Podcast appearances and mentions of john nagl

On this Land Warfare episode, sponsored by American Rheinmetall, Dr. John Nagl, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel who is now a professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the Army War College, joins Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to analyze the US Army's lessons learned from the Ukraine war and the service's new Army Transformation Initiative, an update on efforts to better prepare the force for war in the Indo-Pacific and Cold War lessons worth relearning, attributes that should shape the Army's next tank and ground vehicles, and more.

On this Land Warfare episode, sponsored by American Rheinmetall, Dr. John Nagl, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel who is now a professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the Army War College, joins Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to discuss the work he co-authored with Katie Crombe — A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force — the strategic, operational and tactical lessons of the war; lessons that are applicable to Europe, the Indo-Pacific and universally; the notion of transparency on the battlefield and its implications for operations; harnessing rapid innovation cycles and fielding capabilities at speed and scale; role of the Army in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; and how the Ukraine war ends.

Be sure to visit the Irregular Warfare Initiative website to see all of the new articles, podcast episodes, and other content the IWI team is producing! In what ways do irregular warfare and counterinsurgency overlap? Is China engaged in irregular warfare against its adversaries? What are some of the failures of the wars and conflicts of the last twenty years and why did they occur? What do IW practitioners need to do to avoid the mistakes and to ensure they learn the hard-won lessons of the last twenty years in IW and COIN? This episode explores these deeply important questions and features a conversation with two of the leading experts on the subject: David Kilcullen and John Nagl. Intro music: "Unsilenced" by Ketsa Outro music: "Launch" by Ketsa CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Clausewitz wrote that the first task of a commander is to establish “the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” After two decades of counterinsurgency operations, the US Army now finds itself observing – and supporting – Ukraine's fight against Russia's aggression. The war has turned into a grinding, attritional, industrial age struggle, the kind the US military had assumed was a thing of the past. In this episode of Chain Reaction, John Nagl joins to discuss whether the US Army is positioned to fight this kind of war, whether it wants to or not.Related Reading:A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force - Katie Crombe and John A. Nagl

Black Americans' fight for equality in the U.S. armed forces has been a rough road. At times, the Army has been a leader in driving change in the United States. In other instances, the institution has stood with "feet of clay." Charles Allen and John Nagl have studied the history of black soldiers throughout American history, and their work has led to a new elective course at the Army War College, a recent Joint Force Quarterly article and a number of presentations to the force. Their hope is to educate and inspire others to the recognition and gratitude owed generations of black soldiers who persevered through unjust treatment and segregation by a nation that they sought to defend.

Black Americans' fight for equality in the U.S. armed forces has been a rough road. At times, the Army has been a leader in driving change in the United States. In other instances, the institution has stood with "feet of clay." Charles Allen and John Nagl have studied the history of black soldiers throughout American history, and their work has led to a new elective course at the Army War College, a recent Joint Force Quarterly article and a number of presentations to the force. Their hope is to educate and inspire others to the recognition and gratitude owed generations of black soldiers who persevered through unjust treatment and segregation by a nation that they sought to defend.

Bernard Fall is considered by many to be one of the finest analysts and writers of the Vietnam War. Much of his insight about counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina was informed by the formative experiences earlier in his life. A Better Peace welcomes Nate Moir to discuss his book, "Number One Realist: Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare", which analyses Fall's life to understand what drove his thinking and understanding of the situation. He joins host John Nagl to explain how Fall was consistently ahead of the conventional wisdom. Fall's penetrating assessments of the war brought some rebukes and even monitoring by the FBI, but in hindsight were proved to be sadly prescient and are an outstanding example of critical thought.

Bernard Fall is considered by many to be one of the finest analysts and writers of the Vietnam War. Much of his insight about counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina was informed by the formative experiences earlier in his life. A Better Peace welcomes Nate Moir to discuss his book, "Number One Realist: Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare", which analyses Fall's life to understand what drove his thinking and understanding of the situation. He joins host John Nagl to explain how Fall was consistently ahead of the conventional wisdom. Fall's penetrating assessments of the war brought some rebukes and even monitoring by the FBI, but in hindsight were proved to be sadly prescient and are an outstanding example of critical thought.

