Podcast appearances and mentions of jerry fodor

We've all seen those illusions. The dots seem to dance, when in fact they're completely still. The lines look like they bend, but in reality they're perfectly straight. Here's the thing: It doesn't matter that you know the ground truth of these illusions—the dancing and bending won't stop. And that we see the world one way, even though we know it's actually another way, is a fascinating quirk of our minds—and maybe a telling one. It suggests that there's a chasm between perceiving and thinking, that these may be two independent provinces of the mind. But, if so, we're faced with another question: Where does perception end and thinking begin?  My guest today is Dr. Chaz Firestone. Chaz is an Associate Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Johns Hopkins University, and Director of the Perception and Mind lab there. He and his research group study perceiving, thinking, and the interface between the two. Here, Chaz and I talk about his background in philosophy and how it continues to animate his research. We sketch the differences between perception and cognition and why the two are best considered separate faculties. We consider the idea of so-called "top-down" effects on perception. We discuss the fact that, even if perception and cognition are separate, there's much more to perception than meets the eye. We seem to see things like causes and social interactions; we perceive things like silences and absences. Along the way, Chaz and I touch on the modular view mind, skeletal shapes, the El Greco fallacy, stubborn epistemology, birders and radiologists, retinotopy and visual adaptation, adversarial images, human-machine comparisons, and the case of the blue banana.  This is a fun one, friends. But before we get to it, one humble request. If you've been enjoying Many Minds, now would be a great time to leave us a rating or review. You can do this on Apple Podcasts or on Spotify. It would really help us grow and get the word out! It actually looks like our last review on Apple Podcasts is about 10 months old—so, if you have a minute, that could really use some freshening up.   Alright folks, on to my conversation with Chaz Firestone. Enjoy!   A transcript of this episode will be available soon.    Notes and links 3:00 – Dr. Firestone's early paper reporting the Times Square experiment and the “skeletal shape” phenomenon. 8:00 – A visual explanation of the “missing bullet holes” graphic.  13:00 – Dr. Firestone has collaborated intensively with the philosopher Ian Phillips.  15:00 – A recent book by Ned Block, The Border Between Seeing and Thinking. 24:00 – Visual illusions are legion, as are inventories of them. See, for instance, this catalogue on Wikipedia or this Reddit thread. 25:00 – An obituary for Jerry Fodor, who died in 2017. The classic book by Zenon Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition.  28:00 – A paper by Dr. Firestone about the history of the El Greco fallacy. An empirical paper by Dr. Firestone and Brian Scholl showing the El Greco fallacy at work in perception research.  35:00 – A target article (with commentaries) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences by Dr. Firestone and Dr. Scholl about claims of “top-down” effects on perception. Dr. Firestone has published other work on this theme, e.g., here, here, & here.  41:00 – A paper with discussion (and illustration) of the classic Dalmation Mooney image.  45:00 – A study of rapid visual pattern recognition in expert chess players. 50:30 – A paper by J.J. Valenti and Dr. Firestone about the case of the blue banana. 54:00 – A review paper by Alon Hafri and Dr. Firestone reviewing evidence that people actually perceive high-level relations like causality, support, and social interaction.  56:00 – A study by Martin Rolfs and colleagues about the perception of causality.   1:02:00 – A study by Liuba Papeo and colleagues about the perception of social interactions. A related paper showing an inversion effect. 1:04:00 – A paper by Alon Hafri and colleagues on the perception of roles in an interaction.  1:06:00 – A widely cited paper by J. Kiley Hamlin and colleagues on the recognition of social interactions in preverbal infants. 1:06:30 – A review paper on reading in the brain.  1:10:00 – A paper by Rui Goh, Dr. Phillips, and Dr. Firestone on the perception of silence.  1:18:00 – A recent review paper by Jorge Morales and Dr. Firestone about the dialogue between philosophy of perception and psychology, which discusses the perception of absence (among other case studies).  1:22:00 – A recent perspective piece by Dr. Firestone about human-machine comparisons. 1:25:00 - An empirical paper by Zhenglong Zhou and Dr. Firestone on the deciphering of adversarial images by humans. 1:28:00 – For a review of the mirror self-recognition test, see our earlier audio essay.   1:35:00 – Other interesting work going on in Dr. Firestone's research group has investigated representational momentum, beauty, and epistemic actions, among other topics.   Recommendations The Modularity of Mind, by Jerry Fodor The Contents of Visual Experience, by Susanna Siegel Psych, by Paul Bloom   Many Minds is a project of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute, which is made possible by a generous grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation to UCLA. It is hosted and produced by Kensy Cooperrider, with help from Assistant Producer Urte Laukaityte and with creative support from DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by Ben Oldroyd. Our transcripts are created by Sarah Dopierala.   Subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also now subscribe to the Many Minds newsletter here! We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com.    For updates about the show, visit our website or follow us on Twitter: @ManyMindsPod.

Ernest Lepore is a Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers. Though Ernie is best known for his work in the philosophy of language, he has also published on philosophical logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. Though Robinson and Ernie largely discuss the former, their conversation begins with a bevy of wonderful stories from the profession, as Ernie worked and studied with many of the greatest thinkers—and characters—of twentieth century philosophy, including Ed Gettier, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett, and W.V.O. Quine. They then turn to some quite general problems in the philosophy language, discussion the relationship between language and thought, meta-linguistic negotiation, and conventions before going through the main arc of his book on slurs jointly authored with Una Stojnic of Princeton University. Though Ernie is the author of too many books and articles to list within the confines of this description, a recent book mentioned many times in the conversation is Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language (Oxford University Press, 2015), which Ernie cowrote with Mathew Stone, chair of the Department of Computer Science at Rutgers. OUTLINE 00:00 IN THIS EPISODE 00:38 Introduction 05:33 Ernie's Interest in the Philosophy of Language 14:17 Working with Ed Gettier, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, and Michael Dummett 30:44 Language, Thought, and Convention 44:44 What is Meta-Linguistic Negotiation? 51:53 What is a Slur? 01:04:10 Philosophical Accounts of Slurs 01:13:50 Pejorative Content Accounts of Slurs 01:21:38 Non-Content Accounts of Slurs 01:30:52 A New Theory of Slurs Robinson's Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

On today's ID the Future, Your Designed Body co-author and systems engineer Steve Laufmann continues his conversation with host and neurosurgeon Michael Egnor. In this episode, Laufmann reviews four causal factors involved in Darwin's theory of evolution, and explains why they lack the power to generate life's great variety of forms. To dive deeper into his argument, check out Laufmann's new book co-authored with physician Howard Glicksman. Source

Some time, millenia ago, people began using sounds: to coordinate, to solve problems, to think. Explaining this leap—from non-linguistic beings to language-users—Nirmalangshu Mukherji argues that we shouldn't focus only on language. In The Human Mind through the Lens of Language: Generative Explorations (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), Mukherji draws on resources like René Descartes' conception of mind, proposing that the human mind is fundamentally different than animal cognitive systems. He grounds this distinction in what he calls “Principle G,” a recursive, generative ability underlying human language and other domains. Mukherji's book takes up competing and compatible theories in cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy, refining his conception of mind and language in conversation with Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Michael Corballis, and others. Malcolm Keating is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

Some time, millenia ago, people began using sounds: to coordinate, to solve problems, to think. Explaining this leap—from non-linguistic beings to language-users—Nirmalangshu Mukherji argues that we shouldn't focus only on language. In The Human Mind through the Lens of Language: Generative Explorations (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), Mukherji draws on resources like René Descartes' conception of mind, proposing that the human mind is fundamentally different than animal cognitive systems. He grounds this distinction in what he calls “Principle G,” a recursive, generative ability underlying human language and other domains. Mukherji's book takes up competing and compatible theories in cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy, refining his conception of mind and language in conversation with Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Michael Corballis, and others. Malcolm Keating is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/language

Some time, millenia ago, people began using sounds: to coordinate, to solve problems, to think. Explaining this leap—from non-linguistic beings to language-users—Nirmalangshu Mukherji argues that we shouldn't focus only on language. In The Human Mind through the Lens of Language: Generative Explorations (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), Mukherji draws on resources like René Descartes' conception of mind, proposing that the human mind is fundamentally different than animal cognitive systems. He grounds this distinction in what he calls “Principle G,” a recursive, generative ability underlying human language and other domains. Mukherji's book takes up competing and compatible theories in cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy, refining his conception of mind and language in conversation with Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Michael Corballis, and others. Malcolm Keating is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

Some time, millenia ago, people began using sounds: to coordinate, to solve problems, to think. Explaining this leap—from non-linguistic beings to language-users—Nirmalangshu Mukherji argues that we shouldn't focus only on language. In The Human Mind through the Lens of Language: Generative Explorations (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), Mukherji draws on resources like René Descartes' conception of mind, proposing that the human mind is fundamentally different than animal cognitive systems. He grounds this distinction in what he calls “Principle G,” a recursive, generative ability underlying human language and other domains. Mukherji's book takes up competing and compatible theories in cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy, refining his conception of mind and language in conversation with Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Michael Corballis, and others. Malcolm Keating is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Today's ID the Future is Part 2 of a recent live webinar with Eric Cassell fielding questions about his new book, Animal Algorithms: Evolution and the Mysterious Origin of Ingenious Instincts. He and host Casey Luskin explore the engineering wonders of web-spinning spiders and their extraordinary silk, and the challenge of transforming solitary insects into social insects (with their complex and interdependent caste systems) via a blind step-by-step evolutionary process, and the many thousands of genetic changes required. What does Cassell consider the best explanation? He invokes design theorist William Dembski's work with No Free Lunch theorems to argue that blind processes are a no-go for explaining their origin. From there Luskin opens the webinar up to questions from the Read More › Source

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: human psycholinguists: a critical appraisal, published by nostalgebraist on the LessWrong. (The title of this post is a joking homage to one of Gary Marcus' papers.) I've discussed GPT-2 and BERT and other instances of the Transformer architecture a lot on this blog. As you can probably tell, I find them very interesting and exciting. But not everyone has the reaction I do, including some people who I think ought to have that reaction. Whatever else GPT-2 and friends may or may not be, I think they are clearly a source of fascinating and novel scientific evidence about language and the mind. That much, I think, should be uncontroversial. But it isn't. (i.) When I was a teenager, I went through a period where I was very interested in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. I first got interested via Steven Pinker's popular books – this was back when Pinker was mostly famous for writing about psychology rather than history and culture – and proceeded to read other, more academic books by authors like Gary Marcus, Jerry Fodor, and John Anderson. At this time (roughly 2002-6), there was nothing out there that remotely resembled GPT-2. Although there were apparently quite mature and complete formal theories of morphology and syntax, which could accurately answer questions like “is this a well-formed English sentence?”, no one really knew how these could or should be implemented in a physical system meant to understand or produce language. This was true in two ways. For one thing, no one knew how the human brain implemented this stuff, although apparently it did. But the difficulty was more severe than that: even if you forgot about the brain, and just tried to write a computer program (any computer program) that understood or produced language, the results would be dismal. At the time, such programs were either specialized academic models of one specific phenomenon – for example, a program that could form the past tense of a verb, but couldn't do anything else – or they were ostensibly general-purpose but incredibly brittle and error-prone, little more than amusing toys. The latter category included some programs intended as mere amusements or provocations, like the various chatterbots (still about as good/bad as ELIZA after four decades), but also more serious efforts whose reach exceeded their grasp. SYSTRAN spent decades manually curating millions of morphosyntactic and semantic facts for enterprise-grade machine translation; you may remember the results in the form of the good old Babel Fish website, infamous for its hilariously inept translations. This was all kind of surprising, given that the mature formal theories were right there, ready to be programmed into rule-following machines. What was going on? The impression I came away with, reading about this stuff as a teenager, was of language as a fascinating and daunting enigma, simultaneously rule-based and rife with endless special cases that stacked upon one another. It was formalism, Jim, but not as we knew it; it was a magic interleaving of regular and irregular phenomena, arising out of the distinctive computational properties of some not-yet-understood subset of brain architecture, which the models of academics and hackers could crudely imitate but not really grok. We did not have the right “language” to talk about language the way our own brains did, internally. (ii.) The books I read, back then, talked a lot about this thing called “connectionism.” This used to be a big academic debate, with people arguing for and against “connectionism.” You don't hear that term much these days, because the debate has been replaced by a superficially similar but actually very different debate over “deep learning,” in which what used to be good arguments about “connectionism” are repeated in cruder form as bad arguments...

On this ID the Future host Casey Luskin interviews science journalist Denyse O'Leary about her recent essay, “Is Evolutionary Psychology a Legitimate Way to Understand Our Humanity,” which appears in the new Harvest House anthology co-edited by Luskin, The Comprehensive Guide to Science and Faith. O'Leary, a science journalist and co-author of The Spiritual Brain, offers a withering critique of evolutionary psychology and traces its roots, beginning with The Descent of Man (1871), where Charles Darwin attributed various human behaviors to natural and sexual selection. That fed into what became known as social Darwinism, which fell out of favor after World War II thanks to Hitler and the Nazis' application of social Darwinist ideas to defend Nordic superiority and genocide. Read More › Source

If no one is looking at the moon, does it exist? Why has materialism been around for so long? Will computers ever be conscious? What happens to our consciousness after we die? Bernardo Kastrup tackles these questions and more with Michael Egnor in another bingecast! Show Notes 0:00:28 | Introducing Dr. Bernardo Kastrup 0:01:22 | How quantum mechanics points to… Source

On this ID the Future neurosurgeon Michael Egnor interviews Bernardo Kastrup, a philosopher with a background in computer engineering, about consciousness, evolution, and intelligent design. Did consciousness evolve? What does the evidence suggest? And how do materialists deal with the seemingly immaterial reality that is consciousness? This is a guest episode borrowed with permission from Mind Matters, a podcast of Discovery Institute’s Walter Bradley Center for Natural and Artificial Intelligence. Source

It's very easy to make fun of not-so-educated people who reject evolution, but what happens when one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers, Jerry Fodor, writes a book about “What Darwin Got Wrong”? Similarly, we can dismiss extreme right wing politician like Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, who thinks global warming is a worldwide conspiracy of crazy scientists bent on destroying the American way of life. But what happens when two icons of the skeptic movement, Penn & Teller, do a whole show in which they completely deny all the well established evidence of anthropogenic climate change. And of course it is easy to laugh at Jenny McCarthy, the kook who claims (with Oprah Winfrey's support) that she “just knows” that vaccines cause autism. But, what happens when a politically savvy atheist like Bill Maher says that people who get flu shots are “idiots?" Sped up the speakers by [1.0260962467484207, 1.0]

Did consciousness evolve? How do materialists deal with the definition of consciousness? Dr. Michael Egnor and Dr. Bernardo Kastrup discuss consciousness, evolution, and intelligent design. Show Notes 00:28 | Introducing Dr. Bernardo Kastrup 01:05 | Did consciousness evolve? 03:35 | Two alternatives for Darwinists 05:00 | Intelligent design theory 07:15 | Jerry Fodor on natural selection 10:52 | Random mutations… Source

Did consciousness evolve? How do materialists deal with the definition of consciousness? Dr. Michael Egnor and Dr. Bernardo Kastrup discuss consciousness, evolution, and intelligent design. Show Notes 00:28 | Introducing Dr. Bernardo Kastrup 01:05 | Did consciousness evolve? 03:35 | Two alternatives for Darwinists 05:00 | Intelligent design theory 07:15 | Jerry Fodor on natural selection 10:52 | Random mutations… Source

Is the brain a “computer made of meat”? This is a modern idea associated with artificial intelligence research, neuroscience, linguistics, and the philosophy of mind. But in some ways the idea isn't new at all. The seventh-century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti developed a very sophisticated model of the mind that explained how beliefs and concepts could be caused by more basic sensations - making them somewhat like the outputs of a computational process.  The episode features Dan Arnold, Associate Professor at the University of Chicago Divinity School. We discuss his book, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. We focus on Arnold's comparison of contemporary philosopher Jerry Fodor and Dharmakirti, some objections that apply to both of their positions, and the limits of evolutionary explanations of religious beliefs.

The computational theory of mind has its roots in Alan Turing's development of the basic ideas behind computer programming, specifically the manipulation of symbols according to rules. That idea has been elaborated since in a number of very different ways, but in some form it remains a core idea of the cognitive sciences today. In Explaining the Computational Mind (MIT Press, 2013), Marcin Milkowski, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of Mind of the Polish Academy of Sciences, defends a minimalist view of computationalism as information processing, with the intention of providing a general view of computational explanation that covers all the forms in which information-processing explanations appear. On Milkowski's view, Jerry Fodor's slogan that there is no computation without representation should be replaced with the claim that there is no representation without computation, and David Marr's computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels for describing of complex systems should be replaced with talk of different compositional levels in mechanistic explanation. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

The computational theory of mind has its roots in Alan Turing’s development of the basic ideas behind computer programming, specifically the manipulation of symbols according to rules. That idea has been elaborated since in a number of very different ways, but in some form it remains a core idea of the cognitive sciences today. In Explaining the Computational Mind (MIT Press, 2013), Marcin Milkowski, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of Mind of the Polish Academy of Sciences, defends a minimalist view of computationalism as information processing, with the intention of providing a general view of computational explanation that covers all the forms in which information-processing explanations appear. On Milkowski’s view, Jerry Fodor’s slogan that there is no computation without representation should be replaced with the claim that there is no representation without computation, and David Marr’s computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels for describing of complex systems should be replaced with talk of different compositional levels in mechanistic explanation. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The computational theory of mind has its roots in Alan Turing’s development of the basic ideas behind computer programming, specifically the manipulation of symbols according to rules. That idea has been elaborated since in a number of very different ways, but in some form it remains a core idea of the cognitive sciences today. In Explaining the Computational Mind (MIT Press, 2013), Marcin Milkowski, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of Mind of the Polish Academy of Sciences, defends a minimalist view of computationalism as information processing, with the intention of providing a general view of computational explanation that covers all the forms in which information-processing explanations appear. On Milkowski’s view, Jerry Fodor’s slogan that there is no computation without representation should be replaced with the claim that there is no representation without computation, and David Marr’s computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels for describing of complex systems should be replaced with talk of different compositional levels in mechanistic explanation. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1975, Jerry Fodor published a book entitled The Language of Thought, which is aptly considered one of the most important books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science of the last 50 years or so. This book helped launch what became known as the classical computational theory of the mind, in which thinking was theorized as the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Fodor argued that certain features of human thought required that any human-like computational cognitive system had to have a structured format analogous to the structure that sentences have in natural languages. That is, according to Fodor, we must think in a Language of Thought, sometimes also called Mentalese. Classical computationalism has always had its critics – most notably connectionist or neural-network models, which involve a more brain-like computing system consisting just of simple nodes and their connections, without any obvious internal structure at all. But since 1975 Fodor has argued that the computational model couldn’t explain key features and kinds of reasoning, like making plans for the future or making decisions quickly. And he has also argued against the idea that neuroscience had anything critical to do with understanding the mind. In short, Fodor himself helped undermine the dominance of the classical computational model that he played such an important role in founding. Professor Susan Schneider, a doctoral student of Fodor’s who teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, hopes to revitalize the LOT model in her new book, The Language of Thought: A New Philosophical Direction (MIT Press, 2011). Professor Schneider argues that LOT has suffered because it was underdeveloped in critical ways; in this interview, she talks about how the classical computational model can be modified to remain a vital contender in contemporary cognitive science. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1975, Jerry Fodor published a book entitled The Language of Thought, which is aptly considered one of the most important books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science of the last 50 years or so. This book helped launch what became known as the classical computational theory of the... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/systems-and-cybernetics

In 1975, Jerry Fodor published a book entitled The Language of Thought, which is aptly considered one of the most important books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science of the last 50 years or so. This book helped launch what became known as the classical computational theory of the mind, in which thinking was theorized as the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Fodor argued that certain features of human thought required that any human-like computational cognitive system had to have a structured format analogous to the structure that sentences have in natural languages. That is, according to Fodor, we must think in a Language of Thought, sometimes also called Mentalese. Classical computationalism has always had its critics – most notably connectionist or neural-network models, which involve a more brain-like computing system consisting just of simple nodes and their connections, without any obvious internal structure at all. But since 1975 Fodor has argued that the computational model couldn't explain key features and kinds of reasoning, like making plans for the future or making decisions quickly. And he has also argued against the idea that neuroscience had anything critical to do with understanding the mind. In short, Fodor himself helped undermine the dominance of the classical computational model that he played such an important role in founding. Professor Susan Schneider, a doctoral student of Fodor's who teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, hopes to revitalize the LOT model in her new book, The Language of Thought: A New Philosophical Direction (MIT Press, 2011). Professor Schneider argues that LOT has suffered because it was underdeveloped in critical ways; in this interview, she talks about how the classical computational model can be modified to remain a vital contender in contemporary cognitive science. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

In 1975, Jerry Fodor published a book entitled The Language of Thought, which is aptly considered one of the most important books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science of the last 50 years or so. This book helped launch what became known as the classical computational theory of the mind, in which thinking was theorized as the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Fodor argued that certain features of human thought required that any human-like computational cognitive system had to have a structured format analogous to the structure that sentences have in natural languages. That is, according to Fodor, we must think in a Language of Thought, sometimes also called Mentalese. Classical computationalism has always had its critics – most notably connectionist or neural-network models, which involve a more brain-like computing system consisting just of simple nodes and their connections, without any obvious internal structure at all. But since 1975 Fodor has argued that the computational model couldn’t explain key features and kinds of reasoning, like making plans for the future or making decisions quickly. And he has also argued against the idea that neuroscience had anything critical to do with understanding the mind. In short, Fodor himself helped undermine the dominance of the classical computational model that he played such an important role in founding. Professor Susan Schneider, a doctoral student of Fodor’s who teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, hopes to revitalize the LOT model in her new book, The Language of Thought: A New Philosophical Direction (MIT Press, 2011). Professor Schneider argues that LOT has suffered because it was underdeveloped in critical ways; in this interview, she talks about how the classical computational model can be modified to remain a vital contender in contemporary cognitive science. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It’s very easy to make fun of not-so-educated people who reject evolution, but what happens when one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers, Jerry Fodor, writes a book about “What Darwin Got Wrong”? Similarly, we can dismiss extreme right wing politician like Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, who thinks global warming is a worldwide conspiracy of crazy scientists bent on destroying the American way of life. But what happens when two icons of the skeptic movement, Penn & Teller, do a whole show in which they completely deny all the well established evidence of anthropogenic climate change. And of course it is easy to laugh at Jenny McCarthy, the kook who claims (with Oprah Winfrey’s support) that she “just knows” that vaccines cause autism. But, what happens when a politically savvy atheist like Bill Maher says that people who get flu shots are “idiots?"