Podcasts about generals

China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. 1879

China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. 1925

Chinese Communist Party Turmoil Following Removal of Seven Top Generals. Charles Burton comments on turmoil in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership following the simultaneous removal of seven top generals for corruption, reported after the gathering of the Fourth Plenum in Beijing. Burton suggests that these senior communists, potentially acting patriotically, may be representing the interests of China and the Chinese people in the face of Xi Jinping's "disastrous leadership." Xi is criticized for his handling of domestic economics and the terrible downturn in relations with the United States, which negatively impacts China. Regardless of whether this signals a successful crackdown on dissent, it indicates serious problems between Mr. Xi—who is reportedly very corrupt himself—and the military.

Last time we spoke about the flooding of the Yellow River. As Japanese forces pressed toward central China, Chiang Kai-shek weighed a desperate gamble: defend majestic Wuhan with costly sieges, or unleash a radical plan that would flood its heart. Across/Xuzhou, Taierzhuang, and the Yellow River's bend near Zhengzhou, commanders fought a brutal, grinding war. Chinese units, battered yet stubborn, executed strategic retreats and furious counteroffensives. But even as brave soldiers stalled the enemy, the longer fight threatened to drain a nation's will and leave millions unprotected. Then a striking idea surfaced: breach the dikes of the Yellow River at Huayuankou and flood central China to halt the Japanese advance. The plan was terrifying in its moral cost, yet it offered a temporary shield for Wuhan and time to regroup. Workers, farmers, soldiers, laborers—pushed aside fear and toiled through the night, water rising like a raging tide. The flood bought months, not victory. It punished civilians as much as it protected soldiers, leaving a nation to confront its own hard choices and the haunting question: was survival worth the price?   #172 The Road to Wuhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following the Battle of Xuzhou and the breaching of the Yangtze dykes, Wuhan emerged as Japan's next military objective for political, economic, and strategic reasons. Wuhan served as the interim capital of the Kuomintang government, making it a crucial center of political authority. Its fall would deprive China of a vital rail and river hub, thereby further crippling the Chinese war effort. From a strategic perspective, Japanese control of a major rail and river junction on the Yangtze would enable westward expansion and provide a base for further advances into central and southern China. For these reasons, the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff assessed that the capture of Wuhan would likely deliver the decisive blow needed to conclude the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Recognizing Wuhan's strategic importance, both the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army committed substantial forces to the city and its approaches. The IJA deployed roughly 400,000 troops, while the NRA fielded at least 800,000. China began the war with an estimated regular force of 1.7 to 2.2 million men, organized into six broad loyalty-based categories around Chiang Kai-shek's command. Directly loyal troops formed the first group, followed by a second tier of soldiers who had previously supported Chiang but were less tightly controlled. The next category consisted of provincial troops that Chiang could ordinarily influence, while a fourth group included provincial units over which his sway was weaker. The fifth category comprised Communist forces, the Eighth Route Army in the northwest and the New Fourth Army forming in the central Yangtze region. The final category consisted of Northeastern or Manchurian units loyal to Zhang Xueliang, known as the “Young Marshal.” The first two categories together accounted for roughly 900,000 men, with about a million more in independent provincial armies, and roughly 300,000 in Communist and Manchurian forces. As commander-in-chief, Chiang could effectively command only about half of the mobilizable units at the outbreak of war in July 1937, which meant that military decisions were often slow, fraught with negotiation, and administratively cumbersome. Division-level coordination and communication proved particularly challenging, a stark contrast to the Japanese command structure, which remained clean and disciplined. Geographically, most of Chiang's loyal troops were located in the corridor between the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers at the start of 1938. Having participated heavily in the defense of Shanghai and Nanjing, they retreated to Wuhan at about half strength, with an already decimated officer corps. They then numbered around 400,000 and were commanded by generals Chen Cheng and Hu Zongnan. The northern regional armies, especially Han Fuju's forces in Shandong, had suffered severe losses; some units defected to the Japanese and later served as puppet troops. After six months of Japanese onslaught that cost the coastal and central regions—Peiping-Tianjin to Shanghai and inland toward Nanjing—much of the relatively autonomous, sizable armies remained from the southwest or northwest, under leaders such as Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi (Guangxi), Long Yun (Yunnan), and Yan Xishan (Shanxi and Suiyuan). Roughly 700,000 of these troops—predominantly from Guangxi under Li and Bai—were committed to the defense of Wuhan. The Communist forces, by contrast, numbered about 100,000 and remained relatively unscathed in bases north and east of Xi'an. In total, approximately 1.3 million men were under arms in defense of Wuhan. In December 1937, the Military Affairs Commission was established to determine Wuhan's defense strategy. Following the loss of Xuzhou, the National Revolutionary Army redeployed approximately 1.1 million troops across about 120 divisions. The commission organized the defense around three main fronts: the Dabie Mountains, Poyang Lake, and the Yangtze River, in response to an estimated 200,000 Japanese troops spread over 20 divisions of the Imperial Japanese Army. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, commanding the Fifth War Zone, were assigned to defend the north of the Yangtze, while Chen Cheng, commanding the Ninth War Zone, was tasked with defending the south. The First War Zone, situated to the west of the Zhengzhou–Xinyang segment of the Pinghan Railway, was responsible for halting Japanese forces advancing from the North China Plain, and the Third War Zone, located between Wuhu, Anqing, and Nanchang, was charged with protecting the Yuehan Railway. Following the Japanese occupation of Xuzhou in May 1938, they sought to expand the invasion. The IJA decided to dispatch a vanguard to occupy Anqing as a forward base for an assault on Wuhan. The main force would then advance north of the Dabie Mountains along the Huai River, with the objective of eventually capturing Wuhan via the Wusheng Pass. A second detachment would move west along the Yangtze. However, a flood from the Yellow River forced the IJA to abandon plans to advance along the Huai and instead to attack along both banks of the Yangtze. Despite Chinese numerical superiority on the Wuhan front, roughly a 2:1 advantage, the offensive faced several complicating factors. The NRA was a heterogeneous, fragmented force with a variety of tables of organization and equipment, and it lacked the unified command structure that characterized the IJA. Historian Richard Frank notes the broad diversity of Chinese forces at the outbreak of the war, which hindered cohesive mobile and strategic operations: “Chiang commanded armies of 2,029,000 troops of highly variegated capability and loyalty. His personal forces included an elite cadre of three hundred-thousand German-trained and eighty-thousand German armed men. A second stratum of the Chinese armies, numbering roughly 600,000 included various regional commands loyal to Chiang in the past that generally conformed to his directives. These troops were better armed and trained than the rest. The third category encompassed a million men who were neither loyal nor obedient to Chiang”. The NRA faced a significant disadvantage in both quantity and quality of equipment compared to the Japanese. The disparity was stark in artillery allocations. An IJA infantry division possessed 48 field and mountain guns, whereas a German-equipped Chinese division had only 16. In terms of regiment and battalion guns, a Japanese division had 56, while a German-equipped Chinese division possessed just 30. Of roughly 200 Chinese infantry divisions in 1937, only 20 were German-equipped, and merely eight of those met their paper-strength standards. Many Chinese divisions had no artillery at all, and those that did often lacked radios or forward-observation capabilities to ensure accurate fire. These deficiencies placed the NRA at a clear disadvantage in firepower when facing the Japanese. These equipment gaps were compounded by poor training and tactical doctrine. The NRA lacked adequate training facilities and did not incorporate sufficient field maneuvers, gun handling, or marksmanship into its program. Although the 1935 drill manual introduced small-group “open order” tactics, many formations continued to fight in close-order formations. In an era when increased firepower rendered close-order tactics obsolete, such formations became a liability. The NRA's failure to adapt dispersed assault formations limited its tactical effectiveness. Defensively, the NRA also faced serious shortcomings. Units were often ordered to create deep positions near key lines of communication, but Chinese forces became overly dependent on fixed fortifications, which immobilized their defense. Poor intelligence on Japanese movements and a lack of mobile reserves, there were only about 3,000 military vehicles in China in 1937, meant that Japanese infantry could easily outflank fixed NRA positions. Moreover, the Japanese enjoyed superiority in artillery, enabling them to suppress these fixed positions more effectively. These realities left Chinese defenses vulnerable, especially in the war's first year. The leadership deficit within the NRA, reflected in limited officer training, further constrained operational effectiveness. Chiang Kai-shek reportedly warned that Chinese commanders often equaled their counterparts in rank but did not outmatch them in competence. Only 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training by 1937, and many staff officers had no military training at all. Overall, about 29.1 percent of NRA officers had no military education, severely limiting professional development and command capability. With the exception of the Guangxi divisions, Chinese units were hampered by an unnecessarily complex command structure. Orders from Chiang Kai-shek needed to pass through six tiers before action could be taken, slowing decision-making and responsiveness. In addition, Chiang favored central army units under direct control with loyal commanders from the Whampoa clique when distributing equipment, a pattern that bred discord and insubordination across levels of the Chinese field forces. Beyond structural issues, the Chinese force organization suffered from a lack of coherence due to competing influences. The forces had been reorganized along German-inspired lines, creating large field armies arranged as “war zones,” while Russian influence shaped strategic positioning through a division into “front” and “route” armies and separate rear-area service units. This mix yielded an incoherent force facing the Japanese. Troop placement and support procedures lacked rationalization: Chiang and his generals often sought to avoid decisive confrontation with Japan to minimize the risk of irreversible defeat, yet they also rejected a broad adoption of guerrilla warfare as a systematic tactic. The tendency to emphasize holding railway lines and other communications tied down the main fighting forces, around which the Japanese could maneuver more easily, reducing overall operational flexibility. Despite these deficiencies, NRA officers led roughly 800,000 Chinese troops deployed for the Battle of Wuhan. On the Wuhan approaches, four war zones were organized under capable if overextended leadership: 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 9th. The 5th War Zone, commanded by Li Zongren, defended north of the Yangtze to protect the Beijing–Wuhan railway. Chen Cheng's Ninth War Zone defended south of the Yangtze, aiming to prevent seizure of Jiujiang and other key cities on approaches to Wuhan. The 1st War Zone focused on stopping Japanese forces from the northern plains, while Gu Zhutong's 3rdWar Zone, deployed between Wuhu, Anqing, and Nanchang, defended the Yuehan railway and fortified the Yangtze River. Japan's Central China Expeditionary Army, commanded by Hata Shunroku, spearheaded the Wuhan advance. The CCEA consisted of two armies: the 2nd Army, which included several infantry divisions under Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, and the 11th Army, advancing along the Yangtze's northern and southern banks under Okamura Yasuji. The 2nd Army aimed to push through the Dabie Mountains and sever Wuhan from the north, while the 11th Army would converge on Wuhan in a concentric operation to envelop the city. The Japanese forces were augmented by 120 ships from the 3rd Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Koshirō Oikawa, more than 500 aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service, and five divisions from the Central China Area Army tasked with guarding Shanghai, Beijing, Hangzhou, and other key cities. These forces were intended to protect the back of the main Japanese thrust and complete the preparations for a major battle. The Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was acutely aware that Japan aimed to strike at Wuhan. Facing Japan's firepower and bold offensives, Chiang and his commanders pursued a strategy of attrition at the Wuchang conference in January 1938. Central China would be the primary theater of China's protracted struggle, distant from Japan's existing center of gravity in Manchuria. Chiang hoped Japan's manpower and resources would be exhausted as the empire pushed deeper into Central China. Eventually, Japan would be forced either to negotiate a settlement with China or to seek foreign assistance to obtain raw materials. The mountainous terrain to the north and south of the Yangtze presented natural obstacles that the Chinese believed would hinder large-scale concentration of Japanese forces. North of the Yangtze, the Dabie Mountains provided crucial flank protection; to the south, rugged, roadless terrain made expansive maneuvering difficult. In addition to these natural barriers, Chinese forces fortified the region with prepared, in-depth defenses, particularly in the mountains. The rugged terrain was expected to help hold back the Japanese offensive toward Wuhan and inflict substantial casualties on the attackers. The Yangtze itself was a critical defensive factor. Although the Chinese Navy was largely absent, they implemented several measures to impede amphibious operations. They constructed gun positions at key points where the river narrowed, notably around the strongholds at Madang and Tianjiazhen. Specialized units, such as the Riverine Defense Force, were deployed to defend these river fortifications against amphibious assaults. To reinforce the Riverine Defense Force, Chinese forces sank 79 ships in the Yangtze to create obstacles for potential Japanese naval advances. They also laid thousands of mines to constrain Japanese warships. These defensive measures were designed to slow the Japanese