Podcasts about clausewitz

Schrijver Christiaan Weijts vergelijkt het in zijn nieuwe essaybundel met flaneren: essayeren is als dralen, als slenteren, als drentelen. Onderzoekend, onzeker, onvast, in een tijdperk dat barst van stelligheden en vraagt om productiviteit. Deze avond duiken we in het essaygenre en flaneren we ons een aarzelende weg naar voorzichtige antwoorden over de staat en de toekomst van het essay.Het genre lijkt aan populariteit te winnen. Is het de aandachtsspanne van de lezer – die iets langers wil dan een column, maar iets korters dan een boek? Is het het onderzoekende karakter? Is het de aanbidding van de schrijver, van de intellectueel – lezen we graag over diens leven en denkwijzen? Of imiteren we vooral gretig de Amerikaanse voorhoede? Wat zegt het essay over onze behoeften, onze verlangens?En wat maakt het essay eigenlijk een essay? Waarin verschilt het van, bijvoorbeeld, een pamflet, of memoires, of andere non-fictie? Is het essay elitair? Noemen we een essay dat niet door een veronderstelde intellectueel geschreven is ook een essay, of heet het dan een reportage, een longread, een verhaal?Deze avond duiken we in het essaygenre van Montaigne tot The New Yorker en flaneren we ons een aarzelende weg naar voorzichtige antwoorden over de staat en de toekomst van het essay.Over de sprekersChristiaan Weijts is naast schrijver ook essayist, columnist en criticus. Hij publiceert op regelmatige basis in NRC en De Groene Amsterdammer. In 2006 verscheen zijn veelgeprezen debuut Art. 285b., waarmee hij in 2006 de Anton Wachterprijs en in 2008 het Gouden Ezelsoor won. Daarna schreef hij succesvolle en meervoudig bekroonde romans als Via Cappello 23, Euforie en Het valse seizoen. Deze maand verschijnt de essaybundel Flaneren kun je leren.Joost de Vries is de chef van het katern Zondag van de Volkskrant. De Vries schreef onder andere de romans Clausewitz en De republiek (bekroond met de Gouden Boekenuil). Ook maakt hij de literatuurpodcast Boeken FM. Voor zijn gehele oeuvre ontving hij in 2023 de Frans Kellendonkprijs. In 2024 kwam zijn meeste recente boek Hogere Machten uit.Marian Donner is filosoof en schrijver. In 2019 publiceerde ze het Zelfverwoestingsboek: een oproep om de teugels te laten vieren. Het pamflet werd lovend ontvangen en is inmiddels in verschillende talen uitgebracht. In 2024 verscheen haar non-fictieboek Rooksignalen, een hoofdkussenboek dat genomineerd werd voor de Jan Hanlo Essayprijs. Ze heeft een column over media in de Groene en schrijft essays voor De Volkskrant en het NRC.Arjen van Veelen is schrijver van onder meer de bekroonde roman Aantekeningen over het verplaatsen van obelisken en van de non-fictiebestsellers Amerikanen lopen niet en Rotterdam. Hij publiceert regelmatig essays in o.a. NRC. Arjen studeerde klassieke talen en journalistiek in Leiden. Hij werkte als docent Grieks en Latijn in Rotterdam en als Amerika-correspondent.Programmamaker: Anne Grietje FranssenIn samenwerking met: De ArbeiderspersZie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Episode 121. Grant reports from Newport, Rhode Island with a truck full of family heirlooms and a snapped serpentine belt. Jeff checks in from Air University, where the library fire alarm interrupted his midterm and his grandfather Emmett Gatewood may be hiding in the archives. Tres holds down Frisco, Texas and reviews Christopher Nolan's The Odyssey.The staff brief features an unpaid battalion, a lobster bake from the new S1, a space domain tasking, the Wednesday pizza buffet, and a chaplain check-in you have to hear to believe. Plus: the Good Idea Cutoff Line (GICOL), broken stair steppers and gym radar at the Naval War College, Clausewitz applied to lifting and fatherhood, the oldest ballpark in America, a Red Sox baserunning debate, and a full coaching segment on bench press pain management.America 250 plate is at the machine shop — pre-buyers ship early. The .75 lb plates are back in stock. The Strength app enters beta next week.Podcast Hosts:Grant Broggi: Marine Veteran, Owner of The Strength Co. and Starting Strength Coach.Jeff Buege: Marine Veteran, Outdoorsman, Football Fan and LifterTres Gottlich: Marine Veteran, Texan, Fisherman, Crazy College Football Fan and LifterJoin the Slack and Use code OKAY:⁠https://buy.stripe.com/dR6dT4aDcfuBdyw5ks⁠Check out BW Tax: ⁠https://www.bwtaxllc.com⁠BUY A FOOTBALL HELMET:⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.thestrength.co/mrhelmet/?utm_source=The+Okay+Podcast&utm_medium=Podcast&utm_campaign=Okay_Pod⁠Timestamps: 00:00 - Intro07:31 - Staff Brief28:09 - GICL31:32 - Family Heirlooms41:06 - Chevy Snaps A Belt52:05 - Stairstepper Story56:02 - Fire Alarm Madness01:09:45 - The Odyssey Review01:15:39 - Pain During The Bench Press01:29:21 - Gulls Outing01:36:16 - Sliding Into Bases Rule01:39:57 - Big Announcements01:46:15 - MRS. BROGGI PLEASE MAKE TRES A POUND CAKE

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/from-chanakya-to-ai-india-needs-its-own-management-model-14038647.html/ampIf you interpret the term ‘management' broadly, that is, to include not only the day to day running of companies, but also the bigger picture of governance, leadership, strategy, geoeconomics, and even civilizational survival, the clear answer is that there indeed is a unique Indian style of management.Whether it has been uniquely successful in the past is an open question, and given the ravages of invasion, one may be tempted to say it hasn't been; similarly whether, or how, it is appropriate for today's and tomorrow's needs is another good question.But it is useful to identify what may in fact be the factors underlying such a style of management, and there are likely three reasons: civilizational, cultural, and practical.CivilizationalThe first is perhaps the idea of Bharatiya exceptionalism: that is to say that Bharat exemplifies a singular civilizational thread that goes back to the ancient four-fold Hindu idea of purusharthas: dharma, artha, kama, and moksha. It is a holistic approach, perhaps most evident in the Bhagavad Gita, with its emphasis on ethical leadership and nishkama karma.It is certainly influenced by the topography and geography of the land, Jambudvipa, which has natural boundaries marking its extremities: Bharat, the land between the mountains and the sea.The climate and the rivers and the vegetation reflect a reality of natural abundance: what Rajiv Malhotra referred to when he spoke of the ‘religions of the forest' versus ‘the religions of the desert'. Bharat, in general, had a tropical cornucopia of food, and perhaps that was reflected early in a certain tolerance for not only for other humans, but also for all life.It is notable that among all the lands that were populated early, Bharat was the one that retained its megafauna the best. All other human settlements saw the rapid extinction of large animals. Sustainability, a key mantra these days, was built into the Bharatiya outlook all along.This same generosity was seen in trade patterns in the Indian Ocean as well: from 5,000 years ago, Bharatiya sailors executed cross-oceanic voyages, eastward during the southwest monsoon and vice versa during the northeast monsoon. The trade benefited everybody, as valuable goods were exchanged, in an illustration of the theory of comparative advantage.The infrastructure for trade was brilliantly executed: not only the building of ocean-going ships that plied the Spice Route, and the ability to defend them from pirates, but also the subtler aspects: the “multi-protocol switch” that allowed trading guilds along the peninsular coasts to facilitate trade between say, Romans, and say, Chinese, who had different languages and currencies. Bharatiya traders smoothed the transactions.Furthermore, the venture capital and banking services for the trading guilds were provided by Hindu temples.Pax Indica was benign; for instance, 1,001 years ago Rajendra Chola dispatched a large fleet to open up the Straits of Malacca for trade when the Srivijaya Empire interfered with it. The contrast with the current standoff in the Straits of Hormuz is salutary. Yes, it is necessary to ensure freedom of navigation, and the commons, with deadly force if need be.There was a very real notion of the ‘common good'. For instance, perhaps the greatest intellectual contribution of Bharat was innovation and the creation of Intellectual Property, and then making it freely available to all: not hoarding it for individual benefit.The model was that scholars and intellectuals were frugal, that the State (king or temple) provided for their basic needs, and in return, they produced masterworks over which they, unlike patenting in the western sense, did not claim any rights.Thus you have intellectual giants such as Brahmagupta with his invention of the zero, Panini with his context-free grammar, Madhava with his infinite series for trigonometric functions, and much later Ramanujan who wrote down his extraordinary theorems for all, and JC Bose whose seminal wireless communication discoveries he refused to patent, on principle. In fact, one could argue that the entire idea of “open-source” is a Bharatiya invention.The natural resources of the Indian subcontinent along with the industriousness of its residents allowed for the creation of tremendous wealth; but in the “Guns vs Butter” dichotomy in economics, Bharat neglected to build the guns; which meant that often invaders with guns were able to capture the butter.Management theory suggests that there are only three sustainable business strategies for long-term viability: 1) customer intimacy, 2) cost leadership, 3) innovation. Bharat historically chose innovation, and its native genius may result in the flowering of an intellectual revolution as the effects of impoverishment by conquest begin to recede.CulturalIt is interesting to note that Bharatiyas are different from both Occidentals, (e.g. the Anglosphere) and Orientals (e.g. East Asians) culturally. The stereotypes (with good reason) is that Occidentals are highly individualistic and that Orientals are highly group-oriented. Bharatiyas fall somewhere in between, being fairly individualistic, and gregarious, yet only moderately group-oriented.This has implications for governance. A highly individualistic society needs powerful laws that control individuals, including their tendencies for mischief. Thus, for example, the US is a highly regulated society, and their police are quite capable of unleashing deadly force. A highly group oriented society like Japan has norms that mean children clean after themselves in schools, and that discipline carries over into adulthood as well.Bharatiyas are neither; the net result is that there is a distinction between public spaces and private spaces. While people may keep their homes spotlessly clean, they have no problem littering anywhere or throwing trash just over their walls onto the public street. They also have no problem breaking traffic rules. “The tragedy of the commons” is rife.There is also the cultural memory of shortages and deprivation. Since people have grown up in a shortage economy, there is a tendency to hoard, cut corners, to pay bribes, to find any way of getting a slight advantage over others. Thus the unnecessary pushiness on roads, the inability to queue up anywhere, and especially the unwillingness to let people exit a lift before you enter.This applies to groups as well, as is seen in the “race to the bottom” in the case of the backward, the most backward, and the extremely backward designations intended for government largesse.There is also the unfortunate feeling that a contract is just a mere annoyance, not something that is to be followed to the letter. Punctuality is a small indicator of this: Bharatiyas on average feel justified in being late and casually making excuses. In contrast, both Anglosphere people and many East Asians (especially the Japanese) are punctual, and they can be trusted to deliver absolutely whatever they promise, whenever they promise.Interestingly, Chinese, like Bharatiyas, do not have integrity in terms of keeping promises, which is a problem in doing business with both. In Bharat, there is also extreme reluctance to deliver bad news until the very last minute, for instance the day before something is due to be delivered. This can be very difficult for partners to deal with.Perhaps all this makes Bharat a low-trust society. As a result of all this, doing business in Bharat takes twice as long, and managers need to have contingency plans, and to do intrusive ongoing audits to ensure that things are on time.But there are inspiring counter-examples of community action and high trust. One is the re-greening of the Aravallis with the support of the Tarun Bharat Sangh and Rajendra Singh: a few villages built simple check dams based on traditional knowledge, bringing back an extinct river.PracticalIn addition to the refined heights of the civilizational perspective, Bharat also excelled in the theories of tactical management and even realpolitik. Even though there is a tendency in certain circles to lionize Machiavelli, von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, it is likely that Chanakya outdid all of them in the single-minded pursuit of strategy and governance, and he wrote his masterwork a millennium before them.Chanakya's ideas of statecraft are notable for their cold realism. He focuses on the creation of leverage and thus power for the sovereign. Speaking of leverage, or competitive advantage, we have seen how China has turned its control of the rare earths supply chain into a weapon; similarly the US has its technology (the recent denial of Anthropic Mythos to all foreigners) as well as its control of the SWIFT network of financial transactions. These can be coercive.Another of Chanakya's supremely rational assumptions is that your neighbor is likely to be your enemy, if not today, maybe tomorrow, simply because of proximity and the resulting irritants. Thus it becomes useful to make common cause with their neighbor.Taking this one step further, you arrive at the Mandala theory of statecraft: a series of concentric circles (for convenience of depiction), where you cultivate your neighbor's neighbors, and also the Far Emperor or udasina (indifferent power), a player outside the immediate neighborhood, but powerful, and who can have a significant impact on your local power politics. Clearly Indian foreign policy has looked upon the US as a Far Emperor; similarly Indian firms may look upon Big Tech companies as Far Emperors in their local struggles.Chanakya does not shy away from the harsh realities of power politics. Matsya nyaya, where big fish eat little fish, is a crystal-clear exposition of the idea that might is right: which we see in contemporary affairs, both business and international relations, on a daily basis. In addition, he recognized that information is the key to advantage (as Big Tech demonstrates today), and as such, he made it a priority to collect data, including through a network of spies. This leads to intrigue, infiltration, and the creation of internal dissent among the enemy.Chanakya's four classic stages of competition are notable: sama, dana, bheda and danda. Of these, possibly the one that is most widely practised today is bheda,the exploitation of internal fault lines within the enemy. With the “million mutinies” in India, such as farmer protests, CAA riots, and the recent ‘cockroach' riots, it is clear that there are “toolkits” in play. There is much information warfare, as seen in relentless bot attacks on Bharatiyas on social media.In modern management terms, India should learn from the successful business models of the G2 powers. The US as a nation, and its big firms, typically use overwhelming force (financial, technological or military, as the case may be) to overwhelm their foes. The metaphor is American football: massive force is a major factor, though tactical misdirection is also widespread.China uses a different tactic. It goes for cost leadership by using state-guided industrial policy to build massive over-capacity in selected areas; with fierce internal competition, this leads to plummeting costs. Then by flooding export markets with cheap products, they are able to destroy local players in those markets. A case in point right now is the explosion in cheap generativeAI Large Language Models (LLMs) that are undercutting US firms such as Anthropic and OpenAI.Thus both powers are using their standard operating procedures in generativeAI: US firms are pouring in hundreds of billions of dollars in an effort to corner the market; Chinese firms (and the state) are collapsing the prices in the market.What should India's business model look like in this context? Instead of going head-on against these large economies, India should find ways to thrive around them: for example, look for ‘white spaces' that are not in their gunsights. But these open areas will change rapidly: an example is IT services, which was an opportunity for 20+ years, but not any more.In generativeAI, a sound Bharatiya play might be to avoid over-investment in foundational models, use (Chinese) open-source models and modify them, for example with multi-lingual capabilities; invest in other areas of the stack such as in vertical applications, for instance in agriculture, or medicine, or governance, or jurisprudence. Bharat can use ‘distillation' techniques to reduce the need for data, and also create Small Language Models (SLMs) in narrow domains, e.g. in Indic Knowledge Systems.There is also the salutary example of the operating system, which is arguably the most important piece of software on any machine, because it controls the entire functioning of the system. But Unix, possibly the most capable operating system ever, was open-sourced as Linux, and is freely available and ubiquitous. On the other hand, Microsoft realized its OS, Windows, was a tremendous distribution channel for third-party applications, and has made its trillions based on it. This is what Anthropic, OpenAI et al are betting on.Will the future of LLMs be Unix/Linux (open source) or Windows? Nobody knows at the moment, and therefore it may be best to avoid that battle, and focus on other layers of the stack, such as applications (higher layers) or hardware and GCCs (lower layers).Nimbleness and innovation are key when you are dancing with elephants. Direct confrontation is a bad idea, as in the metaphor of the tree and the cane from the Mahabharata's Santi Parva, where Bhishma comments on the dialogue between the Ocean and Ganga. He suggests that as canes bend to the river, but trees do not, it is best to yield tactically to superior force.Bharat therefore has to evolve a business model of its own that is sustainable in the long run, and based on its own capabilities. At the moment, a good test case is generativeAI. Another is aerospace, where as soon as ISRO began to offer niche markets to the private sector, there has been a virtual explosion in startups doing interesting things.ConclusionTradition and ancient texts give Bharat a set of management practices and principles that may have within them the basis for a unique business model that can outperform the competition, which at the moment consists of American-style private capitalism and Chinese-style state-controlled enterprises.2300 words, 4 August 2026 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

