Podcast appearances and mentions of robert aumann

For the end of the year, Jules and Jonathan are taking some well-deserved time off, and wanted to rerun a past episode they love for the new audience who has joined since then.Is it possible to unravel the paradox of disagreement in rational decision-making? How should we dissolve discord? In this episode, hosts and finance professors Jonathan Berk and Jules van Binsbergen are joined by Robert Aumann, mathematician, professor, and Nobel Prize winner, as they discuss acknowledging errors and embracing diverse viewpoints, with stories of Nobel Prize-winning luminaries showing the importance of evolving one's understanding in light of new evidence.Submit your questions to the show here: https://bit.ly/AllElseEqualFind All Else Equal on the web: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/business-podcasts/all-else-equal-making-better-decisionsAll Else Equal: Making Better Decisions Podcast is a production of Stanford Graduate School of Business and is produced by University FM.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Jorge Fontevecchia en entrevista con el el matemático y economista israelí-estadounidense, ganador del Premio Nobel de Economía en 2005

Jorge Fontevecchia en entrevista con el economista ganador del Premio Nobel

"The reason people disagree is because they're striving toward a different goal," says mathematician and Nobel Prize winner Robert Aumann. In this episode of All Else Equal, Aumann sits down with finance professors and podcast hosts Jonathan Berk and Jules van Binsbergen to discuss why when leaders disagree, it means one party holds more information than the other."If there's a disagreement in the room at the end of a discussion, someone in the room is making a mistake," says Berk.Follow and provide feedback for the All Else Equal Podcast on LinkedInFor more information and episodes, visit AllElseEqualPodcast.comAll Else Equal is a podcast produced by Stanford Graduate School of Business. It is hosted by Jonathan Berk, professor of finance at Stanford GSB, and Jules van Binsbergen, professor of finance, at The Wharton School. Each episode provides insight into how to make better decisions.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Capire l'economia è una serie di 23 dvd coordinata da Odifreddi per Repubblica e L'Espresso, e pubblicata tra il 28 dicembre 2012 e il 31 maggio 2013. Al piano dell'opera hanno partecipato Alberto Alesina, Giuliano Amato (ex presidente del Consiglio), Robert Aumann (premio Nobel 2005), Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Alberto Bisin, Tito Boeri, Valerio Castronovo, Noam Chomsky, Marco Dardi, Alessandro De Nicola, Giorgio Lunghini, Robert Merton (premio Nobel 1997), Robert Mundell (premo Nobel 1999), Alessandro Penati, Romano Prodi (ex presidente del Consiglio e della Comunità Europea), Fabio Ranchetti, Alessandro Roncaglia, Fabiano Schivardi, Amartya Sen (premio Nobel 1998), Michael Spence (premio Nobel 2001), Gianni Toniolo e Luigi Zingales. Oltre allo stesso Odifreddi, che ha effettuato l'intervento di questo episodio. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/vito-rodolfo-albano7/message

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Inadequate Equilibria, Part 7: Against Modest Epistemology, published by Eliezer Yudkowsky. Modest epistemology doesn't need to reflect a skepticism about causal models as such. It can manifest instead as a wariness about putting weight down on one's own causal models, as opposed to others'. In 1976, Robert Aumann demonstrated that two ideal Bayesian reasoners with the same priors cannot have common knowledge of a disagreement. Tyler Cowen and Robin Hanson have extended this result, establishing that even under various weaker assumptions, something has to go wrong in order for two agents with the same priors to get stuck in a disagreement.1 If you and a trusted peer don't converge on identical beliefs once you have a full understanding of one another's positions, at least one of you must be making some kind of mistake. If we were fully rational (and fully honest), then we would always eventually reach consensus on questions of fact. To become more rational, then, shouldn't we set aside our claims to special knowledge or insight and modestly profess that, really, we're all in the same boat? When I'm trying to sort out questions like these, I often find it useful to start with a related question: “If I were building a brain from scratch, would I have it act this way?” If I were building a brain and I expected it to have some non-fatal flaws in its cognitive algorithms, I expect that I would have it spend some of its time using those flawed reasoning algorithms to think about the world; and I would have it spend some of its time using those same flawed reasoning algorithms to better understand its reasoning algorithms. I would have the brain spend most of its time on object-level problems, while spending some time trying to build better meta-level models of its own cognition and how its cognition relates to its apparent success or failure on object-level problems. If the thinker is dealing with a foreign cognitive system, I would want the thinker to try to model the other agent's thinking and predict the degree of accuracy this system will have. However, the thinker should also record the empirical outcomes, and notice if the other agent's accuracy is more or less than expected. If particular agents are more often correct than its model predicts, the system should recalibrate its estimates so that it won't be predictably mistaken in a known direction. In other words, I would want the brain to reason about brains in pretty much the same way it reasons about other things in the world. And in practice, I suspect that the way I think, and the way I'd advise people in the real world to think, works very much like that: Try to spend most of your time thinking about the object level. If you're spending more of your time thinking about your own reasoning ability and competence than you spend thinking about Japan's interest rates and NGDP, or competing omega-6 vs. omega-3 metabolic pathways, you're taking your eye off the ball. Less than a majority of the time: Think about how reliable authorities seem to be and should be expected to be, and how reliable you are—using your own brain to think about the reliability and failure modes of brains, since that's what you've got. Try to be evenhanded in how you evaluate your own brain's specific failures versus the specific failures of other brains.2 While doing this, take your own meta-reasoning at face value. . and then next, theoretically, should come the meta-meta level, considered yet more rarely. But I don't think it's necessary to develop special skills for meta-meta reasoning. You just apply the skills you already learned on the meta level to correct your own brain, and go on applying them while you happen to be meta-reasoning about who should be trusted, about degrees of reliability, and so on. Anything you've already learned abo...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Inadequate Equilibria, Part 7: Against Modest Epistemology, published by Eliezer Yudkowsky. Modest epistemology doesn't need to reflect a skepticism about causal models as such. It can manifest instead as a wariness about putting weight down on one's own causal models, as opposed to others'. In 1976, Robert Aumann demonstrated that two ideal Bayesian reasoners with the same priors cannot have common knowledge of a disagreement. Tyler Cowen and Robin Hanson have extended this result, establishing that even under various weaker assumptions, something has to go wrong in order for two agents with the same priors to get stuck in a disagreement.1 If you and a trusted peer don't converge on identical beliefs once you have a full understanding of one another's positions, at least one of you must be making some kind of mistake. If we were fully rational (and fully honest), then we would always eventually reach consensus on questions of fact. To become more rational, then, shouldn't we set aside our claims to special knowledge or insight and modestly profess that, really, we're all in the same boat? When I'm trying to sort out questions like these, I often find it useful to start with a related question: “If I were building a brain from scratch, would I have it act this way?” If I were building a brain and I expected it to have some non-fatal flaws in its cognitive algorithms, I expect that I would have it spend some of its time using those flawed reasoning algorithms to think about the world; and I would have it spend some of its time using those same flawed reasoning algorithms to better understand its reasoning algorithms. I would have the brain spend most of its time on object-level problems, while spending some time trying to build better meta-level models of its own cognition and how its cognition relates to its apparent success or failure on object-level problems. If the thinker is dealing with a foreign cognitive system, I would want the thinker to try to model the other agent's thinking and predict the degree of accuracy this system will have. However, the thinker should also record the empirical outcomes, and notice if the other agent's accuracy is more or less than expected. If particular agents are more often correct than its model predicts, the system should recalibrate its estimates so that it won't be predictably mistaken in a known direction. In other words, I would want the brain to reason about brains in pretty much the same way it reasons about other things in the world. And in practice, I suspect that the way I think, and the way I'd advise people in the real world to think, works very much like that: Try to spend most of your time thinking about the object level. If you're spending more of your time thinking about your own reasoning ability and competence than you spend thinking about Japan's interest rates and NGDP, or competing omega-6 vs. omega-3 metabolic pathways, you're taking your eye off the ball. Less than a majority of the time: Think about how reliable authorities seem to be and should be expected to be, and how reliable you are—using your own brain to think about the reliability and failure modes of brains, since that's what you've got. Try to be evenhanded in how you evaluate your own brain's specific failures versus the specific failures of other brains.2 While doing this, take your own meta-reasoning at face value. . and then next, theoretically, should come the meta-meta level, considered yet more rarely. But I don't think it's necessary to develop special skills for meta-meta reasoning. You just apply the skills you already learned on the meta level to correct your own brain, and go on applying them while you happen to be meta-reasoning about who should be trusted, about degrees of reliability, and so on. Anything you've already learned abo...

Menti matematiche è una serie di 10 DVD pubblicata da Le Scienze tra gennaio e ottobre 2009, che raccoglie alcuni momenti significativi dei tre Festival della Matematica organizzati a Roma da Odifreddi tra il 2007 e il 2009, e costituisce un complemento visivo alla collezione di articoli Il club dei matematici solitari del professor Odifreddi. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/vito-rodolfo-albano7/message

Michael reaches back to the archives to combine Nobel Prize winner and mathematician Robert Aumann and mathematician Emanuel Derman to one mega episode. The two guests: Robert Aumann Emanuel Derman

Today is another mega eclectic episode featuring Douglas Emlen, Toby Crabel, Robert Aumann, Ryan Holiday, Sally Hogshead and Michael Mauboussin. Douglas Emlen is a professor at the University of Montana. He is the recipient of the Presidential Early Career Award in Science and Engineering from the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House. He has also earned multiple research awards from the National Science Foundation, including their five-year CAREER award. Toby Crabel is founder of Crabel Capital Management. His approach is very different from Covel’s, but there are some commonalities: price action driven, systems, models, risk management. Crabel works on a whole different timeframe than the typical trend follower, typically turning his portfolio over in less than a day. Crabel, a former pro tennis player, has a philosophical nature and discusses how he executes these philosophies in the trading world. Robert Aumann is an Israeli-American mathematician and a member of the United States National Academy of Sciences. He is a professor at the Center for the Study of Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel. Aumann is the 4th Nobel Prize Laureate in economics to be a guest on the podcast. Ryan Holiday is an American author, writer, and marketer. He is the media strategist behind authors Tucker Max and Robert Greene, the former Director of Marketing for American Apparel and an editor-at-large for the New York Observer. Sally Hogshead is an American speaker, author, former advertising executive, as well as the Chief Executive Officer of Fascinate, Inc. Hogshead’s newest book is “How The World Sees You: Discover Your Highest Value Through The Science of Fascination.” Michael Mauboussin is an author, investment strategist in the financial services industry, professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Business, and serves on the board of trustees at the Sante Fe Institute (an independent, nonprofit theoretical research institute). He is managing director and head of Global Financial Strategies at Credit Suisse, where he advises clients on valuation and portfolio positioning, capital markets theory, competitive strategy analysis, and decision making. In this episode of Trend Following Radio: Humans and animals International hacking Game theory Economics World champions of peace The book writing process Flow state Personal branding Multi-disciplinary thinking Luck vs. Skill Outcome bias

Thomas C. Schelling, PhD Harvard economics, 1951, was on the Faculty of Yale University 1953-57, spent 1958-59 at the RAND Corporation, 1959-90 at Harvard, Department of Economics, Centre for International Affairs, and John F. Kennedy School of Government, and 1990-2005 at the University of Maryland’s Department of Economics and School of Public Policy. He was a fiscal analyst at the US Bureau of the Budget, 1945-46, did graduate work at Harvard, 1946-48, was in the Marshall Plan Mission to Denmark 1948-49, the European Office of the Marshall Plan, Paris, 1949-50, the White House Foreign Policy Staff, 1950-51, and the Executive Office of the President (foreign aid programs), 1951-53. His main theoretical interests have been bargaining, conflict and cooperation, racial segregation and techniques of self-management. His main policy interests have been nuclear weapons, the limitation of war, climate change, foreign aid and tobacco. From 1983-1989 he was founding director of the Institute for the Study of Smoking Behaviour and Policy at Harvard University. His major books are The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton H, Halperin) 1961, Arms and Influence 1966, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour 1978, Choice and Consequence 1984, and Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays 2006. He has been elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Medicine, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and is the recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy and the National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavioural Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War. In 2005 he received, jointly with Robert Aumann, the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. Thomas Schelling lives with his wife, Alice Coleman Schelling, in Bethesda Maryland.

My guest today is Robert Aumann, the fourth Nobel Prize winner to appear on this podcast. Aumann is an Israeli-American mathematician, and a member of the United States National Academy of Sciences. He is a professor at the Center for the Study of Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel. The topic is game theory. In this episode of Trend Following Radio we discuss: Conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis World via his game theory perspective Meeting John Nash and Aumann's early background What game theory is trying to accomplish The economic definition of rationality The idea of a strategy matrix The world champions of peace and the best way to maintain peace The 2008-09 bailouts from Aumann's perspective and a game theory outlook Behavioral economics Game theory, diplomats, and the Cuban Missile Crisis The existence of nuclear weapons and the Cold War Jump in! --- I'm MICHAEL COVEL, the host of TREND FOLLOWING RADIO, and I'm proud to have delivered 10+ million podcast listens since 2012. Investments, economics, psychology, politics, decision-making, human behavior, entrepreneurship and trend following are all passionately explored and debated on my show. To start? I'd like to give you a great piece of advice you can use in your life and trading journey… cut your losses! You will find much more about that philosophy here: https://www.trendfollowing.com/trend/ You can watch a free video here: https://www.trendfollowing.com/video/ Can't get enough of this episode? You can choose from my thousand plus episodes here: https://www.trendfollowing.com/podcast My social media platforms: Twitter: @covel Facebook: @trendfollowing LinkedIn: @covel Instagram: @mikecovel Hope you enjoy my never-ending podcast conversation!

Michael Covel welcomes Robert Aumann the fourth individual that has received a Nobel Prize in economics to appear on his podcast. Covel and Aumann discuss conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis; Aumann has a very interesting way of looking at the world via his game theory perspective. Aumann and Covel talk about his first experience meeting John Nash and Aumann’s early background; what game theory is trying to accomplish; the economic definition of rationality; the idea of a strategy matrix; the world champions of peace and the best way to maintain peace; the 2008-09 bailouts from Aumann’s perspective and a game theory outlook; behavioral economics; game theory, diplomats, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; the existence of nuclear weapons and the Cold War. Want a free trend following DVD? Go to trendfollowing.com/win.