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  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

Als Deutsche Tscheka bezeichneten Justiz und Presse in der Weimarer Republik eine kommunistische Untergrundorganisation, die nach dem Scheitern des Hamburger Aufstandes Ende 1923 gegründet worden war und terroristische Anschläge gegen politische Gegner wie den Reichswehrgeneral Hans von Seeckt geplant haben soll. Mehreren vermeintlichen Mitgliedern wurde deswegen seit 1924 am Reichsgericht in Leipzig der Prozess gemacht, welcher gewaltige deutschlandweite Beachtung und auch in den Hamburger Zeitungen regelmäßigen Niederschlag fand. Auch das sozialdemokratische Hamburger Echo berichtete beinahe täglich und hielt mit seiner politischen Meinung gegenüber den Angeklagten und ihren angeblichen Hintermännern nicht hinter dem Berg. Der Gerichtsreport vom 14. Februar 1925 ist einmal mehr ein eindrückliches Beispiel für die Härte, mit der der Konflikt zwischen den unterschiedlichen Flügeln der Arbeiterbewegung in den 1920er Jahren ausgefochten wurde und überrascht nicht nur ob der Schärfe des Tonfalles, sondern auch wegen einiger äußerst diskriminierender Formulierungen. Es liest Frank Riede.

Last time we spoke about the fourth encirclement campaign against the CCP. In 1931, the CCP survived brutal encirclement campaigns while the threat of Japanese invasion in Manchuria shifted focus in China. The new leadership, known as the 28 Bolsheviks, seized control after the downfall of Li Lisan, leading to infighting within the CCP. Despite initial successes, Mao Zedong opposed the aggressive military strategies favored by the Bolsheviks. As the Red Army expanded, Mao's calls for caution clashed with the Central Committee's ambitions, highlighting the struggle for power and differing strategies within the party during a time of upheaval. As the 28th Bolsheviks gained power, they stripped Mao Zedong of key positions, deeming his strategies outdated. The Red Army, while suffering losses, adapted tactics and launched further offensives. Political tensions rose, leading to purges and reorganization under more orthodox leadership. Ultimately, despite setbacks, the CCP's resilience and guerrilla tactics allowed them to persist against KMT forces.   #128 the fifth encirclement campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So the CCP had just survived 4 encirclement campaigns. Now each time an encirclement campaign was unleashed, it was done so during a very tumultuous time to say the least. The first three were done between 1930-1931 where the Central Plains War and multiple large scale rebellions were kicking off. It was also on the cusp of the re-unification of China, thus Chiang Kai-Shek arguably had bigger fish to fry. During the fourth encirclement campaign Chiang Kai-Shek was very much taking notice of the red menace in his interior, however a rather earth shattering moment occurred, the Japanese had invaded Manchuria. And yes, we will get to the 15 year war in good time no worries folks your boy has a lot of goodies coming. So one can understand Chiang Kai-Shek could not very well fully go after the Reds when the Japanese had invaded northeast China and there was absolutely no telling where or when they would stop. Well the fourth encirclement campaign did not provide the results the KMT needed, so obviously there was to be a fifth…and guess what, the Japanese began an invasion of North China that same year of 1933. Now if you really are itching to hear more about these events we will tackle in a few episodes, over at the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or on all major podcast platforms might I suggest the following: my Kanji Ishiwara series covering his entire involvement in these events and during WW2, my full documentary/podcast on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and lastly my full podcast on the Japanese invasion of North China. I am a very busy boy over there as you can see.  In the late winter and early spring of 1933, the Kwantung Army had begun an invasion of North China. They specifically began by invading the province of Rehe, modern day Jehol. After this they attacked the Great Wall of China, a pretty insane story to be honest, and descended further into north china. Understandably Chiang Kai-Shek shifted his focus from the Red menace to the Japanese at his front door. Beginning in July, the KMT established a review team to examine why the encirclement campaigns were failing to provide real results and what improvements could be made. They also established division level training units to retrain the forces with the lessons learned against the Reds. There was also a lot of integration of foreign military advisers, particularly Germans who helped develop better tactics and strategies. The Germans immediately proposed a more deliberate strategy against the Soviets. The first step they argued was to establish an economic blockade. Raw materials and durable goods could not be allowed to enter or leave the Soviet areas. Foods like rice and salt were especially targeted, there was to be an absolute ban on them going in or out. The second step was to establish a series of fortifications, basically blockhouses made out of concrete to provide fire support to offensive operations in nearby cities. As NRA forces advanced into areas to clear them, the previous blockhouses would be abandoned as new ones were built. There also needed to be lines of operation, requiring road development in rear areas to expedite logistical needs to the front. Now none of this sounds new compared to what we spoke about in the previous campaigns, but what was the issue was that it was not being done by all units prior. The KMT was also going to introduce political reforms that complemented the new standardized military strategies. New slogans arose such as “Thirty Percent Military, Seventy Percent Political,”. They were going to revive the baojia system.  The Baojia system was an administrative structure that emerged during the Song Dynasty 960–1279 AD and was prevalent in various forms throughout subsequent dynasties. Its primary purpose was to enhance local governance, community responsibility, and social stability. The system was based on the grouping of households into units known as "bao" and "jia". Each bao typically consisted of ten households, while a jia consisted of ten baos, totaling about one hundred households. This hierarchical structure allowed for more manageable governance and oversight, facilitating communication and administration at the local level. Under the Baojia system, each household was assigned to a bao, and the head of the bao was responsible for maintaining order, collecting taxes, and ensuring the compliance of families with local laws and regulations. The heads of the baojia units worked in conjunction with local officials to enforce state policies and maintain social harmony. This system not only provided a means for effective local governance but also fostered a sense of community among families. Neighbors were encouraged to cooperate and support one another, creating