Send me a text!a deeper dive into the foundational document on warfare; Clausewitz "On War" Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://war102.buzzsprout.com

Anlässlich der 100igsten Podcastfolge von KurzNachgedacht reflektiere ich heute über diese 9 Zitate bzw. Themenfelder kurz nach: „Du kannst andere nicht führen, bevor du nicht dich selbst führst.“ (John C. Maxwell)"„Wer nicht weiß, wo er hin will, wird sich wundern, dass er ganz woanders ankommt.“ (Mark Twain)"„Eine Vision ohne Handeln bleibt nur eine Idee. Handeln ohne Vision ist bloße Zeitvertreibung. Doch eine Vision verbunden mit Handeln hat die Kraft, die Welt zu verändern“ (Joel A Barker)Der Konkurrent, vor dem man sich fürchten muss, ist derjenige, der sich überhaupt nicht um dich kümmert, sondern der sein eigenes Geschäft ständig verbessert (Henry Ford)„Es gibt nur einen Chef. Den Kunden.“ (Sam Walton)„Die Strategie ist eine Ökonomie der Kräfte; sie ist die Kunst, sie auf den entscheidenden Punkt zu konzentrieren.“ (Carl Philipp von Clausewitz, 1832)„Perfektion ist nicht dann erreicht, wenn man nichts mehr hinzufügen kann, sondern wenn man nichts mehr weglassen kann.“ (Antoine de Saint-Exupéry)„Wenn Zeit das wertvollste aller Dinge ist, muss Zeitverschwendung die größte Verschwendung sein.“ (Benjamin Franklin)„Nicht Ideen, sondern die Umsetzungsfähigkeit ist die knappe Ressource.“ (Jürgen Hausschildt)

Gastone BrecciaL'età della "pace ibrida"Le democrazie alla provaScholé - Morcelliana www.morcelliana.netTradizionalmente intesa come strumento per ricomporre l'ordine e ristabilire la pace, oggi la guerra si combatte sempre più spesso nella zona grigia di azioni pianificate per non oltrepassare mai la soglia del conflitto aperto, volte a controllare l'informazione e colpire l'opinione pubblica dell'avversario, la sua economia, i suoi servizi. Questa guerra ibrida si consuma al di sotto dell'orizzonte, tremendo ma riconoscibile, della violenza armata. Rende impossibile attribuire responsabilità e minaccia i fondamenti dei regimi democratici, la trasparenza delle relazioni internazionali, la fiducia reciproca necessaria a un accordo. Alla categoria di guerra ibrida il volume accosta quella, innovativa, di pace ibrida: equilibrio temporaneo in uno stato di ostilità permanente e non – secondo il progetto che era già di Immanuel Kant – cooperazione fondata sul diritto.Gastone Breccia insegna Civiltà bizantina e Storia militare antica all'Università di Pavia. Tra le sue pubblicazioni: A patti con il nemico. Storia del mondo in 30 trattati di pace (Marsilio, 2026); Corea. La guerra dimenticata (il Mulino, 2025); Trafalgar. La battaglia navale (Einaudi, 2024); L'ultimo inverno di guerra. Vita e morte sul fronte dimenticato (il Mulino, 2024); La grande storia della guerra. Uomini, Stati e imperi in lotta (Newton Compton, 2020). Per Einaudi ha curato L'arte della guerra. Da Sun Tzu a Clausewitz (2009).Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/il-posto-delle-parole--1487855/support.IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.it/

