Podcasts about stalingrad

Why did Operation Barbarossa fail? For more than eight decades, historians have offered one dominant answer: Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union was doomed from the outset. Vast distances, brutal weather, weak logistics and the overwhelming industrial power of the Red Army ensured that the Wehrmacht never had a realistic chance of success. But what if this familiar verdict is too comfortable — and too simplistic? In Why Barbarossa Failed: Germany and Russia in the Second World War (Helion and Company, 2026), Timothy Manion offers a bold, deeply researched re-examination of the most consequential campaign of the Second World War. Going far beyond the well-worn clichés of “General Winter” and German hubris, Manion places the story in a much longer arc: the evolution of military thought from the age of Napoleon through the catastrophe of 1914–18 and into the highly mechanised, manoeuvre-driven doctrines championed by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the interwar period. Drawing upon a vast range of previously overlooked archival records, Manion demonstrates that both armies entered the war expecting a rapid, decisive campaign — a return to war between generals, not economies. Early German successes seemed to prove them right. But as Manion reveals, the Wehrmacht's apparent mastery of mobile warfare concealed profound flaws in decision-making, command structure and operational logic. Meanwhile, the Red Army —though battered — adapted faster and more its opponent understood. The result is a compelling challenge to the established consensus. Manion argues that Barbarossa did not collapse under the weight of numbers alone: German generalship and operational misjudgement played a far larger part than most accounts allow, while Soviet resilience and strategic learning proved decisive long before Stalingrad. Rich with analytical clarity, packed with detailed campaign studies, and supported by an extensive set of newly published archival maps and figures, Why Barbarossa Failed is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not only how the 1941 campaign unfolded — but why its outcome shaped the entire course of the war. This is the story of two armies, two visions of modern warfare — and the decision points that sealed the fate of the Eastern Front.Timothy Manion earned dual degrees in mathematics and economics from Boston University. After graduating from Harvard Law School, Manion represented global financial institutions on Wall Street as outside counsel. Not satisfied with traditional explanations for the failure of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Manion has undertaken an extensive investigation of the German and Soviet archives. The results of his study overturn the historical consensus on the campaign and are published here for the first time.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Why did Operation Barbarossa fail? For more than eight decades, historians have offered one dominant answer: Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union was doomed from the outset. Vast distances, brutal weather, weak logistics and the overwhelming industrial power of the Red Army ensured that the Wehrmacht never had a realistic chance of success. But what if this familiar verdict is too comfortable — and too simplistic? In Why Barbarossa Failed: Germany and Russia in the Second World War (Helion and Company, 2026), Timothy Manion offers a bold, deeply researched re-examination of the most consequential campaign of the Second World War. Going far beyond the well-worn clichés of “General Winter” and German hubris, Manion places the story in a much longer arc: the evolution of military thought from the age of Napoleon through the catastrophe of 1914–18 and into the highly mechanised, manoeuvre-driven doctrines championed by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the interwar period. Drawing upon a vast range of previously overlooked archival records, Manion demonstrates that both armies entered the war expecting a rapid, decisive campaign — a return to war between generals, not economies. Early German successes seemed to prove them right. But as Manion reveals, the Wehrmacht's apparent mastery of mobile warfare concealed profound flaws in decision-making, command structure and operational logic. Meanwhile, the Red Army —though battered — adapted faster and more its opponent understood. The result is a compelling challenge to the established consensus. Manion argues that Barbarossa did not collapse under the weight of numbers alone: German generalship and operational misjudgement played a far larger part than most accounts allow, while Soviet resilience and strategic learning proved decisive long before Stalingrad. Rich with analytical clarity, packed with detailed campaign studies, and supported by an extensive set of newly published archival maps and figures, Why Barbarossa Failed is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not only how the 1941 campaign unfolded — but why its outcome shaped the entire course of the war. This is the story of two armies, two visions of modern warfare — and the decision points that sealed the fate of the Eastern Front.Timothy Manion earned dual degrees in mathematics and economics from Boston University. After graduating from Harvard Law School, Manion represented global financial institutions on Wall Street as outside counsel. Not satisfied with traditional explanations for the failure of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Manion has undertaken an extensive investigation of the German and Soviet archives. The results of his study overturn the historical consensus on the campaign and are published here for the first time.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In this episode, I am joined by Ian Buruma to talk about life in Berlin during the Second World War. Rather than focusing on the regime at the top or the battles fought far from the city, we look at how ordinary people experienced daily life as war, repression, bombing, and fear increasingly shaped everything around them. Our conversation centres on what it meant to survive in wartime Berlin, how behaviour and attitudes changed over time, and how the city moved from uneasy normality to catastrophe after Stalingrad and as the Red Army approached. We also discuss the experience of forced labourers in the city, including Ian's father, who was among the hundreds of thousands trying to stay alive under brutal conditions. Ian is the author of Stay Alive: Berlin 1939–1945, which looks at life in the German capital from the outbreak of war to its collapse in 1945, focusing on how ordinary people coped as survival gradually became the central concern.   patreon.com/ww2podcast  

SHOW SCHEDULE THURSDAY 3-12-20261917 COTSWOLDS ENGLAND1. Mary Anastasia O'Grady (Wall Street Journal) discusses Iranian presence in Venezuela, focusing on war drones and agents with Venezuelan passports. She notes the U.S. recognition of Delcy Rodriguez as acting president while pursuing a democratic transition. (1)2. Natalie Ecanow (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) examines Qatar's "Special Watch List" designation for religious freedom abuses, specifically involving a Baha'i leader. She highlights the contradiction of Qatar hosting groups like Hamas while maintaining strategic U.S. partnerships. (2)3. Jeff McCausland (CBS News) analyzes modern warfare's reliance on drones and missiles, noting the lack of a clear U.S. strategy for the Iran conflict. He criticizes the administration's poor messaging regarding tragic civilian casualties. (3)4. Jeff McCausland (CBS News) discusses technology favoring defense in Ukraine and Iran through drones and GPS. He examines Iran's asymmetric strategy targeting global supply chains and their willingness to fight a long attrition war. (4)5. Evan Ellis (U.S. Army War College) details Panama's port contract disputes with China and the transition to APM Terminals. He also discusses ongoing lawfare in Guatemala and the U.S. intention to return Haitian migrants despite local violence. (5)6. Evan Ellis (U.S. Army War College) reports on rumored secret diplomacy between the U.S. and Cuba's Castro family. He explains Cuba's severe economic collapse and electricity crisis following the loss of subsidized oil from Venezuela. (6)7. Evan Ellis (U.S. Army War College) discusses U.S. direct engagement with Venezuela's leadership regarding oil and mining investments. He also analyzes shifting political trends in Colombia and Peru, where right-of-center candidates are gaining significant momentum. (7)8. Evan Ellis (U.S. Army War College) notes cooled relations between Brazil's Lula and the U.S. due to Brazil's foreign policy shifts toward the BRICS. He also analyzes the rise of conservative leader Jose Antonio Kast in Chile. (8)9. Paul Thomas Chamberlain (Columbia University) recounts U.S. strategic calculations before Pearl Harbor, highlighting uncertainty about carrier technology. He describes the U.S. as a reluctant, "anti-colonial" empire facing imminent threats to its Philippine possessions and interests. (9)10. Paul Thomas Chamberlain (Columbia University) identifies late 1942 as World War II's turning point, citing Stalingrad, Guadalcanal, and North Africa. These battles signaled the rise of continent-spanning superpowers over traditional colonial empires in a new world order. (10)11. Paul Thomas Chamberlain (Columbia University) analyzes the Casablanca and Cairo conferences, highlighting Roosevelt's strategies to keep Stalin as an ally. The U.S. promoted anti-colonialism and self-determination to establish a post-war liberal capitalist order dominated by American economy. (11)12. Paul Thomas Chamberlain (Columbia University) examines Allied plans like Operation Ranke to contain Soviet influence as Germany neared collapse. Despite focusing on Europe, the U.S. successfully launched simultaneous offensive thrusts across the Pacific against the Japanese Empire. (12)13. Anatol Lieven (Quincy Institute) discusses the Iran war's impact, noting Russia's benefits through increased energy profits and diverted Western air defenses. He criticizes the U.S. administration for failing to predict predictable Iranian retaliation against global energy supplies. (13)14. Anatol Lieven (Quincy Institute) explores the resurgence of the "Great Game," detailing Israel's goal to dismantle the Iranian state. He argues that bombing will not break Iranian resistance and notes European reluctance to impose sanctions. (14)15. Richard Epstein (Civitas Institute) criticizes President Trump's trade policies and tariff investigations, arguing they cause severe domestic economic dislocation. He highlights the legal uncertainty businesses face regarding tariff refunds and the potential for prolonged litigation. (15)16. Richard Epstein (Civitas Institute) discusses the Middle East war's threat to niche commodities essential for high-end microchips. He critiques recent energy policies and emphasizes the difficulty of assessing military progress due to limited public information. (16)

10. Professor Paul Thomas Chamberlain identifies November 1942as the critical turning point of World War II, marked by the simultaneous battles of Stalingrad, Guadalcanal, and North Africa. These events signaled the rise of superpowers—continent-spanning states with massive industrial bases—that began to eclipse the old European colonial empires. By this point, the expansion of the Germanand Japanese empires had been halted, shifting the global power structure toward the United States and the Soviet Union. (10)1942 WINSTON AND REGIMENT

11. Professor Paul Thomas Chamberlain describes the Casablanca and Tehran conferences, where Allied leaders grappled with the realization that the Soviet Union would emerge as a dominant European power. He highlights Roosevelt's anti-colonial vision, which sought to replace imperial systems with a liberal capitalist order based on free trade and self-determination. Roosevelt's outreach to Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo reflected his recognition of China as a future pillar of this new international framework, often managed in private and out of earshot of Winston Churchill. (11)1942 STALINGRAD

