Podcasts about Hamas

Extreme right-wing group "The Base" and the entirety of Hezbollah - a Shia Islamist Militant group - will be listed as terrorist organisations.

Photo: Britain condemns Hamas.  Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1 @ThadMcCotter @theamgreatness https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-set-proscribe-hamas-terrorist-organisation-uk-media-reports-2021-11-19/

UK calling Hamas terrorists --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/ryan-dawson01/support

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 15-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish world, from Sunday through Thursday. Military correspondent Judah Ari Gross and health and science editor Nathan Jeffay join host Jessica Steinberg. Gross reports on the terror attack in Jerusalem's Old City Sunday, in which a terrorist with known ties to Hamas, shot and killed a 26-year-old Eliyahu Kay, a South African immigrant and lone soldier who was making his way to work as a professional tour guide at the Western Wall. Jeffay discusses two Israeli scientific findings, one about the scents emitted by babies and how they affect mothers and fathers. The other study has resulted in a method for 'reading' miniscule movements in the face in order to spot fibbers. Discussed articles include: Israeli forces raid neighborhood of J'lem attack terrorist, relatives said arrested Jerusalem terror attack fatality named as South African immigrant Eli Kay Babies emit smell to get aggressively loyal moms and mellow dads, Israeli study says Liar, liar! ‘Reading' faces, Israeli tech spots fibbers with 73% accuracy ‘Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on iTunes, Spotify, PlayerFM, Google Play, or wherever you get your podcasts. IMAGE: Eliyahu David Kay, killed in a terror attack in Jerusalem on November 21, 2021. (Facebook) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 15-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish world, from Sunday through Thursday. Founding editor David Horovitz and diplomatic correspondent Lazar Berman join host Jessica Steinberg on today's podcast. Horovitz and Berman discuss the UK decision to designate the entirety of Hamas as a terror organization and outlaw support for the group, speaking about the UK as Israel's staunch ally. They also look at President Isaac Herzog's current visit in London for an official three-day visit that is ceremonial and political, reflecting on his role in the government. Berman speaks about his run along the Tel Aviv beach with the UAE ambassador who was engaging in some sports diplomacy. He also talks about a scoop regarding US State Department employees who are protesting President Biden's vaccine mandate. Discussed articles include: Israel cheers as UK says it will designate Hamas as terror group Herzog heads to UK for meetings with Prince Charles, Boris Johnson Shin Bet intel instrumental in UK's terror designation of Hamas – report US diplomats blast Biden vaccine mandate in internal cable ‘Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on iTunes, Spotify, PlayerFM, Google Play, or wherever you get your podcasts. IMAGE: Britain's Prince Charles and his wife Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall, arrive in Amman, Jordan, on a four-day tour to Jordan and Egypt, November 16, 2021. (Raad Adayleh/AP) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode: US charges two Iranians with waging a sophisticated campaign to disrupt the 2020 US presidential election; Biden says he may boycott Beijing Olympics just days after summit with Xi; US Army says get vaccinated or get out; Britain will designate entire Hamas organization as terrorist entity; China using maritime militia of 300 vessels to dominate South China Sea. 

We have a BRAND NEW cover design for our Facing Jerusalem books. Get 40% OFF for the first 100 copies sold here: https://shop.theisraelguys.com/store/facing-jerusalem/ UNRWA was fundraising in Brussels this week to the tune of 800 million dollars. During the Obama years, they were used to receiving millions from America. After a dry spell with Trump, Biden has already given them 318 million this year. We're not sure what they do with all that money however, as UNRWA is undoubtedly one of the worst things that has ever happened to the Palestinians.  Investigative reports have exposed the Raam Party (currently in Israel's coalition government) as having ties to terrorists, and transfering funds to Hamas in Gaza. Thankfully, the good guys have already shut down one of these channels and vowed to watch any other funds that are heading for Gaza.  Purchase a limited edition TIG t-shirt: https://shop.theisraelguys.com/store/israel-guy-t-shirt/ Shop our Affiliate Links:  Purchase wine from Israel: https://shop.theisraelguys.com/store/category/wine/ Shop products from Israel: https://bit.ly/3FPELdd Subscribe to the network free at https://theisraelguys.com/ Subscribe to our Rumble channel: https://rumble.com/c/TheIsraelGuys Follow us on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/theisraelguys.

Mario Noya nos habla del libro de Jonathan Schanzer Gaza Conflict 2021: Hamas, Israel and Eleven Days of War. 

Police take down biggest arms dealer in the country; Hamas sends two men to their deaths for allegedly spying for Israel & Archaeologists say they've figured out how the Assyrian army broke down the walls of the Kingdom of Judea in 701 BCE! Social Media links, Newsletter sign-up &, Support the show $ here: https://linktr.ee/israeldailynews Music: Loving Woman; Mayer Malik https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BIrzKU8IDdM --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/israeldailynews/support

The boys get together to discuss the tragedy that was Astroworld Fest and they send their thoughts and prayers to those who died, as well as those who had tickets to day two of the fest because it was cancelled. The boys discuss Aaron Rodgers and his abhorrent move of lying about taking the vaccine so that he wouldn't be forced to take it. Well like many people who are vaccinated, he got covid so this is problematic. The boys talk about Hamas guardian law that keeps Gaza women from studying abroad. Also the Uyghurs are brought into the conversation about needing emotional help as Chinese families suffer. The boys dive into some listener emails - one about cancelling Peacock, and the other about having a prepared "woke intro" citing a video from a Microsoft event. Follow the IG page: @TooWokeBoys Email the show: TooWokeBoys@gmail.com Donate to the show on Venmo/ Cashapp: TheSlutFund Give a FIVE STAR REVIEW for the show on iTunes (fun ones will be read on the show) Share a screenshot of the show on your IG and let everyone know YOU ARE AN ALLY @JeffZenisek @MalcolmKelner

Iron Dome shoots down Hamas drone off Gaza coast. New travel framework approve for foreign tourist groups. Report: NSO spyware detected on phones of Palestinian human rights activists See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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durée : 00:58:04 - Cultures Monde - par : Florian Delorme - Mis au ban de la scène politique mondiale, le Hamas multiplie les appels du pied à l'opinion publique palestinienne, y compris en dehors de Gaza, pour se poser en principal défenseur de sa cause. - invités : Leïla Seurat Chercheuse associée au Centre de Recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions pénales (CESDIP) et à l'Observatoire des Mondes Arabes et Musulmans (OMAM); Sarah Daoud Doctorante au CERI de Sciences-Po; Marion Slitine Chercheuse EHESS/ Mucem au Centre Norbert Elias

The 'fog of war' is always an obstacle while covering conflicts between countries and factions. It was heavily on display earlier this year when Israel and Hamas exchanged rocket fire for nearly two weeks. FOX's Trey Yingst speaks with Jonathan Schanzer, the Senior Vice President for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of a new book "Gaza Conflict 2021: Hamas, Israel and 11 Days Of War", about how the news coverage of this most recent conflict was handled.

The 'fog of war' is always an obstacle while covering conflicts between countries and factions. It was heavily on display earlier this year when Israel and Hamas exchanged rocket fire for nearly two weeks. FOX's Trey Yingst speaks with Jonathan Schanzer, the Senior Vice President for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of a new book "Gaza Conflict 2021: Hamas, Israel and 11 Days Of War", about how the news coverage of this most recent conflict was handled.

Knapp eine Woche nach dem Wiener Terroraranschlag vor einem Jahr fand in Österreich die größte Anti-Terroraktion der Zweiten Republik statt: die Operation Luxor. 930 Beamte waren in vier Bundesländern im Einsatz, um im Auftrag der Staatsanwaltschaft Graz mutmaßliche Anhänger der Muslimbruderschaft und der Hamas aufzuspüren. Der Politikwissenschafter Farid Hafez war einer Beschuldigten. Mit ihm spricht Solmaz Khorsand über die Nacht der Großrazzia, den Vorwurf der Muslimbruderschaft anzugehören, den - für viele WissenschafterInnen im deutschsprachigen Raum umstrittenen -  „Europäischen Islamophobiereport", den er seit 2015 mitherausgibt und warum er den Begriff „Islamophobie“ nicht als Kampfbegriff verstanden wissen will. 

“The only sign of hope when I'm looking at this is actually looking at something like bitcoin because you are able to circumvent all these different levels of restrictions, whether it's the Isralis or the Palestinian Authority, or even Hamas.”— Fadi ElsalameenLocation: RemotelyDate: Wednesday 20th OctoberProject: Human Rights Foundation, American Security ProjectRole: Chief Strategy Officer, Adjunct Senior FellowPalestine is a country ravaged by 4 wars in 15 years. However, military conflict is only part of the economic challenges the country faces. There is monetary warfare being waged against its citizens.Crucial services that people in most developing countries take for granted, like simply transferring money, are almost impossible. It's exacerbated by economic policies that have left Palestinians dependent on the outside world.Can Bitcoin allow the people to peacefully fight back against arduous barriers and capital controls?In this interview, I talk to Alex Gladstein and Fadi Elsalamaeen. We discuss declining economic conditions in Palestine, the underlying monetary problems, and how Bitcoin can help.This episode's sponsors:Gemini - Buy Bitcoin instantlyBlockFi - The future of Bitcoin financial servicesSportsbet.io - Online sportsbook & casino that accepts BitcoinCasa - The leading provider of Bitcoin multisig key security.Exodus - The world's leading Desktop, Mobile and Hardware crypto wallets.Ledger - State of the art Bitcoin hardware walletCompass Mining - Bitcoin mining & hosting-----WBD417 - Show Notes-----If you enjoy The What Bitcoin Did Podcast you can help support the show by doing the following:Become a Patron and get access to shows early or help contributeMake a tip:Bitcoin: 3FiC6w7eb3dkcaNHMAnj39ANTAkv8Ufi2SQR Codes: BitcoinIf you do send a tip then please email me so that I can say thank youSubscribe on iTunes | Spotify | Stitcher | SoundCloud | YouTube | Deezer | TuneIn | RSS FeedLeave a review on iTunesShare the show and episodes with your friends and familySubscribe to the newsletter on my websiteFollow me on Twitter Personal | Twitter Podcast | Instagram | Medium | YouTubeIf you are interested in sponsoring the show, you can read more about that here or please feel free to drop me an email to discuss options.

