Podcasts about clausewitz

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

Leadership is difficult. There are many demands on a leader's time, and one of the most important is the retention of quality individuals. Within an organization not bound by employment or contract, there are certain techniques for keeping good people in the right places. Whether you are a unit or club leader overseeing the development of your group or an event coordinator managing an ever changing experience, the lessons learned here will be of benefit. Join us as Malark breaks down how to best recruit, lead, and retain the best of the best. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out all General Nerdery Presents podcasts at www.gnpresents.com

Ramón Indart entrevistó a Álvaro Zicarelli, analista internacional, autor del libro: “La Guerra de las Superpotencias: De Sun Tzu y Clausewitz a la Guerra inevitable entre China y los Estados Unidos”

Le livre de Clausewitz, "De la guerre", est à la fois un chef-d'œuvre de la pensée stratégique, mais aussi un ouvrage de philosophie à part entière. Depuis sa publication, il est continuellement étudié aussi bien par les philosophes, les historiens, les chefs d'État et bien sûr les stratèges du monde entier. Dans cet épisode, nous allons expliquer simplement la pensée de Clausewitz.➔ Regardez la version vidéo de cet épisode : https://youtu.be/AElM-kzQXKs➔ Rejoignez-moi sur Patreon : https://www.patreon.com/ParoledephilosopheMembre du Label Tout Savoir. Régies publicitaires : PodK et Ketil Media._____________Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

https://podcasty.polskieradio.pl/track/0bea982e-015a-4df0-b31c-180bb1ad28a4/Sat, 27 Sep 2025 13:30:00 GMT1508Infomagazin aus Polen: Hobbes und Clausewitz lesen: Es wird Zeit, dass sich die Europäer wieder mit einige

In this episode, we compare and contrast 2 minds of war: Clausewitz vs. Jomini. Special guest and professor Joshua Meeks joins the show to give us an overview on their respective biographies and their military theories. We will discuss all of the following:

The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not. The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned. The Timeless Why The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations. From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict. The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft. The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence. The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war. The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist. The Transformative What While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent. The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks". This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years. This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...

Magnus Christiansson, Hans Brun och Ola Wong talar om den norske militärhistorikern Rolf Hobsons bok ”Krig og strategisk tenkning i Europa 1500-1945”. Krig är politikens fortsättning med andra medel, sade Clausewitz. Men kan politiken och samhällsutvecklingen vara ett resultat av krig och strategiskt tänkande?

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina Clausewitz.

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina Clausewitz.

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina Clausewitz.

