. Marine uniform openly in Nazi-occupied France. He forced a room fu of German officers to raise a toast to President Roosevelt at gunpoint. He escaped POW camps, trained the French Resistance, and once surrendered himself to save an entire village from destruction. Peter Ortiz was one of the most decorated Marines of World War II - and almost no one has heard his story. Until now.Ortiz's War: The Allies' Secret Weapon Against the Nazis in France by Nicholas Reynolds and Katie S. Sanders (releasing August 25, 2026, from Harper Horizon) brings to life the extraordinary exploits of a man who lived like a character out of fiction, yet every word is true.Co-author Katie S. Sanders, an investigative journalist, uncovered a family secret hidden in an archival recording of the radio show This Is Your Life. Her grandfather, Jewish-American B-24 pilot Lieutenant Murray Simon, had been shot down over occupied France, and guided to safety by Peter Ortiz himself. That discovery sent Katie on a years-long journey to document the man who saved her grandfather's life. It's a compelling human story of legacy, memory, and gratitude that resonates far beyond the WWII shelf.. Nicholas Reynolds brings deep authority to the narrative. A retired Marine Corps Colonel and former infantry officer, he holds a PhD from Oxford University and served as a historian for both the Marine Corps and the CIA Museum. Together, Reynolds and Sanders pair rigorous historical research with the intimacy of family history.What Ortiz's War offers:The real-life James Bond: Ortiz's daring, cinematic exploits as an OSS operative behind enemy lines, complete with disguises, gunpoint toasts, and audacious escapes.The surrender at Centron: The gripping account of how Ortiz gave himself up to spare a French village from Nazi reprisal, a story of honor and self-sacrifice.A granddaughter's quest: Katie's personal search to trace the man who rescued her grandfather, and what she learned along the way.Inside the secret war: The complex, sometimes tense collaboration between the OSS, the British SOE, and the French Resistance.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/arroe-collins-like-it-s-live--4113802/support.

This week, we discuss Teddy Roosevelt - the Bull Moose himself. Bully!!!

At 1:15 p.m. on April 12, 1945, Franklin Roosevelt was sitting for a portrait at his cottage in Warm Springs, Georgia, when his face suddenly fell forward. He raised his left hand to his temple and whispered to his cousin Daisy: "I have a terrific pain in the back of my head." He was dead by 3:35. That evening, Harry Truman, a former farmer and failed haberdasher who had been vice president for eighty-two days and had met with Roosevelt only twice, placed his hand on a Bible and became the thirty-third president of the United States. He had never been briefed on the atomic bomb. Thirteen days later, War Secretary Henry Stimson handed him a three-page memo that began: "Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city." Today's guest is James M. Scott, author of Empire of Ashes: Truman, Hirohito, and the Descent into Total War. We discuss how a Hungarian physicist who did his thinking in the bathtub tracked down Einstein by asking a boy on a Long Island street corner to launch the Manhattan Project, why Oak Ridge, Tennessee, became a secret city of 75,000 people who had no idea what they were building, and how the firebombing of Tokyo killed 105,000 people in a single night months before the atomic bombs fell. We look at why Groves wanted to destroy Kyoto for its two thousand temples and Stimson stopped him because he had honeymooned there, how Japan's military leaders refused to surrender even after two atomic bombs and forced an unprecedented intervention by an emperor who had spent the war collecting marine specimens in a palace while his cities burned, and why a group of young officers assassinated the commander of the Imperial Guards and seized the palace on the eve of surrender in a coup that came within hours of succeeding. Scott argues that the historical record supports Truman's decision but lets the last word belong to the survivors, and to a war minister who committed seppuku wearing the white shirt the emperor had personally given him, with a photograph of his dead son folded on top of his dress uniform.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Dirt Bike Kid (1985) Directed by David Zucker Starring: Peter Billingsley, Stuart Pankin, Patrick Collins, Chad SheetsThe Thing with Two Heads (1972) Directed by Lee Frost Starring: Ray Milland, Roosevelt "Rosey" Grier, Don Marshall, Roger PerryA haunted dirt bike and a racist surgeon's severed head walk into a double feature — honestly, what more do you need to know? This week we're kicking off a brand new segment on the show: once a month, we're pitting two deliriously stupid movies against each other in the same episode, and we couldn't think of a better place to start than a sentient magic dirt bike saving a hot dog stand and a two-headed man tearing across the countryside on that exact same bike. Buckle up, because dirt bikes and dickheads is officially our theme.In this episode, we discuss:A Bike Powered by Magic (and Child's Assholes) — We break down how a broke kid trades his grocery money for a supercharged, sentient dirt bike that flies, fights bulldozers, and somehow gets arrested by actual police. We argue about where this movie even takes place, why nobody questions a bike driving itself through town, and how this kid could've just eaten free hot dogs forever instead of going through all this trouble.The Most Trumpian Real Estate Scheme of 1985 — The real villain of Dirt Bike Kid isn't the bike, it's a sleazy banker inflating land values to steamroll a hot dog stand for his own bank. We get into the shockingly adult subtext buried in this PG kids movie, including Playboy magazines and a genuinely unhinged number of food fights.And in our next movie, The Thing with Two Heads:Two Heads, One Body, Zero Chill — We dive into the gloriously unhinged premise of a dying racist surgeon getting his head grafted onto a death row inmate's body, and somehow that's not even the weirdest part. The neck-brace special effects, the mismatched head makeup, and the sheer audacity of the mirror gag get the full breakdown.The Chase Scene That Just Won't End — We argue over exactly how long the climactic two-headed-man-on-a-dirt-bike police chase actually runs (10 minutes? 20?), and why it might be one of the most purely entertaining sequences either of us has watched for this show. Funk soundtrack included.New episodes of the Dewey Pod Monster podcast drop every week. We're proud members of the YouRun Podcast Network at https://yourunpodcast.com.

We've launched Minimum Competence CLE, and our first course is now available completely free. Researching Federal Tax Issues After Loper Brightlooks at how the Supreme Court's decision ending Chevron deference changes the way lawyers should research and evaluate Treasury regulations, IRS guidance, and other federal tax authorities.Take the course and earn CLE credit at cle.minimumcomp.com.This Day in Legal History: The Neutrality Act of 1935On August 31, 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the first of what would become a series of Neutrality Acts—laws designed to keep the United States out of the wars gathering in Europe and Asia. This first act imposed a mandatory embargo on shipping arms and ammunition to any nation the president declared to be at war, and it put America's armaments industry under a measure of federal control. It was a legal expression of the deep isolationism that gripped the country between the world wars.Here's the constitutional wrinkle that makes it interesting, and that Roosevelt himself chafed against. FDR wanted flexibility—he asked Congress for a law that would let him embargo arms to an aggressor nation while still selling weapons to its victim. Congress refused. Instead, it wrote a rigid, evenhanded rule: once the president declared that a state of war existed, he had to embargo arms to all sides, aggressor and victim alike. That was a deliberate congressional choice to tie the executive's hands in foreign affairs, to prevent a president from drawing the country toward one belligerent or another. Roosevelt signed it reluctantly, believing he could get it revised—and over the next several years, as the threat from fascism grew undeniable, the Neutrality Acts were indeed loosened, culminating in Lend-Lease and, ultimately, American entry into the war.The significance of August 31, 1935 is as a case study in the perennial struggle between Congress and the president over foreign affairs, and in the moral limits of legal neutrality. The mandatory embargo's great flaw was exactly its neutrality: by treating aggressor and victim the same, it arguably aided aggressors, who were already armed, against victims who were not. That's the tension in today's opening quote from Desmond Tutu—the idea that neutrality in the face of injustice is not really neutral at all. It's a fitting backdrop for a day that includes a story about the government's power over foreign companies, and one about whether the state can suppress speech it dislikes.A federal judge has dealt a significant blow to the administration's campaign to deport noncitizen students over pro-Palestinian activism, ruling that the effort is unconstitutional. In a lengthy 90-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Noël Wise in San Jose found that the administration's use of existing immigration law to cancel foreign students' visas and put them into deportation proceedings—based on their campus advocacy and criticism of Israel—violates the First Amendment right to free speech. The ruling traces the policy back to March 2025, when the government began revoking visas and detaining noncitizens for pro-Palestinian advocacy, starting with the high-profile arrest of Columbia graduate Mahmoud Khalil. The lawsuit was brought, notably, by the Stanford Daily, Stanford's student newspaper. Here's the core legal principle, and it's an important one that surprises people: noncitizens physically present in the United States have First Amendment rights. The government has broad power over immigration, but the judge found it can't use that power as a pretext to punish people for protected speech—that would be viewpoint discrimination, targeting people precisely because of the ideas they express. Judge Wise sharply criticized the State Department and Homeland Security for deploying immigration law to suppress views they didn't like. The significance connects to threads we've followed all summer—the pressure on universities, the Comey prosecution, the fights over dissent. This is a court drawing a hard line: the immigration system is not a loophole around the First Amendment, and the government cannot deport people for saying things it wishes they hadn't. Expect an appeal, but as a statement of principle, it's a forceful one. Judge deals blow to Trump moves to deport pro-Palestinian activists | ReutersAl Jazeera · The HillNow a story about the business of law: U.S. law firm office leasing surged 17% in the first half of 2026, with firms signing leases for nearly 12.2 million square feet, according to Cushman & Wakefield—and the second quarter was up a striking 27% over the same period last year. This is a boom, concentrated in the big legal markets of New York, Chicago, and Washington, and it includes some eye-popping deals, like Simpson Thacher's roughly 916,000-square-foot Manhattan lease—the same firm we discussed back in July over its rare malpractice trial. What's driving it is worth unpacking, because it contains a real paradox. Firms say their caseloads are exploding under a combination of forces: rising regulatory uncertainty, a more litigious business climate, and—here's the twist—the surge in artificial intelligence. AI adoption in law has rocketed, with something like 62% of firms now using it, up from just 17% a few years ago. And here's the paradox worth sitting with: we covered, a few weeks ago, how AI is thinning out entry-level hiring by automating the document review and first drafts that junior associates used to do. So how are firms leasing more space while hiring fewer juniors? The answer seems to be that the high end of legal work is booming—more complex, higher-stakes matters that generate demand for experienced lawyers and premium space—even as the bottom of the pyramid gets automated. The significance is a snapshot of a profession in transition: Big Law is physically expanding and financially thriving at the top, while the traditional on-ramp for young lawyers narrows. The office towers are filling up; it's just less clear who will be sitting in the entry-level offices a decade from now. US law firm leasing jumped 17% in first half, report says | ReutersCushman & Wakefield · Law360And finally, China's largest memory chipmaker, ChangXin Memory Technologies—CXMT—has sued the Pentagon to get itself off a U.S. government blacklist of companies it says are tied to China's military. The list in question is the Defense Department's roster of “Chinese military companies,” maintained under a provision of federal defense law, and landing on it carries real consequences: restrictions on government contracting and significant reputational damage that can spook customers and partners worldwide. CXMT's argument is straightforward—it says it's not affiliated with the Chinese military at all, and that it designs and sells its DRAM memory chips purely for civilian and commercial use. The most interesting piece of the lawsuit, legally, is a procedural one. CXMT alleges that the Pentagon actually published a notice in February saying the company would be removed from the list—then withdrew that notice the very same day, and later relisted the company in June without adequately explaining why it reversed course. That's the heart of an administrative-law claim: under the standards that govern federal agency action, the government generally can't act arbitrarily or capriciously, and a sudden, unexplained reversal is exactly the kind of thing courts scrutinize. And CXMT isn't alone—Alibaba filed a similar suit in June, and Xiaomi actually won removal from the list through U.S. litigation back in 2021. The significance is a reminder that even in the highly deferential arena of national security, designations like this are reviewable in American courts—foreign companies can, and increasingly do, use U.S. administrative law to challenge being branded a security threat, and sometimes they win. CXMT sues Pentagon over inclusion on list of companies tied to China's military | ReutersUS News · Benzinga This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

And Another Thing With Dave, by Dave SmithThe West's grip on Iran is not diplomacy. It is an offer a country cannot refuse. This episode follows that gangster logic from the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup against Mohammad Mossadegh, through Iran-Contra and Mena, to the Business Plot — the Wall Street scheme to recruit America's most decorated Marine to stop the New Deal.Smedley Butler had two Medals of Honor and 33 years in the Corps. In War Is a Racket he said he was not a patriot for hire. He was “a high-class muscle man for Big Business… a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.” He made Mexico safe for oil, Haiti safe for the banks, Nicaragua safe for Brown Brothers, Honduras safe for fruit companies, China safe for Standard Oil. Al Capone ran three city districts. Butler said the Marines ran three continents.Same playbook in Tehran. Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oil. Operation Ajax removed him. Decades later Iran-Contra sold weapons to the same “terrorist state,” funneled the profits to the Contras in violation of the Boland Amendment, and looked the other way while cocaine paid for the war. Gary Webb was right that the CIA protected Contra-linked traffickers. He was wrong that one ring explained the crack epidemic. Mena was real. The legend is bigger than the documented load.Then they tried it at home. In 1933–34, after Roosevelt left the gold standard and launched New Deal jobs, housing, and labor programs, financiers approached Butler to lead 500,000 veterans on Washington. The plan: a “Secretary of General Affairs” as dictator, FDR as figurehead. Money from Wall Street. Arms from Remington. Cover from the American Liberty League.Butler got the names and testified under oath. The McCormack-Dickstein Committee reported that the plot “was discussed, was planned, and might have been placed in execution when and if the financial backers deemed it expedient.”Nobody was prosecuted. The names were stripped from the public report. The press called it a hoax, then went silent.Same offer. Same refusal. Different map.In this episode:Why Iran policy still reads like a protection racket over oilOperation Ajax and the 1953 overthrow of a elected governmentIran-Contra: arms, hostages, Contras, and the cocaine pipelineWhat Gary Webb got right — and what he overstatedSmedley Butler's confession in War Is a RacketThe Business Plot against FDR, and why no one was chargedRelated episodes:The Clintons, Cocaine, Conspiracy, and Cover Up (Parts 1 and 2)Episode 474: Deep Down the Rabbit Hole of Drug SmugglingBonus: Iran, The History of US Aggression and LiesSeeking the truth. Exposing the lies.And Another Thing With Dave#AATWDListen, share, and review:Apple Podcasts — https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/and-another-thing-with-dave/id1498443271Spotify — https://open.spotify.com/show/1HLX3dqSQgeWZNXVZ1Z4ECAll links — https://linktr.ee/andanotherthingwithdave#AATWD #SmedleyButler #WarIsARacket #BusinessPlot #Iran1953 #OperationAjax #IranContra #CIA #Mossadegh #DarkAlliance #GaryWebb #MenaArkansas #NewDeal #FDR #AmericanHistory #DeepState #OilPolitics #MilitaryIndustrialComplex