advance and complicate their logistics. The Chinese aimed to exploit stalled offensives to strike at exposed flanks and disrupted supply lines, leveraging terrain and fortified positions to offset Japan's superior firepower. On 18 February 1938, an Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service strike force comprising at least 11 A5M fighters of the 12th and 13th Kōkūtais, led by Lieutenant Takashi Kaneko, and 15 G3M bombers of the Kanoya Kokutai, led by Lieutenant Commander Sugahisa Tuneru, raided Wuhan and engaged 19 Chinese Air Force I-15 fighters from the 22nd and 23rd Pursuit Squadrons and 10 I-16 fighters from the 21st Pursuit Squadron, all under the overall command of the 4th Pursuit Group CO Captain Li Guidan. They faced a Soviet Volunteer Group mix of Polikarpov fighters as well. The 4th Group fighters claimed at least four A5Ms shot down, while the Soviet group claimed no fewer than three A5Ms. Both the Japanese fighter group commander, Lieutenant Kaneko, and the Chinese fighter group commander, Captain Li, were killed in action during the battle. A largely intact A5M downed in the engagement was recovered with a damaged engine; it was the second intact A5M to be recovered, repaired, and flight-tested in the war, following the first recovered-intact A5M credited to Colonel Gao Zhihang during an air battle over Nanjing on 12 October 1937. On 3 August 1938, 52 Chinese fighters, including 20 I-15s, 13 I-16s, 11 Gloster Gladiators, and 7 Hawk IIIs, intercepted at least 29 A5Ms and 18 G3Ms over Hankou. The Guangxi era pilots Zhu Jiaxun and He Jermin, along with Chinese-American fighter pilots Arthur Chin and Louie Yim-qun, all flying Gladiators, claimed at least four A5Ms shot down on that day. The Wuhan Campaign began in earnest when the Imperial Japanese Army's 3rd and 13th Infantry Divisions advanced north of the Yangtze River. Central China Expeditionary Army commander Hata Shunroku designated Shouxian, Zhengyangguan, and the Huainan coal mine as the objectives for the 3rd and 13th Infantry Divisions. Meanwhile, the 6th Infantry Division, part of the 11th Army, advanced toward Anqing from Hefei. The 6th Infantry Division coordinated with the Hata Detachment, which launched an amphibious assault from the river. The 2nd Army's sector saw immediate success. On June 3, the 3rd Infantry Division seized the Huainan coal mine; two days later, it captured Shouxian. The 13th Infantry Division also secured Zhengyangguan on that day. The 6th Infantry Division then made rapid progress immediately north of the Yangtze River, taking Shucheng on June 8 and Tongcheng on June 13. These advances forced the Chinese 77th Corps and the 21st and 26th Army Groups to withdraw to a line spanning Huoshan, Lu'an, and Fuyang. More critically, the Hata Detachment crossed the Yangtze River and landed behind the Chinese 27th Army Group's 20th Corps. The sudden appearance of Japanese forces in their rear forced the two Chinese divisions defending Anqing to withdraw. The fall of Anqing represented a major Japanese success, as they gained control of an airfield crucial for receiving close air support. After battles around Shucheng, Tongcheng, and Anqing, all three cities and their surrounding countryside suffered extensive damage. Much of this damage resulted from air raids that indiscriminately targeted soldiers and civilians alike. In Shucheng, the raids were reportedly aided by a Chinese traitor who displayed a red umbrella to guide daylight bombing on May 10, 1938. This air raid caused substantial destruction, killing or wounding at least 160 people and destroying more than a thousand homes. The town of Yimen also endured aerial destruction, with raids killing over 400 people and destroying 7,000 homes. Yimen and Shucheng were among many Chinese towns subjected to terror bombing, contributing to widespread civilian casualties and the destruction of livelihoods across China. The broader pattern of air raids was enabled by a lack of quality fighter aircraft and trained pilots, allowing Japanese bombers free rein against Chinese cities, towns, and villages. While the aerial assaults caused immense damage, the atrocities committed in these cities were even more severe. In Anhui, where Shucheng, Anqing, and Tongcheng were located, the Japanese brutality was on full display. The brutality can be partly understood as an attempt to destroy China's will and capacity to wage war, yet the extremity of some acts points to a warped martial culture within the Japanese Army, which appeared to encourage murder, torture, rape, and other crimes. Indeed, the Army eventually enshrined this brutality in its doctrine with the so-called “three alls”: kill all, burn all, loot all.  These acts, and more, were carried out in Anhui during the summer of 1938 as the Japanese advanced up the Yangtze River. In Anqing, the Hata Detachment killed at least 200 people without compunction. A further 36 civilians on a boat were detained and killed by Japanese marines, who claimed they were potentially Chinese soldiers. The countryside around Anqing, Shucheng, and Tongcheng witnessed continued atrocities. In Taoxi village of Shucheng County, the Japanese burned over 1,000 houses and killed more than 40 people. At Nangang, Japanese soldiers killed more than 200 people and committed numerous rapes, including many victims over 60 years old. Tongcheng also became a site of forced sexual slavery. The Japanese atrocities, intended to terrify the Chinese into submission, did not achieve their aim. Chinese resistance persisted. After a brief withdrawal, the 20th Army held stoutly at Jinshan for four days before retreating to Xiaochiyi and Taihu. These withdrawals, while costly, lured the Japanese deeper into the interior of China. As the Japanese advanced, their flanks became increasingly vulnerable to counterattack. On June 26, 1928, the Chinese 26th Army Group attacked the flanks of the 6th Infantry Division at Taihu. The 26th Army Group was supported by the 20th and 31st Armies, which attacked from the front to pin the 6th Infantry Division in place. The 6th Infantry Division was ill-prepared to respond, suffering a malaria outbreak that left about 2,000 soldiers unfit for combat. Fighting continued until June 29, when the Japanese withdrew. The focus of operations north of the Yangtze shifted to Madang, a key river fortress protected by obstacles and river batteries. Roughly 600 mines were laid in the Yangtze near Madang, and the fortress was largely manned by the Riverine Defense Force, with a small garrison; including stragglers from the 53rd Infantry Division, the Madang garrison totaled roughly 500 men. Initial expectations had Madang holding, since Japanese ships could not easily remove obstacles or suppress the batteries. On the dawn of June 24, however, news reached Madang that Xiangkou had fallen to the Japanese, enabling a land threat to Madang, and many Madang defenders, including most officers above the platoon level, were absent at a nearby ceremony when the attack began.  On 24 June, Japanese forces conducted a surprise landing at Madang, while the main body of the Japanese Eleventh Army advanced along the southern shore of the Yangtze. The Chinese garrison at the Madang river fortress repelled four assaults, yet suffered casualties from intense bombardment by Japanese ships on the Yangtze and from poison gas attacks. Compounding the difficulty, most of the Chinese officers responsible for Madang's defense were absent due to a ceremony at a local military school by Li Yunheng, the overseeing general. Consequently, only three battalions from the second and third Marine Corps and the 313th regiment of the 53rd Division took part in the defense, totaling no more than five battalions. When the 167th Division, stationed in Pengze, was ordered by War Zone commander Bai Chongxi to move swiftly along the highway to reinforce the defenders, divisional commander Xue Weiying instead sought instructions from his direct superior, Li Yunheng, who instructed him to take a longer, more navigationally challenging route to avoid Japanese bombers. Reinforcements arrived too late, and Madang fell after a three-day battle. Chiang Kai-shek promptly ordered a counterattack, offering a 50,000 yuan reward for the units that recaptured the fortress. On June 28, the 60th Division of the 18th Corps and the 105th Division of the 49th Corps retook Xiangshan and received 20,000 yuan, but made no further progress. As the Japanese army pressed the attack on Pengze, Chinese units shifted to a defensive posture. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently had Li Yunheng court-martialed and Xue Weiying executed. After the fall of Madang, the broader Wuhan campaign benefited from Madang as a foothold along the Yangtze, as the river continued to function as a dual-use corridor for transport and amphibious landings, aiding later operations and complicating Chinese defensive planning. The rapid capture of Madang demonstrated the effectiveness of combined arms, amphibious insertion, and secure supply routes along a major river, while Chinese defenses showed weaknesses such as reliance on rough terrain, underestimation of Japanese amphibious capabilities, and delayed reinforcement, which, coupled with gas warfare, produced a swift loss. The fall influenced subsequent Chinese fortifications and defensive doctrine along the Yangtze and affected decisions regarding garrison allocations and riverine operations. After Madang fell, Japan's 11th Army pressed toward its next major objectives, Jiujiang, Huangmei, and Xiaochikou. It took nearly three weeks for the Japanese to clear the waterway around Madang of mines, costing them five minesweepers, two warships, and a landing craft full of marines. Jiujiang stood out as the most important due to its status as a key river port and railway junction. To defend these targets, China deployed the 1st Army Corps to Jiujiang, the 2nd Army Corps to cover the area west of Jiujiang, and the 4th Army Corps to defend Xiaochikou. Despite these reinforcements, the Japanese continued their advance.  The Japanese initially captured Pengze but met strong resistance at Hukou, where they again deployed poison gas during a five-day battle. During the breakout, there were insufficient boats to evacuate the auxiliary troops of the defending 26th Division from Hukou, leaving only a little over 1,800 of the more than 3,100 non-combat soldiers able to be evacuated, and the majority of the more than 1,300 missing soldiers drowned while attempting to cross the Poyang Lake. On July 23, they conducted an amphibious operation at Gutang, with the Hata Detachment landing at Jiujiang shortly thereafter. These landings south of the Yangtze represented another step toward Wuhan, which lay about 240 kilometers away. The Chinese responses consisted of relentless counterattacks, but they failed to dislodge the Japanese from their bridgeheads. Consequently, the Japanese captured Xiaochikou by July 26 and Jiujiang by July 28, with a note that poison gas may have been used at Jiujiang. North of the Yangtze, the 6th Infantry Division moved forward and seized Huangmei on August 2. Despite stubborn Chinese resistance, the Japanese had gained considerable momentum toward Wuhan. Soon after the fall of Jiujiang and surrounding areas, the local population endured a renewed surge of war crimes. The Imperial Japanese Army sought to break China's will to resist and its capacity to endure the onslaught. Male civilians were executed indiscriminately, along with any POWs unable to retreat in time, while women and children were subjected to mass rape. In addition, numerous urban districts and suburban villages were deliberately razed, including the city's ceramics factories and its maritime transportation system. The widely documented “three alls” policy proved devastating in the Yangtze region: in Jiujiang alone, as many as 98,461 people were killed, 13,213 houses destroyed, and property losses reached 28.1 billion yuan. Yet numbers fail to convey the brutality unleashed in Jiujiang, Hukou, and Xiaochikou south of the Yangtze. On July 20, the Japanese confined 100 villagers in a large house in Zhouxi village, Hukou County, and erased them with machine guns and bayonets. Tangshan village witnessed similar brutality on July 31, when eight people were drowned in a pond and 26 houses burned. That September, learning that children and the elderly at Saiyang Township were taking refuge in caves on Mount Lushan, the Japanese proceeded to bayonet defenseless civilians, many beheaded, disemboweled, or amputated. These acts, among others, were carried out on a mass scale south of the Yangtze, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths around Jiujiang. Despite the enormity of these crimes, Chinese people did not surrender. Among those who resisted was Wang Guozhen of Wang Village in Pengze County. Upon learning of the Japanese approach to Pengze on July 1, Wang, a teacher, led women, children, and the elderly into mountains and forests to seek safety. However, Wang and his followers soon encountered Japanese troops who attacked them, instantly killing over 20 people. Wang denounced their actions as the Japanese took him captive and had him whipped for over an hour. They had hit him so hard his skin was peeling off and he had broken his left thigh. They then demanded he collaborate with them, but to this Wang responded “a common man cannot resist the enemy for his country and he will only die”. After hearing these words, the Japanese simply stabbed him with a bayonet in his left eye and in his chest area, ultimately killing him. Wang's small act of defiance would earn him a plaque from the KMT that states “Eternal Heroism”. Even though Wang's heroism was commendable, bravery alone could not halt the Japanese advance along the Yangtze. After securing Jiujiang, Xiaochikou, and Gutang, the 106th and 101st Infantry Divisions carried out amphibious operations further upriver. The 106th Infantry Division landed on the Yangtze's east bank, pushing south of Jili Hu. Concurrently, the Sato Detachment, two infantry battalions plus a field artillery battalion from the 101st Infantry Division, landed east of Xiaochikou and concentrated on the east side of Mount Lu. The Japanese advance soon faced firm Chinese resistance despite these early gains. The 106th Infantry Division encountered the in-depth defenses of Xue Yue's 1st Corps. These defenses formed an isosceles triangle with Jiujiang at the apex and the Jinguanqiao line at the base. Although Jiujiang was abandoned in late July, the triangle's base at Jinguanqiao remained strong, with the 8th, 74th, 18th, 32nd, 64th, 66th, 29th, 26th, 4th, and 70th Armies concentrated in the Jinguanqiao area. These forces inflicted heavy losses on the 106th Infantry Division, which saw nearly half of its captains killed or wounded during the fighting. To aid the 106th Division's breakthrough near Jinguanqiao, the 11th Army deployed the 101st Infantry Division to the area east of Xiaochikou in mid-August. From there, the division pushed toward the east side of Mount Lu, aiming to seize Xingzi in an amphibious assault via Lake Poyang. The objective was to outflank De'an and the nearby Nanxun Road. On August 19, the 101st Infantry Division executed the plan and landed at Xingzi, where they faced strong resistance from the 53rd Infantry Division. However, the division found itself isolated and thus vulnerable to being outflanked. By August 23, the 53rd Infantry Division had withdrawn to the east. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1938 Wuhan stood as China's fragile beacon. Wuhan's defense hinged on a patchwork of war zones and weary commanders, while Japan poured in hundreds of thousands of troops, ships, and air power. The Yangtze became a deadly artery, with river fortresses, brutal bombings, and mass casualties. Yet courage endured: individuals like Wang Guozhen chose defiance over surrender.