What if the best leaders are not the ones with the biggest ideas? In this episode, John Dues argues that the leaders who make the greatest impact are the ones who create the fastest learning cycles. John and Andrew Stotz explore why small tests often outperform large initiatives, how PDSA builds real organizational knowledge, and why improvement is a learning process, not an implementation process. If your organization is launching new initiatives, this conversation offers a different question to ask: What's the smallest test we can run to learn whether this idea actually works? TRANSCRIPT 0:00:02.3 Andrew Stotz: My name is Andrew Stotz and I'll be your host as we dive deeper into the teachings of Dr. W. Edwards Deming. Today I'm continuing my discussion with John Dues, who is part of the new generation of educators striving to apply Dr. Deming's principles to unleash student joy in learning. The topic for today is the Fastest Way to Learn What Works. I love that title, John. Take it away.   0:00:30.0 John Dues: Hey Andrew, it's good to be back. Yeah, I was thinking about talking about leadership today, and I was thinking about who are the leaders that we tend to admire? I think the typical person would say these leaders with big, bold ideas. In my world, a superintendent launches this district-wide initiative, or maybe it's a principal has this sweeping school improvement plan that they've put in place. In your world, maybe some CEO unveils this new strategic direction. We think about these leaders, if they're described, they're visionary, decisive, courageous. But I think, as I've done this study, I've become increasingly convinced that we're paying attention to the wrong leaders in a lot of cases...   0:01:31.6 Andrew Stotz: So the right leaders are the ones that have their pen over their right ear.   0:01:36.9 John Dues: Always. That's the mark. That is the mark...   0:01:39.6 Andrew Stotz: I think I see that on you.   0:01:43.9 John Dues: I'm definitely not describing me. I'm just an observer, observer of the world. But I think these leaders make these big promises, but I'm increasingly convinced that the leaders who we should be paying more attention to are the ones that create these fast learning cycles. So in a typical place, a company or something, a school, they're faced with a problem. These leaders don't immediately ask, "How do we scale this? How do we scale this idea?" I think they're turning to a different question, and that's, "What's the smallest test we can run to learn whether this idea actually works?" It's a very different, very different question. And I think it's tough because this is a question that's not gonna make headlines, but I think it's one of the more important questions that a leader can ask...   0:02:49.9 Andrew Stotz: Isn't a great leader supposed to be doing the big things? You're talking about the smallest.   0:02:52.8 John Dues: The big things, right, the large initiatives, that's what gets attention. But I think the larger the initiative, the problem is the longer it takes to learn whether that thing, that idea, is helping or hurting or maybe having no effect at all. And I think what happens is, and what I've seen in schools repeatedly, I'm sure it's probably the same in the private sector, is oftentimes by the time the evidence actually arrives, if it ever does, so much time, money, and goodwill has been spent that it almost doesn't matter whether the idea itself was successful. All this cost was sunk into training people, all these new expectations have been established, and then we almost become more invested in proving the initiative was the right decision. And then once that happens, it's almost impossible to go about learning if it's actually having the effect that we intended to. And I think a lot of this has to do with many improvement efforts that I see. They start with a solution. They're sort of starting with not a clear definition of the problem, but this idea that they think is gonna have an impact, whatever that is. It could be a new curriculum in a school, an attendance campaign because attendance has been a big thing lately, some type of new evaluation process that they're gonna use with teachers or workers, whatever. But the point is that the assumption is that the solution's known at the beginning and that success really just depends on implementation. But I think the problem I see is that no one stops and thinks, "What if this solution actually doesn't work in our system?" We copy these ideas, we've seen this thing, whatever it is, work somewhere else, and we almost don't even consider whether the context matters. And it's maybe the most important thing to consider.   0:05:11.7 Andrew Stotz: I think about Deming, Dr. Deming, saying, "How would they know?"   0:05:16.0 John Dues: How would they know? Yeah. And I think, again, so much gets sunk into the initiative, all that training, all the money, all the resources, whatever. At a certain point, the organization is so invested that they almost sort of solidify into defending the idea rather than trying to learn whether it's actually working. That tipping point, I think, can happen pretty quickly, especially if it's a large, organization-wide initiative.   0:05:50.5 Andrew Stotz: Yeah, and I can imagine a new person coming... A superstar coming in from another place where they implemented something that really worked, and now they're going, "Let's do it in our..." and that may or may not have the same impact in that new location that that person's responsible for.   0:06:09.6 John Dues: Yeah. And I think almost immediately the conversation then shifts from learning whether the idea is working to confirming what everyone hopes will happen. I think that might be the most dangerous moment in an organization. And so the purpose that I'm talking about, testing on a small scale, is not actually to verify the idea. The purpose is to learn whether the idea survives contact with reality. A good scientist, for example, their first step when they have a hypothesis is try to falsify it. And I feel like if it was ever taught to education or business leaders, that idea has been completely lost to history. And maybe even in some respects in the science world too, that falsification principle is sort of... That's the first step when you're testing an idea. That is not what I've experienced as an educator. I don't know if you've had that same experience in the business world.   0:07:21.9 Andrew Stotz: Yep, yep. I'm just thinking about that quote about no plan survives first contact with the enemy. I know von Clausewitz said it. There was another guy that said it, I think, before him, but it's just so, so true.   0:07:41.2 John Dues: Yeah. And I think this other way of thinking that I'm talking about is so counter to how most organizations operate. Once that solution is selected, whatever it is, the focus completely shifts to implementation and adoption. But the thing is, improvement, at its most fundamental level, it's a learning process. It's not an implementation process. And so... So often we're asking, how do we roll this thing out? I think a good leader, what they're gonna ask, is how can we learn more about this idea as quickly as possible? Right? This other way of thinking, this small testing, it reduces risk, generates feedback, reveals obstacles that you're blind to initially. But most importantly, it creates knowledge, like real working knowledge in your system, in the context where this idea is eventually... When it does roll out system-wide, where it's gonna have to work. And the thing is, is if it works at that small level, you can expand it. If it fails, you can cut your losses when not much has been lost in the way of time, resources, that type of thing. But either way, the organization is gonna learn from that small test...   0:09:09.2 Andrew Stotz: I found it, by the way.   0:09:10.6 John Dues: Oh, go ahead.   0:09:11.9 Andrew Stotz: Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, a Prussian field marshal and military strategist. The closest translation was, "No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength." Or summarized as, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." So it wasn't Mike Tyson who said it first when he said, "Everybody has a plan until you get punched in the face."   0:09:45.3 John Dues: Yeah, right, same idea. I think the Prussians had quite a bit of revolutionary ideas coming out of their military prowess. I think the organizational structure maybe came even from Prussian military hierarchies and stuff like that.   0:09:54.0 Andrew Stotz: Definitely.   0:10:02.8 John Dues: Yeah, but I think, going back to my original sort of statement about which leaders get branded as outstanding or great or leaders to pay attention to, is those large initiatives attract attention, right? And we tend to celebrate those leaders with bold visions or these big plans, sweeping announcements. They're decisive and courageous because when you make those pronouncements, it appears as if they know exactly where the organization could go next or should go next. I think the problem here is that confidence can so easily be mistaken for knowledge. And often, especially in the world that I live in, not just schools but urban schools, the average superintendent is only in their seat for three or so years. Some a little more, some, a lot, a lot less. And so by the time you find out whether the thing worked or didn't, the person's gone. They're on to the next thing, and no one remembers what exactly they promised to do when they got here three years ago...   0:11:18.7 Andrew Stotz: He was really good. "I liked him. He was nice. I thought he had some good ideas."   0:11:21.5 John Dues: Right, right.   0:11:24.4 Andrew Stotz: "Who's our new boss now?"   0:11:27.4 John Dues: Yeah. And so they get this recognition for these big announcements, and it's before any evidence exists that this thing works, right? And so meanwhile, there's these other leaders who I think deserve more attention, are frequently doing something that's much less visible. And what they're doing is building a system that learns.   0:11:40.2 Andrew Stotz: Mm.   0:11:53.1 John Dues: And so instead of asking people to just trust their ideas, they're really thinking about ways to design tests of those ideas. So they're not really trying to prove themselves right like this first camp of leaders is. What they're trying to do is discover where they might be wrong. And that's just not as flashy. It just doesn't garner the same type of attention as that first type of leader. But I think if we really want to improve organizations, schools in my case, or businesses in your case, the thing is, if you're really gonna improve, it depends on actual knowledge, not just enthusiasm, not just charisma. When I think about a promising idea, that's not the same thing as a good idea. And a good idea, even a good idea, is not the same thing as an idea that works in your system, right? And so what we're trying to do is learn, learn, test, not confirm, learn what actually happens when we put something to the test in our system.   0:13:04.7 Andrew Stotz: It makes me think about what I mentioned to you before we turned on the recording, which is that I've been starting to do PDSAs with my accounting and inventory team. Every month I go and sit down with them after they've closed the books, and I've designed a simple format for them. And the way I've explained it to them is that imagine that you want to lose weight, and you think, okay, there's three things I read on the internet: get good quality sleep, eat less carbohydrates, and walk every day. If we do all three of those things, we're probably gonna lose weight. And as an individual, that may be good enough. But if we do them separately, we'll actually acquire knowledge as to which one has the biggest impact. Now, it gets even more difficult because if you do them consecutively, it's harder to make an impact as you start to lose weight. But the point is, is that... And the reason why it's important is because we need to think about how we as an organization are acquiring knowledge. And so I've got a golden three-ring binder, and each of the PDSAs we put in there, and then we're starting to collect them. Once a month, our impact that we're expecting from that PDSA may take six months to occur, but we're revisiting and discussing and deciding, do we continue with this or do we improve it? And we just have two things that we're focusing on, the accounts receivable and also reducing the amount of inventory that we have in the business. And those two things, the beauty of doing PDSA with accounting is that it's a repetitive cycle. Marketing's not a repetitive cycle. Sales, not necessarily a repetitive production, but accounting is the same thing over and over again. So what a great opportunity to improve.   0:15:10.8 John Dues: Yeah, and that's really interesting because a lot of times financial or accounting functions in businesses sort of get left out of the improvement equation. And that's a big mistake, I think, because especially if those people are sort of left to their own devices and the sole focus is on the bottom line, right? And so you could cut cost in an area and actually cause the business, obviously, great harm if you don't have the full picture in mind. So I think that's a great...   0:15:44.0 Andrew Stotz: And that's a whole another area of misusing finance. But the point that I'm thinking about as I'm going through this, because I was thinking about where is the best place to really start strong implementation of PDSA, and my conclusion is accounting. Because accounting is not even like finance saying, "Oh, we need to hit this target" or something. They're just cranking through a process over and over again. And I told my accounting team, I said, because it's a pretty big team of people in both accounting and inventory, I said, "We're gonna work on this for 12 months until we've got the format, the structure, everybody understands it, we have it all translated into Thai from English so it's very clear." I said, "And then you guys are gonna then teach the rest of the organization how do we do PDSA."   0:16:34.0 John Dues: The accountants are, huh?   0:16:36.1 Andrew Stotz: Which is pretty exciting.   0:16:38.4 John Dues: What's... How are they receiving it?   0:16:40.8 Andrew Stotz: It's confusing. It's hard. They're thinking about things and writing stuff down. The first few ones, they realize they didn't really make it that clear, so it's a struggle. And I can say for myself, being an expert in this area, that bringing it to them in a simple way, not easy. And it's also easy to abandon. And I suspect that many employees would think, "Okay, this is the next initiative," versus something that I'm just gonna, every single month, review, work with them on, and keep improving. And then we want to build that competency to understand what works. Because if we can test things one at a time, they also can see how you really got to narrow it down.   0:17:30.8 John Dues: Yeah, that's a great application of continual improvement where you're learning by doing. There's no better way. It's gonna feel clumsy at the start, the first few cycles that you go through. But I think once people see it's not a test, it's not an evaluation especially, it truly is a learning process that can have a big impact on whatever the problems in your area are. That's what I've found. After people go through this a few times, and you make the predictions, and people think they're gonna get judged on their predictions, or the predictions are gonna be wrong, especially at the start, I've continually had to tell people, "No, you're not failing. Yes, your prediction may have been off quite a bit, but that's in the first cycle." We do this a few times, and you're gonna get your sort of understanding of reality and that gap is gonna get closer and closer as you run those cycles.   0:18:28.5 Andrew Stotz: Yeah, and I've been teaching more and more on corporate strategy, and I've identified what I call 11 Ways to Win, how great companies win. And so I've kind of tried to narrow it down to what I think are the core ways that companies win. And one of them is know-how. And Toyota is a good example.   0:18:40.2 John Dues: Yeah.   0:18:52.0 Andrew Stotz: And part of the question for know-how is, does this company have a method of acquiring knowledge? Because know-how can't just be, "We got a couple really smart guys," because when they leave, that competitive advantage is gone.   0:19:00.4 John Dues: Yeah.   0:19:08.8 Andrew Stotz: And that's where the process of how do we acquire knowledge, this idea of narrowing it down as you're talking about, yeah, exciting.   0:19:19.8 John Dues: Yeah, that is exciting. And the PDSA is a great, I think, technique to use to introduce people to continual improvement methods. Because I think after you've gone through it a few times, it becomes pretty intuitive pretty quickly. And it basically combines all the elements that Deming taught into a single sort of learning process. You get the psychology in there, the systems thinking is in there, understanding variation, obviously the theory of knowledge, the PDSA is core to that. So you get all four components right there with the PDSA.   0:19:55.1 Andrew Stotz: Well, shall we wrap this up? What do you want to leave people with?   0:20:13.3 John Dues: Yeah, I think one thing I was gonna say right before the wrap-up was one of the areas that we're trying to do this actually in is actually strategic planning, which is a broad area of an organization that's sort of comprehensive. But we've, I think, tried to incorporate that same sort of PDSA thinking into our strategic planning process. Because schools, like any organization, they're dynamic and the conditions are unpredictable, especially over an extended period of time. And so what we're thinking through is how do you have sort of this combination of a long-term constancy of purpose, because you have to have that, what's our long-term purpose, our long-term aim? But then how do we also continually adapt? And we've tried to build both of those things into our strategic plan. So I think that's sort of a unique approach, a unique way of thinking, even down to the fact that the strategic plan document itself, what we used to do is the culmination would be this color spiral-bound document that looked really, really nice when the consultant would hand it off to you at the end of the process. Now we're doing this all internally, and the strategic plan is in a Google Doc, and it is literally continually updated as we learn through the various tests that we're running over the three-year period. So it's more like a management system than a static document. So even a thing like a strategic plan, which of course there are components that we have locked in for the three-year period, these are some long-term priorities, but there are some annual and quarterly things that we're updating all the time based on what's actually happening on the ground and what the data is telling us. So you kind of have to sort of do a hybrid of both those things in certain areas of your organization, I think. And I think the most important thing is that we're creating a system that's capable of generating knowledge that we're learning over time, all while focused on a sort of clear long-term aim. I think that's kind of the key thing. So...   0:22:15.2 Andrew Stotz: Excellent. I don't think I can add anything to that. So on behalf of everyone at the Deming Institute, I want to thank you again for this discussion. And for listeners, remember to go to deming.org and jump into DemingNEXT to continue your journey. You can find John's book, Win-Win: W. Edwards Deming, the System of Profound Knowledge, and the Science of Improving Schools, on Amazon.com. This is your host, Andrew Stotz, and I'll leave you with one of my favorite quotes from Dr. Deming, and that is that "people are entitled to joy in work."