H.W. Brands, Part Two: As 1941 begins, the legislative battle over Lend-Lease (HR 1776) intensifies, which Lindberghargues favors British imperialism over democracy. Behind the scenes, British intelligence coordinates covert propaganda inside the U.S. to sway American public opinion. Lindbergh testifies before Congress, arguing that air power makes the Western Hemisphere highly defensible without entering European conflicts. However, Roosevelt's declaration of an unlimited national emergency shifts public sentiment, casting isolationists as disloyal. Desperate, Lindbergh delivers his infamous Des Moines speech, blaming the British, Jewish Americans, and the administration for pushing the nation toward war, destroying his political credibility. (2)

Nous sommes le 25 mars 1945. Archie Roosevelt écrit : « Quelle que soit l'amertume que beaucoup de gens ont envers les Roosevelt d'Oyster Bay ou de Hyde Park, ils doivent admettre que le clan dans son ensemble est représenté par un seul homme. Nous en ressentons de la fierté. » Quelques jours plus tard, le 12 avril, l'homme évoqué dans la lettre, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 32e président des Etats-Unis, quatre fois élu à la Maison-Blanche, meurt à l'âge de 63 ans. En réalité, chez les Roosevelt, ils sont plusieurs à représenter la puissance et le rayonnement de la famille. Une famille qui avait déjà donné, à l'Amérique, son 26e président : Théodore, dont le visage, les lunettes et la moustache sont gravés dans le mont Rushmore, le panthéon de la nation. Ils ne sont pas les seuls, quelques femmes aussi ont contribué à l'immense notoriété, pour ne pas dire célébrité, du nom : Eleanor, bien sûr, l'épouse de Franklin Delano, mais aussi Alice, fille de Théodore, chacune œuvrant, à sa manière, pour une certaine émancipation du « sexe faible », comme l'on disait encore à l'époque. Une immense fortune bâtie de génération en génération, depuis l'arrivée, au XVIIe siècle de leurs ancêtres venus de Hollande. L'une de ces dynasties dont raffolent les Américains. Une histoire traversée de grandeur et de compromission, de tragédies personnelles et de panache. Une histoire qui incarne ce que l'on appelle « le premier vingtième siècle », celui qui voit l'Amérique aux prises avec trois grands défis majeurs : la Grande Dépression et les deux guerres mondiales. Partons sur les traces des Roosevelt… Invité : Georges Ayache, ancien diplomate « Les Roosevelt – Une dynastie américaine » aux Editions Perrin. Sujets traités : Roosevelt, l'Amérique, Dynasties, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, fortune , Hollande, Grande Dépression Merci pour votre écoute Un Jour dans l'Histoire, c'est également en direct tous les jours de la semaine de 13h15 à 14h30 sur www.rtbf.be/lapremiere Retrouvez tous les épisodes d'Un Jour dans l'Histoire sur notre plateforme Auvio.be :https://auvio.rtbf.be/emission/5936 Intéressés par l'histoire ? Vous pourriez également aimer nos autres podcasts : L'Histoire Continue: https://audmns.com/kSbpELwL'heure H : https://audmns.com/YagLLiKEt sa version à écouter en famille : La Mini Heure H https://audmns.com/YagLLiKAinsi que nos séries historiques :Chili, le Pays de mes Histoires : https://audmns.com/XHbnevhD-Day : https://audmns.com/JWRdPYIJoséphine Baker : https://audmns.com/wCfhoEwLa folle histoire de l'aviation : https://audmns.com/xAWjyWCLes Jeux Olympiques, l'étonnant miroir de notre Histoire : https://audmns.com/ZEIihzZMarguerite, la Voix d'une Résistante : https://audmns.com/zFDehnENapoléon, le crépuscule de l'Aigle : https://audmns.com/DcdnIUnUn Jour dans le Sport : https://audmns.com/xXlkHMHSous le sable des Pyramides : https://audmns.com/rXfVppvN'oubliez pas de vous y abonner pour ne rien manquer.Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Her father-in-law was fired for union activity, contracted tuberculosis and was sent west to die. He came back to Detroit, won a congressional seat and helped write the Social Security Act — standing in the room when Roosevelt signed it in 1935. That history is what Congresswoman Debbie Dingell carries into Congress every day. On today's episode of America's Work Force Union Podcast, Dingell joins the Labor 132 series as co-chair of the 129-member Congressional Labor Caucus. She discusses why USMCA has not created a level playing field with Mexico, the national security threat posed by Chinese autonomous vehicles collecting data on American streets, why the chaotic application of tariffs has cost average households approximately $3,500, the need to scrap the Social Security earnings cap before the 2033 funding cliff and why she is one of the lead House sponsors of Medicare for All — a bill that now has more than 100 co-sponsors. Visit debbiedingell.house.gov and laborcaucus.house.gov for more.

Franco Pascali was a member of the Junior Program at The Magic Castle and has become a rare blend of hyper-visual cardistry practitioner and hands-off mentalist. Franco's style is marked by contrast, and his audiences go crazy for it. He joins the show to discuss aesthetics, creativity, and his show at The Roosevelt.

Peter J. Ortiz was one of the most decorated United States Marines of the Second World War—and he served in the European Theater. In fact, his service was almost entirely within occupied France, where he worked for the Office of Strategic Services as the manager of a resistance network and later as the leader of a (sort of) Jedburgh Team. The stories of his exploits are legendary, though admittedly legendary among a much smaller circle of people than they deserve to be. One that can be verified is the time that, in a French bar, Ortiz ordered a round of drinks for a group of German officers, opened his raincoat to reveal his Marine uniform, drew two pistols, and ordered the Germans to drink toasts to President Roosevelt and the United States Marine Corps.That and many other tales of his winding career are to be found in Ortiz's War: The Allies' Secret Weapon Against the Nazis in France, a new book by Nicholas Reynolds and Katie Sanders. 

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints.Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

In Part Two of his "How to Win 2026" series, Newt makes the case against today's Democratic Party — in their own words. This is the most substantive episode in the series — a methodical, documented case that today's Democratic Party has drifted far from the tradition of Roosevelt and Kennedy into something most Americans simply don't recognize. Using real names, real quotes, real dates, and actual congressional roll calls, Newt builds the argument across eight acts: Democrats calling to abolish ICE and defund the police; open hostility to Israel; a DSA national co-chair calling for abolishing the U.S. Senate on Fox News; candidates who denigrate America on tape; a coalition that rejects free enterprise while a government-run grocery store in Kansas City already proved the model fails; and a brand-new congressional report naming sitting Democrats in what prosecutors call the largest pandemic fraud scheme in American history.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Two hundred feet from the Alamo stands a hotel that has never closed its doors. Presidents slept there. Theodore Roosevelt recruited the Rough Riders from its bar. Gunmen died beside its mahogany counters. And for more than a century, guests and employees have reported that some of the Menger Hotel's former occupants never actually left. A murdered chambermaid still carries towels through the third floor. A cattle baron walks through a wall where his bedroom door once stood. Roosevelt apparently still enjoys the occasional drink. And a man in buckskin has one question for guests unfortunate enough to encounter him alone: Are you gonna stay, or are you gonna go? T onight, we check into the Menger Hotel...where somewhere between thirty and forty-five ghosts are said to have already answered. YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/@HauntedAmericanHistoryTikTok - @hah_podcasthauntedamericanhistory.comPatreon- ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.patreon.com/hauntedamericanhistory⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠HAH DISCORD - https://discord.com/invite/bJdbpH3hQm Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

↴    ↴    ↴ Construye tu cartera todoterreno bien diversificada. Minicurso GRATIS de 7 lecciones por email aquí. En este podcast te explico por qué oro y Bitcoin se comportaron de forma radicalmente opuesta en 2025 y 2026, a pesar de que mucha gente los considera activos equivalentes.El oro marcó más de cincuenta máximos históricos y cerró 2025 con una rentabilidad superior al 65%.Bitcoin tocó los 126.000 dólares en octubre y luego corrigió un 30%, cerrando el año prácticamente plano.Te cuento qué hay detrás de esa divergencia: desde la dominancia fiscal global y las compras récord de bancos centrales, hasta la presión vendedora de las ballenas históricas del Bitcoin y el estado actual de la regulación institucional.También te desvelo un riesgo del oro que ocurrió en 1933 bajo la presidencia de Roosevelt, que casi nadie tiene en cuenta hoy, y que puede cambiar completamente tu estrategia según cómo decidas custodiar el metal.Te presento todas las opciones disponibles para invertir en oro y en Bitcoin hoy mismo, tanto si resides en España y Europa como en Latinoamérica: desde oro físico y ETCs hasta ETPs de Bitcoin, exchanges regulados y alternativas de renta variable del sector.Y cierro con la parte más práctica: cómo combinar los dos activos en una cartera real, qué peso tiene sentido darle a cada uno según tu perfil, y por qué la correlación de apenas el 6% entre ambos los convierte en una combinación más potente que cualquiera de los dos por separado.

On our radar this week… Another bad week for the 80-year-old President as he gets roasted by Jon Ossoff with a riff that mentioned Natalie and infuriated Trump, setting off a social media frenzy with a​ttacks on the Georgia senator along with CNN and the reporter who asked Trump about the mention of his consta​​nt companion. Trump's priority issue this week seems to be as construction boss for the White House. He's ordered his Justice Department to appeal a halt to further construction of his gold-encrusted ballroom; gave the press a guided tour of his granite helicopter pad construction project; used the tour to promote campaign contributor Scotts Turf Builder; attacked still another female reporter for asking him a question; and saw more of his endorsed candidates lose in their primaries. The Democratic Party's statewide ticket is now complete, with Jocelyn Benson choosing state Senate Majority Leader Winnie Brinks as her running mate. It's the first-ever two-woman top-of-the-ticket in Michigan history … running against an all-male Republican ticket. John James choice of state House Oversight Committee chair Jay DeBoyer is drawing heat over his refusal to investigate alleged widespread sexual abuse of children at Interlochen. DeBoyer says it's a criminal matter and he criticizes Attorney General Nessel for not launching an investigation, overlooking the fact that Nessel has told local law enforcement the resources of her department are available to assist them in any way useful. Our friend Mark the Lawyer had two big wins this week. One could change the outcome of a city election, the other protects voter rights. We know now that there will be two proposals on the November ballot. Proposal one is the constitutionally required vote on whether to rewrite Michigan's constitution which we discussed last week. Proposal 2 would, if enacted, put tight limits on corporate campaign contributions from state utilities and companies doing $250,000 or more in contracts with the state. The Democratic National Committee has made it official: Michigan will be in the first band of presidential primary elections, fifth on the list of primaries and the first large battleground state in the mix. The parade of wannabe presidents has already begun with a high visibility visit from Gavin Newsom, and the announcement that J.D. Pritzker will headline a major state party fundraiser in September. We can add to the mix the potential candidacy of two Michigan Democrats. (Neither Pete Buttigieg or Elissa Slotkin say they are running, but they are talking and acting like candidates.) Joining the podcast this week is perhaps the best political analyst in the state: Congresswoman Debbie Dingell. She's in her 5th term representing portions of southeast Michigan. She is a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Natural Resources Committee, where she leads on critical issues including affordable and accessible health care, clean energy and water, domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience, and protecting our wildlife and natural resources. Debbie Dingell is part of one of the most remarkable stories of a family's public service in U.S. history. There has been a Dingell in the U.S. House of Representatives for 94 years: John Dingell Senior was first elected in the 1932 Roosevelt landslide and served for 22 years. His son John Jr. is a legend, serving a record 60 years. Upon his retirement in 2015 he was succeeded by his wife Debbie. A hallmark of their service has been a proposal for a national health insurance system, first introduced by John Sr. in 1933 and re-introduced since at every Congress by the father and then the son. ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ Subscribe to our YouTube channel ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ A Republic, If You Can Keep It is supported by