Alpha Warrior, Brad Zerbo, and Josh Reid return for Episode 2 of Q After Hours with an explosive late-night dive into the origins of the Q movement, the generals behind the scenes, and the modern digital battlefield. The trio connects the dots between historical military operations, NSA counterintelligence, and the rise of citizen journalism that reshaped information warfare. From the truth behind Snowden and Vault 7 to the mysterious “Q Group,” they explore how predictive analytics, AI, and global alliances may have fueled the Great Awakening. As the conversation unfolds, they break down fresh intel from Trump's inner circle, General Flynn's latest moves, and the ongoing indictments shaking D.C. The team also dissects “comms” across social media, the meaning of “GG,” and hints of what may come on the anniversary of the first drop. Candid, conspiratorial, and charged with energy, this episode feels like a midnight mission briefing from the digital trenches of Badlands.

Charlie from Macroaggressions.io and Activist Post co-hosts ‘Wetware': Scientists Use Human Mini-Brains to Power Computers https://www.cryptogon.com/?p=73769 00:00:00 – Catch-Up & Show Origins Mike and Charlie warm up, talk show history and collaborations, and set the tone with loose banter and pandemic-era memories. 00:04:52 – Bigfoot Doc & Booking Woes Hype for David Paulides' new Bigfoot film, plus behind-the-scenes chatter about trying (again) to land him for an interview. 00:09:50 – The Kirk Incident Search Patterns They tease the Charlie Kirk assassination story and strange pre-event search blips that make the whole thing smell like an op. 00:14:41 – Narrative Holes & Intel Fingerprints Picking at timeline gaps, motive oddities, and the kind of breadcrumbs that usually point back to information operations. 00:18:18 – Who Searched What, Where, When D.C. and Israel pop up in the search chatter; they argue the official story won't hold once timestamps are scrutinized. 00:22:09 – “No Kings” & Street Optics Protest branding and immigration optics collide, with worries that the “domestic extremist” label will be weaponized broadly. 00:27:07 – Censorship Is a Dial, Not a Switch From throttling to shadowbans, they map how platforms fine-tune visibility while pretending nothing's wrong. 00:32:05 – The Re-Platforming Head-Fake Banned voices (Alex Jones, Corbett, etc.) peek back onto YouTube just long enough to claim neutrality, then get squeezed again. 00:36:30 – Culture Wars, Star Wars A jokey riff compares today's moral grandstanding to cartoonish “light vs. dark” narratives—funny, but pointed. 00:41:29 – Algorithms and the Speech Trap They rip into Sam Harris-style free-speech framing and explain how rules get rewritten mid-game by policy teams. 00:46:24 – Viral Clips, Real-World Fallout How a single video can ignite a pile-on, the role of context-stripping edits, and why “clarifications” arrive too late. 00:51:10 – Starlink/Starshield & Mystery Commands Weird satellite command chatter and defense-contract secrecy raise questions about dual-use networks in orbit. 00:55:20 – CIA in Venezuela (Still Busy) News of covert operations in Venezuela sparks a tour through U.S. meddling greatest hits and why none of this ever stops. 00:59:58 – Generals, AI, and Five Eyes Military brass toying with chatbots, Five Eyes posture toward China, and the worry that “temporary” powers never sunset. 01:04:46 – Premonitions & Prophecy Hour A viral Christian vision of a giant craft over the Vatican “releasing lights” kicks off an open-phones, high-strangeness block. 01:09:07 – Call-In: Navajo Paranormal Rangers A caller recounts a talk by the Navajo Paranormal Rangers, leaning into field cases, timelines, and “screen memory” lore. 01:14:05 – Owls, Headlights & Entity Weirdness More caller tales: owl symbolism, bright “headlight” orbs, and those familiar missing-time beats that haunt experiencers. 01:18:56 – Housekeeping & Community Plugs Quick pivot to newsletters, channels, and how to stay connected as platforms keep moving the goalposts. 01:23:28 – Media Narratives & Mind Games They kick around how headlines get massaged, why “fact checks” chase the conversation, and the creep of psy-ops into feeds. 01:28:25 – Dementia Talk & Daily Life Bits A meandering but candid segment on cognitive decline narratives, family moments, and how rumors outpace proof. 01:32:08 – Skinwalkers & Tradition Skinwalker lore comes into focus—how someone becomes “pure evil,” protection practices, and cautionary family stories. 01:35:54 – The Terrifying Doorbell Clip A ring-cam video: three masked visitors threaten “come out or we come in,” police confirm it likely wasn't a prank. 01:40:53 – The Charmin “Forever Roll” Comic relief: the 1,700-sheet megaroll becomes a prepping mascot—good for TP'ing a mansion or surviving a grid-down weekend. 01:45:49 – Collectibles, Gags & Gear They escalate the toilet-paper bit into merch, gag collectibles, and prep gear jokes with listener one-upmanship. 01:50:04 – Fake Funerals & Final Riffs An Indian man fakes his own funeral to see who cares; the crew roasts the narcissism and winds toward plugs and goodbyes. 01:54:00 – Sign-Off & Plugs Quick thanks, channel reminders, and the classic “it's all happening” send-off to cap the night.   Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research ▀▄▀▄▀ CONTACT LINKS ▀▄▀▄▀ ► Website: http://obdmpod.com ► Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/obdmpod ► Full Videos at Odysee: https://odysee.com/@obdm:0 ► Twitter: https://twitter.com/obdmpod ► Instagram: obdmpod ► Email: ourbigdumbmouth at gmail ► RSS: http://ourbigdumbmouth.libsyn.com/rss ► iTunes: https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/our-big-dumb-mouth/id261189509?mt=2  

Guests today include Michael Horowitz (Penn now, in the Biden years was DAS for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities + Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office) and Lauren Kahn (worked with Michael in the DoD, now at CSET). The book that Mike recommended is free to download online! https://history.army.mil/portals/143/Images/Publications/catalog/30-4.pdf Outtro Music: The Shirelles, Soldier Boy 00:00 Gaza and the Middle East Peace Process 06:26 US-Latin American Policy and Military Engagement 10:38 AI and Nuclear Weapons: A Seductive Analogy 17:47 Nuclear Energy vs. AI: Lessons in Governance 20:02 The Future of AI in Military Operations 31:46 Transforming Military Lessons with AI 37:38 Operational Surprise and Historical Context 45:55 Social Acceptability of Military Technologies 57:59 Ethics and Accuracy in AI Warfare Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On this Salcedo Storm Podcast:The national security brothers! Retired, Lt. Colonel Tony Shaffer is a Newsmax Contributor. And he's the President of Project Sentinel.ANDBrigadier General Blaine Holt is a Newsmax contributor, Air Force veteran, C-17 commander, tech entrepreneur, and Co-founder of Restore Liberty.  

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Ret, Major Brian Maddocks "no fat Generals"

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

Send us a textI'm joined by my co-host, Betsey Newenhuyse. We take a fresh, thoughtful, and often provocative look at the week's biggest stories — from politics and power to faith and the future of our democracy.This week, there's a storm brewing in Chicago: ICE agents and the National Guard are deployed in full force, and both Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker and Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson are saying enough is enough. Meanwhile, over 850 generals gathered to hear Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, but The Wall Street Journal's Peggy Noonan had a few sharp words — calling his performance “embarrassing,” and the President's even worse.We'll also unpack Russell Vought's Project 2025 — the ideological blueprint dismantling the federal government in the name of “biblical Christianity” — and Stephen Miller's aggressive new immigration push that's turning cities into deportation zones. Add to that Kamala Harris's new bestseller, 107 Days, Pope Leo's surprising critique of U.S. immigration policy, and an update on Pete Buttigieg — and we've got plenty to talk about.Betsey's SubstackSupport the showBecome a Patron - Click on the link to learn how you can become a Patron of the show. Thank you! Ken's Substack Page The Podcast Official Site: TheBeachedWhiteMale.com

It appears Trump and Hegseth have been getting the Led out, because the song 'Ramble On' pretty much summarizes how their speeches went the other day.Join the Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/PeterZeihanFull Newsletter: https://bit.ly/4gPT30m

In Episode 97 of The Kershner Files, Dave mentions a few noteworthy current events headlines before heading into the usual Survival Realty, Gun Shows, and conferences & convention information. After that, Dave discusses a couple of technology related topics in the US's “Real ID”, the EU's new “EES” Digital ID system, and theories as to why all of those Generals and Admirals we called to Quantico. Articles/topics discussed: Two Rivers Outfitter - The Premiere Online Preparedness Store DesignsbyDandTStore - Dave's Etsy Shop for fun clothing options Spot Prices for Gold (Au) and Silver (Ag) - from the davidjkershner.com website Survival Realty - featured properties and new listings State-by-State Gun Shows - from the davidjkershner.com website Conferences and Conventions - from the davidjkershner.com website Support Dave by visiting his new website at Two Rivers Outfitter for all of your preparedness needs and you can also visit his Etsy shop at DesignsbyDandTStore for fun clothing and merchandise options. Two Rivers Outfitter merchandise is available on both the Two Rivers Outfitter and the davidjkershner.com websites. Available for Purchase - Fiction: When Rome Stumbles | Hannibal is at the Gates | By the Dawn's Early Light | Colder Weather | A Time for Reckoning (paperback versions) | Fiction Series (paperback) | Fiction Series (audio) Available for Purchase - Non-Fiction: Preparing to Prepare (electronic/paperback) | Home Remedies (electronic/paperback) | Just a Small Gathering (paperback) | Just a Small Gathering (electronic)

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Phil Giraldi : Trump and His Generals.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Send us some Fan Mail? Yes please!Just when you thought you were safe from the bickering madness of those terrible two, THEY'RE BACK! Finally returning to join Hermes and cover their thoughts on Hegseth's latest address to military Generals, Khaleesi shares her scatterbrained thoughts on Charlie Kirk, and just enough branches of randomness sprinkled in throughout to keep everything nice and spicy. We surely hope you enjoy!.Subscribe, rate us 5, come join in all the other fun we offer, but most of all we hope you enjoy! If you liked this, and want to hear more, give us a follow and let us know! Or maybe you just want to tell us how awful we are? Comments help the algorithm, and we love to see ‘em! And as always, don't kill the messenger. Whiskey Fund (help support our podcast habit!): PayPalOur Patreon & YouTube Connect with Hermes: Instagram & Twitter Connect with Khaleesi: Instagram & Twitter Support the show

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The feds interview Baca's flinty #2 man and heir apparent, Paul Tanaka, who professes ignorance about who gave the order to hide Anthony Brown. In 2013, as the FBI probe enters its fifth year, feds finally get a chance to grill Baca. He touts his achievements as a reformer but admits he resents that the FBI excluded him from the jail probe and snuck in the cell phone. His answers are evasive and riddled with falsehoods. In Jan. 2014, as the feds close in, he resigns after 15 years as sheriff. Tanaka is convicted of conspiracy and obstruction of justice. Baca enters a plea that will give him a maximum of six months in prison, but a judge deems it too lenient, setting the stage for the sheriff's trial.Their questioning showed how politics and power shaped Los Angeles law enforcement. What began as a probe into jailhouse abuse had reached the top of the nation's largest sheriff's department. Chris Goffard, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter and host of Dirty John, explains how the scandal unraveled the careers of two of the county's most powerful figures.Topics in this episode include: Sheriff Lee Baca, Paul Tanaka conviction, FBI interrogation, Los Angeles jail scandal, obstruction of justice.