Last time we spoke about the end of the battle of khalkin gol. In the summer of 1939, the Nomonhan Incident escalated into a major border conflict between Soviet-Mongolian forces and Japan's Kwantung Army along the Halha River. Despite Japanese successes in July, Zhukov launched a decisive offensive on August 20. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the river, unleashing over 200 bombers and intense artillery barrages that devastated Japanese positions. Zhukov's northern, central, and southern forces encircled General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, supported by Manchukuoan units. Fierce fighting ensued: the southern flank collapsed under Colonel Potapov's armor, while the northern Fui Heights held briefly before falling to relentless assaults, including flame-throwing tanks. Failed Japanese counterattacks on August 24 resulted in heavy losses, with regiments shattered by superior Soviet firepower and tactics. By August 25, encircled pockets were systematically eliminated, leading to the annihilation of the Japanese 6th Army. The defeat, coinciding with the Hitler-Stalin Pact, forced Japan to negotiate a ceasefire on September 15-16, redrawing borders. Zhukov's victory exposed Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare, influencing future strategies and deterring further northern expansion.   #192 The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Despite the fact this technically will go into future events, I thought it was important we talk about a key moment in Sino history. Even though the battle of changkufeng and khalkin gol were not part of the second sino-Japanese war, their outcomes certainly would affect it.  Policymaking by the Soviet Union alone was not the primary factor in ending Moscow's diplomatic isolation in the late 1930s. After the Munich Conference signaled the failure of the popular front/united front approach, Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, and Poland's Józef Beck unintentionally strengthened Joseph Stalin's position in early 1939. Once the strategic cards were in his hands, Stalin capitalized on them. His handling of negotiations with Britain and France, as well as with Germany, from April to August was deft and effective. The spring and summer negotiations among the European powers are well documented and have been examined from many angles. In May 1939, while Stalin seemed to have the upper hand in Europe, yet before Hitler had signaled that a German–Soviet agreement might be possible, the Nomonhan incident erupted, a conflict initiated and escalated by the Kwantung Army. For a few months, the prospect of a Soviet–Japanese war revived concerns in Moscow about a two-front conflict. Reviewing Soviet talks with Britain, France, and Germany in the spring and summer of 1939 from an East Asian perspective sheds fresh light on the events that led to the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact and, more broadly, to the outbreak of World War II. The second week of May marked the start of fighting at Nomonhan, during which negotiations between Germany and the USSR barely advanced beyond mutual scrutiny. Moscow signaled that an understanding with Nazi Germany might be possible. Notably, on May 4, the removal of Maksim Litvinov as foreign commissar and his replacement by Vyacheslav Molotov suggested a shift in approach. Litvinov, an urbane diplomat of Jewish origin and married to an Englishwoman, had been the leading Soviet proponent of the united-front policy and a steadfast critic of Nazi Germany. If a settlement with Hitler was sought, Litvinov was an unsuitable figure to lead the effort. Molotov, though with limited international experience, carried weight as chairman of the Council of Ministers and, more importantly, as one of Stalin's closest lieutenants. This personnel change seemed to accomplish its aim in Berlin, where the press was instructed on May 5 to halt polemical attacks on the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. On the same day, Karl Schnurre, head of the German Foreign Ministry's East European trade section, told Soviet chargé d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that Skoda, the German-controlled Czech arms manufacturer, would honor existing arms contracts with Russia. Astakhov asked whether, with Litvinov's departure, Germany might resume negotiations for a trade treaty Berlin had halted months earlier. By May 17, during discussions with Schnurre, Astakhov asserted that "there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for enmity between the two countries," and that Britain and France's negotiations appeared unpromising. The next day, Ribbentrop personally instructed Schulenburg to green-light trade talks. Molotov, however, insisted that a "political basis" for economic negotiations had to be established first. Suspicion remained high on both sides. Stalin feared Berlin might use reports of German–Soviet talks to destabilize a potential triple alliance with Britain and France; Hitler feared Stalin might use such reports to entice Tokyo away from an anti-German pact. The attempt to form a tripartite military alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan foundered over divergent aims: Berlin targeted Britain and France; Tokyo aimed at the Soviet Union. Yet talks persisted through August 1939, with Japanese efforts to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alignment continually reported to Moscow by Richard Sorge. Hitler and Mussolini, frustrated by Japanese objections, first concluded the bilateral Pact of Steel on May 22. The next day, Hitler, addressing his generals, stressed the inevitability of war with Poland and warned that opposition from Britain would be crushed militarily. He then hinted that Russia might "prove disinterested in the destruction of Poland," suggesting closer ties with Japan if Moscow opposed Germany. The exchange was quickly leaked to the press. Five days later, the first pitched battle of the Nomonhan campaign began. Although Hitler's timing with the Yamagata detachment's foray was coincidental, Moscow may have found the coincidence ominous. Despite the inducement of Molotov's call for a political basis before economic talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop did not immediately respond. On June 14, Astakhov signaled to Parvan Draganov, Bulgaria's ambassador in Berlin, that the USSR faced three options: ally with Britain and France, continue inconclusive talks with them, or align with Germany, the latter being closest to Soviet desires. Draganov relayed to the German Foreign Ministry that Moscow preferred a non-aggression agreement if Germany would pledge not to attack the Soviet Union. Two days later, Schulenburg told Astakhov that Germany recognized the link between economic and political relations and was prepared for far-reaching talks, a view echoed by Ribbentrop. The situation remained tangled: the Soviets pursued overt talks with Britain and France, while Stalin sought to maximize Soviet leverage. Chamberlain's stance toward Moscow remained wary but recognized a "psychological value" to an Anglo–Soviet rapprochement, tempered by his insistence on a hard bargain. American ambassador William C. Bullitt urged London to avoid the appearance of pursuing the Soviets, a view that resonated with Chamberlain's own distrust. Public confidence in a real Anglo–Soviet alliance remained low. By July 19, cabinet minutes show Chamberlain could not quite believe a genuine Russia–Germany alliance was possible, though he recognized the necessity of negotiations with Moscow to deter Hitler and to mollify an increasingly skeptical British public. Despite reservations, both sides kept the talks alive. Stalin's own bargaining style, with swift Soviet replies but frequent questions and demands, often produced delays. Molotov pressed on questions such as whether Britain and France would pledge to defend the Baltic states, intervene if Japan attacked the USSR, or join in opposing Germany if Hitler pressured Poland or Romania. These considerations were not trivial; they produced extended deliberations. On July 23, Molotov demanded that plans for coordinated military action among the three powers be fleshed out before a political pact. Britain and France accepted most political terms, and an Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow on August 11. The British commander, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket-Ernle-Erle-Drax, conducted staff talks but could not conclude a military agreement. The French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could sign but not bind his government. By then, Hitler had set August 26 as the date for war with Poland. With that looming, Hitler pressed for Soviet neutrality, or closer cooperation. In July and August, secret German–Soviet negotiations favored the Germans, who pressed for a rapid settlement and made most concessions. Yet Stalin benefited from keeping the British and French engaged, creating leverage against Hitler and safeguarding a potential Anglo–Soviet option as a fallback. To lengthen the talks and avoid immediate resolution, Moscow emphasized the Polish issue. Voroshilov demanded the Red Army be allowed to operate through Polish territory to defend Poland, a demand Warsaw would never accept. Moscow even floated a provocative plan: if Britain and France could compel Poland to permit Baltic State naval operations, the Western fleets would occupy Baltic ports, an idea that would have been militarily perilous and diplomatically explosive. Despite this, Stalin sought an agreement with Germany. Through Richard Sorge's intelligence, Moscow knew Tokyo aimed to avoid large-scale war with the USSR, and Moscow pressed for a German–Soviet settlement, including a nonaggression pact and measures to influence Japan to ease Sino–Japanese tensions. On August 16, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to urge Molotov and Stalin toward a nonaggression pact and to coordinate with Japan. Stalin signaled willingness, and August 23–24 saw the drafting of the pact and the collapse of the Soviet and Japanese resistance elsewhere. That night, in a memorandum of Ribbentrop's staff, seven topics were summarized, with Soviet–Japanese relations and Molotov's insistence that Berlin demonstrate good faith standing out. Ribbentrop reiterated his willingness to influence Japan for a more favorable Soviet–Japanese relationship, and Stalin's reply indicated a path toward a détente in the East alongside the European agreement: "M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."  Second, the assertion that the Soviet Union was prepared for and unafraid of war with Japan is an overstatement, though Stalin certainly had grounds for optimism regarding the battlefield situation and the broader East Asian strategic balance. It is notable that, despite the USSR's immediate diplomatic and military gains against Japan, Stalin remained anxious to conceal from Tokyo any peace initiative that originated in Moscow. That stance suggests that Tokyo or Hsinking might read such openness as a sign of Soviet weakness or confidence overextended. The Japanese danger, it would seem, did not disappear from Stalin's mind. Even at the height of his diplomatic coup, Stalin was determined not to burn bridges prematurely. On August 21, while he urged Hitler to send Ribbentrop to Moscow, he did not sever talks with Britain and France. Voroshilov requested a temporary postponement on the grounds that Soviet delegation officers were needed for autumn maneuvers. It was not until August 25, after Britain reiterated its resolve to stand by Poland despite the German–Soviet pact, that Stalin sent the Anglo–French military mission home. Fortified by the nonaggression pact, which he hoped would deter Britain and France from action, Hitler unleashed his army on Poland on September 1. Two days later, as Zhukov's First Army Group was completing its operations at Nomonhan, Hitler faced a setback when Britain and France declared war. Hitler had hoped to finish Poland quickly in 1939 and avoid fighting Britain and France until 1940. World War II in Europe had begun. The Soviet–Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the sole, nor even the principal, factor prompting Stalin to conclude an alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a European war that could fracture the major capitalist powers might have been reason enough. Yet the conflict with Japan in the East was also a factor in Stalin's calculations, a dimension that has received relatively little attention in standard accounts of the outbreak of the war. This East Asian focus seeks to clarify the record without proposing a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy; rather, it adds an important piece often overlooked in the "origins of the Second World War" puzzle, helping to reduce the overall confusion. The German–Soviet agreement provided for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland soon after Germany's invasion. On September 3, just forty-eight hours after the invasion and on the day Britain and France declared war, Ribbentrop urged Moscow to invade Poland from the east. Yet, for two more weeks, Poland's eastern frontier remained inviolate; Soviet divisions waited at the border, as most Polish forces were engaged against Germany. The German inquiries about the timing of the Soviet invasion continued, but the Red Army did not move. This inactivity is often attributed to Stalin's caution and suspicion, but that caution extended beyond Europe. Throughout early September, sporadic ground and air combat continued at Nomonhan, including significant activity by Kwantung Army forces on September 8–9, and large-scale air engagements on September 1–2, 4–5, and 14–15. Not until September 15 was the Molotov–Togo cease-fire arrangement finalized, to take effect on September 16. The very next morning, September 17, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier into a country collapsed at its feet. It appears that Stalin wanted to ensure that fighting on his eastern flank had concluded before engaging in Western battles, avoiding a two-front war. Through such policies, Stalin avoided the disaster of a two-front war. Each principal in the 1939 diplomatic maneuvering pursued distinct objectives. The British sought an arrangement with the USSR that would deter Hitler from attacking Poland and, if deterred, bind Moscow to the Anglo–French alliance. Hitler sought an alliance with the USSR to deter Britain and France from aiding Poland and, if they did aid Poland, to secure Soviet neutrality. Japan sought a military alliance with Germany against the USSR, or failing that, stronger Anti-Comintern ties. Stalin aimed for an outcome in which Germany would fight the Western democracies, leaving him freedom to operate in both the West and East; failing that, he sought military reassurance from Britain and France in case he had to confront Germany. Of the four, only Stalin achieved his primary objective. Hitler secured his secondary objective; the British and Japanese failed to realize theirs. Stalin won the diplomatic contest in 1939. Yet, as diplomats gave way to generals, the display of German military power in Poland and in Western Europe soon eclipsed Stalin's diplomatic triumph. By playing Germany against Britain and France, Stalin gained leverage and a potential fallback, but at the cost of unleashing a devastating European war. As with the aftermath of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly after hostilities ceased at Nomonhan. The Molotov–Togo agreement of September 15 and the local truces arranged around Nomonhan on September 19 were observed scrupulously by both sides. On October 27, the two nations settled another long-standing dispute by agreeing to mutual release of fishing boats detained on charges of illegal fishing in each other's territorial waters. On November 6, the USSR appointed Konstantin Smetanin as ambassador to Tokyo, replacing the previous fourteen-month tenure of a chargé d'affaires. Smetanin's first meeting with the new Japanese foreign minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, in November 1939 attracted broad, favorable coverage in the Japanese press. In a break with routine diplomatic practice, Nomura delivered a draft proposal for a new fisheries agreement and a memo outlining the functioning of the joint border commission to be established in the Nomonhan area before Smetanin presented his credentials. On December 31, an agreement finalizing Manchukuo's payment to the USSR for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached, and the Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention was renewed for 1940. In due course, the boundary near Nomonhan was formally redefined. A November 1939 agreement between Molotov and Togo established a mixed border commission representing the four parties to the dispute. After protracted negotiations, the border commission completed its redemarcation on June 14, 1941, with new border markers erected in August 1941. The resulting boundary largely followed the Soviet–MPR position, lying ten to twelve miles east of the Halha River. With that, the Nomonhan incident was officially closed.  