Morale is vital to any conflict, but it also plays a part heavily in our own lives. Whether making our way through our workday, tending to our personal relationships, or playing our favorite wargame, pursuing higher morale can contribute to our happiness and abilities. In this episode, Malark dives deep into the concept of morale. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Den 3 juli 1866 drabbade närmare 500 000 man trupper ur den preussiska armén samman med den österrikiska armén vid Köningsgrätz i nuvarande Tjeckien. Slaget var det största i Europa mellan Napoleonkrigen och första världskriget.Den preussiska 7.infanteridivisionen och 1.gardesinfanteridivisionen anföll och i princip krossade fyra österrikiska kårer i skogarna kring Shiepwald och Chlum. Det österrikiska nederlaget ledde direkt till fred och innebar att Preussen kunde bilda ett Nordtyskt förbund och ta ett stort steg mot ett enat Tyskland under Preussen.I detta avsnitt av Militärhistoriepodden samtalar Martin Hårdstedt och Peter Bennesved om ett av den europeiska militärhistoriens mindre kända, men betydelsefulla krig.1864 hade Danmark besegrats genom en gemensam preussisk-österrikisk krigsinsats. Motsättningar om hur de nya områden Slesvig och Holstein skulle styras tillsammans med den grundläggande konkurrensen mellan de båda maktcentrumen i Berlin och Wien utmynnade i en direkt konflikt 1866. De nordtyska staterna anslöt på den preussiska sidan och de sydtyska staterna gjorde gemensam sak med Österrike.Den preussiska framgången berodde på den reformerade preussiska arméns slagkraft som ett resultat av skicklig ledning, taktiskt välövade trupper och nya beväpning. Den preussiska generalstabens chef Helmuth von Moltke hade inspirerad av militärteoretikern Clausewitz teori om kriget och infört nya principer för hur krigföringen skulle ledas. Fyra preussiska arméer rörde sig snabbt med järnväg mot den österrikiska huvudarmén. Österrikarna var på papperet numerärt överlägsna, men tvingades avdela en armé för att försvara sig mot ett italienskt anfall från söder. Den mångkulturella österrikiska arméns olika avdelningar var visserligen att betrakta som en yrkesarmé, men hade mycket varierande stridsvärde. Vid Königgrätz koncentrerade preussarna tre arméer och fångade den österrikiska huvudarmén under den uppgivne och passive befälhavaren Benedek.Preussarna hade underlägset artilleri, men ett nytt bakladdat tändnålsgevär som medgav en snabbare eldgivning än de äldre mynningsladdade österrikiska musköterna. De österrikiska kolonnanfallen i täta formeringar i rent napoleansk stil krossades av den intensiva preussiska eldgivningen. Trots att den österrikiska armén hann retirera i relativt god ordning valde kejsare Frans Josef att gå med på en fredsuppgörelse. Den preussiska rikskanslern Otto von Bismarck valde att så snabbt som möjligt få en fredsuppgörelse till stånd. Hans mål var inte att krossa eller förödmjuka Österrike och dess habsburgske kejsare. Han vill få fria händer att bilda ett nordtyskt förbund under ledning av Preussen. Nästa steg i enandet av Tyskland kom några år senare i samband med det Fransk-tyska kriget 1870-71. Lyssna också på Dansk-tyska kriget år 1864 – en dansk katastrof samt Fransk-tyska kriget år 1870-71 – krig som politiskt medel.Bild: Den preussiske kejsaren Wilhelm I, Bismarck och general Moltke observerar det största inringningsslaget i krigshistorien: Den 3 juli 1866 stod omkring 180 000 österrikare och 200 000 preussare mot varandra. Den preussiska arméns seger öppnade vägen för ett enande av imperiet under preussiskt ledarskap - utan Österrike. Av Georg Bleibtreu (1828–1892), Wikipedia, Public Domain.Musik: KÖNIGGRÄTZER MARSCH av Grosses Blasorchester; G. Piefke, 1952, Internet Archive, Public Domain. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

durée : 02:29:45 - Les Matins - par : Guillaume Erner, Isabelle de Gaulmyn - . - réalisation : Félicie Faugère - invités : Frédéric Encel Géopolitologue.; Nadine Levratto Économiste et directrice de recherches au CNRS; David Colon Enseignant et chercheur à Sciences Po 

durée : 00:12:32 - Les Enjeux internationaux - par : Guillaume Erner - Carl von Clausewitz, militaire prussien, occupe une place centrale dans les guerres napoléoniennes qui redéfinissent l'Europe au début du XIXe siècle. Comment ses écrits peuvent-ils éclairer notre compréhension des conflits contemporains ? - réalisation : Félicie Faugère - invités : Frédéric Encel Géopolitologue.