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Part 1 The Geopolitical context   Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I've actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930's” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy.    Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war.    Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941. There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930's within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan.  The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol.  During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles. While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks. There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show: USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons). Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons. What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26's, BT-5's and BT-7's who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets.  The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR. Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin. Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan's final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope. Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United States also placed an embargo on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939. Other things like Rubber and tin were also off the table, as this was mostly acquired from British held Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.    Now the crux of everything is the China War. Japan was stuck, she needed to win, in order to win she needed the resources she was being denied. The only logical decision was to attack the places with these resources. Thus until 1941, Japan prepared to do just that, investing in the Navy primarily. Then in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly informs the Japanese that he is going to invade the USSR. The Japanese were shocked and extremely angry, they nearly left the Tripartite Pact over the issue. This unprecedented situation that ushered in the question, what should Japan do? There were those like Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who argued they must abandon the neutrality pact and launch a simultaneous offensive with the Germans against the USSR. The IJA favored this idea….because obviously it would see them receiving more funding as the IJN was currently taking more and more of it for the Nanshin-ron plans. But this is not a game of hearts of Iron IV, the Japanese government had to discuss and plan if they would invade the USSR….and boy it took awhile. I think a lot of you will be very disappointed going forward, but there is no grand unleashing of a million Japanese across the borders into the Soviet Far East, in the real world there is something called logistics and politics.    The Japanese military abided by a flexible response policy, like many nations do today. Theres was specifically called the Junbi Jin Taisei or “preparatory formation setup”. Japan would only go to war with the USSR if favorable conditions were met. So in our timeline the Junbi Jin encountered its first test on June 24th when the IJA/IJN helped a conference in the wake of operation barbarossa. A compromise was made allowing the IJA to prepare an invasion plan if it did not impede on the nanshin-ron plans. There was those in the IJA who argued they should invade the USSR whether conditions were favorable or not, there were those who only wanted to invade if it looked like the USSR was on the verge of collapse. One thing agreed upon was if Japan unleashed a war with the USSR, the hostilities needed to be over by mid-October because the Siberian climate would hit winter and it would simply be impossible to continue. The IJA needed 60-7 days to complete operational preparations and 6-8 weeks to defeat the Soviets within the first phase of the offensive. Here is a breakdown of what they were thinking: 28 June: Decide on mobilization 5 July: Issue mobilization orders 20 July: Begin troop concentration 10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   The plan called for 22 divisions (might I add my own calculations of 20 divisions were pretty spot on), with roughly 850,000 men, including Manchukuo allies, supported by 800,000 tons of shipping. The Japanese hoped the Soviets would toss at least half their forces in the Far East, perhaps 2/3rd of their armor and aircraft against the Germans giving them a 2-1 superiority. Even the 22 divisions was questionable, many in the war ministry thought only 16 divisions could be spared for such a venture, something only suitable for mop up operations in the aftermath of a German victory along the eastern front. It was clear to all, Japan needed perfect conditions to even think about performing such a thing.    The War hawks who still sought to perform Hokushin-ron tried to persaude Hideki Tojo on july 5th to go through with a new plan using a total of 25 divisions. This plan designated “Kantogun Tokushu Enshu or Kantokuen” would involve 2 phases, a buildup and readiness phase and an offensive phase. On July 7th they went to Hirohito for his official sanction for the build up. Hirohito questioned everything, but gradually relented to it. The plan was nearly identical to the former plans, banking on the Soviets being unable to reinforce the Far East because of Germany's progress. The level of commitment was scaled down somewhat, but still enormous. Again a major looming issue was the Manchurian railways that would need to be expanded to accomodate the movement of men and supplies. This meant the construction of port facilities, military barracks, hospitals and such. Kantokuen would begin with a initial blow against the Ussuri front, targeting Primorye and would be followed up by a northern attack against Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1st area army, 3rd and 20 armies with the 19th division of the Korean army would penetrade the border south of Lake Khanka to breach the main soviet defensive lines, thus threatening Vladivostok. The 5th army would strike south of Dalnerechensk to complete the isolation of the maritime province, sever the trans-sierian railway and block Soviet reinforcements. The 4th army would attack along the Amur river before helping out against Blagoveshchensk. Two reinofrced divisions would invade Sakhalin from land and sea. The second phase would see the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula were contemplated.   It was agreed the operation could only afford 24 divisions, with 1,200,000 men, 35,000 vehicles, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses and 300,000 coolies. The deployment of thse forces would mean the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-baikal region would be pretty much open, so delaying actions would have to be fought if the soviets performed a counter offensive there. Air forces were critical to the plan. They sought to dispatch up to roughly 2000 aircraft cooperating with 350 naval aircraft to launch a sudden strike against the Soviet Far East Air Force to knock them out early.    The Soviet Far East had two prominent weaknesses to be exploited. Number 1 was Mongolia's 4500 km long horeshoe shaped border. Number 2 was its 100% dependency on European Russia to deliver men, food and war materials via the trans-siberian railway. Any disruption of the trans-siberian railway would prove fatal to the Soviet Far East.    Now as for the Soviets. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the USSR take up a defensive policy, but retained offensive elecments as well. Even with the German invasion and well into 1942, the Soviets held a strategy of tossing back the IJA into Manchuria if attacked. The primary forces defending the Far east in 1941 were the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, under the command of Generals Iosif Apanasenko and Mikhail Kovalyov. The Trans-Baikal front held 9 divisions, including 2 armored, a mechanized brigade and a heavily fortified region west of the Oldoy River near Skovorodino had a garrison. The Far Eastern Front had 23 divisions including 3 armored, 4 brigades and 11 heavily fortified regions with garrisons including Vladivostok. Altogether they had 650,000 men, 5400 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 57,000 vehicles, 15,000 artillery pieces and nearly 100,000 horses. By 1942 the Vladivostok sector had 150 artillery pieces with 75 -356 mm calibers organized into 50 batteries. As you can imagine after Operation Barbarrosa was unleashed, things changed. From June to December, roughly 160,000 men, 3000 tanks, 2670 artillery pieces, 12,000 vehicles and perhaps 1800 aircraft were sent to deal with the Germans. Despite this, the Soviets also greatly expanded a buildup to match the apparent Japanese buildup in Manchuria. By July 22nd 1941 the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts were to be raised by 1 million men for august. By December it was nearly 1.2 million. Even the Soviet Far East Navy saw an increase from 100,000 men to 170,000 led by Admiral Yumashev. The Soviet Mongolian allies were capable of manning about 80,000, though they lacked heavy equipment.    Thus if this war broke out in September the Soviets and Mongolians would have just over a million men, with 2/3rds of them manning the Amur-Ussuri-Sakhalin front, the rest would defend Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. Even though the war against the Germans was dire, the Soviets never really gave up their prewar planning for how to deal with the Japanese. There would be an all-out defense over the border to prevent any breach of Soviet territory. The main effort would see the 1st and 25th armies holding a north-south axis between the Pacific ocean and Lake Khanka; the 35th army would defend Iman; the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies would repel the Japanese over the Amur River; and other forces would try to hold out on Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Pacific coast. The Soviets had constructed hundreds of fortified positions known as Tochkas along the border. Most of these were hexagonal concrete bunkers contained machine gun nests and 76 mm guns. The fortified regions I mentioned were strategically placed forcing the Japanese to overcome them via frontal attacks. This would require heavy artillery to overcome. Despite the great defensive lines, the Soviets did not intend to be passive and would launch counteroffensives. The Soviet air force and Navy would play an active role in defeating a Japanese invasion as well. The air force's objetice would be to destroy the Japanese air force in the air and on the ground, requiring tactical ground attack mission. They would also destroy key railways, bridges and airfields within Manchuria and Korea alongside intercepting IJN shipping. Strategic bombing against the home islands would be limited to under 30 DB-3's who could attack Tokyo, Yokosuka, Maizuru and Ominato. The Soviet Navy would help around the mouth of the Amur River, mine the Tatar Strait and try to hit any IJN ships landing men or materials across the Pacific Coasts.    Japan would not be able to continue a land war with the USSR for very long. According to Japanese military records, in 1942 while at war they were required to produce 50 Kaisenbun. A Kaisenbun is a unit of measurement for ammunition needed for a single division to operate for 4 months. Annual production never surpassed 25 kaisenbun with 100 in reserve. General Shinichi Tanaka estimated for an operation against the USSR 3 Kaisenbun would be needed per divisions, thus a total of 72 would be assigned to 24 divisions. This effectively meant 2/3rds of Japans ammunition stockpile would be used on the initial strike against the USSR. Japan would have been extremely hard pressed to survive such a war cost for 2 years.    Now in terms of equipment Japan had a lot of problems. During the border battles, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged and grossly under supplied compared to the Soviet heavier guns. Despite moving a lot of men and equipment to face the Germans, the Red Army maintained a gross superiority in armor. The best tank the Kwantung Army had in late 1941 was the Type 97 Chi-Ha, holding 33mm armor with a low velocity 57 mm gun. There was also Ha-Go and Te-Ke's with 37 mm guns but they had an effective range less than 1 km.   The Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7's had 45 mm guns more than capable of taking out the Japanese armor and the insult to injury was they were crudely made and very expendable. Every Japanese tank knocked out was far greater a loss, as Japan's production simply could not remotely match the USSR. For aircraft the Japanese were a lot better off. The Polikarpov I-16 was the best Soviet fighter in the Far East and performed alright against the Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkhin Gol. The rest of the Soviet air arsenal were much older and would struggle. The Soviets would have no answer to the IJN's Zero fighter or the IJA's high speed KI-21 bomber that outraced the Soviet SB-2. Japanese pilots were battle hardened by China and vastly experienced.   Another thing the Japanese would have going for them was quality of troops. The Soviets drained their best men to fight the Germans, so the combat effectiveness in the far east would be less. Without the Pacific War breaking out, some of Japan's best Generals would be brought into this war, of course the first one that comes to mind for me is General Yamashita, probably the most armor competent Japanese general of ww2.    Come August of 1941 those who still sought the invasion of the USSR were facing major crunch time. The IJA planners had assumed the Soviets would transfer 50% or more of their power west to face the Germans, but this was not the case. By August 9th of 1941, facing impossible odds and with the western embargos in full motion, in our timeline the Japanese Hokushin-Ron backers gave up. But for the sake of our story, for some batshit insane reason, the Japanese military leadership and Hirohito give the greenlight for an invasion on August 10th.   Part 3 the catastrophe   So to reiterate the actual world plan had    10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   So what is key to think about here is the events of September. The Battle for Moscow is at the forefront, how does a Japanese invasion in the first week or two of September change things? This is going to probably piss off some of you, but Operation Typhoon would still fail for Germany.  In our time line the legendary spy Richard Sorge sent back information on Japan's decision to invade the USSR between August 25th to September 14th. On the 25th he informed Stalin the Japanese high command were still discussing whether to go to war or not with the USSR. On September 6th Stalin was informed the Japanese were beginning preparations for a war against the west. Then on September 14th, the most important message was relayed to Stalin "In the careful judgment of all of us here... the possibility of [Japan] launching an attack, which existed until recently, has disappeared...."[15]    With this information on hand from 23 June to 31 December 1941, Stalin transferred a total of 28 divisions west. This included 18 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 3 tank divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 3 mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (9 divisions).    Here we come to a crossroads and I am going to have to do some blunt predictions. Let's go from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. Scenario 1) for some insane reason, Stalin abandons Moscow and moves his industry further east, something the Soviets were actively preparing during Operation Typhoon. This is not a defeat of the USSR, it certainly would prolong the war, but not a defeat. Now that seems rather silly. Scenario 2) Stalin attempts transferring half of what he did in our time line back to Moscow and the Germans fail to take it. The repercussions of course is a limited counteroffensive, it wont be as grand as in our timeline, but Moscow is saved. Scenario 3) and the most likely in my opinion, why would Stalin risk moscow for the Far East? Stalin might not transfer as many troops, but certainly he would have rather placed his chips in Moscow rather than an enemy literally 6000 km's away who have to cross a frozen desert to get to anything he cares about.  Even stating these scenarios, the idea the German army would have taken Moscow if some of the very first units from the far east arrived, because remember a lot of these units did not make it in time to defend moscow, rather they contributed to the grand counteroffensive after the Germans stalled. The German armies in front of Moscow were depleted, exhausted, unsupplied and freezing. Yes many of the Soviet armies at Moscow were hastily thrown together, inexperienced, poorly led and still struggling to regain their balance from the German onslaught. Yet from most sources, and by sources I mean armchair historian types argue, the Germans taking Moscow is pretty unlikely. And moscow was not even that important. What a real impact might have been was the loss of the Caucasus oil fields in early 1942, now that could have brought the USSR down, Moscow, not so much, again the Soviets had already pulled their industry further east, they could do it again.   So within the context of this Second Russo-Japanese War, figure the German's still grind to a halt, they don't take Moscow, perhaps Soviets dont push them back as hard, but the USSR is not collapsing by any means. Ok now before we talk about Japans invasion we actually need to look at some external players. The UK/US/Netherlands already began massive embargoes against Japan for oil, iron, rubber, tin, everything she needed to continue her war, not just against the USSR, but with over 35 divisions fighting in China. President Roosevelt was looking for any excuse to enter WW2 and was gradually increasing ways to aid Britain and the Soviets.  Now American's lend-lease program seriously aided the USSR during WW2, particularly the initial stages of the war. The delivery of lend-lease to the USSR came through three major routes: the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The most important was the Pacific Route which opened up in August of 1941, but became affected when Japan went to war with America. The major port was Vladivostok, where only Soviet ships could transport non-military goods some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. Vladivostok would almost certainly be captured by the Japanese in our scenario so it won't be viable after its capture. Here is the sticky part, Japan is not at war with the US, so the US is pretty much free to find different Pacific paths to get lend-lease to the Soviets, and to be honest there's always the Arctic or Persian corridors. Hell in this scenario America will be able to get supplies easily into China as there will be no war in Burma, hong kong, Malaya and such. America alone is going to really ruin Japans day by increasing lend-lease to the UK, China and the USSR. America wont be joining the war in 1941, but I would strongly wager by hook or by crook, FDR would pull them into a war against Germany, probably using the same tactic Woodrow Wilson did with WW1. This would only worsen things for Japan. Another player of course is China. Late 1941, China was absolutely battered by Japan. With Japan pulling perhaps even more troops than she did for the Pacific war to fight the USSR, Chiang Kai-Shek would do everything possible to aid his new found close ally Stalin. How this would work out is anyone's guess, but it would be significant as I believe America would be providing a lot more goodies.    Ok you've all been patient, what happens with the war? Japan has to deliver a decisive knock out blow in under 4-6 months, anything after this is simply comical as Japan's production has no resources. The oil in siberia is not even remotely on the table. The Japanese can't find it, would not be able to exploit it, let alone quick enough to use it for the war. Hell the Italians were sitting on oil in Libya and they never figured that out during WW2.   So Kantokuen is unleashed with an initial blow against the Primorye in the Ussuri Front followed by an assault against Blagoveshchensk and Kiubyshevka. The main soviet lines south of Lake Khanka are attacked by the Japanese 1st area army, 3rd and 20th armies and the 19th Korean division. This inturn threatens Vladivostok who is also being bombarded by IJA/IJN aircraft. The 5th Ija army attacks south of Dalnerechensk in an attempt to sever the trans-siberian railway, to block Soviet reinforcements and supplies. The 4th IJA army fords the Amur river to help with the assault of Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile Sakhalin is being attacked from land and sea by two IJA divisions.  Despite the Soviets being undermanned the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region is wide up to an attack as its only defended by the 23rd IJA division, so a limited counteroffensive begins there. The Japanese quickly win air superiority, however the heavily fortified Tochkas are not being swept aside as the Japanese might have hoped. A major problem the Japanese are facing is Soviet artillery. The Japanese artillery already placed along the borders, initially performed well, crushing Tochkas in range, but when the Japanese begin advancing and deploying their artillery units they are outgunned perhaps 3-1, much of the Soviet artillery outranges them and the Soviets have a much larger stockpile of shells. Airpower is failing to knock out soviet artillery which is placed within Tochkas and other fortified positions with anti-aircraft guns. Without achieving proper neutralization or counter battery fire, the Japanese advance against the fortified Soviet positions. The Soviets respond shockingly with counterattacks. The 15th and 35th Soviet armies with the Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla toss limited counterattacks against both sides of the Sungari River, harassing the Japanese. While much of the soviet armor had been sent west, their light tanks which would be useless against the Germans have been retained in the far east and prove capable of countering the IJA tanks. The Soviets inflict tremendous casualties, however General Yamashita, obsessed with blitzkrieg style warfare he saw first hand in the west, eventually exploits a weak area in the line.Gradually a blitzkrieg punches through and begins to circle around hitting Soviet fortified positions from the rear. The Soviets knew this would be the outcome and had prepared to fight a defense in depth, somewhat managing the onslaught.  The trans-siberian railway has been severed in multiple locations close to the border area, however this is not as effective as it could be, the Japanese need to hook deeper to cut the line further away. In the course of weeks the Soviets are gradually dislodged from their fortified positions, fighting a defense in depth over great stretches of land. Vladivostok holds out surprisingly long until the IJN/IJA seize the city. Alongside this Sakhalin is taken with relative ease. The Soviet surface fleet is annihilated, but their large submarine force takes a heavy toll of the IJN who are attempting Pacific landings. Kantokuen phase 1 is meeting its objectives, but far later than expected with much more casualties than expected. The Japanese are shocked by the fuel consumption as they advance further inland. Each truck bearing fuel is using 50% of said fuel to get to the troops, something reminiscent of the north african campaign situation for Rommel. The terrain is terrible for their vehicles full of valleys, hills, forests and mountains. Infrastructure in the region is extremely underdeveloped and the Soviets are burning and destroying everything before the Japanese arrive. All key roads and cities are defended until the Japanese can encircle the Soviets, upon which they depart, similar to situations the Japanese face in China. It is tremendously slow progress. The IJA are finding it difficult to encircle and capture Soviet forces who have prepared a series of rear lines to keep falling back to while performing counterattacks against Japanese columns. As the Japanese advance further into the interior, the IJN are unable to continue supporting them with aircraft and much of the IJA aircraft are limited in operations because of the range. The second phase of Kantokuen calls for the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are on standby as the IJN fears risking shipping as a result of Soviet submarine operations. The sheer scope of the operation was seeing the tide sides stretching their forces over a front nearly 5000 km in length. At some points the Japanese were attempting to advance more than 1000 km's inland, wasting ungodly amounts of fuel and losing vehicles from wear and tear.  So what does Japan gain? Within the span of 4 months, max 6 months Japan could perhaps seized: Sakhalin, the Primorsye krai including Vladivostok, segments of the trans siberian railway, Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka. If they are really lucky Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk. Additionally, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula. What does this mean? Really nothing. Pull out a map of manchuria during WW2, take a pencil and expand the manchurian border perhaps 1000 km if you really want to be generous, that's the new extent of the empire of the rising sun. The real purpose of attacking the USSR is not to perform some ludicrous dash across 6000 km's of frozen wasteland to whittle down and defeat the Soviets alongside the rest of the Axis. It was only to break them, in late 1941 at Moscow there was perhaps a fools chance, but it was a fool's chance for Japan.  Japan has run out of its stockpiles of Kaisenbun, oil, iron, rubber, tin, all types of resources necessary for making war. Unlike in our timeline where Japan began exporting resources from its conquests in southeast asia and the pacific, here Japan spent everything and now is relying on the trickles it has within its empire. The China war will be much more difficult to manage. The lend-lease will increase every day to China. The US/UK/Netherlands will only increase pressure upon Japan to stop being a nuisance, Japan can't do anything about this as the US Pacific Fleet is operating around the Philippines always a looming threat. The Japanese are holding for a lack of better words, useless ground in the far east. They will build a buffer area to defend against what can only be described as a Soviet Invasion of Manchuria x1000. The Allies will be directing all of their effort against Germany and Italy, providing a interesting alternate history concept in its own right. After Germany has been dealt with, Japan would face a existential threat against a very angry Stalin. Cody from Alternate History Hub actually made an episode on this scenario, he believed the Soviets would conquer most of Japan occupied Asia and even invade the home islands. It would certainly be something on the table, taking many years, but the US/UK would most likely interfere in some way. The outcome would be so much worse for Japan. Perhaps she is occupied and a communist government is installed. Perhaps like in our timeline the Americans come in to bolster Japan up for the looming coldwar.  But the question I sought to answer here was, Japan invading the USSR was a dumb idea. The few Japanese commanders who pushed it all the way until August 9th of 1941 simply had to give up because of how illogical it was. I honestly should not have even talked about military matters, this all came down to logistics and resources. You want to know how Japan could have secured itself a better deal in WW2? 1941, the China War is the number one problem Japan can't solve so they look north or south to acquire the means to solve the China problem? Negotiate a peace with China. That is the lackluster best deal right there.    Sorry if this episode did not match your wildest dreams. But if you want me to do some batshit crazy alternate history stuff, I am more than happy to jump into it and have fun. Again thank all of you guys who joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Until next time this is the Pacific War channel over and out. 

A-BLOCK (2:30) SPECIAL COMMENT: TRUMP SUDDENLY SPECULATES ABOUT LIFE WITHOUT HIM: From anybody else it would be trivia. From Trump this is startling. Buried in an ordinary narcissistic flight: "It'll be very unfair in the future when they (Republicans) don't have Trump to fight for them." That quote, might be the biggest headline Trump has made this year and it sailed RIGHT past the American news media yesterday. What in the HELL did he mean by that and more importantly why did he suddenly acknowledge there is an end, maybe soon? After being MIA for five days – no live public viewing of him, just one video that according to White House time stamps took more than two hours to produce even though it only required him to try to speak for a minute-ten… he EMERGED with what was, even for him, such an utterly bizarre and especially vulnerable admission. He was out of view for FIVE DAYS. FIVE. From that bizarre “please clap” speech before the Generals at Quantico on Tuesday – the Pete Hegseth International Day of Military Hair Care Symposium and Product Sampling – through yesterday morning when he managed to stagger out of the White House, blast a series of non sequitirs at the press pool, and then go to another military celebration for which we have the money even in the middle of his shutdown of the government. Nobody asked: HOW have you been, WHERE have you been, WHAT are they treating you for, WHAT does that "when they don't have (you) to fight for them" quote mean? Because again, as in the week he went MIA at the beginning of LAST month, nobody had a clue what would take a man with compulsive talking disease and an ego so large it has own it zip code, from appearing in front of crowds and cameras for FIVE DAYS. And THEN Trump went in front of the Navy and said he warned about Osama Bin Laden last year, and told Pete Hegseth about it a year before 9/11, and claimed he was president in 2016 but they fixed the 2016 election, but they ran it again and he "got 250." What. In The Hell. Is Wrong. With Trump’s Health? B-Block (27:44) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: A $1 Trump coin? Ten cents per chin? Ian Miles Cheong doesn't think they'll eat his face. Noem and Lewandowski think they'll find undocumented immigrants attending the Super Bowl. And Kristi really has to go to the toilet. THIS IS OFFICIAL BUSINESS! C-Block (38:00) THINGS I PROMISED NOT TO TELL: Well, here we are. Fifty years ago Tuesday night, at 11:15 PM, I did my first broadcast on an actual radio station with advertisers and listeners. I was 16 and it's not bad for 16 and for the fact that my much older colleagues at WVBR-FM did a superb job of hazing me. And yes, that first broadcast is still extant, as you'll hear.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

The Information War Begins: Generals Avoid Written Mention of the Devastating Fire Professor Benjamin L. Carp, Professor of History at Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center | The Great New York Fire of 1776: A Lost Story of the American Revolution The fire quickly ignited an "information war." Robert Morris and Benjamin Franklin urged their European emissaries to spread the narrative that Americans were innocent and highlighted British atrocities. Despite the information war, General Howe, when writing to Washington days later, complained about "dastardly acts" like doctored bullets but avoided mentioning the fire itself. Washington likewise omitted the topic from his correspondence. Both sides competed for public opinion: the British press insisting Americans were responsible, and the American press denying guilt and emphasizing arbitrary hangings like Wright White's.

Started the week off with a political rally in India that killed 40 people, and then talked about Japan's new female prime minister. Plus Hegseth and the generals, Czech Republic election, UK synagogue terror attack, Diddy jailed, and a guy in Mexico arrested for raping dog. Music: Backyard Savagery/“Laughing at the Gore”

The Government Shuts Down. It's About Healthcare. Who Leads the Democrats? Blue State Spending Cancelled. AI Meme Wars. Hegseth's Embarrassment. Trump's Unhinged Speech to the Generals. No Nobel for Trump. With Linda Feldmann, White House Correspondent and Washington Bureau Chief for The Christian Science Monitor, Philip Bump, former Columnist for The Washington Post and Arthur Delaney, Senior Reporter at Huff Post. Today's Bill Press Pod is supported by The American Federation of Government Employees. More information at AFGE.org.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Attack in Manchester; Gaza Peace Deal?; Generals; Drug War? | Yaron Brook ShowOctober 3, 2025

Retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling joins the Beast's Hugh Dougherty to unpack the jaw-dropping spectacle at Quantico, where Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth addressed 800 top military leaders. Hertling breaks down how Military brass in the room really reacted when Trump rambled on about “dangerous cities” as training grounds, mocked rules of engagement, and praised a random World War II documentary made in the 50s. Hertling pulls no punches, calling the speeches “berating,” “embarrassing,” and dangerously out of touch with modern military standards. He explains why generals were silent, what U.S. allies and adversaries are thinking, and the legal and constitutional risks of Trump's orders. From the impact on troop morale to how Russia is exploiting the chaos, Hertling offers an inside look at a Commander-in-Chief unlike any before, and what it means for the military and the nation. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week, John Dickerson, David Plotz, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the disturbing spectacle of military fealty staged by Hegseth and Trump at Quantico, the possible outcomes of the dramatic government shutdown, and the hybrid war Russia appears to be waging with drones over distressed European cities. For this week's Slate Plus bonus episode, John, David, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the ugly spectacle of US golf fan behavior at this week's Ryder Cup and what it says about the state of American public discourse. In the latest Gabfest Reads, Emily talks with author and Yale professor Judith Resnik about her new book, Impermissible Punishments: How Prison Became a Problem for Democracy. They discuss the history of the prison system's use of punishments like whipping, how the practice came to an end, and more. Email your chatters, questions, and comments to gabfest@slate.com. (Messages may be referenced by name unless the writer stipulates otherwise.) Podcast production by Kevin Bendis Research by Emily Ditto Want more Political Gabfest? Join Slate Plus to unlock weekly bonus episodes. Plus, you'll access ad-free listening across all your favorite Slate podcasts. You can subscribe directly from the Political Gabfest show page on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. Or visit slate.com/gabfestplus to get access wherever you listen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week, John Dickerson, David Plotz, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the disturbing spectacle of military fealty staged by Hegseth and Trump at Quantico, the possible outcomes of the dramatic government shutdown, and the hybrid war Russia appears to be waging with drones over distressed European cities. For this week's Slate Plus bonus episode, John, David, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the ugly spectacle of US golf fan behavior at this week's Ryder Cup and what it says about the state of American public discourse. In the latest Gabfest Reads, Emily talks with author and Yale professor Judith Resnik about her new book, Impermissible Punishments: How Prison Became a Problem for Democracy. They discuss the history of the prison system's use of punishments like whipping, how the practice came to an end, and more. Email your chatters, questions, and comments to gabfest@slate.com. (Messages may be referenced by name unless the writer stipulates otherwise.) Podcast production by Kevin Bendis Research by Emily Ditto Want more Political Gabfest? Join Slate Plus to unlock weekly bonus episodes. Plus, you'll access ad-free listening across all your favorite Slate podcasts. You can subscribe directly from the Political Gabfest show page on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. Or visit slate.com/gabfestplus to get access wherever you listen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today is Emmajority Report on the Majority Report On today's show: As the government shutdown rolls along, we are left looking around for Democratic leadership as Hakeem Jeffries makes the fight about memes and himself. AOC and Bernie take the reins with a shutdown explainer video. Rep Nancy Pelosi is offended by the rumor that AOC is really the one in charge of the House Dems and reaffirms Hakeem Jeffries role as Minority Leader. Co-Founder of Drop Site News and co-host of Breaking Points, Ryan Grim joins the program to provide an update on the IF intercepted Global Sumud Flotilla. Award winning journalist and author of Another World is Possible: Lessons for America From Around the Globe, Natasha Hakimi Zapata joins the program to discuss Jeremy Corbyn's new leftist party in the UK, and the failures of Kier Starmer led Labour government. Check out her piece in The Nation "Labour Has Only Itself to Blame for the UK's New Left-Wing Party" In the Fun Half: We are joined by Matt Binder & Brandon Sutton Pete Hegseth pleads to the Generals and Admirals to treat your unit the way you would treat your child's unit. Benny Johnson and Corey Lewandowski are offended by the 'woke' NFL's choice of Bad Bunny for the Super Bowl halftime show. Tim Pool and Charlie Kirk's B-Team crack themselves up by suggesting that TPUSA should broadcast a competing half time show featuring Creed. All that and more The Congress switchboard number is (202) 224-3121. You can use this number to connect with either the U.S. Senate or the House of Representatives. Follow us on TikTok here: https://www.tiktok.com/@majorityreportfm Check us out on Twitch here: https://www.twitch.tv/themajorityreport Find our Rumble stream here: https://rumble.com/user/majorityreport Check out our alt YouTube channel here: https://www.youtube.com/majorityreportlive Gift a Majority Report subscription here: https://fans.fm/majority/gift Subscribe to the AMQuickie newsletter here: https://am-quickie.ghost.io/ Join the Majority Report Discord! https://majoritydiscord.com/ Get all your MR merch at our store: https://shop.majorityreportradio.com/ Get the free Majority Report App!: https://majority.fm/app Go to https://JustCoffee.coop and use coupon code majority to get 10% off your purchase Check out today's sponsors: ZOCDOC: Go to Zocdoc.com/MAJORITY and download the Zocdoc app to sign-up for FREE and book a top-rated doctor.  SUNSET LAKE:  Head to SunsetLakeCBD.com and use the code JustTreats25 to save 30% on all their gummies for sleep, focus, and relaxation Follow the Majority Report crew on Twitter: @SamSeder @EmmaVigeland @MattLech Check out Matt's show, Left Reckoning, on YouTube, and subscribe on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/leftreckoning Check out Matt Binder's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/mattbinder Subscribe to Brandon's show The Discourse on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ExpandTheDiscourse Check out Ava Raiza's music here! https://avaraiza.bandcamp.com/