Nếu bạn chưa từng đọc Bàn về Chiến tranh, có lẽ bạn vẫn biết câu châm ngôn nổi tiếng của Carl von Clausewitz rằng: “Chiến tranh là sự tiếp nối của chính trị bằng những phương tiện khác”. Ý của ông là chiến tranh phải luôn có một mục tiêu chính trị rõ ràng, và mục tiêu đó phải định hướng cho việc chọn chiến lược cũng như cách thức sử dụng sức mạnh quân sự. Những thắng lợi rực rỡ trên chiến trường sẽ trở nên vô nghĩa nếu chúng không mang lại được kết quả chính trị mong muốn.Xem thêm.

Carl von Clausewitz argued that the object of war is always the predetermined end state — not the battle itself. In the midst of peace negotiations with Iran, America has won militarily while fumbling the endgame: no regime change, no Strait of Hormuz renegotiation, no nuclear agreement, and a $300 billion rebuild check on the table. The same strategic clarity we demand of individuals has to govern superpowers — and right now, it doesn't. Unless negotiations take a different direction, what's happening in Iran is shaping up to be a complete national embarrassment.Connect with Stephen:Website: https://stephenmansfield.tv/Instagram: https://instagram.com/mansfieldwrites/X: https://twitter.com/MansfieldWrites

L’istant S : de l’influence de la géographie sur les pratiques ludiquesL'instant P – Quel ressort psychologique ? Carl von Clausewitz, officier prussien auteur de l'ouvrage “De la guerre”La madeleineLa bonne occaz du mois : OkiyaL'atelier de Mac Gyver :... Continue Reading →

¿Puede conquistarse un país sin invadirlo? ¿O ganar una guerra sin disparar un solo tiro? En este episodio hablamos con Marc Vendrell, autor de La batalla invisible, para descubrir cómo funcionan las guerras híbridas del siglo XXI: desinformación, operaciones psicológicas, ciberataques, manipulación social y lucha por el control del relato. Desde las enseñanzas de Sun Tzu y Clausewitz hasta los conflictos actuales entre grandes potencias, analizamos una inquietante posibilidad: que algunas de las guerras más importantes de nuestro tiempo se estén librando delante de nuestros ojos… sin que apenas seamos conscientes de ello. Dirige y presenta Alfonso Trinidad.

¿Puede conquistarse un país sin invadirlo? ¿O ganar una guerra sin disparar un solo tiro? En este episodio hablamos con Marc Vendrell, autor de La batalla invisible, para descubrir cómo funcionan las guerras híbridas del siglo XXI: desinformación, operaciones psicológicas, ciberataques, manipulación social y lucha por el control del relato. Desde las enseñanzas de Sun Tzu y Clausewitz hasta los conflictos actuales entre grandes potencias, analizamos una inquietante posibilidad: que algunas de las guerras más importantes de nuestro tiempo se estén librando delante de nuestros ojos… sin que apenas seamos conscientes de ello. Dirige y presenta Alfonso Trinidad. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Is war rational? The great philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, was a product of three schools of education: the classical tradition of Aristotle, the enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and the practical experience of Napoleon. Each of these three challenged and opposed the other two. His work, On War expresses this tension and opposition. In his effort to develop a comprehensive theory of war, he had to deal with the many instances where the reality of war seemed to defy any coherent framework, where the things which should happen in war are contradicted by what actually happens. (This fits with his assigning the element of probability and chance to the military leg of his famous triad.) “Consequently,” he wrote, “it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments…” If it did, he concluded, then in the end, war would never need to be fought. But wars are fought. Is war itself then, irrational?   Music: Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain) Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

Colombia se enfrenta a la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales bajo un ambiente de altísima tensión. Sin debates programáticos, con un frenesí de demandas mutuas, con el presidente Petro y hasta el presidente Trump interviniendo sin recato, y la posibilidad de un voto finish, en el país podría estarse materializando el aforismo de Clausewitz en el sentido de que “la guerra es la continuación de la política por otros medios”. En este episodio de Enclave Podcast María Alejandra Villamizar y Juan Carlos Restrepo conversan sobre esta difícil coyuntura.

A detective story told through letters about painters in Renaissance Florence, the Inca colonisation of Europe, or a meta-novel about the assassination of Nazi figure Heydrich: in his work, French author Laurent Binet explores the relationship between fiction and history, between reality and imagination.In his latest novel Perspectives, Binet questions the ways in which art and free expression come under pressure—then, but according to Binet, certainly also in our own time.During this evening, we will talk with Binet about his work. Writer Joost de Vries, who also blends historical fact with fiction in his writing, will join the conversation. What can fiction tell us that reality cannot?Laurent Binet (Paris, 1972) studied at the University of Paris III–Sorbonne Nouvelle, obtained the agrégation in modern literature, and taught in Seine-Saint-Denis and abroad. In 2010 he published his debut novel HHhH, for which he received the Prix Goncourt for best first novel. This was followed by Rien ne se passe comme prévu (2012), The Seventh Function of Language (2015), which won the Prix du roman Fnac and the Prix Interallié, and Civilizations (2019), which received the Grand Prix du roman de l'Académie française.Joost de Vries (1983) is editor of the Volkskrant Sunday supplement. He is also one of the regular contributors to the literary podcast BoekenFM and the author of the acclaimed novels Clausewitz, The Republic (winner of the Golden Owl Award), Old Masters, and the short story collection Calm Down, Tiger. In 2023, De Vries was awarded the Frans Kellendonk Prize for his entire body of work. His latest novel, Higher Powers (2024), was nominated for the Libris Literature Prize.Programme editor: Ianthe MosselmanIn collaboration with: Institut français NLZie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Quelle est la doctrine de guerre de Trump ? En a-t-il d'ailleurs une ? Peut-on la comprendre à partir de celle de l'administration Bush ? Voire même à partir du Vom Kriege (De la guerre) de Carl von Clausewitz, le livre qui a structuré la pensée de la guerre révolutionnaire marxiste autant que celle des états-majors de la bourgeoisie occidentale ? Les guerres sont-elles toujours subordonnées à une politique ? Mais si c'est le cas, n'y a-t-il pas autant de guerres que de manières de faire de la politique ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous recevons Catherine Hass à propos de son livre Aujourd'hui la guerre, paru en 2019, dont la finesse des analyses a pris toute sa pertinence ces derniers temps entre le génocide à Gaza, les dévastations du Soudan, les opérations de pure prédation et le retour des guerres de haute intensité entre superpuissances de l'Ukraine à l'Iran.Vous aimez ou au moins lisez lundimatin et vous souhaitez pouvoir continuer ? Ca tombe bien, pour fêter nos dix années d'existence, nous lançons une grande campagne de financement. Pour nous aider et nous encourager, C'est par ici.