a network of mutual responsibility. In addition to its administrative functions, the Baojia system played a significant role in maintaining social order. By organizing families into these small units, it facilitated surveillance and mutual accountability among community members. Residents were motivated to monitor each other's behavior, discouraging misconduct and promoting adherence to social norms. As a result, the system contributed to the overall stability and cohesion of society, particularly in rural areas where government presence was often limited. Now to get all of this done, the KMT increased the NRA forces deployed to Jiangxi to nearly 700,000 who were broken down into 4 area armies and 5 air corps. They deployed the Northern Route NRA Army consisting of 33 divisions in Jinzhi, Jishui, Nangeng and the Le'an front; and the Southern Route NRA Army, consisting of eleven Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment, established a blocking position along a line connecting the cities of Wuping, Anyuan, Shangyou and Ganxian. The Southern Route NRA army would move to the blocking positions north in coordination with the other NRA forces to try and squeeze the Reds. The Western Route NRA army consisting of 9 Hunanese divisions and 3 independent regiments were responsible for blocking the Reds from advancing west of the Gan River. The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area army HQ was assigned 11 divisions and 4 security regiments to block any Reds from escaping through northeast Jiangxi. All of this encompassed the fifth encirclement campaign.  When the NRA was ready to commence the campaign, it was too late for the Reds to properly mount a counter encirclement campaign. The only thing the Reds had going for them was their recruitment efforts that saw them grow perhaps 100,000 strong. The Red Army even began touting a slogan “Million Man Army” to further recruit. By late October 1933, the Reds were certainly numerous, but this also meant they needed more supplies and equipment. With their Eastern Front Army now in Fujian, the Central Front Army and local populace should have been raising revenues and stockpiling supplies, especially rice and salt, but that is of course if they knew a fifth encirclement campaign was coming.  On September 25th, the NRA deployed 3 divisions south from Nanchang to attack Lichuan. Within 3 days of battle, the city fell, which greatly shocked the CCP. The Central Front Red Army fell back, waiting for the Eastern Front Red Army to rush back over from Fujian to meet the threat. By October 6th both front Red armies consolidated to perform a counterattack. They first attacked Xunkou, where they annihilated 3 NRA brigades. However the success was to be short lived. For the proceeding two months, the Red Army attacked multiple NRA blockhouses in Zixi, Huwan Bajiaoting, Xiaoshi, Daxiongguan and Yuangai Mountain. Yet they were unsuccessful at breaching the defensive line. The concrete block houses were acting as pillboxes allowing the NRA to concentrate fire using brand new German made machine guns. They also were utilizing new Krupp artillery pieces and German made aerial bombs against the Red army formations whenever they assaulted the blockhouse line. By November the KMT's attention was slightly diverted as Fujian had just seen a full blown rebellion, more about that in the next episode, but to summarize a bit. On November 30th, the KMT 19th route army in conjunction with the Fujian provincial government rebelled against the KMT and set up an independent government. As you might be guessing, they were also working with the CCP. Back in October they had formed a military alliance, better said cease fire. This little arrangement did not last long and there even emerged hostilities. During this chaos the revolutionary military council held an emergency meeting to figure out a course of action. Otto Braun advocated for a strong offensive to decisively defeat the KMT. He argued the golden age of guerrilla warfare in China was over and now the Red Army must conduct convention warfare against NRA positions. Thus Mao Zedong's “lure the enemy in deep” strategy was replaced by “defending against the enemy outside the Soviet”. In January of 1934 the second soviet congress was held where a series of resolutions were passed to focus the Red Army against the fifth encirclement campaign. The resolutions reiterated Otto Braun's offensive strategy and repeatedly attacked Mao Zedong's strategies. Building upon the strategy of defending against the enemy outside the Soviets, Otto Braun also proposed using “short, swift thrusts”. This would see the employment of repeated infantry assaults to overwhelm the NRA blockhouse lines. Otto Braun also advocated for continuing the mass recruitment efforts and brought up perhaps beginning a system of conscription to fill the ranks. After the Fujian rebellion situation simmered down, the NRA refocused their attention against the Reds. The NRA established a line of blockhouses going from Lichuan to Le'an and began clearing out the area south of Ruijin using 35 divisions. The NRA forces first targeted Guangchang, lying about halfway between Nanchang and Ruijin. The NRA's Eastern Front also began advancing west, totaling some 14 divisions. By March of 1934 the NRA Northern and Eastern Fronts linked up at Deshengguan where they began coordinated efforts towards Guangchang. In response to the NRA advances towards Guangchang, the Red Army built a series of fortifications and trenchworks to defend the area. On April 9th, the NRA began its attack on Guangchang, deploying the 3rd Route army's 10 divisions from Nanfeng with heavy artillery and aircraft support. The NRA forces advanced south along both sides of the Xu River leading towards Guangchang. The Northern Route NRA Army established new blockhouses on one side of the river before clearing the other side. It took the NRA forces roughly 2 weeks to advance down the riverway to Guangchang. By April 23rd, they breached the Red Army's defensive lines and seized control over some high ground surrounding the area. The Reds were forced to pull back into the city where they continued to build fortifications and trench lines. On the 27th the NRA began to artillery and aerially bomb the city, easily destroying the wooden fortifications and trench lines constructed by the Reds. On the 28th, the NRA stormed the city forcing the Reds to retreat south. The Reds had suffered 5093 casualties, roughly 20% of their defending force at Guangcheng whereas the NRA suffered 2000 casualties. It was very evident, the NRA were wielding superior equipment, notably the heavy artillery and aircrafts that the Red's had no real answer for.  