In 2005, Israelis withdrew from Gaza – every soldier, every farmer, every synagogue, every grave. It was an historic land-for-peace experiment – and it failed. In May, Hamas began firing missiles at Israeli cities, towns, and villages, sparking the fourth intense armed conflict since Hamas defeated Fatah and began ruling Gaza. Many in the international media blamed Israel more than Hamas – despite the fact that it was Hamas that attacked; despite the fact that Hamas used human shields, a clear violation of international and U.S. law; despite the fact that Hamas' intentions toward Israelis are openly and unambiguously genocidal. Jonathan Schanzer, FDD's senior vice president for research, a ground-breaking scholar of Middle Eastern affairs, has now produced the first and, so far, only book on this conflagration: Gaza Conflict 2021: Hamas, Israel and Eleven Days of War. Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus served as the international spokesman for the Israeli Defense Forces during the fighting. Both join Foreign Podicy host Cliff May to discuss why Hamas fights and how Israel defends itself.

01:46:50 Philip Banse Der Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern (Muriel Asseburg, SWP) 104 full Der Konflikt zwischen Insrael und den Palästinensern gehört zu den politischen Konstanten des 20. und leider wohl auch des 21. Jahrhunderts: Sehr kompliziert – zumal Deutschland durch den Holocaust da ja auch noch mal eine ganz besondere Stellung einnimmt. In den Nachrichten hört man oft nur News-Fragmente – Gazastreifen, Autonomiebehörde, Oslo, besetze Gebiete, Intifada, Hamas – und ich glaube, es gibt nur wenige, die das wirklich verstehen und zu einem Bild zusammensetzen können. Zu ihnen gehört Muriel Asseburg, Forscherin bei der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Sie hat jetzt ein Buch veröffentlich: Palästina und die Palästinenser. Eine Geschichte von der Nakba bis zur Gegenwart Das Buch schildert den Konflikt sehr leserlich und verständlich – aus palästinenseiscer Perspektive. Ihr könnt diese Interview auch werbefrei hören unter kuechenstud.io/plus – 1000 Dank an alle, die schon dabei sind. Ich schulde Euch auch noch die dritte Folge der Reihe zu Julien Assange – die kommt, versprochen. https://www.kuechenstud.io/medienradio/podcast/di104-der-konflikt-zwischen-israel-und-de

Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at CFR, leads a conversation on geopolitics in the Middle East.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you want to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's topic is geopolitics in the Middle East. Our speaker was supposed to be Sanam Vakil, but she had a family emergency. So we're delighted to have our very own Steven Cook here to discuss this important topic. Dr. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of several books, including False Dawn; The Struggle for Egypt, which won the 2012 Gold Medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling But Not Governing. And he's working on yet another book entitled The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. So keep an eye out for that in the next year or so. He's a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and contributor and commentator on a bunch of other outlets. Prior to coming to CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. So, Dr. Cook, thank you for being with us. I thought you could just—I'm going to give you a soft question here, to talk about the geopolitical relations among state and nonstate actors in the Middle East. And you can take that in whatever direction you would like. COOK: Well, thanks so much, Irina. It's a great pleasure to be with you. Good afternoon to everybody who's out there who's on an afternoon time zone, good morning to those who may still be in the evening, and good evening to those who may be somewhere where it's the evening. It's very nice to be with you. As Irina mentioned, and as I'm sure it's plenty evident, I am not Sanam Vakil, but I'm happy to step in for her and offer my thoughts on the geopolitics of the Middle East. It's a small topic. That question that Irina asked was something that I certainly could handle effectively in fifteen to twenty minutes. But before I get into the details of what's going on in the region, I thought I would offer some just general comments about the United States in the Middle East. Because, as it turns out, I had the opportunity last night to join a very small group of analysts with a very senior U.S. government official to talk precisely about the United States in the Middle East. And it was a very, very interesting conversation, because despite the fact that there has been numerous news reporting and analytic pieces about how the United States is deemphasizing the Middle East, this official made it very, very clear that that was practically impossible at this time. And this was, I think, a reasonable position to take. There has been a lot recently, in the last recent years, about withdrawing from the region, from retrenchment from the region, reducing from the region, realignment from the region. All those things actually mean different things. But analysts have essentially used them to mean that the United States should deprioritize the Middle East. And it seems to me that the problem in the Middle East has not necessarily been the fact that we are there and that we have goals there. It's that the goals in the region and the resources Washington uses to achieve those goals need to be realigned to address things that are actually important to the United States. In one sense that sound eminently reasonable. We have goals, we have resources to meet those goals, and we should devote them to—and if we can't, we should reassess what our goals are or go out and find new resources. That sounds eminently reasonable. But that's not the way Washington has worked over the course of the last few decades when it comes to the Middle East. In many ways, the United States has been overly ambitious. And it has led to a number of significant failures in the region. In an era when everything and anything is a vital interest, then nothing really is. And this seems to be the source of our trouble. For example, when we get into trying to fix the politics of other countries, we're headed down the wrong road. And I don't think that there's been enough real debate in Washington or, quite frankly, in the country about what's important in the Middle East, and why we're there, and what we're trying to achieve in the Middle East. In part, this new book that I'm writing called the End of Ambition, which, as Irina pointed out, will be out hopefully in either late 2022 or early 2023, tries to answer some of these questions. There is a way for the United States to be constructive in the Middle East, but what we've done over the course of the last twenty years has made that task much, much harder. And it leads us, in part, to this kind of geostrategic picture or puzzle that I'm about to lay out for you. So let me get into some of the details. And I'm obviously not going to take you from Morocco all the way to Iran, although I could if I had much, much more time because there's a lot going on in a lot of places. But not all of those places are of critical importance to the United States. So I'll start and I'll pick and choose from that very, very large piece of geography. First point: There have been some efforts to deescalate in a region that was in the middle of or on the verge of multiple conflicts. There has been a dialogue between the Saudis and the Iranians, under the auspices of the Iraqis, of all people. According to the Saudis this hasn't yielded very much, but they are continuing the conversation. One of the ways to assess the success or failure of a meeting is the fact that there's going to be another meeting. And there are going to be other meetings between senior Iranian and Saudi officials. I think that that's good. Egyptians and Turks are talking. Some of you who don't follow these issues as closely may not remember that Turkey and Egypt came close to trading blows over Libya last summer. And they pulled back as a result of concerted diplomacy on the part of the European Union, as well as the Egyptian ability to actually surge a lot of force to its western border. Those two countries are also talking, in part under the auspices of the Iraqis. Emiratis and Iranians are talking. That channel opened up in 2019 after the Iranians attacked a very significant—two very significant oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, sort of scaring the Emiratis, especially since the Trump administration did not respond in ways that the Emiratis or the Saudis had been expecting. The Qataris and the Egyptians have repaired their relations. The Arab world, for better or for worse, is moving to reintegrate Syria into is ranks. Not long after King Abdullah of Jordan was in the United States, he and Bashar al-Assad shared a phone call to talk about the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria and to talk about, among other things, tourism to the two countries. The hope is that this de-escalation, or hope for de-escalation coming from this dialogue, will have a salutary effect on conflicts in Yemen, in Syria, in Libya, and Iraq. Thus far, it hasn't in Yemen, in particular. It hasn't in Syria. But in Libya and Iraq, there have been some improvements to the situation. All of this remains quite fragile. These talks can be—can break off at any time under any circumstances. Broader-scale violence can return to Libya at any time. And the Iraqi government still doesn't control its own territory. Its sovereignty is compromised, not just by Iran but also by Turkey. But the fact that a region that was wound so tight and that seemed poised to even deepen existing conflicts and new ones to break out, for all of these different parties to be talking—some at the behest of the United States, some entirely of their own volition—is, I think, a relatively positive sign. You can't find anyone who's more—let's put it this way, who's darker about developments in the Middle East than me. And I see some positive signs coming from this dialogue. Iran, the second big issue on the agenda. Just a few hours ago, the Iranians indicated that they're ready to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. This is sort of a typical Iranian negotiating tactic, to push issues to the brink and then to pull back and demonstrate some pragmatism so that people will thank for them for their pragmatism. This agreement to go back to the negotiating table keeps them on decent terms with the Europeans. It builds on goodwill that they have developed as a result of their talks with Saudi Arabia. And it puts Israel somewhat on the defensive, or at least in an awkward position with the Biden administration, which has very much wanted to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. What comes out of these negotiations is extremely hard to predict. This is a new government in Iran. It is certainly a harder line than its predecessor. Some analysts believe that precisely because it is a hardline government it can do the negotiation. But we'll just have to see. All the while this has been going on, the Iranians have been proceeding with their nuclear development, and Israel is continuing its shadow campaign against the Iranians in Syria, sometimes in Iraq, in Iran itself. Although, there's no definitive proof, yesterday Iranian gas stations, of all things, were taken offline. There's some suspicion that this was the Israelis showing the Iranians just how far and deep they are into Iranian computer systems. It remains unclear how the Iranians will retaliate. Previously they have directed their efforts to Israeli-linked shipping in and around the Gulf of Oman. Its conventional responses up until this point have been largely ineffective. The Israelis have been carrying on a fairly sophisticated air campaign against the Iranians in Syria, and the Iranians have not been able to mount any kind of effective response. Of course, this is all against the backdrop of the fact that the Iranians do have the ability to hold much of the Israeli population hostage via Hezbollah and its thousands of rockets and missiles. So you can see how this is quite worrying, and an ongoing concern for everybody in the region, as the Israelis and Iranians take part in this confrontation. Let me just continue along the line of the Israelis for a moment and talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict, something that has not been high on the agenda of the Biden administration, it hasn't been high on the agenda of many countries in the region. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, there have been some significant developments. The normalization as a result of the Abraham Accords continues apace. Recently in the Emirates there was a meeting of ministers from Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan. This is the first kind of face-to-face meeting of government officials from all of these countries. Now, certainly the Israelis and the Emiratis have been meeting quite regularly, and the Israelis and the Bahrainis have been meeting quite regularly. But these were broader meetings of Cabinet officials from all of the Abraham Accords countries coming together in the United Arab Emirates for talks. Rather extraordinary. Something that thirteen months—in August 2020 was unimaginable, and today is something that doesn't really make—it doesn't really make the headlines. The Saudis are actually supportive of the normalization process, but they're not yet willing to take that step. And they're not willing to take that step because of the Palestinian issue. And it remains a sticking point. On that issue, there was a lot of discussion after the formation of a new Israeli government last June under the leadership, first, of Naftali Bennett, who will then hand the prime ministership over to his partner, Yair Lapid, who are from different parties. That this was an Israeli government that could do some good when it comes to the Palestinian arena, that it was pragmatic, that it would do things that would improve the lives of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, and seek greater cooperation with both the United States and the Palestinian authority toward that end. And that may in fact turn out to be the case. This government has taken a number of steps in that direction, including family reunification, so that if a Palestinian on the West Bank who is married to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the Palestinian in the West Bank can live with the family in Israel. And a number of other things. But it should also be clear to everybody that despite a kind of change in tone from the Israeli prime ministry, there's not that much of a change in terms of policy. In fact, in many ways Prime Minister Bennett is to the right of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. And Yair Lapid, who comes from a centrist party, is really only centrist in terms of Israeli politics. He is—in any other circumstances would be a kind of right of center politician. And I'll just point out that in recent days the Israeli government has declared six Palestinian NGOs—long-time NGOs—terrorist organizations, approved three thousand new housing units in the West Bank, and worked very, very hard to prevent the United States from opening a consulate in East Jerusalem to serve the Palestinians. That consulate had been there for many, many, many years. And it was closed under the Trump administration when the U.S. Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration would like to reopen that consulate. And the Israeli government is adamantly opposed. In the end, undoubtably Arab governments are coming to terms with Israel, even beyond the Abraham Accords countries. Egypt's flag carrier, Egyptair, announced flights to Tel Aviv. This is the first time since 1979. You could—you could fly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, something that I've done many, many times. If you were in Egypt, you'd have to go and find an office that would sell you a ticket to something called Air Sinai, that did not have regular flights. Only had flights vaguely whenever, sometimes. It was an Egyptair plane, stripped of its livery, staffed by Egyptair pilots and staff, stripped of anything that said Egyptair. Now, suddenly Egyptair is flying direct flights to Tel Aviv. And El-Al, Israel's national airline, and possibly one other, will be flying directly to Cairo. And there is—and that there is talk of economic cooperation. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm al-Sheikh not long ago. That was the first meeting of Israeli leaders—first public meeting of Israeli leaders and Egyptian leaders in ten years. So there does seem to be an openness on the part of Arab governments to Israel. As far as populations in these countries, they don't yet seem to be ready for normalization, although there has been some traffic between Israel and the UAE, with Emiratis coming to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and so on and so forth. But there are very, very few Emiratis. And there are a lot of Egyptians. So as positive as that all is, this is—this has not been a kind of broad acceptance among the population in the Arab world for Israel's legitimate existence. And the kind of issue du jour, great-power competition. This is on everybody's lips in Washington, D.C.—great-power competition, great-power competition. And certainly, the Middle East is likely to be an arena of great-power competition. It has always been an arena of great-power competition. For the first time in more than two decades, the United States has competitors in the region. And let me start with Russia, because there's been so much discussion of China, but Russia is the one that has been actively engaged militarily in the region in a number of places. Vladimir Putin has parlayed his rescue of Hafez al-Assad into influence in the region, in an arc that stretches from NATO ally Turkey, all the way down through the Levant and through Damascus, then even stretching to Jerusalem where Israeli governments and the Russian government have cooperated and coordinated in Syria, into Cairo, and then into at least the eastern portion of Libya, where the Russians have supported a Qaddafist general named Khalifa Haftar, who used to be an employee of the CIA, in his bid for power in Libya. And he has done so by providing weaponry to Haftar, as well as mercenaries to fight and support him. That episode may very well be over, although there's every reason to believe that Haftar is trying to rearm himself and carry on the conflict should the process—should the political process in Libya break down. Russia has sold more weapons to Egypt in the last few years than at any other time since the early 1970s. They have a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. It's not clear what that actually means, but that defense agreement was signed not that long after the United States' rather chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which clearly unnerved governments in the Middle East. So Russia is active, it's influential, its militarily engaged, and it is seeking to advance its interests throughout the region. I'll point out that its presence in North Africa is not necessarily so much about North Africa, but it's also about Europe. Its bid in Libya is important because its ally controls the eastern portion of Libya, where most of Libya's light, sweet crude oil is located. And that is the largest—the most significant reserves of oil in all of Africa. So it's important as an energy play for the Russians to control parts of North Africa, and right on Russia's—right on Europe's front doorstep. China. China's the largest investor and single largest trading partner with most of the region. And it's not just energy related. We know how dependent China is on oil from the Gulf, but it's made big investments in Algeria, in Egypt, the UAE, and in Iran. The agreement with Iran, a twenty-five-year agreement, coming at a time when the Iranians were under significant pressure from the United States, was regarded by many in Washington as an effort on the part of the Chinese to undercut the United States, and undercut U.S. policy in the region. I think it was, in part, that. I think it was also in part the fact that China is dependent in part on Iranian oil and did not want the regime there to collapse, posing a potential energy crisis for China and the rest of the world. It seems clear to me, at least, that the Chinese do not want to supplant the United States in the region. I don't think they look at the region in that way. And if they did, they probably learned the lesson of the United States of the last twenty-five years, which has gotten itself wrapped around the axle on a variety of issues that were unnecessary and sapped the power of the United States. So they don't want to get more deeply involved in the region. They don't want to take sides in conflicts. They don't want to take sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't take sides in the conflict between the United States and Iran, or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They want to benefit from the region, whether through investment or through extraction, and the security umbrella that the United States provides in the region. I'm not necessarily so sure that that security umbrella needs to be so expensive and so extensive for the United States to achieve its goals. But nevertheless, and for the time being at least, we will be providing that security umbrella in the region, from which the Chinese will benefit. I think, just to close on this issue of great-power competition. And because of time, I'm leaving out another big player, or emerging player in the region, which is India. I'm happy to talk about that in Q&A. But my last point is that, going back to the United States, countries in the region and leaders in the region are predisposed towards the United States. The problem is, is that they are very well-aware of the political polarization in this country. They're very well-aware of the political dysfunction in this country. They're very well-aware of the incompetence that came with the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, or any number of disasters that have unfolded here in the United States. And it doesn't look, from where they sit in Abu Dhabi, in Cairo, in Riyadh, and in other places, that the United States has staying power, the will to lead, and the interest in remaining in the Middle East. And thus, they have turned to alternatives. Those alternatives are not the same as the United States, but they do provide something. I mean, particularly when it comes to the Chinese it is investment, it's economic advantages, without the kind of trouble that comes with the United States. Trouble from the perspective of leaders, so that they don't have to worry about human rights when they deal with the Chinese, because the Chinese aren't interested in human rights. But nevertheless, they remain disclosed toward the United States and want to work with the United States. They just don't know whether we're going to be there over the long term, given what is going on in the United States. I'll stop there. And I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Steven, that was fantastic. Thank you very much. We're going to now to all of you for your questions. So the first raised hand comes from Jonas Truneh. And I don't think I pronounced that correctly, so you can correct me. Q: Yeah, no, that's right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Cook, for your talk. I'm from UCL, University College London, in London. COOK: So it is—(off mic). Q: Indeed, it is. Yeah. That's right. COOK: Great. Q: So you touched on it there somewhat particularly with great-power competition, but so my question is related to the current energy logic in the Middle East. The Obama administration perhaps thought that the shale revolution allowed a de-prioritization, if I'm allowed to use that word, of the Middle East. And that was partly related to the pivot to Asia. So essentially does the U.S. still regard itself as the primary guarantor of energy security in the Persian Gulf? And if so, would the greatest beneficiary, as I think you indicated, would that not be China? And is that a case of perverse incentives? Is there much the U.S. can do about it? COOK: Well, it depends on who you ask, right? And it's a great question. I think that the—one of the things that—one of the ways in which the Obama administration sought to deprioritize and leave the region was through the shale revolution. I mean, the one piece of advice that he did take from one of his opponents in 2002—2008, which was to drill, baby, drill. And the United States did. I would not say that this is something that is specific to the Obama administration. If you go back to speeches of presidents way back—but I won't even go that far back. I'll go to George W. Bush in 2005 State of the Union addressed, talked all about energy independence from the Middle East. This may not actually be in much less the foreseeable future, but in really—in a longer-term perspective, it may be harder to do. But it is politically appealing. The reason why I say it depends on who you ask, I think that there are officials in the United States who say: Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed. But when the Iranians attacked those two oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, that temporarily took off 50 percent of supply off the markets—good thing the Saudis have a lot stored away—the United States didn't really respond. The president of the United States said: I'm waiting for a call from Riyadh. That forty years of stated American policy was, like, it did not exist. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine suddenly didn't exist. And the entirety of the American foreign policy community shrugged their shoulders and said: We're not going to war on behalf of MBS. I don't think we would have been going to war on behalf of MBS. We would have been ensuring the free flow of energy supplies out of the region, which is something that we have been committed to doing since President Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, and then President Reagan added his corollary to it. I think that there are a number of quite perverse incentives associated with this. And I think that you're right. The question is whether the competition from China outweighs our—I'm talking about “our”—the United States' compelling interest in a healthy global economy. And to the extent that our partners in Asia, whether it's India, South Korea, Japan, and our important trading partner in China, are dependent upon energy resources from the Gulf, and we don't trust anybody to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, it's going to be on us to do it. So we are kind of hammered between that desire to have a healthy global economy as being—and being very wary of the Chinese. And the Chinese, I think, are abundantly aware of it, and have sought to take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, which got an up-vote, from Charles Ammon, who is at Pennsylvania State University. And I think this goes to what you were building on with the great-power competition: What interests does India have in the Middle East? And how is it increasing its involvement in the region? COOK: So India is—imports 60 percent of its oil from the region. Fully 20 percent of it from Saudi Arabia, another 20 percent of it from Iran, and then the other 20 percent from other sources. So that's one thing. That's one reason why India is interested in the Middle East. Second, there are millions and millions of Indians who work in the Middle East. The Gulf region is a region that basically could not run without South Asian expatriate labor, most of which comes from India—on everything. Third, India has made considerable headway with countries like the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, in counterextremism cooperation. This has come at the expense of Pakistan, but as relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and relations between Pakistan and the UAE soured in recent years, the Indians have been able to take advantage of that. And Indian leaders have hammered away at the common interest that India and leaders in the region have in terms of countering violent extremism. And then finally, India and Israel have quite an extraordinary relationship, both in the tech field as well as in the defense area. Israel is a supplier to India. And the two of them are part of a kind of global network of high-tech powerhouse that have either, you know, a wealth of startups or very significant investment from the major tech players in the world. Israel—Microsoft just announced a huge expansion in Israel. And Israeli engineers and Indian engineers collaborate on a variety of projects for these big tech companies. So there's a kind of multifaceted Indian interest in the region, and the region's interest in India. What India lacks that the Chinese have is a lot more capacity. They don't have the kind of wherewithal to bring investment and trade in the region in the other direction. But nevertheless, it's a much more important player than it was in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: How do you envision the future of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia politics for the next thirty years? Ethiopia controls the Nile dam projects. And could this dispute lead to a war? And what is the progress with the U.S. in mediating the talks between the three countries? COOK: Thank you. FASKIANOS: And that is coming from the King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. COOK: Fabulous. So that's more than the evening. It's actually nighttime there. I think that the question of the great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is really an important one, and it's something that has not gotten as much attention as it should. And for those of you who are not familiar, in short the Ethiopians have been building a massive dam on the Blue Nile, which is a tributary to the Nile. And that if—when competed, threatens the water supply to Egypt, a country of 110 million people that doesn't get a lot of rainfall. Ethiopia, of course, wants to dam the Nile in order to produce hydroelectric power for its own development, something that Egypt did when it dammed the Nile River to build the Aswan High Dam, and crated Lake Nasser behind it. The Egyptians are very, very concerned. This is an existential issue for them. And there have been on and off negotiations, but the negotiations aren't really about the issues. They're talks about talks about talks. And they haven't gotten—they haven't gotten very far. Now, the Egyptians have been supported by the Sudanese government, after the Sudanese government had been somewhat aligned with the Ethiopian government. The Trump administration put itself squarely behind the Egyptian government, but Ethiopia's also an important partner of the United States in the Horn of Africa. The Egyptians have gone about signing defense cooperation agreements with a variety of countries around Ethiopia's borders. And of course, Ethiopia is engaged in essentially what's a civil war. This is a very, very difficult and complicated situation. Thus far, there doesn't seem to be an easy solution the problem. Now, here's the rub, if you talk to engineers, if you talk to people who study water, if you talk to people who know about dams and the flow of water, the resolution to the problem is actually not that hard to get to. The problem is that the politics and nationalism have been engaged on both sides of the issue, making it much, much more difficult to negotiate an equitable solution to the problem. The Egyptians have said in the past that they don't really have an intention of using force, despite the fact of this being an existential issue. But there's been somewhat of a shift in their language on the issue. Which recently they've said if red lines were crossed, they may be forced to intervene. Intervene how? What are those red lines? They haven't been willing to define them, which should make everybody nervous. The good news is that Biden administration has appointed an envoy to deal with issues in the Horn of Africa, who has been working very hard to try to resolve the conflict. I think the problem here however is that Ethiopia, now distracted by a conflict in the Tigray region, nationalism is running high there, has been—I don't want to use the word impervious—but not as interested in finding a negotiated solution to the problem than it might have otherwise been in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Bob Pauly, who's a professor of international development at the University of Southern Mississippi. It got three up-votes. What would you identify as the most significant likely short and longer-term effects of Turkey's present domestic economic and political challenges on President Erdogan's strategy and policy approaches to the Middle East, and why? COOK: Oh, well, that is a very, very long answer to a very, very interesting question. Let's see what happens in 2023. President Erdogan is facing reelection. His goal all along has been to reelected on the one hundredth anniversary of the republic, and to demonstrate how much he has transformed Turkey in the image of the Justice and Development Party, and moved it away from the institutions of the republic. Erdogan may not make it to 2023. I don't want to pedal in conspiracy theories or anything like that, but he doesn't look well. There are large numbers of videos that have surfaced of him having difficulties, including one famous one from this past summer when he was offering a Ramadan greeting on Turkish television to supporters of the Justice and Development Party, and he seemed to fade out and slur his words. This is coupled with reports trickling out of Ankara about the lengths to which the inner circle has gone to shield real health concerns about Erdogan from the public. It's hard to really diagnose someone from more than six thousand miles away, but I think it's a scenario that policymakers in Washington need to think seriously about. What happens if Erdogan is incapacitated or dies before 2023? That's one piece. The second piece is, well, what if he makes it and he's reelected? And I think in any reasonable observer sitting around at the end of 2021 looking forward to 2023 would say two things: One, you really can't predict Turkish politics this far out, but if Turkish elections were held today and they were free and fair, the Justice and Development Party would get below 30 percent. Still more than everybody else. And Erdogan would have a real fight on his hands to get reelected, which he probably would be. His approaches to his domestic challenges and his approaches to the region are really based on what his current political calculations are at any given moment. So his needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean was a function of the fact that he needed to shore up his nationalist base. Now that he finds himself quite isolated in the world, the Turks have made overtures to Israel, to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia. They're virtually chasing the Egyptians around the Eastern Mediterranean to repair their relationship. Because without repairing these relationships the kind of investment that is necessary to try to help revive the Turkish economy—which has been on the skids for a number of years—is going to be—is going to be more difficult. There's also another piece of this, which is the Middle East is a rather lucrative arms market. And during the AKP era, the Turks have had a significant amount of success further developing their defense industrial base, to the point that now their drones are coveted. Now one of the reasons for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is that the United States will not sell Saudi Arabia the drones it wants, for fear that they will use them in Yemen. And the Saudis are looking for drones elsewhere. That's either China or Turkey. And Turkey's seem to work really, really well, based on experience in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. So what—Turkish foreign policy towards the region has become really dependent upon what Erdogan's particularly political needs are. There's no strategic approach to the region. There is a vision of Turkey as a leader of the region, of a great power in its own right, as a leader of the Muslim world, as a Mediterranean power as well. But that's nothing new. Turkish Islamists have been talking about these things for quite some time. I think it's important that there's been some de-escalation. I don't think that all of these countries now love each other, but they see the wisdom of pulling back from—pulling back from the brink. I don't see Turkey's position changing dramatically in terms of its kind of reintegration into the broader region before 2023, at the least. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's go next to, raised hand, to Caleb Sanner. And you need to unmute yourself. Q: Hello, my name is Caleb. I'm from the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. So, Dr. Cook, you had mentioned in passing how China has been involved economically in North Africa. And my question would be, how is the U.S. taking that? And what are we doing, in a sense, to kind of counter that? I know it's not a military advancement in terms of that, but I've seen what it has been doing to their economies—North Africa's economies. And, yeah, what's the U.S. stance on that? COOK: Well, I think the United States is somewhat detached from this question of North Africa. North Africa's long been a—with the exception of Egypt, of course. And Egypt, you know, is not really North Africa. Egypt is something in and of itself. That China is investing heavily in Egypt. And the Egyptian position is: Please don't ask us to choose between you and the Chinese, because we're not going to make that choice. We think investment from all of these places is good for—is good for Egypt. And the other places where China is investing, and that's mostly in Algeria, the United States really doesn't have close ties to Algeria. There was a tightening of the relationship after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, recognizing that the Algerians—extremist groups in Algerian that had been waging war against the state there over the course of the 1990s were part and parcel of this new phenomenon of global jihad. And so there has been a security relationship there. There has been some kind of big infrastructure kind of investment in that country, with big companies that build big things, like GE and others, involved in Algeria. But the United States isn't helping to develop ports or industrial parks or critical infrastructure like bridges and airports in the same way that the Chinese have been doing throughout the region. And in Algeria, as well as in Egypt, the Chinese are building a fairly significant industrial center in the Suez Canal zone, of all places. And the United States simply doesn't have an answer to it, other than to tell our traditional partners in the region, don't do it. But unless we show up with something to offer them, I'm afraid that Chinese investment is going to be too attractive for countries that are in need of this kind of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to a written question from Kenneth Mayers, who is at St. Francis College in Brooklyn. In your opinion, what would a strategic vision based on a far-sighted understanding of both resources and U.S. goals—with regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms and values such as human rights—look like in the Middle East and North Africa? COOK: Well, it's a great question. And I'm tempted to say you're going to have to read the last third of my new book in order to get the—in order to get the answer. I think but let me start with something mentioned about norms and values. I think that one of the things that has plagued American foreign policy over the course of not just the last twenty years, but in the post-World War II era all the way up through the present day, you see it very, very clearly with President Biden, is that trying to incorporate American values and norms into our approach to the region has been extraordinarily difficult. And what we have a history of doing is the thing that is strategically tenable, but morally suspect. So what I would say is, I mean, just look at what's happened recently. The president of the United States studiously avoided placing a telephone call to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Egyptians, as many know, have a terrible record on human rights, particularly since President Sisi came to power. Arrests of tens of thousands of people in the country, the torture of many, many people, the killings of people. And the president during his campaign said that he was going to give no blank checks to dictators, including to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And then what happened in May? What happened in May was that fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas and others in the Gaza Strip, a brutal eleven-day conflict. And Egypt stepped up and provided a way out of the conflict through its good offices. And that prompted the United States to—the president of the United States—to have two phone calls in those eleven days with the Egyptian leader. And now the United States is talking about Egypt as a constructive partner that's helping to stabilize the region. Sure, the administration suspended $130 million of Egypt's annual—$130 million Egypt's annual allotment of $1.3 billion. But that is not a lot. Egypt got most of—most of its military aid. As I said, strategically tenable, morally suspect. I'm not quite sure how we get out of that. But what I do know, and I'll give you a little bit of a preview of the last third of the book—but I really do want you to buy it when it's done—is that the traditional interests of the United States in the Middle East are changing. And I go through a kind of quasi, long, somewhat tortured—but very, very interesting—discussion of the origins of our interests, and how they are changing, and how we can tell they are changing. And that is to say that the free flow of energy resources may not be as important to the United States in the next twenty-five years as it was over the course of the previous fifty or sixty years. That helping to ensure Israeli security, which has been axiomatic for the United States, eh, I'd say since the 1960s, really, may not be as important as Israel develops its diplomatic relations with its neighbors, that has a GDP per capita that's on par with the U.K., and France, and other partners in Europe, a country that clearly can take care of itself, that is a driver of technology and innovation around the globe. And that may no longer require America's military dominance in the region. So what is that we want to be doing? How can we be constructive? And I think the answers are in things that we hadn't really thought of too systematically in the past. What are the things that we're willing to invest in an defend going forward? Things like climate change, things like migration, things like pandemic disease. These are things that we've talked about, but that we've never been willing to invest in the kind of the resources. Now there are parts of the Middle East that during the summer months are in-habitable. That's going to produce waves of people looking for places to live that are inhabitable. What do we do about that? Does that destabilize the Indian subcontinent? Does it destabilize Europe? Does it destabilize North Africa? These are all questions that we haven't yet answered. But to the extent that we want to invest in, defend and sacrifice for things like climate, and we want to address the issue—related issue of migration, and we want to deal with the issue of disease and other of these kind of functional global issues in the Middle East is better not just for us and Middle Easterners, but also in terms of our strategic—our great-power competition in the region. These are not things that the Chinese and the Russians are terribly interested in, despite the fact that the Chinese may tell you they are. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Ahmuan Williams, with a raised hand, at the University of Oklahoma. COOK: Oklahoma. Q: Hi. And thank you for being here. You kind of talked about the stabilization of northern Africa and the Middle East. And just a few days ago the Sudanese government—and they still haven't helped capture the parliamentarian there—have recycled back into a military—somewhat of military rule. And it's been since 2005 since the end of their last civil war, which claimed millions of innocent civilians through starvation and strife and, you know, the lack of being able to get humanitarian aid. There was also a huge refugee crisis there, a lot of people who evacuated Sudan. How's that going to impact the Middle East and the American take to Middle East and northern Africa policy, especially now that the Security Council is now considering this and is trying to determine what we should do? COOK: It's a great question. And I think that, first, let's be clear. There was a coup d'état in Sudan. The military overthrew a transitional government on the eve of having to hand over the government to civilians. And they didn't like it. There's been tension that's been brewing in Sudan for some time. Actually, an American envoy, our envoy to East Africa and Africa more generally, a guy named Jeff Feltman, was in Khartoum, trying to kind of calm the tension, to get the two sides together, and working to avert a coup. And the day after he left, the military moved. That's not—that doesn't reflect the fact that the United States gave a blessing for the military to overthrow this government. I think what it does, though, and it's something that I think we all need to keep in mind, it demonstrates the limits of American power in a variety of places around the world. That we don't have all the power in the world to prevent things from happening when people, like the leaders of the Sudanese military, believe that they have existential issues that are at stake. Now, what's worry about destabilization in Sudan is, as you point out, there was a civil war there, there was the creation of a new country there, potential for—if things got really out of hand—refugee flows into Egypt, from Egypt across the Sanai Peninsula into Israel. One of the things people are unaware of is the large number of Sudanese or Eritreans and other Africans who have sought refuge in Israel, which has created significant economic and social strains in that country. So it's a big deal. Thus far, it seems we don't—that the U.S. government doesn't know exactly what's happening there. There are protesters in the streets demanding democracy. It's very unclear what the military is going to do. And it's very unclear what our regional allies and how they view what's happening. What Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, what Saudi Arabia, what Israel—which Sudan is an Abraham Accords country now—what they are doing. How they view the coup as positive or negative will likely impact how effective the United States can be in trying to manage this situation. But I suspect that we're just going to have to accommodate ourselves to whatever outcome the Sudanese people and the Sudanese military come to, because I don't think we have a lot of—we don't have a lot of tools there to make everybody behave. FASKIANOS: OK. So I'm going to take the next question from Elena Murphy, who is a junior at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. And she's a diplomatic intern at the Kurdistan Regional Government's Representation in the United States. COOK: That's cool. FASKIANOS: That's very cool. So as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional hegemony has affected Erdogan's domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors policy? COOK: Great. Can I see that? Because that's a long question. FASKIANOS: Yeah, it's a long question. It's got an up-vote. Third one down. COOK: Third one down. Elena, as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism—I'm sorry, I'm going to have to read it again. How much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional has affected Erdogan's both domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors? OK. Great. So let us set aside the term “neo-Ottomanism” for now. Because neo-Ottomanism actually—it does mean something, but people have often used the term neo-Ottomanism to describe policies of the Turkish government under President Erdogan that they don't like. And so let's just talk about the way in which the Turkish government under President Erdogan views the region and views what Turkey's rightful place should be. And I think the Ottomanism piece is important, because the kind of intellectual framework which the Justice and Development Party, which is Erdogan's party, views the world, sees Turkey as—first of all, it sees the Turkish Republic as a not-so-legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. That from their perspective, the natural order of things would have been the continuation of the empire in some form or another. And as a result, they believe that Turkey's natural place is a place of leadership in the region for a long time. Even before the Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, Turkey's earlier generation of Islamists used to savage the Turkish leadership for its desire to be part of the West, by saying that this was kind of unnatural, that they were just merely aping the West, and the West was never actually going to accept Turkey. Which is probably true. But I think that the Justice and Development Party, after a period of wanting to become closer to the West, has turned its attention towards the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world more generally. And in that, it sees itself, the Turks see themselves as the natural leaders in the region. They believe they have a cultural affinity to the region as a result of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and they very much can play this role of leader. They see themselves as one of the kind of few real countries in the region, along with Egypt and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the rest are sort of ephemeral. Needless to say, big countries in the Arab world—like Egypt, like Saudi Arabia—don't welcome the idea of Turkey as a leader of the region. They recognize Turkey as a very big and important country, but not a leader of the region. And this is part of that friction that Turkey has experienced with its neighbors, after an earlier iteration of Turkish foreign policy, in which—one of the earliest iterations of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which was called no problems with neighbors. In which Turkey, regardless of the character of the regimes, wanted to have good relations with its neighbors. It could trade with those neighbors. And make everybody—in the process, Turkey could be a driver of economic development in the region, and everybody can be basically wealthy and happy. And it didn't really work out that way, for a variety of reasons that we don't have enough time for. Let's leave it at the fact that Turkey under Erdogan—and a view that is shared by many—that Turkey should be a leader of the region. And I suspect that if Erdogan were to die, if he were unable to stand for election, if the opposition were to win, that there would still be elements of this desire to be a regional leader in a new Turkish foreign policy. FASKIANOS: Steven, thank you very much. This was really terrific. We appreciate your stepping in at the eleventh hour, taking time away from your book. For all of you— COOK: I'm still not Sanam. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) I know, but you were an awesome replacement. So you can follow Steven Cook on Twitter at @stevenacook. As I said at the beginning too, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine. So you can read his work there, as well as, of course, on CFR.org, all of the commentary, analysis, op-eds, congressional testimony are there for free. So I hope you will follow him and look after his next book. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday November 3, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. In the meantime, I encourage you to follow us, @CFR_Academic, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. And stay well, stay safe, and thank you, again. COOK: Bye, everyone. FASKIANOS: Bye. (END)