All comments and opinions are those of the individuals recorded; they do not reflect any official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.Dr. Ben Zweibelson is an author, philosopher, and a retired Army Infantry Officer with multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ben lectures and publishes on military strategy, operational planning, design thinking, and war philosophy. His latest book, Reconceptualizing War, was released on April 30th. He has published two other books on the military design movement and innovation in defence applications. Ben earned the Army's Master Parachutist, Pathfinder, Air Assault, Expert and Combat Infantryman's Badges, the Ranger Tab, and was awarded four Bronze Stars in combat. He resides in Colorado Springs with his wife and children. His hobbies include getting injured doing jiu-jitsu, snowboarding, and CrossFit.A magnum opus, a tour de force—Dr. Ben Zweibelson's latest book, Reconceptualizing War, is all of these and more. I was fortunate enough to receive an advance copy, and it was a rich feast. If you've ever wondered what your favourite strategist, philosopher, or school of thought had to say about warfare, you're more than likely to find them in the pages of Reconceptualizing War. From Clausewitz to Kant, Tolstoy, Engels, Mao, the Futurists, Marcuse, or Deleuze and Guattari—and several dozen more—every time I wondered if a thinker was about to appear, there they were. I especially appreciated how Reconceptualizing War complemented the aims of my Hypervelocity podcast: going deeper to examine the philosophical underpinnings of conflict. The cover art goes hard too. Our conversation delves into the themes of reconceptualising war through various philosophical and theoretical lenses. Dr. Ben Zweibelson discusses the importance of social paradigms, the historical context of anti-fascism, and the evolution of ideological movements like Antifa. The dialogue also explores the theoretical connections between Kant, Clausewitz, and contemporary armed movements, as well as the implications of game theory and the future of warfare in the age of artificial intelligence.Chapters00:00 – Introduction to Reconceptualizing War02:44 – Theoretical Foundations: Burrell, Morgan, and Rapoport10:48 – Kant, Clausewitz, and Contemporary Movements17:01 – Antifa: Historical Context and Modern Implications26:03 – Understanding War: Paradigms and Frameworks37:48 – Radical Structuralism and Omnism in Warfare47:49 – The Marxist Vision of Utopia50:15 – The Enduring Nature of War52:04 – Game Theory and Warfare57:57 – Complexity Science and the Afghan Conflict01:06:28 – Radical Structuralism and Revolutionary Success01:14:56 – Détente and Radical Structuralism01:21:47 – Interpretivism and the Limitations of DiagramsAll comments and opinions are those of the individuals recorded; they do not reflect any official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.

Hamas has Israel where it wants it. The group's insistence that ending the war be part of any ceasefire deal and refusal to disarm strengthens its position. To be sure, Israel has severely weakened Hamas militarily. To be sure, Israel has severely weakened Hamas militarily. Moreover, Hamas barely scores double digits in Gaza opinion polls. Hamas may no longer be able to organize an attack on the scale of its October 7, 2023, assault on Israel in which some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Even so, Hamas still has a de facto presence in much of Gaza. Moreover, based on-19th century Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz's principle of “war as a continuation of politics by other means," Hamas is scoring points in what amounts to a war of attrition as Israel relentlessly batters the Strip.

“There's a power, there's a beauty, there's a magic to focus. And there is only the lonely road to darkness and defeat in dissipating and flitting from one thing to another.”Success isn't about doing everything—it's about doing one thing exceptionally well. Too many people flit from idea to idea, never sticking with anything long enough to see results. The key? Relentless focus. In this episode, we break down why concentrating your efforts is the ultimate power move in business. From Karl von Clausewitz's military strategy to Robert Greene's 48 Laws of Power, we explore how deep focus generates real, lasting success. Whether you're mastering podcast guesting, business growth, or personal development, the rule is the same: go all in until you win.The Concise 48 Laws of Power by Robert Greene: https://www.amazon.com/Concise-Laws-Power-Robert-Greene/dp/1861974043Get Booked and Get Paid: by Nicky Billou, Marc Von Musser, Theresa Dugwellhttps://a.co/d/8TArEiOVisit https://www.eCircleAcademy.com and book a success call with Nicky to take your practice to the next level.

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don't know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch'unch'on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China's potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China's political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan's role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan's national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai's universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai's Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch'un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let's delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria's ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan's claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka's cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara's ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto's career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.  

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

Many elements go into an offensive strategy. There are the issues of lengthening our supply lines, the capitalization of momentum while maintaining economy of force, and the precision and timing that allow us to prevail over our defensive opponent. Time is not a friend to the attacker, so our actions need to be swift and decisive. When seeking our military aims, we will often come up against an enemy army. While destruction of the enemy army may not be the primary goal, we must still be prepared to deal with such resistance. In this episode, Malark takes a close look at how Clausewitz prepares us to conduct an offensive battle. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are: War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective.  Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it. It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy. Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy. A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective. If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.   Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709 Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain(

Clausewitz begins our study of offensive warfare by establishing a framework. In this we can see how the lessons we learned in previous episodes on defense can also apply to our study going forward. As always, Clausewitz provides us with concise lists of considerations, including how to preserve our force while we achieve our objectives. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