Vincent Desportes, Général de corps d'armée, ancien directeur de l'École de Guerre est l'un des épisodes qui a le plus marqué sur Vlan! Leadership.J'avoue que j'avais une image un peu caricaturale de l'armée avant cet épisode. L'ordre, la hiérarchie stricte, le "on obéit parce qu'on obéit". Et puis j'ai lu le livre de Vincent. Et j'ai réalisé que, sur la question du leadership, les militaires ont une longueur d'avance assez déconcertante sur la majorité des entreprises. Pas parce qu'ils sont plus durs. Mais parce qu'ils ont compris bien avant nous que personne ne fait quelque chose d'extraordinaire sous la contrainte. Que le désir, comme disait Spinoza, est le vrai moteur. Et que le rôle du chef n'est pas de motiver, mais de créer les conditions de l'auto-motivation.Dans cet épisode, nous parlons de ce que distingue vraiment une bonne armée d'une mauvaise, pourquoi la guerre en Ukraine est avant tout une histoire de leadership, comment on crée de l'autonomie sans perdre le cap, et ce que le brouillard de la guerre nous apprend sur la manière de prendre des décisions dans un monde qu'on ne comprend plus très bien. J'ai aussi questionné Vincent sur ses propres erreurs de jeune lieutenant, sur la vulnérabilité du chef, et sur cette phrase qu'il cite dans le livre et qui m'a arrêté net : "Le désir secret des hommes est moins d'être libre que d'être inspiré." Citations marquantes"Un soldat sait qu'il ne vaut rien sans les autres.""Je ne peux pas motiver les gens. Je dois créer les conditions de l'auto-motivation.""Doutez toujours. Mais n'hésitez jamais.""L'initiative est la forme la plus aboutie de la discipline.""Le désir secret des hommes est moins d'être libre que d'être inspiré."Idées clefs1. Le préfixe le plus important en leadership : "auto" [00:00 à 20:00] Vincent revient sur une idée qu'il développe dans son livre : on ne peut pas motiver quelqu'un, on ne peut pas responsabiliser quelqu'un de l'extérieur. Ce qu'on peut faire, c'est créer les conditions pour que ça émerge de l'intérieur. Auto-motivation, auto-responsabilisation, auto-discipline. C'est un renversement total de la logique managériale classique qui dit "je vais mobiliser mes équipes" comme si c'était une action qu'on fait à quelqu'un. Ça explique pourquoi tant d'initiatives de "mobilisation" tombent à plat : elles partent dans le mauvais sens.2. Le lien entre intérêt individuel et intérêt collectif est la vraie clé [08:50 à 14:00] Ce n'est pas le sens qu'on donne à une mission qui fait avancer les gens. C'est le fait que chacun perçoive un intérêt personnel à ce que le collectif réussisse. Rousseau disait que c'est l'émotion qui fait avancer l'humain, pas la pensée. Spinoza disait que l'homme est désir. Vincent traduit ça en pratique managériale : je dois créer le lien émotionnel entre "mon avenir à moi" et "notre projet ensemble". Ce lien ne se décrète pas, il se construit, souvent dans les petits gestes et les conversations du quotidien.3. "Aucun plan ne résiste au premier coup de canon" [20:00 à 33:00] Von Moltke, général prussien du XIXe siècle, avait posé les bases de ce qu'on redécouvre aujourd'hui sous le nom d'agilité. Un plan, c'est fait pour entrer en contact avec la réalité, pas pour la dicter. Et ce qui fait la différence entre une bonne organisation et une mauvaise, ce n'est pas la qualité du plan initial, c'est la capacité d'adaptation de chacun quand le plan se casse. Ce qui implique d'avoir construit l'autonomie avant que la crise arrive, pas pendant.4. Le drill et la liberté : les deux ne s'opposent pas [29:00 à 33:00] Il y a des tâches qu'on automatise pour libérer la tête. Un parachutiste sait exactement où est son couteau, son masque à gaz, ses grenades, sans regarder, parce que ça libère sa bande passante pour penser à ce qui change. C'est exactement ce que font les bonnes entreprises : automatiser les tâches sans valeur ajoutée humaine pour que les gens puissent s'adapter à l'imprévu. La robotisation n'est pas une menace si elle est pensée comme libération de l'initiative.5. Le leader est un créateur de contexte, pas un distributeur de sens [47:30 à 56:45] McGregor distingue deux types de management : le mécaniste (on tire sur la tige pour que la plante monte) et l'agricole (on crée les conditions pour qu'elle pousse). Vincent va encore plus loin avec la métaphore du tournesol : si le contexte est bon, les gens s'orientent naturellement vers la lumière, sans qu'on ait besoin de les y forcer. Le rôle du leader n'est pas d'indiquer le chemin à chaque pas, c'est de faire en sorte que l'orientation devienne naturelle.Questions posées dans l'interviewQu'est-ce que c'est qu'un bon leader selon vous, et à quoi ça ressemble ?Est-ce que l'armée fonctionne par contrainte ou par adhésion ?Pourquoi la différence Ukraine/Russie est-elle d'abord une question de leadership ?Comment faire naître l'envie à l'intérieur de chaque personne dans une organisation ?Comment un leader peut-il développer l'autonomie chez ses collaborateurs concrètement ?Comment changer une culture organisationnelle ancrée dans le drill et la non-autonomie ?Vous avez eu des échecs personnels qui vous ont appris quelque chose sur le leadership ?La vulnérabilité, l'aveu du doute, est-ce un signe de bon leadership ou une faiblesse ?Le "brouillard de la guerre", est-ce une métaphore pertinente pour ce que vivent les entreprises aujourd'hui avec la crise écologique ?Qu'est-ce que vous entendez par "un leader est un influenceur par le contexte" ? Références citéesPersonnes historiques et militairesNapoléon Bonaparte : plusieurs citations sur le commandement par le rêve, la connaissance des hommes, l'uniforme comme vecteur d'identité [00:44, 15:43, 30:48, 37:10, 51:26]Von Moltke (Helmut von Moltke) : "Aucun plan ne résiste au premier coup de canon" et "Un ordre ne doit contenir que ce qu'un subordonné ne peut décider de lui-même" [20:57]Carl von Clausewitz : théoricien de la guerre, créateur du concept de "brouillard de la guerre" [44:23]Maréchal Foch : "La discipline formelle est une forme d'indiscipline" [24:50]Général Lagarde : "L'initiative est la forme la plus aboutie de la discipline" [24:50]Leclerc (Général Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque) : leadership par les objectifs, libérateur de Paris [25:38]Général Bradley : formation avant le débarquement de Normandie, équilibre drill/initiative [32:02]Clémenceau et Foch : images des chefs militaires dans les tranchées [14:57]Wagner / Prigogine : exemple de leadership par la contrainte [02:18]Philosophes et penseursSpinoza : "L'homme est désir" [08:27]Rousseau : "C'est la pensée qui fait l'humain, mais c'est l'émotion qui le fait avancer" [11:35]Edgar Morin : capacité humaine d'intuition face aux machines [29:04]Pascal / Descartes : le doute cartésien appliqué à la décision [41:23]Théoriciens du managementRobert Greenleaf : concept du "servant leader" [06:43]McGregor : management mécaniste vs management agricole [48:12]Jean-Dominique Senard : dirigeant de Michelin, exemple de leadership humaniste [18:03]Culture et littératurePierre Schoendorffer, Le Crabe-tambour : "Le désir secret des hommes est moins d'être libre que d'être inspiré" [56:11]Ubuntu : principe africain du collectif comme force [54:08]Événements historiquesDébarquement de Normandie / plage d'Omaha : exemple d'adaptation sous contrainte [31:24, 32:02]6 juin 1944 / libération de Paris [25:38, 06:43]Covid : décision sous incertitude et légitimité du changement [42:51]Réforme des retraites : lien intérêt individuel/collectif [54:08]Grande Dépression / Roosevelt à la radio [12:56]Churchill et De Gaulle : leadership par le discours émotionnel [12:13]Livre de l'invitéDevenez leader, Vincent Desportes, éditions Odile Jacob [00:13]Timestamps clés pour YouTube00:13 — Un bon leader, à quoi ça ressemble vraiment ? Desportes pose la définition : un leader, c'est quelqu'un qui transforme une addition d'êtres humains en une synergie de volontés. Pas quelqu'un qui commande, quelqu'un qui crée l'envie d'aller quelque part ensemble.01:35 — Napoléon commandait par le rêve, pas par le fouet La différence entre les armées qui gagnent et celles qui perdent. Avec un parallèle direct et saisissant sur Wagner et l'armée russe aujourd'hui.05:40 — Ce sont les soldats qui gagnent les guerres, pas les généraux Et c'est exactement le même problème dans les entreprises. Celui qui crée la valeur, c'est l'opérateur, le commercial, le soldat. Le chef, lui, crée les conditions.08:27 — Spinoza, Rousseau, et pourquoi on ne motive pas les gens On pense avec le cerveau, mais on avance avec le cœur et les tripes. Ce moment où la philosophie rencontre la pratique du commandement militaire.14:09 — Le quiet quitting expliqué par un général Pourquoi les gens se déconnectent ? Parce que leur intérêt a changé et que les organisations ne l'ont pas vu venir. Une analyse qui dépasse largement le cadre militaire.18:57 — Le préfixe le plus important du leadership : AUTO Auto-motivation, auto-responsabilisation, auto-discipline. Je ne peux pas imposer ces choses de l'extérieur. Mon rôle est de créer les conditions pour qu'elles émergent.20:57 — Von Moltke et "aucun plan ne résiste au premier coup de canon" Pourquoi le plan stratégique est une illusion et ce qu'il faut faire à la place. L'autonomie comme seule réponse réaliste à l'imprévu.30:48 — Le drill existe toujours dans les armées, et c'est normal Automatiser ce qui n'a pas de valeur ajoutée humaine pour libérer la tête vers ce qui en a. La robotisation vue comme libération plutôt que menace.40:01 — "Doutez toujours. Mais n'hésitez jamais." La grande phrase de l'épisode. Décision sous incertitude, légitimité du changement de cap, et pourquoi les gens ont critiqué Macron pendant le Covid en ayant fondamentalement tort.44:23 — Le brouillard de la guerre, c'est notre quotidien La crise écologique, la polycrise, l'accélération. Clausewitz avait tout compris. La stratégie, ce n'est pas un chemin fixe, c'est un objectif stable sur un chemin qu'on ajuste en permanence.47:37 — Le leader est un agriculteur, pas un mécanicien La métaphore de McGregor et des tournesols. On ne tire pas sur la plante pour qu'elle monte. On crée les conditions pour qu'elle s'oriente naturellement vers la lumière.52:42 — La puissance collective n'est pas un résultat, c'est une résultante On ne produit pas de l'intelligence collective en le décrétant. On crée le lien vertical (intérêt individuel/collectif) et le lien horizontal (fraternité, besoin des autres). Le reste vient tout seul.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Waardeer je onze video's? Steun dan Café Weltschmerz, het podium voor het vrije woord: https://www.cafeweltschmerz.nl/doneren/Het is weer hip voor politici - die zelf nooit onder de wapenen vielen of zelfs maar in dienst zaten- om oorlog te hitsen. Daarom bespreken we vandaag twee klassiekers over hoe je als militair zo'n oorlog wint of juist verliest. Het 2500 jaar oude “De Kunst van het Oorlog voeren” van Sun Tzu en de klassieker van Carl von Clausewitz. (1831) In hun tijd kon je nog spreken van een ‘duel' tussen naties: de ‘absolute' oorlog was verschrikkelijk en dodelijk voor wie het treft, maar wel een gelijkwaardig treffen als in Martial Arts. Met moderne wapens en drones is toen gepromote ridderlijkheid onmogelijk geworden.Boeken van de week:Andrew W. Ziegler (vertaler) (2010): Sun Tzu's origional Art of War, Colors Network PublishingCarl von Clausewitz (1831, 1997) On War, Engelse vertaling Wordsworth classics of World LiteratureHoofdstuk 3 uit Liever dood dan Slaaf: “De Strijd om het Bestaan”Boek en StrijdT Bier bestellen viahttps://lieverdooddanslaaf.com/Volg Rypke ook dagelijks op https://www.interessantetijden.nl/ en wekelijks Interessante Tijden op Youtubehttps://www.youtube.com/@interessantetijden---Deze video is geproduceerd door Café Weltschmerz. Café Weltschmerz gelooft in de kracht van het gesprek en zendt interviews uit over actuele maatschappelijke thema's. Wij bieden een hoogwaardig alternatief voor de mainstream media. Café Weltschmerz is onafhankelijk en niet verbonden aan politieke, religieuze of commerciële partijen.Wil je meer video's bekijken en op de hoogte blijven via onze nieuwsbrief? Ga dan naar: https://www.cafeweltschmerz.nl/videos/Wil je op de hoogte worden gebracht van onze nieuwe video's? Klik dan op deze link: https://bit.ly/3XweTO0

As reflexões de Carl von Clausewitz exerceram enorme influência sobre o pensamento militar moderno e continuam presentes nos debates sobre guerra, estratégia e política. Escrevendo em meio às transformações provocadas pelas Guerras Napoleônicas, Clausewitz buscou compreender a natureza dos conflitos armados para além das batalhas em si, formulando conceitos que marcaram profundamente os estudos estratégicos posteriores. Em sua obra mais conhecida, Da Guerra, discutiu temas como a relação entre guerra e política, a fricção, o papel do acaso, a importância da moral das tropas e os limites do planejamento racional em cenários de combate. Seus escritos atravessaram os séculos XIX e XX influenciando militares, governantes e teóricos de diferentes correntes, ao mesmo tempo em que suscitaram interpretações variadas e debates sobre a aplicabilidade de suas ideias em guerras contemporâneas. Convidamos Delmo Arguelhes para analisar os principais conceitos desenvolvidos por Clausewitz, o contexto intelectual e militar em que suas obras foram produzidas e a permanência de seu pensamento nos debates sobre estratégia, política e teoria da guerra.Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@iclesrodrigues⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠PIX: leituraobrigahistoria@gmail.comAdquira o curso História: da pesquisa à escrita por apenas R$ 49,90 ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠CLICANDO AQUI⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Adquira o curso A Operação Historiográfica para Michel de Certeau por apenas R$ 24,90 ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠CLICANDO AQUI⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Adquira o curso O ofício do historiador para Marc Bloch por apenas R$ 29,90 ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠CLICANDO AQUI⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Colabore com nosso trabalho em ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠apoia.se/obrigahistoria⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Versatilidade é com a INSIDER! Meu cupom HISTORIAFM dá 10% de desconto pra cliente recorrente e, até 25/05, dá 30% pra cliente novo! Acesse o site pelo link ⁠⁠⁠https://creators.insiderstore.com.br/HISTORIAFM⁠⁠⁠ e aproveite! #insiderstore

Prusyalı askerî stratejist Carl Von Clausewitz'in belirttiği gibi her dönemin kendine özgü bir savaş biçimi, kendine özgü sınırlayıcı koşulları ve kendine özgü önyargıları vardır. ABD/İsrail-İran savaşı Clausewitz'in bu tespitinin ne kadar yerinde olduğunu gözler önüne seriyor.

The United States is in yet another war. The usual pundits say that we cannot win while others say we have already won. The same people seem to say nearly the same things about Russia's war in Ukraine. I doubt that pundits in either camp can coherently describe what winning or losing a war means or looks like. So, in this episode, I will once again lean heavily on Carl von Clausewitz to describe what has always been true about winning a war and how that applies to current wars. For the pro-Sun Tzu crowd, stay with me to the end as he makes a rare appearance in my podcasts.   Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.   Music: Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried's Funeral (Public Domain)  

"Se vuoi la pace, prepara la guerra" è una verità storica o l'alibi del potere? In questo primo episodio della nuova stagione di Pensiero Stupendo, il prof. Matteo Saudino osserva il ritorno dei conflitti globali attraverso la lente spietata della filosofia politica. Dal realismo di Niccolò Machiavelli, per cui la guerra è l'essenza dello Stato, al "guerra-duello" di Carl von Clausewitz, passando per Hegel, che vede nel conflitto una necessaria "igiene del mondo", e Carl Schmitt con la sua distinzione brutale tra amico e nemico. Dalle milizie mercenarie ai moderni contractors, un viaggio tra le domande fondamentali di chi la guerra la teorizza e chi, purtroppo, la subisce.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

I am not sure, but I think that I mention the Laws and Customs of War in about half of my episodes. (Clausewitz, of course features in almost EVERY episode -- except this one.) There is one part of the Law of War that is infrequently discussed. So infrequent that the term International Humanitarian Law (IHL) doesn't even include it. The International Committee of the Red Cross even says that it is of little importance! That nearly forgotten part of the Law of War is the Law of Neutrality. I do not agree with the comment in the ICRC's IHL database tha, “the traditional law of neutrality has lost much of its former importance.” I believe that the armed conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and those in the middle east reveal problems which result when the law of neutrality is forgotten or abused. I believe these conflicts also represent an opportunity to reassert that branch of the Law of War, but only if States and nations have the courage to do so. As usual, the content of this podcast is entirely my own opinion, and does not represent to position of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other orgaization I am or have previously been associated with   References:   of Defense, DoD Law of War Manual, June 2015, Updated July 2023 ICRC, How does Law Protect in War, p.3 https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf   International Committee of the Red Cross IHL Databases: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-v-1907   Music: Kiilstofte, P. Freedom Fighters, Machinamasound (Licensed)  

It's not every day that you get the former Deputy Chief of Staff for US Air Force Central Command lined up to talk about the war in Iran, but that's what you folks have today! You've heard Matt Van Hook on the podcast before to talk about everything from Abraham Lincoln to Operation Midnight Hammer, and if you've listened to those shows you know Matt's a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. That alone would give him some credibility to discuss the operational and strategic aspects of what has been dominantly an air war with Iran. But even more than that, Matt has spent significant chunks of his career in this particular theater of operations (Middle East) and area of responsibility (CENTCOM). Today on the show, Matt and I work on sorting information from dis/misinformation when it comes to assessing the war, reframe the conversation on alliances away from the American media's Euro-centric view and towards one that takes America's regional allies into consideration, and Matt leverages the grandaddy of Western military thought, Carl von Clausewitz to give us a crash course on how to assess a military operation that's unfolding in real time. Subscribe to Tim Talks Politics⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ on Substack⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ for the full show notes (30% off for podcast listeners)!