Check out our merch store! https://2njb.com/merch *** About 6 months ago, in May of this year, the entire country was hit with a wave of Arab-Israeli mob violence. Jews were targeted both in the streets and in their homes in cities like Acre, Lod, Jaffa. 2 Jews died, one in Acre, one in Lod. Many were injured. There were also a few incidents of Jewish mob violence but not quite on the same scale. On May 10th, Israel began it's fourth military operation in Gaza. Another round in Israel's ongoing attempt to defend itself against Hamas. All hope for co-existence seemed gone. And then about a month later the government was formed. In an unexpected and historic twist, Prime Minister Bennett managed to form a coalition by garnering the support of one of Israel's Arab parties. For the first time in history, an Arab party is part of the ruling coalition. Is this just a fling or is this a true step in the direction of peace between Israel and the Palestinians? Today we are joined by comedian and activist Noam Shuster-Eliassi. Noam joined us back in June to talk about her bout of covid and her time in Hotel Corona. But Covid-19 is so 2020. This time, Noam joins us to talk about Peace in the Middle East. Noam hails from quite a unique place - Neve Shalom or Wahat Al-Salam (which translates to Oasis of Peace), a cooperative village founded by Arabs and Jews with the stated goal of showing the world that it's possible. Noam performs in Hebrew, Arabic, and English and we are thrilled to have her on the show today.