Kwantung Army and Red Army leaders alike sought to "teach a lesson" to their foe at Nomonhan. The refrain recurs in documents and memoirs from both sides, "we must teach them a lesson." The incident provided lessons for both sides, but not all were well learned. For the Red Army, the lessons of Nomonhan intertwined with the laurels of victory, gratifying but sometimes distracting. Georgy Zhukov grasped the experience of modern warfare that summer, gaining more than a raised profile: command experience, confidence, and a set of hallmarks he would employ later. He demonstrated the ability to grasp complex strategic problems quickly, decisive crisis leadership, meticulous attention to logistics and deception, patience in building superior strength before striking at the enemy's weakest point, and the coordination of massed artillery, tanks, mechanized infantry, and tactical air power in large-scale double envelopment. These capabilities informed his actions at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and ultimately Berlin. It is tempting to wonder how Zhukov might have fared in the crucial autumn and winter of 1941 without Nomonhan, or whether he would have been entrusted with the Moscow front in 1941 had he not distinguished himself at Nomonhan. Yet the Soviet High Command overlooked an important lesson. Despite Zhukov's successes with independent tank formations and mechanized infantry, the command misapplied Spanish Civil War-era experience by disbanding armored divisions and redistributing tanks to infantry units to serve as support. It was not until after Germany demonstrated tank warfare in 1940 that the Soviets began reconstituting armored divisions and corps, a process still incomplete when the 1941 invasion began. The Red Army's performance at Nomonhan went largely unseen in the West. Western intelligence and military establishments largely believed the Red Army was fundamentally rotten, a view reinforced by the battlefield's remoteness and by both sides' reluctance to publicize the defeat. The Polish crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe drew attention away from Nomonhan, and the later Finnish Winter War reinforced negative Western judgments of Soviet military capability. U.S. military attaché Raymond Faymonville observed that the Soviets, anticipating a quick victory over Finland, relied on hastily summoned reserves ill-suited for winter fighting—an assessment that led some to judge the Red Army by its performance at Nomonhan. Even in Washington, this view persisted; Hitler reportedly called the Red Army "a paralytic on crutches" after Finland and then ordered invasion planning in 1941. Defeat can be a stronger teacher than victory. Because Nomonhan was a limited war, Japan's defeat was likewise limited, and its impact on Tokyo did not immediately recalibrate Japanese assessments. Yet Nomonhan did force Japan to revise its estimation of Soviet strength: the Imperial Army abandoned its strategic Plan Eight-B and adopted a more defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. An official inquiry into the debacle, submitted November 29, 1939, recognized Soviet superiority in materiel and firepower and urged Japan to bolster its own capabilities. The Kwantung Army's leadership, chastened, returned to the frontier with a more realistic sense of capability, even as the Army Ministry and AGS failed to translate lessons into policy. The enduring tendency toward gekokujo, the dominance of local and mid-level officers over central authority, remained persistent, and Tokyo did not fully purge it after Nomonhan. The Kwantung Army's operatives who helped drive the Nomonhan episode resurfaced in key posts at Imperial General Headquarters, contributing to Japan's 1941 decision to go to war. The defeat of the Kwantung Army at Nomonhan, together with the Stalin–Hitler pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, triggered a reorientation of Japanese strategy and foreign policy. The new government, led by the politically inexperienced and cautious General Abe Nobuyuki, pursued a conservative foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Chongqing left the Chinese war at a stalemate: the Japanese Expeditionary Army could still inflict defeats on Chinese nationalist forces, but it had no viable path to a decisive victory. China remained Japan's principal focus. Still, the option of cutting Soviet aid to China and of moving north into Outer Mongolia and Siberia was discredited in Tokyo by the August 1939 double defeat. Northward expansion never again regained its ascendancy, though it briefly resurfaced in mid-1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany's alliance with the USSR during Nomonhan was viewed by Tokyo as a betrayal, cooling German–Japanese relations. Japan also stepped back from its confrontation with Britain over Tientsin. Tokyo recognized that the European war represented a momentous development that could reshape East Asia, as World War I had reshaped it before. The short-lived Abe government (September–December 1939) and its successor under Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (December 1939–July 1940) adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the European war. That stance shifted in the summer of 1940, however, after Germany's successes in the West. With Germany's conquest of France and the Low Countries and Britain's fight for survival, Tokyo reassessed the global balance of power. Less than a year after Zhukov had effectively blocked further Japanese expansion northward, Hitler's victories seemed to open a southern expansion path. The prospect of seizing the resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch, French, and British and, more importantly, resolving the China problem in Japan's favor, tempted many in Tokyo. If Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek, channeled through Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Burma could be cut off, some in Tokyo believed Chiang might abandon resistance. If not, Japan could launch new operations against Chiang from Indochina and Burma, effectively turning China's southern flank. To facilitate a southward advance, Japan sought closer alignment with Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka brought Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in the hope of neutralizing the United States, and concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union to secure calm in the north. Because of the European military situation, only the United States could check Japan's southward expansion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared determined to do so and confident that he could. If the Manchurian incident and the Stimson Doctrine strained U.S.–Japanese relations, and the China War and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek deepened mutual resentment, it was Japan's decision to press south against French, British, and Dutch colonies, and Roosevelt's resolve to prevent such a move, that put the two nations on a collision course. The dust had barely settled on the Mongolian plains following the Nomonhan ceasefire when the ripples of that distant conflict began to reshape the broader theater of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The defeat at Nomonhan in August 1939, coupled with the shocking revelation of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, delivered a profound strategic blow to Japan's imperial ambitions. No longer could Tokyo entertain serious notions of a "northern advance" into Soviet territory, a strategy that had long tantalized military planners as a means to secure resources and buffer against communism. Instead, the Kwantung Army's humiliation exposed glaring deficiencies in Japanese mechanized warfare, logistics, and intelligence, forcing a pivot southward. This reorientation not only cooled tensions with the Soviet Union but also allowed Japan to redirect its military focus toward the protracted stalemate in China. As we transition from the border clashes of the north to the heartland tensions in central China, it's essential to trace how these events propelled Japan toward the brink of a major offensive in Hunan Province, setting the stage for what would become a critical confrontation. In the immediate aftermath of Nomonhan, Japan's military high command grappled with the implications of their setback. The Kwantung Army, once a symbol of unchecked aggression, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture along the Manchurian-Soviet border. The ceasefire agreement, formalized on September 15-16, 1939, effectively neutralized the northern front, freeing up significant resources and manpower that had been tied down in the escalating border skirmishes. This was no small relief; the Nomonhan campaign had drained Japanese forces, with estimates of over 18,000 casualties and the near-total annihilation of the 23rd Division. The psychological impact was equally severe, shattering the myth of Japanese invincibility against a modern, mechanized opponent. Georgy Zhukov's masterful use of combined arms—tanks, artillery, and air power—highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities, prompting internal reviews that urged reforms in tank production, artillery doctrine, and supply chains. Yet, these lessons were slow to implement, and in the short term, the primary benefit was the opportunity to consolidate efforts elsewhere. For Japan, "elsewhere" meant China, where the war had devolved into a grinding attrition since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The capture of Wuhan, a major transportation hub and temporary capital of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, had been hailed as a turning point. Japanese forces, under the command of General Shunroku Hata, had pushed deep into central China, aiming to decapitate Chinese resistance. However, Chiang's strategic retreat to Chongqing transformed the conflict into a war of endurance. Nationalist forces, bolstered by guerrilla tactics and international aid, harassed Japanese supply lines and prevented a decisive knockout blow. By mid-1939, Japan controlled vast swaths of eastern and northern China, including key cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, but the cost was immense: stretched logistics, mounting casualties, and an inability to fully pacify occupied territories. The Nomonhan defeat exacerbated these issues by underscoring the limits of Japan's military overextension. With the northern threat abated, Tokyo's Army General Staff saw an opening to intensify operations in China, hoping to force Chiang to the negotiating table before global events further complicated the picture. The diplomatic fallout from Nomonhan and the Hitler-Stalin Pact further influenced this shift. Japan's betrayal by Germany, its nominal ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact—fostered distrust and isolation. Tokyo's flirtations with a full Axis alliance stalled, as the pact with Moscow revealed Hitler's willingness to prioritize European gains over Asian solidarity. This isolation prompted Japan to reassess its priorities, emphasizing self-reliance in China while eyeing opportunistic expansions elsewhere. Domestically, the Hiranuma cabinet collapsed in August 1939 amid the diplomatic shock, paving the way for the more cautious Abe Nobuyuki government. Abe's administration, though short-lived, signaled a temporary de-escalation in aggressive posturing, but the underlying imperative to resolve the "China Incident" persisted. Japanese strategists believed that capturing additional strategic points in central China could sever Chiang's lifelines, particularly the routes funneling aid from the Soviet Union and the West via Burma and Indochina. The seismic shifts triggered by Nomonhan compelled Japan to fundamentally readjust its China policy and war plans, marking a pivotal transition from overambitious northern dreams to a more focused, albeit desperate, campaign in the south. With the Kwantung Army's defeat fresh in mind, Tokyo's Imperial General Headquarters initiated a comprehensive strategic review in late August 1939. The once-dominant "Northern Advance" doctrine, which envisioned rapid conquests into Siberia for resources like oil and minerals, was officially shelved. In its place emerged a "Southern Advance" framework, prioritizing the consolidation of gains in China and potential expansions into Southeast Asia. This pivot was not merely tactical; it reflected a profound policy recalibration aimed at ending the quagmire in China, where two years of war had yielded territorial control but no decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Central to this readjustment was a renewed emphasis on economic and military self-sufficiency. The Nomonhan debacle had exposed Japan's vulnerabilities in mechanized warfare, leading to urgent reforms in industrial production. Tank manufacturing was ramped up, with designs influenced by observed Soviet models, and artillery stockpiles were bolstered to match the firepower discrepancies seen on the Mongolian steppes. Logistically, the Army General Staff prioritized streamlining supply lines in China, recognizing that prolonged engagements demanded better resource allocation. Politically, the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, installed in September 1939, adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward Europe but aggressively pursued diplomatic maneuvers to isolate China. Efforts to negotiate with Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in Nanjing intensified, aiming to undermine Chiang's legitimacy and splinter Chinese resistance. Japan also pressured Vichy France for concessions in Indochina, seeking to choke off aid routes to Chongqing. War plans evolved accordingly, shifting from broad-front offensives to targeted strikes designed to disrupt Chinese command and supply networks. The China Expeditionary Army, under General Yasuji Okamura, was restructured to emphasize mobility and combined arms operations, drawing partial lessons from Zhukov's tactics. Intelligence operations were enhanced, with greater focus on infiltrating Nationalist strongholds in central provinces. By early September, plans coalesced around a major push into Hunan Province, a vital crossroads linking northern and southern China. Hunan's river systems and rail lines made it a linchpin for Chinese logistics, funneling men and materiel to the front lines. Japanese strategists identified key urban centers in the region as critical objectives, believing their capture could sever Chiang's western supply corridors and force a strategic retreat. This readjustment was not without internal friction. Hardliners in the military lamented the abandonment of northern ambitions, but the reality of Soviet strength—and the neutrality pacts that followed—left little room for debate. Economically, Japan ramped up exploitation of occupied Chinese territories, extracting coal, iron, and rice to fuel the war machine. Diplomatically, Tokyo sought to mend fences with the Soviets through the 1941 Neutrality Pact, ensuring northern security while eyes turned south. Yet, these changes brewed tension with the United States, whose embargoes on scrap metal and oil threatened to cripple Japan's ambitions. As autumn approached, the stage was set for a bold gambit in central China. Japanese divisions massed along the Yangtze River, poised to strike at the heart of Hunan's defenses. Intelligence reports hinted at Chinese preparations, with Xue Yue's forces fortifying positions around a major provincial hub. The air thickened with anticipation of a clash that could tip the balance in the interminable war—a test of Japan's revamped strategies against a resilient foe determined to hold the line. What unfolded would reveal whether Tokyo's post-Nomonhan pivot could deliver the breakthrough so desperately needed, or if it would merely prolong the bloody stalemate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident saw Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeat Japan's Kwantung Army at Khalkin Gol, exposing Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare. This setback, coupled with the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact, shattered Japan's northern expansion plans and prompted a strategic pivot southward. Diplomatic maneuvers involving Stalin, Hitler, Britain, France, and Japan reshaped alliances, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941. Japan refocused on China, intensifying operations in Hunan Province to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.   

