Podcasts about clausewitz

Morale is vital to any conflict, but it also plays a part heavily in our own lives. Whether making our way through our workday, tending to our personal relationships, or playing our favorite wargame, pursuing higher morale can contribute to our happiness and abilities. In this episode, Malark dives deep into the concept of morale. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Firenzeläinen 1500-luvulla elänyt diplomaatti Niccolò Machiavelli tunnetaan teoksestaan Ruhtinas, joka toi tekijälleen maineen kyynisenä, vallanpitäjiä imartelevana pragmaatikkona. Nyt on ensimmäistä kertaa suomennettu toinen hänen teoksensa nimeltään Sotataidosta (Dell' arte della Guerra, suom. Antti Immonen). Se oli ainoa Machiavellin teoksista, joka julkaistiin vielä tekijän eläessä. Kirjaa ovat käyttäneet oppaanaan monet maailman suurista sotapäälliköistä, muun muassa Fredrik Suuri, Napoleon ja pohjolan leijona Kustaa II Aadolf, samoin sotateoreetikko Carl von Clausewitz. Vieraina ovat kirjaan esipuheet laatineet Machiavelli-asiantuntijat Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun dosentti Marko Palokangas sekä valtio-opin yliopistonlehtori Mikko Lahtinen Tampereen yliopistosta. Ohjelman juontaa Nicklas Wancke.

Den 3 juli 1866 drabbade närmare 500 000 man trupper ur den preussiska armén samman med den österrikiska armén vid Köningsgrätz i nuvarande Tjeckien. Slaget var det största i Europa mellan Napoleonkrigen och första världskriget.Den preussiska 7.infanteridivisionen och 1.gardesinfanteridivisionen anföll och i princip krossade fyra österrikiska kårer i skogarna kring Shiepwald och Chlum. Det österrikiska nederlaget ledde direkt till fred och innebar att Preussen kunde bilda ett Nordtyskt förbund och ta ett stort steg mot ett enat Tyskland under Preussen.I detta avsnitt av Militärhistoriepodden samtalar Martin Hårdstedt och Peter Bennesved om ett av den europeiska militärhistoriens mindre kända, men betydelsefulla krig.1864 hade Danmark besegrats genom en gemensam preussisk-österrikisk krigsinsats. Motsättningar om hur de nya områden Slesvig och Holstein skulle styras tillsammans med den grundläggande konkurrensen mellan de båda maktcentrumen i Berlin och Wien utmynnade i en direkt konflikt 1866. De nordtyska staterna anslöt på den preussiska sidan och de sydtyska staterna gjorde gemensam sak med Österrike.Den preussiska framgången berodde på den reformerade preussiska arméns slagkraft som ett resultat av skicklig ledning, taktiskt välövade trupper och nya beväpning. Den preussiska generalstabens chef Helmuth von Moltke hade inspirerad av militärteoretikern Clausewitz teori om kriget och infört nya principer för hur krigföringen skulle ledas. Fyra preussiska arméer rörde sig snabbt med järnväg mot den österrikiska huvudarmén. Österrikarna var på papperet numerärt överlägsna, men tvingades avdela en armé för att försvara sig mot ett italienskt anfall från söder. Den mångkulturella österrikiska arméns olika avdelningar var visserligen att betrakta som en yrkesarmé, men hade mycket varierande stridsvärde. Vid Königgrätz koncentrerade preussarna tre arméer och fångade den österrikiska huvudarmén under den uppgivne och passive befälhavaren Benedek.Preussarna hade underlägset artilleri, men ett nytt bakladdat tändnålsgevär som medgav en snabbare eldgivning än de äldre mynningsladdade österrikiska musköterna. De österrikiska kolonnanfallen i täta formeringar i rent napoleansk stil krossades av den intensiva preussiska eldgivningen. Trots att den österrikiska armén hann retirera i relativt god ordning valde kejsare Frans Josef att gå med på en fredsuppgörelse. Den preussiska rikskanslern Otto von Bismarck valde att så snabbt som möjligt få en fredsuppgörelse till stånd. Hans mål var inte att krossa eller förödmjuka Österrike och dess habsburgske kejsare. Han vill få fria händer att bilda ett nordtyskt förbund under ledning av Preussen. Nästa steg i enandet av Tyskland kom några år senare i samband med det Fransk-tyska kriget 1870-71. Lyssna också på Dansk-tyska kriget år 1864 – en dansk katastrof samt Fransk-tyska kriget år 1870-71 – krig som politiskt medel.Bild: Den preussiske kejsaren Wilhelm I, Bismarck och general Moltke observerar det största inringningsslaget i krigshistorien: Den 3 juli 1866 stod omkring 180 000 österrikare och 200 000 preussare mot varandra. Den preussiska arméns seger öppnade vägen för ett enande av imperiet under preussiskt ledarskap - utan Österrike. Av Georg Bleibtreu (1828–1892), Wikipedia, Public Domain.Musik: KÖNIGGRÄTZER MARSCH av Grosses Blasorchester; G. Piefke, 1952, Internet Archive, Public Domain. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