Al-Monitor columnist Daoud Kuttab says that Jerusalem and settlements remain the big issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; why Hamas is gaining in popularity; how Palestinian President Mahmoud is managed the consequences of the Abraham Accords and thinking about his legacy and succession; and why we may see more Palestinian protests in the coming year.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Today's speakers, who are human rights activists as well as being business-oriented, will discuss why Bitcoin matters, especially in the Middle East region. Alex Gladstein, vice president of strategy for the Oslo Freedom Forum, has connected many dissidents and civil society groups with business leaders, philanthropists, policymakers and artists, to promote free and open societies. He has shared his views at MIT, Stanford, BBC, the European Parliament, the U.S. State Department, and other venues. He is the singularity expert at Singularity University and advises Blockchain Capital. Fadi Elsalameen, who was born in Hebron, is a critic of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and has received death threats for his pro-democracy and anti-corruption work. He is a graduate of Seeds of Peace, a successful businessperson, and has also shared his views at many leading institutions, including The Commonwealth Club of California. SPEAKERS Fadi Elsalameen M.S., International Relations and Economics; Adjunct Senior Fellow, American Security Project Alex Gladstein Chief Strategy Officer, Human Rights Foundation; Co-Author, The Little Bitcoin Book Jonathan Curiel Author—Moderator In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are currently hosting all of our live programming via YouTube live stream. This program was recorded via video conference on October 18th, 2021 by the Commonwealth Club of California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today's speakers, who are human rights activists as well as being business-oriented, will discuss why Bitcoin matters, especially in the Middle East region. Alex Gladstein, vice president of strategy for the Oslo Freedom Forum, has connected many dissidents and civil society groups with business leaders, philanthropists, policymakers and artists, to promote free and open societies. He has shared his views at MIT, Stanford, BBC, the European Parliament, the U.S. State Department, and other venues. He is the singularity expert at Singularity University and advises Blockchain Capital. Fadi Elsalameen, who was born in Hebron, is a critic of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and has received death threats for his pro-democracy and anti-corruption work. He is a graduate of Seeds of Peace, a successful businessperson, and has also shared his views at many leading institutions, including The Commonwealth Club of California. SPEAKERS Fadi Elsalameen M.S., International Relations and Economics; Adjunct Senior Fellow, American Security Project Alex Gladstein Chief Strategy Officer, Human Rights Foundation; Co-Author, The Little Bitcoin Book Jonathan Curiel Author—Moderator In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are currently hosting all of our live programming via YouTube live stream. This program was recorded via video conference on October 18th, 2021 by the Commonwealth Club of California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Shurat HaDin Law Center undertakes civil actions against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PLO, The Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, Egypt, North Korea, UBS, and the Lebanese Canadian Bank. The cases, being tried in Israeli, American, Canadian and European jurisdictions, allow the victims of terrorism to fight back. The Definitive Rap 20OCT2021 - PODCAST