Únor je sice ještě zimní měsíc, pro zahrádkáře už ale začaly přípravy na sezónu. Bohatou úrodu brambor zajistí správný výběr sadby. Své zásoby ve sklepech probírají a třídí také členové Základní organizace Českého svazu zahrádkářů Stalingrad ve Žďáře nad Sázavou.

Únor je sice ještě zimní měsíc, pro zahrádkáře už ale začaly přípravy na sezónu. Bohatou úrodu brambor zajistí správný výběr sadby. Své zásoby ve sklepech probírají a třídí také členové Základní organizace Českého svazu zahrádkářů Stalingrad ve Žďáře nad Sázavou.

Únor je sice ještě zimní měsíc, pro zahrádkáře už ale začaly přípravy na sezónu. Bohatou úrodu brambor zajistí správný výběr sadby. Své zásoby ve sklepech probírají a třídí také členové Základní organizace Českého svazu zahrádkářů Stalingrad ve Žďáře nad Sázavou.

Únor je sice ještě zimní měsíc, pro zahrádkáře už ale začaly přípravy na sezónu. Bohatou úrodu brambor zajistí správný výběr sadby. Své zásoby ve sklepech probírají a třídí také členové Základní organizace Českého svazu zahrádkářů Stalingrad ve Žďáře nad Sázavou.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

In the latest NdB Sunday Show with Chris Steyn, US intelligence analyst, retired Colonel Chris Wyatt comments on the likelihood of US President Donald Trump imposing personal sanctions on some South African politicians in the face of continued provocation from the African National Congress (ANC); President Cyril Ramaphosa's SONA speech; his decision to send in the military to fight crime; the crime cartel infiltrated SAPS; the performance of Agriculture Minister John Steenhuisen who has abandoned his bid for re-election as Democratic Alliance (DA) leader; as well as the bad treatment received by some of the 2,000 odd South African refugees that have gone to America.

durée : 00:10:37 - Le Fil de l'histoire - par : Stéphanie DUNCAN - À la fin de l'année 1941, il s'en est fallu de peu que Moscou ne subisse le même sort que Leningrad. En janvier 1942, la situation reste très grave pour les Soviétiques : l'armée d'Hitler contrôle une grande partie du territoire et entend bien continuer sa progression. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

In this episode, Dr. Philip Blood returns to talk about the Battle of Aachen which is the subject of his latest book, War Comes to Aachen: The Nazis, Churchill, and the 'Stalingrad of the West'. LinksWar Comes to Aachen (Amazon ⁠https://www.amazon.com/War-Comes-Aachen-Churchill-Stalingrad/dp/1911723693⁠)WW2TV Part 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHNorlGemTEWW2TV Part 2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J_IRkeDAFs&list=PLDG3XyxGI5lA8jsUPclS-2jakJlDdp_Hk&index=3Mother of Tanks website (http://www.motheroftanks.com/podcast/)Bonus Content (https://www.patreon.com/c/motheroftanks)

Shout-outs, Call-outs, Tap-outs, Fade-outs, we're on the outs tonight. Nothing can fade us, bro. Not politics, not larger men, not new babies, nothing. We're so jammed that we went back to England again. We just keep doing this. Check out STALINGRAD.

Plongez dans l'histoire des grands personnages et des évènements marquants qui ont façonné notre monde ! Avec enthousiasme et talent, Franck Ferrand vous révèle les coulisses de l'histoire avec un grand H, entre mystères, secrets et épisodes méconnus : un cadeau pour les amoureux du passé, de la préhistoire à l'histoire contemporaine.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Join our book club!  / lifeonbooks  Get the Freedom App to remove distractions and read more books:https://freedom.sjv.io/N9074OJoin the Life on Books mailing list to stay up to date on all of our latest book giveaways, projects, and more!https://linktw.in/BRYAnVhWant to read one book from every country? Check out our resource online:https://linktw.in/ZeoltyWant to know my all time favorite books? Click the link below!https://bookshop.org/shop/lifeonbooksFollow me on Instagram:  / alifeonbooks  Follow Andy on Instagram  / metafictional.meathead  Books mentioned in this episode (using these links helps to support the show)One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquezhttps://amzn.to/3MRQ0Kmhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780060...Stalingrad by Vasily Grossmanhttps://amzn.to/498NQgIhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781681...The Logos by Mark Desilvahttps://amzn.to/4q1aVsWhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781955...The Sellout by Paul Beattyhttps://amzn.to/4b6VzPchttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781250...Boswell by Stanley Elkinhttps://amzn.to/3LHiV3Ehttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781564...Mr. Weightlifting by Richard BakI, Grape by Brock Clarkehttps://amzn.to/3YSH4XThttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781946...Solenoid by Mircea Carterescuhttps://amzn.to/4pQx8sMhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781646...Marshland by Otohiko Kagahttps://amzn.to/49KEdFqhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781628...Radiant Terminus Antoine Volodinehttps://amzn.to/4pQKndahttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781940...Natural Causes by Nina Lykkehttps://amzn.to/4qTsRWzhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781948...A Thousand Peaceful Cities by Jerzy Pilchhttps://amzn.to/49Y9d58https://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781934...Tomas Jonsson, Best Seller by Guðberger Bergssonhttps://amzn.to/3NAOexwhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781940...Children in Reindeer Woods by Kristin Omarsdottirhttps://amzn.to/4pRpwWYhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781934...A Thousand Forests in One Acornhttps://amzn.to/49NX5Dw

James Cameron-Wilson is impressed that The Housemaid has risen to the top spot. #2 is the quintessentially British movie Hamnet, despite Irish leads (Paul Mescal & Jessie Buckley) and Chinese writer-director Chloé Zhao. It's a slow burn but builds to a highly emotional climax. James loved it to within an inch of its brocade. On Amazon Prime, he was impressed by The Tank, a German film about a Tiger crew on a secret mission against the Russians after Stalingrad. It's tense and excellent until the final, infuriating twist. He is a fan of Kate Winslet's directorial debut, Goodbye June on Netflix. Written by her son Joe Anders, the cast includes Helen Mirren and Timothy Spall. It has great humanity, humour and wisdom, despite its sentimental ending. He watched The Family Plan 2 on Apple TV+ to see why Mark Wahlberg's online movies are so popular. It has some good action and one-liners but the plot is incredibly familiar. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Join our book club!  / lifeonbooks  Books mentioned in this episode (purchasing through these links helps to support the channel)One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquezhttps://amzn.to/3MRQ0Kmhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780060...Stalingrad by Vasily Grossmanhttps://amzn.to/498NQgIhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781681...The Logos by Mark Desilvahttps://amzn.to/4q1aVsWhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781955...You Bright and Risen Angels by William Vollmannhttps://amzn.to/4a9mr0yhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780140...Europe Central by William T. Vollmannhttps://amzn.to/4pzHiOphttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780143...Solenoid by Mircea Carterescuhttps://amzn.to/4pGZENEhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781646...The Tartar Steppe by Dino Buzzatihttps://amzn.to/49U3zBYhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781681...Waiting for the Barbarians by JM Coetzeehttps://amzn.to/4a1xUO7https://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781613...The Adventures and Misadventures of Maqrollhttps://amzn.to/4qybESPhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780940...Natural Causes by Nina Lykkehttps://amzn.to/4qTsRWzhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781948...Baron Wenckheim's Homecoming by Laszlo Krasznahorkaihttps://amzn.to/4qSSl6phttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780811...Fury by Clyo Mendozahttps://amzn.to/45dOpFbhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781644...Too Much of Life by Clarice Lispectorhttps://amzn.to/45JijkEhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780811...The Flanders Road by Claude Simonhttps://amzn.to/3LwvGxShttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781681...https://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780393...https://amzn.to/49SIWWRhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780393...2666 by Roberto Bolanohttps://amzn.to/45ob15Chttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780312...The Savage Detectives by Roberto Bolano

Join our book club!  / lifeonbooks  Follow J. on Instagram!  / science_visuals  See more of her work here:https://www.scivisuals.com/Books mentioned in this episode:The Old Filth Trilogy by Jane Gardamhttps://amzn.to/49e4X2cYou Bright and Risen Angels by William Vollmannhttps://amzn.to/4a9mr0yhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780140...One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquezhttps://amzn.to/3MRQ0Kmhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780060...Stalingrad by Vasily Grossmanhttps://amzn.to/498NQgIhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9781681...Blood Meridian by Cormac McCarthyhttps://amzn.to/4qve3NUhttps://bookshop.org/a/103053/9780679...The Invention of Nature by Andrew Wulfhttps://amzn.to/452Sig0The Rise and Reign of Mammals by Steve Brusattehttps://amzn.to/4prd4grThe Green Knight by Iris Murdochhttps://amzn.to/4qeGwHWHabibi by Craig Thompsonhttps://amzn.to/4powDWJJoin the Life on Books mailing list to stay up to date on all of our latest book giveaways, projects, and more!https://linktw.in/BRYAnVhWant to read one book from every country? Check out our resource online:https://linktw.in/ZeoltyWant to know my all time favorite books? Click the link below!https://bookshop.org/shop/lifeonbooksFollow me on Instagram:  / alifeonbooks  Follow Andy on Instagram  / metafictional.meathead  

Why did the Soviets bring a brass band to Finland? What is the significance of the Arcadia Conference in WW2? When was Operation Bodenplatte? Join James Holland and Al Murray as they discuss the major events of each January 1st in WW2. To watch the ad-free, video-supported, version of this episode, please head to our Patreon page directly. A Goalhanger Production Produced by James Regan Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Social: @WeHaveWaysPod Email: wehaveways@goalhanger.com Membership Club: patreon.com/wehaveways Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Die Weihnacht kommt im klaren Winterwind ins Tal. Die Mutter beugt sich über ihr Kind, der Vater steht weit entfernt im Feld auf Wache, und viele Sterne leuchten durch die graue Nacht. Zwei Sterne spiegeln sich in den Augen unseres Kindes und zeigen: Wir gehören zusammen. Der Liedtext aus der Sammlung Deutsche Kriegsweihnacht (München 1942) fasst typische Elemente der nationalsozialistischen Weihnachtskultur zusammen. Zum einen wird das Fest mit einer eher vagen Naturmystik verbunden – Winter, Nacht, Sterne. Zum anderen spielt der stark idealisierte Mutterkult eine wichtige Rolle. In dem Lied von Hans Baumann (1914–1988) kommt außerdem die Figur des Vaters hinzu, der als Soldat im Feld steht und Wache hält. Wie Weihnachten in Stalingrad gefeiert wurde – sowohl von den eingeschlossenen deutschen Soldaten als auch von den sowjetischen Truppen –, wollen wir in dieser Folge genauer untersuchen. Dafür müssen wir zunächst etwas ausholen und klären: Welche Bedeutung hatte Weihnachten im Nationalsozialismus?