After Guangchang the NRA advanced in all four directions. By May 1, NRA forces from the Western Front had taken control of both Shaxi and Longgang. Meanwhile, the Eastern Route NRA forces advanced and captured Jianning by May 16. By June, the CCP began feeling the strain from these assaults. A combination of the blockade and the baojia system was gradually eroded local support for the CCP. The attrition warfare strategy also took a toll on the quality of leadership and experience in the Red Army, as more inexperienced soldiers filled the ranks. Under pressure, many of these recruits deserted, further weakening the Red Army's effectiveness. Additionally, the shortage of supplies and food lowered morale and diminished public support for the Red Army's offensive. Even military and party publications gradually withdrew their support for the offensive, shifting focus to the promotion of guerrilla warfare to conserve resources. Recruitment efforts to replenish losses had little impact as the NRA's superior strategy continued to stifle the Soviet, reducing its control from seventeen counties to ten. In the summer of 1934, the Red Army began exploring new strategies, establishing a defensive perimeter stretching from Ninghua to Ningdu and Xingguo. By May, the Central Committee convened and concluded that the current offensive strategy was ineffective, likely necessitating the Red Army's evacuation from the Soviet area. They sought approval from the COMINTERN to change their approach, which was granted a few days later, stressing that the CCP's priority should be preserving the Red Army's combat strength. However, Braun and Bo Gu proposed a different method. Instead of immediately preparing to withdraw from the Soviet, they advocated for a final stand, urging everyone to give their all to defend the territory and secure victory. Alongside this shift in rhetoric, the Red Army maintained its defensive posture, constructing wooden blockhouses and trenches. Additionally, the CCP approved an expansion of guerrilla warfare across multiple fronts to defeat the NRA. In July, the NRA launched another offensive, focusing this time on the city of Shicheng, positioned between Ninghua and Ningdu as their entry point. The two forces clashed fiercely along this final line of defense for nearly a month. In early August, the Red Army mounted a strong counteroffensive during the battle of Gaohunao, inflicting over 4,000 casualties on the NRA. However, the Red Army also suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat to the last defensive line just north of Shicheng. At Shicheng, the Red Army managed to hold the NRA in a stalemate. Ultimately, the NRA deployed twelve large howitzers, breaking through the defensive line in August. Shicheng eventually fell in October. The defense cost the Red Army 5,000 casualties, leaving it severely weakened and forcing its leaders to consider drastic actions. By this point, the Jiangxi Soviet had been reduced to a small area around Ruijin and Xingguo. With mounting casualties and the imminent threat of an NRA assault on Ruijin, the Red Army made a bold decision to retreat from Jiangxi on October 10, 1934, ending the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There has been a lot of thorough investigative work into why the CCP failed during the fifth encirclement campaign. This episode will be a bit different then previous ones as I thought it might be interesting to tell the overall story and then explain the finer details as to why it went down this way. Going back to when I discussed the NRA analyzing why their fourth encirclement campaign had failed. The analytics from that were incorporated into plans formed by the German advisers such as Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Faulkenhausen. The Germans dramatically improved the NRA's performance across the board. This was seen in terms of training, the employment of more modern military tactics and of course the Germans sold the NRA some really good toys. Now again this was done in the vacuum of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Northern China. The real aim of the Germans' assistance was directed against the Japanese, but the advisers acknowledged how China must combat the external aggressor while not succumbing to internal threats. Ironically it was that exact situation that had toppled multiple Chinese dynasties in the past, take the Ming for example.  The NRA also employed effective counterinsurgent strategies that complimented their conventional warfare strategies. Beginning back in 1928 the KMT gradually re-instituted the baojia system. The NRA first cleared out Red areas and then established local administrators who were loyal to the KMT, protected by local militias. Through this the NRA was able to hold cleared areas and block any Red infiltration. Many residents in these areas actively began providing intel to the NRA. The Baojia system also supported the economic blockade, providing a system of sentries at the entrance of villages placing a lot of pressure on the Red Army and local populations. Chiang Kai-Shek's political reform “70% political, 30% military” also helped incorporate many disenfranchised Chinese, taking their support away from the Reds. The NRA also adopted a methodical, patient approach to tackle the Reds. The NRA quickly found out the Reds did not have the necessary weaponry to take out their concrete blockhouses, thus a war of attrition was on the table. Electing for a long campaign rather than a short one severely hurt the Reds who were incapable of conducting prolonged operations. The NRA also had learnt from the Red's usage of diversionary and feint attacks, not falling for them this time around. There was also obviously their NRA enormous advantage in numbers, they did toss nearly a million men at the Soviets. On the other side the Red Army suffered from numerous internal problems. The Red Army had undergone numerous measures to reform and professionalize the army, under the leadership of the 28 bolsheviks whom dominated the Central Committee. The mass recruitment efforts were directly primarily on uneducated peasants who required intensive training. Meanwhile the offensive strategy was decimating Red Army forces, many new recruits were tossed straight into the front lines without any training. The lack of training and political guidance, accompanied with low morale led to mass desertions. By the end of the fifth encirclement campaign the Red Army could not generate the proper forces to fill its demand and simply kept tossing more and more untrained peasants into the lines, degrading the combat effectiveness. The arrival of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks in the CCP led to significant changes in the overall military strategy of the Red Army. Much of the new leadership's perspectives were shaped by Stalinist Soviet ideology, which markedly contrasted with the views of both Li Lisan and Mao Zedong, particularly in relation to Mao Zedong's approach, which was influenced by political considerations. These ideological differences also resulted in a substantial gap in military tactics. Nevertheless, both the Bolsheviks and Mao shared a similar stance on the expansion and training of the Red Army, emphasizing the vital importance of political training in building a robust party army. Ultimately, the CCP believed that the success of the Red Army hinged on the professionalization of the force, ensuring unity of command, a shared