Ron Arad, an Israeli Air Force navigator, has been missing since 1986. Recently, the Mossad carried out an operation to find out any new information about his fate. In this week's episode, we explore Israel's philosophy to never give up, and never leave a soldier behind. ~~~~ Learn more about Unpacked: https://jewishunpacked.com/about/ Visit Unpacked on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/unpacked Teaching about this topic? Check out our relevant educator resources here: https://unpacked.education/why-is-israel-still-searching-for-ron-arad/ ~~~~ Sources https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Gifts_to_the_Poor.8.10?lang=bi https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Gittin.4.6?lang=he-en&utm_source=etzion.org.il&utm_medium=sefaria_linker https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-must-do-everything-to-bring-soldiers-home-1.10276763 https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/prisoners-dilemma-137099 https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/the-ron-arad-saga-national-trauma-or-national-obsession-681380 https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-s-obsessive-worship-of-the-dead-1.10272770 https://unpacked.education/video/eli-cohen-the-mossads-master-spy/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=weekly-21-10-12&utm_campaign=ued-reengagement https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-must-do-everything-to-bring-soldiers-home-1.10276763 https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/10/07/wife-of-missing-navigator-ron-arad-defends-operation/  ~~~~ Unpacked is a division of OpenDor Media

In May, Hamas leaders in Gaza — a territory from which Israelis withdrew in 2005 — launched more than 4,000 missiles at Israel, sparking an eleven-day conflict that would have been bloodier — on both sides — had the Israelis not been in possession of the Iron Dome, a marvel of engineering that intercepts and destroys short-range missiles before they can reach their intended victims. In other words, it is not a sword but a shield. Last month, far-left House Democrats blocked a bill to keep the federal government operating until it was stripped of funds to help Israelis replenish interceptors for the Iron Dome. A few days later, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer brought Iron Dome up as a stand-alone bill. There were 420 votes in favor and nine opposed. To discuss these and related issues, Foreign Podicy host Cliff May is joined by Jacob Nagel, who has served in the Israeli Defense Forces, the Israeli Defense Ministry, and the Prime Minister's Office including as the head of Israel's National Security Council and acting National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He headed the “Nagel Committee,” which was responsible for Israel's decision to develop Iron Dome. He also led the negotiations and signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for U.S. military aid to Israel from 2018 to 2027. He's currently a visiting professor at the Technion Aerospace Engineering Faculty and a senior fellow at FDD. Also joining the conversation: Enia Krivine, Senior Director of FDD's Israel Program as well as FDD's National Security Network; and Bradley Bowman, senior director of FDD's Center on Military and Political Power. Before joining FDD, Enia's work focused on strengthening U.S.-Israel relations including at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); the Israel Allies Foundation; and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where she served as a Middle East fellow. Brad has served as a national security advisor to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Prior to that, he was an active-duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot, and assistant professor at West Point.

Allison Kaplan Sommer, Miriam Herschlag and Noah Efron discuss three topics of incomparable importance and end with an anecdote about something in Israel that made them smile this week. Listen to the Extra-Special, Special Extra Segment on Patreon   —Vax & Figures— What's the link between who Israelis vote for and whether, when, and how we get vaxxed and boostered? —The Cost of Freedom— Gilad Shalit was freed from Hamas captivity in Gaza exactly ten years ago. Was the deal that brought him home a good one? —Once They Wrote Love Songs for Tel Aviv— Has Tel Aviv jumped the shark? —What to Make of L'Affaire de Rooney?— For our most unreasonably generous Patreon supporters, in our extra-special, special extra discussion, we wonder what we ought to make of l'Affaire de Rooney? All that and new music of Israel's most outre rapper, Hadar Farjun!

In this episode, BICOM's Research Associate Samuel Nurding speaks with Lord Eric Pickles, the Parliamentary Chairman (Lords) of the Conservative Friends of Israel, about everything Israeli-related at the Tory party conference, as well as Sally Rooney's decision to join the cultural boycott of Israel, and the UK's position on designating Hamas' political wing, Iran and the JCPOA, and strengthening the Abraham Accords. 

The Abraham Accords constituted a historic leap forward in Israel's relations with the Arab world. But what does the future hold for the United States and Israel after the Trump presidency? And how can local lawmakers get involved? Join Karla Jones, Senior Task Force Director for Federalism and International Relations, as she sits with Aryeh Lightstone, advisor to former United States Ambassador to Israel David Friedman and Special Envoy for Economic Normalization, to discuss where both nations go from here. Failure of Palestinian Governance and the Latest Conflict between Israel and Hamas, by Karla Jones and Anna Small https://www.alec.org/article/failure-of-palestinian-governance-and-the-latest-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas/ Strengthening the U.S. Israel Economic and Strategic Partnership https://www.alec.org/article/strengthening-the-u-s-israel-economic-and-strategic-partnership/

Hamas and Israel expected to have a prison swap & ceasefire; Angela Merkel visits Israel for the last time as Germany's Chancellor & the biggest Byzantine winery ever uncovered in central Israel. Social Media links, Newsletter sign-up &, Support the show $ here: https://linktr.ee/israeldailynews Music: Livchor Nachon; Mordy Weinstein, Nicole Raviv, Edan Tamler https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivUoekTlTyw --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/israeldailynews/support

On the Israel Podcast: Join Rabbi Yishai for a deep dive on hidden meanings of Torah's Flood narrative and what Noah's Ark represents on our life. Then, the roots of the Biblical word "Hamas" - violent distruction - and Israel's fight for control of the Holy Land.