Pour cette fin d'année, Contre-addictions vous propose de découvrir ou redécouvrir des épisodes qui ont marqué les prmières saisons du podcast.

Today on Little Wars FM, Greg interviews Dr. Prit Buttar to learn about the critical period of late November through December 1942. Dr. Buttar is a prolific historian with many published books, but today's conversation focuses on his 2018 book "On a Knife's Edge," which details the fall of Stalingrad and the failed relief effort to save Paulus's 6th Army. Should Paulus have initiated a breakout? Was a breakout even logistically possible? Is Manstein's legend overhyped in the context of Operation Winter Storm? And what about Zhukov's role...in his own memoirs did he steal the spotlight from other Red Army commanders? Why did Operation Winter Storm make such excellent progress on its first day before grinding to a halt in the ensuing week? Could Hitler have authorized the release of more divisions? Those questions are just the beginning of a fascinating, two-hour talk. You can read Dr. Buttar's book, "On a Knife's Edge" and get a copy directly from the publisher, Osprey. Also, you can learn more about his work on his personal website. We want to thank Prit Buttar for being so generous with his time and chatting with Little Wars TV for our Winter Storm campaign series on YouTube!

The recently unveiled U.S. National Security Strategy has ruffled liberal and even some conservative feathers both here and abroad, for two reasons:  No. 1, the Trump administration told Europe an inconvenient truth: The birthplace of Western civilization is facing “civilization erasure.” And No. 2, critics feel that the strategy is not critical enough of Russia and China. They're wrong. An entire section, “Economic Security,” is a not-so-subtle nod to America's ongoing, great power competition with China, evident in these carefully selected priorities: “balanced trade,” ”securing access to critical supply chains and materials,” “reindustrialization,” “reviving our defense industrial base,” etc. The other controversy is: Why does the strategy call for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war and not just openly condemn Vladimir Putin instead?  Because the assessment is grounded in reality. Unless the Europeans want to spend more than the already mandated 5% of GDP on defense budgets and pour more sophisticated weapons systems into Ukraine, then the conflict has no clear end in sight: “Do you wanna have an ongoing bleeding Stalingrad or Verdun … right on the borders of Europe,” asks Victor Davis Hanson on today's edition of “Victor Davis Hanson: In a Few Words.”

Heute wenden wir uns einem Schriftsteller zu, dessen Lebensweg untrennbar mit einem der dramatischsten Kapitel des Zweiten Weltkriegs verbunden ist. Viktor Nekrassow diente als junger Offizier in Stalingrad und erlebte die verheerenden Kämpfe nicht aus der Distanz, sondern unmittelbar in den Schützengräben, Seite an Seite mit seinen Kameraden. Gerade deshalb ist sein Werk so bemerkenswert: Es eröffnet die Möglichkeit, den Kampf um Stalingrad aus einer sowjetischen Perspektive zu betrachten.   Bemerkenswert ist zudem Nekrassows literarischer Werdegang. Bevor er zu schreiben begann, hatte er keinerlei Erfahrung als Autor. Gerade diese Unmittelbarkeit seiner Beobachtungen und sein Stil machten sein Debüt so kraftvoll. Mit seinem Roman In den Schützengräben von Stalingrad gelang ihm auf Anhieb ein Werk, das weit über die Grenzen der Sowjetunion hinaus Aufmerksamkeit erregte. Das Buch wurde zu einem internationalen Erfolg, brachte ihm schlagartig Weltruhm ein und erschien schließlich in mehr als dreißig Sprachen – ein Beleg dafür, wie sehr seine präzise, schonungslose Darstellung des Kriegsgeschehens die Leser und Leserinnen weltweit berührte.

For the Allies it was an enormous triumph and for Nazi Germany it was another Stalingrad. But 80 years on, the battle for Tunisia is barely mentioned in popular accounts of the Second World War, having been totally eclipsed by the iconic clashes in Europe and the Pacific. In his new book, Tunisgrad, military historian Saul David seeks to redress the balance, arguing that this north African campaign was one of the three biggest turning points of the entire war. In conversation with Rob Attar, he explains why. (Ad) Saul David is the author of Tunisgrad: Victory in Africa (HarperCollins, 2025). Buy it now from Waterstones: https://go.skimresources.com?id=71026X1535947&xcust=historyextra-social-histboty&xs=1&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.waterstones.com%2Fbook%2Ftunisgrad%2Fsaul-david%2F9780008653811. The HistoryExtra podcast is produced by the team behind BBC History Magazine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

After their victory at the Battle of Midway, Allied forces in the Pacific took the initiative in the South Pacific. However, the ensuing Guadalcanal campaign would prove to be challenging both on land and in nearby waters.Support the show My latest novel, "Califia's Crusade," is now available at Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Kobo, Apple Books, Bookshop.org, and many other online platforms!

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! El prestigioso mariscal del Reich, que se hizo un nombre al comandar las tropas acorazadas, fue uno de los testigos de la defensa en los Juicios de Núremberg. Creador del mito de "la Wehrmacht inocente" y condenado posteriormente por crímenes contra la humanidad, en esta entrevista de Goldensohn se muestra comprensivo con el sacrificio del 6º Ejército en Stalingrado y desconocedor de los asesinatos en masa en los territorios bajo su mando. Te lo cuentan Julio `Caronte' y Dani CarAn. 🎰 SORTEO FANS JULIO'25 👉 https://bit.ly/SORTEOCBFANS0725 Libro: Desperta Ferro - PANZER Vol.1 (1939-1940). El triunfo de la Blitzkrieg) Juego: SCOPE Panzer, Stalingrad o U-Boot (a elegir) Videojuego de Estrategia: Armored Brigade II 🔗 Enlaces para Listas de Episodios Exclusivos para 💥 FANS 👉 CB FANS 💥 https://bit.ly/CBPListCBFans Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books zeppelinbooks.com es un sello editorial de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Estamos en: 👉 https://podcastcasusbelli.com 👉 X/Twitter https://twitter.com/CasusBelliPod 👉 Facebook https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉 Instagram estamos https://www.instagram.com/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Canal https://t.me/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Grupo de Chat https://t.me/casusbellipod 📺 YouTube https://bit.ly/casusbelliyoutube 👉 TikTok https://www.tiktok.com/@casusbelli10 👨💻Nuestro chat del canal es https://t.me/casusbellipod ⚛️ El logotipo de Casus Belli Podcasdt y el resto de la Factoría Casus Belli están diseñados por Publicidad Fabián publicidadfabian@yahoo.es 🎵 La música incluida en el programa es Ready for the war de Marc Corominas Pujadó bajo licencia CC. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ El resto de música es bajo licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o SGAE SGAE RRDD/4/1074/1012 de Ivoox. Incluye cortes de audio de RTVE Play 📧¿Queréis contarnos algo? También puedes escribirnos a casus.belli.pod@gmail.com ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast, patrocinar un episodio o una serie? Hazlo a través de 👉 https://www.advoices.com/casus-belli-podcast-historia Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, ya que nos da mucha visibilidad. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast? Hazlo con advoices.com/podcast/ivoox/391278 Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

SUPPORT THE SHOW ON PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/lionsledbydonkeys In the opening stages of WWI, an Army of 40 year old reservists from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, armed with decades-old weapons and no food, and largely unable to even speak to one another, attempt to hold off the Russian Imperial Army in what became known as "Austria-Hungary's Stalingrad" Sources: Graydon Tunstall. Written in Blood: The Battles For Fortress Przemysl in WWI. Dr. Alexander Watson. The Fortress: The Siege of Przemsysl and the Making of Europe's Bloodlands. Christopher Miskimon. The Siege of Przemysl. Military Heritage. Jan 2016. Volume 17, No 4.

What can war teach us about how the human brain really works? And why is human decision-making a more significant factor than military strength in wars?Episode SummaryOn this episode, I'm exploring how the human brain truly manifests in conflict—and what that reveals about everyday decision-making. Dr Nicholas Wright, a neurologist-turned-neuroscientist who advises the Pentagon Joint Staff, joins me to discuss his new book Warhead: How the Brain Shapes War and War Shapes the Brain. In our conversation, Nick explains why fear is functional, how “will to fight” can outweigh superior force, and why democracies remain capable of catastrophic decisions. He also explains how perception operates as a controlled hallucination anchored to reality rather than a simple sensory feed, and why that distinction matters for strategy, leadership, and risk. Moving from fruit flies to front lines, Nick shows how simple neural chemicals regulate aggression, how the brain's grid cells create literal maps to navigate danger and opportunity, and how both biological and organisational models can mislead when mistaken for reality. The discussion ranges from 1940 France to Kyiv, from Stalingrad to Gaza, and from deception as a vice to deception as a civic virtue.Nick makes a compelling case for metacognition — the ability to think about one's own thinking— as the conductor of the brain's internal orchestra and argues that wisdom—not merely cleverness — must be deliberately designed into leaders and into the next generation of artificial intelligence.We end with practical insights: cultivating “better ignorance,” inviting real dissent in the spirit of Churchill, and creating deliberate spaces for reflection like (I'm delighted to report) long train journeys.Guest Biography Dr Nicholas Wright, MRCP, PhD, is a neuroscientist researching the intersections of the brain, technology, and security at University College London, Georgetown University, and the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, DC. He also serves as an adviser to the Pentagon Joint Staff. Beyond academia, Wright leads projects connecting neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and strategy, and has advised the Pentagon Joint Staff for more than a decade.He consults on AI for SAP and edited Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order (Air University Press, 2019).His latest book, Warhead: How the Brain Shapes War and War Shapes the Brain, is published by St. Martin's Press (US) and Pan Macmillan (UK).AI_Generated Time-stamped Summary[00:00:00] Introduction [00:01:00] Nick Wright's journey from neurologist to defense advisor, applying neuroscience to strategy and AI.[00:04:29] How evolution shaped the human brain for survival and combat — we're “built to win or survive a fight.”[00:05:59] Fear as a vital yet double-edged emotion; anxiety as a side effect of peace.[00:08:26] Origins of the book Warhead and cultural perceptions of its title.[00:09:39] Why war remains relevant; critique of overconfidence in peace and Pinker's “Better Angels” thesis.[00:12:01] Lessons from France's WWII defeat — cognition and morale outweigh material strength.[00:14:41] Ukraine's resistance as an example of will to fight; psychology as a decisive factor.[00:15:42] Creativity and emotion as essential tools in decision-making; the brain as an orchestra balancing logic and instinct.[00:18:10] What fruit flies reveal about aggression and shared neural circuitry with humans.[00:21:13] Structure of Warhead — using neuroscience to reinterpret history and warfare.[00:26:37] Mental models and how the brain simulates reality to guide choices.[00:30:37] Perception vs. reality — the brain generates, not records, the world we see.[00:35:31] The “uncanny valley” and prediction errors — why imperfect mimicry unsettles us.[00:36:17] Moral symmetry in conflict — both sides perceive their cause as just.[00:38:00] Deception and fog of war — manipulating human perception as a timeless weapon.[00:41:00] WWII story of René Carmille — lying as moral resistance.[00:43:59] Social media, attention, and the loss of reflection — the modern “disease of abundance.”[00:45:41] Wisdom versus cleverness — Churchill's reflective habits and valuing dissent.[00:48:11] “Better ignorance” and intellectual humility as foundations of wise leadership.[00:51:26] Cognitive diversity, AI, and the need to embed wisdom—not just intelligence—into machines.[00:58:28] From WWII to China today — the enduring need for wisdom in navigating global conflict.LinksNick's website - https://www.intelligentbiology.co.uk/WarHead Nick's book - https://www.intelligentbiology.co.uk/booksNick on LinkedIn -  https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicholas-d-wright-bba3a065/If you liked this episode, you might also like my discussion with Dr Mike Martin - https://www.humanriskpodcast.com/dr-mike-martin-on-war-politics/

Part Three of a preview of Jonathan Trigg's blockbuster book Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Operation Uranus sees the Russians attempting to oust the Germans from their frozen enclave in the city of Stalingrad. Part One starts in episode 121. Part Two starts in episode 122. FeedSpot automatic email service Use Feedspot for free email notifications. Find the Fighting Through Podcast on the list at this link. Fill in your details and get notified every time an episode drops. https://podcast.feedspot.com/world_war_ii_podcasts/ The book - Battle of Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Jonathan Trigghttps://amzn.to/3WcBFtn Jonathan Trigg Website https://jonathantrigg.co.uk/ Angus Wallace interview with J Trigg on the WW2 Podcast https://overcast.fm/+AAEenslaUww The Fighting Through Podcast 'German eyes' collection:https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/categories/german-eyes/ Fighting Through website - Show notes and photos (none for this episode:https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/123-battle-of-stalingrad-through-german-eyes-ww2 Buy Me a Coffeehttps://www.buymeacoffee.com/fightingthrough Patreon:https://www.patreon.com/FightingThrough Episode shortlist - All the episodes for this podcast in a short list (or link via the website menu)https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/about/ Reviews: Please review in your usual app or on my website here: https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/reviews/new/ Follow me on Facebook:https://www.facebook.com/FightingThroughPodcast YouTube Channel:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnlqRO9MdFBUrKM6ExEOzVQ?view_as=subscriber Interested in Bill Cheall's book?  Link here for more information. Fighting Through from Dunkirk to Hamburg, hardback, paperback and Kindle etc.        

Driving through Gaza is like "driving through the ruins of Hiroshima, or Stalingrad, or Dresden"Tom Fletcher has been the United Nations humanitarian chief for almost a year and speaks to Nick two weeks into his organisation's efforts to get as much aid as possible into the Gaza Strip.He gives a behind-the-scenes account of how he works with the Trump White House and how the ceasefire deal was struck in Sharm el-Sheikh.Fletcher also shares his lessons learned from his years as foreign adviser to Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron.Producer: Daniel Kraemer Research: Chloe Desave Editor: Giles Edwards Sound: Hal Haines and Ged Sudlow

Mention légales : Vos données de connexion, dont votre adresse IP, sont traités par Radio Classique, responsable de traitement, sur la base de son intérêt légitime, par l'intermédiaire de son sous-traitant Ausha, à des fins de réalisation de statistiques agréées et de lutte contre la fraude. Ces données sont supprimées en temps réel pour la finalité statistique et sous cinq mois à compter de la collecte à des fins de lutte contre la fraude. Pour plus d'informations sur les traitements réalisés par Radio Classique et exercer vos droits, consultez notre Politique de confidentialité.Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Mention légales : Vos données de connexion, dont votre adresse IP, sont traités par Radio Classique, responsable de traitement, sur la base de son intérêt légitime, par l'intermédiaire de son sous-traitant Ausha, à des fins de réalisation de statistiques agréées et de lutte contre la fraude. Ces données sont supprimées en temps réel pour la finalité statistique et sous cinq mois à compter de la collecte à des fins de lutte contre la fraude. Pour plus d'informations sur les traitements réalisés par Radio Classique et exercer vos droits, consultez notre Politique de confidentialité.Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Part Two of a preview of Jonathan Trigg's blockbuster Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Part One starts in episode 121. The fighting advances into the Russian city of Stalingrad itself. Battle of Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Jonathan Trigghttps://amzn.to/3WcBFtn Jonathan Trigg Website https://jonathantrigg.co.uk/ The Fighting Through Podcast 'German eyes' collection:https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/categories/german-eyes/ Fighting Through website - Show notes and photos (none for this episode:https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/122-battle-of-stalingrad-through-german-eyes-ww2 Buy Me a Coffeehttps://www.buymeacoffee.com/fightingthrough Patreon:https://www.patreon.com/FightingThrough Episode shortlist - All the episodes for this podcast in a short list (or link via the website menu)https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/about/ Reviews: Please review in your usual app or on my website here: https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/reviews/new/ Follow me on Facebook:https://www.facebook.com/FightingThroughPodcast YouTube Channel:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnlqRO9MdFBUrKM6ExEOzVQ?view_as=subscriber Interested in Bill Cheall's book?  Link here for more information. Fighting Through from Dunkirk to Hamburg, hardback, paperback and Kindle etc.

A preview of Jonathan Trigg's blockbuster Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Five months, one week and three days of hell. The German offensive to capture Stalingrad from the Soviets began in August 1942, The losses on both sides were eye-watering – the Soviets alone suffered something approaching half a million dead and more than 650,000 sick or wounded – and in his unique style author Jonathan Trigg reveals the human agony behind such statistics through the words of the Germans who were there. The Through German Eyes list actually goes D-Day to VE-Day, Barbarossa, Stalingrad and then Air War. Stalingrad Through German Eyes. Jonathan Trigghttps://amzn.to/3WcBFtn The Fighting Through 'German' episodes: https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/categories/german-eyes/ Show notes and photos: https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/121-battle-of-stalingrad-through-german-eyes-second-world-war   Buy Me a Coffeehttps://www.buymeacoffee.com/fightingthrough Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/FightingThrough Episode shortlist - All the episodes for this podcast in a short list (or link via the website menu) https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/about/ Reviews: Please review in your usual app or on my website here: https://www.fightingthroughpodcast.co.uk/reviews/new/ Follow me on Facebook:https://www.facebook.com/FightingThroughPodcast YouTube Channel:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnlqRO9MdFBUrKM6ExEOzVQ?view_as=subscriber

Hey before I begin the podcast, I just want to thank all of you who joined the patreon, you guys are simply awesome. Please take the time to vote and comment on the patreon polls so I can best tackle the specific subjects you want to hear more about and hell it does not have to be about the Pacific War, I like ancient Rome, WW1, WW2, just toss some ideas and I will try to make it happen.   This Podcast is going to be a very remarkable story about a Korean man who fought for the IJA, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the second world war.  He is also a man whom most than likely never existed.   Did that catch you off guard haha?   If you have a chance you can pull up wikipedia and search Yang Kyoungjong. The first thing you will notice is a disclaimer that states numerous historians who claim Yang Kyoungjong does not exist. Yet this man exists in some history books, there is a iconic photo of him, there is a documentary looking into him, countless Korean stories are writing loosely about him, there is a pretty decent war film and multiple youtubers have covered his so-called story. So how does this guy not exist if his story is so popular?   His story is claimed to be real by military historian Stephen Ambrose who wrote about him in his book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II. There is also references to him in Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga's book“the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. In 2005 a Korean SBS documentary investigated his existence and concluded there was no convincing evidence of his existence. For those of you who have ever heard of this man, I guarantee it's because of the 2011 south korean film “My Way”. That's where I found out about it by the way. Many of you probably saw the iconic photo of him, again if you pull up the wikipedia page on Yang Kyoungjong its front and center. The photo shows a asiatic man wearing a wehrmacht uniform and he has just been captured by american forces on the d-day landings.   Now I don't want to jump into the is he real or not busy just yet. So this is how the podcast will go down, very reminiscent of “Our fake History's Podcast” might I add, I am a huge fan of that guys work. I am going to tell you the story of Yang Kyoungjong, then afterwords disclose my little investigation into whether he is real or not.   So without further adieu this is the story of a man who fought for three nations during WW2.   The Story   It was June 1944, the allies had just unleashed Operation Overlord, the D-Day landings at Normandy. Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave an extremely incredible story. To who did he say these things, no one knows.   Yang Kyoungjong was born in 1920, in Shin Eu Joo, part of modern day North Korea. At the age of 18, Yang was forcibly conscripted into the Imperial Japanese army. Korea was one of the bread baskets of Asia and the Empire of Japan had annexed her in 1910. Japan held sovereignty over Korea, making Koreans subjects.    In 1939 the Empire of Japan faced major labor shortages and as a result began conscription of Japanese men for the military, while importing vast amounts of Korean laborers to work in mainland Japan. For the Imperial Japanese Army, Koreans were not drafted until 1944 when things were dire for Japan. Until 1944, the IJA allowed Koreans to volunteer in the army. In 1938 there was a 14% acceptance rate, by 1943 this dropped dramatically to 2%, but the number of applicants increased exponentially from 3000 per annum in 1939 to 300,000 by the end of the war. On paper it looked like Koreans were registering en masse on their on violation, but this is quite the contrary, the Japanese policy was to use force. Japanese officials began press gang efforts against Korean peasants, forcing them to sign applications, it is believed over half of the applications were done in such a manner. Other applicants registered for a variety of reasons, typically because of economic turmoil. Korea would produce 7 generals and many field grade officers. One of the most well known was Lt General Crown Prince Yi Un who would command Japanese forces in the China War.   Thus Yang Kyoungjong was forced into the IJA and would find himself stationed with the Kwantung Army. Quite unfortunately for him, he was enlisted into their service at a time where two major border skirmishes occurred with the Soviet Union. The USSR was seen as Japan's number one rival going all the way back to the Triple Intervention of 1895 when the Russians thwarted Japan's seizure of the Liaodong peninsula after they had won the first sino japanese war. This led to the Russo-Japanese war, where Japan shocked the world being victorious over the Russian Empire. When the Russian Empire fell and the Russian civil war kicked off, Japan sent the lionshare of men to fight the Red Army during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-1922.    Communism was seen as the greatest if not one of the greatest threats to the Kokutai and thus Japan as a whole. As such Japan placed the Kwantung Army along the Manchurian borderlands to thwart any possible soviet invasion. There had numerous border skirmishes, but in 1938 and 1939 two large battles occurred. In 1938 the Kwantung army intercepted a Soviet message indicating the Far East forces would be securing some unoccupied heights west of Lake Khasan that overlooked the Korean port city of Rajin. Soviet border troops did indeed move into the area and began fortifying it. The Kwantung army sent forces to dislodge them and this soon led to a full on battle. The battle was quite shocking for both sides, the Soviets lost nearly 800 men dead with 3279 wounded, the Japanese claimed they had 526 dead with 913 wounded. The Soviet lost significant armor and despite both sides agreeing to a ceasefire, the Kwantung army considered it a significant victory and proof the Soviets were not capable of thwarting them.   In theory Yang Kyoungjong would be in training and would eventually reach the Manchuria borders by 1939. Another man sent over would be Georgy Zhukov who was given the task of taking command of the 57th special corps and to eliminate Japanese provocations. What was expected of Zhukov was if the Japanese pressed again for battle, to deliver them a crushing and decisive blow. On May 11th, 1939 some Mongolian cavalry units were grazing their horses in a disputed area. On that very same day, Manchu cavalry attacked the Mongols to drive them past the river of Khalkhin Gol. Two days later the Mongols returned in greater numbers and this time the Manchu were unable to dislodge them.    What was rather funny to say, a conflict of some horses grazing on disputed land, led to a fully mechanized battle. On May 14th, Lt Colonel Yaozo Azuma led some regiments to dislodge the Mongols, but they were being supported by the Red Army. Azuma force suffered 63% casualties, devastating. June saw the battle expand enormously, Japan was tossing 30,000 men in the region, the Soviets tossed Zhukov at them alongside motorized and armored forces. The IJA lacking good armored units, tossed air forces to smash the nearby Soviet airbase at Tamsakbulak. In July the IJA engaged the Red Army with nearly 100 tanks and tankettes, too which Zhukov unleashed 450 tanks and armored cars. The Japanese had more infantry support, but the Soviet armor encircled and crushed them. The two armies spared with another for weeks, the Japanese assumed the Soviets would suffer logistical problems but Zhukoev assembled a fleet of 2600 trucks to supply his forces, simply incredible. Both sides were suffering tremendous casualties, then in August global politics shifted. It was apparent a war in Europe was going to break out, Zhukov was ordered to be decisive, the Soviets could not deal with a two front war. So Zhukov now using a fleet of 4000 trucks began transported supplies from Chita to the front next to a armada of tanks and mechanized brigades. The Soviets tossed 3 rifle divisions, two tank divisions and 2 tank brigades, nearly 500 tanks in all, with two motorized infantry divisions and 550 fighters and bombers.    The stalemate was shattered when Zhukov unleashed is armada, some 50,000 Soviets and Mongols hit the east bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese were immediately pinned down, while the Soviets were employing a double envelopment. The Japanese tried to counter attack and it failed horribly. The Japanese then scrambled to break out of the encirclement and failed. The surrounded Japanese forces refused to surrender as the Soviets smashed them with artillery and aerial bombardment. By the end of August the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were annihilated. On September 15th the USSR and Japan signed a ceasefire.    The battle of Khalkhin Gol was devastating for both sides. The Japanese claim they had 8440 deaths, 8766 wounded, lost 162 aircraft and 42 tanks. Its estimated 500-600 Japanese forces were taken prisoner. Because of IJA doctrine these men were considered killed in action. Some sources will claim the real numbers for Japanese casualties could have been as high as 30,000. The Soviets claim 9703 deaths, 15,251 wounded, the destruction of 253 tanks, 250 aircraft, 96 artillery pieces and 133 armored cars. Of those tank losses, its estimated 75-80% were destroyed by anti-tank guns, 15-20% field artillery, 5-10% infantry thrown incendiary bombs, 3% mines and another 3% for aircraft bombing.   Back to Yang Kyoungjong, he alongside the other Japanese, Manchu and Korean POW's were sent to Gulags in Siberia. As the war on the Eastern Front kicked off between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, facing annihilation the Soviets did anything possible to survive. One of these actions was to create the Shtrafbats, “Penal battalions”. Stalins order No 227 created the first penal battalions, who were supposed to be around 800 men strong. The first Shtrafbat battalion was deployed to the Stalingrad Front on August 22nd of 1942.   On order was issued on November 26, 1942 “status of Penal units of the army”, it was issued by Georgy Zhukov, now deputy commander in chief who was the man who formally standardized soviet penal units. The Shtrafbats were around 360 men per battalion commanded by mid range Red Army officers and politruks. The men forced into these were permanents or temporaries. Permanents were officers, commanders, the higher ranks guys. Temporary known as shtrafniki “punishees” were the grunts, typically prisoners and those convicted of crimes. From september 1942 to May of 1945 422,700 men would be forced into penal battalions.    Typically those forced into penal military units were one of two things: 1) those convicted of dissertation or cowardice, 2) Soviet Gulag labor camp inmates. It seems Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a very awkward situation as he would be forced into one of these penal battalions and sent to fight on the eastern front. As pertaining to Order No. 227, each Army was to have 3–5 barrier squads of up to 200 persons each, these units would be made up of penal units.    So back toYang Kyoungjong, he would find himself deployed at the third battle of Kharkov. This battle was part of a series of battles fought on the eastern front. As the German 6th army was encircling Stalingrad, the Soviets launched a series of wide counter attacks, as pertaining to “operation star”. Operation star saw massive offensives against Kharkov, Belgorod, Kursk, Voroshilovgrad and Izium. The Soviets earned great victories, but they also overextended themselves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein seeing the opening, performed a counter-strike against Kharkov on February 19th of 1943, using fresh troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps alongside two other panzer armies. Manstein also had massive air support from field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofens Luftflotte 4, 1214 aircraft tossed 1000 sorties per day from February 20th to march 15th. The Red army had approximately 210,000 troops who fought in the Voronezh-Kharkov offensive, the Germans would have roughly 160,000 men, but their tanks outnumbered the Soviets 7-1, they had roughly 350 of them.   The Germans quickly outflanked the Soviets, managing to encircle and annihilate many units. Whenever soviets units made attempts to escape encirclements, the German air forces placed pressure upon them. The German air forces had the dual job of airlifting supplies to the front lines giving the Soviets no breathing space. Gradually the fight focused around the city of Kharkov seeing the Soviets dislodged. The Germans caused severe casualties, perhaps 45,000 dead or missing with another 41,000 wounded. The Germans suffered 4500 deaths, 7000 wounded. The Germans took a large number of prisoners, and Yang Kyoungjong was one of them.   Yet again a prisoner Yang Kyoungjong was coerced into serving another nation, this time for Die Ost-Bataillone. The Eastern Front had absolutely crippled Germany and as a result Germany began to enlist units from just about any nation possible and this included former Soviet citizens. There were countless different units, like the Russian liberation Army, die Hilfswillige, Ukrainian collaborationists, and there were also non-Russians from the USSR who formed the Ost-Bataillone. These eastern battalions would comprise a rough total of 175,000 men. Many of the Ost-Bataillone were conscripted or coerced into serving, though plenty also volunteered. Countless were recruited from POW camps, choosing to serve instead of labor in camps. The Osttruppen were to typically deployed for coastal defense, rear area activities, security stuff, all the less important roles to free up the German units to perform front line service.   There were two different groups, the Ost-Legionen “eastern legions” and Ost-Bataillone “eastern battalions”. The Ostlegionen were large foreign legion type units raised amongst members of specific ethnic or racial groups. The Ost-Bataillone were composed of numerous nationalities, usually plucked from POW camps in eastern europe. They were tossed together into battalion sized units and integrated individually into German combat formations. Obviously the Germans did not get their hands on large numbers of Koreans, so Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a Ost-Bataillone.    In 1944, due to massive losses in the Eastern Front, and in preparation for the allies about to open a second front, the Germans began deploying a lot of Ost-Bataillone along the coastal defense line at Cherbourg. Yang Kyoungjong was enlisted in the 709th static infantry division, a coastal defense unit assigned to defend the eastern and northern coasts of the Cotentin Peninsula. This would include the Utah beach landing site and numerous US airborne landing zones. The sector was roughly 250 km running northeast of Carentan, via Barfleur-Cherbourg-Cap de la Hague to the western point of Barneville. This also included the 65 km of land just in font of Cherbourg harbor. A significant portion of the 709th were Ost-bataillon, countless were from eastern europe, many were former Soviet POW'S. There were also two battalions of the 739th Grenadier regiment whom were Georgian battalions. A significant amount of the 709th had no combat experience, but had trained extensively in the area.   The 709th would be heavily engaged on D-day meeting US airborne units and the 4th infantry division who landed at Utah beach. In the early hours of June 6th, the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions landed at the base of the Cotentin peninsula and managed to secure a general area for the US 4th infantry division to land at Utah beach, with very few casualties compared to other beach landings. After the landings the forces tried to link up with other forces further east. By June 9th they had crossed the Douve river valley and captured Carentan. House to house fighting was seen in the battle for Carentan, the Germans tossed a few counterattacks, but the Americans held on with the help of armor units of the 13th.    The Americans then advanced to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, now supported by 3 other infantry divisions. The Germans had few armored or mobilized infantry in the area. By June 16th the German command was tossed into chaos as Erwin Rommel wanted them to pull out and man the Atlantic Wall at Cherbourg, but Hitler demanded they hold their present lines of defense. By the 17th Hitler agreed to the withdrawal, under some provisions the men still took up limited defenses spanning the entire peninsula. On the 18th the US 9th infantry division reached the west coast of the peninsula thus isolating the Cherbourg garrison. A battle was unleashed for 24 hours with the 4th, 9th and 79th US infantry divisions driving north on a broad front. They faced little opposition on the western side and the eastern, the center held much stronger resistance. The Americans would find several caches of V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rocket installations at Brix. After two days the Americans were in striking distance of Cherbourg. The garrison commander Lt General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben had 21,000 men, but many were naval personnel and labor units. Schliebens 709th had performed a fighting withdrawal to Cherbourg and were completely exhausted. The trapped forces were low in provisions, fuel and ammunition. The luftwaffe tried dropping supplies on their positions but it was inadequate.    A general assault began on the 22nd and the German forces put up stiff resistance within their concrete pillboxes. Allied warships bombarded the city on the 25th of june and on the 26th a British elite force, No. 30 Commando launched an assault against Octeville, a suburb of southwestern Cherbourg. The commandos quickly captured 20 officers and 500 men of the Kriegmarine naval intelligence HQ at Villa Meurice. As the Germans were ground down, Schlieben was captured and with that a surrender was made on the 29th.   The Americans suffered nearly 3000 deaths with 13,500 wounded during the operation. The Germans suffered 8000 deaths with 30,000 captured. For the 709th who took a lionshare of the fighting they reported sustaining 4000 casualties.    Amongst the captured was Yang Kyoungjong. As I said in the beginning Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave the story. Apparently Yang Kyoungjob was granted US citizenship and would spend the rest of his life in Illinois until his death in 1992.   So that is the story of Yang Kyoungjong.    The truth Did Yang Kyoungjong exist? Where does his story originate? For those of you who have not guessed it yet, the story I told you was full of details, I simply added based on historical events, with zero evidence at all any man named Yang Kyoungjong was involved in them. I did this specifically to highlight, thats exactly what others have done over the course of many years, creating a sort of mythos. If you know the game broken telephone, thats what I would theorize makes up most of this mans story. But lets go through some actual evidence why don't we?   From the digging I have done, the story seemed to originate with historian Stephen Ambrose book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II”. While writing this book, Ambrose interviewed Robert Burnham Brewer, who served E Company, 2nd battalion, 506th parachute infantry regiment of the 101st airborne division. This same man was portrayed in Band of Brothers by the way. Brewer gave one rather ambiguous account where he spoke about capturing 4 asian men in Wehrmacht uniforms.    Here is patient zero as told to us by Ambrose's book (Page 34, no footnote on the page)   The so-called Ost battalions became increasingly unreliable after the German defeat at Kursk; they were, therefore, sent to france in exchange for German troops. At the beach called Utah on the day on the invasion, Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th Parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division, US Army, captured four asians in Wehrmacht uniforms. No one could speak their language; eventually it was learned that they were Koreans. How on earth did Koreans end up fighting for Hitler to defend france against Americans? It seems they had been conscripted into the Japanese army in 1938-Korea was then a Japanese colony-captured by the Red Army in the border battles with Japan in 1939, forced into the Red Army, captured by the Wehrmacht in December 1941 outside Moscow, forced into the German army, and sent to France”. What happened to them, Lt Brewer never found out, but presumably they were sent back to Korea. If so, they would almost certainly have been conscripted again, either into the south or north korean army. It is possible than in 1950 they ended up fighting once again, either against the US army or with it, depending on what part of Korea they came from. Such are the vagaries of politics in the 20th century. By June 1944, one in six German rifleman in France was from an Ost battalion.   Now digging further since there are no footnotes, it seems Ambrose took an oral account from Lt Brewer, but did not directly quote him and instead abstractly expanded upon his story. Ambrose was guilty of doing this often. As multiple historians have pointed out, Brewer was living in the 1940s and was by no means an ethnographer, he was not a person who could have accurately known the nationality of the four asian men he captured. It is plausible he or other US units around him, just came up with Korean for the four asians who could have been from nearly anywhere in central to east asia. For all we know the men found could have been from Turkestan. What was “asian” to westerners of the 1940's is extremely broad.    If you look up the Ost-Bataillone or Ostlegionen you will see they consisted of captured former soviet soldiers. During the d-day landings, 1/6th of the German forces defending the atlantic coast were made up of the Ost-battailones. They came from numerous places, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkestan, Mongolia and numerous parts of the USSR. Needless to say, there were a ton of people whom would be considered asian and could be mistaken to be from Korea, Japan, Burma, etc.    It seems Brewer's vague account was transformed by Amrose, but this only covers one part of all of this, the story, what about the photo?    The iconic photograph is another matter entirely. The photograph has nothing to do with Brewer's account, it is simply a random photograph taken at Utah beach of a captured asian soldier wearing a Wehrmacht uniform. The official description of the photo states “Capture Jap in Nazi uniform. France, fearful of his future, this young Jap wearing a nazi uniform, is checked off in a roundup of German prisoners on the beaches of france. An american army captain takes the Jap's name and serial number” Author Martin Morgan believes the man in the photograph is not Yang Kyoungjong, but instead an ethnic Georgian from the 795th Georgian Battalion, which was composed of Georgian Osttruppen troops or someone who was Turkistani. In 2002 word of the story became more popularized online and in 2004 the iconic photo also began to circulate heavily on the internet. The Korean media became aware of the story in 2002 and when they saw the picture the Korean news site DKBNews investigated the matter. Apparently a reader of the DKBNews submitted biographical details about the soldier in the photo, including his name, date of birth, the general story we now know, his release, life in Illinois and death. The DKBNews journalist requested sources and none were provided, typical.   So some random unknown reader of the DKBNews gave a name, place and time of birth and even where he ended up and died.  In 2005 the Seoul broadcasting system aired a documentary specifically investigating the existence of the asian soldiers who fought for Germany on d-day.   In the SBS special “The Korean in Normandy,” produced and broadcast in 2005 based on rumors of Yang kyoungjog,  they searched for records of Korean prisoners of war during the Battle of khalkhin gol and records of Korean people who participated in the German-Japanese War, and records related to the German Army's eastern unit, but could not find traces of such a person. In addition, the soldiers who served in the Soviet army, who were captured, and then transferred to the German army's eastern units were considered by the Soviet Union to be serious traitors. Accordingly, under a secret agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, they were forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union after the war and held in Gulags.. The SBS production team stated that the rumors that a 'Korean from Normandy' had gone to the United States and that he died in seclusion near Northwestern University under the name of 'Yang Kyoungjong', which they were unaware of, were false. The investigative team looked for any traces of a Yang Kyoungjong and found none, so they concluded although there were accounts of asian soldiers in the German army during WW2, there was zero evidence of the existence of Yang Kyoungjong or any Koreans fighting on D-day for that matter.    The 2005 SBS Special documentary sprang forth a bunch of stories by Korean authors, expanding the mythos of Yang Kyoungjong.   In 2007 author Jo Jeong-rae published a novel titled “human mask” which told the story of SHin Gilman, The story ends with Shin Gil-man, who was conscripted into the Japanese army at the age of 20, as a prisoner of war in Normandy, then transported back to the Soviet Union and eventually executed by firing squad. Another novel called “D-day” by author Kim Byeong-in was release in 2011, just prior to the film My War, the plot is extremely similar to the movie. The main characters are Han Dae-sik and Yoichi, who met as children as the sons of a Japanese landowner and the house's housekeeper, harboring animosity toward each other, and grew up to become marathon runners representing Joseon and Japan. As they experience the war together, they feel a strange sense of kinship and develop reconciliation and friendship.   And of course the most famous story would find its way to the big screen. In 2011 the film My Way came out, back then the most expensive south korean film ever made at around 23$ million.   Then in 2012 a unknown person created a wikipedia page piecing together the Ambrose story, the photo and the unknown DBK readers information. With all of this information becoming more viral suddenly in 2013, two history books hit the scene and would you know it, both have “Yang Kyoungjong” in them.    These are Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga in his book “the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. Both authors took the story, name and iconic photo and expanded on the mythos by adding further details as to how the Korean man would have gone from Korea to Cherbourg france.   So Ambrose's story spreads across the internet alongside this photo. Both spark interest in Korea and an investigation receives some random guys testimony, which quite honestly was groundless. Despite the korean documentary stating there was no evidence of a Yang Kyoungjong, it sparks further interest, more stories and a famous film in 2011. 2012 sees a wikipage, it becomes more viral and now seeps into other historians work.   And I would be remiss not to mention the bizarre controversy that broke out in my nation of Canada. A nation so full of controversies today, dear god. Debbie Hanlon a city councilor in St John Newfoundland was absolutely wrecked online in 2018 for an advertisement promoting her real estate business stating “Korean Yang kyoungjong fought with Japan against the USSR. He then fought with the USSR against Germany. Then with Germany against the US! Want an agent who fights for you, call me!” Really weird ad by the way. So it seems her ad was to point out how far she was willing to go for her real estate clients. It was considered extremely offensive, and not the first time she pulled this off, her husband Oral Mews had recently come under fire for another ad he made using a photo of the Puerto Rican cab driver Victor Perez Cardona, where the vehicle turned into a casket. That ad said “He can't give you a lift because he's dead. He's propped up in his cab at his wake! Need a lift to great service, call me!” Hanlon was surprised at the amount of backlash she received since the ads had been running for over 4 years online. She claimed to be the victim of cyberbullying and trolls. So yeah, that happened.    Did Yang Kyoungjong exist, more than likely not, was it possible some Koreans found themselves in a position his story pertains to, you know what it's quite possible. During War a lot of weird things happen. I hope you liked this episode, please let me know in the comments on the Patreon what you think, how I can improve things and of course what you want to hear about next!

durée : 00:11:07 - Le Fil de l'histoire - par : Stéphanie DUNCAN - Début 1943, la fin de la bataille de Stalingrad marque un tournant dans la guerre et la fin du mythe de l'invincibilité de l'armée allemande. Cette nouvelle donne n'enlève rien au zèle de Pierre Laval envers l'Allemagne. Le 15 février 1943, il annonce la création du Service du Travail Obligatoire... Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

“It's really theft. And it's not mistaken theft or stupid theft. It's deliberate policy theft,” says Matthew Piepenburg, author of Rigged to Fail, of the current fiscal environment. He warns we are at a “Stalingrad moment” for the U.S. dollar, driven by unsustainable debt and central banks “net stacking gold and net dumping U.S. Treasuries.”This historic shift, he explains, is because “policymakers are not your friends” and are deliberately debasing currency. “When that debt credit balloon approaches a popping moment… the currency used to monetize that debt… melts like an ice cube.” In this environment, “gold just tells the truth,” acting as a vital lifeboat. “Gold has almost a supernatural, historical, and inherent quality that's simply unmatched. And that's why it's in such demand, and it will always get the last laugh over dying fiat paper money. It just always does.”✅ FREE RESOURCESDownload The Private Wealth Playbook — a data-backed guide to strategically acquiring gold and silver for maximum protection, privacy, and performance. Plus, get Daniela Cambone's Top 10 Lessons to safeguard your wealth (FREE)

By the end of the Second World War, more than seventy million people across the globe had been killed, most of them civilians. Cities from Warsaw to Tokyo lay in ruins, and fully half of the world's two billion people had been mobilized, enslaved, or displaced.In 1942, historian Peter Fritzsche offers a gripping, ground-level portrait of the decisive year when World War II escalated to global catastrophe. With the United States joining the fight following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, all the world's great powers were at war. The debris of ships sunk by Nazi submarines littered US beaches, Germans marauded in North Africa, and the Japanese swept through the Pacific. Military battles from Singapore to Stalingrad riveted the world. But so, too, did dramas on the war's home fronts: battles against colonial overlords, assaults on internal “enemies,” massive labor migrations, endless columns of refugees.With an eye for detail and an eye on the big story, Fritzsche takes us from shipyards on San Francisco Bay to townships in Johannesburg to street corners in Calcutta to reveal the moral and existential drama of a people's war filled with promise and terror.BUY THE BOOK

Today, we unravel the dramatic North African campaign of World War II. Discover how the Allies turned the tide against Rommel, why Tunisia's fall was as pivotal as Stalingrad, and how these battles shaped the fate of Europe.We're joined by Saul David, broadcaster, historian and author of 'Tunisgrad: Victory in Africa' for a sweeping look at strategy, leadership, and global stakes of the desert war.Produced by James Hickmann and edited by Dougal Patmore.We'd love to hear your feedback - you can take part in our podcast survey here: https://insights.historyhit.com/history-hit-podcast-always-on.You can also email the podcast directly at ds.hh@historyhit.com. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.