Twelve years ago last week, on May 2, 2011, the U.S. military conducted a raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan that killed Usama bin Laden. Once the mission was accomplished, the SEAL team conducted sensitive site exploitation and gathered up and returned with all of the materials and equipment they discovered in the compound. Nelly Lahoud and her team sorted through some 97,000 files and 6,000 pages of declassified documents, all in Arabic, to discover the truth about bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network. She's in the studio to discuss her book, "The Bin Laden Papers: How the Abbottabad Raid Revealed the Truth about Al-Qaeda, Its Leader and His Family" with host John Nagl. The information gleaned from this incredible undertaking paints a picture of a man and a network that, after the 9/11 attack, were confined, restrained and not very successful.

Twelve years ago last week, on May 2, 2011, the U.S. military conducted a raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan that killed Usama bin Laden. Once the mission was accomplished, the SEAL team conducted sensitive site exploitation and gathered up and returned with all of the materials and equipment they discovered in the compound. Nelly Lahoud and her team sorted through some 97,000 files and 6,000 pages of declassified documents, all in Arabic, to discover the truth about bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network. She's in the studio to discuss her book, "The Bin Laden Papers: How the Abbottabad Raid Revealed the Truth about Al-Qaeda, Its Leader and His Family" with host John Nagl. The information gleaned from this incredible undertaking paints a picture of a man and a network that, after the 9/11 attack, were confined, restrained and not very successful.

At the end of January 2023 we ran an article by John Nagl and Matthew Woessner about a fictional student's ill-informed preparation for his War College comprehensive exams. It was a bit tongue-in-cheek, demonstrating how the student learns the exact wrong lessons by skimming Thucydides' The History of the Peloponnesian War. Today, 28 March 2023, is the first day of comps for the AY23 resident class and Woessner and Nagl felt they had to step up to the mics to help the students with that last minute cram session. They join podcast editor Ron Granieri to explain the origin of the idea and what students really need to know about T-Diddy.

At the end of January 2023 we ran an article by John Nagl and Matthew Woessner about a fictional student's ill-informed preparation for his War College comprehensive exams. It was a bit tongue-in-cheek, demonstrating how the student learns the exact wrong lessons by skimming Thucydides' The History of the Peloponnesian War. Today, 28 March 2023, is the first day of comps for the AY23 resident class and Woessner and Nagl felt they had to step up to the mics to help the students with that last minute cram session. They join podcast editor Ron Granieri to explain the origin of the idea and what students really need to know about T-Diddy.

Released  10 August 2022. Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our will to fight. Click here to read the article. Keywords: victory, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, irregular warfare, landpower Episode Transcript: “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars”  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. John Nagl, author of “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies at the US Army War College. He is author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice. Welcome to Decisive Point, John. Thank you for being here. (John Nagl) It's terrific to be here, Stephanie. Thanks for having me. Host Let's talk about “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars.” You note in your article that since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less-than-enviable combat record. Ouch. Give us a brief overview of where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat. (Nagl) Yeah, I think “ouch” is the right word. And, of course, I love the Army dearly and care about the well-being of the nation. I've seen what happens when wars go badly. It's very painful to write that, but it's intended to be tough love for an organization that really matters. And for the most important country in the world, I might add. What I argue in the article is that the United States government is one, three, and one in our nation's wars, and I'll go through them quickly. Korea (the Korean War), the first war after World War II, where the United States was decisive and won decisively: Korea ended in an armistice. The important lesson for that, I think, is the United States was unprepared for conventional combat in Korea. It was unprepared to be the global hegemon that the international order yearns for and so desperately needs. And we learned from that. We created a state of readiness. The 2nd Infantry Division in Korea's motto is “Fight tonight,” and they're ready. And that readiness for combat—for conventional combat—is something that the American Army, I think, can be enormously proud of. But, since Korea, with Vietnam (the Vietnam War); the first Iraq war (the Persian Gulf War); Afghanistan (the Afghanistan War); and the second Iraq war (the Iraq War), Operation Iraqi Freedom, our record is decidedly not as good. We are, I would argue, one and three in those wars, with (Operation) Desert Storm being a clear win, but Vietnam and Afghanistan being decisive losses, and the second Iraq war, the current Iraq war—it's still too soon to tell, but it's hard to put it in the win column. So I looked for—as I thought about the combat record of the United States military since World War II, I tried hard to isolate what it was that led to that less-than-enviable combat record. That's really the point of the article. Is there something in common with the wars that we don't do well in that provides lessons for the Army as it thinks...

For Day 10 of The Realignment's daily Ukraine coverage, Marshall spoke with retired U.S. Army Lt. Col John Nagl, counterinsurgency expert and visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College. John is the author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and co-authored the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. They discuss how the study of past insurgencies instructs about Russia's ability to accomplish its military objectives in Ukraine. SUPPORT/SEND US A TIP: https://buy.stripe.com/bIYdRx0gc6qjaE... REALIGNMENT NEWSLETTER: https://therealignment.substack.com/ BOOKSHOP: https://bookshop.org/shop/therealignment

In episode 25, Eugene Yang sits down with Dr. John Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (Ret.), to discuss how organizations react to new challenges, from the current pandemic to counterinsurgency. Dr. Nagl reflects on his start in professional military writing and the importance of education for America's next generation of leaders. Dr. Nagl is currently the ninth Head of School at The Haverford School in Pennsylvania. You can follow him on Twitter @drjohnnagl. Interested in an interview with a particular leader? Have a question you'd like to hear answered? Contact us @DODReads or podcast@dodreads.com. Finally, head to DODReads for more resources, free books, and interviews with military authors. The views presented in this episode are those of the participants and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or its components.

After fighting in the first gulf war, John Nagl returned to the United States and took part in a simulated military exercise. As a tank commander, he had all the overwhelming firepower any soldier could hope for…and yet he lost to a group of Alaskan National Guard infantrymen, known as the Nanooks. Nagl’s unit was unassailable by any conventional military force but a group of lightly armed troops, defying all the rules of how wars “should” be fought had defeated a much, much stronger force. That failure bothered him so much that he decided to devote the rest of his life to understanding it and making sure it never happened again. During the 90’s, the American military trained for the war it wanted to fight: a war just like the first Gulf War. Nagl’s experience with the Nanooks had convinced him that no conventional military would ever make the same mistake that Saddam Hussein had made in taking the US Army on head on. Instead, he suspected that the US’ major threats would come from small, irregular groups of troops employing hit and run engagements rather than full frontal assaults. Even though it would reduce his chances of rising through the ranks, Nagl convinced the Army to send him to Oxford to study counter-insurgency and figure out how the US could defeat an enemy as irregular as the Nanooks. As he read through the histories and primary sources, he came to realize that what the Nanooks had done was a very old form of warfare. In fact, it was the exact form of warfare used by the Viet Cong in Vietnam. The exact form of warfare that America (focused on the conventional military tactics of World War II) had been unable to defeat. While in traditional war, the goal is to annihilate the enemy this strategy is counter-productive in fighting a counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is much more complicated, subtle and time-consuming. It is what T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) described in his book as being like learning to eat soup with a knife. This phrase so inspired Nagl that he made it the title of his own book on the topic, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Throughout the 90’s and early 2000’s, little attention was paid to this book. By the time Nagl deployed to Iraq for the War on Terror, the book was still virtually unknown. However, as America found itself mired in another insurgency, the American military began to realize the vital importance of Nagl’s insights. And so, General Petraeus asked Nagl to write the official Army and Marine Field Manual on Counter-Insurgency. In his most recent book, Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, Lt. Col John A. Nagl (Ret.) tells the story of the incredible revolution in military thinking that he has helped pioneer. If you don’t want the terrorists to win, you should read all of John Nagl’s books.

13 years in to a the long war, what have re relearned, mastered, forgotten, and retained for future use? What have we learned about ourselves, the nature of our latest enemy, and the role of our nation? What have those who have served learned about their nation, their world, and themselves?Iraq, Afghanistan, the Islamic State, and the ever changing global national security ecosystem, how are we now, and where are we going?Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be returning guest John Nagl, LTC US Army (Ret.) D.Phl, using he most recent book Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice as the starting point for our discussion. Dr. Nagl is the Ninth Headmaster of The Haverford School. Prior to assuming responsibility for the School in July 2013, he was the inaugural Minerva Research Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He was previously the President of the Center for a New American Security. He graduated from the United States Military Academy Class  in 1988 and served as an armor officer for 20 years. Dr. Nagl taught at West Point and Georgetown University, and served as a Military Assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense. He earned his Master of the Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. Dr. Nagl is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.   

Although the concept of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol is an ancient one (think scouts), they only began to be used by the US Army in Vietnam in the latter part of the war. Dropped far behind enemy lines, these five to six man Long Range Patrol teams (often referred to as "Lerps") would be tasked with gathering intel on terrain, water supplies and enemy troop movements. Far from significant American military support, these teams had to blend into the jungle and do everything they could to avoid detection. Adopting many of the same techniques as the insurgents gives those who served in these units a unique perspective on the American War in Vietnam.In today's episode, it is our pleasure to have Jim Seymour on the podcast who completed 54 LRP missions during three years spent in Vietnam. In his book, In the Jungle...: Camping With the Enemy Seymour lays out what he learned from his time deep behind enemy lines, how he survived training and how he learned to deal with the possibility that he might not survive the war. Jim's book is a deeply personal account of a war that still has many lessons to teach us today. Many of those lessons are the same as the lessons laid out by John Nagl in his books and in our interview with him.In the Jungle...: Camping With the Enemy is available on Amazon. We strongly recommend it as a first-person account that strongly complements John Nagl's books and Fiasco.

After fighting in the first gulf war, John Nagl returned to the United States and took part in a simulated military exercise. As a tank commander, he had all the overwhelming firepower any soldier could hope for…and yet he lost to a group of Alaskan National Guard infantrymen, known as the Nanooks. Nagl’s unit was unassailable by any conventional military force but a group of lightly armed troops, defying all the rules of how wars “should” be fought had defeated a much, much stronger force. That failure bothered him so much that he decided to devote the rest of his life to understanding it and making sure it never happened again. During the 90’s, the American military trained for the war it wanted to fight: a war just like the first Gulf War. Nagl’s experience with the Nanooks had convinced him that no conventional military would ever make the same mistake that Saddam Hussein had made in taking the US Army on head on. Instead, he suspected that the US’ major threats would come from small, irregular groups of troops employing hit and run engagements rather than full frontal assaults. Even though it would reduce his chances of rising through the ranks, Nagl convinced the Army to send him to Oxford to study counter-insurgency and figure out how the US could defeat an enemy as irregular as the Nanooks. As he read through the histories and primary sources, he came to realize that what the Nanooks had done was a very old form of warfare. In fact, it was the exact form of warfare used by the Viet Cong in Vietnam. The exact form of warfare that America (focused on the conventional military tactics of World War II) had been unable to defeat. While in traditional war, the goal is to annihilate the enemy this strategy is counter-productive in fighting a counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is much more complicated, subtle and time-consuming. It is what T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) described in his book as being like learning to eat soup with a knife. This phrase so inspired Nagl that he made it the title of his own book on the topic, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.Throughout the 90’s and early 2000’s, little attention was paid to this book. By the time Nagl deployed to Iraq for the War on Terror, the book was still virtually unknown. However, as America found itself mired in another insurgency, the American military began to realize the vital importance of Nagl’s insights. And so, General Petraeus asked Nagl to write the official Army and Marine Field Manual on Counter-Insurgency. In his most recent book, Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, Lt. Col John A. Nagl (Ret.) tells the story of the incredible revolution in military thinking that he has helped pioneer. If you don’t want the terrorists to win, you should read all of John Nagl’s books.

So, which is it? Do we forget our history and are therefor doomed to repeat it, or are we always preparing to fight the next war? As we finish up the final chapter of our participation in Afghanistan after well over a decade, and reflect on the changes in the arch of the Muslim world from the Atlas mountains to Mindanao - what do we need to intellectually, retain for what is coming "next?" With one eye on historical patterns and another on developing economic, demographic, and political trends - what do we need to do to man, train, and equip the armed forces best positioned to address what we think we will face, but will be flexible enough to flex to what we don't know? Our guest for the full hour will be John Nagl, Lt Col USA (Ret.), PhD, presently the Minerva Research Professor at the US Naval Academy, previously the President of CNAS. Dr. Nagl was a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Military Academy Class of 1988 who served as an armor officer in the U.S. Army for 20 years.  His last military assignment was as commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor.  He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Nagl taught national security studies at West Point and Georgetown University and served as a Military Assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense.  He earned his Master of the Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the writing team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. His writings have also been published in The New York Times, Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, among others.