durée : 02:29:45 - Les Matins - par : Guillaume Erner, Isabelle de Gaulmyn - . - réalisation : Félicie Faugère - invités : Frédéric Encel Géopolitologue.; Nadine Levratto Économiste et directrice de recherches au CNRS; David Colon Enseignant et chercheur à Sciences Po 

durée : 00:12:32 - Les Enjeux internationaux - par : Guillaume Erner - Carl von Clausewitz, militaire prussien, occupe une place centrale dans les guerres napoléoniennes qui redéfinissent l'Europe au début du XIXe siècle. Comment ses écrits peuvent-ils éclairer notre compréhension des conflits contemporains ? - réalisation : Félicie Faugère - invités : Frédéric Encel Géopolitologue.

All comments and opinions are those of the individuals recorded; they do not reflect any official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.Dr. Ben Zweibelson is an author, philosopher, and a retired Army Infantry Officer with multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ben lectures and publishes on military strategy, operational planning, design thinking, and war philosophy. His latest book, Reconceptualizing War, was released on April 30th. He has published two other books on the military design movement and innovation in defence applications. Ben earned the Army's Master Parachutist, Pathfinder, Air Assault, Expert and Combat Infantryman's Badges, the Ranger Tab, and was awarded four Bronze Stars in combat. He resides in Colorado Springs with his wife and children. His hobbies include getting injured doing jiu-jitsu, snowboarding, and CrossFit.A magnum opus, a tour de force—Dr. Ben Zweibelson's latest book, Reconceptualizing War, is all of these and more. I was fortunate enough to receive an advance copy, and it was a rich feast. If you've ever wondered what your favourite strategist, philosopher, or school of thought had to say about warfare, you're more than likely to find them in the pages of Reconceptualizing War. From Clausewitz to Kant, Tolstoy, Engels, Mao, the Futurists, Marcuse, or Deleuze and Guattari—and several dozen more—every time I wondered if a thinker was about to appear, there they were. I especially appreciated how Reconceptualizing War complemented the aims of my Hypervelocity podcast: going deeper to examine the philosophical underpinnings of conflict. The cover art goes hard too. Our conversation delves into the themes of reconceptualising war through various philosophical and theoretical lenses. Dr. Ben Zweibelson discusses the importance of social paradigms, the historical context of anti-fascism, and the evolution of ideological movements like Antifa. The dialogue also explores the theoretical connections between Kant, Clausewitz, and contemporary armed movements, as well as the implications of game theory and the future of warfare in the age of artificial intelligence.Chapters00:00 – Introduction to Reconceptualizing War02:44 – Theoretical Foundations: Burrell, Morgan, and Rapoport10:48 – Kant, Clausewitz, and Contemporary Movements17:01 – Antifa: Historical Context and Modern Implications26:03 – Understanding War: Paradigms and Frameworks37:48 – Radical Structuralism and Omnism in Warfare47:49 – The Marxist Vision of Utopia50:15 – The Enduring Nature of War52:04 – Game Theory and Warfare57:57 – Complexity Science and the Afghan Conflict01:06:28 – Radical Structuralism and Revolutionary Success01:14:56 – Détente and Radical Structuralism01:21:47 – Interpretivism and the Limitations of DiagramsAll comments and opinions are those of the individuals recorded; they do not reflect any official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.

Hamas has Israel where it wants it. The group's insistence that ending the war be part of any ceasefire deal and refusal to disarm strengthens its position. To be sure, Israel has severely weakened Hamas militarily. To be sure, Israel has severely weakened Hamas militarily. Moreover, Hamas barely scores double digits in Gaza opinion polls. Hamas may no longer be able to organize an attack on the scale of its October 7, 2023, assault on Israel in which some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Even so, Hamas still has a de facto presence in much of Gaza. Moreover, based on-19th century Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz's principle of “war as a continuation of politics by other means," Hamas is scoring points in what amounts to a war of attrition as Israel relentlessly batters the Strip.

Es war der Skandal Mitte der 60er Jahre in Berlin: Stasi-Spionage in einem Edelbordell. Schauplatz ist die Pension Clausewitz in der Nähe vom Kudamm. Der Verdacht: Die Stasi hört dort West-Berliner Promis ab. Und wirklich: In der Wohnung des Bordellbetreibers werden Tonbänder gefunden und Telefonnummern, die der Stasi gehören. Selbst der damalige Innensenator ist in den Skandal verwickelt. Doch was geschah wirklich in der Pension? Was trieb die Stasi dort? Das verraten Tim Koschwitz und Lydia Mikiforow in dieser Folge. Folge 282 des rbb 88.8-Podcasts "100 % Berlin"

La question de la stratégie politique à gauche réémerge depuis quelques années. Depuis la montée en puissance des politiques néolibérales dans les années 80, la gauche critique et un tant soi peu radicale a essuyé de nombreuses défaites, que ce soit dans la rue ou dans les urnes. Retour sur la question stratégique avec le livre Marxisme, stratégie et art militaire d'Emilio Albamonte et Matias Maiello aux Editions Communard.e.s. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

“There's a power, there's a beauty, there's a magic to focus. And there is only the lonely road to darkness and defeat in dissipating and flitting from one thing to another.”Success isn't about doing everything—it's about doing one thing exceptionally well. Too many people flit from idea to idea, never sticking with anything long enough to see results. The key? Relentless focus. In this episode, we break down why concentrating your efforts is the ultimate power move in business. From Karl von Clausewitz's military strategy to Robert Greene's 48 Laws of Power, we explore how deep focus generates real, lasting success. Whether you're mastering podcast guesting, business growth, or personal development, the rule is the same: go all in until you win.The Concise 48 Laws of Power by Robert Greene: https://www.amazon.com/Concise-Laws-Power-Robert-Greene/dp/1861974043Get Booked and Get Paid: by Nicky Billou, Marc Von Musser, Theresa Dugwellhttps://a.co/d/8TArEiOVisit https://www.eCircleAcademy.com and book a success call with Nicky to take your practice to the next level.

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don't know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch'unch'on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China's potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China's political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan's role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan's national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai's universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai's Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch'un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let's delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria's ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan's claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka's cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara's ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto's career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.  

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

Kurz und bündig, interessant und informativ. Aber auch tröstlich und gelegentlich anstößig. Bunt wie das Leben sollen auch die Formen der christlichen Botschaft im Sender sein. Von Bettina von Clausewitz.

Many elements go into an offensive strategy. There are the issues of lengthening our supply lines, the capitalization of momentum while maintaining economy of force, and the precision and timing that allow us to prevail over our defensive opponent. Time is not a friend to the attacker, so our actions need to be swift and decisive. When seeking our military aims, we will often come up against an enemy army. While destruction of the enemy army may not be the primary goal, we must still be prepared to deal with such resistance. In this episode, Malark takes a close look at how Clausewitz prepares us to conduct an offensive battle. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are: War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective.  Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it. It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy. Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy. A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective. If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.   Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709 Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain(

Clausewitz begins our study of offensive warfare by establishing a framework. In this we can see how the lessons we learned in previous episodes on defense can also apply to our study going forward. As always, Clausewitz provides us with concise lists of considerations, including how to preserve our force while we achieve our objectives. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

You can send me a text if you have a comment or questionThis covers the 1799 campaigns in Italy and Switzerland and Suvorov's art of war.  The title is a play on Clausewitz's work on the topic, and Clausewitz is a major source.Massena, Moreau, Joubert and Jourdan try to fight campaigns dominated by the presence of Suvorov the greatest Russian commander of all times.Suvorov dominates Italy, defeating three French armies in 3 major battles.Archduke Charles begins the campaign in Switzerland, defeating Jourdan, eventually driving him into retirement.  But Massena is a more difficult opponent.The Aulic Council makes one of history's great unforced errors.  Leaving Rimsky-Korsakov (no, not him, his father though) to face Massena alone.  Scheherazade cannot save him.We end with some of Suvorov's writings on warfare, including excerpts from his: How to Win, an Address to Soldiers in their own Language.

Send me a text!A brief introduction to the war of the moment and foreseeable future.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

You can send me a text if you have a comment or questionWe take a look at 1798, a year when Clausewitz defines 5 French outrages that would have led to a general European war.1. The occupation of the Papal States, followed by the kidnapping and death of the Pope.2. The conquest of Malta, from the Order of Saint John of the Hospital.  A clear violation of international law, as it stood at the time.  It drew Tsar Paul into the war.3.  The invasion of Switzerland and formation of the Helvetic Republic.  The eastern cantons asked for Austrian occupation.  This fundamentally upset the balance of power and the assumptions of strategic defense.4.  The invasion and conquest of Naples.  We actually spend a lot of time on Maria Carolina and explore the political situation there.  The usual criticisms of Austrian and British cynicism and exploitation are brought into a wider context.5. The annexation of the Piedmont and packing away the House of Savoy to Sardinia.For added joy, the French invasion of Egypt brought the Ottoman empire into the anti-French coalition.

Send me a text!The Eastern Master is finally discussed as a prelude to Irregular warfare.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

Send us a textThe FTGN Merch Store is Live!! Help Support the site with official FTGN Gear!Joe Byerly sits down with Furman Daniel, author of Blood, Mud, and Oil Paint: The Remarkable Year That Made Winston Churchill. Together, they explore a transformative year in Churchill's life—a time of political humiliation, personal reinvention, and the development of five life-changing gifts, including painting, friendship, and a modern perspective on warfare. Furman shares how Churchill's resilience and adaptability during his darkest days laid the foundation for his iconic leadership during World War II.This conversation is packed with timeless insights on failure, perseverance, and finding restoration through personal passions, offering applicable lessons for leaders at all levels:Failure is a springboard for future success.Creative outlets restore energy and focus.Genuine friendships are invaluable during tough times.Presence builds trust and respect as a leader.Confidence balanced with humility fosters growth.Perseverance leads to breakthroughs over time.Stepping back provides clarity and perspective.Lifelong learning is essential for great leadership.And more!Join Joe and Furman for an inspiring discussion on turning setbacks into triumphs and what it means to stay in the fight when the odds are against you.Dr. John Furman Daniel III is an associate professor of political science at Concordia University. He has authored numerous publications on international relations theory, the influence of fiction on foreign policy decision-making, Edmund Burke, Carl von Clausewitz, George Patton, technology diffusion, space colonization and home-field advantage in Major League Baseball. His four books are 21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era (2016), The First Space War: How Patterns of History and Principles of STEM Will Shape Its Form (2019), Patton: Battling with History (2020) and Blood, Mud and Oil Paint: The Remarkable Year that Made Winston Churchill (2024).A special thanks to this week's sponsors!Veteran-founded Adyton. Step into the next generation of equipment management with Log-E by Adyton. Whether you are doing monthly inventories or preparing for deployment, Log-E is your pocket property book, giving real-time visibility into equipment status and mission readiness. Learn more about how Log-E can revolutionize your property tracking process here!Exray a veteran-owned apparel brand elevating the custom gear experience. Exray provides free design services and creates dedicated web stores for unitsMy favorite coffee is veteran-owned Alpha Coffee and I've been drinking it every morning since 2020! They make 100% premium arabica coffee. Alpha has donated over 22k bags of coffee to deployed units and they offer a 10% discount for military veterans, first responders, nurses, and teachers! Try their coffee today. Once you taste the Alpha difference, you won't want to drink anything else!  Learn more here

„Aténčan Thukydides opísal vojnu medzi Peloponézanmi a Aténčanmi, tak ako ju spolu viedli, a začal hneď pri jej vypuknutí, pretože predvídal, že bude veľká, zo všetkých dovtedajších najdôležitejšia. Usudzoval tak z toho, že vojnové prípravy oboch strán dosiahli v každom ohľade vrchol, a videl, ako sa ostatný grécky svet pridáva k jedným či druhým, niektorí okamžite, iní to mali v úmysle. Je to vskutku najväčší otras, aký zažili Gréci a časť barbarov, ba takmer by sa dalo povedať väčšina ľudstva.“ To sú úvodné slová klasického literárneho diela Dejiny peloponézskej vojny z pera gréckeho historika Thukydida. Ten začína svoje rozprávanie naozaj impozantne. Čitateľ môže chvíľami nadobudnúť pocit, že sa schyľuje naozaj k veľkému, priam svetovému konfliktu. Už tento krátky úryvok totiž sľubuje všetko, čo aj moderný človek od vojny vedome či podvedome očakáva – dlhodobé prípravy, vytváranie spojeneckých aliancií, voľbu konkrétnej stratégie, ale i politiku zastrašovania, propagandu a obratnú diplomaciu. Aj preto sa natíska otázka – vedeli už starí Gréci o vojne všetko? A vnímali ju rovnako ako o viac než 2200 rokov neskôr pruský generál Carl von Clausewitz, ktorý označil vojnu za pokračovanie politiky inými prostriedkami? Alebo je aj naše chápanie vojny ako fenoménu skrz-naskrz grécke? Jaro Valent z časopisu Historická revue sa rozpráva s historikom Michalom Habajom. *Podporte podcast Dejiny v aplikácii Toldo na sme.sk/extradejiny. – Ak máte pre nás spätnú väzbu, odkaz alebo nápad, napíšte nám na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaroslav.valent@petitpress.sk⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Všetky podcasty denníka SME nájdete na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠sme.sk/podcasty⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Odoberajte aj denný newsletter ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠SME.sk⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ s najdôležitejšími správami na ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠sme.sk/suhrnsme⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ – Ďakujeme, že počúvate podcast Dejiny.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The 3rd Marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732), soldier, diplomat and scholar, pioneered humanist ways to prevent or suppress insurgencies in his Military Reflections. In his time, Marcenado was the most widely read Spanish author on war. He drew on his own rich experiences of the Spanish War of Succession to complement his erudition based on existing publications from antiquity to the Age of Enlightenment. In a work comprising 11 volumes, he examined subjects ranging from the ethical question of whether it is right to go to war, to the leadership qualities required in a general, to the merits and dangers of battle or the recruitment of soldiers. Intended as guidance for practitioners, his work set standards in both erudition and the human approach to war. This applies particularly to his thoughts on how to prevent, contain or pacify insurgencies. Marcenado was also a diplomat charged with negotiating on behalf of his kingdom to end the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727. His writing on war thus transcends the merely military, and the greater political dimension behind it can already be discerned. Dr Pelayo Fernández García of the University of Oviedo – our guest for this episode – is the greatest living expert on this Spanish thinker and practitioner, whose ideas are strikingly modern even for our times.

Igjen rammer krig Europa og andre deler av verden. Våpen og militærmakt brukes fortsatt for å ødelegge og undertrykke, men også for å kjempe for frihet, demokrati og nasjonal selvstendighet. Hvordan kan vi forstå krig? Carl von Clausewitz forsøkte å svare på dette spørsmålet for 200 år siden. Hva kan han lære oss om krig i dag? Gjest: Harald Høiback, oberstløytnant med professorkompetanse og nestkommanderende ved Forsvarets museer.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Elizabeth Dearden-Williams, a former student of mine from Cambridge who is currently pursuing a masters, comes on to discuss the work of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz.

Deze week blikken we terug op Plein Publiek uit februari met schrijver en journalist Joost de Vries. Programmamaker Ianthe Mosselman gaat met De Vries in gesprek over zijn roman Hogere Machten, een verhaal over verlangen, verraad en liefde. Het verhaal speelt zich af op verschillende continenten in de jaren dertig van de vorige eeuw. De Vries werkte jaren aan het boek: is dit werk hét hoogtepunt van zijn oeuvre tot nu toe?Joost de Vries is adjunct-hoofdredacteur van De Groene Amsterdammer en auteur van onder andere romans Clausewitz en De republiek (bekroond met de Gouden Boekenuil). Ook maakt hij de literatuurpodcast Boeken FM. Voor zijn gehele oeuvre ontving hij afgelopen jaar de Frans Kellendonkprijs.In deze wekelijkse talkshow van De Balie interviewen programmamakers de makers die hen inspireren. Van cabaretiers tot schrijvers en van theatermakers tot kunstenaars.De podcast wordt geïntroduceerd door programmamaker Rokhaya Seck.Zie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.Zie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Send me a text!A quick look at the levels of war from each of the belligerents and where they went right, and where they went wrong.Different quotes Support the showwar102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

Nhà lý luận quốc phòng Carl von Clausewitz đã viết vào đầu thế kỷ 19: “Mỗi thời đại đều có loại hình chiến tranh, điều kiện hạn chế và những định kiến ​​riêng”. Không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa, Clausewitz đã đúng. Xem thêm.

We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States.  I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.     Reference: Although a main reference for almost all episodes is On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, a primary reference for this episode is Chapter 5.12 of the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2016 edition. Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)  

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

For the last many episodes we have been making our way through Clausewitz's lessons concerning defense. It has been a comprehensive study, looking at all levels of action when it comes to defensive warfare, from such diverse topics as favorable terrain to understanding the momentum and rhythm of battle. In this episode, we bring all of these concepts together and look at the big picture, on how they mesh together into strategies that are effective and efficient. Join Malark as we close out our study of strategic defense when we see it actively in the Defense of a Theatre Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Last week, the U.S. Army War College welcomed Sir Hew Strachan, a distinguished British military historian and accomplished author. He graciously took the time to sit down with Michael Neiberg in the studio for another episode of our "On Writing" series. During their conversation, Sir Hew shared his journey to becoming one of the foremost experts on the First World War. They explored the significance of historical perspective in contemporary analysis, delved into his extensive studies of Clausewitz and other strategists, and discussed how appearing on television prompted him to think about war in more distilled terms. This engaging dialogue showcases the insights of two skilled and passionate historians.

It isn't glamorous to consider, but sometimes in war a tactical withdrawal is called for. These must be planned and orderly, guarding against our enemy who will surely try to take advantage. There are several reasons this might be a reasonable move. If we can get a better advantage over our opponent on different ground, if our supply lines are threatened, if we need to regroup and wait for reinforcements; these are some of the valid reasons for this consideration. Join Malark to examine how best to reposition our army by using a Retreat to the Interior. Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.   Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984 Music: Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives) The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain) Kilstoffe, P., Freedom Fighters from Machinimasound  

GOOD EVENING:  The show begins in Ukraine and, following Clausewitz, asks questions of the resources, risk and reward of the Kursk Salient.... 1917 Western Front CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9-915 #Ukraine: The Kursk Salient and the Storm Shadow. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (retired) @mccauslj @CBSNews @dickinsoncol 915-930 #HEZBOLLAH: The war of the North. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (retired) @mccauslj @CBSNews @dickinsoncol 930-945 1/2: #POTUS: Superseding Special Counsel Smith Indictment of Trump and SCOTUS https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/smiths-superseding-indictment-returns-trump-case-to-square-one/ 945-1000 2/2: #POTUS: Superseding Special Counsel Smith Indictment of Trump and SCOTUShttps://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/smiths-superseding-indictment-returns-trump-case-to-square-one/ SECOND HOUR 10-1015 #NewWorldReport: The corruption story from Chavez to Maduro. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1015-1030 #NewWorldReport: Venezuela Opposition struggles while the arrests continue. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1030-1045 #NewWorldReport: AMLO makes a play for PRI-like control of the electorate. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis 1045-1100 #NewWorldReport: Drought, famine and arson describe the climate future. Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. @revanellis #NewWorldReportEllis THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 FRANCE: SUNFLOWERS AND BLACKBERRIES: Simon Constable, Occitanie. 1115-1130 #UK: PM Starmer "and" unpopular. Simon Constable, Occitanie. 1130-1145 1/2: HYPERSONIC: Testing the weapon to eclipse the ballistic missile of the 1950s. Jerry Hendrix, Sagamore Institute https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/the-u-s-military-must-go-hypersonic/ 1145-1200 2/2: HYPERSONIC: Testing the weapon to eclipse the ballistic missile of the 1950s. Jerry Hendrix, Sagamore Institute https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/08/the-u-s-military-must-go-hypersonic/ FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 UKRAINE: CLAUSEWITZ'S THREE R'S: RESOURCES, RISK, REWARD: James Holmes, first holder of the Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and blogger at The Naval Diplomat (https://navaldiplomat.com/), @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILLhttps://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/greats-agree-ukraines-kursk-offensive-strategic-malpractice-212455 1215-1230 PHILIPPINES: RISK: Rebecca Grant, vice president of the Lexington Institute, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL https://apnews.com/article/china-us-sullivan-national-security-adviser-c3838cb0578b281b46a5896e6d475190 1230-1245 ROK: UNIFICATION: David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL https://www.newsweek.com/south-korea-shares-blueprint-unification-north-1940218 1245-100 am PRC: DUMPING EVS AND STEEL: Alan Tonelson, independent economic policy analyst who blogs at RealityChek and tweets at @AlanTonelson, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL:https://apnews.com/article/canada-china-evs-tariffs-0cd68ba7533bc6e7111cdd5811c8889c

UKRAINE: CLAUSEWITZ'S THREE R'S: RESOURCES, RISK, REWARD: James Holmes, first holder of the Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and blogger at The Naval Diplomat (https://navaldiplomat.com/), @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL 1943 SICILY

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, instantly killing up to 80,000 civilians, with another 40,000 dying soon after from burns and radiation poisoning. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the surrender of the Japanese Army, marking the end of the most destructive war in history. War has been a constant throughout history. Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have waged war against one another. Some argue that war is ingrained in human nature, from our ancestors battling over resources and empires seeking expansion, to biblical genocides and acts of human sacrifice—Homo sapiens are seemingly insatiable for conflict. Others, however, believe war is not inevitable and that we have the capacity for humility, justice, and kindness without resorting to armed conflict. We must remember that explaining war is not the same as justifying it. While pacifism, as exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, is often seen as noble, is non-violence truly effective against regimes intent on ethnic cleansing? If not, how do we determine when war is justified and what defines proportional force? Can the killing of innocent civilians ever be justified? And, if not, how do they differ from innocent combatants? War, huh, good god, what is it good for? Links A.C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (book) Richard Overy, Why War? (book) Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War (book) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (book) Carl von Clausewitz, On War (book) War, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.   Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984 Music: Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives) Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)  

The Red Badge of Courage (1895) is a singularly unique war novel: whereas most depictions of the horrors of combat and the trauma of the battlefield are naturalistic, attempting to inflict upon the reader the violence the prose describes and terrifying us with the prospect that humans do not rise to heroic occasions, Stephen Crane's novel is impressionistic, blurring detail at the edges and giving scattershot glimpses of confusion, guilt, regret, and even envy and resentment. Through the story of Private Henry Fleming (aka "The Youth"), Red Badge is arguably the novel that best encapsulates the phrase "the fog of war," a term credited to the 19th-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. In this episode we explore how Crane---who was not yet born when the battle of Chancellorsville that is the setting occurred---managed to capture the experience so authentically that Union veterans assumed he had worn the blue alongside them. The novel launched its twenty-four-year-old author into the type of fame few writers experience: as a journalist, pulp writer, and celebrity observer of international conflagrations (not to mention fan of bordellos), Crane epitomized the image of the author as a globetrotting adventurer---an image only elevated to tragic irony when he died from tuberculosis in 1900.   

Clausewitz's descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia's “special military operation” in Ukraine. If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one. E97: Friction in War https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld E98: The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace) https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2   Reference: Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One (Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)   Music: Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar(piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517  (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.) The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)  

The wars during the time of Clausewitz were set by conventions that sometimes seem strange to us in modern wargaming. One of the general prohibitions during that era, if I may include a spoiler, was that flanking was not a useful tactic. This is obviously not the case in modern war and wargaming, but the advice he does include is cautiously insightful. Malark delves into the deeps of this maneuver to bring back the pearls of wisdom relating to the methods of Defensive Flanking Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.   Reference: Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One (Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.) Randomly Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (from the clausewitz.com website.): https://www.clausewitz.com/MP4/romp2.mp4 Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.) Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar (piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517

Fog of war is a military term that describes the uncertainty, confusion, and lack of complete information that commanders and soldiers face during armed conflicts. It refers to the inherent challenges and limitations in understanding the current state of the battlefield, including the location and intentions of both friendly and enemy forces.The term is also frequently used in the context of strategy and tactics in war games and simulations.Key points in a summary of the fog of war include:Incomplete Information: During a battle, military commanders often lack real-time information about the location, strength, and movements of enemy forces. This information gap can lead to tactical and strategic uncertainties.Uncertainty: The fog of war creates an environment of uncertainty, where commanders must make critical decisions with imperfect or outdated information. This uncertainty can result in suboptimal decisions or even catastrophic mistakes.Miscommunication: Communication between different units and levels of command can be disrupted or compromised in the chaos of battle, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of orders.Deception: The enemy may use tactics, such as camouflage, decoys, and misinformation, to further obscure their true intentions and capabilities, making it even more challenging to discern their actions.Friction: The term "friction" describes the numerous difficulties and unexpected challenges that arise during warfare, compounding the fog of war. These difficulties can include equipment failures, weather, terrain, and the psychological stress of combat.Mitigation: Military forces use a variety of tools and techniques to reduce the fog of war, including reconnaissance and surveillance, intelligence gathering, improved communication systems, and training to adapt to changing situations.Historical Significance: The concept of the fog of war has been discussed in military literature and philosophy for centuries and is associated with renowned military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz.Modern Relevance: The fog of war is still a critical consideration in contemporary conflicts, including conventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and cyber warfare.(commercial at 9:22)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.   Music: Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried's Funeral (Public Domain) The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain) Kilstoff, Jan, The Cavalry (Licensed)

The Cognitive Crucible is a forum that presents different perspectives and emerging thought leadership related to the information environment. The opinions expressed by guests are their own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of or endorsement by the Information Professionals Association. During this episode, Dr. Wayne “Mike” Hall discusses his latest capstone book: the Moral Imperative of Our Time-Purposeful Intellectual Growth. According to Mike, America's intellect is sharply declining; he implores national security leaders to address this problem immediately by: 1) improving individual learning, 2) promoting organizational learning, and 3) encouraging intellectual mentoring. Satisfying these callings is the moral imperative. Mike also discusses other important themes such as: will, incorporating information and cognition as warfighting domains, how to think in today's fight, non-linearity and complex systems, anticipation compared to prediction, and the importance of initial conditions, and unity of effort. Research Question: Mike Hall suggests interested students examine:  How does this fit into DOTMLPF? How do we get politicians to understand Clausewitz? Recording Date: 21 June 2024 Resources: Cognitive Crucible Podcast Episodes Mentioned #47 Yaneer Bar-Yam on Complex Systems and the War on Ideals #72 Noah Komnick on Cybernetics and the Age of Complexity Mike Hall's website Chinese Military Targeting Future Wars And Fighting The Five Cognitive Battles The Moral Imperative of Our Time-Purposeful Intellectual Growth: Developing and Using the Human Mind To Outthink America's Enemies and To Stay Abreast of Changing Technologies by Ed D Wayne Michael Hall Whispers from the Arrow of Time: Essays from an Evolving Mind on How to Think about National Security in the Information Age by Wayne Michael Hall Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age by Wayne Michael Hall Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum The Power of Will in International Conflict: How to Think Critically in Complex Environments by Wayne Michael Hall and Patrick M. Hughes Link to full show notes and resources Guest Bio:  Wayne Michael “Mike” Hall, Brigadier General, US Army (Retired), is a career U.S. Army intelligence officer with over 50 years of experience in intelligence operations. In the Army, Brigadier General Hall served in four infantry divisions: 2d, 1 st , 4 th , and 82d. He commanded intelligence units at the company (337 th ASA Company), battalion (313 th MI Bn, 82d Airborne Division), and brigade (501 st MI Brigade in the Republic of Korea). BG Hall was an infantry battalion S-2 in the 1 st Infantry Division, an infantry brigade S-2 while in Korea in the 2d Infantry Division, and an infantry brigade S-2 in the 1 st Infantry Division. He was the G-2 of the 82d Airborne Division, and as a general officer, the J-2 US Forces Korea. After retiring from the Army in 1999, he worked with military and private corporations providing consulting services in intelligence-related matters for more than 12 years. He also created a two-week intensive seminar for intelligence analysts and collections specialists, centering on his book Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments. Brigadier General Hall led the strenuous two-week seminars from 2008-2014 and helped ~1250 intelligence analysts and collection people learn “how to think” in complex environments. Brigadier General Hall has written six books: Stray Voltage War in the Information Age (2003); Intelligence Analysis How to Think in Complex Environments(2009); Intelligence Collection How to Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection in Complex Environments (2012); The Power of Will in International Conflict (2018); Whispers From the Arrow of Time (2023); and The Moral Imperative of Our Time—Purposeful Intellectual Growth. Brigadier General Hall holds a BS from the University of Nebraska, an MS from Kansas State University, an MMAS from the US Army CGSC, and an EdD from The George Washington University. Brigadier General Hall is a graduate of the US Army's Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the National War College. Brigadier General Hall is a Senior Parachutist and a Ranger School graduate from the US Army's Ranger School, February 1973. Brigadier General Hall lives with his wife near Denton Texas. About: The Information Professionals Association (IPA) is a non-profit organization dedicated to exploring the role of information activities, such as influence and cognitive security, within the national security sector and helping to bridge the divide between operations and research. Its goal is to increase interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars and practitioners and policymakers with an interest in this domain. For more information, please contact us at communications@information-professionals.org. Or, connect directly with The Cognitive Crucible podcast host, John Bicknell, on LinkedIn. Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate, 1) IPA earns from qualifying purchases, 2) IPA gets commissions for purchases made through links in this post.

How does a winning Olympic coach approach strategy?  In this episode, Rich sits down with Hugh McCutcheon, the Assistant Athletics Director and Sport Development Coach at the University of Minnesota. Hugh coached the US Men's Volleyball team to the gold medal at the 2008 Olympic games, then coached the US Women's volleyball team to the silver medal at the 2012 Olympic games. He shares his thoughts on coaching, competition, practice, and team-building. ---------Key Quotes:“As a coach and a leader, we're a service provider. The service we're providing is helping the people who are investing the most precious resource they have, their lives, in our endeavor. We're trying to help them to achieve this goal. And that's a significant responsibility.”“I've got nothing wrong with tradition, right? But tradition should only be the right reason for doing anything when it's the right reason. We shouldn't just keep doing stuff just because that's the way we've always done it. We should be basing our stuff in best practice methods.”“There's not just a physical element to the moment of competition, but there's a mental one, and even a social component that goes on in competition. And the mental is not just about performance and executing. It's also about emotional control, which, by the way, is not emotional suppression. We all have emotions. It's creating a space between the emotion and the action.”Practice Makes ProfitAt it's foundation, a plan should answer two questions: What are you trying to achieve?How will you achieve it? To answer these questions clearly and consistently I developed the GOST Framework, which stands for goals, objectives, strategies and tactics. Goals and objectives answer the “What” question—goal is generally what you are trying to achieve and objectives are specifically what you are trying to achieve. Strategy and tactics answer the “How” question—strategy is generally how you will reach the goal and tactics are specifically how you will reach the goal.  Example:Goal: Build a culture of high performance.Objective: Retain 90% of high performers (those rated 4s & 5s) through Q4 of this year.Strategy: Significantly differentiate bonus compensation based on performance.Tactics: Create a bonus comparison chart and share with teams; Design a quarterly performance scorecard;Communicate top performers' results. League of Strategic MindsQuestion: How often should we be looking at our strategy and making changes?Answer: Use a Strategy Tune-up on a quarterly basis consisting of a 2-4 hour review of the current business situation and calibrate goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics accordingly. Winsights: Ideas for AdvantageCarl von Clausewitz, Prussian General and renowned military strategist wrote: “There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated.” Where is the single most important area for you and your team to focus your resources?--------Time stamps:(01:04) Deep Dive Interview with Hugh McCutcheon (47:09) Practice Makes Profit(50:17) League of Strategic Minds (52:39) Winsights, Ideas for Advantage  ---------Links:Submit a question for Rich to the League of Strategic Minds Rich Horwath on LinkedInRich Horwath on YouTubeRich Horwath on InstagramStrategic Thinking Institute WebsiteInc. Magazine's Top 4 book for 2024: STRATEGIC  BookNew executive development platform: Strategic Fitness SystemSign up for Rich's free Strategic Thinker Newsletter Hugh McCutcheon LinkedInChampionship Behaviors, by Hugh McCutcheon[Subscribe to the Podcast] On Apple PodcastsOn Spotify

In a perfect homage to our ongoing study of Clausewitz, Malark hosted a panel at MisCon 38 in 2024 on the "Principles of War and their Applications towards Game Theory". This is the raw recording largely without edits. Enjoy Malark live and unfiltered at MisCon 38 and his exploration of the Principles of War(gaming)! Support our Patreon! www.patreon.com/theartofwargaming Email: artofwargamingpodcast@gmail.com Facebook: @theartofwargamingpodcast Instagram: @artofwargamingpodcast Check out more of The Art of Wargaming at www.taowargaming.com Check out more earVVyrm podcasts at www.earvvyrm.com

Send me a text!A brief explanation of four critical concepts brought to us by Carl von Clausewitz.  Center of Gravity, Paradoxical trinity, Friction, and Fog of WarGet your copy herehttps://amzn.to/3X1lfWtGoes great with Sun Tzuhttps://amzn.to/3Kqs3FCDifferent quotes Support the Show.war102podcast@gmail.comhttps://www.reddit.com/r/War102Podcast/https://war102.buzzsprout.com

Was ist der Krieg? Und wieso tendiert er in der Moderne oft zur äußersten Gewalt? Antworten darauf gibt es bei einem Klassiker der Militärtheorie: Carl von Clausewitz. Ein Denker, der das Verhältnis von Krieg und Politik auslotet und dessen Theorie heute wieder erschreckend aktuell geworden ist. Von Jerzy Sobotta