On the Israel Podcast: Join Rabbi Yishai for a deep dive on hidden meanings of Torah's Flood narrative and what Noah's Ark represents on our life. Then, the roots of the Biblical word "Hamas" - violent distruction - and Israel's fight for control of the Holy Land.

Zach Korner a Zionist Jew debates Zach Foster an Anti-Zionist Jew. In the debate, they will discuss...- Is Israel singled out unfairly?- When is it OK to single out a country?- Is Israel treated by a double standard?- Is BDS violent or non-violent?▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬★ MEET OUR GUESTS ★▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Zachary Foster completed his Ph.D in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton. His dissertation was titled, “The Invention of Palestine.” He is also a Director of Product at Academia.edu.Get in touch with Zach:Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIo4...Twitter: https://twitter.com/_ZachFoster▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Zach Korner is a philosopher of Zionism and antisemitism.  He served in the IDF as an infantryman then spent a number of years at various Talmudic Academies in Jerusalem.  He is the author of the eventually forthcoming "Antisemitism of Love: New Ideas on the Israel Palestinian Conflict".Get in touch with ZachIG: https://www.instagram.com/zachkorner/FB: https://www.facebook.com/ZachKornerIPC/▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Sulha Socialshttps://linktr.ee/theSulha▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Adar's Socialshttps://linktr.ee/adarw▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Support the ShowPatreon: https://www.patreon.com/sulhaPayPal: https://paypal.me/AdarW?locale.x=en_US▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Huge shoutout to our Patreon Legendary member:- SpeedyWeedy - www.myspeedyweedy.com

Mohammed El Halabi is accused of stealing relief money and giving it to Hamas for their war effort against Israel. But five years on, the evidence against him looks seriously flawed. By Joe Dyke. Help support our independent journalism at theguardian.com/longreadpod

Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile defense system has been in the news over the past several weeks as radical members of Congress tried to de-fund the project. While Congress ultimately approved a bill to finance the Iron Dome, on this week's Israel Uncensored with Josh Hasten, Josh says that with or without Iron Dome, Israel must respond harshly to every rocket fired, regardless if the system successfully shoots the projectiles out of the air. He argues that Iron Dome's efficiency should not be a factor for Israel in doing everything possible to prevent Israeli children from having to run to the shelters. The bottom line is that one rocket is one too many, and the terrorists must pay a heavy price, which will deter them from firing. Photo Credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Iron_Dome_Intercepts_Rockets_from_the_Gaza_Strip.jpg

If the United States decides to remove all remaining troops from Iraq and Syria, it would spell the end of the https://www.theepochtimes.com/t-yazidis (Yazidis) and the Syrian Christians, says Rabbi Abraham Cooper. “They would essentially disappear.” In this episode, we sit down with Rabbi Cooper, the associate dean and director of Global Social Action at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, to discuss efforts to combat religious persecution globally, from Christians being killed in Nigeria to genocide in China. “That is supposed to be beyond the pale. That is supposedly why the United Nations came into existence in the first place—now forgotten by alliances of convenience and cynicism and hypocrisy,” says Rabbi Cooper. We also discuss growing attacks on Jews around the world, fueled by propaganda from https://www.theepochtimes.com/t-hamas (Hamas), and Cooper's work facilitating tolerance and understanding in the https://www.theepochtimes.com/t-t-middle-east (Middle East), including his role in the https://www.theepochtimes.com/t-abraham-accords (Abraham Accords). There are still companies like American Hartford Gold, that value freedom of speech and honest discourse—and are sponsoring shows like ours. With inflation on the rise, investing in gold is another option to diversify your assets. American Hartford Gold is a patriotic, family-owned company that not only sells precious metals right to your front door, they can help deposit gold into a retirement account like an IRA or 401K. They've got an A+ rating with the Better Business Bureau, and right now they have a promotion where they will give you up to $1,500 of free silver on your first order. You can just call 855-862-3377, that's 855-862-3377 or you can text “AMERICAN” to 6-5-5-3-2.

If the United States decides to remove all remaining troops from Iraq and Syria, it would spell the end of the Yazidis and the Syrian Christians, says Rabbi Abraham Cooper. “They would essentially disappear.”In this episode, we sit down with Rabbi Cooper, the associate dean and director of Global Social Action at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, to discuss efforts to combat religious persecution globally, from Christians being killed in Nigeria to genocide in China.“That is supposed to be beyond the pale. That is supposedly why the United Nations came into existence in the first place—now forgotten by alliances of convenience and cynicism and hypocrisy,” says Rabbi Cooper.We also discuss growing attacks on Jews around the world, fueled by propaganda from Hamas, and Cooper's work facilitating tolerance and understanding in the Middle East, including his role in the Abraham Accords.There are still companies like American Hartford Gold, that value freedom of speech and honest discourse—and are sponsoring shows like ours.With inflation on the rise, investing in gold is another option to diversify your assets. American Hartford Gold is a patriotic, family-owned company that not only sells precious metals right to your front door, they can help deposit gold into a retirement account like an IRA or 401K.They've got an A+ rating with the Better Business Bureau, and right now they have a promotion where they will give you up to $1,500 of free silver on your first order. You can just call 855-862-3377, that's 855-862-3377 or you can text “AMERICAN” to 6-5-5-3-2.

Detective Paul DiGiacomo looks at who's to blame for the crime wave that's ripping apart New York City. Brett Arends looks at the short term and long term effects of Inflation and why we aren't at our lowest point yet. Charmaine Yoest trusts the science behind the vaccine but why the messaging behind the CDC's latest bit of urgency is all wrong as it pertains to pregnant women. Governor Mike Huckabee takes aim at the Biden Administration and Kamala Harris in particular for coddling the mind of an 18 year old that sympathizes with Hamas and chastises Israel for using the Iron Dome to defend itself against acts of war.

Il y a plus de 25 ans, le 4 novembre 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, Premier ministre israélien, était assassiné par un extrémiste juif alors qu'il quittait un rassemblement pour la paix à Tel Aviv. Rabin fut, aux côtés de Yasser Arafat, à l'origine du processus de paix entre Israël et la Palestine à travers la conférence de Madrid (1991) puis la signature des accords d'Oslo (1993). Où en est le conflit israélo-palestinien aujourd'hui ? Qu'en est-il de la double opposition au processus de paix de l'extrême droite israélienne et du Hamas suite aux accords d'Oslo ? L'assassinat d'Yitzhak Rabin a-t-il emporté avec lui l'espoir d'une paix entre Israël et la Palestine ? Le réalisateur, scénariste et producteur israélien Amos Gitaï rend hommage à l'ancien Premier ministre israélien à travers un ouvrage "Yitzhak Rabin, chronique d'un assassinat" (Gallimard, BNF) et une exposition à la Bibliothèque nationale de France. Dans ce Podcast, il revient aux côtés de Pascal Boniface sur l'évolution des rapports entre Israël et la Palestine depuis la mort d'Yitzhak Rabin, à l'occasion des Géopolitiques de Nantes 2021. Pour aller plus loin :

Support the SHOW https://www.buymeacoffee.com/derekosheashowSUPPORT THE SHOW: https://streamelements.com/theoneminutenews/tipPolitically Homeless LIVE Night Show | Biden | Covid News | Emmys | Illegal Migrants | Breaking News#IRL #comedyshow #politicsBill Gates,Microsoft,Elon Musk,SNL,Dogecoin,Palestinian,Israeli,Hamas,Colonial Pipeline,FDA,CDC,Vaccine Confidence,SpaceX,North Korea,Border Crisis,Chicago,Macron,Melinda Gates,Trump,Canadian Pastor,Railroad,Laughing,Not Laughing,Funny,Conservative,Conservative MEME,Talk Show,Meme,Funny Show,IRL,Tim Cast,Talk,Joe Biden,Biden Live,Breaking News Live,Political Podcast,Border Crossing,Covid News,FDA Kids Vaccine,UN Nations,Foreign PolicySupport the show (https://www.buymeacoffee.com/derekosheashow)

The families of the three young men who were abducted and killed in 2014 are supposed to get a payout from the Hamas killer who did it; PM Bennett sits down with Egypt's el-Sissi & an Israeli tech company accomplishes the country's biggest acquisition yet. Social Media links, Newsletter sign-up &, Support the show $ here: https://linktr.ee/israeldailynews Music: שירה גבריאלוב ; פוקחת עיניים לראות Shira Gavrielov https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smNZciI1Esw --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/israeldailynews/support

Wayne Resnick sits in for Bill Handel. 20 years after 9/11, President Biden faces an uncertain path to closing Guantanamo Bay. From pariah to partner: How Qatar's role in Afghanistan helped to restore U.S. relations. Jennifer Jones Lee and the man himself! Bill Handel join Wayne for the Late Edition of HANDEL on the News, where the trio discuss news topics that include: President Biden heads out west to assess the wildfires and campaign for Gavin Newsom, tropical storm Nichols threatens the Gulf Coast with heavy rain and flooding, and Israel has shot down Hamas rockets in addition to launching air strikes in the Gaza Strip.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 15-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish world, from Sunday through Thursday. Today's guests are military writer Judah Ari Gross and political reporter Tal Schneider, with host Jessica Steinberg. Gross fills us in on the recent uptick in Gazan violence, and examines what that really means in terms of Hamas control over the Gaza Strip, a situation that recent Israeli governments have allowed, rather than risk escalating the situation. Schneider discusses how she came about her latest feature regarding a secret 2017 mission by Israeli engineers and an American Jewish lawyer to steal into Iraq in order to rehabilitate the tomb of the prophet Nachum. That feature will be in the Times of Israel on Wednesday, after first appearing on Zman Yisrael in Hebrew. Gross and Schneider close the podcast with a conversation about recent statements on the part of Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid regarding Iran, Israel and the US. Discussed articles include: Israeli jets strike Gaza after 2nd rocket attack in 24 hours Terrorists fire one rocket from Gaza, then another as IDF strikes Hamas targets Gantz reveals Iranian drone base, says it is used to train terror groups Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on iTunes, Spotify, PlayerFM, Google Play, or wherever you get your podcasts. PHOTO: Palestinians protest near the border with Israel, east of Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on September 2, 2021. (Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Foreign Minister Yair Lapid laid out his strategy for the future of Gaza at a conference on terrorism yesterday. His plan - to defeat Hamas through economic improvements and through diplomacy. On this week's Israel Uncensored with Josh Hasten, Josh argues that Lapid has it completely backwards. Instead of easing conditions in Gaza, which the residents there would then credit Hamas for accomplishing, Israel should create a reality in which Gazans want to see the terror group Hamas dethroned and out of their lives completely. This story plus all the latest news from Israel on this week's show.

