Podcasts about class action fairness

On this episode of Future of Freedom, host Scot Bertram is joined by two guests with opposing viewpoints about whether conservatives should embrace the current class action system. First on the show is Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School. Later, we hear from Ted Frank, director of the Center for Class Action Fairness at the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute. You can find Brian on X, formerly Twitter, at @BTFitzPat and Ted at @TedFrank. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/future-of-freedom/support

Amount in controversy (sometimes called jurisdictional amount) is a term used in civil procedure to denote the amount at stake in a lawsuit, in particular in connection with a requirement that persons seeking to bring a lawsuit in a particular court must be suing for a certain minimum amount (or below a certain maximum amount) before that court may hear the case. United States. In federal courts. Diversity jurisdiction. In United States federal courts, the term currently applies only to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that the court is able to hear the case only because it is between citizens of different states. In such cases, the US Congress has decreed in 28 USC § 1332(a) that the court may hear such suits only where "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000." This amount represents a significant increase from earlier years. Congress first established the amount in controversy requirement when it created diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, pursuant to its powers under Article 3 of the US Constitution, the amount being $500. It was raised to $2,000 in 1887, to $3,000 in 1911, to $10,000 in 1958, to $50,000 in 1988, and finally to the current $75,000 in 1996. The use of the word "exceeds" in Section 1332 implies that the amount in controversy must be more than $75,000; a case removed from state court to federal court must be remanded back to state court if the amount in controversy is exactly $75,000.00. Federal question jurisdiction. Congress did not create a consistent federal question jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear any case alleging a violation of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, until 1875, when Congress created the statute which is now found at 28 USC § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." At that time, such cases had the same amount of controversy requirement as the diversity cases. Congress eliminated this requirement in actions against the United States in 1976 and in all federal question cases in 1980. Aggregation of claims. Where a single plaintiff has multiple unrelated claims against a single defendant, that plaintiff can aggregate those claims – that is, add the amounts together – to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. In cases involving more than one defendant, a plaintiff may aggregate the amount claimed against multiple defendants “only if the defendants are jointly liable.” Middle Tennessee News Company Incorporated v Charnel of Cincinnati, Incorporated (2001). However, “if the defendants are severely liable, the plaintiff must satisfy the amount in controversy required against each individual defendant.” The 5–4 decision in Exxon Mobil Corporation v Allapattah Services Incorporated, (2005), held that a federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims of other plaintiffs who do not meet the jurisdictional amount for a diversity action, when at least one plaintiff in the action does satisfy the jurisdictional amount. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/law-school/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/law-school/support

Chase Geiser is joined by Will Chamberlain. Will Chamberlain is a lawyer and the publisher of Human Events. Will worked as an attorney at the Competitive Enterprise Institute's Center for Class Action Fairness in Washington, DC. Before that, he practiced complex commercial litigation at Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan LLP in Los Angeles, CA. Will graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 2015, and is an active member of the State Bar of California and the District of Columbia Bar. You can find Will on Twitter and Periscope under the handle @willchamberlain. EPISODE LINKS: Chase's Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/RealChaseGeiser Will's Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/WillChamberlain --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/oneamerican/support

The Supreme Court issued its decision in Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System on June 21, 2021. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined in full.In this case, a group of Goldman shareholders sought to certify a class action suit against Goldman arguing that they had detrimentally relied on Goldman's alleged misrepresentations about conflict management, which had resulted in inflation maintenance and subsequent shareholder loss. In arguing for class certification, the plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court's 1988 Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision allowing plaintiffs to prove reliance based on evidence common to the class. Goldman argued against certification and against the Basic presumption by presenting evidence showing the alleged misrepresentations had not affected stock prices.On its second attempt, the District Court certified a class and the Second Circuit affirmed. In its decision, the Supreme Court remanded to the Second Circuit to consider the generic nature of the alleged misrepresentations even though that evidence might get to materiality not usually considered at the initial certification stage under Rule 23. The Court also clarified the Basic presumption holding that a defendant does bear the burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption of reliance allowed to class action plaintiffs. Joining us to discuss is Mr. Ted Frank, a class action litigator and the Director of the Center for Class Action Fairness at the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute. Featuring:-- Theodore "Ted" Frank, Director of Litigation and Senior Attorney, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute

On March 29, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System. The questions before the court were whether, first, a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security, even though that evidence is also relevant to the substantive element of materiality; and, second, whether a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption has only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion.Ted Frank, Director at the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and the Center for Class Action Fairness, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.