You can send me a text if you have a comment or questionThis covers the 1799 campaigns in Italy and Switzerland and Suvorov's art of war.  The title is a play on Clausewitz's work on the topic, and Clausewitz is a major source.Massena, Moreau, Joubert and Jourdan try to fight campaigns dominated by the presence of Suvorov the greatest Russian commander of all times.Suvorov dominates Italy, defeating three French armies in 3 major battles.Archduke Charles begins the campaign in Switzerland, defeating Jourdan, eventually driving him into retirement.  But Massena is a more difficult opponent.The Aulic Council makes one of history's great unforced errors.  Leaving Rimsky-Korsakov (no, not him, his father though) to face Massena alone.  Scheherazade cannot save him.We end with some of Suvorov's writings on warfare, including excerpts from his: How to Win, an Address to Soldiers in their own Language.

Send me a text!A brief introduction to the war of the moment and foreseeable future.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

You can send me a text if you have a comment or questionWe take a look at 1798, a year when Clausewitz defines 5 French outrages that would have led to a general European war.1. The occupation of the Papal States, followed by the kidnapping and death of the Pope.2. The conquest of Malta, from the Order of Saint John of the Hospital.  A clear violation of international law, as it stood at the time.  It drew Tsar Paul into the war.3.  The invasion of Switzerland and formation of the Helvetic Republic.  The eastern cantons asked for Austrian occupation.  This fundamentally upset the balance of power and the assumptions of strategic defense.4.  The invasion and conquest of Naples.  We actually spend a lot of time on Maria Carolina and explore the political situation there.  The usual criticisms of Austrian and British cynicism and exploitation are brought into a wider context.5. The annexation of the Piedmont and packing away the House of Savoy to Sardinia.For added joy, the French invasion of Egypt brought the Ottoman empire into the anti-French coalition.

Send me a text!The Eastern Master is finally discussed as a prelude to Irregular warfare.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

Send us a textThe FTGN Merch Store is Live!! Help Support the site with official FTGN Gear!Joe Byerly sits down with Furman Daniel, author of Blood, Mud, and Oil Paint: The Remarkable Year That Made Winston Churchill. Together, they explore a transformative year in Churchill's life—a time of political humiliation, personal reinvention, and the development of five life-changing gifts, including painting, friendship, and a modern perspective on warfare. Furman shares how Churchill's resilience and adaptability during his darkest days laid the foundation for his iconic leadership during World War II.This conversation is packed with timeless insights on failure, perseverance, and finding restoration through personal passions, offering applicable lessons for leaders at all levels:Failure is a springboard for future success.Creative outlets restore energy and focus.Genuine friendships are invaluable during tough times.Presence builds trust and respect as a leader.Confidence balanced with humility fosters growth.Perseverance leads to breakthroughs over time.Stepping back provides clarity and perspective.Lifelong learning is essential for great leadership.And more!Join Joe and Furman for an inspiring discussion on turning setbacks into triumphs and what it means to stay in the fight when the odds are against you.Dr. John Furman Daniel III is an associate professor of political science at Concordia University. He has authored numerous publications on international relations theory, the influence of fiction on foreign policy decision-making, Edmund Burke, Carl von Clausewitz, George Patton, technology diffusion, space colonization and home-field advantage in Major League Baseball. His four books are 21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era (2016), The First Space War: How Patterns of History and Principles of STEM Will Shape Its Form (2019), Patton: Battling with History (2020) and Blood, Mud and Oil Paint: The Remarkable Year that Made Winston Churchill (2024).A special thanks to this week's sponsors!Veteran-founded Adyton. Step into the next generation of equipment management with Log-E by Adyton. Whether you are doing monthly inventories or preparing for deployment, Log-E is your pocket property book, giving real-time visibility into equipment status and mission readiness. Learn more about how Log-E can revolutionize your property tracking process here!Exray a veteran-owned apparel brand elevating the custom gear experience. Exray provides free design services and creates dedicated web stores for unitsMy favorite coffee is veteran-owned Alpha Coffee and I've been drinking it every morning since 2020! They make 100% premium arabica coffee. Alpha has donated over 22k bags of coffee to deployed units and they offer a 10% discount for military veterans, first responders, nurses, and teachers! Try their coffee today. Once you taste the Alpha difference, you won't want to drink anything else!  Learn more here