Pete Hegseth calls out “fat generals” and pushes for higher fitness standards in the U.S. military. The panel reacts to his tough message, Sunny Hostin's criticism on The View, and the broader debate over discipline, readiness, and woke policies in the armed forces. Pat, Tom, Vinnie, and Brandon break down why military strength starts with physical standards and leadership.

The summer has come to a close in a crescendo of chaos. Political violence, confusion and anger are the defining features of the American vibe. And the American vibe, it ain't good. Tension everywhere as new cities are added to the target list seemingly daily. Memphis, LA, New York, Chicago. And now a government shutdown when things couldn't get any more fraught. It's a good time to stay frosty and an even better time to stay vigilant. And now, on the heels of this week's unprecedented speech at Quantico by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and President Trump, we need some perspective. And this week we're joined by one of our favorite voices to hear from — one of America's favorite voices to hear from — when we need clarity. Legendary documentary filmmaker Ken Burns is back for another stirring, timely exploration of America's ongoing revolution—past and present with your host Paul Rieckhoff (@PaulRieckhoff). Ken reflects on the meaning of patriotism, baseball's role in American life, and the fragile state of democracy in 2025. From the complexity of the nation's origins to the lessons of George Washington's leadership and baseball's enduring power, this episode is bringing the light to counteract all of the heat of our completely broken political system. Because every episode of Independent Americans with Paul Rieckhoff breaks down the most important news stories—and offers light to contrast the heat of other politics and news shows. It's independent content for independent Americans. In these trying times especially, Independent Americans is your trusted place for independent news, politics, inspiration, and hope. The podcast that helps you stay ahead of the curve—and stay vigilant. Ken Burn's past appearances: Episode 195 - November 3, 2022 Episode 275 - March 28, 2024 -WATCH video of Paul and Ken's conversation. -Learn more about Independent Veterans of America and all of the IVA candidates.  -Join the movement. Hook into our exclusive Patreon community of Independent Americans. Get extra content, connect with guests, meet other Independent Americans, attend events, get merch discounts, and support this show that speaks truth to power.  -Check the hashtag #LookForTheHelpers. And share yours.  -Find us on social media or www.IndependentAmericans.us. And get cool IA and Righteous hats, t-shirts and other merch.  -Check out other Righteous podcasts like The Firefighters Podcast with Rob Serra, Uncle Montel - The OG of Weed and B Dorm.  Independent Americans is powered by veteran-owned and led Righteous Media. Ways to Listen: Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0F1lzdRbTB0XYen8kyEqXe Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/independent-americans-with-paul-rieckhoff/id1457899667 Amazon Podcasts: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/49a684c3-68e1-4a85-8d93-d95027a8ec64/independent-americans-with-paul-rieckhoff Ways to watch: YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@independentamericans Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/IndependentAmericansUS/ Social Channels: X/Twitter: https://x.com/indy_americans BlueSky: https://bsky.app/profile/indyamericans.bsky.social Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/IndependentAmericansUS/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week, John Dickerson, David Plotz, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the disturbing spectacle of military fealty staged by Hegseth and Trump at Quantico, the possible outcomes of the dramatic government shutdown, and the hybrid war Russia appears to be waging with drones over distressed European cities. For this week's Slate Plus bonus episode, John, David, and guest host Juliette Kayyem discuss the ugly spectacle of US golf fan behavior at this week's Ryder Cup and what it says about the state of American public discourse. In the latest Gabfest Reads, Emily talks with author and Yale professor Judith Resnik about her new book, Impermissible Punishments: How Prison Became a Problem for Democracy. They discuss the history of the prison system's use of punishments like whipping, how the practice came to an end, and more. Email your chatters, questions, and comments to gabfest@slate.com. (Messages may be referenced by name unless the writer stipulates otherwise.) Podcast production by Kevin Bendis Research by Emily Ditto Want more Political Gabfest? Join Slate Plus to unlock weekly bonus episodes. Plus, you'll access ad-free listening across all your favorite Slate podcasts. You can subscribe directly from the Political Gabfest show page on Apple Podcasts and Spotify. Or visit slate.com/gabfestplus to get access wherever you listen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ryan and Emily discuss Bernie rips Trump as gov shuts down, Portland invasion, Hegseth slams fat generals, Israel bribes influencers, Trump betrays farmers, Rubio plots Venezuela regime change. Joe Vaclavik: https://www.youtube.com/@GrainMarketsandOtherStuff/videos To become a Breaking Points Premium Member and watch/listen to the show AD FREE, uncut and 1 hour early visit: www.breakingpoints.comMerch Store: https://shop.breakingpoints.com/See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

-- On the Show: -- Donald Trump openly admits that presidents are responsible for shutdowns while bragging about using this one to make irreversible cuts -- Trump slurs his speech, appears disoriented, and shows symptoms raising concerns of a possible stroke or other serious condition -- Trump delivers a bizarre speech to generals about gold paper, civil disturbances, and fake news while wasting taxpayer money -- Top military leaders criticize Trump and Pete Hegseth's chaotic meeting as a clown show and openly mock their weakness -- Gavin Newsom taunts Trump over his weight and hypocrisy, sparking debate about Trump's insecurities and false claims about himself -- Organizers plan over 2,100 “No Kings” demonstrations across all 50 states as protests test whether mass resistance can disrupt Trump's rule -- Trump shocks with threats to cut health care during the shutdown while rambling incoherently alongside Robert F Kennedy Jr and Mehmet Oz -- Multiple new polls show Trump deeply unpopular, collapsing on the economy and immigration, and increasingly propped up by a radical minority -- Trump's administration subsidizes coal in 2025 despite its economic collapse and health costs, clinging to nostalgia instead of reality -- On the Bonus Show: Trump shares a deepfake of Jeffries and Schumer, Republicans block an elected Democrat from taking office ahead of the shutdown, OpenAI prepares to launch an AI video app, and more…

Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In this episode of The Wright Report, we cover the federal government shutdown, Pete Hegseth's blunt message to America's generals, new immigration updates from Chicago to Central America, and surprising global research on obesity. From furloughs in Washington to fat generals at the Pentagon, today's brief connects politics, security, and science shaping America's future.   Federal Government Shutdown Begins: Negotiations collapsed after Democrats demanded $1 trillion for health care tied to Biden's immigration surge. Trump warned, “We can do things during the shutdown that are irreversible,” and began cutting federal workers, including 100 FBI agents. Essential services like Social Security remain open, while departments like Labor shutter. Bryan notes, “This shutdown is ultimately about an argument I thought we settled last November.”   Pete Hegseth Calls Out Fat Generals: The Secretary of War unveiled a 10-point plan to toughen the military, starting with weight and fitness standards for all ranks. “It is tiring to look out… at any formation and see fat troops,” Hegseth said. The plan includes tougher boot camp, one combat standard for men and women, and no more promotions based on quotas. Trump joked, “Pete gave a great speech… but I don't want him to get so good I can't go on after that.”   Immigration Updates from Chicago to Central America: Four leftist protesters attacked an ICE facility in Chicago, one threatening, “I'll f------ kill you right now.” In Portland, illegals shined lasers at a CBP helicopter. In Iowa, ICE arrested a school superintendent who was in the country illegally and registered to vote. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports migrants are sending record remittances home — $161 billion projected this year — fearing deportation. Bryan says, “Migrants are getting while the getting is good.”   Obesity Campaigns Fail Worldwide: A new Lancet study found that none of 17 childhood obesity programs worked, even with parental training and nutrition education. French researchers concluded rising caloric intake is the real driver, echoing why drugs like Ozempic work by cutting appetite. Bryan quips, “I put a new picture of Pete Hegseth on my fridge. I've already lost five pounds.”   "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32     Keywords: federal government shutdown 2025, Trump irreversible budget cuts quote, FBI agents fired shutdown, Pete Hegseth fat generals 10 point plan, military fitness standards women combat, Chicago ICE attack leftist protesters, Portland illegals laser CBP helicopter, Iowa illegal superintendent voter registration, migrant remittances $161 billion Bloomberg, Lancet obesity study children, French study caloric intake obesity, Ozempic Wegovy appetite suppression

Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth held a part-pep rally, part-declaration of war on the U.S. Constitution in Quantico on Tuesday. Former Lieutenant Generals David Lute and Mark Hertling join David Rothkopf and Ed Luce to discuss Trump's speech in Quantico, America's security posture under this administration, and more. Looking for More from the DSR Network? Click Here: https://linktr.ee/deepstateradio Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In a speech to military officials, President Trump went full fascist: He said America is under “invasion from within,” declared that the generals in the room will be enlisted in a “war” against that enemy, and bizarrely insisted that U.S. cities should be used as military training grounds. We think this is Trump's most explicit declaration yet that he sees large swaths of America as themselves constituting a kind of enemy nation within our borders. The display prompted Senator Ruben Gallego to scorch Trump at length as an “idiot,” suggesting that mockery and contempt is a good approach in situations like these. We talked to Ian Reifowitz, a history professor at SUNY Empire State University and co-author of Riling up the Base. He explains how Trump is relying on longtime right-wing political tropes that trade on grievance and hate, how Trump-MAGA are supercharging this in a newly emboldened way, and why it's all heading to a very dark place. Looking for More from the DSR Network? Click Here: https://linktr.ee/deepstateradio Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John discusses the government shutdown as Republicans refuse to negotiate a continuing resolution that doesn't completely screw Americans, preferring instead to simply screw them with a shutdown and then of course make up lies about Democrats causing it. He also talks about Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump completely boring the nation's top military brass while pitching a fighting force that is thinner, meaner, more male and less accountable than ever before. Then, he interviews author Joel Edward Goza and they discuss points in his books "America's Unholy Ghosts: The Racist Roots of Our Faith and Politics", and "Rebirth of a Nation: Reparations and Remaking America". Next, he talks policy and politics with fellow Sirius XM host and Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist - Karen Hunter. And lastly, John jokes with Comedy Daddy - Keith Price on pop culture and Donald Trump. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Megyn Kelly is joined by Stu Burguiere, host of Stu Does America, to talk about Sec. Pete Hegseth calling out "fat" generals and troops in major address, promising to end DEI and radical progressive ideology in the military, Trump's hilarious AI video of Schumer and Jeffries, the meltdown about it being "racist," Kamala Harris rambling incoherently about her "light" with Joy Reid, reports she wants to run for president in 2028, J.K. Rowling's remarks directed at Emma Watson on the trans issue after years of silence, her powerful letter addressing the hate that has been directed her way, Ta-Nehisi Coates' hateful lies about Charlie Kirk, Coates calling out Ezra Klein for trying to lower the temperature, the left's inability to be honest about Kirk's legacy, and more. Then Britt Mayer, host of "The Britt Mayer Show," and Will Witt, author of "Do Not Comply," join to discuss the announcement of Bad Bunny as the Super Bowl halftime performer, his negative remarks about America and refusal to perform here, his history of cross-dressing and "fluid" sexuality, Rosie O'Donnell's embarrassing therapy admission about Trump, and more. Burguiere- https://www.youtube.com/StuDoesAmericaMayer- https://open.spotify.com/show/6ej8rWH1AxG6q8i00Q9Izk?si=Witt- https://purebasicscollective.com/us Birch Gold: Text MK to 989898 and get your free info kit on goldPique: Get 20% off your order plus a FREE frother & glass beaker with this exclusive link: https://piquelife.com/MEGYNDone with Debt: https://www.DoneWithDebt.com & tell them Megyn Kelly sent you!Chapter: For Free and unbiased Medicare help dial 27-MEDICARE (276-334-2273) or go to https://askchapter.org/kellyDisclaimer: Chapter and its affiliates are not connected with or endorsed by any government entity or the federal Medicare program. Chapter Advisory, LLC represents Medicare Advantage HMO, PPO, and PFFS organizations and standalone prescription drug plans that have a Medicare contract. Enrollment depends on the plan's contract renewal. While we have a database of every Medicare plan nationwide and can help you to search among all plans, we have contracts with many but not all plans. As a result, we do not offer every plan available in your area. Currently we represent 50 organizations which offer 18,160 products nationwide. We search and recommend all plans, even those we don't directly offer. You can contact a licensed Chapter agent to find out the number of products available in your specific area. Please contact Medicare.gov, 1-800-Medicare, or your local State Health Insurance Program (SHIP) to get information on all your options.  Follow The Megyn Kelly Show on all social platforms:YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/MegynKellyTwitter: http://Twitter.com/MegynKellyShowInstagram: http://Instagram.com/MegynKellyShowFacebook: http://Facebook.com/MegynKellyShow Find out more information at:https://www.devilmaycaremedia.com/megynkellyshow Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

David Rothkopf, the Daily Beast's unmissable columnist, lifts the lid on what's really going on at Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth's "pep rally" this week for generals and admirals. Rothkopf, CEO of The Rothkopf Group and a Clinton administration veteran, tells executive editor Hugh Dougherty tells what his own sources are warning the meeting signifies. And he warns how a militarized response to phantom threats like “war-torn Portland” saps real military readiness. He also tells why Trump weaponizing the DOJ against enemies including James Comey means the U.S. is not just facing becoming an authoritarian police state; in fact it's already there. He also traces the next evolution of MAGA from grievance politics to white Christian nationalist revivalism and warns how it could outlast Trump himself thanks to people including Erika Kirk and JD Vance. Yet he offers a glimmer of hope in the power of numbers, new platforms, and a public that still wants sanity. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

During today's show, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave us a preview of the new standards he expects from every rank in the U.S. Military. Lt. Col. Tony Schaffer addresses that as well as a pending Israel/Hamas ceasefire agreement and if it will stick. Stigall also felt it important to address the growing anti-Israel sentiment bubbling up and how short sighted it is. And it really has nothing to do with Israel. Plus, Steve Moore on just how bad Jerome Powell really is a Federal Reserve Chair and can the Republicans reclaim ground in states like Virginia after a huge scandal in one of their largest public school systems? Candidate for Lt. Governor John Reid joins the show. -For more info visit the official website: https://chrisstigall.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/chrisstigallshow/Twitter: https://twitter.com/ChrisStigallFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/chris.stigall/Listen on Spotify: https://tinyurl.com/StigallPodListen on Apple Podcasts: https://bit.ly/StigallShowSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode of The President's Daily Brief: America is just hours away from a government shutdown. While Capitol Hill descends into partisan gridlock, the real cost may be to national security. We'll break down the risks. President Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth deliver a rare address to hundreds of military leaders at Quantico. We'll have the details To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President's Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief CBDistillery: Visit https://CBDistillery.com and use promo code PDB for 25% off your entire order!   Birch Gold: Text PDB to 989898 and get your free info kit on gold Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Rich Zeoli Show- Full Show (09/30/2025): 3:05pm- According to a report from The New York Post, both of Mikie Sherrill's children were admitted to the U.S. Naval Academy—but did they receive special treatment to gain admission? The school has a 9% acceptance rate. 3:30pm- “The C-Word” podcast with Lena Dunham is coming to Audacy soon—Rich suspects many of his audience members will find this news relevant as the two shows are virtually identical. PLUS, a lot of people believe Dunham's podcast is scalable! Whatever that means…. 4:00pm- Brent Sadler—Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in the Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation—joins The Rich Zeoli Show to break down Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's new combat directives to senior military officials. During a speech from Quantico, Virginia earlier today, Hegseth memorably declared: “Simply put, if you do not meet the male level physical standards for a combat position, cannot pass a PT test, or don't want to shave and look professional—it's time for a new position.” 4:30pm- From the Oval Office, President Donald Trump signed executive orders lowering the cost of pharmaceuticals and vowing to use technological innovations, like artificial intelligence, as well as increased federal funding to defeat childhood cancer. 4:40pm- While speaking with the press, President Donald Trump said the U.S. is likely to experience a government shutdown at midnight on Tuesday—noting that Democrats won't agree on a continuing resolution (CR) and are demanding government-provided healthcare for migrants residing in the country illegally. President Trump said if Democrats remain unreasonable, he will use the shutdown to make permanent cuts to the federal workforce. 5:00pm- Mike Opelka joins Rich for The Drive at 5—where they attempt to define “scalability,” listen to new Zeoli show jingles, and discuss Kamala Harris's new book (no, Mike didn't buy it, but he did slow down the audio book and make her sound drunk). Plus, The View's Sunny Hostin says she doesn't understand why physical standards should be important for those serving in the United States armed forces! She wants fat troops!? Speaking of which, someone has leaked KFC's eleven secret herbs and spices! You can find Opelka here: https://pureopelka.com. 5:30pm- Free Speech Under Attack in England: Armed British police arrested a blogger named Peter North at his home for posting a “F*** Hamas” meme on X. 5:40pm- In a conversation with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Oracle billionaire Larry Ellison alarmingly revealed he'd like to centralize data for total surveillance: "Citizens will be on their best behavior because we're constantly watching & recording everything that's going on." 6:05pm- While speaking with the press, Congresswoman Maxine Waters said that Democrats are “demanding healthcare for everyone.” Does that include migrants residing in the U.S. illegally? 6:15pm- Entertainment Update: Matt says Leonardo DiCaprio's new film, “One Battle After Another,” is good but centers around political violence in America—which makes it a tough watch at times given the recent news cycle. Plus, when will the next James Bond be named? 6:30pm- On Tuesday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth issued new combat directives to senior military officials during a speech from Quantico, Virginia. Hegseth memorably declared: “Simply put, if you do not meet the male level physical standards for a combat position, cannot pass a PT test, or don't want to shave and look professional—it's time for a new position.”

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu announce a peace plan for Gaza, including proposals for Hamas disarmament, a transitional government, and an international security force. Will this work, and what if Hamas doesn't accept? Plus, Pete Hegseth calls hundreds of military generals and admirals to Washington to speak to them about his vision for the Department of War. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Trump to attend Tuesday's unprecedented gathering of US military commanders, YouTube to pay $24.5M to settle Trump's lawsuit over 2021 account suspension, Sen Rick Scott joins the show Check Out Our Partners: American Financing: Save with https://www.americanfinancing.net/benny NMLS 182334, nmlsconsumeraccess.org. APR for rates in the 5s start at 6.327% for well qualified borrowers. Call 888-528-1219 or americanfinancing.net/Benny, for details about credit costs and terms TRUMP STORE: Go to https://www.TrumpStore.com and use my code BENNY15 at checkout for 15% off your first order. Allio Capital: Text ”BENNY” to 511511 Shopify: Sign up for your $1 per month trial: http://shopify.com/benny Bon Charge: Go to https://www.boncharge.com/BENNY and use coupon code BENNY to save 15% Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On Tuesday, the top U.S. generals will meet at Quantico for an audience with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and President Donald Trump. Hegseth's order for the gathering comes on the heels of the firing of top military officers. It also lands in the middle of Hegseth's attempts to purge the military of DEI initiatives and programs that he sees as not aligned with the military's core mission of “lethality.” President Trump is expected to address the group. His speech comes after his recent order to send the National Guard into “war ravaged” Portland, Oregon, over the objection of local officials. Host Colby Itkowitz speaks with Pentagon reporter Dan Lamothe about how The Post broke the story of the generals' meeting, the logistics of gathering so many senior military officials in one place, and the optics of the president and defense secretary speeches to the top brass.Today's show was produced by Rennie Svirnovskiy with help from Laura Benshoff. It was edited by Ariel Plotnick and mixed by Sean Cater. Subscribe to The Washington Post here.