Shane Gillis and Joe Rogan see the problem: big corporations and government are deeply intertwined. But is giving the government even more power really the solution? Nate and Charlie break down the call for another Teddy Roosevelt and argue that the very institutions designed to control powerful corporations helped create the incentives behind today's corporate-government relationship. They dig into Roosevelt's view of executive power, railroad regulation that protected companies from competition, antitrust enforcement, the early framework that led toward the Federal Reserve, and the growth of federal control over drugs, food, and meat processing. The recurring question is simple: if government becomes the gatekeeper to running a successful business, where are corporations going to spend their money and influence? The guys also get into the absurdities of trucking regulations, government-created railroad monopolies, USDA meat-processing rules, and why another government agency probably isn't fixing government corruption.   Follow or subscribe to Good Morning Liberty, and leave us a rating and review wherever you listen. 00:00 Good Morning Liberty + Charlie's Former Band 03:15 Shane Gillis and Joe Rogan Want Another Teddy Roosevelt 07:15 The Problem They Almost Get Right 10:30 Why More Government Creates More Corruption 13:15 Teddy Roosevelt's Theory of Presidential Power 15:30 How Railroad Regulation Protected the Railroads 19:15 When Regulation Spread From Railroads to Trucking 22:45 Monopoly, Antitrust, and the Free Market 28:15 The Government-Created Railroad Monopolies 33:00 Teddy Roosevelt and the Road Toward the Federal Reserve 36:30 The Origins of Federal Drug and Food Regulation 43:00 How Regulation Helps Consolidate Industries   Join GML: https://joingml.com All GML Links: https://gml.bio.link Watch All Episodes: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLi78svKlBr_8o0dDOX8DxO_Wwxu6WYhhA Watch Host Favorites: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLi78svKlBr__Zu40RL7mWxCuOOe54zgy2 Join the Fed Haters Club: https://www.goodmorningliberty.us/fedhatersclub Martens Minute: https://martensminute.podbean.com/  

Before FDR the idea of a "First Hundred Days" was not a thing. But Roosevelt was so incredibly active during that period that ever since American Presidents have been judged by his standard. Today I cover Roosevelt's First Hundred Days, what legislation he passed, what worked, and what didn't. Western Civ 2.0

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Pacific War. In late 1941, the Second Battle of Changsha ended with Chinese forces claiming victory despite suffering nearly 100,000 casualties against roughly 1,670 Japanese losses. Chiang Kai-shek's government launched an aggressive propaganda campaign, flooding international press with fabricated triumph narratives to sustain national morale. Behind closed doors, Chiang was furious at his generals' tactical failures, executing commanders and dismantling units. Meanwhile, geopolitical forces threatened China's survival. Japan's 1939 defeat at Nomonhan crushed hopes for a Soviet alliance against Tokyo. Germany's pact with the Soviet Union left China isolated, while Western powers remained reluctant to commit meaningful support. Britain offered little; the US provided only modest loans. By 1941, facing potential collapse, Chiang desperately searched for allies while Wang Jingwei's Japanese-backed rival government beckoned as an alternative. China's exhausted people endured horror—including a 1941 bombing massacre in Chongqing that killed over 400 trapped civilians. Then Japan unleashed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.   #215 An Implosion in the East Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet was anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Two waves of Japanese bomber aircraft, launched from six aircraft carriers, attacked the vessels and their sleeping crews, destroying the battleship Arizona outright and damaging seventeen others, as well as most of the military aircraft parked nearby. Some 2,400 Americans died, and another 1,100 were wounded. Within a day Japanese invasion forces had attacked Siam, Malaya, and the Philippines. Chiang Kai-shek heard the news at one o'clock in the morning and immediately dictated a letter of support to President Roosevelt, pledging commitment to a new "common battle." The news reached Zhou Fohai in Shanghai as well. On December 8 across the international date line from Hawaii he had heard the sounds of firing as the Japanese took over the rest of the city, and then received reports that Japan had declared war on the Western powers. "I heard they'd bombed Honolulu, Manila, Singapore, and Hong Kong. From now on, the Pacific becomes a killing ground."   When Japanese carrier planes descended on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, they were executing far more than a tactical strike. They were unleashing the culmination of a strategic vision that had shaped Japanese military planning since the 1920s: the Nanshin-ron, or "Southern Advance" doctrine.    The Nanshin-ron represented a critical strategic choice that emerged from internal Japanese debates during the 1920s and 1930s. Japan faced an inescapable vulnerability: it was an island nation with virtually no natural resources of its own. The nation's population had doubled since the Meiji Restoration, growing to over 70 million by 1941. An industrial economy of tremendous sophistication, capable of producing world-class warships, aircraft, and military equipment, depended entirely on imported raw materials. Oil, rubber, tin, iron ore, bauxite, copper, and manganese all had to be acquired through foreign trade or conquest. This resource dependency was not a luxury problem; it was an existential one. A nation that could not feed itself or fuel its economy was a nation vulnerable to strangulation by enemies who controlled the resources it needed. Japanese strategic thinkers divided into two camps on how to resolve this vulnerability. The Hokushin-ron advocates, primarily within the Army, pushed for expansion northward into Siberia and Mongolia, seeking to conquer Soviet territory and resources. The Soviet Union possessed vast tracts of land, mineral wealth, timber, and agricultural output. From a purely materialist perspective, the Northern Advance made geographic sense—it was contiguous with Manchuria, which Japan had already secured in 1931. Yet by the late 1930s, the Hokushin-ron strategy had suffered a catastrophic blow. In 1938 and 1939, Japanese and Soviet forces clashed at Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia in what the Japanese called the Nomonhan Incident. The battles revealed a terrifying truth: the Soviet Red Army, under General Georgy Zhukov, was far more formidable than Japanese military planners had anticipated. Soviet armor, air power, and coordinated tactics annihilated Japanese forces. Japan suffered over 60,000 casualties while inflicting perhaps 10,000 on the Soviets. The defeat was concealed from the Japanese public, but it was unmistakable to military planners. A direct clash with Soviet power could end catastrophically. The Northern Advance, it became clear, would almost certainly provoke war with a nation capable of destroying the Japanese Army. This strategic defeat tilted the balance decisively toward the Nanshin-ron. If Japan could not safely expand northward, it must expand southward, toward Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, and the western Pacific. The appeal of the Nanshin-ron was immediately apparent to the Navy, which had always been more oriented toward maritime commerce and expansion across the ocean. The territories to the south were not militarily formidable. The colonial powers, Britain, the Netherlands, France, were either already defeated in 1940 or distracted by their own desperate struggles leaving Britain fighting alone against Germany. The United States, though potentially a formidable adversary, was not yet at war, and there was a chance, however slender, that a decisive blow against American naval power might convince America to negotiate rather than fight. But beyond strategic opportunity, the Nanshin-ron offered something that the Hokushin-ron did not: it offered resources of staggering abundance. The Dutch East Indies possessed oil reserves that could dwarf Japan's consumption for years. Malaya produced the world's rubber. Thailand offered agricultural bounty and geographic position. Burma's timber and agricultural products could feed Japan's growing empire. The Philippines possessed harbors, airfields, and economic output. These were not marginal additions to Japan's economy—they were transformative. Together, they would convert Japan from a resource-hungry island nation into the master of an imperial domain encompassing hundreds of millions of people and containing most of the strategic materials necessary for sustained industrial warfare. In the last episode I explained the western sanctions and embargoes that drained Japan's military of the resources they required to continue the China War. By 1941, Japan faced a civilization crisis. Japan imported roughly 90 percent of its petroleum, and the bulk of that came from the Dutch East Indies and the United States. Suddenly, the American supply was cut off entirely. Reserves would last perhaps 18 months if Japan's military and industrial consumption continued at existing rates. After that, the military machine would sputter and die. The industrial economy would collapse. Even civilian life would become impossible to sustain. Japan was facing not merely economic inconvenience but literal strangulation by the Western powers.   Yet it would be a mistake to reduce Japanese motivation to just materialism. Japanese military leaders wrapped their conquests in an ideological framework, one that many of them genuinely believed, or wanted to believe, served a higher historical purpose. The concept of the Daitoa Kyoeiken, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," posited a new regional order in which Japan would play the leading role in liberating Asian peoples from Western colonial domination and creating an Asian-centered political and economic system. This ideology drew on genuine anti-colonial sentiment. For a century, Western powers had dominated Asia, treating Asian peoples and nations as subordinate, colonized territories existing to serve Western economic interests. Japan, which had modernized and Westernized enough to avoid colonization, saw itself as the natural leader of an Asian renaissance—a civilizing force that would restore Asian dignity and independence even as it established Japanese hegemony. Of course, this was propagandistic. Japanese conquest represented a substitution of one imperial master for another, and often a harsher and more brutal one at that. But for understanding Japanese decision-making, the ideology mattered profoundly. It provided Japanese leaders with a moral narrative for conquest. It allowed them to understand themselves as liberators rather than mere conquerors. It provided a rationale for extracting resources from occupied territories and for mobilizing subject populations to support the Japanese war effort. And it resonated with anti-Western sentiment throughout Asia, making Japanese occupation seem, in some quarters, preferable to continued Western colonial rule. The slogan Hakko ichiu—"eight corners under one roof", captured this ideological vision: a unified Asia and eventually world under Japanese guidance. Whether Japanese leaders truly believed this vision or cynically deployed it as propaganda, it shaped how they understood their actions and justified them to their subjects. Now I know this is a podcast dedicated to the century of humiliation, ie: China's experience. But I thought it was necessary just to have one episode explain what Dan Carlin titled "a supernova in the east" and I have titled an implosion in the east. I won't go into depth into the campaigns as some of them have a lot of Chinese involvement and we will be covering them in depth, but rather I will explain the rationale for Japan's numerous invasions following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.   Japan's assault on Malaya began within hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, indeed, Japanese troops were already landing on the Kota Bharu beachhead on the Malaysian peninsula before dawn on December 8, 1941 local time. Malaya was one of the world's largest rubber producers, and Singapore, at the tip of the peninsula, was the linchpin of British naval power in the Far East.The Japanese interest in Malaya was straightforward but crucial: rubber. The Japanese military consumed vast quantities of rubber for tires, gaskets, hoses, and countless other applications. American and Dutch rubber supplies were now cut off by embargo. Malaya's rubber plantations represented perhaps the world's richest reservoir of this strategic material. Beyond rubber, Malaya and the surrounding region were major tin producers—essential for alloys and manufacturing. For Japan to conduct prolonged warfare, Malaya was not a luxury target; it was a necessity. Singapore represented something different: a symbol of Western power in Asia and a strategic chokepoint. As the major British naval base in the region, Singapore served as the anchor of British imperial authority across the South China Sea. By seizing Singapore, Japan would not only capture crucial resources and port facilities but would also deliver a psychological blow to the entire edifice of Western dominance in Asia. The fortress city that the British considered nearly impregnable fell within seventy days, a stunning demonstration of Japanese military capability and the vulnerability of overextended Western empires. If Malaya was critical for rubber, the Dutch East Indies was essential for oil. The region, comprising present-day Indonesia, was the world's third-largest oil producer and had reserves that could sustain Japanese military operations for years. This was the jewel of the resource-conquest strategy. Japanese planners had long eyed the East Indies, but direct conquest had seemed risky while Britain and America remained neutral or opposed. With both now at war, the window of opportunity had opened. Japan needed the oil so desperately that when the Dutch East Indies Petroleum Company initially agreed to some Japanese oil purchases before the war, Tokyo was already planning its takeover. The conquest of the Dutch East Indies would provide not just oil but also tin, nickel, bauxite, and other materials essential to an industrial war machine. The islands would also provide air and naval bases from which Japan could defend its new empire and potentially threaten Australia. The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, which began in late December 1941 and accelerated through January and February 1942, was methodical and comprehensive. Various island groups were targeted systematically: Java, Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas. Dutch military forces, though brave, were overwhelmed. By March 1942, Japan had secured the entire archipelago,a stunning logistical and military achievement that delivered vast resources into Japanese hands. Thailand presented a fundamentally different case from Japan's other targets. Rather than conquest, Japan pursued alliance with military strongman Plaek Phibunsongkhram, who had seized power in a 1938 coup as a nationalist ideologue determined to reassert Thai sovereignty and recover territory lost to French colonialism in the nineteenth century. Thailand was the last independent state in mainland Southeast Asia, hemmed in by British-controlled Burma and Malaya to the west, and French Indochina to the east. For a century, Thailand had survived by playing European imperial powers against each other. But by the late 1930s, this strategy was becoming obsolete. Europe was distracted by Hitler's Germany. Colonial powers were weakening. Japanese power was visibly ascending. Phibunsongkhram recognized both danger and opportunity. He could resist Japan and invite invasion, or he could ally with Japan and profit from rising Asian power. Japanese diplomats approached Thailand with sophistication: they offered military alliance and support for Thai territorial expansion at French expense. This addressed Thailand's deepest national wound, the humiliation of nineteenth-century territorial losses to France. The Franco-Thai War of 1940-1941 became transformative. With Japan providing military support, advisors, tanks, aircraft, Thai forces defeated the French for the first time in history. By May 1941, Thailand had recovered 54,000 square kilometers of Cambodian territory and portions of Laos. For Phibunsongkhram, this was extraordinary: he had achieved what Thai leaders could not in a century, reclaiming territory from a Western imperial power. Domestically, his position was dramatically strengthened. The parallel to China's century of humiliation—the foundation of your podcast is striking: Thailand too was reversing colonial diminishment through association with rising Asian power. The Thai-Japanese relationship was unique. Unlike the Philippines, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies, Thailand would retain nominal independence. Phibunsongkhram remained in power. Japanese occupation was light. Thai forces maintained their own command structure. Most importantly, Thailand's territorial gains from the Franco-Thai War were recognized and secured. Japan valued Thai cooperation more than conquest. Burma, controlled by the British, was the next target in Japan's southwestward advance. Japanese planners had multiple motivations for invading Burma. First, it was strategically positioned on India's eastern frontier, and Japan harbored ambitions of eventually striking toward India and linking up with Germany in the Middle East or at least destabilizing the British position in South Asia. Second, Burma was a significant producer of timber and agricultural products. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the invasion of Burma was meant to cut the Burma Road, the crucial supply line that allowed American aid to reach Nationalist China. The invasion of Burma began in late 1941 and accelerated through early 1942.  The invasion of the Philippines, which began on December 10, 1941, just days after Pearl Harbor, served multiple strategic purposes. Like the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, it was meant to neutralize American military power in the region, in this case, the American garrison under General Douglas MacArthur and the American colonial administration. But the Philippines were also valuable in their own right. The islands sat directly in the path of what Japan envisioned as its defensive perimeter. By controlling the Philippines, Japan would make it extraordinarily difficult for American forces to project power westward into Southeast Asia. The territory would provide naval and air bases critical to defending Japan's new empire. Additionally, the Philippines possessed some agricultural and industrial resources valuable to the war effort, and their conquest delivered a psychological victory, defeating American forces and ending American colonial rule in Asia, which appealed to anti-Western sentiment that Japan tried to cultivate. Beyond Southeast Asia and the Philippines, Japan rapidly invaded Guam and Wake island to extend Japan's defensive perimeter further into the Pacific and eliminate American air and naval bases that could threaten Japanese operations. Guam, seized on December 10, 1941, fell within two days, the American garrison was small and the island's strategic value lay primarily in denying the United States a forward staging ground for any counteroffensive. Wake Island, attacked the same day and finally captured on December 23 after a brief but heroic American defense, served similar purposes: cutting off American reconnaissance and interdicting potential supply lines to the Philippines.  Now I believe that's enough of the implosion in the east, let's get back to the situation in China. After Chiang Kai-shek sent his letter of support to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, pledging Chinese commitment to what he termed a new "common battle." he did something most revealing about his mood towards the global war. He played "Ave Maria" on his gramophone, celebrating with an almost spiritual gratitude the implications of what had just transpired in the American Pacific. This moment crystallized the profound difference Pearl Harbor would mean to different members of the emerging Allied coalition. For the United States, the attack was pure shock, a violation of the sanctity of American soil and the complacency of American isolationism. For Britain, it was like the pricking of a large, painful blister—painful but perhaps not entirely unexpected given Japan's regional ambitions. But for China, the relief that surged through the government and the consciousness of the Chinese people surpassed even Britain's response. For four long years, China had fought Japan almost alone, watching as Western nations remained neutral or limited their commitment to rhetorical support and modest material assistance. Now, suddenly, the trajectory of the entire conflict had shifted with breathtaking speed. Chiang's emotional state at this moment could scarcely be contained, and those close to him understood that beneath his carefully maintained Confucian composure burned an intoxicating sensation of vindication. These Western powers who had been so impatient with Chinese strategy, who had mocked the retreats of the Nationalist Army and spoken scornfully of Japanese capabilities, were now themselves in headlong retreat from those very islanders. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila, British and American forces would be fighting desperately for their lives against the Japanese military that China had been contending with for years. Chiang could not have failed to perceive the irony: the Japanese had conquered vast stretches of China through relentless campaigns, yet Westerners had dismissed Chinese resistance as inadequate. Now the Japanese were proving that they posed a formidable challenge to Western military power as well. There was a bitter satisfaction in this vindication, even as Chiang understood that the strategic implications of American entry far outweighed any emotional satisfaction. What was pragmatic and strategically clear to Chiang, however, was far more important than any emotional satisfaction. The United States was now at war, and it was on China's side. This represented the transformation for which Chiang had labored for years, bringing the full weight of American industrial capacity and military might to bear against the Japanese enemy. The diplomatic foundations for this alliance had already been laid in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Beginning in the spring of 1941, the United States had begun to commit significant resources to supporting China. In April 1941, following the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement, which had devastated Chinese morale by suggesting that Japan might attack the Soviet Union rather than move southward, the Roosevelt administration had determined to provide $45 million worth of militarily useful commodities to China as an immediate gesture of support. Then, on May 6, 1941, President Roosevelt had made a more formal commitment by announcing that the munitions provisions of the Lend-Lease Act applied to China, declaring a phrase that captured the strategic logic of American assistance: "defending China is the key to defending America." This declaration represented a significant shift in American policy, elevating China from a regional concern to a central element of American grand strategy in Asia. Subsequently, in July 1941, Roosevelt had sent Owen Lattimore to China to serve as political adviser to the Chinese government, a position that signaled deepening American engagement with Chinese affairs. In August, the administration appointed John Magruder as military attaché and head of the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), with the primary responsibility of overseeing the delivery of Lend-Lease material to the Chinese armed forces. On the diplomatic front, Chiang moved with remarkable alacrity. He had already severed relations with Germany on July 2, 1941, the very day after Hitler had formally recognized the Wang Jingwei puppet government in an attempt to appease Japan and encourage it to finally implement the Southern Advance. Now, on December 8, 1941, just one day after the Pearl Harbor attack, Chiang took the decisive step of formally declaring war against the Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This declaration transformed China's position from a beleaguered nation fighting a war of survival into a formal member of the Allied coalition. Chiang had seized the opportunity that Pearl Harbor presented to ally China with a genuinely strong power against Japan, a gambit that fundamentally altered the diplomatic weight and international legitimacy of both the Chinese government and the Chinese cause. From a strategic perspective, the Japanese had committed what Chiang and others immediately recognized as a catastrophic blunder. On the operational level, Pearl Harbor was indeed a devastating tactical success, the American Pacific Fleet was crippled, and Japanese forces now enjoyed temporary naval superiority throughout much of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Yet strategically, Pearl Harbor represented a failure of epic proportions, a miscalculation rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the intangibles of warfare: what motivated the Chinese people and what motivated the Americans. The Chinese had understood, through four years of brutal conflict, that warfare was about more than territorial conquest and resource acquisition. It was about will, about endurance, about the capacity to absorb punishment and continue fighting. The Japanese had learned this lesson imperfectly in China, where despite overwhelming military advantages they had been unable to force a decisive conclusion or compel Chinese surrender. The Americans would teach the Japanese this lesson even more emphatically. The attack on American sailors in Hawaii instantly galvanized the American population to prosecute an unlimited war, with Tokyo itself as the ultimate destination of American counterattack. While Americans would remember the "date that will live in infamy" primarily because of the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, the strategic consequence was that Japanese actions in Hawaii had introduced numerous new adversaries into the Pacific conflict: not only the United States, but also Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. These additions transformed what had been, from the Japanese perspective, a regional conflict with manageable parameters into a global war that Japan could not possibly win through any conceivable means. What made this particularly disastrous for Japan was the context in which the new theater had been opened. Japan was already deeply mired in a quagmire in China—a "malignant quagmire," as one observer would later characterize it, that had consumed vast resources, inflicted enormous casualties, and failed to produce decisive victory. In military strategy, it is sometimes wise to open a new theater in order to attack an enemy from an additional and unexpected direction, thereby dispersing their forces and creating new challenges for them to manage. But opening a new theater that introduces an entirely new, powerful adversary, and doing so when one is already overextended in an existing theater is a prescription for strategic catastrophe. This was precisely what Japan had done at Pearl Harbor. Chiang Kai-shek understood the magnitude of Japan's miscalculation with crystalline clarity. He understood that whatever the military complexities that lay ahead, whatever the challenges of coordinating with Western allies, and whatever the limitations of Western military assistance to China might be, the fundamental equation had changed. The United States would ultimately defeat Japan. The Chinese did not need to defeat Japan by themselves; they merely needed to survive long enough for American industrial and military capacity to grind the Japanese military into defeat. In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Chinese and American officials moved swiftly to formalize the alliance and establish the mechanisms of wartime cooperation. Roosevelt asked Chiang Kai-shek to serve as commander in chief of the Allied forces in the China theater, a designation that recognized China's central role in the Pacific War and elevated Chiang's international standing to something he had long sought: a position as an equal partner in the Allied coalition, a seat at the "top table of global decision-making" alongside Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. To support this expanded role and to ensure effective coordination of the military effort, Roosevelt dispatched Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell to China. Stilwell was not chosen randomly; he brought fifteen years of experience in China, a deep familiarity with the country, its military, and its complexities that few American officers possessed. Stilwell was appointed to serve simultaneously as the U.S. government's military representative in China, as chief of staff of the China Theater, and as commander in chief of the American forces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. This appointment established the framework for joint Chinese-American military cooperation and represented an American commitment to the Asian theater that, while never receiving the resources devoted to the European theater, nonetheless signified recognition of China's strategic importance. Trust me, going forward we will be having a lot of time dedicated to the hilarious bromance / bro hatred of Vinegar Joe and Peanut.  Yet the formation of an alliance and the establishment of command structures was easier than the practical implementation of military cooperation. The fundamental challenge that would plague Chinese-American relations throughout the war emerged almost immediately: the problem of delivering military assistance to China. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and China had reached agreement on three major points regarding military assistance. First, the United States would provide training and technical support to assist China in establishing a modern air force. Second, the United States would provide training and equipment for a ground army consisting of thirty divisions. Third, the United States would assist China in constructing railways and highways from Yunnan to Burma, along with the provision of rolling stock and vehicles to support these new transportation routes. These were ambitious plans, reflecting the extent of Chinese need and American willingness to support the Chinese war effort. However, the outbreak of the Pacific War threw American plans into disarray. The fundamental strategic doctrine guiding American policy was the "Europe first" strategy, which meant that the European theater and the defeat of Nazi Germany received priority over the Pacific theater. Additionally, China's geography made it extraordinarily difficult to supply. China could only be reached through supply lines of extraordinary length and complexity, either through the port of Rangoon in Burma and then overland via the treacherous Yunnan-Burma Road, or through the port of Hong Kong, which immediately fell into Japanese hands after Pearl Harbor. The first Sino-American loan agreement had specified that the United States would deliver commodities worth $45 million to China in 1941. However, shipping shortages meant that only $26 million worth of commodities actually left the United States. These commodities were shipped to the transit port of Rangoon, where a massive traffic jam developed as supplies accumulated faster than they could be distributed onward to China. Along the Yunnan-Burma Road, that "much-contested life line" as it came to be known, conditions were chaotic. The road had always been a source of trouble: it was long, extraordinarily difficult to keep in repair, fantastically dangerous to travel, and too narrow to permit much volume of traffic at any one time. Due to mismanagement and pilfering, the commodities that were shipped out of Burma suffered heavy losses in transit, and only one-third of them eventually arrived in Chongqing. Yet the United States had already established one valuable asset in China that could be deployed relatively quickly: an air force nucleus. Just before Pearl Harbor, a group of American aviators had been formally organized in Chongqing who worked on volunteer status for China under the command of Colonel Claire Chennault, an American aviation officer who served as instructor at the Chinese Air Force Cadet School. Some of these men had been flying in China since the Kuomintang first began purchasing American aircraft, having come to demonstrate the aircraft and remaining to pilot and teach. Others had hurried to China after being released from their volunteer service in Spain, where they had gained combat experience during the Spanish Civil War. It was a familiar joke that pilots from both sides of the Spanish conflict were likely to meet and work side by side in China, but political convictions proved immaterial to these professional aviators, they got on well enough with each other, mercenaries of the twentieth century united by their expertise and their willingness to fight. When American traffic on the Burma Road swelled in volume and became chaotic, with cargo lost to pilfering and trucks breaking down from mishandling, the air freight service into Chongqing became increasingly vital to maintaining Chinese military capabilities. The backbone of this organization was American, and it had been in operation for months before the Japanese attack. Halfway down the Burma Road, over the border in Burma, was a plane factory backed by American and Chinese capital, providing some degree of repair and maintenance capacity for the aircraft operating out of China. Recognizing the strategic value of these experienced aviators and the need to formalize and expand their operations, American and Chinese officials moved quickly to incorporate this volunteer group, formally known as the American Volunteer Group or "Flying Tigers," into the U.S. Army Air Force. This transformation of volunteer aviators into official American military personnel represented a commitment to providing air support to Chinese operations, recognizing that air power could compensate to some degree for Chinese numerical disadvantages in ground combat. In Chongqing, it was clear that among the United Nations fighting Japan, America was the only one taking China seriously, the only one prepared to invest significant resources in Chinese military capabilities and the Chinese war effort. Yet Pearl Harbor brought consequences that extended far beyond the strategic and diplomatic spheres. For Western civilians living in China,missionaries, teachers, doctors, businessmen, and journalists, the attack represented a catastrophic change in their status and their fate. Until December 8, 1941, Westerners residing in China had maintained a curious protected status as foreign neutrals, even in areas nominally controlled by the Japanese. This status had provided them with a measure of distance from, and protection against, the grinding reality of the war that had devastated Chinese populations. For a century, Americans had been part of an imperial presence in China, sometimes benevolent, sometimes violent, but always ultimately under Western control. That world came to an abrupt end on December 8, 1941. All across eastern China, Americans and Britons were rounded up and interned. The International Settlement of Shanghai—that remarkable oasis of neutrality that had persisted in the midst of a war-torn city—was now reunified under Japanese control. Thousands of foreigners with Allied nationality were sent to holding camps scattered throughout occupied China. Some, like the eleven-year-old British boy Jim Ballard, would remain imprisoned for the remainder of the war, enduring hunger, cold, and disease in camps like Longhua, which housed approximately 2,000 detainees. Forty years later, as the novelist J. G. Ballard, he would memorialized this experience in his semi-autobiographical novel Empire of the Sun. For missionaries like Velva Brown, the evacuation process was degrading and final. The missionary staff were permitted to pack no more than three suitcases with their belongings. As they prepared to leave, Japanese and Taiwanese "sightseeing" parties arrived to decide which houses they might want to occupy. The journey home aboard crowded Japanese ships offered no concessions to status or dignity; ambassadors, consuls, merchants, and missionaries alike were given "bed-sized strips of Chinese matting which we spread side by side on the iron floor of the hold," as Brown recorded. The humiliation was compounded by the finality of it all. For many, their decades-long presence in China was ending not in orderly retreat but in hasty evacuation, leaving behind "servants, many of whom had been with us for fifteen or twenty years." Despite these immediate human tragedies, the strategic transformation that Pearl Harbor wrought for China was undeniable. Chiang Kai-shek now embarked on an entirely new sort of life, heavily involved with the leaders and generals of the Western powers. He held diplomatic discussions with the leaders of the United Nations and military planning sessions with Western generals. In these unfamiliar circumstances, he did his best to live up to the Confucian ideal of the gentleman, seldom permitting the mask to slip—though the pressure of these new responsibilities and the intoxicating combination of vindication and anxiety would occasionally prove too much even for his considerable self-control. Within weeks of Pearl Harbor, Chiang demonstrated the value he could bring to the new alliance. He visited India and spoke with the leaders of the Indian independence struggle as an ally and friend, as a fellow non-European speaking to others seeking to escape from colonialism and imperial domination. He joined the Allies in their first joint campaign, not in China but in the jungles of neighboring Burma, committing Chinese forces to operations outside China's borders in support of the broader Allied military strategy. Yet the price that Chiang would pay for China's belated entry into the global alliance against the Axis powers would prove to be a heavy one. Chiang desperately needed his new American and British partners, but accepting this alliance would unleash forces within Chinese society that would threaten the very basis of his political control. The complexities of this bargain would become most visible in the four-year struggle between Chiang and General Joseph Warren Stilwell, the American officer who would become simultaneously his chief of staff and the administrator of American military assistance to China. This relationship, shaped by mutual suspicion, different strategic visions, and incompatible political agendas, would define Chinese-American military cooperation during the Pacific War and would have profound implications extending far beyond the battlefields of Asia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Pearl Harbor's shock reverberated through Asia. Japan's assault on Hawaii, combined with invasions of Burma, the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, inadvertently transformed regional conflict into global war. Chiang Kai-shek, vindicated after four years of isolation fighting Japan, embraced American alliance with profound relief. The U.S. committed military aid, appointed General Stilwell as chief of staff, and recognized China as a co-belligerent. For Chiang, this partnership brought diplomatic status but also internal tensions that would define the Pacific War's final chapter.

Pour écouter 5000 ans d'Histoire en entier, sans pub et avec les bonus, pour 2€ par mois :https://m.audiomeans.fr/s/S-tavkjvmo Le 17 août 1943, à Québec, les alliés préparent la suite. En effet, le 17 août 1943, dans le calme apparent du château Fontenac à Québec, deux hommes se retrouvent à huis clos. Winston Churchill et Franklin Roosevelt. C'est la première conférence de Québec, nom de code Quadrant. Officiellement, elle ne devait pas exister. Officieusement, elle va dessiner la suite de la guerre. Car en cet été 1943, la situation a changé. Les Allemands ont été battus à Stalingrad. L'axe recule lentement, l'Italie vacille. Les alliés ont maintenant besoin d'un plan clair pour abattre l'Allemagne nazie et puis le Japon. Autour de la table, pas de Staline. L'URSS n'est pas conviée.C'est un véritable moment anglo-américain centré sur la stratégie occidentale et les sujets brûlants. D'abord, l'Europe. Roosevelt et Churchill décident d'ouvrir un second front en France en 1944. Ce sera l'opération Overlord, ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui le débarquement de Normandie. La date n'est pas encore fixée, mais le principe est acté. Ensuite, l'Italie. Les alliés veulent remonter la botte, mais des désaccords apparaissent. Churchill, fidèle à sa vision méditerranéenne, insiste, lui, sur les Balkans. Roosevelt, lui, vise l'essentiel, frapper le cœur du Reich. En plus, la conférence ne se limite pas à l'Europe. Il est aussi question du Japon et notamment d'un projet encore top secret, le développement de la bombe atomique évoquée sous le nom de Code-Projet-Québec. C'est à cette occasion que le Canada entre pleinement dans l'alliance nucléaire entre Londres et Washington. Enfin, un accord de principe est posé sur l'après-guerre, désarmement de l'Allemagne, occupation militaire, limitation de son industrie de guerre et premières ébauches de ce qui deviendra l'ONU. Le 17 août 43, dans le secret feutré d'un hôtel canadien, le monde d'après prend forme. Les décisions prises à Québec vont orienter les derniers chapitres de la seconde guerre mondiale et en écrire l'épilogue. A demain dans TIME SHOT pour une nouvelle Minute Histoire. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Back on this day in 1935, President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act into law. It gauranteed an income for the unemployed and retirees.

This Day in Legal History: The Social Security ActOn August 14, 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act, creating the foundation of the American social safety net and permanently changing the relationship between citizens and their government. Flanked by members of Congress and photographers, FDR put his signature to a law that guaranteed, for the first time in American history, a measure of economic security against the hazards of old age, unemployment, and poverty.The Act was born of the Great Depression, when the suffering of millions—elderly people with no savings, workers with no jobs, families with no support—overwhelmed the old assumption that hardship was a purely private matter. Social Security established old-age benefits funded by taxes on workers and employers, created a federal-state system of unemployment insurance, and provided aid for dependent children, the blind, and people with disabilities. Roosevelt himself was clear-eyed about its limits, saying at the signing that no law could insure everyone against every vicissitude of life, but that this one gave “some measure of protection” against poverty-ridden old age and unemployment.The legal significance runs deep, and it connects to a story we've told before on this show. When the Social Security Act was challenged as an unconstitutional federal overreach and an improper use of the taxing power, it reached a Supreme Court that had been striking down New Deal programs left and right. But in 1937—in the same term as the failed court-packing fight and the Court's famous doctrinal shift—the justices upheld Social Security, in Steward Machine Company v. Davis and Helvering v. Davis, broadly reading Congress's power to tax and spend for the general welfare. Those decisions helped cement the constitutional foundation of the modern administrative and welfare state. Ninety-one years later, Social Security remains the single largest program in the federal budget, and the principle it established—that the national government has a role in securing the economic dignity of its people—remains, as our opening quote from FDR suggests, a live measure of the country's progress.A federal trade court has upheld President Trump's authority to close the “de minimis” tariff exemption—handing the administration a rare courtroom win on tariffs. The U.S. Court of International Trade, a three-judge panel in New York, ruled that Trump lawfully used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, to end the duty-free treatment that low-value imports—parcels worth $800 or less—had long enjoyed. Some quick background: the de minimis exemption is what let a flood of cheap packages, especially from Chinese e-commerce sellers, enter the U.S. tariff-free, and closing it has already generated over a billion dollars in new duty payments. What makes this ruling notable is that it cuts against the trend. Trump's tariff agenda has fared badly in court—the Supreme Court ruled in February that IEEPA does not authorize him to unilaterally impose sweeping tariffs, which led to that roughly $100 billion in refunds we covered, and the trade court later struck down a replacement tariff. So how does the administration win this one? The court drew a fine but important distinction: ending a duty-free privilege is not the same as affirmatively imposing a tariff. The challenger, an auto-parts importer, argued IEEPA gave the president no independent power to close the exemption, but the panel found that rescinding a trade-related “privilege” falls within the emergency-powers statute even if imposing new tariffs does not. The significance is that it carves out a narrow lane where the administration's emergency-powers theory actually holds up—a reminder that in the tariff wars, the difference between taking away a benefit and imposing a new burden can be the difference between winning and losing in court. US court backs Trump's power to close ‘de minimis' tariff exemption | ReutersCNBC · BloombergThe Supreme Court has taken up a case that sounds technical but goes to the heart of whether wrongly detained immigrants can find a lawyer at all. The question is whether attorneys who successfully challenge an immigrant's detention through a habeas corpus petition can recover their fees from the federal government. It turns on the Equal Access to Justice Act—a statute that lets people who beat the government in court recover their attorney's fees, unless the government's position was “substantially justified.” Here's why this matters enormously right now. As immigration detention has surged, so have habeas petitions challenging it: one court in California went from a handful of these cases in 2021 to hundreds in a single month this year, and courts have repeatedly ordered the government to pay fees after finding people were detained unlawfully. But two federal appeals courts, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, have held that habeas challenges to immigration detention aren't the kind of “civil case” the fee statute covers—which would mean the lawyers who win these cases can't recover a dime. Think about the practical stakes. Detained immigrants are frequently poor, often can't work, and have no right to a free lawyer in immigration proceedings. Fee-shifting is a big part of what makes it economically possible for attorneys to take these cases at all. If the Supreme Court rules that EAJA doesn't apply, it doesn't change the substance of anyone's detention—but it quietly removes much of the financial incentive for lawyers to challenge unlawful detention, weakening one of the few real checks on the system. The significance is that this is access to justice in its most concrete form: whether the courthouse door stays open depends, as it so often does, on who can afford to walk through it. US Supreme Court case tests fees for immigration detainees | ReutersSCOTUSblog · Bloomberg LawAnd finally, a story from the frontier of AI misuse that is equal parts alarming and absurd. A Connecticut judge has sanctioned a plaintiff who hid secret instructions inside his own court filings—instructions aimed not at the judge, but at any artificial intelligence that might read the documents. The plaintiff, representing himself, buried text in white font on a white background, invisible to a human eye, telling any AI model reviewing the filing to side with him. This is what's known as a “prompt injection” attack, and it's reportedly the first documented instance of one aimed at a U.S. court. The court caught it—apparently tipped off by strange white spaces in the text—and issued an order warning him to stop. He didn't. At the next hearing, he'd hidden a message reading “hi, I hope you can't see me,” and, in another filing, a concealed link to a SpongeBob SquarePants video. The judge was not amused, issuing a decision bluntly titled “Court Sanction for Plaintiff's Use of Prompt-Injection.” The remedy is almost poetically low-tech: the plaintiff is now barred from filing electronically and must submit everything on paper. Now, it's easy to laugh—and the SpongeBob link earns a chuckle—but the serious point is real. This is a new species of the AI-integrity problem we've tracked all summer, alongside the fake hallucinated citations. It's an attempt to corrupt the decision-making process itself, and it quietly reveals something bigger: that courts and their staff may increasingly be using AI tools to help review filings, which creates a brand-new attack surface for litigants willing to game it. The significance is that the age-old duty of candor to the tribunal now has to contend with adversaries trying to whisper to the machines—and courts are going to need new rules, and sharp eyes, to catch them. Connecticut judge says plaintiff hid messages for AI in court filings | Reuters404 Media · Tom's Hardware This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

In the illustrated guide, Poking the Squid, Perrin Roosevelt Ireland illustrates the splendid diversity of nature's eroticism. Chock full of delightful watercolor comics featuring pregnant seahorse dads, spider oral sex, and the four-headed echidna penis, Ireland takes us on a wild biodiversity ride through queerness, infidelity, consent, divorce, sex change, and even sexual cannibalism in the animal world. Ireland interviews researchers probing the leading edge of animal reproductive biology and, with the help of her cats Ursula and Pudge, brings readers along as she learns the latest discoveries that implode traditional notions of sex roles, relationships, and just who is mounting whom. These researchers are making dolphin vaginal popsicles, retrieving sperm packets from male squid mouths, and documenting dolphin orgies. From the externalized clitoris of the spotted hyena to mating-by-fusion in anglerfish, Poking the Squid draws on decades of feminist and queer theory to show that sexual diversity is biodiversity, and boisterous boinking is only natural. Ireland reminds us that we humans, from habitat destruction to climate change, impact all of animal life, including their private lives. Yet Earth's sexual ecosystem is filled with joy, resilience, and vitality — a balm to climate grief and a reason to protect all forms of nature's pleasure. And by illuminating and celebrating animal diversity, Poking the Squid invites us to embrace our own. Perrin Roosevelt Ireland is an artist and environmentalist. For a decade, she worked at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), ultimately as deputy to the executive director. Her artwork has been published in Discover, Nature, Scientific American, and The Rumpus. She serves on the board of the Roosevelt Institute, was an inaugural Artist in Residence at the New York Aquarium, and is a Banff Graphic Novel Resident. Perrin lives in Brooklyn, New York, with her cats (and muses) Ursula and Pudge. Buy the Book Poking the Squid: What We Can Learn from Animal Sex (Hardcover) Third Place Books

Boone and Crockett Club: History & Mission Tony Schoonen shares the rich history of the Boone and Crockett Club, which was founded in 1887 by Theodore Roosevelt and George Bird Grinnell. The organization was formed by sportsmen after Roosevelt witnessed the severe decimation of wildlife and natural resources in the West, particularly in the Yellowstone region. In its first two decades, the club was instrumental in passing the Yellowstone Preservation Act (1892) and the Lacey Act (1900), and helped establish the National Forest Reserves, the National Park Service, and the National Wildlife Refuge System. The founders effectively shifted wildlife management away from unregulated market hunting to the sustainable, state-managed model we rely on today. Tony and Larry discuss the vital distinction between conservation (the active, wise use and management of natural resources) and preservation (a "no-touch" approach that can negatively impact ecosystems). The club's iconic records program was established in the 1930s. It was not created as a hunting contest, but as a scientific tool to measure the success of conservation efforts over the previous 30 years. The records program uses the presence of mature male specimens (measured by antler and horn size) as an indicator of a healthy, thriving ecosystem. Today, wildlife managers across North America actively use this database to monitor habitat health. Fair Chase ethics remain a cornerstone of the organization; only free-ranging animals legally harvested under fair chase conditions are eligible for the record books. Tony highlights a major new initiative aimed at combating poaching, a crime that historically suffers from low detection (under 4%) and low prosecution rates. Following a five-year research project funded by the Leopold Foundation, the club realized the massive financial loss the public trust bears due to wildlife theft. The club developed a formula to calculate the true replacement cost of illegally harvested animals and is actively working to implement this into state legislation. The Poach & Pay legislation has already passed in 8 pilot states. The initiative also aims to elevate severe poaching crimes from misdemeanors to felonies. To further empower citizens, the club is developing a smartphone app that will allow individuals to instantly drop a pin and report suspected poaching directly to law enforcement. The core of the Boone and Crockett Club consists of 100 Regular Members (problem-solving business leaders mirroring the original founders) and approximately 167 Professional Members (wildlife scientists, academics, and agency heads). The club also offers an Associate Membership base, which is open to the public and currently boasts around 4,000 grassroots members, an impressive 25% of whom are Lifetime Associates. Hunters and conservationists interested in supporting the club's ongoing legislative, ethical, and habitat-management efforts can join by visiting their website at boone-crockett.org. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the ending of the Second Battle of Changsha. In late September and early October 1941, Chinese commander Chen Cheng planned an operation to retake Yichang, a strategic Yangtze River city whose control was essential for protecting the approach to Chongqing. Japanese forces were pulling back from Changsha, weakened by supply problems and casualties, which created an opportunity for Chen to intensify his campaign. Yichang had been captured by Japan in 1940, a defeat that Chen carried as a personal and political burden. He therefore moved to encircle the Japanese 13th Division inside Yichang and drive it to collapse. Although the Chinese held a clear manpower advantage—fourteen divisions against the encircled Japanese—progress was slowed by stubborn fighting from prepared, entrenched positions. The battle inside the city produced desperate close-quarters combat and heavy casualties, showing how the fate of Yichang and the wider defense of Chongqing were tightly linked.    #214 War hits the Pacific Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   The guns fell silent on October 9, 1941, as the Ninth War Zone's forces restored their pre-battle positions, marking the end of the Second Battle of Changsha. The balance sheet was grim on both sides, but it was China that bore the heavier cost. The Ninth Military Front suffered 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing. The concurrent Yichang offensive added a further 21,368 casualties to the Sixth Military Front, a force that outnumbered its Japanese opponents ten to one yet still failed to retake the city. By the time the dust settled, the Chinese army had lost nearly 100,000 men across both theatres. The Chinese command was frank, at least in private, about what had gone wrong. The Japanese had moved with a speed that recalled Blitzkrieg, advancing 130 kilometres in eleven days and withdrawing at twelve kilometres a day, catching the defenders perpetually off-balance. The 26th, 37th, 10th, and 74th Corps had been picked apart piecemeal rather than fighting in concert, the original plan to destroy the Japanese south of the Miluo River coming to nothing. Elite formations had paid a disproportionate price: the 74th Corps suffered 14,521 casualties, the 37th Corps 14,015, and the 58th Division alone lost 6,192 of its 11,907 men, nearly its entire fighting strength.   Yet none of this was the story the public would hear. On October 10th, China's National Day, radio stations announced the "Second Great Victory in Northern Hunan", the annihilation of over 40,000 enemy troops. Newspapers rushed out special editions. Congratulatory telegrams flooded in from government ministries and civic organizations. Senior officials seized on the moment: Sun Ke, Premier of the Executive Yuan, declared that the victory "laid the foundation for the counter-offensive and the recapture of Hankou and Guangzhou," while General Bai Chongxi called it "the pivotal moment for us to turn defeat into victory." Chiang Kai-shek, reading through the pages of triumphant commentary produced overnight by his propagandists, was reportedly impressed by their industry, if not convinced by their content. He had not wanted to call it a victory at all, but the political calculus was unavoidable: after four years of war, an exhausted nation needed the psychological sustenance that only "victory" could provide.   The gap between public performance and private reality was nowhere more visible than in the arrival of a twenty-two-member international press delegation on October 13th. Journalists from Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hong Kong, and major Chinese newspapers were flown to Changsha and carefully guided through selected battlefields, where they inspected mountains of war trophies and heard testimony from soldiers and civilians. They left satisfied, presenting their war souvenirs—swords, binoculars, Japanese military flags—to their audiences back home as proof of Chinese heroism and Japanese defeat. Both China and Japan were claiming victory simultaneously. The only conclusion the foreign press could draw was that one side was lying, and it was not the side that had shown them the evidence.   Chiang Kai-shek's real verdict came at the Third Nanyue Military Conference, held from October 16 to 21. His anger was withering. He condemned his generals for their obsession with defending sprawling outer perimeter lines while leaving city centres barely fortified, a mentality so rigid, he said, that the Japanese could announce the exact time of their advance and withdrawal in advance and still execute it on schedule without interference. "Generals, what a disgrace this is!" On the failure to capture prisoners, only 263 prisoners were claimed across the entire front, of whom only 16 names were actually published, he was almost incredulous: "We can definitely defeat the enemy, capture many enemy prisoners, and seize countless enemy weapons! Even if we cannot capture ten thousand prisoners, we should at least capture a thousand! If not a thousand, then at least a hundred! But now, you don't even have ten!" The conference handed down punishments to match the rhetoric. Liao Lingqi, commander of the shattered 58th Division, was sentenced to death for desertion and shot on October 22nd. His men were so outraged that three regimental commanders resigned in protest; the division was pulled from the order of battle entirely and given three months to rebuild. Li Yutang, commander of the 10th Corps, was dismissed—though the Third Battle of Changsha would begin before his replacement could take post, and he would be reinstated to play a key role in the city's defence.   On the Japanese side, the 11th Army acknowledged 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing, far fewer than Chinese claims, though post-war regimental histories suggest the true figure was higher. Lieutenant General Anami, who had championed the operation, found himself stung by the charge that the battle had served mainly as material for Chinese propaganda. On November 23rd, he reportedly reacted with visible displeasure when someone in his headquarters said as much aloud.  Anami's annoyance was easy enough to understand, but the accusation carried a troubling degree of accuracy. The Second Battle of Changsha had yielded no decisive strategic gain and no substantial alteration in the military balance. What it did generate, rather effectively, was a story and by the autumn of 1941, stories were one of the few things China still had in plentiful supply. The most consequential struggles were taking place not along the Miluo River, but in foreign ministries and embassies, in Washington and Moscow, in the messages passing between Chongqing and London, and in the increasingly strained calculations of statesmen trying to determine, amid rapidly changing circumstances, whom to support and for how long.   For Chiang Kai-shek, the challenge was never merely military. It was structural, and had been so from the outset. He had always seen clearly, precisely because he understood China's weakness, that Japan could not be defeated by China alone. The country lacked the industrial base, the logistical reach, and after four years of relentless attrition more and more the manpower needed to force a decisive result on the battlefield. China's survival depended on making its war inseparable from the wars of other powers. Since 1937, Chiang's diplomacy had pursued that single objective: convincing enough great powers that their interests were aligned with China's, and holding that coalition together long enough for Japan to be subdued. That effort turned out to be vastly more difficult than it ought to have been.   The problem started with the international order in which the war emerged. Chiang had hoped to assemble a concert of allies willing to help defend China against Japanese aggression. He was blocked not just by the reluctance of neutral states to aid China, but by the speed with which alliances shifted in the opening years of the Second World War. He had never welcomed the prospect of a general European conflict, correctly fearing that it would push China even further to the margins of world attention. Even so, he recognized that once the lines had hardened between the imperial democracies and fascism, new alignments might become possible. From his perspective, the growing amity between Berlin and Moscow was therefore disastrous. He had been eager to draw the USSR into war against Japan. Instead, the Soviets were now effectively aligned with the Nazis, who were themselves allied with Tokyo.   The world created after Versailles had already enraged many Chinese. After all, the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 had arisen directly from the settlement reached at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet that older order had at least possessed recognizable anchors, especially the dominance of the two great European empires and the United States. Now those empires were weakening, and no one could say with confidence what the new geopolitical order would be. For all Chiang knew, Germany might emerge as Europe's new dominant power. The early years of the European war produced a bewildering spectacle of diplomatic realignment.   The Nationalist government had previously enjoyed a short-lived flirtation with Nazi Germany. In fact, Hitler's regime continued supplying Chiang with munitions in the first months of China's war against Japan. The Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 had theoretically joined Germany, Italy, and Japan into the Axis, but mutual distrust prevented them from forming anything like a fully coherent alliance. Chiang found it useful to imply to Western powers that he might be pushed into closer alignment with Germany, a particularly disturbing possibility for the USSR, which faced enemies in both Europe and Asia. But eventually the contradictions in German policy toward East Asia became too severe. In April 1938, Germany yielded to Japanese pressure and ended its support for China.   Britain offered little meaningful help. Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in May 1937 at the head of a Conservative-led National Government, and was quickly overwhelmed by the deteriorating European situation. If Czechoslovakia was for him a "far-off country of which we know nothing," China's fate was even more distant and obscure to many,  perhaps most  policymakers in London. The Nationalists had more success in cultivating the United States. At the Nine-Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, the Chinese delegation failed to persuade Washington to impose sanctions on Japan and confront it directly. By the middle of 1938, however, American views were beginning to shift. As Japan pushed deeper into southern China, it became increasingly obvious that the occupied territory would be closed to foreign trade. In December 1938, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau arranged a private American loan of $25 million to China, to be repaid through shipments of tung oil, a varnish product whose real importance lay not in itself, but in what the arrangement signified: a quiet American expression of faith that Chongqing would survive. Chiang also held on to the hope of an even less likely partnership. He had become fiercely anti-Communist during the 1920s, yet in the early years of the anti-Japanese war his greatest hope still rested on Soviet entry into the conflict. Soviet advisers and pilots had aided China from 1937 to 1939, but the USSR never formally declared war on Japan. Still, as Japanese aggression in northern Asia intensified, it remained possible that the Soviets would eventually be drawn in.   Then, as so often happened whenever Chiang tried to impose some control over the course of the war, events beyond China's borders altered the struggle in fundamental ways. While Western attention remained fixed on Europe's darkening horizon, a battle with major consequences for East Asia unfolded on the frontiers of Outer Mongolia, Manchukuo, and the eastern Soviet Union. Throughout much of 1938 and early 1939, one faction within the Japanese Imperial Army sought to pressure the Soviets along their eastern frontier. The USSR appeared vulnerable; Stalin's paranoid purges had executed or exiled many of the Red Army's best officers. In May 1939, fighting broke out near Nomonhan between forces from Soviet-backed Mongolia and Japanese troops from Manchukuo. Within days, both sides had reinforced heavily, until nearly 60,000 Soviet troops faced about 40,000 soldiers from the Kwantung Army. Over the next four months, until mid-September, they fought a major battle ending in a decisive Japanese defeat and establishing the reputation of General Georgi Zhukov, who would later become one of Stalin's most celebrated wartime commanders. The much-derided Soviet Army had fought with formidable effectiveness, and the result was not only a ceasefire but also a nonaggression pact between the two sides, extinguishing, in one stroke, Chiang's hopes for a Chinese-Soviet military alliance. The final blow came after developments in northern Europe. In the Winter War of 1939–1940, the Soviet invasion of Finland led Britain and France to back a motion expelling the USSR from the League of Nations. China, then a member of the League Council, declined to use its veto to block the resolution. Stalin was enraged by Chiang's failure to prevent Soviet expulsion, and mutual suspicion thereafter poisoned relations between the two leaders for the rest of the war against Japan. China would now have to continue without further major Soviet backing.   By the spring of 1940, China's position had become deeply precarious. In March, senior Japanese negotiators sought an agreement with Chiang in Chongqing, while Wang Jingwei was trying to formalize his rival Nationalist government in Nanjing. This effort, known in Chinese as the Tong Operation, and in Japanese as Operation Kiri, led to talks in Hong Kong from March 7 to 10, 1940. Militarily, the Nationalists were in grave danger: the United States remained neutral, and Europe was in chaos. Indeed, that same spring, with France seemingly near collapse, the British government also sent out discreet feelers to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace with Germany. For China, Western assistance was nowhere in sight. The Japanese judged the moment favorable for pressing Chiang toward concessions. Faced with serious danger to his regime, Chiang allowed the door to negotiation to open just slightly.   As a consequence, the Japanese delayed full recognition of Wang Jingwei's new government. Through the summer and autumn of 1940, Tokyo remained uncertain about the defector. Prominent Japanese figures such as Count Arima Yoriyasu of the Privy Council said Wang's conduct demonstrated his untrustworthiness, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke continued to express interest in an agreement with Chongqing. Zhou Fohai captured the defectors' frustration, men who believed they had made the highest patriotic sacrifice when he wrote: "Chongqing sees us as collaborators, we see ourselves as heroes. We think only peace can save the country — that's why we think of ourselves as heroes. If we end up classed as heroes, then China and Japan will be at peace. If we end up classed as collaborators, then China and Japan will never be at peace."That formulation conveyed something genuine about the moral dizziness of the period. Most of the defectors were not men devoid of principles; they were men whose principles had carried them to a place that history would find exceptionally hard to pardon.   The "New Fourth Army Incident" brought to a close one of the most consequential years in modern Chinese political history. The battle of ideas unfolding in 1940 was already visible to informed contemporaries. Early in 1941, US Ambassador Nelson Johnson sent Washington a detailed assessment of the Chinese political situation in reply to another report passed along by Major Evans Carlson, an American officer who had made an extensive journey through the Chinese interior. The contrast between the two documents revealed a widening split in American views of China. Carlson, together with his travelling companion, the New Zealander Rewi Alley, had become increasingly sympathetic to the Communists after visiting their territories in 1938 and admiring their discipline. Carlson described the Nationalists as moving toward "fascism," and argued that American aid should be conditioned on Chiang's government being compelled to adopt more "democratic" institutions.   Johnson strongly disagreed. It was "only normal and natural," he wrote, that the Nationalists wanted to retain power, but during the war they had established the National Political Consultative Council, in which multiple parties, including the Communists, were represented. He also noted that the CCP could publish its own newspaper in Chongqing in a way that would have been impossible before the war. One might have expected the Nationalists to use the war as a justification "to extinguish . . . all political opposition," yet instead they had chosen to "muddle along." Johnson further thought that the influence of competing cliques inside the Nationalist Party had been overstated. Chiang Kai-shek, by contrast, had "grown in stature, as he has come to be recognized as the symbol of united resistance to Japanese encroachment"; ultimately, "it is he who makes the final decisions." Johnson did agree with Carlson that Chiang's regime was hesitant to encourage a broad-based popular movement animated by anything beyond anti-Japanese feeling, though he also pointed to Nationalist cooperative programs and county-level reforms. But he rejected the idea that American support should depend on sweeping political transformation. Chiang was committed to continuing the war against Japan, and Washington should back him in that effort. In a notably farsighted passage, Johnson wrote: "It is my view that since the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the collapse of the traditional Chinese concept of government the Chinese people have been feeling their way along toward a new evolving form of government. A definitive form of government has not yet been established and may not be established for decades; it may or may not be in the form of a democracy, but it will be a type of government that will be adapted to the needs of China and its people." The tension between these two American interpretations,  Carlson's idealized belief in the Communists and Johnson's pragmatic support for Chiang was more than a minor bureaucratic dispute. It foreshadowed a debate that would dominate American foreign policy for the next decade, and would still echo when the People's Republic was proclaimed in 1949.   The disastrous experience of 1940 seemed to cast doubt on whether any future for China existed outside the Japanese Empire. As 1941 wore on, another dreadful event shook the exhausted wartime capital. On June 5, Chongqing endured roughly five hours of bombing, driving the population into air-raid shelters. In one tunnel in the Shibati district, the conditions were even worse than usual. The large shelter was supposed to have lights and electric fans, but the generators had never been connected. Inside, the air was dark, hot, and suffocating. Around ten that evening, people began emerging from the tunnel when rumors spread that the Japanese were returning with poison-gas bombs. Air-raid wardens forced people back inside, even as others were still trying to come out. Bodies toppled over one another, and panic spread as people realized they could not breathe. Over the next few hours, hundreds died underground in the darkness. The exact number was never definitively established: the official figure was 461, though a contemporary police report placed it far higher, at 1,527. What rescuers remembered most vividly were the tortured expressions of the dead, people tangled together in each other's arms as they lost consciousness, clothing ripped to shreds by desperate hands clawing at one another, and bodies so drenched in sweat that they looked as though they had been soaked in water. One survivor, Tang Zhengchang, remembered a hand reaching out from a pile of corpses and pleading, "Sir, please help me . . ." The grip on Tang's shorts was so tight that it pulled them off; he escaped the tunnel naked from the waist down. Official descriptions of the disaster were softened. Even so, the tragedy deepened the city's gloom and in a place already saturated with grief, an added layer of darkness mattered a great deal.   Yet events elsewhere would soon offer the National Government a narrow margin of hope. Late in 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt won re-election as president of the United States. "I am not going to send your boys into any foreign wars," he had proclaimed during the campaign against Wendell Willkie. But Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull both understood that Nazi domination of Europe posed a grave challenge to American influence there. And with China's "Open Door" to trade effectively shut by Japanese occupation, it was becoming increasingly clear that strict neutrality might not remain viable. In a 1941 report on China's domestic and foreign situation, Ambassador Johnson noted that during Germany's sweeping victories across Europe in mid-1940, the Chinese had become anxious about whether the Allies would remain committed to their cause. Britain's refusal to surrender, however, together with continuing Soviet goodwill, lifted public morale in China. People now looked toward the United States and Britain for support and felt that "victory" was "virtually theirs."   Then, on June 22, 1941, the world awoke to news that roughly three million German soldiers were advancing into the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the USSR, dramatically overturned the nonaggression that had governed relations between the two major European dictatorships for the previous two years. It transformed the war in Europe entirely. Less obviously, it also transformed the war in Asia. Thanks to intelligence leaks, Chiang Kai-shek had already realized that war between Germany and the USSR was likely. After the neutrality treaty between the USSR and Japan was signed on April 13, 1941, Chiang predicted that the United States would be drawn into the Asian war, and even that Japan might eventually reverse course and strike the Soviet Union. If that happened, China would become the critical Asian ally of both Washington and Moscow. Stalin had been caught off guard by the German assault — largely because he ignored increasingly urgent warnings from senior colleagues receiving intelligence from well-placed spies in Germany and the Comintern, eager to preserve its alliances, now pressed the Chinese Communists to cooperate more closely with the Nationalists. On June 23, 1941, the CCP Central Committee responded with a declaration that it would "persevere in the Anti-Japanese United Front, persevere in Nationalist-Communist cooperation," and would align itself with the British, the Americans, and others resisting the "fascist rulers" of the Axis.   In Chongqing and Yan'an, the German attack on the Soviet Union was interpreted as a hopeful sign that Japan's fortunes might be beginning to turn. In Nanjing, the reaction was different. On June 22, Zhou Fohai recorded in his diary that, although the outcome "cannot be predicted," members of the Nanjing regime "all believe Germany will win and will take Moscow within two months." Zhou speculated that Japan could not easily reconcile its neutrality treaty with the USSR and its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was supposed to unite the Axis against Soviet expansionism. Still, because Germany had struck first, Japan was under no formal obligation to help. Zhou also continued to view events through a lens he had never abandoned: that of Chinese nationalism. "If Chongqing joins the Allies and they win," he wrote, "then this is good for China." If they lost, it would be disastrous for Chiang Kai-shek; but because Wang Jingwei had established a government in Nanjing under Japanese sponsorship, China now had "a foot in both boats." It was a ruthless calculation, but not a wholly dishonorable one. Zhou was not merely advancing Japanese interests. He was hedging, wagering on multiple futures in the name of a China he believed would endure beyond whatever constellation of powers happened to dominate at the moment. Whether posterity would judge that conduct prudent or collaborative was a question he could neither settle nor live to see resolved to his satisfaction.   The summer of 1941 marked a major geopolitical turning point in the war. Until then, the conflicts in China and Europe had remained separate, if desperate, struggles on the Eurasian continent. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union now forced Japan to decide whether it too would enter war against the USSR. Debate in Tokyo was brief. Although some officials, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka, favored striking north before moving south, both the Kwantung Army and the Navy advised against helping Germany at least until Germany had succeeded in drawing substantial Soviet forces away from Siberia and into Europe. Konoye, once again prime minister, agreed. With the northern option set aside, Japanese leaders turned toward another great power instead: the United States. Japan's failure to gain further decisive momentum in China had fueled demands for broader regional expansion, especially into Southeast Asia, with its abundant oil, rubber, and other strategic resources. From 1940 onward, measures such as the pressure to close the Burma Road made it increasingly obvious that Tokyo had adopted a more aggressive posture in Asia. Unable to subdue China, Japanese policymakers chose instead to escalate the conflict still further.   Japanese political life had become ever more dominated by the unresolved war in China. As early as 1938, military expenditures consumed about 70 percent of the national budget, and that same year a National Mobilization Bill granted the government "total war control" over the zaibatsu, Japan's major industrial conglomerates. By 1940, the New Order was making itself felt throughout everyday life, with campaigns against luxury and extravagant consumption taking on new prominence. In February 1940, a parliamentarian was expelled from the Diet simply for daring to criticize the "holy war" in China. In such an atmosphere, retreat from imperial ambitions became increasingly unthinkable. That figure, 70 percent of the national budget devoted to the military is worth dwelling on, because it reveals something essential about the trap in which Japanese strategists had placed themselves. The war in China had not been won, yet abandoning it would have meant admitting a failure so severe that it would have shaken the ideological and institutional foundations of military supremacy in Japanese politics. The only apparent ways out required pushing further in: more conquest, more extraction, more expansion. The logic was brutally clear, and profoundly destructive.   The Roosevelt administration watched these developments with growing alarm. Though still formally neutral, the United States was already using Lend-Lease to provide major assistance to Britain and the Soviet Union in their struggles against Germany. It now expanded aid to China as well. On February 10, Roosevelt's representative Lauchlin Currie visited Chongqing to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would soon provide $45 million in military equipment. General John Magruder, head of the small AMMISCA mission,  the American Military Mission in China had been sent to Chongqing in September 1941, as part of quiet preparation for possible Chinese entry into an alliance against Japan. The China branch of the OSS, precursor to the CIA, was led by General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, whom Roosevelt had dispatched to China in early 1941.   The Americans repeatedly tried to discourage Japan from moving south into Southeast Asia, but relations only grew more confrontational. Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina, and in response the United States imposed an oil embargo in July 1941. The consequences were immense. Japan imported around 80 percent of its oil from the United States. Without that supply, its navy, the essential instrument for southern expansion  had reserves for perhaps eighteen months. The real question facing Tokyo, then, was not whether it must act, but how soon. Unable any longer to resist mounting military pressure for war, Konoye resigned on October 16 and was replaced as premier by General Tōjō Hideki. Tokyo accelerated its preparations for conflict with the Western powers. Planned targets included Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. I should note, if you want to learn about all of this history in more detail, you can go check out the pacific war channel on youtube. I have a chronological series that is just now talking about events like the Japanese invasion of french indochina and the road to pearl harbor.   Throughout the autumn of 1941, increasingly desperate negotiations took place between Japan and the United States. Washington insisted that Japan withdraw from China; Tokyo was equally firm that it would do no such thing. From the Japanese point of view, the demand to leave China was not a serious negotiating position but a demand for national humiliation a call to repudiate four years of war, vast casualties, and the ideological basis of Japanese militarism in a single diplomatic act. In the end, the gulf between the two positions could not be bridged.   While civilian and military leaders in Tokyo argued over the pace at which they should move toward war, few among Japan's rulers doubted that war was coming. At the imperial conference of November 5, it was formally agreed that if no satisfactory diplomatic solution had been reached by December 1, war would follow soon after. Talks in Washington between Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō, diplomat Kurusu Saburō, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull led nowhere. On November 26, Hull delivered a note repeating the American position that Japan must withdraw from both China and Indochina. On December 1, the imperial conference resolved to go to war; the following day, the date of attack was fixed as December 8, December 7 by American time. In one sense, this was the culmination toward which the entire previous decade had been moving. The war in China had started as a localized conflict, then expanded into a continental one, and was now about to become something larger still: a truly global war, stretching from the North Atlantic to the western Pacific. China's long, lonely resistance would suddenly gain new dimensions and new allies,  though not the ones Chiang had spent four years trying to cultivate, and not under circumstances he would have chosen.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet lay anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, its sailors and officers still largely asleep as dawn crept across the Pacific. The attack did not come without warning signs,  American and Japanese diplomats had been locked in increasingly desperate negotiations throughout the autumn, each side hardening its position until no room remained to maneuver. Washington had demanded that Japan withdraw from China, a condition Tokyo viewed not as a serious opening offer but as a demand for national humiliation: a call to repudiate four years of brutal war, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the entire ideological foundation upon which Japanese militarism rested. No agreement was possible on those terms, and both sides privately knew it.   The strike force assembled in secret was formidable. Six aircraft carriers,  the Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku had sailed under strict radio silence across the North Pacific, launching their aircraft in two successive waves before the American base had any meaningful chance to respond. The first wave of approximately 183 planes swept in just before 8 a.m., targeting the rows of battleships moored along Battleship Row and the military airfields at Wheeler, Hickam, and Ford Island simultaneously, ensuring that American aircraft could not scramble in time to mount an effective defense. A second wave of roughly 170 planes followed less than an hour later, pressing the attack on damaged ships and harbor installations.   The destruction was staggering. The battleship Arizona suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion after a armor-piercing bomb penetrated her forward decks, killing nearly 1,177 of her crew in minutes, almost half of the total American dead from the entire attack. The Oklahoma capsized after being struck by multiple torpedoes. The West Virginia and California sank at their moorings. In total, seventeen vessels were damaged or destroyed, and the vast majority of military aircraft at the nearby airfields were caught on the ground and obliterated before they could take flight. Around 2,400 Americans were killed and another 1,100 wounded, making it the deadliest single attack on American soil or territory in the nation's history to that point.   Yet the attack was not a complete strategic success for Japan. The US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers, the vessels that would ultimately decide the naval war in the Pacific happened to be at sea that morning and escaped unharmed. The harbor's fuel storage and repair facilities were also left largely intact, allowing the fleet to reconstitute faster than Japanese planners had anticipated. What Japan achieved in tactical devastation, it partly squandered in strategic miscalculation. The attack ended American neutrality instantly and irrevocably. The following day, President Roosevelt addressed Congress, calling December 7 "a date which will live in infamy," and within hours the United States declared war on Japan. For China, after more than four years of fighting alone, the blow that devastated Pearl Harbor paradoxically carried a thread of desperate hope at last, the great power Chiang Kai-shek had spent years trying to draw into the conflict had arrived, not under circumstances he would have chosen, but arrived nonetheless. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After years of fighting, China's situation darkened in 1941 with intense bombing of Chongqing and fears of poison-gas attacks. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June shifted alliances and pressured Japan toward wider war. Japan escalated plans for Southeast Asia, suffered an oil embargo, and negotiations with the United States broke down over withdrawing from China and Indochina. Then the Pearl Harbor attack began the Pacific War.

Sesimizin tonu ne söylediğimizden daha mı önemli? Mikrofonun icadı siyasette neyi değiştirdi? Margaret Thatcher başbakan seçilmek için sesini neden kalınlaştırdı? 111 Hz'in bu bölümünde konuşma şeklimizin ve tonumuzun sosyal konumumuz üzerindeki etkisini irdeliyoruz. Bu bölümde: (00:00) Sesin Algı Üzerindeki İlk Etkisi (04:25) Mikrofon Devrimi ve Roosevelt'in Şömine Başı Sohbetleri (08:09) Siyasette Kadın Ses Tonu: Margaret Thatcher'ın Değişimi (11:47) Kadın Ses Tonunun Evrimi ve Primatlar (14:33) Bioakustik ve Evrimsel Kodlar: Eugene Morton Kuralı (17:57) Prozodi ve Kelimelerden Önce Duygu (19:39) Anne Karnından Başlayan Ses Ritmi (21:52) Konuşmanın Sınıfsallığı (25:05) İç Sesin Frekansı Sunan: Barış Özcan Yapımcı: Podbee Media Tüm bölümler, videolar ve daha fazlasına Podbee App ve podbee.com'dan ücretsiz olarak ulaşabilirsiniz. Bu bölüm reklam ve sponsorluk içerebilir.

H.W. Brands, author of America First: Roosevelt vs. Lindbergh in the Shadow of War, Part One: In April 1939, world-famous aviator Charles Lindbergh returns to the United States as global tensions escalate. Lindbergh, who moved to Europe following the "trial of the century" regarding his son's kidnapping, admires German technical proficiency but is deeply skeptical of British endurance. President Franklin Roosevelt attempts to co-opt Lindbergh into his administration to control his influence, but Lindbergh refuses, fiercely guarding his independence. When war erupts in Europe, Lindbergh uses his celebrity status to broadcast radio appeals for neutrality, believing American intervention would repeat the "mistake" of World War I. Meanwhile, Roosevelt maneuvers to modify the Neutrality Act and shift public opinion toward supporting Britain. Lindbergh views the fall of France as vindication for staying out of the conflict, while FDRuses the international emergency to justify a historic third term, a move Lindbergh fears will lead to a "presidency for life." (1)

   H.W. Brands, Part Two: In 1941, the debate intensifies over the Lend-Lease Act, which Lindbergh argues supports British imperialism rather than democracy. Lindbergh testifies before Congress, asserting that air power makes the Western Hemisphere more defensible, contradicting Roosevelt's claims that technology has made America more vulnerable. Roosevelt declares an "unlimited national emergency," casting anti-interventionists as disloyal "copperheads" and "fifth columnists." The America First movement is effectively ruined following Lindbergh's Des Moines speech, in which he identifies "Jewish Americans" as a group pushing the U.S. toward war, leading to widespread accusations of anti-Semitism. The national debate ends abruptly with the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war. Although Roosevelt bars his chief critic from official military service, Lindbergh eventually flies combat missions surreptitiously as a civilian consultant in the Pacific. (2)v       

Produced by Joseph Cottrell, Wayne Hall, Jeffrey Crecelius, and Doug Curran This week, Mark and I have been taking a somewhat forensic look at the newly-released Roosevelt Stadium Jersey City 17 June 1976 live set. We go rather deeply into the weeds around the quality, sources, presentation and packaging, all for your edification. Mark uncovers some surprising aspects of the (rather expensive) vinyl version of this release and we both enjoy the actual performances of the band which featured Patrick Moraz rather than Rick Wakeman at this time, during the Solo Albums Tour. What does this recording sound like? Where did it come from? What are the troubling aspects of the vinyl version?

Produced by Joseph Cottrell, Wayne Hall, Doug Curran and Jeffrey Crecelius This week, Mark and I have been taking a somewhat forensic look at the newly-released Roosevelt Stadium Jersey City 17 June 1976 live set. We go rather deeply into the weeds around the quality, sources, presentation and packaging, all for your edification. Mark uncovers some surprising aspects of the (rather expensive) vinyl version of this release and we both enjoy the actual performances of the band which featured Patrick Moraz rather than Rick Wakeman at this time, during the Solo Albums Tour. What does this recording sound like? Where did it come from? What are the troubling aspects of the vinyl version? Vinyl and CD versions Hype sticker from CD Slightly spurious details? Rear of vinyl The puzzling expanse of dead wax... Yes - The Tormato Story & Tales from Topographic Oceans - Yes Album Listening Guide Available now! YesMusicBooks.com YMP Patrons: Producers: Joseph Cottrell Wayne Hall Jeffrey Crecelius Doug Curran Patrons: Aaron SteelmanSteve LuziettiLindAl Dell'AngeloTerence SadlerLobate ScarpBarry GorskyJohn ThomsonMark BaggsBill WhittakerSteve PerryMark James LangBob MartilottaThomas DeVriesMark SlaterBrian HarrisJohn ViolaMartin KjellbergBrian SullivanSteve RodeMichael HanderhanChris BandiniTim StannardMichael O'ConnorCraig EstenesSteve ScottMiguel FalcãoDave OwenChip PalmerPaul HailesDavidGuy DeRomePaul TomeiDavid HeydenSteve MossRachel HadawayDavid PannellGeoffrey MasonRobert NasirDavid WatkinsonHenrik AntonssonRobert VandiverDeclan LogueHogne Bø PettersenRonnie NeeleyDemSteven RoehrScott ColomboBrianTodd DudleySimon BarrowFergus CubbageJohn HoldenStephen LambeFred BarringerDouglas CaldwellSteve DillGary BettsJohn CowanJamie McQuinnGeoff BailieRay RiethmeierKen Fuller Become a Patron!

Theodore Roosevelt National Park — it's one of those national parks that doesn't quite get the recognition it deserves. But today, we're fixing that!  As the show title suggests, we're taking you around the churned-up, colorful labyrinth of buttes in the quiet North Dakota prairie to share some of our favorite fun facts about Theodore Roosevelt National Park.  In this episode, we cover: Why Theodore Roosevelt National Park was the only unit ever designated a "National Memorial Park" The real story behind how the teddy bear got its name (yes, it has everything to do with Teddy Roosevelt!) How glaciers, ancient volcanoes, and the Little Missouri River spent 65 million years carving North Dakota's Badlands The devastating winter of 1886 that wiped out Roosevelt's cattle herd and changed the direction of his life Why Roosevelt called this land "the romance of my life" and how it helped him grieve and heal The last-minute "Midnight Forests" scramble that protected 16 million acres of land before Congress could stop him Just how much land Roosevelt protected by the end of his presidency Your task for today: In the episode, we talked about the full list of lands Roosevelt protected through executive action. See if a forest, monument, or refuge near you made the cut, and tell us about it over on the @DirtInMyShoes Facebook or Instagram page! Don't miss the full show notes packed with all the links we mentioned so you can plan your adventures like a pro: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/5-fascinating-fun-facts-about-theodore-roosevelt-national-park/ Planning Your Own Theodore Roosevelt National Park Adventure? 8 Things You Can't Miss On Your First Visit to Theodore Roosevelt: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/8-things-cant-miss-first-visit-theodore-roosevelt-national-park/  Episode 149: Exploring Theodore Roosevelt National Park: Best Tips + Activites: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/exploring-theodore-roosevelt-national-park-best-tips-activities/ Master Reservation List: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/list/  National Parks Checklist: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/national-parks-checklist/  Trip Packing List: https://www.dirtinmyshoes.com/pack/

Trump's approval with independents just hit 24%. Republicans are going home to their districts and getting an earful about an unauthorized, unconstitutional, and wildly unpopular war with Iran that is now pulling in the Saudis, the Egyptians, and Iranian proxies from Iraq to Yemen. Paul Rieckhoff calls it what it is — a sucking chest wound — and lays out why Senate Republicans are finally breaking, why Lindsey Graham comparing Trump and Netanyahu to Roosevelt and Churchill isn't landing, and why supporting the troops means demanding a coherent plan, not a blank check for one man's war. From there, the episode moves to John Cornyn refusing to be rolled on Trump's weaponization slush fund, Todd Blanche's Epstein problem and his condescending meeting with survivors, and the acting-AG limbo that could stretch into September. And it closes with a tribute to Coach Yeoman Wilder — the New York youth baseball legend who stood up to ICE agents at his practice, protected his players, and reminded a country full of capitulating law firms and universities what actual patriotism looks like. Righteous anger, patriotic hope, and a call to meet the moment. -WATCH full video of this episode here. -Millions of American veterans are being locked out of primary elections in the country they served. See what we're doing to change that. -Visit Kalshi and trade on anything. Use code [INDEPENDENT] to get ten dollars when you trade ten. -Join Noble Mobile today and get a $100 bonus when you use code PAUL and stay a member for 2 months! -Join IVA and help us get independent veterans elected to office. -Learn more about Paul's work to elect a new generation of independent leaders with Independent Veterans of America. -Learn more about American Veterans for Ukraine here. -Remember Independent is an Attitude. -Learn more about The Headstrong Project for Veterans, Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS), and Department of Veterans Affairs resources in your area. Seeking support is not a sign of weakness. It's a show of strength. If you or a loved one are in immediate crisis, dial 988 and press 1, or text 838255. Connect with Independent Americans: Subscribe on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, and all podcast platforms Read more at Substack Support ad-free episodes at Patreon  Connect: Instagram  • X/Twitter • BlueSky • Facebook  Follow on social: @PaulRieckhoff on X, Instagram, Threads, and Bluesky -Join the movement. Hook into our exclusive Patreon community of Independent Americans. Get extra content, connect with guests, meet other Independent Americans, attend events, get merch discounts, and support this show that speaks truth to power.  -And get cool IA and Righteous hats, t-shirts and other merch now in time for the new year.  Independent Americans is powered by veteran-owned and led Righteous Media.  And now part of the BLEAV network!  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

What is the economy for — GDP, corporate profits, or people? This week, Nick and Goldy talk with Elizabeth Wilkins, President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute, about Roosevelt's new Good Life Agenda and why so many old assumptions about markets, government, and growth are suddenly up for grabs. It's a conversation about human flourishing, public power, and what democracy has to deliver if people are going to believe in it again. Elizabeth Wilkins is the President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute.She previously served as Chief of Staff to the Chair and Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade Commission. She has also held senior roles in the White House and the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, clerked for Justice Elena Kagan and then-Judge Merrick Garland. She began her career as a labor organizer with SEIU 32BJ. She is one of the authors of Roosevelt's new report, The Good Life: An Agenda for Fuller Lives, a Stronger Economy, and Renewed Trust. Social Media: @elizabethwwilkins.bsky.social @ewwilkins Further reading:  The Good Life: An Agenda for Fuller Lives, a Stronger Economy, and Renewed Trust. Website: http://pitchforkeconomics.com Facebook: Pitchfork Economics Podcast Bluesky: @pitchforkeconomics.bsky.social Instagram: @pitchforkeconomics Threads: pitchforkeconomics TikTok: @pitchfork_econ YouTube: @pitchforkeconomics LinkedIn: Pitchfork Economics Twitter: @PitchforkEcon, @NickHanauer Substack: The Pitch

Neil Lanctot, author of The Approaching Storm: Roosevelt, Wilson, Addams, and Their Clash Over America's Future, introduces the three primary figures of the narrative in 1912: Jane Addams, Theodore Roosevelt (TR), and Woodrow Wilson. All three identified as progressives, though their interpretations of the movement differed significantly. Addams, a world-renowned social reformer and founder of Hull House, broke tradition by nominating TR for the presidency under the new Progressive Party. She viewed progressivism through the lens of social justice, suffrage, and labor reform. TR, at 53, had transformed into a "radical" progressive, advocating for aggressive corporate reform and women's suffrage to align with a changing nation. Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson, the scholarly Governor of New Jersey, focused on economic progressivism and the Jeffersonian ideal of breaking up trusts. Despite their shared intellectual depth and elite educations, the three leaders possessed vastly different temperaments, ranging from Roosevelt's "freakish" photographic memory to Wilson's more labored academic style. (1)

Jason and Tyler are joined by cohost of The Ringer Fantasy Football Show Danny Heifetz to discuss allegations that China is fueling data center resistance. In this episode: (00:00) Intro (3:19) Roosevelt shot McKinley? (8:30) Chinese psyop causing data center hate? (40:38) Trump's "Freedom Fuel" (53:47) The Doomscroll: Taylor Farms (58:09) Police buying Israeli spy vans (1:00:07) Meta targeting employees? (1:03:49) The Center for Intellectual Freedom (1:07:05) Jimothy the raccoon Hosts: Jason Concepcion and Tyler Parker Guest: Danny Heifetz Producers: Donnie Beacham and Justin Sayles Art direction: David Shoemaker Motion graphics and animations: Chris Calleton Engineering: Sarah Reddy Set design: Hannah Leiken and Jonathan Ratliff Additional support: Dae Shik Kim Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Charles Spicer describes how, following the May 1940 retreat at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, finally acting on the intelligence Christie had provided for years. The polemic Guilty Men was published, simplifying the blame for the war onto appeasers like Chamberlain and Baldwin. Meanwhile, Lord Lothian, serving as ambassador to the US, successfully mobilized the "arsenal of democracy" by persuading Roosevelt and the American public to support Britain. The segment also notes the Rudolf Hess mystery, as the deputy Führer flew to Scotland in 1941, mistakenly believing his Fellowship connections could facilitate a peace treaty with the British elite. (14)1939