„Aténčan Thukydides opísal vojnu medzi Peloponézanmi a Aténčanmi, tak ako ju spolu viedli, a začal hneď pri jej vypuknutí, pretože predvídal, že bude veľká, zo všetkých dovtedajších najdôležitejšia. Usudzoval tak z toho, že vojnové prípravy oboch strán dosiahli v každom ohľade vrchol, a videl, ako sa ostatný grécky svet pridáva k jedným či druhým, niektorí okamžite, iní to mali v úmysle. Je to vskutku najväčší otras, aký zažili Gréci a časť barbarov, ba takmer by sa dalo povedať väčšina ľudstva.“ To sú úvodné slová klasického literárneho diela Dejiny peloponézskej vojny z pera gréckeho historika Thukydida. Ten začína svoje rozprávanie naozaj impozantne. Čitateľ môže chvíľami nadobudnúť pocit, že sa schyľuje naozaj k veľkému, priam svetovému konfliktu. Už tento krátky úryvok totiž sľubuje všetko, čo aj moderný človek od vojny vedome či podvedome očakáva – dlhodobé prípravy, vytváranie spojeneckých aliancií, voľbu konkrétnej stratégie, ale i politiku zastrašovania, propagandu a obratnú diplomaciu. Aj preto sa natíska otázka – vedeli už starí Gréci o vojne všetko? A vnímali ju rovnako ako o viac než 2200 rokov neskôr pruský generál Carl von Clausewitz, ktorý označil vojnu za pokračovanie politiky inými prostriedkami? Alebo je aj naše chápanie vojny ako fenoménu skrz-naskrz grécke? Jaro Valent z časopisu Historická revue sa rozpráva s historikom Michalom Habajom. *Podporte podcast Dejiny v aplikácii Toldo na sme.sk/extradejiny. – Ak máte pre nás spätnú väzbu, odkaz alebo nápad, napíšte nám na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaroslav.valent@petitpress.sk⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Všetky podcasty denníka SME nájdete na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠sme.sk/podcasty⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Odoberajte aj denný newsletter ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠SME.sk⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ s najdôležitejšími správami na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠sme.sk/suhrnsme⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Ďakujeme, že počúvate podcast Dejiny.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The 3rd Marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732), soldier, diplomat and scholar, pioneered humanist ways to prevent or suppress insurgencies in his Military Reflections. In his time, Marcenado was the most widely read Spanish author on war. He drew on his own rich experiences of the Spanish War of Succession to complement his erudition based on existing publications from antiquity to the Age of Enlightenment. In a work comprising 11 volumes, he examined subjects ranging from the ethical question of whether it is right to go to war, to the leadership qualities required in a general, to the merits and dangers of battle or the recruitment of soldiers. Intended as guidance for practitioners, his work set standards in both erudition and the human approach to war. This applies particularly to his thoughts on how to prevent, contain or pacify insurgencies. Marcenado was also a diplomat charged with negotiating on behalf of his kingdom to end the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727. His writing on war thus transcends the merely military, and the greater political dimension behind it can already be discerned. Dr Pelayo Fernández García of the University of Oviedo – our guest for this episode – is the greatest living expert on this Spanish thinker and practitioner, whose ideas are strikingly modern even for our times.

Igjen rammer krig Europa og andre deler av verden. Våpen og militærmakt brukes fortsatt for å ødelegge og undertrykke, men også for å kjempe for frihet, demokrati og nasjonal selvstendighet. Hvordan kan vi forstå krig? Carl von Clausewitz forsøkte å svare på dette spørsmålet for 200 år siden. Hva kan han lære oss om krig i dag? Gjest: Harald Høiback, oberstløytnant med professorkompetanse og nestkommanderende ved Forsvarets museer.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Elizabeth Dearden-Williams, a former student of mine from Cambridge who is currently pursuing a masters, comes on to discuss the work of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz.

Send me a text!A quick look at the levels of war from each of the belligerents and where they went right, and where they went wrong.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

Nhà lý luận quốc phòng Carl von Clausewitz đã viết vào đầu thế kỷ 19: “Mỗi thời đại đều có loại hình chiến tranh, điều kiện hạn chế và những định kiến ​​riêng”. Không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa, Clausewitz đã đúng. Xem thêm.

We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States.  I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.     Reference: Although a main reference for almost all episodes is On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, a primary reference for this episode is Chapter 5.12 of the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2016 edition. Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)  

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

For the last many episodes we have been making our way through Clausewitz's lessons concerning defense. It has been a comprehensive study, looking at all levels of action when it comes to defensive warfare, from such diverse topics as favorable terrain to understanding the momentum and rhythm of battle. In this episode, we bring all of these concepts together and look at the big picture, on how they mesh together into strategies that are effective and efficient. Join Malark as we close out our study of strategic defense when we see it actively in the Defense of a Theatre Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Last week, the U.S. Army War College welcomed Sir Hew Strachan, a distinguished British military historian and accomplished author. He graciously took the time to sit down with Michael Neiberg in the studio for another episode of our "On Writing" series. During their conversation, Sir Hew shared his journey to becoming one of the foremost experts on the First World War. They explored the significance of historical perspective in contemporary analysis, delved into his extensive studies of Clausewitz and other strategists, and discussed how appearing on television prompted him to think about war in more distilled terms. This engaging dialogue showcases the insights of two skilled and passionate historians.

It isn't glamorous to consider, but sometimes in war a tactical withdrawal is called for. These must be planned and orderly, guarding against our enemy who will surely try to take advantage. There are several reasons this might be a reasonable move. If we can get a better advantage over our opponent on different ground, if our supply lines are threatened, if we need to regroup and wait for reinforcements; these are some of the valid reasons for this consideration. Join Malark to examine how best to reposition our army by using a Retreat to the Interior. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.   Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984 Music: Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives) The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain) Kilstoffe, P., Freedom Fighters from Machinimasound  

UKRAINE: CLAUSEWITZ'S THREE R'S: RESOURCES, RISK, REWARD: James Holmes, first holder of the Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and blogger at The Naval Diplomat (https://navaldiplomat.com/), @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL 1943 SICILY

GOOD EVENING:  The show begins in Ukraine and, following Clausewitz, asks questions of the resources, risk and reward of the Kursk Salient.... 1917 Western Front CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9-915 #Ukraine: The Kursk Salient and the Storm Shadow. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (retired) @mccauslj @CBSNews @dickinsoncol 915-930 #HEZBOLLAH: The war of the North. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (retired) @mccauslj @CBSNews @dickinsoncol 930-945 1/2: #POTUS: Superseding Special Counsel Smith Indictment of Trump and SCOTUS https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/smiths-superseding-indictment-returns-trump-case-to-square-one/ 945-1000 2/2: #POTUS: Superseding Special Counsel Smith Indictment of Trump and SCOTUShttps://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/smiths-superseding-indictment-returns-trump-case-to-square-one/ SECOND HOUR 10-1015 #NewWorldReport: The corruption story from Chavez to Maduro. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1015-1030 #NewWorldReport: Venezuela Opposition struggles while the arrests continue. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1030-1045 #NewWorldReport: AMLO makes a play for PRI-like control of the electorate. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1045-1100 #NewWorldReport: Drought, famine and arson describe the climate future. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 FRANCE: SUNFLOWERS AND BLACKBERRIES: Simon Constable, Occitanie. 1115-1130 #UK: PM Starmer "and" unpopular. Simon Constable, Occitanie. 1130-1145 1/2: HYPERSONIC: Testing the weapon to eclipse the ballistic missile of the 1950s. Jerry Hendrix, Sagamore Institute https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/the-u-s-military-must-go-hypersonic/ 1145-1200 2/2: HYPERSONIC: Testing the weapon to eclipse the ballistic missile of the 1950s. Jerry Hendrix, Sagamore Institute https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/the-u-s-military-must-go-hypersonic/ FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 UKRAINE: CLAUSEWITZ'S THREE R'S: RESOURCES, RISK, REWARD: James Holmes, first holder of the Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and blogger at The Naval Diplomat (https://navaldiplomat.com/), @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILLhttps://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/greats-agree-ukraines-kursk-offensive-strategic-malpractice-212455 1215-1230 PHILIPPINES: RISK: Rebecca Grant, vice president of the Lexington Institute, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL https://apnews.com/article/china-us-sullivan-national-security-adviser-c3838cb0578b281b46a5896e6d475190 1230-1245 ROK: UNIFICATION: David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL https://www.newsweek.com/south-korea-shares-blueprint-unification-north-1940218 1245-100 am PRC: DUMPING EVS AND STEEL: Alan Tonelson, independent economic policy analyst who blogs at RealityChek and tweets at @AlanTonelson, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL:https://apnews.com/article/canada-china-evs-tariffs-0cd68ba7533bc6e7111cdd5811c8889c

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.   Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984 Music: Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)  

The Red Badge of Courage (1895) is a singularly unique war novel: whereas most depictions of the horrors of combat and the trauma of the battlefield are naturalistic, attempting to inflict upon the reader the violence the prose describes and terrifying us with the prospect that humans do not rise to heroic occasions, Stephen Crane's novel is impressionistic, blurring detail at the edges and giving scattershot glimpses of confusion, guilt, regret, and even envy and resentment. Through the story of Private Henry Fleming (aka "The Youth"), Red Badge is arguably the novel that best encapsulates the phrase "the fog of war," a term credited to the 19th-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. In this episode we explore how Crane---who was not yet born when the battle of Chancellorsville that is the setting occurred---managed to capture the experience so authentically that Union veterans assumed he had worn the blue alongside them. The novel launched its twenty-four-year-old author into the type of fame few writers experience: as a journalist, pulp writer, and celebrity observer of international conflagrations (not to mention fan of bordellos), Crane epitomized the image of the author as a globetrotting adventurer---an image only elevated to tragic irony when he died from tuberculosis in 1900.   

Clausewitz's descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia's “special military operation” in Ukraine. If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one. E97: Friction in War https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld E98: The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace) https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2   Reference: Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One (Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)   Music: Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar(piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517  (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.) The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)  

The wars during the time of Clausewitz were set by conventions that sometimes seem strange to us in modern wargaming. One of the general prohibitions during that era, if I may include a spoiler, was that flanking was not a useful tactic. This is obviously not the case in modern war and wargaming, but the advice he does include is cautiously insightful. Malark delves into the deeps of this maneuver to bring back the pearls of wisdom relating to the methods of Defensive Flanking Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Fog of war is a military term that describes the uncertainty, confusion, and lack of complete information that commanders and soldiers face during armed conflicts. It refers to the inherent challenges and limitations in understanding the current state of the battlefield, including the location and intentions of both friendly and enemy forces.The term is also frequently used in the context of strategy and tactics in war games and simulations.Key points in a summary of the fog of war include:Incomplete Information: During a battle, military commanders often lack real-time information about the location, strength, and movements of enemy forces. This information gap can lead to tactical and strategic uncertainties.Uncertainty: The fog of war creates an environment of uncertainty, where commanders must make critical decisions with imperfect or outdated information. This uncertainty can result in suboptimal decisions or even catastrophic mistakes.Miscommunication: Communication between different units and levels of command can be disrupted or compromised in the chaos of battle, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of orders.Deception: The enemy may use tactics, such as camouflage, decoys, and misinformation, to further obscure their true intentions and capabilities, making it even more challenging to discern their actions.Friction: The term "friction" describes the numerous difficulties and unexpected challenges that arise during warfare, compounding the fog of war. These difficulties can include equipment failures, weather, terrain, and the psychological stress of combat.Mitigation: Military forces use a variety of tools and techniques to reduce the fog of war, including reconnaissance and surveillance, intelligence gathering, improved communication systems, and training to adapt to changing situations.Historical Significance: The concept of the fog of war has been discussed in military literature and philosophy for centuries and is associated with renowned military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz.Modern Relevance: The fog of war is still a critical consideration in contemporary conflicts, including conventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and cyber warfare.(commercial at 9:22)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com