Van Oekraïne tot Hormuz en van Groenland tot Taiwan – oorlogen en dreiging ermee zijn aan de orde van de dag. En het zijn allerminst geïsoleerde, separate conflicten, stelt Jack Watling in zijn nieuwe boek Statecraft - bij zojuist verschenen onder de titel Staatskunst. De senior research fellow voor landoorlogvoering van het Royal United Services Institute onderzoekt ter plekke die hotspots en analyseert hoe de keuzes en strategie van grote machten en spelers elkaar beïnvloeden en de op wereldschaal de uitkomst bepalen. Met Jaap Jansen en PG Kroeger loopt hij langs deze oorlogen, hun prijs en hun impact. *** This episode is largely in English (after a short introduction in Dutch) *** Deze aflevering is mede mogelijk gemaakt met donaties van luisteraars die we hiervoor hartelijk danken. Word ook vriend van de show! Jack Watling was in Nederland op uitnodiging van de Atlantische Commissie. Heb je belangstelling om in onze podcast te adverteren of ons te sponsoren? Zend ons een mailtje en wij zoeken contact. *** Jack Watling beaamt dat zijn analytische werk een modern vervolg is op het 18e-eeuwse denkwerk van Carl von Clausewitz. Die zag bijvoorbeeld hoe Napoleon de militaire en politieke strijd in Europa volledig veranderde. Oorlog voeren is nog altijd ‘de voortzetting van politiek met andere middelen’. Dat zien we nu in Oekraïne en in de Straat van Hormuz. Vladimir Poetin had een heldere politiek. Hij wist wat hij wilde: een vazalstaat in Kyiv à la Belarus ter herstel van de eeuwenoude dominante positie van Rusland. De 'andere middelen' die hij inzette bleken echter de verkeerde. Niet adequaat en niet opgewassen tegen de wil tot overleven van Volodymyr Zelensky en zijn volk. Watling beschrijft hoe deze oorlog inmiddels vier fasen kent. De Blitzkrieg die mislukte. Het overrompelende tegenoffensief dat bijna slaagde. De stellingenoorlog rond Bachmoet, Kupiansk en de fortificaties in Donbas. De innovatieve fase door drone-ontwikkeling die nu flexibeler fronten gaat opleveren. Zelensky heeft niet verloren en Poetin niet gewonnen. Het Westen deed steeds net voldoende, maar niet genoeg. En Rusland zwicht niet: Poetin is bereid zijn economie en zijn volk een enorme prijs te laten betalen. Hij gokt erop dat Donald Trump en Europa eerder moe zijn dan hijzelf. En dat zij een halfhartige wapenstilstand zullen slikken die Oekraïne destabiliseert zodat Rusland aan het langste eind trekt. Nieuwe ronde, nieuwe kansen. Dat hóeft niet te gebeuren, maar Europa kan het wel zo ver laten komen. Europa zal dus een eigen strategie moeten voeren en niet steeds opnieuw naar het pijpen van Washington dansen. Watling is niet mals. Hij onderstreept dat Barack Obama al duidelijk was: Europa moet binnen de NAVO de eigen boontjes doppen. De NAVO-top in Ankara, begin juli, is richtingwijzend. Het verloop onvoorspelbaar. Watling adviseert regelmatig zijn eigen Britse regering. Hij is niet positief: het Britse leger moet een enorme inhaalslag maken wil het weer krachtig zijn. Nederland heeft wel degelijk invloed, stelt Watling. De militaire kwaliteit is hoog, logistiek is het cruciaal en met zijn high tech van ASML tot ruimtevaart is het avant garde. En met NAVO secretaris-generaal Mark Rutte heeft het – ondanks ‘daddy’ - een behendig speler in het veld. Anders dan Poetin met Oekraïne had Trump voor de Perzische Golf geen uitgewerkt plan. Bovendien wordt hij geadviseerd door mensen als Steve Witkoff die volgens Watling alles behalve een diplomaat is. Bovendien was vanaf het begin helder dat Israël en de VS als eenzame bondgenoten allerminst dezelfde politieke doelen nastreven. Met Clausewitz kun je dan een fiasco zien aankomen. Trumps onberaden aanpak versterkt het land dat hij als zijn grootste tegenstander ziet: China. Het regime van de ayatollahs zou wel eens kunnen overleven en met zijn dreigende houding in de Straat van Hormuz Amerika's vrienden in Europa kunnen verleiden zich af te koppelen van de VS, net als China. Dit zou een smadelijke nederlaag zijn en Poetin in de kaart spelen. Xi Jinping kijkt ondertussen rustig toe, hij kan wachten. Misschien valt Taiwan binnenkort wel als rijp fruit in zijn handen. *** Verder luisteren Clausewitz, zijn tijd en denken 339 – De geopolitiek van de 19e eeuw is terug. De eeuw van Bismarck 567 - De geschiedenis beukt op Europa's deur. Caroline de Gruyter over zondagskinderen in een ruige wereld Nederland en geopolitiek 575 - Nederland staat niet langer op het menu, maar zit aan tafel 571 - Het kabinet-Jetten in een geopolitieke orkaan 558 – Poetins rampjaar, Jettens kans 551 – Klem tussen Amerika en China: de koude oorlog rond ASML Oekraïne en Rusland 576 – Oekraïense toetreding versterkt de EU, zegt rasdiplomaat Robert Serry 548 – Poetins dictaat voor Oekraïne 257 - Het machtige Rusland als mythe: hoe 'speciale militaire operaties' een fiasco werden Europa en NAVO 528 - ‘Europa, ontwaak!’ Manfred Weber en de eenzaamheid van Europa 492 – Macrons Europese atoombom 484 - Hoe Trump chaos veroorzaakt en de Europeanen in elkaars armen drijft 447 - Als Trump wint staat Europa er alleen voor Trumps oorlog 577 - Hoe Jimmy Carter de bescherming van de Golfregio tot Amerika’s prioriteit maakte 574 – Hormuz: eeuwenoud brandpunt van de wereld 515 – De heftige strijd tussen Israël en Iran China en Taiwan 564 – Xi Jinping en de zuivering van de Chinese legertop 549 - China en Japan op ramkoers 458 - De gedroomde nieuwe wereldorde van Poetin en Xi *** Tijdlijn 00:00:00 – Deel 1 00:33:19 – Deel 2 00:57:41 – Deel 3 01:13:26 – VVDS: Alexander Klöpping 01:21:41 – EindeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

General Gerhard von Scharnhorst was the intellectual architect of Prussia's military revival after its crushing 1806 defeat by Napoleon. In this video, special guest Ethan Soefje explores Scharnhorst's revolutionary reforms, his role in transforming the Prussian Army, and how his ideas laid the foundations for modern warfare.Discover how Scharnhorst ended aristocratic privilege, introduced merit-based advancement, reorganized training and education, and helped create the Prussian General Staff. We also examine his collaboration with figures like Gneisenau, Clausewitz, and Blücher, and his contributions during the War of Liberation (1813) against Napoleon.From his early career as a theorist and officer to his fatal wounding at the Battle of Lützen, this video explains why Scharnhorst remains one of the most influential military reformers in European history.X/Twitter: @andnapoleon

I believe that the Law of War remains valid in modern warfare and is essential to establishing peace after war. Despite that belief we see States such as Russia and Iran and non-state groups such as Hamas operate in a manner that looks like violating the most fundamental aspects of the law of war, including deliberate targeting of civilians, to be an objective rather than a restriction. In this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I propose some reasons for this and insist that, in the end, it will be counterproductive to achieving success. The material in these podcasts are my own opinion and do not represent the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other organization I have been or I am currently associated with References: “The Law of War: Not Dead Yet,” Episode 56 of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare Clausewitz, C. von, Howard, M. E., Paret, P., & Clausewitz, C. (1984). On war. Princeton University Press. of Defense, DoD Law of War Manual, June 2015, Updated July 2023 Music Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)  

John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point and host of the Urban Warfare Project podcast, joins the show to break down how the U.S. and Israel are executing a 'neurological' campaign—using precision, targeted strikes on the Iranian Regime and its center of gravity. A strategy that's as old as Clausewitz but more relevant than ever. How are the U.S. and Israel balancing the psychological impact of their precision strikes in tandem with the more traditional threat of brute force? What might this approach reveal about today's conflicts, and how might it influence the next global showdown?  ▪️ Times 03:25 Targeting as strategy   10:40 Neurological strike      20:16 An evolution in military affairs 26:30 Adaptation  30:48 Center of gravity 39:37 The missile program Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find more content on our School of War Substack

"Der Atomausstieg war ein strategischer Fehler". So sprach Frau von der Leyen diese Woche in Paris.Das soll Napoleon 1817 auf St. Helena über Waterloo auch gesagt haben.Ob diese enorm frühe Uschi- Erkenntnis der Tatsache geschuldet ist, dass der Atomkraft- Fan Macron anwesend war, dem sie ihren Posten als Kommissionspräsidentin der EU ja überhaupt verdankt oder ob teure Berater ihre Hände im Spiel hatten?Wir werden's wohl nicht erfahren. Ich gehe davon aus, dass alle entsprechenden Daten auf ihrem Diensthandy bereits gelöscht sind.Wenn es um Strategie geht, lohnt es sich, bei Clausewitz nachzulesen, dem großen preußischen Militärstrategen des 19. Jahrhunderts.Strategie setzt dem Krieg ein Ziel und definiert so seinen Zweck.Der Stratege benötigt daher einen starken Charakter und einen klaren und sicheren Geist. Eigenschaften, die ihn über die Mittelmäßigkeit der allermeisten Feldherren erheben. Und genau daran, so Clausewitz, scheitert Strategie zumeist.Wenn man solche Zeilen liest, dann fragt man sich unweigerlich, woher schon der Clausewitz die Uschi gekannt hat!?Wie hat sie 2011 nach Fukushima gesagt?"Die CDU hat die Dringlichkeit der Energiewende verschlafen." Darauf hin wurde sie erst einmal Verteidigungsministerin, nach der Berateraffäre in ihrem Ministerium dann Selbstverteidigungsministerin und jetzt versucht sie sich in Sachen Atomausstieg als angehende Olympiasiegerin im Zurückrudern.Man muss zugeben, in Sachen "strategische Fehler" kennt sie sich aus.Schwerer tut sich da im Moment der Münchner Oberbürgermeister Dieter Reiter. Sich vom FC Bayern für einen Aufsichtsratsposten honorieren zu lassen und hinterher zu sagen, er habe das gar nicht gewusst, dass das genehmigungspflichtig sei, das hat mit Strategie nicht mal mehr im Ansatz zu tun. Taktik?Bei Clausewitz findet man dazu Aufschlussreiches im Kapitel "Verteidigung im Morast".Sumpfiges Gelände stelle zwar grundsätzlich eine gute, weil schwer zu überwindende Verteidigungslinie dar.Die große Gefahr besteht jedoch darin, dass dem Feind eine einzige Übergangsstelle ausreicht, um diese Verteidigungslinie zu sprengen und der anschließende Kampf im sumpfigen Gelände mit großen Verlusten verbunden ist.Ein Wahlbeobachter in München hätte die Lage nicht besser beschreiben können.Wenn der Münchner Oberbürgermeister Clausewitz gelesen hat, weiß, er, was bis zur Stichwahl auf ihn zukommt.Ein strategischer Fehler der Gewerkschaft verdi ist es inzwischen, im Arbeitskampf Warnstreiks bei Bus und Bahn auf drei Tage auszudehnen und sich damit auch noch die letzten Sympathien in der Bevölkerung zu verspielen.Fahren ohne die Fahrkarten zu kontrollieren, statt mit dem Kopf durch die Wand, das wäre ein Streik von geradezu Clausewitz'scher Genialität.Eben alles eine Frage der Perspektive.