understanding of the mission, and an enhanced capacity to execute that mission. The primary advocate for the professionalization strategy of the Red Army was the Soviet Union. Stalin's interest in the Red Army was driven by both external and internal factors. The Soviet Union viewed an imminent threat from both Japan and Germany. Japan, a longstanding adversary of Russia, had expanded its presence in China, particularly following the 1932 occupation of Manchuria, which posed a direct risk to Russia's southern flank and national security. The Soviets believed that a large, professional Red Army, loyal to the Soviet Union, would serve as a formidable defense against Japanese aggression, and later, German threats. Additionally, the Soviets resumed discussions with the Nationalist government after years of silence to help ensure the security of their Chinese flank. For Stalin, the struggle for control over the CCP was intertwined with a broader power struggle within the Soviet Union against Trotsky. His internal conflicts with Trotsky solidified his communist ideology, resulting in a stringent approach within the COMINTERN and the new CCP. Through the COMINTERN and Bolsheviks, Stalin aimed to consolidate his power by eliminating Trotskyists in China. These internal Soviet political dynamics ultimately influenced the choice of Chinese political and military strategies, which had detrimental effects on the Red Army. At first glance, the policies of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks closely resembled those of Li Lisan. Both groups viewed the urban proletariat as the central force in the communist revolution. They shared the conviction that merging the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat with modern strategies would empower the Red Army to achieve victory. Additionally, they felt that the conditions were ripe for revolution to spread into urban areas, emphasizing the necessity for the Red Army to engage in the cities to support students and workers involved in the movement. Wang Ming even remarked that although the 1930 assault on Changsha was a mistake, he did not see this failure as evidence against the soundness of the strategy of targeting urban centers. Upon closer inspection, the distinctions between the two factions were quite pronounced. Disputes between them arose early on; in June 1930, Li Lisan criticized Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and two other group members for opposing his plans. However, their differences ran deeper than mere political conflict. Ideologically, the Bolsheviks challenged Li Lisan's characterization of the bourgeoisie. In Wang Ming's The Two Lines, he asserted that all "capitalist bourgeois reformers were counterrevolutionary." This broadened the definition to encompass wealthy and middle-class peasants, who became targets during land reform efforts. Additionally, their strategies for confronting urban centers differed significantly. The factions also had contrasting views on the role of the Red Army: Li Lisan believed it should support urban proletariat uprisings to capture the cities, while the Bolsheviks regarded it as the primary force for seizing the metropolis. The distinctions between Mao Zedong and the 28 Bolsheviks were significant. Unlike Mao Zedong, the Bolshevik-led CCP rejected any form of alliance, insisting on the defeat of both the Nationalists and the Japanese. In their view, both groups were imperialists and posed equal threats to the Soviet Union and the communist movement. During the Mukden Incident, many nationalists and communists sought to forge a united front against Japanese aggression. However, the CCP opposed this, advocating for the overthrow of what they considered the agent of imperialism—the KMT.  The Bolsheviks also held a strong opposition to Maoist military strategies. They believed that an incorrect guerrilla warfare approach had infiltrated the Red Army, epitomized by the "lure the enemy in deep" tactic. Wang Ming likened this strategy to a form of "retreat" or "escape." The Bolsheviks advocated for the significant expansion and professionalization of the Red Army, aiming to move away from a peasant mentality. With a larger force, the Red Army could adopt an offensive stance, employing Soviet tactics to capture urban centers and extend Soviet influence. While guerrilla warfare was not entirely dismissed, it was relegated to local militias in rear and flank areas. In contrast, Mao had a more practical perspective on the capabilities of Red Army soldiers. He recognized that the Red Army lacked the technology necessary for conventional warfare. Moreover, Mao believed that achieving victory was not the sole priority; sustainability after victory and ensuring that the gains outweighed the losses were also crucial considerations. In hindsight, the positional warfare and offensive tactics advocated by Otto Braun and the students proved to be ineffective against the NRA. However, at the time, it is understandable why this approach was favored over Mao Zedongs strategy of "luring the enemy deep." This new offensive military strategy was predicated on the belief that the Red Army was strong and capable of launching attacks against the NRA. Although this assessment may have been overstated, the victories achieved during the Extermination Campaigns did boost the morale of the Red Army. Furthermore, their later success in resisting the Fourth Extermination Campaign reinforced the capabilities of the Communist military forces. This offensive strategy also marked a departure from the tactic of conceding territory, which had always posed challenges for the local population. The CCP garnered more support for its strategy by asserting that the Red Army was now strong enough to defend their territory and confront the enemy directly, allowing locals to remain in their homes. This simple shift fostered greater support for their cause. Conversely, Mao Zedong had a keen understanding of local conditions and recognized the detrimental effects of Bolshevik policies on land redistribution. The Bolshevik approach increased the burden on a larger portion of the local populace and threatened the fragile support necessary for waging a "people's war." Mao Zedong and his followers also aimed to delay and hinder large recruitment efforts, arguing that expansion would be an unnecessary distraction for locals who were already busy with agricultural work. Moreover, the Bolshevik offensive strategy was more conventional compared to Mao Zedongs concept of mobile warfare. At that time, Mao Zedongs approach of "luring the enemy deep" and other mobile warfare tactics were revolutionary in China and faced considerable criticism and skepticism. Even after the significant defeat of the Li Lisan line, the ability of the Bolsheviks and Otto Braun to revive a similar strategy two years later demonstrated the ongoing support for a more conventional military approach. In its new strategy, the Red Army blended traditional and modern tactics to engage the enemy. On the one hand, it maintained its reliance on established strengths in intelligence gathering and deception to outmaneuver the NRA. However, with the introduction of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks and Otto Braun, the Red Army transitioned from a mobile defense approach to employing “short, swift thrusts” as offensive tactics against the NRA blockhouses during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. The Red Army also capitalized on advantages gained from previous campaigns. Improvements in signal intelligence, particularly through increased collection of wireless communications and the creation of training schools, enabled the Red Army to closely monitor NRA movements during the Fourth Extermination Campaign. Additionally, the Red Army integrated tactical intelligence into its operations, using plain-clothed soldiers and deploying double agents within KMT units to gather intelligence and disrupt them. The thoroughness of the Red Army's intelligence collection was a notable strength. For instance, an intelligence report on the KMT's Seventy-ninth NRA Division analyzed the background and motivations of its soldiers, revealing that many hailed from the same area as their commander, which fostered strong loyalties. This insight made the unit a less appealing target for subversion, given the traditional Confucian emphasis on hierarchical loyalty. The Red Army continued to execute feints and deceptive operations throughout its campaigns. The Eleventh Red Army effectively served as the main effort on two occasions. Moreover, the Red Army sent misleading communications to confuse NRA forces. For instance, while near Huangpi, NRA scouts “intercepted” a message claiming that the Red Army's main forces were positioned in Nanchang, prompting the division units to lower their guard in the city, only to be ambushed. The biggest change to Red Army tactics was the introduction of what Otto Braun described as “short, swift thrusts,” while Lin Biao defined this tactic as “sudden, rapid raids launched against the enemy who emerges from their blockhouses to advance the fortification line by a short distance, specifically between 2½ to 5 kilometers or even less. These thrusts aim to eliminate the main enemy forces before they can solidify their position. Although the tactics appeared straightforward, significant differences emerged in their application, particularly between Braun's theoretical approach and Lin Biao's practical execution. Firstly, the ultimate objectives of the tactics differed greatly. Braun's approach was part of a broader strategy aimed at safeguarding Soviet territory. Rather than seeking a decisive victory over the numerically superior NRA forces, the Red Army focused on defending territory and achieving small tactical victories that could translate into operational and strategic advantages. In contrast, Lin Biao viewed this tactic as a means to “annihilate the enemy or secure victory in the entire battle.”His emphasis was on defeating the enemy and achieving a decisive victory. Secondly, Braun promoted a more methodical strategy, where the Red Army would establish strong points with small clusters of fortifications. These areas provided defensive protection against artillery and air assaults, creating conditions conducive for the Red Army to launch rapid attacks on the NRA when they were away from their blockhouses. During an attack, Braun suggested that the Red Army should first fix the NRA in its rear, flank, or even front, followed by a strike aimed at weakening the enemy to disrupt its forces. Conversely, Lin Biao had a different perspective on the assault, prioritizing mobility and movement for the Red Army during these thrusts. The Red Army's primary defense relied on secrecy, moving quietly to occupy high ground while only establishing makeshift defensive structures for air and artillery protection. When the enemy entered their territory, the Red Army would encircle their forces, cutting off their retreat and swiftly attacking their flanks before they could construct fortifications. He advocated for the pursuit, believing it was the most effective way to convert a tactical victory into operational or strategic success. In contrast, Lin Biao rejected the idea of pursuit, reasoning that if his tactics were executed effectively, the enemy would have no escape route, making a pursuit unnecessary. These differing views on tactics underscored the challenges of translating theoretical military concepts into practical application. Otto Braun's offensive strategy stemmed from his experiences and understanding of Western military traditions. When applied to the Chinese battlefield, Lin Biao adapted his own experiences to formulate his interpretation of “short, swift thrusts,” which incorporated several of Mao's tactical principles. Given the circumstances of the Red Army, Lin Biao aimed for a quick, decisive victory, steering clear of prolonged battles with the NRA. He utilized intelligence and terrain—particularly through reconnaissance—to gain an advantage over the enemy. His strategy prioritized focusing on the enemy rather than merely securing territory, enabling his unit to engage in battle on favorable ground. While the localization of “short, swift thrusts” did not provide the Red Army with the decisive edge needed to overcome the NRA, it illustrated how the Red Army continued to adapt concepts to local conditions to achieve success in combat. Between 1932 and 1934, the Red Army reached its maximum size and level of professionalism, only to be outmatched by a stronger NRA force. With the rise of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the Red Army adopted a more aggressive, offensive strategy. Although this approach would later be deemed a mistake, it initiated a series of reforms that enhanced the Red Army's professionalism. During this period, the Red Army nearly doubled its strength to six army corps. To promote uniformity and centralize command, all Red Army units, including local militia groups, were standardized. Additionally, the Red Army founded the Red Academy and the Red Army War College, alongside specialized schools to train and develop its officers. These reforms contributed to the Red Army's success in the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the NRA and facilitated the expansion of Soviet influence into four provinces. However, following their defeat, the NRA adapted and developed a more effective strategy against the Red Army. Lacking the necessary heavy weapons and supplies, the Red Army could not prevent the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. In order to survive the Red Army would have to embark on arguably one of the most important historic moments of the CCP's history, it was a notably very long march. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The 28 Bolsheviks wrestled control over the CCP and this had rather dramatic consequences. For one, Mao Zedong's strategies were thrown to the wind as full on offensive strategies took the center stage. In the face of the most intense NRA encirclement campaign as of yet, the CCP crumbled and would now have to march to away trying to survive.

Poco a poco el carro de combate va calando en los organigramas de la República de Weimar, y de la experiencia de la base-escuela de Kazán, Seeckt crea sobre el papel las primeras brigadas y divisiones, y se crean sus primeros prototipos de tanques, con los nombres de tractor ligero y tractor pesado para no despertar sospechas en las comisiones aliadas para el cumplimiento del Tratado de Versalles. La evolución teórica y tecnológica avanzan para el arma acorazada desde un punto de vista diferente a las potencias occidentales, y los diseños de los carros de combate así lo atestiguan. El "regalo checo" en forma de LT vz. 35 (Pz.Kpfw.35(t)) y LT vz. 38 (Pz.Kpfw.38(t)) fue importantísimo para la invasión de Polonia, y determinante para la ofensiva que pronto se daría en el Oeste. Te lo cuentan Gustavo Flamme, Félix Lancho y Antonio Gómez. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Das Jahr 2021 startet mit einem neuen Format auf dem Portal KenFM: HIStory "Wer die Vergangenheit nicht kennt, kann die Gegenwart nicht verstehen und die Zukunft nicht gestalten." - Helmut Kohl Der Buchautor und Publizist Hermann Ploppa erläutert in HIStory kurz und sachlich historische Daten und Jahrestage von herausragenden geschichtlichen Ereignissen. Dabei werden in diesem Format Begebenheiten der Gegenwart, die mit einem Blick in die Vergangenheit in ihrer Bedeutung besser einzuordnen sind, künftig alle 14 Tage montags in einen geschichtlichen Kontext gebracht. Das Thema heute: Das deutsch-russische Verhältnis - der Kampf um die eurasische Platte Russland: Da sehen wir sofort Wladimir Putin vor unserem geistigen Auge. Dann denken wir vielleicht an Nawalny. Nawalny: ein Kritiker des allmächtigen russischen Dauer-Präsidenten Wladimir Putin. Putin habe seinen Kritiker Nawalny mit dem heimtückischen Gift Nowitschok zum Schweigen bringen wollen. Das ist für alle Medien der westlichen Wertegemeinschaft sonnenklar. Überhaupt: Putin und die Russen. Wenn dem so ist, dann wollen wir Deutschen auch kein russisches Erdgas aus der Nordstream-Pipeline beziehen. Darüber denkt zumindest unsere Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel öffentlich nach. Russland: da müssten wir eigentlich doch auch an die 28 Millionen getöteten Bürger der Sowjetunion denken, die durch die deutsche Wehrmacht oder die Waffen-SS umgebracht worden sind. Das klingt nun alles in allem nicht sehr angenehm. Eher düster und bedrohlich. Wenn wir an Russland denken, dann denken wir an Kriege. An Konflikte und Spannungen. Unsere Beziehungen mit Russland waren schon immer negativ eingefärbt. Stimmt das denn überhaupt? War das immer so.Schauen wir uns ein bisschen in der Geschichte der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen um. Dann sehen wir: Phasen gegenseitigen Misstrauens wurden immer wieder abgelöst von Phasen großen gegenseitigen Vertrauens und einer sehr engen, ja sogar intimen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland und Russland. Phasen, in denen Deutsche und Russen fast alles miteinander geteilt haben. Deswegen machen wir jetzt einen kleinen Streifzug durch die wechselhafte Geschichte der Deutsch-Russischen Beziehungen. In vergangenen Jahrhunderten gab es keine Nationalstaaten in unserem Sinne. Und auch keine klaren Grenzziehungen. Und auch keine Trennung nach Völkern. Deutsche, Polen, Russen oder Slowaken lebten munter durchmischt in territorialen Flickenteppichen. Nicht ohne Konflikte, aber ohne gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen. Im Großen und Ganzen friedlich. Die Zeit der „ethnischen Säuberungen“ lag noch in der Zukunft. In einem großen Raum innerhalb Europas und Asiens konnten sich Händler oder sonstige Reisende frei von Ost nach West und von West nach Ost hin und her bewegen. Es gab keine Mauer. Und auch keine Trennung in politische, verfeindete Blöcke. So war traditionell der Austausch zwischen Deutschland und Russland überaus rege. Die Zarin Katharina die Große stammte aus Deutschland. Michael Wassilijewitsch Lomonossow studierte ausgiebig in Deutschland, bevor er in Russland die Wissenschaft befruchtete. Russische Adlige kurierten ihre Wehwehchen in Baden-Baden aus. Deutsche Siedler fanden in Russland ein neues Zuhause. Zahlreiche deutsche Namen russischer Generäle, Politiker und Wissenschaftler zeugen von diesem lebendigen russisch-deutschen Handel und Wandel. London, im Jahre 1904: Der überaus einflussreiche englische Gelehrte Halford Mackinder denkt über die Zukunftsperspektiven des Britischen Weltreichs nach. Bislang war das British Empire Herrscher der Welt. Großbritannien stützte sich auf seine übermächtige Marine. Nun stellt Mackinder aber fest: Eisenbahn und das neuartige Automobil können ab jetzt das Binnenland erschließen. Da können nun aber die Binnenländer ihre eigenen Rohstoffe viel besser abbauen und auf den Markt bringen als bisher. Damit entstehen der unangefochtenen Seemacht Großbritannien ganz neue Konkurrenten. England möchte auch gerne die neuen Rohstoffpotentiale in Russland und China für sich selber nutzen. Wenn aber die Binnenländer die Rohstoffe für sich selber nutzen, dann werden die Binnenländer automatisch auch immer mächtiger. Mackinder warnt seine Landsleute: wenn sich jemals Deutschland und Russland zusammentun - mit dem deutschen Ingenieurwissen und den gigantischen russischen Rohstoffen - dann können England und die USA einpacken. Und Mackinder fordert: ein solches deutsch-russisches Bündnis muss auf jeden Fall verhindert werden! Da muss auf dem europäischen Festland ein Verbündeter gefunden werden, der für Großbritannien die Rohstoffe auf dem eurasischen Super-Kontinent sicherstellen. Das kann Frankreich sein. Es kann aber auch irgendein anderer westeuropäischer Staat sein. Doch zunächst machte der Genius der Geschichte den klugen Plänen von Mackinder und seinen englischen Mitstreitern einen fetten Strich durch die Rechnung. Denn im Jahre 1917 wurde aus dem russischen Reich der Zaren ziemlich schnell die kommunistische Sowjetunion. Das hatten ausgerechnet zwei erzreaktionäre deutsche Generäle auf dem Gewissen. Denn der Erste Weltkrieg, der 1914 mit so viel Schwung begonnen hatte, fraß sich in den nordfranzösischen Schützengräben fest. Neben der Westfront mit englischen und französischen Feinden hatten die Kaiserlichen Deutschen Streitkräfte noch einen kostspieligen Krieg gegen Russland im Rücken. Das Sagen hatten in Deutschland in jenen Tagen die beiden militärischen Oberbefehlshaber General Paul von Hindenburg und dessen Graue Eminenz, General Erich Ludendorff. Im Frühjahr 1917 löste eine liberaldemokratische Regierung das Zarenregime ab. Jedoch dachten Kerenski und die anderen neuen russischen Führer gar nicht daran, den Krieg gegen Deutschland zu beenden. Sie ließen die russischen Soldaten weiter gegen Deutschland kämpfen und sterben. Hindenburg und Ludendorff ließen daraufhin den bis dahin ziemlich unbedeutenden russischen Sozialdemokraten Wladimir Iljitsch Uljanow, der sich selber Lenin nannte, in dessen kärglicher Dachkammer im Züricher Exil ausgraben. Hindenburg und Ludendorff statteten Lenin mit mächtig viel Geld aus. Sie steckten ihn in einen verschlossenen Sonderzug von Zürich über Deutschland und Skandinavien. Und ließen ihn schließlich in Petrograd, das gerade eben noch Sankt Petersburg hieß, aussteigen. Mit den üppigen deutschen Geldspenden gelang es Lenin sodann, im Handumdrehen zur bekanntesten Figur in der russischen Politik aufzusteigen. Mit dem Sturm auf das zaristische Winterpalais im Oktober 1917 putschten sich Lenins Bolschewisten an die Macht. Lenin beendete sofort den Krieg gegen Deutschland. Hindenburgs Streitkräfte konnten nun alle Mannschaften an die Westfront schicken. Was allerdings nichts mehr einbrachte. Denn mittlerweile waren die frischen, ausgeruhten Soldaten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf den westeuropäischen Kriegsschauplätzen aufmarschiert. Wir alle wissen: der Erste Weltkrieg von 1914 bis 1918 hat die Spielkarten der Geopolitik ganz neu gemischt. Deutschland wurde von einer Koalition der Staaten Großbritannien, USA und Frankreich gänzlich niedergerungen. Aus dem russischen Zarenreich war die Sowjetunion hervorgegangen. Deutschland und die Sowjetunion wurden geächtet und aus der Völkergemeinschaft für einige Zeit ausgeschlossen. Was lag näher, als dass die beiden Paria-Staaten Deutschland und die Sowjetunion sich zusammentun? Genau das geschah denn auch. Die Kontakte zu den Bolschewisten waren ja schon vom Generalsgespann Hindenburg und Ludendorff hergestellt worden. Und so verwundert es nicht, wenn bereits im Jahre 1920 der Chef der Reichswehr, Hans von Seeckt – alles andere als ein Kommunistenfreund – ganz offen sagt: „Nur im festen Anschluß an Groß-Rußland hat Deutschland die Aussicht auf Wiedergewinnung seiner Weltmachtstellung … England und Frankreich fürchten den Zusammenschluß der beiden Landmächte und suchen ihn mit allen Mitteln zu hindern – also ist er von uns mit allen Kräften anzustreben …Und wenn Deutschland sich auf Rußlands Seite stellt, so ist es selbst unbesieglich, denn andere Mächte werden dann immer Rücksicht auf Deutschland nehmen müssen, weil sie Rußland nicht unbeachtet lassen können.“ Das sahen Deutschlands Konzernlenker ganz genauso. Und im politischen Spektrum der Weimarer Republik waren sich alle einig: um ein enges Bündnis mit der Sowjetunion führt kein Weg vorbei. Weiterlesen: https://kenfm.de/history-kampf-um-die-eurasische-platte Das aktuelle Buch von Hermann Ploppa: "Der Griff nach Eurasien: Die Hintergründe des ewigen Krieges gegen Russland" Bildquellen: https://kenfm.de/history-kampf-um-die-eurasische-platte KenFM jetzt auch als kostenlose App für Android- und iOS-Geräte verfügbar! Über unsere Homepage kommt Ihr zu den Stores von Apple und Google. Hier der Link: https://kenfm.de/kenfm-app/ Abonniere jetzt den KenFM-Newsletter: https://kenfm.de/newsletter/ Jetzt KenFM unterstützen: https://www.patreon.com/KenFMde Dir gefällt unser Programm? Informationen zu weiteren Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten hier: https://kenfm.de/support/kenfm-unterstuetzen/ Jetzt kannst Du uns auch mit Bitcoins unterstützen. BitCoin Adresse: 18FpEnH1Dh83GXXGpRNqSoW5TL1z1PZgZK See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Ein freches Gedicht über billigen Sekt und einen schalen Seeckt (Hans von Seeckt war 1920 Chef der Heeresleitung). Freiheit, 5.12.1920.

This one is also available as video with us sitting in front of a Flak Tower in Vienna and showing various Tank Models as overlay and also showing quotes for some of the sources and important corrections here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-Z2eV72iv4Link to Chieftain’s Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCp4j9Y9L6jie44iZroCb99AA talk with Nicholas “Chieftain” Moran the military historian for Wargaming America / World of tanks and me. (Note: this was a private meeting). We talk about Shermans, Panzer IIIs, Panzer IVs, US Tank Crew Losses in World War 2, Guderian, Doyle, Liddell Hart, dust signature, tank bites, logistics, tactics, operations, Patton, intelligence, North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, Iraq, Zombies and a few other topics that crossed our minds. All in front of a Flak Tower (Command Version) in Vienna, Austria.»» SUPPORT MHV ««» patreon - https://www.patreon.com/mhv» paypal donation - https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=TFHEY4P4YU3NY» Book Wishlist https://www.amazon.de/gp/registry/wishlist/3LJIXNJIUXJES/ref=cm_wl_huc_view» SOURCES «Herrera, Geoffrey L.: Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military Innovation and the Rise of Germany. In: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, June 2004, p. 243-271Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War IIhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdfOperation Think Tank – Question on Influence of Liddell Hart & Guderian (timestamped)https://youtu.be/_oLY4FOrnjc?t=461Pöhlmann, Markus: Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945 (Zeitalter der Weltkriege) amazon.de (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2ELyDX1Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943Amazon.com (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2rtOdkmAmazon.de (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2mWaTEpCorum, James S.: The Roots of Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt and German Military ReformAmazon.com (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2trNRfjAmazon.de (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2twxZIkMarkus Pöhlmannhttp://www.mgfa-potsdam.de/html/zms_mitarbeiter_einzeln.php?do=display&ident=4885e2649d1b4Frieser, Karl-Heinz: The Blitzkrieg LegendAmazon.com (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2vsZtOfAmazon.de (affiliate): http://amzn.to/2x1rs8BEstes, Kenneth W.: Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916-2000Amazon.com (affiliate): https://amzn.to/2r4KXIRAmazon.de (affiliate): https://amzn.to/2vNucaEThayer, Thomas C.; Daddis, Gregory A.: War Without Fronts – The American Experience in VietnamAmazon.com Link (Affiliate): http://amzn.to/2mrVFosAmazon.de (affiliate): https://amzn.to/2HtmyHY» REFERENCED RELATED VIDEOS «2:31 - Captain Billotte's Wild Ride - The Battle of Stone3:16 - Why Barbarossa failed - German Blunders9:24 - Oh My God - The Stuart is on Fire25:10 - Panzer Tactics - "Blitzkrieg" Years38:56 - Heinz Guderian: Myth & Reality53;14 - Did Hitler Delay the Me 262?» DISCLAIMER «Amazon Associates Program: “Bernhard Kast is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to amazon.com.”Bernhard Kast ist Teilnehmer des Partnerprogramms von Amazon Europe S.à.r.l. und Partner des Werbeprogramms, das zur Bereitstellung eines Mediums für Websites konzipiert wurde, mittels dessen durch die Platzierung von Werbeanzeigen und Links zu amazon.de Werbekostenerstattung verdient werden können. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn's book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine.

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Matthias Strohn‘s The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle, 1918-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2011) is an important challenge to the existing literature on interwar German military doctrine. The stunning German victories in 1939 and 1940 have usually been attributed to their practice of “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War). The inventive use of armored divisions and airpower allowed the Wehrmacht to sweep its enemies from the battlefield with relatively low casualties (on the German side, at least) and with little negative impact on the German homefront or domestic economy. James Corum, Robert Citino (a recent interviewee) and others have traced the roots of this combined arms doctrine in the interwar period, focusing on the “stormtroop” innovations World War One and the advocacy of mobility above all else by planners like Hans von Seeckt. But Strohn believes that this understandable fixation on the roots of Blitzkrieg has blinded us to the practical importance of defensive doctrine in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. With no hope of challenging France (a fact brought painfully to life in the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr) and little prospect for success even against the Polish army, German strategists (Joachim von Stulpnagel more than Seeckt) concentrated on defensive doctrine, hoping to survive an initial attack long enough to organize (perhaps) a guerrilla campaign or to die gloriously in arms. Based on extensive archival research, Strohn’s book should provoke a conversation among scholars of the German army that will refresh the debate about interwar doctrine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices