Podcasts about Roosevelt

1940: The Fall of France and the Rise of Churchill: Colleague Charles Spicer recounts that as the British Expeditionary Force retreated from Dunkirk in May 1940, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister and actively utilized intelligence from Christie and Vansittart; critiquing the 1940 book Guilty Men as a simplistic polemic that established the popular narrative blaming appeasers for the war, the narrative highlights Lord Lothian's success in Washington persuading Roosevelt to support Britain, and connects Rudolf Hess's flight to Scotland to the Fellowship, explaining that Hess sought out the Duke of Hamilton in a delusional attempt to broker peace. 1938

Movies and History on a SundayFirst,  a look at this day in History.Then, Screen Directors Playhouse, originally broadcast December 7, 1950, 75 years ago, My Favorite Wife starring Cary Grant and Irene Dunne.   A comedy about a man whose missing wife turns up after 7 1/2 years, on the day he remarries!Followed by The Lux Radio Theater, originally broadcast December 7, 1942, 83 years ago, The War Against Mrs Hadley starring Edward Arnold and Fay Bainter.   A Washington socialite cannot forgive nor understand the Nazis and Japs for declaring war and interfering with the lives of her son and daughter.Then, NBC News Broadcast, originally broadcast December 7, 1941, 84 years ago.  Live network programming from 4:30 to 5pm Eastern time.  Report from London (ninety seconds). Upton Close reports from San Francisco: the Japanese consul in San Francisco denies any knowledge of the attack (5 1/2 minutes). Upton Close continues for another six minutes. Report from KGU, Honolulu: a summary of the attack. The report of an attorney who was flying his own airplane when the Japanese attacked. Three hundred and fifty men have been killed at Hickum Field. (4 1/2 minutes). A telegram from David Sarnoff to President Roosevelt is read. Followed by HV Kaltenborn News, originally broadcast December 7, 1941, 84 years ago.   "Japan has made war on the United States without declaring war." Late news developments and commentary. An army transport has been torpedoed thirteen hundred miles west of San Francisco. An unidentified warship is firing on Pearl Harbor. Finally,  Lum and Abner, originally broadcast December 7, 1942, 83 years ago, The Golden Era Discussion Club.  Lum is planning to start "The Pine Ridge Golden Era Discussion Club." He plans to win a set of encyclopedias from "Information Please."Thanks to Richard G for supporting our podcast by using the Buy Me a Coffee function at http://classicradio.streamCheck out Professor Bees Digestive Aid at profbees.com and use my promo code WYATT to save 10% when you order! Find the Family Fallout Shelter Booklet Here: https://www.survivorlibrary.com/library/the_family_fallout_shelter_1959.pdfhttps://wardomatic.blogspot.com/2006/11/fallout-shelter-handbook-1962.html

When headlines feel heavier by the day, it's tempting to wish for a return to “normal.” We take a sharper path instead, asking what real peace requires and how conviction, not comfort, reshapes a nation. Through prayer, Scripture, and a candid look at our cultural blind spots, we trace a line from personal character to public life, from the kitchen table to the town square, and from Advent hope to daily courage.We start with the hard truth: hoping for a status quo won't heal a fractured culture. Titus 2 offers a counterculture of restraint, integrity, and mentoring that rebuilds trust where it's lost—older saints modeling steadiness, younger hearts learning self‑control, speech that can't be condemned because the life behind it is clean. Revelation 11 widens our view, reminding us that faithfulness can be costly and that history is not leaderless. The two witnesses stand, fall, and rise at God's command, and the seventh trumpet declares a kingdom that outlasts empires. That promise doesn't remove our duty; it anchors it.Psalm 139 brings the cosmic close: God sees, guides, and guards, even when fear presses in. We sit with the wonder of being knit together, known fully, and led along an everlasting path. A brief stop in Proverbs names the ache of endless appetite and points us back to limits that free. We honor Seaman Edward William Boers, whose Medal of Honor moment reveals how ordinary duty becomes extraordinary under pressure. Then Christmas voices from Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt invite us to practice charity, forgiveness, worship, and generosity—habits that quiet the soul and strengthen the home.Across these threads, a theme emerges: lasting renewal starts with prayer, character, and courage. We affirm the spiritual roots that shaped American life, not to posture, but to serve with truth and grace. If you found clarity or courage here, follow the show, share it with a friend, and leave a quick review so others can find it. Your voice helps this community grow.Support the showThe American Soul Podcasthttps://www.buzzsprout.com/1791934/subscribe

Lots of work to do—let's get to it—Here are 3 big things for this hour—   Number One— The Trump administration is not backing off on hitting drug running boats from Venezuela in the open sea—saying they will stop the poison flowing into the country—   Number Two— President Trump made a major announcement yesterday in the Roosevelt Room about helping kids in tougher neighborhoods—start saving money from an early age—and it was jumpstarted by $6.25 billion dollars from Dell—   Number Three— I'm in D.C. all week – and had a chance to ask President Trump about the state of our economy Yesterday during a big announcement in the Roosevelt room – take a look:

“His single minded mission was to elevate the United States as a leading world power… he was dedicated to the ideal of American greatness.” That is how today's guest, Bret Baier, describes President Theodore Roosevelt in his new book, To Rescue the American Spirit. In this episode, we interview Mr. Baier on how Roosevelt shaped the American Century. TO RESCUE THE AMERICAN SPIRIT: TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF A SUPERPOWER https://www.amazon.com/Rescue-American-Spirit-Superpower-Presidential/dp/0063360756 JOIN PREMIUMListen ad-free for only $5/month at www.bit.ly/TAPpremiumFOLLOW USwww.linktr.ee/thisamericanpresidentCREDITSHost: Richard LimProducer: Michael NealArtist: Nip Rogers, www.NipRogers.comSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

1/8. FDR's 1936 Campaign Begins Amid Loss and Opposition from the Right — David Pietrusza — Pietrusza'sbook Roosevelt Sweeps Nation details the opening phase of FDR's 1936 reelection campaign, commencing with the April death of Franklin D. Roosevelt's principal political advisor, Louis Howe, a devastating personal and strategic loss. Roosevelt immediately confronted sharp opposition from the political right, spearheaded by his former mentor Al Smith, who aligned with the wealthy American Liberty League. Roosevelt strategically leveraged Smith's challenge to wage an aggressive class warfare campaign emphasizing wealth redistribution and populist appeals. 1936

8/8. Roosevelt's Landslide and the Realignment of American Politics — David Pietrusza — Contrary to the Literary Digest straw poll prediction of a close race, early returns confirmed Roosevelt's enormous landslide victory, securing 46 states and overwhelming electoral dominance. The victory produced 74 Democratic senators and 334 Democratic house members, establishing commanding majorities in both chambers. This comprehensive electoral sweep cemented the realignment of American politics, as Roosevelt carried 104 out of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party'sinstitutional strength in urban centers and establishing durable electoral coalitions. 1936 POLAND

5/8. William Randolph Hearst Breaks with Roosevelt over Tax Policy — David Pietrusza — Newspaper and radio magnate William Randolph Hearst, who initially opposed FDR in 1932, became progressively disaffected as Rooseveltmoved leftward and proposed substantial tax increases on wealthy Americans. FDR explicitly discussed the political utility of throwing wealthy opponents, particularly Hearst, "to the wolves" as a populist rallying point. Hearst, who had met with Hitler in 1934, remained a formidable though complicating political force that FDR deemed necessary to neutralize or isolate. 1936

2/8. The Populist Challenge: Huey Long's Legacy and Eugene Talmadge — David Pietrusza — Roosevelt faced formidable challenges from both the populist left and the conservative South. Although Huey Long (representing the radical Share Our Wealth program) was assassinated in 1935, his political strategy envisioned electing Republicans in 1936 to pave the path for his own presidential bid in 1940. FDR also contended with Eugene Talmadge, a Georgianconservative populist who employed race-baiting rhetoric and opposed New Deal welfare program funding, representing a distinct political threat. 1936 BERLIN

4/8. FDR Deals with the Socialist and Communist Parties — David Pietrusza — Roosevelt expressed concern that the Socialist Party (led by Norman Thomas) and the Communist Party (led by Earl Browder) would siphon votes from the Democratic ticket. Due to Stalin's strategic pivot toward the Popular Front strategy opposing Hitler, the CPUSA, directed by Browder, tacitly supported Roosevelt by concentrating opposition fire on the Republican nominee. The Communists aligned strategically with radical organizations including the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. 1936 BERLIN

"Like a Siren" by Major Stars from More Colors of Sound; "Rust" by Ben Boehmer from Caught Up In the Fire; "A Perpetual Song" by Certain Slant of Light from It Isn't But It Is; "Flatline" by Venera from Exinfinite; "Faults" by Hilary Woods from Night Criu; "Just" by Claire Rousay (feat. M Sage) from A Litle Death; "7-21-17_substitute_hifi_v3" by Toro y Moi from Soul Trash; "Snurra Pa Hjulet" by Dungen from Sitting on the Moon; "The Pressure" by Bruise Blood from You Run Through the World Like an Open Razor; "Waterfalls" by Oneohtrix Point Never from Tranquilizer; "Wine Water Jesus" by Rumah Sakit from Rumah Sakit 25; "Isomorph" by Secret Places of the Lion from High Gardens

Our speaker is Richard Breitman who is an Emeritus Professor of History at American University and the author of a new book entitled Calculated Restraint: What Allied Leaders Said About the Holocaust. I want to learn from Richard about whether the allies should have bombed the rail lines to the concentration camps and if Roosevelt and Churchill should have said more to warn the Jews of Europe to the Holocaust so that the Jews could have gone into hiding. Get full access to What Happens Next in 6 Minutes with Larry Bernstein at www.whathappensnextin6minutes.com/subscribe

On this episode, Sam Hodson, President of BC's Landquest Realty, unpacks how to achieve the dream of owning a rural or recreational property and why, in most cases, land is an investment you won't ever regret.  Sam is also an avid hunter and outdoorsman and shares a great Roosevelt elk hunting story to kick off the episode.  From recreational hunting and fishing properties to leaving the city to live on that rural property you've always dreamed of, Sam covers the ins and outs of how to make owning a piece of land in BC, regardless of where you live, a reality.  NOTABLE QUOTES:  "The best time to buy something is right now."   @landquestrealty  LANDQUEST.COM   ---------------------------  DEALS & PARTNERS:  For over 100 years Leica has set the standard for premium optics. From spotting scopes to binoculars, rifle scopes and the new CRF MAX rangefinders, Leica is the choice for those who accept no compromises.  Don't miss out on Canada's best mountain hunting and conservation expo! The 2026 Wild Sheep Society of BC's Salute to Conservation Mountain Hunting Expo will sell out fast. Get your tickets now!  onX Hunt is the most powerful 3D mapping solution for hunters. Get your FREE trial today. If you're already a member, check out the exclusive offers and perks available when you upgrade to an Elite Member.   Tired of gut rotting instant coffee? Check out This Is Coffee and get yourself some great instant coffee for when you're in the backcountry or on the road.  ---------------------------  SUPPORT WILD SHEEP:  Go to Wild Sheep Foundation to find a membership option that suits your budget and commitment to wild sheep.  Go to Wild Sheep Society of BC to become a member, enter raffles, buy merch and support BC's wild sheep populations.  SUPPORT MOUNTAIN GOATS:  Go to Rocky Mountain Goat Alliance to find a membership option that suits your budget and commitment to conserving mountain goats and their habitat.   

Larry Ostola speaks with Marc Milner about his book Second Front: Anglo-American Rivalry and the Hidden Story of the Normandy Campaign. In June 1944, an Allied army of British, American, and Canadian troops sought to open up a Second Front in Normandy. But they were not only fighting to bring the Second World War to an end. After decades of Anglo-American struggle for dominance, they were also contending with one another—to determine who would ascend to global hegemony once Hitler's armies fell. Marc Milner traces this bitter rivalry as it emerged after the First World War and evolved during the fragile peace which led to the Second. American media and domestic politics dominated the Allied powers' military strategy, overshadowing the contributions of Britain and the remarkably critical role played by Canada in establishing this Second Front. Culminating in the decisive Normandy campaign, Milner shows how the struggle for supremacy between Churchill and Roosevelt changed the course of the Second World War—and how their rivalry shaped our understanding of the Normandy campaign, and the war itself. Marc Milner is emeritus professor of history at the University of New Brunswick and former director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society. He is the author of ten acclaimed books, including Stopping the Panzers and Battle of the Atlantic. If you like our work, please consider supporting it: bit.ly/support_WTY. Your support contributes to the Champlain Society's mission of opening new windows to directly explore and experience Canada's past.

The most notorious accused spy of the early Cold War, Alger Hiss, emerged from Lewisburg Penitentiary on 27th November, 1954; calm, composed, and determined to reclaim his reputation. Surrounded by a scrum of journalists, he insisted fear had shaped his conviction, and vowed to vindicate his name. A reserved, cultured “grey man” who had risen through the New Deal, attended the Yalta Conference with Roosevelt, and served as acting Secretary-General at the UN's founding, Hiss's conviction for perjury when accused of Soviet espionage had captured America's attention. Former communist Whitaker Chambers claimed Hiss had been part of an underground network with him in the 1930s, and produced the explosive “pumpkin papers” to prove it: microfilm and typed copies of classified documents that he said Hiss had passed to him, which he'd then stored inside a pumpkin on his farm in Maryland. In this episode, Arion, Rebecca and Olly uncover how a young Richard Nixon was instrumental in Hiss's downfall; discover how support for Hiss among prominent liberals turned the case into an early culture-war flashpoint, fuelling the rise of McCarthyism; and probe into Hiss's red-tinged prison reading list… Further Reading: • ‘Chaos Agent, by Jeff Kisseloff' (Harper's, 2025): https://harpers.org/archive/2025/09/chaos-agent-jeff-kisseloff-rewriting-hisstory-alger-hiss/ • ‘SEQUELS: Ordeal of Living' (TIME, 1954): https://time.com/archive/6885609/sequels-ordeal-of-living/ • Alger Hiss Released From Jail' (British Pathé, 1954): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIII6PLV4LY #Scandal #ColdWar #50s #Legal #Politics  Love the show? Support us!  Join 

Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In this Holiday Week edition of The Wright Report, Bryan covers new investigations into the lawmakers known as the Seditious Six, breaking developments in the Charlie Kirk assassination case, President Trump's sweeping order to re-interview every refugee approved under Joe Biden, and a deep dive into the global AI Revolution. He also closes with listener questions, warnings about AI addiction, and early holiday shipping advice. FBI and Pentagon Probe the Seditious Six: Federal investigators are reviewing six Democratic lawmakers who urged military and intelligence personnel to resist hypothetical unlawful orders from President Trump. Senator Mark Kelly is under Pentagon scrutiny that could result in recall or charges as soon as December 10. Bryan explains how such calls create a culture of insubordination and how similar movements in countries like Pakistan and Egypt eventually led to military dominance over civilian government. Security Failures in the Charlie Kirk Assassination: New reporting shows that Charlie Kirk's head of security, Brian Harpole, flagged rooftop vulnerabilities on the Utah campus but accepted a vague assurance from the university police chief, who replied, "I got you covered." Bryan argues that professional security teams never outsource responsibility to campus police, outlining how Harpole should have pressed for plans, deployed his own team, or pulled Kirk from the event. An official investigation is ongoing, but Bryan says the early facts reveal basic failures that contributed to a preventable tragedy. Trump Orders Review of All Biden-Era Refugees: Bloomberg reports that all 200,000 refugees admitted under the Biden administration will be re-interviewed and reconsidered for green card eligibility. Those found to have been approved improperly will have their status revoked with limited appeals. Democrats plan to sue, although the White House cites widespread failures in vetting under Biden. Listener questions lead Bryan to explain why proper vetting was not possible — from fake IDs and nonfunctional federal databases to the absence of cultural fit screening. A Nation of Immigrants, but Not Without Standards: Bryan contrasts historical immigration patterns, which centered on European migrants who shared language and cultural norms, with modern arrivals from countries whose governments cannot verify identities or criminal history. He argues that America must re-embrace expectations of assimilation, loyalty, and work, echoing Theodore Roosevelt's warning about divided identities. China's AI Factories and the New Industrial Revolution: The Wall Street Journal reports that China is using AI-infused robots and fully automated "dark factories" to produce goods faster and cheaper with minimal human labor. Bryan answers a listener's question about AI bubbles and universal basic income, explaining why he believes AI will reduce the need for human workers, reshape immigration policy, and create a divide between nations that benefit and those that collapse under labor displacement. He warns that American tech companies are pursuing highly addictive chatbots designed for engagement rather than accuracy, creating what he calls "virtual heroin" for vulnerable users. U.S. Cargo Shortage Before Christmas: Bloomberg reports that UPS and FedEx have grounded portions of their fleets after an MD-11 crash in Louisville. UPS has lost about 10% of its cargo aircraft, and FedEx about 5%. Bryan advises listeners to order holiday gifts early to avoid potential delays.   "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32   Put a smile on your face and give joy to your taste buds… Give Masa and Vandy beef tallow chips a try today! Use code WRIGHT for 25% off your first order… at MASAchips.com or VandyCrisps.com. So incredibly delicious! I promise, you won't be disappointed.     Keywords: Seditious Six investigation, Mark Kelly Pentagon review, Elissa Slotkin unlawful orders video, Charlie Kirk assassination security, Brian Harpole campus police Utah, Trump refugee re-interview order, Biden refugee vetting failures, immigrant cultural fit Roosevelt quote, China dark factories AI robots, AI addiction chatbot engagement, UPS FedEx MD 11 grounding

Hosts Heidi and Joel Heitkamp are joined by political commentator Chris Matthews to discuss the future of the Democratic Party, lessons from Bobby Kennedy, and the importance of connecting with everyday Americans. They examine recent election results, challenges facing rural America, and how both parties can better serve working people. You will gain valuable insight into how Democrats can rebuild trust with rural and working-class voters. Chris Matthews shares stories about the Kennedys and offers advice for future leaders. You should listen if you care about democracy, dignity, and the future of rural America.Join us on The Hot Dish every week, where we serve up hearty conversations that resonate with every corner of the country.The Hot Dish is brought to you by the One Country Project, making sure the voices of the rest of us are heard in Washington. To learn more, visit https://onecountryproject.org or find us at https://onecountryproject.substack.com/. (05:22) - Chris Matthews discusses how snobbery hurts Democrats in reaching rural America. (12:00) - Chris, Heidi and Joel debate the hypocrisy around immigration in Red states. (22:18) - Heidi and Chris highlight the importance of rallying for our country's democracy. (27:36) - Joel and Chris discuss how Senators need to speak up and use their office for the good of the country. (33:49) - Heidi and Chris debate Roosevelt's Social Security strategy.

Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome. This is a part 2 about Hirohito's responsibility during the wars of 1931-1945, so if you have not heard part 1, perhaps go do so, or maybe you just don't care about 1931-1940 and just want to hear about the 1941-1945 period, hell by all means enjoy.   So last time we kind of left it on a bit of a dramatic cliff hanger. I spoke about Emperor Hirohito's involvement in what was called at the time the “China Incident”. It was not an official declared war until December of 1941. We left off in 1940, Hirohito was struggling with a situation of juggling two things: 1) how the hell to finally end the China War 2) how to do it without receiving horrible ramifications from the international world. On July 22nd of 1940, Konoe was back and formed a second cabinet. Notably General Hideki Tojo went from vice to army Minister during this time. If you guys ever want a podcast on Hideki Tojo, let me know, he is one rather bizarre figure that's for sure. Konoe tackled his job by holding an imperial HQ government liaison conference. For 90 minutes everyone worked on a new national policy designed to exploit the international situation, IE: Germany bulldozing europe.  The result was a document on national policy dated July 27th. It shifted focus to the “southern area” IE: southeast asia and the Pacific if the China war did not end quickly. Its basis was to exploit the foreign nations that had their hands full in europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands. It called for an invasion of French Indochina to establish bases to launch assaults against the Dutch East Indies for natural resources if diplomatic means failed. It acknowledged if the Dutch East Indies were seized through military means, Japan would also seek to fight Britain, but not the US, instead Japan would prepare for a possible war with the Americans. To all of this Hirohito approved. The army also kept pressuring its desire to ally with Germany. Throughout 1939-1940 Hirohito rejected this idea, not because of any ideological differences, it was because of Germans anti aggression pact with the USSR. If Japan were to ally to Germany, Hirohito wanted it to be mutually to fight the USSR. The Navy likewise opposed allying to Germany because they believed it would force Britain and the US to increase their aid to Chiang Kai-shek.   However the Blitzkrieg changed everything. Everyone was shocked at how well Germany was doing. Prince Chichibu repeatedly argued with Hirohito to change his mind over the alliance idea. Then suddenly the Navy changed their mind and began favoring an alliance. This changed came about in June of 1940 when the France fell. The Navy changed their mind based on a few factors, a major component was the belief if Germany and the USSR were allied, than at least Japan would not have to worry about the USSR and could focus on the pacific. Both the IJA and the IJN believed Hitler would soon take Britain and thus there was a huge desire to join the new international order on the winning side. A third factor was a new clause in negotiations with Germany and Japan, that if they allied Japan would not automatically be drawn into a war with Britain against her will. Some in the navy also believed perhaps Germany could help their diplomatic situation with the Americans. So the army and navy were now both demanding an alliance with Germany, it was all up to hirohito.    At an imperial briefing on June 19th of 1940, Hirohito asked chief of staff Prince Kan'in and the Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” Such as question revealed Hirohito's perception at the time that Germany was on the verge of victory and that he was gradually considering the deployment of troops in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies as neither parent nation were in a position to defend their holdings. In regards to the China war, the Japanese sought to end leaks of materials getting into China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicated Britain would not accept closing the movement of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military acknowledged it would probably be required to invade Hong Kong and thus declare war on Britain. Upon hearing of this Hirohito remarked “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don't you agree?” To this his lord of the privy seal, Kido reassured him stating “the nation must be fully resolved to resist to proceed cautiously and not to be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies”. Konoe's second cabinet resolved to end the China war, construct a new order in greater east asia and to complete war preparations as a national defense state. On July 27th at a liaison conference a document was adopted, affirming a course of advancing to the south and to ally with Germany. Japan would incorporate the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and other resource rich areas of Southeast Asia into its new order while simultaneously bolstering its relationship with the Axis states. After hearing and reading everything, Hirohito sanctioned it all. Thus Hirohito had sanctioned the preliminary actions that would set Japan into a collision course with the US.   In September Japan began sending troops into northern French Indochina after concluding its Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy. Now Hirohito was briefed beforehand by Army Minister Tojo and other chiefs of staff about securing bases in northern French indochina. Hirohito agreed to this under the belief acquiring such bases would stop more leaked materials going into China and thus contribute to the fall of Chongqing. But Hirohito also sanctioned it under the full knowledge it was preparing the Nanshin-ron advance and that carried a risk of going to war with Britain and by proxy the US. Naturally he wanted to thwart any war breaking out with the US by it seems his officials had convinced him they could manage most of their plans without aggravating the US.   On July 29th with the German offensive aimed at finishing off Britain, Hirohito summoned his chiefs and vice chiefs of staff to the imperial HQ. He began to question the prospects of war with the US. Prince Fushimi replied “[u]nless we complete our domestic preparations, particularly the preparation of our material resources, I do not think we should lightly start war even if there is a good opportunity to do so.” Hirohito then asked if  “the Army were planning to occupy points in India, Australia, and New Zealand.” But overall Hirohito seemed to be the most concerned about the US, Germany and the USSR. “Could Japan, obtain a victory in a naval battle with the United States as we once did in the Battle of the Japan Sea? . . . I heard that the United States will ban exports of oil and scrap iron [to Japan]. We can probably obtain oil from other sources, but don't you think we will have a problem with scrap iron?” In regards to the USSR “If a Japan-Soviet nonaggression treaty is made and we advance to the south, the navy will become the main actor. Has the army given thought to reducing the size of its forces in that case? . . . How do you assess the future national power of Germany? . . . Both Germany and the Soviet Union are untrustworthy countries. Don't you think there will be a problem if one of them betrays us and takes advantage of our exhaustion fighting the United States?I]t seems as though you people are thinking of implementing this plan by force because there is a good opportunity at this moment for resolving the southern problem even though some dangers are involved. . . . What does a good opportunity mean? [To this question Sawada replied: “For example, if a German landing in England commences.”] In that case wouldn't the United States move to aid Britain? . . . Well, I've heard enough. I take it, in short, that you people are trying to resolve the southern problem by availing yourselves of today's good opportunities.”   You can tell Hirohito understood the very real threat of an Anglo-American alliance and was very cautious. It seemed to Hirohito, that his officials were trying to take the limelight off the abysmal situation in China but emphasizing a southern advance. Well Americans response to the Japanese movement into northern French indochina was to see it as a direct threat. Something I have not paid much attention to was Hirohito's decision making being the direct result of trying to mediate between competing entities, ie: the IJA and IJN. At this point in time the IJA and IJN top officials had the power to simply stop governmental functions from occurring altogether whenever they were displeased with a decision. As you can imagine the IJA and IJN were also competing for resources and political power. Thus Hirohito spent a lot of time and effort trying to formulate decisions that at a minimum kept the governance going.    In the end Hirohito sanctioned Imperial HQ army order number 458, ordering the area army to begin the entry into French Indochina. Thus once again Hirohito sanctioned aggression aboard. America began what it called a “moral embargo” on aircraft parts, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. This was one of many gradual steps America took to incrementally sanction Japan, while aiding China to keep it bogged down. Japan's direct response was joining the Axis with a clause “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict”. This clause was designed specifically to check Britain and the US. Hirohito knew this was a turning point carrying the possibility of war with the US. Later he would blame some officials and even his brothers Chichibu and Takamatsu, but not his own actions sanctioning the Axis pact.    Speaking of his brothers, at this time Chichibu got severely ill with tuberculosis and as a result retired from active public life, now Prince Takamatsu stood as next regent. Thus Takamatsu would begin reading reports and advise Hirohito. Takamatsu like Chichibu approved the Tripartite Pact and found his brother Hirohito's performance lacking. Meanwhile Britain responded to the Tripartite pact by opening up the Burma road and America made a loan to Chiang Kai-shek.   The Soviets came to Japan for a neutrality pact and sweetened the deal by offering Soviet coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. Hirohito ratified the treaty on April 25th of 1941. 5 weeks later on June 5th, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi reported to Hirohito and the high command that Hitler was about to invade the Soviets. The Army high command sprang into action drafting plans to open a war with the Soviets while simultaneously advancing south into French Indochina. But many in the military also sought to wait until the time was ripe, and a rift emerged. Operation barbarossa commenced and on June 23rd the IJN high command gave their opinion that Japan should seize all military bases and airfields in southern French Indochina even at the risk of war with Britain and America. Can you say boy that escalated quickly?   There was obvious temptation to invade Siberia towards Lake Baikal, but at the same time the western powers were tightening sanctions on Japan, she needed resources. At this point Japan had been stuck in China for 4 years and 5 months, the army had expanded from 17 divisions totalling 250,000 men in july of 1937 to 51 divisions at 2.1 million men in December 8th of 1941. On July 2nd, 10 tens into Operation barbarossa, Konoe summoned an imperial conference to debate actions going forward. The consensus was that southern French Indochina needed to be taken and that it probably would not provoke the US going to war with Japan. Hirohito sanctioned it and on July 30th made a major operational intervention by advising General Sugiyama to build up forces in Manchukuo to prevent the Soviet Far Eastern Army.   Japan negotiated with Vichy France to allow Japanese troops to occupy southern parts of French Indochina. What was to be originally just 40,000 IJA forces turned into 185,000 and in response America increased sanctions and began preparing the Philippines for war. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the US on July 26th and by August the 1st a total embargo of oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Konoe's cabinet, the military high command, pretty much everyone was shocked by how harsh the economic sanctions were. Emperor Hirohito told Sugiyama to halt mobilizing forces in Manchukuo and the army basically dropped all plans of attacking the USSR. A month after the US oil embargo suddenly the army had changed its mind to go all in on the southern advance. Britain likewise began sanctions against Japan and both Britain and the US managed to convince the Dutch to follow suit by refusing to sell oil to Japan. The Dutch even took it a step further and followed Americans lead in freezing Japanese assets.    Konoe was in full panic mode, be believed his ambassador to washington was a moron and sought to go in person to speak to Roosevelt. At 11:40am on August 4th Konoe spoke to Hirohito about the plan, but Washington kept making up excuses prolonging any meeting from taking place. Meanwhile Washington was building up its navy, and the IJN were stressing, in the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.    On september 3rd at a liaison conference it was decided Japan was to prepare for a war against the US, UK and Netherlands while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy. If diplomacy failed by early October the decision for war would be made. Konoe presented everything to Hirohito on September 5th and requested an imperial conference on the matter. The most important decision of his life was about to be made.    Now take a second to feel the moment. Germany's invasion of the USSR was in its 6th week and not producing a decisive victory; Britain was still in the fight and the Japanese ambassador to London reported back Britain would allow Japan to maintain its great power status and exert influence in asia if they stayed out of the European War and “re-examined their current policy”. An olive branch. Hirohito had options is what I am arguing. He could stale things, he could mobilize units into Manchukuo to simply threaten the Soviet border, he could simply stay out of new wars, even it the China war would get worse, but try to profit from the situation in Europe. He could stop the southern advance, lose the chance to seize the resource in southeast asia, but perhaps the US, UK and Netherlands would lift some sanctions.   After speaking back and forth with Konoe while scolding Sugiyama here is a bit of their conversation:    Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory?  Sugiyama: Yes, they will.  Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time. . . .  Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties. . . . [ellipses in original]  Emperor: Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me? Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement.  Emperor: Go ahead.  Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there. . . . Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor's diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don't you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today. . . . If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won't be able to do a thing about it.  Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.]  Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow's agenda? How would you like me to go about it? Emperor: There is no need to change anything.   There is no need to change anything. Konoe grabbed Hirohito for a private audience afterwards and tried to get Hirohito to revise the outline, but Hirohito ignored this. Hirohito at that point could have stopped or at least slowed down the countdown to all out war. Hirohito instead did not want to displease the pro-war factions in his military, perhaps he saw them as a threat to his authority. Hirohito was not at all pleased with the policy plan. When he was shown in on september 5th, he looked extremely irritated and blew up on Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole. 20 minutes before the Imperial conference on September 6th, Hirohito spoke with his lord of the privy Kido and told him he was going to raise some questions at the meeting. Kido told him that it would be best to leave the questions at the very end, basically he was advising to allow for things to go through. Thus Hirohito sat through the meeting and sanction the preparations for war. Here is a conversation between Hirohito and the Chiefs of the general staff:   Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you'll stop, won't you?  Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will.  Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]?  Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us   Meanwhile Konoe's deadline to reach a diplomatic resolution with the US was fast approaching. On October 13th Hirohito told Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.” The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting and Army minister Tojo took the lionshare of talking:   For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked. . . . Our decision was “to start the war . . . if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth. . . . We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough. . . . The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]. ...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined   And so Konoe resigned two days later, but before he did his last official action was to recommend Prince Higashikuni to succeed him, in fact he got Tojo to do the same. Prince Higashikuni was deemed capable of controlling both the Army and Navy. And what did Hirohito say to this? He said no, and appointed Hideki Tojo. Why? As going back to the beginning of this series, to protect the Kokutai. He did not want a member of the royal family to hold the seat as Prime Minister during a time when war might be declared, a war that Japan might lose, which would toss the responsibility onto the imperial house. It was a threat to the Kokutai. Hirohito chose Tojo because Tojo was 100% loyal subject to the emperor. Tojo was the perfect fall guy if one ever existed.    Between November 8-15th, Hirohito received a full rundown of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack plan and sanctioned it. The deadline to reach a diplomatic solution with the US was set for midnight December 1st.    Hirohito ever since the Mukden Incident had expressed fear that not taking warlike actions, not pumping up the kokutai or not suppressing dissent would jeopardize the imperial system of government and damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than external ones, because they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. As the time approached for his finally decision on declaring war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussion. The carriers enroute to Pearl harbor departed on november 27th, while on December 1st, 19 leaders, the entire Tojo cabinet and Emperor met. Tojo pulled a rather cheeky maneuver, he reported the response from America, the famous Hull note by stating “the United States . . . has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” but in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” Hara asked “I would like to know,whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China'? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?” Togo's reply to this was “However . . . the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China. . . . On the other hand . . . there has been a change in their position . . . they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and . . . they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously” A nonsensical gibberish answer, intentionally done to make everyone think America did in fact include Manchukuo, thus forcing everyone to see the demands as impossible to comply with. Togo finished the meeting : “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty's mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.” Hirohito simply nodded. Sugiyama remarked that the emperor did not show the slightest sign of anxiety, in fact he looked like he was in a good mood.   Hirohito's naval aid Jo Eiichiro wrote minutes on the first day of the pacific war, recording the emperors actions. 4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. . . . Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.   Hirohito believed Germany would win, thus if with their help he believed Japan could thwart off the US until a negotiated peace. Having made his choice, Hirohito devoted himself to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. He was a extremely cautious person, every single campaign he looked for what could go wrong, made worse case scenario predictions and was very suspicious of reports from his high officials. He was notably very harsh and critical on said high commanders. Although he did not visit the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised and controlled influence on theater operations, both in the planning and execution whenever he chose to do so. As was the same case with the China war before it, he issued the highest military orders of the Imperial HQ, performed audited conferences and led to decisions transmitted in his name. He received generals and admirals to the imperial palace who gave full reports of the battlefront. He visited bases, battleships, various army and naval headquarters. He inspected military schools, you know the full shebang.    After 26 months of war, the naval air force had lost 26,006 aircraft, nearly a third of its total power, thousands of veteran pilots were dead. Hundreds of thousands of tons of warship was sunk, the merchant and transport fleet was crippled. Late 1943 saw the Americans turning the initiative of the war, Japan was on the defensive. Guadalcanal had been the major turning point. During the staled battle for the philippines, Hirohito pressed upon Army chief of staff Sugiyama to increase troop strength to knock out Bataan. The problem persisted, on February 9th and 26th Hirohito pressed Sugiyama again about getting more troops to take Bataan.   Hirohito was confronted with the prisoner of war issue after the doolittle raid. When the pilots were caught, Togo initially opposed executions, but many in the IJA sought all 8 men executed. Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the execution of 5 out of the 8. Why just 5, no one knows to this day, but its theorized it was to demonstrate his benevolence while simultaneously giving a bit of what the army wanted.    The CBI theater took the lionshare of his attention in 1942, he continuously pressed up Sugiyama when a final blow would be delivered against Chongqing. When the Midway disaster occurred, Hirohito was given a full report of what happened, but he chose to hid the extent of the loss from the IJA. In fact in response to the Guadalcanal campaign he was heard once asking “I wonder if this is not the start of the AmericanBritish counteroffensive?” He urged his commanders to increase offensive activities and to toss all weapons possible at the enemy, because Japan needed more time to secure its reserves of vital oil, rubber and iron. When he heard the first report of the Ichiki detachment being wiped out, he simply stated “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” With numerous reports pouring in about the men dying from tropical disease and starvation, Hirohito kept demanding greater efforts from them. Hirohito continuously applied pressure on his naval and land commanders to recapture the island. On September 15th, November 5th and November 11th he called for more IJA troops and aircraft to be allocated to it. Sugiyama was nervous about sending more IJA pilots as they were inexperienced in transoceanic combat and he sought to reinforce the north china army to hit Chongqing. Hirohito demanded it a second time and Sugiyama replied the IJA had deployed its air power instead to New Guinea and Rabaul. Hirohito continuously hammered the issue despite the high level commanders disagreeing with it. By late november it was clear guadalcanal was a lost cause.    At an imperial HQ conference on December 31st of 1942, the chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempts to recapture guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned it but stated “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” Hirohito forced the issue and it was decided the new strategic points would be in the solomons north of New Georgia and the Stanley range on New Guinea. Hirohito in fact threatened not to authorize the withdrawal of men from Guadalcanal until such a plan was made. Hirohito would go on to oppose the withdrawal from the Munda airfield on New Georgia since it contradicted the new defensive line. As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern solomons was crumbling, Hirohito continued to demand the navy fight decisive battles to regain the initiative so ships could begin transports supplies to the countless soldiers trapped on islands without them. When Hirohito heard of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd he stated  “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.” “Do this for me” would become his signature message.    In August of 1943 as the fall of the solomons progressed, Hirohito lambasted “Isn't there someplace where we can strike the United States? . . . When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don't you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!'[emphasis added]”” Hirohito berated his chiefs of staff and in the face of mounting defeats he remained undismayed, rigidly self disciplined and aggressive as ever. When he received a report on September 21st of 1943 that the allies were heading for Finschhafen he replied “Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking.”   When the Americans destroyed the main naval anchorage at Truk forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind numerous tanks, the dream of fighting one great decisive naval battle in the central pacific was over.    On February 21st of 1944, Hirohito took the unprecedented action to force Sugiyama to resign so Tojo could assume his position, alongside that of army minister and prime minister. He did this to end dissent. Hirohito and Tojo oversaw the haymaker attempts in 1944, like operation Ichi-go and the Imphal campaign fall into ruins. It looked like the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Bonin islands and eventually the home islands would be invaded. When Saipan fell, the home islands had at last come into range of the dreaded B-29 Super flying fortresses. Hirohito had warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” For two days his chiefs of staff explained the dire situation on Saipan was hopeless, but Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Admiral Shimada to recapture it, the first department of the navy general staff immediately poured themselves into the problem. Day and night they worked, until a draft plan was created on June 21st, 3 days later the combined fleet gave opposition. Tojo and Shimada formally reported to Hirohito the recapture plan needed to be canceled. Hirohito refused to accept the loss of Saipan and ordered his chief aide General Hasunuma to convene in his presence the board of field marshals and fleet admirals. They all met on the 25th, upon which they all unanimously stated the reports indicating Saipan was a lost cause were valid, Hirohito simply told them to put it in writing and he left the room.    Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tojo, allowing Tojo's numerous enemies to take down his cabinet on July 18th 1944. But Hirohito was undaunted in determination to steal victory from the allies. Imperial HQ on October 18th ordered a decisive naval battle and the battle of Leyte Gulf was it. After the war Hirohito would go on the record stating “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.” This statement shows the facts as they were, Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita to engage the American invasion force in a place Yamashita did not want to fight nor prepared adequate defenses. It was a horrible loss.   The Kamikaze attacks increased as Japan's desperation wore on. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?”  On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    Konoe re-entered the stage writing to Hirohito pleading with him to order a surrender because from his perspective “The Soviet Union is Japan's biggest threat. Defeat was inevitable, but more to be feared than defeat was the destruction of the Kokutai. Sue quickly for peace, before a Communist revolution occurred that would make preservation of the kokutai impossible”. Hirohito was taken aback by this, as he shared his military's hope that the Soviets would help Japan reach a peace settlement. So he rejected the advice of Konoe. Hirohito remarked “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.” Then Japan's intelligence units reported the Soviets were going to break the neutrality pact and join the war once the Germans were done. Meanwhile Tokyo was turned to rubble on March 9th 1945 by 334 B-29's dropping firebombs, 40% of the capital was destroyed, up to 100,000 were dead. Hirohito remained undaunted. 60 Japanese cities were leveled by firebomb campaigns. Europe's war finished. Then the battle for Okinawa was lost, suddenly Hirohito began looking for ways to end the war.   On June 22nd Hirohito personally informed the supreme war leadership council his desire to see diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. A special envoy was sent to Moscow, while Hirohito publicly issued an imperial rescript ordering the nation “to smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations and achieve the goals of the war”. B-29's began dropping leaflets with joint declarations issued by the US, UK and China requesting the citizens of Japan demand their government surrender. Prefectural governors, police chiefs and officers began submitting home ministry reports on the rapid deterioration of the nations spirit.   Germany signed the unconditional surrender documents on May 7th and 8th of 1945, Japan was alone. Newly installed President Truman declared on May 8th, Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people, but the unconditional surrender principles remained unaltered. The Japanese meanwhile were awaiting word from the Soviets. The Americans unleashed their first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th of 1945 killing up to 140,000 people. Then on August 8th the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began an invasion of Manchuria. On August 9th the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki killing around 40,000 people.   Thus began the surrender clock as I like to say. After the first atomic bomb, Hirohito said and did nothing about the surrender terms. Hirohito then authorized Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” The next day, Secretary of State Byrnes replied by alluding to the subordination of the emperors authority to the supreme commander of the allied powers. It was ambiguous as hell. The Japanese leaders erupted into arguments, and on August 14th, Hirohito went before a microphone and recorded his capitulation announcement which aired on August 15th to all in Japan, they surrendered. Why did it take so long?   The peace talks between the Japanese and Soviets went on through June, July and early August. Japan offered the Soviets limited territorial concessions and they refused to accept the envoy on July 22nd because the Japanese were being too ambiguous in their terms. There was continuous back and forth between the intelligence of Moscow and Japan trying to figure out the stance of the other, but then Stalin heard about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he was shocked and ordered an invasion of Manchuria in response. In the meantime the Japanese were tossing all sorts of concessions at Moscow, they stated they would allow Japanese to be used as forced laborers in Siberia, a form of reparation as it were, that they would demobilize the military and so on. The response was the invasion of Manchuria.    Hirohito knew prior to the bombing of Hiroshima that the cabinet was divided on accepting the Potsdam terms. Hirohito also knew he and he alone could unify governmental affairs and military command. Why then did he wait until the evening of August 9th to surrender?   The reality of the matter is its complicated, numerous variables at play, but let me try to pick at it. The people of japan under the firebomb campaigns were becoming hostile towards the military, the government and many began to criticize the emperor. Hirohito was given reports from the Home Ministry from governors and police chiefs all over Japan revealing people were speaking of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for worsening the war situation. Does that sound like a threat to the Kokutai? People were starving en masse, the atomic bomb is flashy, but what really was killing the Japanese, it was starvation. The home islands were blockaded and the sea approaches mined as pertaining to the optimally named “operation starvation”. Hirohito knew full well how bad his people were suffering but he did not surrender for so long.   After Hiroshima was bombed, Hirohito delayed for 2 days before telling Kido at 10am on August 9th “quickly control the situation, the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us”. Now here is a piece of Hirohito's surrender proclamation to the citizens of Japan    “Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable ”.   Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai. Did you know there was a rescript of this proclamation that was made to the entire IJA and IJN? Yes Emperor Hirohito gave out two different proclamations for surrender, here is what the armed forces heard.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The proclamation does not speak of the atomic weapons, but emphasizes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito was presented as a benevolent sage and an apolitical ruler that had ended the war. Hirohito sought to justify the surrender upon the bombs to the public, but did he believe so, did his armed forces believe so? People debate to this day why the surrender occurred, I love the fact there are two message offered because both are true. Hirohito's decision to surrender was based on numerous variables, the atomic bombs, the invasion of Manchuria by the soviets, but above all else, what really was important to the man, the emperor, the god? The kokutai. The Soviets were more of a threat to the kokutai, thus Hirohito jumped into the arms of the Americans. The language between the Americans and Japanese in the communications for unconditional surrender were ambiguous, but Hirohito and the high commanders knew there was zero chance of the kokutai surviving if the Soviets invaded Japan, perhaps the Americans would allow it to continue, which is just what they ended up doing. The entire purpose of this series would to emphasize how Hirohito definitely had a active role in the war of 1931-1945, he had numerous occasions where he could put the hammer down to stop the situation from escalating. But in the end when his back was against the wall, he did what he did to cling on to the Kokutai.   I shall leave you with this. On August 12th, as Hirohito came to inform the imperial family of his decision to surrender, Prince Asaka asked him whether the war would continue if the Kokutai could not be preserved, what do you think he said? “Of Course”. 

Strangers - Roosevelt

Hanaka and his guard must now deal with the fact that Zardoz will not come to their rescue. Georgia deactivates the machine gun and programs it to load itself onto the Mercury. The ROBO unit Gracee has also been deactivated and loaded onto the Mercury. Kate learns the shocking truth about where Meredith's so called private jet is really registered. Scarlett and Thornton arrange to meet Barnes, Sam and Nelson at the foot of the Roosevelt bridge on Teddy Roosevelt Island. They are in for a big surprise. Simon's team comes up with a possible candidate for the Russian mole. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Hanaka and his guard must now deal with the fact that Zardoz will not come to their rescue. Georgia deactivates the machine gun and programs it to load itself onto the Mercury. The ROBO unit Gracee has also been deactivated and loaded onto the Mercury. Kate learns the shocking truth about where Meredith's so called private jet is really registered. Scarlett and Thornton arrange to meet Barnes, Sam and Nelson at the foot of the Roosevelt bridge on Teddy Roosevelt Island. They are in for a big surprise. Simon's team comes up with a possible candidate for the Russian mole. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Más de 20 años después de su cierre, los militares de EE.UU. realizan un importante despliegue en esta antigua instalación en Puerto Rico que llegó a ser una de sus base navales más grandes en el mundo.

Sydney Levit was 17 years old when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Like most kids his age, he was eager to serve. In 1943, Levit was drafted into the U.S. Army and he soon had the opportunity to join the airborne, training as a paratrooper and also with gliders. He became part of the 17th Airborne Division.In this edition of Veterans Chronicles, Levit describes the rigorous training he went through as part of the airborne, including his first jump out of an airplane and learning how gliders work. He then explains how his unit spent months training in England, waiting to enter the fight. Their first action was at Malmedy and was both vicious and chaotic.Levit details the logistical fight against the Germans at the Bulge and the separate struggle against the brutal and unrelenting cold that was also a daily fight to stay alive.Then, Levit takes us into Operation Varsity, the massive airborne campaign designed to help the Allies cross the Rhine River. Yet, very few Americans are even aware of it.Levit also shares memorable moments away from the fighting, including his interactions with prisoners, being stunned by the death of President Roosevelt, and being surprised when a Hollywood star just popped into his tent.

From Restraint to Ruin - The Birth of the Bombing WarAt the dawn of World War II in 1939, a fragile consensus existed among the warring powers. Spurred by an appeal from President Roosevelt, leaders like Neville Chamberlain and even Hitler gave public undertakings to abstain from the horror of aerial attacks on civilians. There was a genuine, if naïve, belief that the looming conflict could be "humanised," and that the bomber would be restricted to purely military targets.But how did this initial restraint crumble into the devastating strategic bombing campaigns that would define the war? In this episode, we delve into Richard Overy's "The Bombing War" to explore the complex factors that shaped Britain's approach to aerial warfare in the crucial early years of 1939-1942.Join us as we uncover the story of a nation caught between its self-image as a "civilised" power and the brutal necessities of total war. We'll examine why RAF Bomber Command was initially held back, not just by political and legal niceties, but by its own operational unreadiness. Discover how the unique, independent institutional culture of Bomber Command—a force designed solely to attack—fostered a doctrine that would eventually target the enemy's home front, leading to the destruction of cities like Hamburg, Cologne, and Dresden under the infamous command of Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris.If you liked this episode, listen to: https://shows.acast.com/explaininghistory/episodes/the-politics-of-rearmament-in-britain-1936Go Deeper: Visit our website at www.explaininghistory.org for articles and detailed explorations of the topics discussed.▸ Join the Conversation: Our community of history enthusiasts discusses episodes, shares ideas, and continues the conversation. Find us on:Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcast/Substack: https://theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com/▸ Support the Podcast: Explaining History is a listener-supported production. Your contribution helps us cover the costs of research and keep these conversations going. You can support the show and get access to exclusive content by becoming a patron.Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/explaininghistoryExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Send us a textThe meteoric rise and sudden fall of Milli Vanilli. The 40th anniversary of the groundbreaking Calvin and Hobbes comics. A battle for supremacy with AI over 1970s movie soundtracks.Episode 221 is the appetizer of GenX nostalgia before Thanksgiving week.We start with a rise and fall for the ages. Imagine going from on top of the world to being dropped by your record label in an instant. That is what happened to the pop duo Milli Vanilli 35 years ago this week. In one of the most infamous scandals in music history, a chart-topping group was exposed as frauds and ostracized from the industry. We do a deep dive into the unbelievable but true story of Milli Vanilli.40 years ago this week a new comic strip debuted and changed the way people viewed them. Calvin and Hobbes brought insight and thought-provoking conversations to the typically simple world of newspaper comics. A little boy and his stuffed tiger burst onto the scene, made an immense impact, and then retreated into history, all within the span of a decade. It's a 40th anniversary celebration of the beloved comic strip this week.Me v. AI Top 5 returns with a bang and maybe some funky dance moves. I battle ChatGPT over the best 1970s movie soundtracks while a pair of computer programs battle over who gets to read the AI answers.There is a brand new This Week In History and Time Capsule, where we look back at the creation of the beloved teddy bear.You can support my work by becoming a member on Patreon. Or you can Buy Me A Coffee!Helpful Links from this EpisodeBuy My New Book, In Their Footsteps!Searching For the Lady of the Dunes True Crime BookHooked By Kiwi - Etsy.comDJ Williams MusicKeeKee's Cape Cod KitchenChristopher Setterlund.comCape Cod Living - Zazzle StoreSubscribe on YouTube!Initial Impressions 2.0 BlogCJSetterlundPhotos on EtsyRead Calvin and HobbesListen to Episode 220 hereSupport the show

Hello again Pacific War Week by Week listeners, it is I your dutiful host Craig Watson with more goodies from my exclusive patreon podcast series. This is actually going to be a two parter specifically looking at the failure and responsibility of Emperor Hirohito during the 15 year war Japan unleashed in 1931. Again a big thanks to all of you for listening all these years, you are all awesome.   Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome.    Now I realize very well when I jumped into my former patreon episode on Ishiwara Kanji, I fell into a rabbit hole and it became a rather long series. I wanted to get this one done in a single episode but its also kind of a behemoth subject, so I will do this in two parts: this episode will be on Hirohito's failure and responsibility in regards to the China War from 1931-1941. The next one will cover Hirohito's failure and responsibility in the world war from 1941-1945.   I am not going to cover the entire life of Hirohito, no what I want is to specifically cover his actions from 1931-1945. Nw I want you to understand the purpose of this episode is to destroy a narrative, a narrative that carried on from 1945-1989. That narrative has always been that Emperor Hirohito was nothing more than a hostage during the war years of 1931-1945. This narrative was largely built by himself and the United States as a means of keeping the peace after 1945. However upon his death in 1989 many meeting notes and diaries from those who worked close to him began emerging and much work was done by historians like Herbert P Bix and Francis Pike. The narrative had it that Hirohito was powerless to stop things, did not know or was being misled by those around him, but this is far from the truth. Hirohito was very active in matters that led to the horrors of the 15 year war and he had his own reasons for why or when he acted and when he did not.   For this episode to be able to contain it into a single one, I am going to focus on Hirohito's involvement in the undeclared war with China, that's 1931-1941. For those of you who don't know, China and Japan were very much at war in 1931-1937 and certainly 1937 onwards, but it was undeclared for various reasons. If you guys really like this one, let me know and I can hit Hirohito 1941-1945 which is honestly a different beast of its own.   For those of you who don't know, Hirohito was born on April 29th of 1901, the grandson of Emperor Meiji. Hirohito entered the world right at the dawn of a new era of imperial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific. According to custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. In 1908 he entered elementary education at the age of 7 and would be taught first be General Nogi Maresuke who notoriously did not pamper the prince. Nogi rigorously had Hirohito train in physical education and specifically implanted virtues and traits he thought appropriate for the future sovereign: frugality, diligence, patience, manliness, and the ability to exercise self-control under difficult conditions. Hirohito learnt what hard work was from Nogi and that education could overcome all shortcomings. Emperor Meiji made sure his grandson received military training.   When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, Hirohito's father, Yoshihito took the throne as emperor Taisho. Taisho for a lack of better words, suffered from cerebral meningitis at an early age and this led to cognitive deficiency's and in reality the Genro would really be running the show so to say. When Taisho took the throne it was understood immediately, Hirohito needed to be prepared quickly to take the throne. After Meiji's funeral General Nogi politely told the family he could no longer be a teacher and committed seppuku with his wife. He wrote a suicide letter explained he wanted to expiate his disgrace during the russo japanese war for all the casualties that occurred at Port Arthur, hardcore as fuck. Hirohito would view Nogi nearly as much of an iconic hero as his grandfather Meiji, the most important figure in his life.   Hirohito's next teacher was the absolute legendary Fleet Admiral Togo Heihachiro who would instill national defense policy into him. Hirohito would be taught Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahans theories as all the great minds were taught at the time. Now I know it sucks but I cant delve deep into all this. What I want you to envision is a growing Man, instilled with the belief above all else, the Kokutai was most important. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule.   If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know.    Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have actual executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all Americans simply felt he did. Thus everyone acted in accordance to his wishes as they assumed them to be, thats my best way of explaining Japan under Hirohito.    Emperor Taisho dies in 1926, and Hirohito takes the throne ushering in the Showa Era. He inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. Hirohito sought to restore the image of a strong charismatic leader on par with his grandfather Meiji, which was sorely lacking in his father Taishos reign. He was pressured immediately by the Navy that the national sphere of defense needed to be expanded upon, they felt threatened by the west, specifically by the US and Britain who had enacted the Washington Naval Treaty. Hirohito agreed a large navy was necessary for Japan's future, he was a proponent of the decisive naval battle doctrine, remember his teacher was Togo.    From the very beginning Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. In 1928 the Japanese covertly assassinated the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. The current prime minister Tanaka Giichi had performed a thorough investigation of the incident and presented his report to Hirohito on December 24th of 1928. He told Hirohito he intended to court martial the criminals, purge the army and re-establish discipline. However the rest of Tanaka's cabinet wished to allow the army to deal with the matter and quiet the entire thing down. Hirohito responded by stating he had lost confidence in Tanaka and admonished his report. Hirohito allowed the army to cover up the incident, he sought to have it hushed up as well. Thus Hirohito had indulged the army in its insubordination and the kwantung army officers now felt they could take matters into their own hands.   Also in 1928 the Tanaka cabinet failed to endorse the international protocol banning chemical and biological warfare. The next year the privy council, pressured by the military, failed to ratify the full geneva convention of prisoners of war. Hirohito in response began doing something Emperor Meiji never had done, he began to scold officials to force them to retire from positions. Tanaka Giichi was bullied out. Hirohito then stated his endorsement of Hamaguchi Osachi as Tanaka's successors.   Just a few months after Hamaguchi cabinet formed, Hirohito overrode the advice of his naval chief of staff and vice chief of staff, Admiral Kato and Vice Admiral Suetsugu. The Americans and British were hinting they might form a naval alliance against Japan if she did not abide by the Washington Conference mandates on naval tonnage. Kato and Suetsugu refused to accept the terms, but prime minister Hamaguchi stood firm against them. The navy leaders were outraged and accused Hamaguchi of signing the treaty without the support of the Navy General Staff thereby infringing upon the “emperor's right of supreme command”. Two months after signing the treaty, Hamaguchi was assassinated and upon learning of this Hirohito's first concern apparently was “that constitutional politics not be interrupted”. The military felt greatly emboldened, and thus began the age of the military feeling “its right of supreme command”. Generals and Admirals fought back against arms reduction talks, discipline within the officer corps loosened, things spiraled out of control. Alongside this came the increasing cult of the emperor, that they were all doing this in his name.   When rumors emerged of the emerging Mukden Incident in 1931, Hirohito  demanded the army be reigned in. Attempts were made, but on September 18th of 1931, Kwantung army officer detonated an explosion at Liut'iaokou north of Mukden as a false flag operation. The next day the imperial palace were given a report and Hirohito was advised by chief aide de camp Nara Takeji “this incident would not spread and if the Emperor was to convene an imperial conference to take control of the situation, the virtue of his majesty might be soiled if the decisions of such a conference should prove impossible to implement”. This will be a key theme in Hirohito's decision making, protect the kokutai from any threats.   As the Mukden incident was getting worse, the Kwantung officers began to demand reinforcement be sent from the Korea army. The current Wakatsuki cabinet met on the issue and decided the Mukden incident had to remain an incident, they needed to avoid a declaration of war. The official orders were for no reinforcements of the Korea army to mobilize, however the field commander took it upon his own authority and mobilized them. The army chief of staff Kanaya reported to Hirohito the Korea army was marching into Manchuria against orders. At 31 years of age Hirohito now had an excellent opportunity to back the current cabinet, to control the military and stop the incident from getting worse. At this time the military was greatly divided on the issue, politically still weak compared to what they would become in a few years, if Hirohito wanted to rule as a constitutional monarch instead of an autocratic monarch, well this was his chance. Hirohito said to Kanaya at 4:20pm on September 22nd “although this time it couldn't be helped, [the army] had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito accepted the situation as fait accompli, he was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If it involved a brief usurpation of his authority so bit, as long as the operation was successful. Within two weeks of the incident, most of Japan had rallied being the kwantung army's cause. Hirohito knew it was a false flag, all of what they had done. Hirohito planned the lightests punishments for those responsible. Hirohito then officially sanctioned the aerial strike against Chinchou, the first air attack since ww1.   A message had gone out to the young officers in the Japanese military that the emperors main concern was success; obedience to central command was secondary. After the Mukden incident Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned in december after failing to control the army and failing to contain the financial depression. The new Priminister Inukai took to action requesting permission from Hirohito to dispatch battalions to Tientsin and a brigade to Manchuria to help the Kwantung army take Chinchou. Hirohito responded by advising caution when attacking Chinchou and to keep a close eye on international public perception. Nevertheless Chinchou was taken and Hirohito issued an imperial rescript praising the insubordinate Kwantung army for fighting a courageous self defense against Chinese bandits. In a few more years Hirohito would grant awards and promotions to 3000 military and civil officials involved in the Manchurian war. When incidents broke out in Shanghai in 1932 involved the IJN, Tokyo high command organized a full fledged Shanghai expeditionary force under General Shirakawa with 2 full divisions. But within Shanghai were western powers, like Britain and America, whom Hirohito knew full well could place economic sanctions upon Japan if things got out of hand. Hirohito went out of his way to demand Shirakawa settle the Shanghai matter quickly and return to Japan.   And thus here is a major problem with Hirohito during the war years. On one end with Manchuria he let pretty much everything slide, but with Shanghai he suddenly cracks the whip. Hirohito had a real tendency of choosing when he wanted to act and this influenced the military heavily. On May 15th of 1932, young naval officers assassinated prime minister Inukai at his office. In the political chaos, Hirohito and his advisors agreed to abandon the experiment in party cabinets that had been the custom since the Taisho era. Now Hirohito endorsed a fully bureaucratic system of policy making, cabinet parties would no longer depend on the two main conservative parties existing in the diet. When the diet looked to the genro as to who should be the next prime minister, Hirohito wrote up “his wishes regarding the choice of the next prime minister”. Loyal officials backed Hirohito's wishes, the cult of the emperor grew in power. To the military it looked like Hirohito was blaming the party based cabinets rather than insubordinate officers for the erosion of his own authority as commander in chief. The young military officers who already were distrustful of the politicians were now being emboldened further.    After Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. There were two emerging political factions within the military, the Kodoha and Toseiha factions. Both aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to do so, the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up of junior and youthful officers who greatly distrusted the capitalists and industrialists of Japan, like the Zaibatsu and believed they were undermining the Emperor. The Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Chichibu might I add was in the 3rd infantry regiment under the leadership of Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita.   This time period has been deemed the government by assassination period. Military leaders in both the IJA and IJN and from both the Kodoha and Toseiha began performing violence against politicians and senior officers to get things done.    A enormous event took place in 1936 known as the february 26 incident. Kodoha faction officers of the IJA attempted a coup d'etat to usher in a showa restoration. They assassinated several leading officials, such as two former prime ministers and occupied the government center of Tokyo. They failed to assassinate the current prime minister Keisuke Okada or take control over the Imperial palace. These men believed Japan was straying from the Kokutai and that the capitalist/industrialists were exploiting the people of the nation by deceiving the emperor and usurping his power. The only solution to them was to purge such people and place Hirohito as an absolute leader over a military dictatorship.    Now the insurrectionists failed horribly, within just a few hours they failed to kill the current prime minister, and failed to seize the Sakashita Gate to the imperial palace, thus allowing the palace to continue communicating with the outside, and they never thought about what the IJN might do about all of this. The IJN sent marines immediately to suppress them. The insurrectionists had planned to have the army minister General Kwashima who was a Kodoha backer, report their intentions to Hirohito who they presumed would declare a showa restoration. They falsely assumed the emperor was a puppet being taken hostage by his advisers and devoid of his own will.   At 5:40am on February the 26th Hirohito was awakened and informed of the assassinations and coup attempt. From the moment he learnt of this, he was outraged and demanded the coup be suppressed and something I would love to highlight is he also immediately demanded his brother Prince Chichibu be brought over to him. Why would this be important? Hirohito believed the insurrectionists might enlist his brother to force him to abdicate. Hirohito put on his army uniform and ordered the military to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing”. Hirohito then met with Kwashima who presented him with the insurrectionists demands to “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life and fulfill national defense, aka showa restoration”. Hirohito scolded Kwashima and ordered him to suppress the mutiny. On the morning of the 27th Hirohito declared administrative martial law on the basis of Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution, pertaining to emergency imperial ordinances. Formally he was invoking his sovereign power to handle a crisis. Hirohito displayed an incredible amount of energy to crush the mutiny as noted by those around him at the time. Every few hours he demanded reports to be given to him by top officials and at one point he was so angry he threatened to lead the Imperial Guard division himself to go out and quell it. Hirohito met with Chichibu and its alleged he told his brother to end any relationships he had with the Kodoha members. By february 29th, Hirohito had firmly crushed the mutiny, most of the ringleaders were arrested. In april they were court martialed secretly without even given a chance to defend themselves in court and 17 were executed by firing squad in July. As a result of it all, the Kodoha faction dissolved and the Toseiha faction reigned supreme.    On the morning of July 8th of 1937 came the Marco Polo Bridge incident, a nearly identical false flag operation to what occurred at Mukden in 1931. Hirohito's reaction was first to consider the possible threat of the USSR. He wondered if the communists would seize the opportunity to attack Manchukuo. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied.    Hirohito demanded to know what contingency plans existed. After this he approved the decision of the Konoe cabinet to move troops into Northern China and fixed his seal to the orders of dispatch. The emperor had tacitly agreed to it all from the start. With each action taken for the following months, Hirohito would explicitly sanction them after the fact. In his mind he kept thinking about a fight with the USSR, he believed he had no choice in the China matter. All of his top ranking officials like Sugiyama would tell him “even if war with China came… it could be finished up within two or three months”. Hirohito was not convinced, he went to Konoe, to imperial conferences, to other military officials to get their views. None convinced him but as Hirohito put it  “they agreed with each other on the time factor, and that made a big difference; so all right, we'll go ahead.”     Two weeks into the conflict, the kwangtung army and Korean army were reinforced by 3 divisions from Japan and on July 25th were reaching Beijing. What did the man who was not responsible in such decision making say? On July 27 Hirohito sanctioned an imperial order directing the commander of the China Garrison Force to “chastise the Chinese army in the Peking-Tientsin area and bring stability to the main strategic places in that region.” Hirohito wanted a killing blow to end the war, and thus he escalated the incident. Historian Fujiwara Akira noted “it was the [Konoe] government itself that had resolved on war, dispatched an army, and expanded the conflict,” and Hirohito had fully supported it”   Chiang Kai-shek abandoned northern China pulling into the Interior and unleashed a campaign in Shanghai to draw the Japanese into a battle showcased in front of western audiences. Chiang Kai-shek tossed the creme of his military all into Shanghai to make it as long and explosive as possible to try and win support from other great powers. On August 18 Hirohito summoned his army and navy chiefs for a pointed recommendation. The war, he told them, “is gradually spreading; our situation in Shanghai is critical; Tsingtao is also at risk. If under these circumstances we try to deploy troops everywhere, the war will merely drag on and on. Wouldn't it be better to concentrate a large force at the most critical point and deliver one overwhelming blow? Based on our attitude of fairness, Do you, have in hand plans for such action? In other words, do we have any way worked out to force the Chinese to reflect on their actions?”   The chiefs of staff returned 3 days later with an aerial campaign to break China's will to fight and strategic cities needed to be seized. Hirohito gave his sanction and on August 31st gave the order “for the Dispatch of the North China Area Army. [D]estroy the enemy's will to fight and wipe out resistance in the central part of Hepei Province,” Over the course of weeks Hirohito sanctioned 6 troop mobilizations to the Shanghai area where the fighting had bogged down. Then he sanctioned 3 divisions from Taiwan to Shanghai, but for units in northern Manchuria to stand guard firmly in case the USSR attacked. The entire time this was happening both China and Japan referred to it as an incident and not a real war lest either of them lose the backing of their great power allies. Japan needed oil, iron and rubber from America, China was likewise received materials from the USSR/America/Britain and even Germany.    By november the war was not going well and Hirohito had the Imperial Headquarters established within his palace as a means to exercise his constitutional role as supreme commander, the army and navy would act in concert. For a few hours in the morning a few days every week, the chiefs of staff, army and navy ministers and chiefs of operations would meet with Hirohito. At these imperial conferences Hirohito presided over and approved decisions impacting the war. This was Hirohito's device for legally transforming the will of the emperor into the will of the state. Hirohito not only involved himself, sometimes on a daily basis he would shape strategy and decide the planning, timing and so on of military campaigns. He even intervened in ongoing field operations. He monitored and occasionally issued orders through commanders to subordinate units. Now I can't go through the entire 1937-1945 war and showcase all the things he did but I will highlight things I think we're important.    On November 9th, the Shanghai battle was finally falling apart for the Chinese as they began a withdrawal to the Nanking area some 180 miles away. The Japanese forces chased them and for the first time were really coming into direct contact with Chinese civilians, when it came to Shanghai most had evacuated the areas. The Japanese burned, plundered and raped villages and towns as they marched towards Nanking. On december 1st, Hirohito's imperial HQ ordered the 10th army and Shanghai expeditionary force to close in on Nanking from different directions, a pincer maneuver. Prince Asaka took command of the Shanghai expeditionary force and General Matsui commanded the Central China Area Army consisted of the Shanghai force and 10th army. Asaka led the forces to assault the walled city of Nanking with a population estimated to be 4-5 hundred thousand and it would fall on December 13th. Was there an order to “rape Nanking”, no. The Imperial HQ did not order the total extermination of the Chinese in Nanking, they had ordered an encirclement campaign. However, the standing orders at this time were to take no prisoners. Once Nanking fell, the Japanese began to execute en massage military prisoners and unarmed troops who surrendered willingly. There was a orgy of rape, arson, pillage and murder. The horror was seen in Nanking and the 6 adjacent villages over the course of 3 months far exceeding any atrocities seen during the battle for Shanghai or even the march to Nanking. General Nakajima's 16th division on its first day in Nanking was estimated to have murdered 30,000 POWs. Estimate range insanely, but perhaps 200,000 POW's and civilians were butchered over the course of 6 weeks.   Prince Asaka the 54 year old grand uncle to Hirohito and other members of the Imperial Family commanded the attack on Nanking and supervised the horrors. 49 year old General Prince Higashikuni chief of the army air force alongside Prince Kan'in knew of the atrocities occurring. Army minister Sugiyama knew, many middle echelon officers of the Imperial HQ knew. Hirohito was at the top of the chain of command, there is no way he was not informed. Hirohito followed the war extensively, reading daily reports, questioned his aides. It was under his orders that his army “chastise China”, but did he show any concern for the breakdown of his army's discipline? There is no documented evidence he ordered an investigation, all we are met with as historians is a bizarre period of silence. Hirohito goes from supervising the war with OCD precision, to silence, then back to normal precision. Did Hirohito show anything publicly to show angry, displeasure or remorse, at the time he energetically began spurring his generals and admirals on their great victories and the national project to induce “Chinese self-reflection”.    On November 24th Hirohito gave an after the fact sanction to the decision of General Matsui to attack and occupy Nanking. Hirohito was informed the city was going to be bombarded by aircraft and artillery and he sanctioned that as well. That was basically him removing any restrictions on the army's conduct. On December 14th the day after Nankings fall, he made an imperial message to his chiefs of staff expressing his pleasure at the news of the city's capture and occupation. Hirohito granted General Matsui an imperial rescript for his great military accomplishments in 1938 and gave the order of the golden early to Prince Asaka in 1940. Perhaps Hirohito privately agonized over what happened, but publicly did nothing about the conduct of his armed forces, especially in regards to the treatment of POW's.   Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Naking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to end the fighting by enticing the other great powers to intervene. At the 9 power treaty conference in Brussel in november of 1937, Britain and the US proposed boycotting Japan. However the conference ended without any sanctions being enacted upon Japan. The Konoe government and Imperial HQ immediately expanded the combat zone. Chiang Kai-shek in desperation accepted a previous offer by Germany to mediate. Oscar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China attempted to negotiate with Japan, but it failed. China was offered harsh terms; to formally recognize Manchukuo, cooperate with it and Japan to fight communism, permit the indefinite stationg of Japanese forces and pay war reparations.    On January 9th of 1938, Imperial HQ formed a policy for handling the China incident which was reported to Hirohito. Konoe asked Hirohito to convene an imperial conference for it, but not to speak out at it  “For we just want to formally decide the matter in your majesty's presence.” Konoe and Hirohito were concerned with anti expansionists within the army general staff and wanted to prevent German interference in Japanese affairs. On January 11th, the policy was showcased and adopted, there would be no peace until Chiang kai-shek's regime was dissolved and a more compliant regime followed. Hirohito presided over the conference in full army dress uniform and gave his approval. He sat there for 27 minutes without uttering a word, appearing to be neutral in the matter, though in fact he was firmly backing a stronger military policy towards China.    The Konoe cabinet inaugurated a second phase to the China incident, greatly escalating the war. By this point in time Japanese had seen combat casualties at 62,007 killed, 160,000 wounded. In 1939 it would be 30,081 killed, 55,970 wounded, then 15,827 killed and 72,653 wounded in 1940. Major cities were under Japanese control ranging from the north east and south. Chiang Kai-shek fled to Chongqing, the war was deadlocked without any prospect of victory in sight.    On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer. Konoe resigned in disgrace in 1939 having failed to bring the China war to an end and being outed by his colleagues who sought an alliance with Germany, which he did not agree with. His successor was Hiranuma a man Hirohito considered a outright fascist. Hiranuma only received the job because he promised Hirohito he would not make enemies of Britain or the US by entering in a hasty alliance with Nazi Germany. However his enter prime ministership would be engulfed by the alliance question.   In May of 1939 there was another border clash with the USSR, the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This one was much larger in scale, involving armored warfare, aircraft and though it seems it was not used, the Japanese brought biological warfare weapons as well. The Japanese had nearly 20,000 casualties, it was an unbelievable defeat that shocked everyone. Hirohito refrained from punishing anyone because they technically followed orders based on a document “outline for dealing with disputes along the manchurian soviet border” that Hirohito had sanctioned shortly before the conflict arose.   In July of 1939, the US told Hiranuma's government they intended not to renew the US-Japan treaty of commerce and navigation. Until this point Roosevelt had been very lenient towards Japan, but now it looked to him war would break out in europe and he wanted Japan to know they could expect serious economic sanctions if they escalated things. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Then suddenly as Japan was engaging in a truce with the USSR to stop the border conflict, Germany shocked the world and signed a nonaggression pact with them. This completely contravened the 1936 Japan-German anti-comintern pact. Hiranuma resigned in disgrace on august 28th.    Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”. Then Germany invaded Poland and began a new European War. Abe's cabinet collapsed from the unbelievable amount of international actions by January 14th 1940. Hirohito appointed Admiral Yonai as prime minister  and General Tojo to vice army minister. As we have seen Hirohito played a active role appointing high level personnel and imposed conditions upon their appointments.    Hirohito dictated what Yonai was to do, who he was to appoint to certain positions so on and so forth. When a large part of the military were calling for an alliance with Germany, Hirohito resisted, arguing Japan should focus on the China war and not ally itself to Germany unless it was to counter the USSR. Three months passed by and Germany began invading western europe. Norway fell, Denmark fell, Luxembourg, Belgium, the netherlands and then France, it was simply stunning. While Japan had been locked in a deadlock against China, Germany was crushing multiple nations with ease, and this had a large effect on asia. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not hope to protect their holdings in asia. But Hirohito kept pressuring Yonai not to begin any talks of an alliance, and the military leaders forced Yonai's cabinet to collapse.    So Hirohito stood by while Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai met each crisis and collapses. He watched as the China war went nowhere and the military was gradually pushing for the Nanshin-ron doctrine to open a southern war up with the west. Not once did he make a public effort on his lonesome to end the war in China. Japan's demands of China were unchanged, relations with the west were getting worse each day. The China war was undeclared, hell it was from the Japanese viewpoint “chastising China”. Japan was no respecting any rules of war in China, atrocities were performed regularly and for that Hirohito shared responsibility. For he alone was free to act in this area, he needed to act, but he did not. He could have intervened and insisted on respecting the rules of war, especially in regards to POW's and the results could have been dramatically different. Hirohito bore direct responsibility for the use of poison gas upon Chinese and Mongolian combatants and non combatants even before the undeclared war of 1937.    Then on July 28th of 1937 Hirohito made his first directive authorizing the use of chemical weapons which was transmitted by the chief of the army general staff prince Kan'in. It stated that in mopping up the Beijing-Tientsin area, “[Y]ou may use tear gas at suitable times.” Then on September 11th of 1937 he transmitted again through Kan'in the authorization to deploy special chemical warfare units in Shanghai. Gas weapons were one weapon the imperial HQ, aka Hirohito held effective control over throughout the China war. Front line units were never free to employ it at their own discretion, it required explicit authorization from the imperial HQ. During the Wuhan offensive of August to October 1938, imperial HQ authorized the use of poison gas 375 separate times. Hirohito authorized on May 15th of 1939 the carrying out of field studies of chemical warfare along the Manchukuo-soviet border.  In 1940 Hirohito sanctioned the first experimental use of bacteriological weapons in China, though there is no documented evidence of this, given the nature of how he micro managed everything it goes without saying he would have treated it the same as the poison gas. He was a man of science, a person who questioned everything and refused to put his seal on orders without first examining them. Imperial HQ directives went to unit 731 and as a rule Hirohito overlooked them. There again is no documents directly linking him to it, but Hirohito should be held responsibility for strategic bombing campaigns performing on cities like Chongqing. Alongside such horror Hirohito sanctioned annihilation campaigns in China. Such military campaigns were on the scale of what occurred at Nanking. Take for example the Hebei offensive which saw the infamous “three alls policy, burn all, kill all, steal all”.    Before Pearl Harbor and the ushering in of the war against the west, look at the scene that had unfolded. China and Japan were not officially at war until December of 1941. Not to say it would have been easy by any means, but look at the countless opportunities the man, emperor, so called god if you will, held in his hands to stop it all or at the very least stop escalating it. Why did he not do so? To protect the Kokutai. Above all else, the role and survival of the emperor's divinity over the people of Japan was always at the forefront of his mind. He did what he thought was always necessary to thwart threats internal and external. He allowed his military to do horrible things, because they did so in his name, and likewise they were a threat to him. I know its abrupt to end it like this, but for those of you who perhaps say to yourself “well he really was powerless to stop it, they would have killed him or something”, who chose suddenly to intervene in 1945 and made the decision to surrender?

On this episode, Roosevelt Patterson Jr. shares a journey that spans championships at Vigor High School and the University of Alabama, time in the NFL and CFL, and a life-changing commitment to helping young people avoid the mistakes he once made. Roosevelt opens up about the highs of football, the lessons learned through adversity, and the mission behind Rosie's Foundation. His story is one of redemption, purpose, and using experience to lift others.

On this Make A Difference Minute, Roosevelt Patterson Jr. shares how the nickname “Rosie” began during his time playing for Coach Gene Stallings at Alabama and how that same name became the heart of his work today. Roosevelt explains why he chose to call his youth mentorship effort Rosie's Foundation and how his own struggles inspire him to help young people avoid the pitfalls he once faced. His story shows how a simple nickname grew into a mission of hope and guidance. Sponsor: Premier Structures, Inc. PremierStructures.com

On this episode of the podcast, we are joined by Jiu-Jitsu World Champion and BJJ Black Belt Roosevelt Sousa. Roosevelt discusses his start in Jiu-Jitsu, what helped with developing a strong work ethic, how learning the mindset of high level Volleyball players hlped with success in BJJ, how to get the most out of training as a black belt, how working with a sports psychologist helped with performance in BJJ, his competition mindset, how Roosevelt prepared for Jiu-Jitsu Worlds in 2 weeks and training with white belts, the importance of being a good role model for your students, the impact of being a coach, what immigrating to America has meant to Roosevelt, the importance of customer service, and how BJJ can help improve your life. Thanks to the podcast sponsors: Check out "Athlethc" at https://athlethc.com/ and use the code Chewjitsu10 to get 10% off of your order of hemp-derived THC performance mints.  Charlotte's Web CBD. Head over to https://bit.ly/chewjitsu30 and use the promo code Chewjitsu30 to get 30% off of your total purchase. Epic Roll BJJ. Check out https://epicrollbjj.com/ and use the promo code Chewjitsu20 to get 20% off of your total purchase. Check out podcast exclusives including conversations with guests, Q&A sessions, and tons more at https://patreon.com/thechewjitsupodcast

The guys discuss why an overly generous employer makes going home nearly impossible, when hearing "just don't get it in his eyes" initiates a prayer for pepper spray, and how pork-filled sky scrapers will inadvertently regulate the price of a cup of coffee.

A shock win feels like a movement—until the math starts. We dig into Zoran Mamdani's ascent with a clear-eyed look at why voters broke for him, what “anti-politics” actually signals, and how a mayor's bold promises get squeezed by bonds, taxes, and thin state capacity. The story here isn't a fairy tale of revival; it's a patient autopsy of party cartels in decline, activist narratives colliding with ordinary voter motives, and a political entrepreneur who read the room better than the machine.We unpack the split between the activist layer and the broader electorate: one sees a springboard for a project; the other wants rent relief and competent delivery. That tension meets hard constraints. Cities don't print money. They borrow or tax, and capital reacts. We trace why progressive mayors post-1950s hit the same wall, why LaGuardia needed Roosevelt's federal cash, and why Dinkins and de Blasio serve as useful mirrors for what comes next. If national headwinds return—especially a Trump-era reset—does combat raise Mamdani's profile while shrinking his room to maneuver, or does conciliation cost him the left while buying breathing room?We also zoom out: unions that poll well but feel managerial on the ground, populism as a political strategy rather than a mass social force, and the broader void where anti-politics thrives. Mamdani's early refusal to dignify culture-war bait showed how composure builds legitimacy in an era of institutional mistrust; later moralism was safer but weaker. The stakes now are concrete: visible affordability wins without tripping fiscal tripwires. If he threads that needle, he sets a new urban playbook. If not, the void stays open for the next savvy reader of the moment.If this lens helps you see past the noise, follow the show, share it with a friend, and leave a review with the one question you want answered next.Send us a text Musis by Bitterlake, Used with Permission, all rights to BitterlakeSupport the showCrew:Host: C. Derick VarnIntro and Outro Music by Bitter Lake.Intro Video Design: Jason MylesArt Design: Corn and C. Derick VarnLinks and Social Media:twitter: @varnvlogblue sky: @varnvlog.bsky.socialYou can find the additional streams on YoutubeCurrent Patreon at the Sponsor Tier: Jordan Sheldon, Mark J. Matthews, Lindsay Kimbrough, RedWolf, DRV, Kenneth McKee, JY Chan, Matthew Monahan, Parzival, Adriel Mixon, Buddy Roark, Daniel Petrovic

[00:07:23] – The Black Committee: America's First Mass Surveillance ProgramBeito explains Senator Hugo Black's seizure of millions of private telegrams to spy on FDR's opponents — a little-known episode that prefigured today's surveillance state and “national security” abuses. [00:27:29] – The Newport Sex Scandal and FDR's Moral HypocrisyKnight and Beito expose Roosevelt's secret Navy operation that used entrapment to target suspected homosexual sailors — a scandal later erased from mainstream history. [00:39:31] – Going Off Gold: Roosevelt's Monetary RevolutionThe discussion covers how FDR's abandonment of the gold standard and arbitrary price-fixing launched America's age of fiat currency, inflation, and centralized economic manipulation. [00:49:16] – The “Fake News” Law That Almost HappenedBeito recounts a 1930s proposal to criminalize “false news” under FDR's influence — an early prototype of modern truth policing and digital censorship laws. [01:00:16] – The 72-Dose Childhood Vaccine LawsuitKnight reviews a lawsuit claiming the CDC never tested the combined safety of its full childhood vaccine schedule, arguing the agency hides behind untested assumptions of safety. [01:14:46] – Eli Lilly Bribery and Big Pharma CorruptionKnight reports on a Texas lawsuit accusing Eli Lilly of paying doctors to push high-profit drugs, tying it to systemic collusion between pharmaceutical giants and captured regulators. [01:24:23] – James Bradley on Vietnam: Precious FreedomAuthor James Bradley joins to discuss his book Precious Freedom, reframing the Vietnam War from the Vietnamese perspective and exposing decades of U.S. and media propaganda. [01:36:39] – Media Lies and CIA MythsBradley reveals how the U.S. and its allies fabricated the idea of “North and South Vietnam” as separate nations, a CIA-backed myth used to justify decades of warfare. [02:22:00] – Fourth Turning Politics and the Rise of Authoritarian SaviorsKnight and Bonta examine how historical cycles of crisis create conditions for strongmen like FDR, Trump, and others who exploit social chaos to centralize power. [03:02:17] – De-Dollarization and the End of U.S. Financial SupremacyBonta closes by warning that the weaponization of the dollar is accelerating the global shift toward BRICS and gold-backed trade systems, threatening the foundation of American economic dominance. Money should have intrinsic value AND transactional privacy: Go to https://davidknight.gold/ for great deals on physical gold/silverFor 10% off Gerald Celente's prescient Trends Journal, go to https://trendsjournal.com/ and enter the code KNIGHTFind out more about the show and where you can watch it at TheDavidKnightShow.com If you would like to support the show and our family please consider subscribing monthly here: SubscribeStar https://www.subscribestar.com/the-david-knight-showOr you can send a donation throughMail: David Knight POB 994 Kodak, TN 37764Zelle: @DavidKnightShow@protonmail.comCash App at: $davidknightshowBTC to: bc1qkuec29hkuye4xse9unh7nptvu3y9qmv24vanh7Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-david-knight-show--2653468/support.

Mason Payer has been at Nosler for nearly 15 years. The Marketing Brand Director and passionate hunter works closely with product development and field testing. Highlights from the conversation include: Mason's perspective on how Bend, Oregon has changed in his lifetime An unlikely place for an ammunition factory Blacktails and mulies with his sons Roosevelt [...]

While we refer to a few books in the discussion that follows, this discussion with my dear old friend Albert Lerman is primarily about his experience as an 18 year old infantryman in World War II. And when I say old friend, I really mean it. Albert turned 100 earlier this year and Albert's son Bill, a dear and old friend as well, suggested that it would be timely to have this discussion. Albert was a grunt in the Army, an infantryman, tough, resilient, essential,  the backbone of the army, and part of The Greatest Generation.Carol and I have known and loved Albert for more than 50 years, and he's exemplified The Greatest Generation his entire life.  I'm so pleased to have had this discussion with Albert and Bill. (U.S. forces met allied Russian forces at the Elbe River in Germany on April 25, 1945, effectively splitting Nazi Germany in half and symbolizing the imminent end to the war.  In the picture above, Albert is the grunt with the cigarette in his mouth greeting Russian soldiers at the Elbe.)Albert discusses the drafting of the entire freshman and sophomore classes from Penn into the Army gearing up to fight the war; the hell of war for the soldiers (“you know, the guy beside you, all of a sudden, he ain't alive anymore. That's tough. That's tough”), including the misery of living in foxholes, and for the German civilians as well (“absolutely, war is hell for them too, the people that we flushed out of these houses were women and children“); his war injuries; the historic meeting of U.S. and allied Russian forces at the Elbe River; the preference of the Germans to surrender to American forces (“they were deathly afraid of the Russians”); his extended honeymoon with Evelyn after the war; and his hope for the U.S. to avoid war in the future.My 2018 discussion with Evelyn, who we all loved beyond measure - Tell Me What You're Reading No. 32: Evelyn Lerman - Ev's tribute to her Mom, and my tribute to Ev - can be found on Spotify or Apple PodcastsBooks referred to in my discussion with Albert.D-Day, June 9, 1944, by Stephen AmbroseThe Greatest Generation, by Tom BrokawWhen Time Stopped, A Memoir of my Father's War and What Remains, by Ariana NeumannSome of the other WWII books I've read.Roosevelt the Soldier of Freedom, by James MacGregor BurnsNo Ordinary Time, by Doris Kearns GoodwinEleanor and Franklin, by Joseph P LashRoosevelt and Hopkins, by Robert  E SherwoodLeadership in Turbulent Times, by Doris Kearns GoodwinFive Days in London, May 1940, by John LucasChurchill: Walking with Destiny, by Andrew RobertsThe Last Lion, by William ManchesterThe Conquerors, by Michael BeschlossFrom the Crash to the Blitz 1929 1939, by Cabel PhillipsIn the Garden of Beasts, by Eric LarsonHitler's Willing Executioners, by Daniel Jonah GoldhagenInside the Third Reich, by Albert SpeerThe Brass Ring,by Bill MauldinUnbroken, A World War II Story, by Laura HillenbrandHiroshima, by John HerseyTruman, by David McCulloughThe Winds of War, by Herman WoukWar and Remembrance, by Herman Wouk#WWII #Veterans #104th Infantry #First Army #First Canadian Army #The Big Red One - The First Infantry Division #General Patton - The Third Army #Terrible Terry Allen. 

US Military Operations off Venezuela and the War in Ukraine. General Blaine Holt (United States Air Force retired) analyzes the significant US military buildup off Venezuela, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads, describing it as a "war-winning force" primarily targeting cartels and sending a global message of American might. He suggests that operations will likely use commando-style tactics rather than a full occupation, potentially leveraging historical events like the Bay of Pigs as cover for unconventional approaches. The conversation pivots to Ukraine, where Russia is effectively using new glide bombs and missiles, having shifted to a wartime mobilization economy. Holt notes the profound erosion of Ukraine's infrastructure and the demoralizing lack of manpower. He argues innovative, inexpensive defenses, such as Reaper drones with Sidewinders or lasers, are needed, as current air defense economics are unsustainable. 1917 USS WYOMING

US Military Operations off Venezuela and the War in Ukraine. General Blaine Holt (United States Air Force retired) analyzes the significant US military buildup off Venezuela, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads, describing it as a "war-winning force" primarily targeting cartels and sending a global message of American might. He suggests that operations will likely use commando-style tactics rather than a full occupation, potentially leveraging historical events like the Bay of Pigs as cover for unconventional approaches. The conversation pivots to Ukraine, where Russia is effectively using new glide bombs and missiles, having shifted to a wartime mobilization economy. Holt notes the profound erosion of Ukraine's infrastructure and the demoralizing lack of manpower. He argues innovative, inexpensive defenses, such as Reaper drones with Sidewinders or lasers, are needed, as current air defense economics are unsustainable. 1926 HCMS VANCOUVER

Venezuela Pressure Campaign and Asian Diplomacy. Mary Kissel analyzes the massive US military buildup near Venezuela, staged from Roosevelt Roads, noting that the Trump administration prioritizes removing Maduro due to national security threats. She emphasizes that the State Department possesses numerous non-military levers, like sanctions and international pressure through the OAS, to induce Maduro's exit without direct intervention. Kissel also characterizes President Trump's diplomatic engagement at ASEAN and APEC as very successful, securing vital commitments on rare earth mining and processing to counter Chinese economic threats in the Pacific.

Venezuela Pressure Campaign and Asian Diplomacy. Mary Kissel analyzes the massive US military buildup near Venezuela, staged from Roosevelt Roads, noting that the Trump administration prioritizes removing Maduro due to national security threats. She emphasizes that the State Department possesses numerous non-military levers, like sanctions and international pressure through the OAS, to induce Maduro's exit without direct intervention. Kissel also characterizes President Trump's diplomatic engagement at ASEAN and APEC as very successful, securing vital commitments on rare earth mining and processing to counter Chinese economic threats in the Pacific. 1876 BOLIVAR ENTERS CARACAS

US Military Buildup Near Venezuela and Opposition Support for Action. Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa discuss the unprecedented US military buildup at the former Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Puerto Rico, interpreted as preparations for action against Venezuela. Peña Esclusa clarifies that the true Venezuelan opposition, led by María Corina Machado (who won 93% of the primary vote), supports US action against the Maduro drug cartel. Araújo asserts that this is viewed regionally as a "crusade against organized crime," not an invasion, and would be welcomed by people tired of instability. This credible threat is already pressuring Venezuelan military officials to negotiate Maduro's exiIT. 1902 TRINIDAD

US Military Buildup Near Venezuela and Opposition Support for Action. Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa discuss the unprecedented US military buildup at the former Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Puerto Rico, interpreted as preparations for action against Venezuela. Peña Esclusa clarifies that the true Venezuelan opposition, led by María Corina Machado (who won 93% of the primary vote), supports US action against the Maduro drug cartel. Araújo asserts that this is viewed regionally as a "crusade against organized crime," not an invasion, and would be welcomed by people tired of instability. This credible threat is already pressuring Venezuelan military officials to negotiate Maduro's exiIT. 1902 CARACAS

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

1. The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson and the Split over the League of Nations David Pietrusza 1920: The Year of the Six Presidents The 1920 election followed President Woodrow Wilson's debilitating stroke in October 1919, which left him perpetually frail. The core issue became the League of Nations, which Wilson championed but the Republican Party bitterly contested, ultimately causing public skepticism. Wilson held fierce opposition to former President Theodore Roosevelt, who died in January 1919. Roosevelt had detested Wilson's neutrality regarding German aggression. Despite his frail health, Roosevelt would have been the unstoppable Republican candidate had he lived. Wilson reacted to news of Roosevelt's death with shockingly hateful language, revealing the depth of his personal animosity toward his predecessor. 1929 Hoover Inaugural

5. The Democratic Convention: Wilson's Downfall and the Rise of Cox and Roosevelt David Pietrusza 1920: The Year of the Six Presidents Meeting in San Francisco in July 1920, the Democrats grappled with Woodrow Wilson's political liability due to his uncompromising League of Nations stance and desire for a third term. Wilson received only a grim demonstration of support, and his cabinet feared he would die if nominated. The two leading contenders were William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law, and Ohio Governor John Cox. Due to the Democratic two-thirds rule, the convention took many ballots. Cox, a moderate publisher, secured the nomination after 44 ballots. After meeting with Wilson, Cox abandoned his moderate position to strongly support the League. Franklin D. Roosevelt was chosen as Vice President due to his name recognition, Navy service, and New York connections. 1929 HOOVER INAUGURAL

6. The Campaign Focuses on the League and Eugene Debs David Pietrusza 1920: The Year of the Six Presidents The campaign featured the Democratic ticket of Cox and Roosevelt against Harding. Though criticized for his "bloviating" speeches, Harding was a charming speaker who avoided trouble. After meeting the frail Woodrow Wilson, Cox was deeply moved and made the League of Nations the central, defining issue for the Democrats—a political miscalculation. Wilson refused to compromise on the League due to a personality flaw that made him unable to accept opposition. Other critical issues included Prohibition, debated as "wet and dry." The segment introduces Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate, whose platform contained concepts like social security that would later become mainstream policy.

The Postponement of the Budapest Meeting and Negotiating with Putin. Cliff May discusses the postponement of the Trump-Putin Budapest meeting, attributing it to Marco Rubio insisting on a cessation of hostilities, which Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected, demanding "all Ukraine." May warns President Trump against being outnegotiated, referencing Stalin's success over Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. Putin admires Stalin, who expanded the Russian Empire and engineered the Holodomor famine. May stresses that Russians negotiate only to win, not to compromise. 1921 RED ARMY

SHOW 10-24-25 CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR THE SHOW BEGINS IN THE DOUBTS ABOUT CANADA  IN THE EYES OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. FIRST HOUR 9-915 Pennsylvania Aims to Be AI Capital with US-Made Non-Lithium Batteries. Salena Zito reports on Governor Shapiro's plan to establish Pennsylvania as the AI and data center capital, capitalizing on its energy resources and university system. She focuses on EOS, a Turtle Creek company making non-lithium batteries that are 97% US-made, countering reliance on Chinese lithium. AI data centers require high energy reliability, favoring coal and natural gas infrastructure. Governor Shapiro supports this buildout, including a $22 million grant for EOS. 915-930 Italian Olive Harvest and Historical Vatican-UK Royal Visit. Lorenzo Fiori reports that the olive harvest in Tuscany is expected to be low in quantity due to mosquito damage caused by humidity and rain. However, recent strong winds helped remove damaged olives, potentially ensuring a "very tasty" oil. Fiori also discusses the historical visit of King Charles III to the Vatican's Sistine Chapel to pray with Pope Francis. This event, which Fiori found spectacular, is seen as crucial for restoring dialogue between the Anglican and Catholic Churches after centuries of division. 930-945 Small Business Economy Steady; AI Remains a 'Toy'. Gene Marks reports on the small business economy, noting steady activity among machine parts manufacturers, often preparing for an "onshoring boom." Construction and housing are holding steady but anticipate a future boom as interest rates decline. Tariffs have a muted impact, often absorbed or passed on as separate invoice line items for transparency. Marks demonstrates that AI, despite its advances, is not ready for prime-time business use, failing to accurately generate a requested image of a Yorkshire Terrier hitting a home run. 945-1000 Small Business Economy Steady; AI Remains a 'Toy'. Gene Marks reports on the small business economy, noting steady activity among machine parts manufacturers, often preparing for an "onshoring boom." Construction and housing are holding steady but anticipate a future boom as interest rates decline. Tariffs have a muted impact, often absorbed or passed on as separate invoice line items for transparency. Marks demonstrates that AI, despite its advances, is not ready for prime-time business use, failing to accurately generate a requested image of a Yorkshire Terrier hitting a home run. SECOND HOUR 10-1015 Pacific Palisades Housing Dispute and West Coast Infrastructure Challenges. Jeff Bliss covers West Coast issues, including traffic disruption from new high-speed rail construction between Southern California and Las Vegas. Pacific Palisades residents are protesting state and local plans to use burned-out lots for high-density, multistory affordable housing, fearing the change in community character and increased traffic. Additionally, copper theft from EV charging stations is undermining Los Angeles's zero emissions goals. Homeless encampments are also sparking major brush fire concerns in areas like Malibu and the Sepulveda Basin. 1015-1030 Pennsylvania Pursues Data Center Hub Status, Converting Golf Courses. Jim McTague reports on Pennsylvania's effort to become a data center hub, citing over $90 billion committed investment statewide. York County secured $5 billion, with plans including converting Brierwood Golf Course into a data center. This effort faces public resistance fueled by fears of higher electricity and water prices. McTague notes that consumer spending in Lancaster County is "steady." The conversion of golf courses reflects the decline of golf, seen as a "dinosaur" activity that takes too much time. 1030-1045 Professor Epstein Slams Trump's Economic Policies as 'State Socialism'. Professor Richard Epstein analyzes four Trump administration economic decisions concerning Intel, Nvidia, US Steel, and MP Mining, labeling them forms of state-owned enterprise or "state socialism." Epstein argues that acquiring golden shares or negotiating side deals—like Nvidia paying 15% of China revenue—destroys market value, undercuts competitors, and violates the neutral application of laws. He also critiques the Gaza deal, stating Hamas must be wiped out before any subsequent phases of the agreement can proceed. 1045-1100 Professor Epstein Slams Trump's Economic Policies as 'State Socialism'. Professor Richard Epstein analyzes four Trump administration economic decisions concerning Intel, Nvidia, US Steel, and MP Mining, labeling them forms of state-owned enterprise or "state socialism." Epstein argues that acquiring golden shares or negotiating side deals—like Nvidia paying 15% of China revenue—destroys market value, undercuts competitors, and violates the neutral application of laws. He also critiques the Gaza deal, stating Hamas must be wiped out before any subsequent phases of the agreement can proceed. THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 cMcNamara at War: Loyalty, Secrets, and the Vietnam Conflict. Professor William Taubman discusses Robert McNamara's complicated role during the LBJ years. McNamara enabled the Vietnam War escalation, notably misrepresenting the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to Congress. Despite later secretly opposing the war ("I want so badly to bring the boys home"), he remained silent due to loyalty to Johnson and the presidency. Taubman also details McNamara's role spying on the Kennedys for LBJ and his "loving" relationship with Jackie Kennedy. His post-Pentagon role at the World Bank served as a form of repentance. 1115-1130 cMcNamara at War: Loyalty, Secrets, and the Vietnam Conflict. Professor William Taubman discusses Robert McNamara's complicated role during the LBJ years. McNamara enabled the Vietnam War escalation, notably misrepresenting the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to Congress. Despite later secretly opposing the war ("I want so badly to bring the boys home"), he remained silent due to loyalty to Johnson and the presidency. Taubman also details McNamara's role spying on the Kennedys for LBJ and his "loving" relationship with Jackie Kennedy. His post-Pentagon role at the World Bank served as a form of repentance. 1130-1145 cMcNamara at War: Loyalty, Secrets, and the Vietnam Conflict. Professor William Taubman discusses Robert McNamara's complicated role during the LBJ years. McNamara enabled the Vietnam War escalation, notably misrepresenting the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to Congress. Despite later secretly opposing the war ("I want so badly to bring the boys home"), he remained silent due to loyalty to Johnson and the presidency. Taubman also details McNamara's role spying on the Kennedys for LBJ and his "loving" relationship with Jackie Kennedy. His post-Pentagon role at the World Bank served as a form of repentance. 1145-1200 cMcNamara at War: Loyalty, Secrets, and the Vietnam Conflict. Professor William Taubman discusses Robert McNamara's complicated role during the LBJ years. McNamara enabled the Vietnam War escalation, notably misrepresenting the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to Congress. Despite later secretly opposing the war ("I want so badly to bring the boys home"), he remained silent due to loyalty to Johnson and the presidency. Taubman also details McNamara's role spying on the Kennedys for LBJ and his "loving" relationship with Jackie Kennedy. His post-Pentagon role at the World Bank served as a form of repentance. FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 Trump Administration's Economic Interventionism Questioned as 'State Capitalism'. Veronique de Rugy critiques the Trump administration's economic policies regarding companies like Intel, US Steel, and MP Mining, calling them "state capitalism" or forms of nationalization. She argues that the government acquiring a minority share in Intel creates bad incentives and unfair competitive advantages. Regarding MP Mining, de Rugy notes that guaranteeing a price floor fails to address the underlying issue of government regulation hindering rare earth production in the US.E 1215-1230 The Postponement of the Budapest Meeting and Negotiating with Putin. Cliff May discusses the postponement of the Trump-Putin Budapest meeting, attributing it to Marco Rubio insisting on a cessation of hostilities, which Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected, demanding "all Ukraine." May warns President Trump against being outnegotiated, referencing Stalin's success over Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. Putin admires Stalin, who expanded the Russian Empire and engineered the Holodomor famine. May stresses that Russians negotiate only to win, not to compromise. 1230-1245 NASA's Artemis Woes, Chinese Debris, and Global Space Industry Shifts. Bob Zimmerman discusses NASA's Artemis program, noting Administrator Sean Duffy is using a social media feud with Elon Musk as a "shiny object" to distract from the Orion capsule's untrustworthy heat shield risks. Other space issues include China's dangerous rocket debris crashes, some using highly toxic fuels, and European satellite companies consolidating into Project Bromo due to competition. Zimmerman also highlights the discovery of a large asteroid orbiting near Venus and Lockheed Martin's investment in Venus Aerospace's radical rocket engine design. 1245-100 AM NASA's Artemis Woes, Chinese Debris, and Global Space Industry Shifts. Bob Zimmerman discusses NASA's Artemis program, noting Administrator Sean Duffy is using a social media feud with Elon Musk as a "shiny object" to distract from the Orion capsule's untrustworthy heat shield risks. Other space issues include China's dangerous rocket debris crashes, some using highly toxic fuels, and European satellite companies consolidating into Project Bromo due to competition. Zimmerman also highlights the discovery of a large asteroid orbiting near Venus and Lockheed Martin's investment in Venus Aerospace's radical rocket engine design.

Putin's Yalta Model: Out-Negotiating Donald Trump. Cliff May, writing for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, looks at Putin's ambition to out-negotiate Donald Trump by emulating Stalin's success at the 1945 Yalta Conference. Stalin won that round of negotiations against Churchill and Roosevelt, securing Poland and much of Eastern Europe. This outcome was partly facilitated because Roosevelt, who was ill and viewed himself as a mediator, thought he could handle Stalin. The discussion reviews history to see if this model foreshadows future negotiations over Ukraine.

Newt talks with Brett Baier, chief political anchor for Fox News Channel, about his new book "To Rescue the American Spirit: Teddy Roosevelt and the Birth of a Superpower." Baier, known for his passion for presidential biographies, discusses the historical significance of Theodore Roosevelt, highlighting his role in expanding America's global influence and his larger-than-life persona. Their conversation touches on Roosevelt's achievements, such as brokering peace in the Russo-Japanese War and his leadership style exemplified by the Rough Riders. Baier draws parallels between Roosevelt and modern figures like Donald Trump, noting their shared charisma and unconventional approaches. The discussion also covers Roosevelt's progressive policies, his impact on American culture, and his adventurous spirit, including his perilous Amazon expedition. Baier's book tour and his approach to balancing his career in news with writing are also discussed.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.