On March 29, 2021, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the case of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System. The case turns on class action issues and the 1988 Supreme Court case Basic Inc. v. Levinson. In Goldman Sachs, the Court will address whether a class action defendant in a case alleging securities fraud may rebut a presumption of class-wide reliance on an alleged misstatement by pointing to the generic nature of the statement and if so, whether that defendant ultimately bears the burden of production or the burden of persuasion.Featuring:-- Ted Frank, Director, Center for Class Action Fairness, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute

On March 30, 2021, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the case of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. In this case, the Court will address the type of injury required by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Article III of the U.S. Constitution for a class of plaintiffs to sue where the injury alleged by the class representative is different (and arguably greater) than the injury alleged by the remaining class members. Featuring:-- Ted Frank, Director, Center for Class Action Fairness, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute

ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) holds it misconduct for an attorney to “engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination” in connection with the practice of law. Scholars have criticized the Rule as chilling speech on matters of public concern and unlawful viewpoint discrimination; several state attorneys general concluded the rule is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania adopted a modified version of Rule 8.4(g), including “words or conduct” within its ambit. In Greenberg v. Haggerty (E.D. Pa. 2020), an attorney represented by the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute obtained a preliminary injunction against Pennsylvania’s enforcement of the rule. Pennsylvania officials have appealed to the Third Circuit. HLLI’s Ted Frank will discuss Rule 8.4(g) and its consequences for speech, the Greenberg decision and appeal, and the prospects for future litigation. Featuring: -- Ted Frank, Director of Litigation and Senior Attorney, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and the Center for Class Action Fairness.

What happens when a Subway foot-long sandwich is only 11 inches long? There’s a class action lawsuit for that. In recent years, high-profile class action settlements have been criticized for delivering little to no monetary relief to plaintiffs — instead, providing coupons, injunctive relief or “cy pres” relief in which the defendant makes charitable donations — while making large fee awards to attorneys. On the latest episode of the ABA Banking Journal Podcast — sponsored by Reich and Tang Deposit Solutions — class action expert Ted Frank discusses recent trends in class litigation. As founder of the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and its Center for Class Action Fairness, Frank discusses his efforts to object to settlements that deliver insufficiently for consumers — and how these efforts have helped to reduce frivolous lawsuits by making it harder for plaintiffs attorneys to get big fee awards. He also discusses the value of arbitration for consumers compared to class actions, as well as the role of shareholder strike suits in mergers and acquisitions.

Is rational basis review the appropriate approach consistent with constitutional text, history, and good public policy, or is it an abdication of judicial responsibility?Advocates for greater judicial engagement argue that courts have a constitutional obligation to apply meaningful judicial review to infringement of unenumerated “nonfundamental” rights. Judicial abdication of that responsibility, they argue, permits special interests to interfere with competition, innovation, and economic liberty.Defenders of rational basis review maintain that judges are ill-equipped to second-guess the policy judgments of elected lawmakers, and that absent a clear violation of a constitutional protection, such determinations are better left to that branch of government subject to democratic accountability.Ted Frank of Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and Clark Neily of The Cato Institute will debate the merits of judicial engagement and rational basis review. Featuring: -- Ted Frank, Director, Center for Class Action Fairness, Hamiliton Lincoln Law Institute-- Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice, Cato Institute-- Moderator: Hon. Paul B. Matey, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Is rational basis review the appropriate approach consistent with constitutional text, history, and good public policy, or is it an abdication of judicial responsibility?Advocates for greater judicial engagement argue that courts have a constitutional obligation to apply meaningful judicial review to infringement of unenumerated “nonfundamental” rights. Judicial abdication of that responsibility, they argue, permits special interests to interfere with competition, innovation, and economic liberty.Defenders of rational basis review maintain that judges are ill-equipped to second-guess the policy judgments of elected lawmakers, and that absent a clear violation of a constitutional protection, such determinations are better left to that branch of government subject to democratic accountability.Ted Frank of Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and Clark Neily of The Cato Institute will debate the merits of judicial engagement and rational basis review. Featuring: -- Ted Frank, Director, Center for Class Action Fairness, Hamiliton Lincoln Law Institute-- Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice, Cato Institute-- Moderator: Hon. Paul B. Matey, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Professor Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School and Ted Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness debate Professor Fitzpatrick’s provocative new book, The Conservative Case for Class Actions (University of Chicago Press).

Professor Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School and Ted Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness debate Professor Fitzpatrick’s provocative new book, The Conservative Case for Class Actions (University of Chicago Press).

This Liberty Law Talk is with Ted Frank on reforming class action litigation and, in particular, the settlements plaintiffs receive under the current system. Frank, the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness, argues that class-action suits contribute little to plaintiffs and substantially benefit only their lawyers. Monitoring and agency problems reign because most […]

Brian and Shant discuss the following:OTO v. Kho: An arbitration agreement ruled void and unenforceable due to unconscionability. Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center: A wrongful death matter that confronts the issue of agency authority and substantive unconscionability.  The Court held that an arbitration agreement signed by a daughter on behalf of her mother was procedurally unconscionable because the mother was not present when the daughter signed the agreement where the care center asserted the contrary.  Moreover, the Court held the agreement substantively unconscionable because the provisions in the agreement were substantially one-sided. Bustos v. Wells Fargo: A close look at the provisions of the California Homeowners Bill of Rights (CABOR) and what remedies it provides.  The Court held that the bank was in violation of the CABOR and in response granted injunctive relief in the form of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in addition to $4,200.00 in attorneys fees.  Wells Fargo argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because the matter was not finalized based upon the grant of the TRO and therefore not a prevailing party.  However, the Court disagreed and found that a TRO is a Preliminary Injunction and therefore Plaintiff is in fact a prevailing party. Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott: A case dealing with an employment class action and the implications of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) for the purposes of removal and remand.  Mancini Associates v. Schwetz: A look at an award of attorney fees arising from the breach of an agreement.  Davis v. Ross: A dispute over a disabled parking spot leads a woman to a felony vandalism conviction.  She then sues the victim of her vandalism and loses because of the principle of Litigation Privilege after a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  She argued the concept of spoliation of the evidence and the Court ruled that the argument only applies to non-communicative conduct and is also subject to the Litigation Privilege. 

Brian and Shant discuss a United States Supreme Court Case that has to do with the Class Action Fairness in Removal Statute, treble damages under penal code, failure to prosecute during a case in trial, picking off class representatives from First District Court of Appeal, and one-way attorney fee statute under labor code. Have questions for us? You can reach us at 213-217-5000, or visit our website at www.kbklawyers.com.

Ted Frank of the Competitive Enterprise Institute Center for Class Action Fairness discusses how class action lawsuits sometimes benefit only the lawyers bringing the suit, not the damaged consumers. Actions taken by the center have resulted in positive changes for consumers involved in class action lawsuits.

On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) alleging that, during gameplay on the Xbox 360 video game console, discs would come loose and get scratched by the internal components of the console, sustaining damage that then rendered them unplayable. The district court, deferring to an earlier denial of class certification entered by another district court dealing with a similar putative class, entered a stipulated dismissal and order striking class allegations. Despite the dismissal being the product of a stipulation--that is, an agreement by the parties--the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the parties remained sufficiently adverse for the dismissal to constitute a final appealable order. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded it had appellate jurisdiction over the case. Reaching the merits, that Court held that the district court had abused its discretion, and therefore reversed the stipulated dismissal and order striking class allegations, and remanded the case. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1291 to review an order denying class certification (or, as in this case, an order striking class allegations) after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Theodore H. Frank, who is Senior Attorney and Director of the Center for Class Action Fairness at the Competitive Enterprise Institute.

Microsoft v. Baker involved a class action lawsuit against the Microsoft Company by plaintiffs who alleged that during games on their Xbox video game console, the game disc would come loose and scratch the internal components of the device, permanently damaging the Xbox. Since only .4% of Xbox consoles experienced this issue, the district court determined that "a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own." The named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. The case was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where the court overturned the lower court's decision and held that the district court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in removing the class action allegations. -- On Monday, June 12 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the decision. Ted Frank of the Competitive Enterprise Institute joined us to discuss the holding and its significance. -- Featuring: Theodore H. Frank, Senior Attorney, Director, Center for Class Action Fairness, Competitive Enterprise Institute.

The New Jersey State Appeals Court recently ruled that texting someone while that person is driving may cause the sender to be liable if an accident occurs. Supporting arguments say those texting drivers are “virtually present” at the accident. This potential liability affects the distribution of responsibility amongst drivers when a collision occurs. On this edition of Lawyer2Lawyer, your hosts Bob Ambrogi and J. Craig Williams invite Attorneys Ted Frank and Marc Saperstein to the discuss the case ruling, whether this advisory ruling will effectively prevent distracted driving, if it’s a fair allocation of responsibility, and more. • New Jersey Attorney Marc Saperstein is a founding member of Davis, Saperstein, and Solomon and a part of the New Jersey Association for Justice. He regularly lectures to fellow lawyers on current case law, class actions, and injury law. Saperstein has a special interest in distracted driving education and prevention. • Manhattan Institute Attorney Ted Frank is the founder and president of Center for Class Action Fairness. He has written law reviews for The Washington Post, The Washington Journal, and The American Spectator. Frank is also on the executive committee of the Federalist Society Litigation Practice Group. Thanks to our sponsor, Clio.

Download the MP3 file of this posting. Lanier v. Norfolk Southern Corporation, 2006 WL 1878984, No. 1:05-3476-MBS (D.S.C. July 6, 2006) You could almost hear the district judge shout, "All aboard!"  The South Carolina District Court let the defendants ride the CAFA train into federal court, and then derailed the plaintiff’s case on a motion to dismiss, stopping only to address the burden of proof issue.  On July 6, 2006, United States District Judge Margaret B. Seymour issued an opinion and order not only retaining federal court jurisdiction under CAFA, but also dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The plaintiff filed the action in South Carolina state court on December 9, 2005 seeking to certify a class of individuals who were laid off or discharged from Avondale Mills facilities in Graniteville, South Carolina after a train derailment which released chlorine gas damaged the mill facility. The chlorine gas damaged the property and equipment, and it interrupted production capacity thereby causing a reduction in employment levels. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ negligence resulted in the derailment, subsequent release of chlorine gas, the disruption of the facilities, and the reduction in work force.  The defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to CAFA.  The plaintiff, wanting off of the train headed to federal court, responded with a motion to remand.  The defendants, wanting to punch the plaintiffs' ticket, also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.  Judge Seymour examined each motion in turn.  First, the remand motion focused solely on CAFA. The defendants argued that the burden of proof, under CAFA, shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that removal is improvident. The court disagreed and noted that the Seventh Circuit in Brill, the Ninth Circuit in Abrego and the Eleventh Circuit in Miedema had all rejected the argument.  Specifically, the court quoted Miedema for its proposition that “a committee report cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law.” (Editors' Note:  See the CAFA Law Blog's analysis of Brill posted on November 2, 2005, the CAFA Law Blog analysis of Abrego posted on May 25, 2006, the CAFA Law Blog analysis and critique of Miedema posted on August 22, 2005, and a discussion and Law Review article by the Editors that disagrees with these holdings entitled “CAFA’s New Minimal Diversity Standard For Interstate Class Actions Creates A Presumption That Jurisdiction Exists, With The Burden Of Proof Assigned To The Party Opposing Jurisdiction” here).  The Court did find, however, that the defendants carried the burden noting that “once the proponent of jurisdiction has set out the amount in controversy, only a legal certainty that the judgment will be less forecloses federal jurisdiction.” The court also made short work of the minimal diversity requirement holding that the Plaintiff was from South Carolina and the defendants were Virginia corporations. The remand motion was denied. Thereafter, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff could not allege a cause of action for negligence on the basis of purely economic loss. The plaintiff was asserting the indirect damages from the train derailment as economic loss. The court held that there were policy reasons that limit tort liability for this exact type of indirect economic loss. Even though the federal court retained jurisdiction, in the same opinion it dismissed the case. 

The Class Action Fairness Act became law in the U.S. in February of 2005. But has CAFA been a real benefit to the justice system across the country? Join Coast to Coast hosts, attorneys and Law.com bloggers, J. Craig Williams and Bob Ambrogi, for an in depth debate with their guests, appellate Attorney Howard Bashman, columnist for Law.com and The Legal Intelligencer of ALM Media, legal reporter Shannon Duffy, who also writes for The Legal Intelligencer and other ALM Media publications and Attorney Richard W. Cohen of Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad and Selinger, P.C. with first-hand experience in an ongoing class action case affected by the CAFA. You'll get the details of CAFA's first year from every side of the issue on this edition.