Stefan Molyneux takes up several listener questions and works through them using his framework of Universally Preferable Behavior. He defends a fully rational basis for ethics that stands apart from any religious foundation, while still making space for humility—especially when dealing with hostile or trolling responses in discussion. He examines how personal virtue connects to genuine love, looks at the way modern society handles crime and justice, and wrestles with the conflict that arises between faith and reason inside Christian thought. Toward the end he turns to the practical side of ideological disagreements, showing how they strain or even break personal relationships and offering ways to approach those tensions with clearer moral reasoning and calmer, more rational conversation.Questions:I think of UPB as an Aristotelian proof of morality (which also implies God). I have always loved your content, but don't catch all of it. Do you have thoughts on this or an episode I missed?Any thoughts on Nigeria?You've had the same trolls on your live streams a few times. I'm curious to know why you allow them so much time to talk? Is there a lesson you're trying to teach us?Any opinion on the shroud of Turin?How do you grapple with martial/military philosophy? Clausewitz, Mushashi, Sun Tzu, etc.) I understand that it may tend to violate UPB, but surely it is useful to know for defensive stratagem and to understand the actions of the enemy.Ever read any of Steve Ditko's comic books? he was a huge Ayn Rand fan.Is the Age of Enlightenment a fake historic time period made up in the 20th century? And what's the core of this movement?Have you ever been back to Ireland?If we are not virtuous, does that mean we should stay single or not deserving of love?What do you think about Christian Zionists?GET FREEDOMAIN MERCH! https://shop.freedomain.com/SUBSCRIBE TO ME ON X! https://x.com/StefanMolyneuxFollow me on Youtube! https://www.youtube.com/@freedomain1GET MY NEW BOOK 'PEACEFUL PARENTING', THE INTERACTIVE PEACEFUL PARENTING AI, AND THE FULL AUDIOBOOK!https://peacefulparenting.com/Join the PREMIUM philosophy community on the web for free!Subscribers get 12 HOURS on the "Truth About the French Revolution," multiple interactive multi-lingual philosophy AIs trained on thousands of hours of my material - as well as AIs for Real-Time Relationships, Bitcoin, Peaceful Parenting, and Call-In Shows!You also receive private livestreams, HUNDREDS of exclusive premium shows, early release podcasts, the 22 Part History of Philosophers series and much more!See you soon!https://freedomain.locals.com/support/promo/UPB2025

Carlo Altini"Thomas Hobbes. Elementi di legge naturale e politica"Olschki Editorewww.olschki.itQuesta opera di Hobbes costituisce il primo laboratorio sistematico della sua filosofia. Lo scopo è chiaro: individuare un fondamento razionale per la conoscenza non solo della natura, ma anche della politica. Qui la lezione di Galileo fonda l'intera scena teorica: la dimensione materialistico-meccanicistica propria della nuova scienza naturale permea l'universo hobbesiano nella sua totalità, in polemica con Aristotele e la Scolastica, giungendo a delineare un quadro organico dei rapporti tra filosofia naturale e filosofia morale, tra scienza e politica, tra antropologia e psicologia che sarà decisivo per l'impalcatura del pensiero moderno.Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) è uno dei più grandi pensatori dell'epoca moderna. Nato nel Wiltshire, nel sud-ovest dell'Inghilterra, compie i suoi studi a Oxford, ma non intraprende la carriera universitaria; grazie al suo ruolo di precettore presso la famiglia Cavendish ha comunque la possibilità di accedere a un patrimonio librario di prim'ordine e di compiere numerosi viaggi nel continente, entrando in contatto con importanti intellettuali dell'epoca, come Galilei, Descartes, Mersenne, Boyle, Spinoza, Bramhall e Wallis.L'opera che lo rende noto in tutta Europa come pensatore eterodosso è il De cive (1642), ma sarà il Leviathan, pubblicato nel 1651, a conferirgli l'immortalità.Sua massima aspirazione è la composizione di un sistema filosofico radicalmente antiaristotelico, in grado di tenere insieme teologia, filosofia prima, filosofia naturale, antropologia e filosofia civile: esso prenderà forma nel 1655 con il De corpore e, nel 1658, con il De homine, i quali, insieme al De cive, costituiscono i suoi Elementa philosophiae.“Archivio Thomas Hobbes. Testi e Studi” nasce con due intenti reciprocamente in dialogo. Il primo, di taglio storico-filosofico, mira a presentare una prospettiva critica e aggiornata sull'opera di Hobbes e sulla sua ricezione: in un'ottica di rigore scientifico, la collana ospita nuove traduzioni dei testi hobbesiani e dei suoi principali interpreti, corredate da un ampio apparato critico e bibliografico, con l'intento di offrire sia edizioni di saggi mai tradotti, sia nuove edizioni di opere già presenti in Italia, ma ormai datate e di difficile reperibilità. Il secondo intento, di matrice filosofico-politica, mira a individuare nel pensiero di Hobbes uno snodo fondamentale per la comprensione della modernità, dalle sue origini alla sua crisi, nei suoi vari aspetti metafisici, scientifici, antropologici, religiosi e politici. L'intreccio tra le due prospettive produce un contributo di riflessione storico-critica in grado di illuminare alcuni caratteri della nostra contemporaneità – dalle relazioni di potere nello spazio globale al ruolo dell'umano nell'era del digitale – sulla cui interpretazione possono avere ancora presa, per similitudine o per differenza, le categorie filosofiche moderne, notevolmente modellate da Hobbes.Carlo Altini è professore ordinario di Storia della filosofia nell'Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, direttore del Convegno nazionale dei dottorati di ricerca in filosofia e componente della direzione della rivista «Filosofia politica». Nelle sue ricerche si è occupato delle origini, degli sviluppi e della crisi della modernità filosofica e politica, ricostruendo la storia e la teoria di alcuni concetti (progresso, utopia, democrazia, sovranità, potenza/potere, guerra/pace) e analizzando il contributo di alcuni pensatori moderni e contemporanei (tra cui Machiavelli, Hobbes, Harrington, Spinoza, Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, Karl Löwith, Gershom Scholem e Leo Strauss, di cui è uno dei maggiori specialisti a livello internazionale).Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/il-posto-delle-parole--1487855/support.IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.it/

Alex unpacks why Carl von Clausewitz's warnings about the unpredictable pull of war feel especially urgent as the United States edges closer to conflict with Iran. With the new Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei recently announced as Iran's supreme leader, political shifts in Tehran may inject more radical elements into the mix, potentially deepening the trap. Alex explores Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity—the interplay of people, military, and government—and how this complex system makes escalation nonlinear: small strikes, public sentiment, and political decisions can cascade into outcomes no leader intends. From fog and friction on the battlefield to the challenge of identifying Iran's center of gravity, Alex will show why policy alone struggles to control a system that can quickly take on a life of its own.

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz's concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.   Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

The philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, described three legs that support the architecture of war: Primordial violence, the play of chance, and reason. Clausewitz aligned the element of chance the military. Every revolution brings unintended consequences -- the free play of chance. A revolution in military affairs, therefore, means exponential chance to affect the other legs of that trinity. Did the predicted revolution in military affairs come about? Are we at the threshold of one? Is that a good thing or an unacceptable risk that must be avoided? Can we avoid it? Colonels Jayson Altieri and Robert Waring, US Army Retired and instructors in our War Colleges, join me to discuss some of these questions. This is longer than my recent podcasts, but I think it will be worth your time.   Music: Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, Les Preludes. Public Domain Beatles, Revolution (1968). (Unpublished take) Downloaded from Internet Archives, Identifier# 680904f-revolution-take-1 (Fair use for education)  

Today's guest is the legendary strategist Edward Luttwak — the Machiavelli of Maryland. He's consulted for presidents, prime ministers, and secretaries of defense, and authored magnificent books on Byzantine history, a guide to planning a successful coup, and an opus on the logic of strategy and the rise of China. He raises cows, too. We recorded this episode in Feb of 2024. Thanks to the Hudson Institute for sponsoring this episode. Our conversation today covers… Luttwak's childhood and formative encounters with war, including an early fascination with the mafia in Sicily, Technological step-changes in warfare, Books that shaped Luttwak's view of war, from Clausewitz to the Iliad, The costs of “removing war from Europe” post-1945, China's strategic missteps, The psychology of deterrence, including what kind of Middle East policy would actually deter Iran, The strengths of democracies vs. autocracies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today's guest is the legendary strategist Edward Luttwak — the Machiavelli of Maryland. He's consulted for presidents, prime ministers, and secretaries of defense, and authored magnificent books on Byzantine history, a guide to planning a successful coup, and an opus on the logic of strategy and the rise of China. He raises cows, too. We recorded this episode in Feb of 2024. Thanks to the Hudson Institute for sponsoring this episode. Our conversation today covers… Luttwak's childhood and formative encounters with war, including an early fascination with the mafia in Sicily, Technological step-changes in warfare, Books that shaped Luttwak's view of war, from Clausewitz to the Iliad, The costs of “removing war from Europe” post-1945, China's strategic missteps, The psychology of deterrence, including what kind of Middle East policy would actually deter Iran, The strengths of democracies vs. autocracies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Trevor Loudon Reports – Nyquist argued that American leadership, including Trump, operates through stratagem rather than genuine strategy. Drawing from Clausewitz, he defined stratagem as deception through action. Trump exemplifies this pattern, presenting bold actions that ultimately preserve the bipolar world order dominated by the socialist camp led by Moscow and Beijing...

Trevor Loudon Reports – Nyquist argued that American leadership, including Trump, operates through stratagem rather than genuine strategy. Drawing from Clausewitz, he defined stratagem as deception through action. Trump exemplifies this pattern, presenting bold actions that ultimately preserve the bipolar world order dominated by the socialist camp led by Moscow and Beijing...