Photo: Toronto from top of Rossin House (S.E. corner of King and York Streets looking towards Niagara); 1840s  CBS Eyes on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow Memories of 9-11-01 at Toronto, Ontario. @ConradMBlack .. National Post    The greatest significance of the dramatic and evil assault on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington 20 years ago was that it initiated a new form of quasi-military violence against the Western democratic powers that had emerged at the end of the Cold War as overwhelmingly the most influential political, economic and cultural force in the world. The national security policy of the leader of the Western alliance, the United States, was enunciated in two speeches to the United States Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941. In his State of the Union address in January of that year he said that America “must always be wary of those who with ‘sounding brass and tinkling cymbal' would preach the ‘ism of appeasement'.” In his war message of December 8, 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and many other sites in the Pacific, Roosevelt said, “we will make very certain that this form of treachery never again endangers us.” The burden of these assertions was that the United States would not be an appeasement power and that it would thereafter retain sufficient deterrent strength that no country would attack it again as Japan had.     Between Roosevelt and George W. Bush, 10 presidents, five of each party, had essentially upheld that double formula successfully. The United States did not appease competing or adversarial states, although it attempted to compromise with them; and no other country has dared to risk the retaliatory response of American military might. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the fruit of the imagination of the most militant enemies of America and the West: an attack by people who deliberately committed suicide in conducting the attack—not only were unafraid of dying but were eager to die—by forces that could not be directly linked in any command structure to any sovereign state. It was, after 50 years, the double evasion of the Roosevelt formula: forces so shadowy it was not clear how they could be appeased if anyone wished to do so, and so fanatical that they could not be deterred from even the most heinous acts because of their ardent desire to die for their cause. Clearly, and in the most dramatic possible way, a new threat had emerged.  The spectacle on television of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers is rivaled only by the film of the assassination of Pres. Kennedy as the most vividly and widely remembered incident in the lifetime of anyone now living.    It must be said that the American and allied response was impressive. For the first time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked the war clause and the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing authority, unanimously stated that an Alliance member had been attacked in an act of war and every country in the alliance responded as if it were an act of war against themselves: “An attack upon one is an attack upon all.” Forces from a large number of NATO countries were dispatched to Afghanistan, [which w]as the training and staging area for the 9/11 outrages. They quickly overthrew the Afghan government, destroyed the training facilities of the terrorist groups and drove them out of Afghanistan; and virtually every country in the world other than a few militantly Islamist or very primitive states united in a vast system of information exchange and paramilitary cooperation.     Those who remember 9/11 well will remember the widespread speculation and the noisy threats of terrorist spokespeople to the effect that this was merely the introduction of an endless series of massive terrorist assaults upon the West. Of course, there have been some such assaults, although very few recently and some of them were very deadly—though none as horrible or spectacular as the 9/11 attacks 20 years ago. We must not be so depressed and scandalized by the shameful end of the NATO presence in Afghanistan, at the instigation of the current U.S. president, that we fail to recognize the very thorough and almost leak-proof protection that the antiterrorist forces of the Western Alliance and its affiliates, such as Israel and Japan, have given the civil population of the West and its allies these 20 years.                     The disorderly withdrawal from Afghanistan has been an appalling fiasco but the West was certainly not militarily defeated. The American government decided, as the Soviet Union decided in the 1980's and the British Empire decided in the middle of the 19th century, that Afghanistan had few resources, was primitive, landlocked, and terribly inhospitable, had practically no strategic value and was accordingly not worth the military effort to maintain control of the urban areas as NATO was doing with only about 10,000 members of its Armed Forces until a month ago. There is room to dispute this judgment, and I don't agree with it myself, but it was a public relations and not a military defeat. The effect of this withdrawal will be to test whether the Islamist terrorist forces wish to use Afghanistan again as the launching place for their criminal violence or not. If they do, obviously, Afghanistan will be attacked again and probably with much greater violence than it was 20 years ago. Afghanistan has been regarded as rich only in heroin, but the theory has recently arisen that it is rich in rare earths as well.  It sounds like Marxist Herbert Marcuse's theory that the U.S. was in Vietnam because of the oil (which still has not been discovered). In any case, if China wants to plunge into mineral exploration in Afghanistan and add it to its famous Belt and Road, it is welcome to it.     Terrorism isn't really war: it isn't an effort of one sovereign authority to try to overcome and defeat another. It is an attempt by people who possess no sovereign authority, no legitimacy whatever, to strike at innocent people with such violence that it produces sketchily outlined concessions from legitimate sovereign countries. It has been successful only when it has been the advance activity of ultimately successful revolutionary movements within certain countries. It is conceivable that it could undermine and heavily influence, as it has in the last 20 years, some countries highly susceptible to militant Islam. But even those countries will not explicitly adopt terrorist techniques because the retaliation from the states they attacked would be so overwhelming, it would completely over-power the small number of fanatics and programmed idiots who want to die for their cause.     The terrible events of 20 years ago and their sequels have not threatened our civilization as Nazism and Soviet communism did: Great Powers armed to the teeth and led by satanic dictators. Terrorism horrifies all decent people and kills a comparatively small number, but as an instrument of advancement of the cause in which it is inflicted, terrorism is a failure. The West's error, and it was the mistake of George W. Bush, was to try to eradicate terrorism and war by promoting democracy. This required nation-building so profound that there were not the time or the resources to complete it effectively in the barren soil of primitive and undemocratic societies. And it failed to provide for the democratic selection of anti-democratic political movements: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iraqi electorate may prefer dictatorship to democracy.     Humiliating debacle though it was, the departure from Afghanistan does represent a withdrawal by the West from an overextended position, and an opportunity for the principal Muslim terrorist organizations to try more conventional and less sociopathic methods of advancing their cause. It is obvious that there will be no toleration, anywhere in the West, or by China and Russia (pending Russia taking its rightful place as a western country) for terrorism or any of its espoused objectives. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 20 years ago were permanently shocking, but as the dramatic beginning of a campaign to shatter Western civilization, they and their sequels have been almost as conspicuous a failure as were Nazi Germany's recourse to aggressive war in 1939 and Imperialist Japan's assault on Pearl Harbor and across the Pacific in 1941.    ..  

How do we make life better for those who live in Gaza? According to Palestinian political analyst Bassem Eid, we start by recognizing who is really responsible for the suffering that happens there. Today is the LAST DAY for TRIPLE MATCH donations! Please make a tax-deductible donation today to help us continue reaching millions of young people online. Donate today: PragerU.com/donate/

Biden's bungled Afghanistan exit has become such a catastrophe that even the liberal media is beginning to question the Commander in Chief's competence. As American foreign policy collapses before our very eyes, Senator Ted Cruz joins Michael Knowles for a sobering dive into what went wrong, what can still be done, and what America's place on the international stage will be under Biden and beyond. The eyes of the world are upon us now—especially the eyes of China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Photo:  The hostage Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit on a Hamas poster, which reads: "Our heroes prisoners may we have a new Gilad each year" and down :"They (Palestinian prisoners) are not alone" Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1  ;  @ThadMcCotter @theamgreatness 1. The tragedy in Kabul encourages Hamas and Hezbollah https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-jets-said-striking-gaza-following-fires-set-by-arson-balloons/ .. Permissons: Gilad Shalit on Hamas poster, Nablus said: "Our hero prisoners We hope that Every year and new Gilad" and down :"They (Palestinian prisoners) are not alone" Date | May 2007 Source | https://www.flickr.com/photos/tomspender/532148254/ Author | Tom Spender Licensing | This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. | 

On Wednesday's Mark Levin Show, In light of Gov Andrew Cuomo's sexual harassment allegations, Jen Psaki was asked for her reaction to the Tara Reade/Joe Biden sexual allegations. Psaki dodged the question and reiterated that Biden believed that all women should be respected after brushing it off as "heavily litigated during the campaign." Biden and Psaki seem to be done talking about this issue, however, it is impossible to believe Reade and Biden at the same time. Are they sticking to the notion that all women should be believed? Did Reade ever have her day in court? Then, McAllen, Texas is feeling the brunt of the border crisis and has declared a state of emergency after Biden's policies just dumped 1500 illegal aliens in their small city. Later, Rep Rashida Tlaib is a Hamas-supporting anti-semite and says that Palestinians have been cut off from clean water for a profit. Tlaib was alluding to a global Jewish structure that defends itself against Hamas' terror attacks. Meanwhile, Iran has blown an Israeli tanker out of the water, and in an act of appeasement, Sec. Blinken says he will leave it to Britain to figure out. Afterward, Biden and the CDC don't have the authority to extend any eviction moratorium. Moreover, not all renters are facing eviction, this is about power and expanding their massive and spending. When will the freebies end?