When conducting an invasion, it is important to consider the risks involved with such operations. There are many factors including the sum of physical and mental powers and the cause of increase, or decrease, of power for the advancing army. These factors are usually not static, so it is of utmost significance to pay attention to the changing situation. There is also the issue of our follow through, when to press our advantage and when to pause so we can regroup. We also must consider the ultimate end that our invasion wishes to accomplish. In this episode, Malark takes a detailed look at the best ways to conduct an invasion. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out all General Nerdery Presents podcasts at www.gnpresents.com

„Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.“ Doch ist dieser wohl bekannteste Satz von Carl von Clausewitz auch heute noch gültig? Lässt sich diese These auf die Konflikte und sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit übertragen? Und vor allem: Wie sind die Begriffe Krieg und Politik in diesem Zusammenhang überhaupt zu verstehen und voneinander abzugrenzen? Mit diesen grundlegenden Fragen wollen wir uns in der heutigen Podcast-Folge eingehend beschäftigen. Dabei geht es nicht nur um theoretische Überlegungen, sondern auch um die praktische Bedeutung von Clausewitz' Denken für die moderne Welt. Bevor wir jedoch tiefer in diese Thematik einsteigen, werfen wir zunächst einen Blick auf die Person hinter diesem berühmten Zitat. Wer war Carl von Clausewitz und welche Erfahrungen prägten sein Verständnis von Krieg und Politik?

Martí Perarnau y David Llorens salían todos los lunes en el Tú diràs de Jordi Basté. Yo tenía quince años y aunque el programa deportivo de RAC1 terminaba a la una de la madrugada me quedaba despierto porque ya sabía, o por lo menos intuía, que esas historias serían de más provecho que la lección de un profesor desmotivado la mañana siguiente en el instituto. «We learned more from a three-minute record than we ever learned in school». Los lunes leía también las Historias del Calcio de Enric González en El País y lo que me gustaba de todos esos periodistas es que trataran al oyente de forma adulta, que me descubrieran las más fascinantes anécdotas. Yo tendría unos quince años y justo empezaba a configurar mi visión del mundo, pero si hoy Kapital existe es gracias a personas como Martí. Aprendemos por imitación y yo solo quería un amigo con ese fino sentido del humor, que me contaran esas vivencias en una cena. Es curiosa la vida. Te haces mayor y un día recibes un mensaje. «Soy oyente de tu podcast y me gustaría mandarte un libro». Las cosas un día llegan, como llegan las cosas en la vida, cuando ya no las esperas. Las cosas llegan aunque no puedas explicarlas, si fuiste en tu camino honesto. Las cosas llegan porque un chico tomó la decisión, cuando tenía quince años, de escuchar la radio a escondidas, porque quería un amigo como Martí.Kapital es posible gracias a sus colaboradores:⁠Crescenta⁠. Invierte como imaginas.En Crescenta son especialistas en la inversión en capital privado. EQT, Cinven, Clearlake… coinvierte con los inversores institucionales más experimentados en fondos de las gestoras más reconocidas. Crescenta selecciona menos del 3% de los fondos de Private Equity que analiza, construyendo así un portfolio concentrado, diseñado para ofrecer diversificación con una única inversión. Desde 10.000 euros hasta millones, con una propuesta adaptada a todos los inversores. Private Equity Growth, Buyouts, secundarios, activos reales. Construye tu cartera con Crescenta.* Rentabilidades pasadas no implican rentabilidades futuras. Consulta riesgos y condiciones.⁠Thenomba⁠⁠. La escuela que te hará encontrar tu propósito.Thenomba es la escuela que nunca tuviste. Un viaje de 12 etapas para entender quién eres, cómo pensar, qué da sentido y cómo transformar el mundo. Cada día, en solo 20 minutos, te acompañan algunos de los mejores pensadores y creadores del ámbito hispano: de Prada, Higinio Marín, Izanami, Miguel Anxo Bastos, Recuenco y muchos más. En un formato revolucionario con videoclases, eventos, lecturas y comunidad, Thenomba cultiva la dimensión más olvidada de nuestra época: la cultural y espiritual. Una propuesta para quienes quieren dejar de ejecutar y empezar a crear. Descubre donde la IA jamás podrá llegar en thenomba.com.Si quieres formar parte de la primera promoción, utiliza el código KAPITAL para llevarte un 10% de descuento. Las clases ya han empezado, puedes unirte hoy.Patrocina Kapital. Toda la información en este link.Índice:0:32 La trefilería de los Perarnau.6:15 Periodista gracias al Golfo.12:39 Fosbury y la invención de la colchoneta.22:50 Moscú 1980.36:38 Bendita juventud desafiando a Videla.43:42 La emoción está en la escasez.52:32 Breve historia táctica del fútbol.1:04:44 ¿Se juega hoy distinto?1:12:21 Petrosian, Kasparov y Guardiola.1:21:55 La enfermiza obsesión de los grandes campeones.1:32:07 Sísifo empuja la piedra.1:45:50 «Ama tu oficio, tu vocación, tu estrella».1:53:33 Se juega como se vive.Apuntes:El fútbol y su filosofía. Martí Perarnau.La evolución táctica del fútbol 1863 - 1945. Martí Perarnau.Herr Pep. Martí Perarnau.La metamorfosis. Martí Perarnau.Dios salve a Pep. Martí Perarnau.El mundo de ayer. Stefan Zweig.El arte de la guerra. Tsun Zu.De la guerra. Carl von Clausewitz.Medalla d'Honor del Parlament. Josep Guardiola.Suficiente. John Bogle.Algunas reflexiones acerca del mundo real de uno que echó un vistazo y se marchó. Bill Watterson.

In this episode, hosts Ray Powell and Jim Carouso welcome Peter Mattis, President of the Jamestown Foundation and former CIA analyst, to dissect the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "political warfare" against Taiwan. Mattis argues this is not merely diplomatic maneuvering, but "United Front work playing out on a global scale" - a comprehensive campaign to reshape the international order by recreating China's domestic political controls abroad.​War by Other MeansMattis grounds the political warfare concept in George Kennan's Cold War definition: the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in peacetime. For Beijing, unification is a political objective requiring total control over Taiwan's social, economic, and political life - goals that military force alone cannot secure. The CCP seeks to "pull in" global interests, ensuring they are mediated through Beijing rather than through alliances or international law.​The View from TaiwanFor the Taiwanese, this warfare is felt on a spectrum. It ranges from the overt "gray zone" harassment of military aircraft and sand dredgers to the psychological grinding of CCP-aligned media narratives. These narratives are designed to paint the U.S. as unreliable and unification as inevitable. Mattis specifically highlights the corrosive effect of espionage, noting that every spy scandal erodes the critical trust necessary for Taiwan's own bureaucracy and its security partners.​United Front: A Global DragnetA key mechanism discussed is the "Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China," which operates chapters globally, including in the U.S. and the Philippines. Mattis explains how these groups mobilize diaspora communities, often hijacking the voices of pragmatic businesspeople, to influence local politicians. He cites the recent indictment of former New York state official Linda Sun as a prime example of how these influence operations effectively bury engagement with Taiwan inside democratic institutions without leaving a public trace.​The Japan Example & Global SignalingWhen Japan's Prime Minister recently called a Taiwan contingency an "existential threat," China responded with fierce rhetoric and economic coercion. Mattis explains this reaction was double-edged: it aimed to punish Tokyo, but also served as a signal to the "Malaysias and Indonesias" of the region. The message is clear: if Beijing can inflict pain on a major power like Japan, smaller nations should fear the consequences of stepping out of line.​The Democratic DeficitWhy do democracies struggle to push back? Mattis argues our institutions are too siloed: the military ignores non-kinetic threats, diplomats fear rocking the boat, and law enforcement is jurisdiction-bound. China exploits these seams to operate without consequence. Mattis suggests democracies must stop looking for "symmetric" responses - which often don't exist - and instead pursue asymmetric, disproportionate measures to re-establish deterrence and uncertainty for Beijing.​

In the time in which Clausewitz wrote "On War", going on the offensive involved no small amount of risk. Between the rise of dominance in the field of artillery and new and brutal ways of preparing a killing field, going on the attack meant being vulnerable to all matter of calamity. As a result, his analysis of offensive variations stresses the need for boldness and prudence in equal measure. There are many reasons to mount an attack, from the wholesale destruction of our opponents to the acquisition of secondary objectives, each of them having their own hazards and considerations for success. Yaga Malark delves into this simple yet complicated subject to bring you the best methods for offensive variations. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out all General Nerdery Presents podcasts at www.gnpresents.com

Send us a textThis episode was originally released as a Patreon only episode in March 2025 as a reaction to the first meeting in the Oval Office between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky.Summary: Throughout history, political thinkers have sought to understand the nature of power, war, and human ambition. The question I ask, having been exposed to the writings of three important works of political philosophy, is, but do their insights align with biblical wisdom?In this special bonus episode, I examine three foundational works of political thought—Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, Carl von Clausewitz's On War, and Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. By exploring these texts, I believe we uncover the patterns that have shaped human history and I compare them to the teachings of Scripture, asking what they reveal about the fallen nature of humanity and God's vision for justice, peace, and righteous leadership.Join us as we navigate these works, wrestle with their implications, and seek to apply biblical truth to our understanding of politics and power.Episode NotesThucydides' History of the Peloponnesian WarWritten in the 5th century BC, Thucydides' work is one of the first analytical histories, focusing on power, human nature, and realpolitik.Key themes: war, empire, morality of power, and the nature of justice in international relations.The Melian Dialogue exemplifies political realism: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”Christian Perspective: Thucydides' bleak view contrasts with biblical teachings on justice, mercy, and the dignity of all people (Micah 6:8, Matthew 5).Carl von Clausewitz's On WarWritten in the early 19th century, this work explores the philosophy of war, strategy, and the nature of conflict.Key ideas: war as an extension of politics, the unpredictability of war (fog of war), and the role of passion, policy, and uncertainty.Christian Perspective: Clausewitz's pragmatic approach often ignores moral constraints. While war is a reality of a fallen world, Christian teachings call for peacemaking (Matthew 5:9) and emphasize justice over mere strategic success.Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among NationsA foundational text in international relations (1948), advocating political realism—the idea that international politics is driven by power and self-interest.Key themes: the balance of power, national interest, and the anarchic nature of the international system.Christian Perspective: While Morgenthau correctly diagnoses human self-interest, he neglects the possibility of moral progress, redemption, and God's call for justice and peace (Romans 12:18, Isaiah 2:4).ConclusionThese three thinkers provide essential insights into the realities of political history and international relations. Yet, their perspectives sometimes contrast sharply with Christian teachings on justice, mercy, and the ultimate hope for peace in God's kingdom. By engagSupport the showTo listen to my monthly church history podcast, subscribe at; https://thehistoryofthechristianchurch.buzzsprout.com For an ad-free version of my podcasts plus the opportunity to enjoy hours of exclusive content and two bonus episodes a month whilst also helping keep the Bible Project Daily Podcast free for listeners everywhere support me at;|PatreonSupport me to continue making great content for listeners everywhere.https://thebibleproject.buzzsprout.com

En este episodio de Micro Mundos conversamos con Álvaro Zicarelli, analista político y consultor, con trayectoria en la función pública y asesorías estratégicas. Fue asesor en política exterior de Gabriela Michetti, Elisa Carrió y del actual presidente Javier Milei en su etapa como diputado. Hablamos sobre el rumbo del gobierno, la reconfiguración de la oposición, los desafíos institucionales del país y las tensiones globales en un mundo marcado por el enfrentamiento entre Estados Unidos y China. También abordamos su libro "La Guerra de las Superpotencias: De Sun Tzu y Clausewitz a la guerra inevitable entre China y los Estados Unidos".Definiciones clave:

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

Leadership is difficult. There are many demands on a leader's time, and one of the most important is the retention of quality individuals. Within an organization not bound by employment or contract, there are certain techniques for keeping good people in the right places. Whether you are a unit or club leader overseeing the development of your group or an event coordinator managing an ever changing experience, the lessons learned here will be of benefit. Join us as Malark breaks down how to best recruit, lead, and retain the best of the best. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out all General Nerdery Presents podcasts at www.gnpresents.com

In this episode, we compare and contrast 2 minds of war: Clausewitz vs. Jomini. Special guest and professor Joshua Meeks joins the show to give us an overview on their respective biographies and their military theories. We will discuss all of the following: