Podcast appearances and mentions of kristin andrews

There is no consensus on what minds are, but there is plenty of agreement on where they can be found: in humans. Yet human consciousness may account for only a small proportion of the consciousness on our planet. Our guest, Kristin Andrews, is a Professor of Animal Minds at the University of York, Ontario, Canada. She is a philosopher working in close contact with biologists and cognitive scientists and has spent time living in the jungle to observe research on orangutans. Kristin notes that comparative psychology has historically resisted attributing such things as intentions, learning, consciousness, and minds to animals. Yet she argues that this is misguided in the light of the evidence, that often the best way to make sense of the complexity of animal behavior is to invoke minds and intentional concepts. Recently Kristin has proposed that the default assumption — the null hypothesis — should be that animals have minds. Currently, biologists examine markers of consciousness on a species-by-species basis, for example looking for the presence of pain receptor skills, and preferential tradeoffs in behavior. But everywhere we have looked, even in tiny nematode worms, we find multiple markers present. Kristin reasons that switching the focus from asking "where are the minds?" to "what sort of minds are there?" would prove more fruitful. The question of consciousness and AI is at the forefront of popular discourse, but to make progress on a scientific theory of mind we should draw on the richer data of the natural world. Kristin's website has links to her books and papers. As an introduction to her thinking How To Study Animal Minds is a gem of a book.

We may not know what it's like to be a bat, but we're pretty confident that it's like something—that bats (and other mammals) are sentient creatures. They feel pleasure and pain, cold and warmth, agitation and comfort. But when it comes to other creatures, the case is less clear. Is a crab sentient? What about a termite, or a tree? The honest answer is we just don't know—and yet, despite that uncertainty, practical questions arise. How should we treat these beings? What do we owe them? My guest today is Dr. Jonathan Birch. Jonathan is a Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and the author of the new book The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI. In it, he presents a framework for thinking about which beings might be sentient and about how our policies should account for this. Here, we talk about Jonathan's work at the nexus of philosophy, science, and policy—in particular, his role in advising the UK government on the welfare of cephalopods and decapods. We discuss what it means to be sentient and what the brain basis of sentience might be. We sketch his precautionary framework for dealing with the wide-ranging debates and rampant uncertainty around these issues. We talk about several prominent edge cases in the natural world. And, finally, we consider whether AI might become sentient and, if so, by what route. Along the way, Jonathan and I touch on: plants, crayfish, bees, larvae, and LLMs. We talk about "sentience candidates" and the "zone of reasonable disagreement"; about Jonathan's stances on octopus farming and live-boiling of crabs; about the “run-ahead principle” and the “gaming problem”; and about the question of whether all conscious experience has a valence. Jonathan's book is a remarkably clear and compelling read—if you find yourself intrigued by our conversation, I definitely recommend that you check out The Edge of Sentience as well. Alright friends, without further ado, on to our sixth season of Many Minds and on to my conversation with Dr. Jonathan Birch. Enjoy! A transcript of this episode will be available soon. Notes and links 3:00 – The full report prepared by Dr. Birch and colleagues for the UK government is available here. 4:30 – Listen to our earlier episode with Dr. Alex Schnell here. 7:00 – Dr. Birch's 2017 book, from an earlier chapter of his career during which he focused on kin selection and social behavior. 11:00 – A paper by Dr. Birch on the UK government's response to the pandemic. 16:00 – A classic 1958 paper on sentience by the philosopher Herbert Feigl. 20:30 – Read Dr. Birch's general audience essay on the case of live-boiling crabs. 28:30 – Advocates of the idea that regions of the midbrain support sentience include Antonio Damasio, Jaak Panskepp (whose work we discussed in this earlier episode), and Bjorn Merker (whose work we discussed in this earlier episode).  31:30 – A discussion of the possibility of sentience in plants, with former guest Paco Calvo. 34:30 – Peter Godfrey Smith's recent book, Metazoa. 35:30 – A paper by Dr. Birch and colleagues titled ‘Dimensions of animal consciousness.' 39:30 – A study reporting conditioned place avoidance in octopuses. 40:30 – A study reporting anxiety-like states in crayfish. 42:00 – A primer on "nociception" (which Kensy mispronounces in this segment). 44:00 – A popular article by Dr. Birch and colleagues arguing against octopus farming. 47:00 – A paper about welfare concerns in farmed insects. 49:00 – A paper showing that bees will selectively groom an antenna that was touched with a heat probe. 51:00 – The OpenWorm project. 1:02:00 – A recent piece by Dr. Birch and former guest Kristin Andrews about developing better markers for understanding AI sentience. The question of defining “markers” of conscious experience was also a central topic of our recent episode with Tim Bayne.   Recommendations Other Minds, Peter Godfrey-Smith The Mind of a Bee, Lars Chittka Justice for Animals, Martha Nussbaum   Many Minds is a project of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute, which is made possible by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation to Indiana University. The show is hosted and produced by Kensy Cooperrider, with help from Assistant Producer Urte Laukaityte and with creative support from DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by Ben Oldroyd. Our transcripts are created by Sarah Dopierala. Subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also now subscribe to the Many Minds newsletter here! We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com.  For updates about the show, visit our website or follow us on Twitter (@ManyMindsPod) or Bluesky (@manymindspod.bsky.social).

This is Evan's part of the two lectures given by Evan Thompson and Kristin Andrews delve into the concept of life as sensemaking and its implications for artificial intelligence (AI) and consciousness. The speakers […]

This is Kristin's part of the two lectures given by Evan Thompson and Kristin Andrews delve into the concept of life as sensemaking and its implications for artificial intelligence (AI) and consciousness. The speakers […]

A new scientific declaration argues that bees, snakes and a broad array of animals experience consciousness. We talk to the declaration's co-author Kristin Andrews about what that means, from our relationship with nature to what's for dinner.

Philosophy professor Kristin Andrews thinks a lot about how animals think. We talked to her about why understanding dolphin babysitters, and whether rats have culture could enhance our multispecies world.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Taking care of some spring cleaning this week, but we're excited to resurface this conversation with Kristin Andrews and Susana Monsó. We'll be back with a fresh episode in two weeks. In the meanwhile, enjoy! - The Many Minds team --- Your friend is in a bit of distress. They've just been dunked in a pool, and they can't pull themselves out. You're looking on as they're paddling furiously, trying to hold onto the pool's ledge. Fortunately, there's a way to save your friend, to give them an escape route. The thing is, there's also something else vying for your attention at the moment: a chunk of chocolate. So what do you do? Do you first nab the chocolate and then free your friend? Turns out that most rats in this position—that's right, rats—will first free their friend and then go for the chocolate. This is one of many studies that have raised profound questions about whether animals are moral beings, about whether they are capable of things like care and empathy. Such studies are doing more than raising questions about animal morality, though; they're also reshaping our understanding of what animal minds are capable of. My guests today are not one but two philosophers: Dr. Kristin Andrews, Professor of Philosophy at York University in Toronto and Dr. Susana Monsó, Assistant Professor in the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at UNED in Spain. Both Susana and Kristin have emerged as central figures in the new conversations and debates that springing about animal minds and animal morality. We cover a lot of ground in this episode. We talk about rats and empathy. We discuss the role of philosophy in the crossdisciplinary study of animal cognition. We talk about Kristin's most recent book, which is a critical consideration of how scientists are trained to study animals, and Susana's book, which is an extended investigation into animals' understandings of death. We zoom in on the “animal morality debate”—about whether animals should be considered moral beings. We consider how touch might inform the debate and social norms and morality are deeply enmeshed than you may realize. As we navigate these lofty ideas, we also touch on the use of thermography to study emotions in marmosets, planning in orangutans, tongue-biting in orcas, and playing dead in possums. This is basically a double episode. It features two amazing guests. It takes on two big topics—the study of animal minds in general and the animal morality debate in particular. It's also a tad longer than our usual fare, but I promised its packed with useful frameworks, provocative findings, and a bunch of open questions. I think it also picks up steam as we go—so be sure to stick with it, through to the second half. Alright folks, as always, thanks so much for listening. And be sure to send us your guest and topic ideas, your glowing reviews, and your crotchety comments. You can reach us on Twitter or by email at manymindspodcast@gmail.com. Now for my conversation with Dr. Susana Monsó and Dr. Kristin Andrews. Enjoy!   A transcript of this episode is available here.   Notes and links 5:00 – An essay by Dr. Andrews & Dr. Monsó in Aeon magazine, about how rats deserve ethical protections. 7:30 – A popular article about findings that vervet monkeys socially learn food preferences. The original research paper is here. 9:10 – A popular article on the findings that rats can learn to play hide-and-seek. 22:00 – Dr. Andrews' most recent book is How to Study Animal Minds. Her earlier book, The Animal Mind, is now out in a second edition. 24:00 – Morgan's Canon has been widely discussed and criticized in recent decades (see here, here, and here). 27:00 – A paper by Dr. Andrews on the role of folk psychology in animal cognition research. 33:00 – A paper by Dr. Andrews discussing the idea of “anthropectomy.” 34:00 – The paper by Dan Dennett that makes the distinction between “romantics” and “killjoys.” 35:20 – Dr. Monsó's recent book (in Spanish) translates as Schrödinger's Opossum. See also: her essay in Aeon about the phenomenon of “playing dead” and what it tells us about predator cognition; and her recent philosophical papers on the same topic (here, here). 49:30 – See the recent chapter by Dr. Monsó & Dr. Andrews on “animal moral psychologies.” See also a paper by Dr. Monsó and colleagues, ‘Animal morality: What it means and why it matters.' 51:30 – A classic article by Frans de Waal, ‘Putting the altruism back into altruism.' 53:40 – An “appreciation and update” to Tinbergen's four questions. 58:00 – For a review of some of the “rat empathy” studies, see the “animal moral psychologies” chapter by Dr. Monsó & Dr. Andrews. This line of work began with a paper by Bartal and colleagues in 2011. A skeptical take can be found here. 1:01 – A popular article on how chimpanzees pass the “marshmallow test.” 1:04:00 – A paper on (the apparent absence of) “third-party punishment” in chimpanzees. 1:06:00 – A recent paper using thermography to gauge whether marmosets understand each other's “conversations.” 1:08:00 – One of the now-famous “ape suit” studies by Chris Krupenye and colleagues. 1:11:30 – A recent paper by Dr. Andrews on the possibility of animal social norms. 1:17:00 – A recent paper by Dr. Monsó on “how the study of touch can inform the animal morality debate.” 1:21:00 – A recent paper by Filip Mattens on touch—and the “vigilance” function of touch in particular. 1:25:20 – A video of “eye-poking” in capuchins, which Susan Perry has studied. 1:28:00 – On the WEIRD issue, see our essay on first decade of the acronym.   Dr. Andrews recommends: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Dr. Andrews & Jacob Beck ‘Gricean communication, language development, and animal minds,' by Richard Moore Chimpanzee Memoirs, edited by Stephen Ross* & Lydia Hopper Dr. Monsó recommends: The Animal Cognition entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Mind of a Bee, Lars Chittka (forthcoming) An Immense World, Ed Yong (forthcoming) You can read more about Dr. Andrews' work at her website and follow her on Twitter. You can read more about Dr. Monsó's work at her website and follow her on Twitter. * Sadly, shortly after this episode was recorded, Stephen Ross died unexpectedly. Read an obituary here.   Many Minds is a project of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute, which is made possible by a generous grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation to UCLA. It is hosted and produced by Kensy Cooperrider, with help from Assistant Producer Urte Laukaityte and with creative support from DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by Ben Oldroyd. Our transcripts are created by Sarah Dopierala. You can subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you like to listen to podcasts.  **You can now subscribe to the Many Minds newsletter here!** We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com.  For updates about the show, visit our website (https://disi.org/manyminds/), or follow us on Twitter: @ManyMindsPod.

Today we bring you the voices of more members of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute (DISI) community — Dr. Amanda Seed, Dr. Cat Hobaiter, Dr. Dora Biro, Dr. Michael Muthukrishna, Dr. Kristin Andrews, and Dr. Tom Griffiths. They share some of their fascinating research that has been funded by Templeton World Charity Foundation grants. They talk about why they love what we affectionately call “adult summer science camp,” and why interdisciplinary conversations and collaborations about diverse intelligences are more important now than ever. Read the transcript of this episode Subscribe to Stories of Impact wherever you listen to podcasts Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube Comments, questions and suggestions info@storiesofimpact.org Supported by Templeton World Charity Foundation

Your friend is in a bit of distress. They've just been dunked in a pool, and they can't pull themselves out. You're looking on as they're paddling furiously, trying to hold onto the pool's ledge. Fortunately, there's a way to save your friend, to give them an escape route. The thing is, there's also something else vying for your attention at the moment: a chunk of chocolate. So what do you do? Do you first nab the chocolate and then free your friend? Turns out that most rats in this position—that's right, rats—will first free their friend and then go for the chocolate. This is one of many studies that have raised profound questions about whether animals are moral beings, about whether they are capable of things like care and empathy. Such studies are doing more than raising questions about animal morality, though; they're also reshaping our understanding of what animal minds are capable of. My guests today are not one but two philosophers: Dr. Kristin Andrews, Professor of Philosophy at York University in Toronto and Dr. Susana Monsó, Assistant Professor in the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at UNED in Spain. Both Susana and Kristin have emerged as central figures in the new conversations and debates that springing about animal minds and animal morality. We cover a lot of ground in this episode. We talk about rats and empathy. We discuss the role of philosophy in the crossdisciplinary study of animal cognition. We talk about Kristin's most recent book, which is a critical consideration of how scientists are trained to study animals, and Susana's book, which is an extended investigation into animals' understandings of death. We zoom in on the “animal morality debate”—about whether animals should be considered moral beings. We consider how touch might inform the debate and social norms and morality are deeply enmeshed than you may realize. As we navigate these lofty ideas, we also touch on the use of thermography to study emotions in marmosets, planning in orangutans, tongue-biting in orcas, and playing dead in possums. This is basically a double episode. It features two amazing guests. It takes on two big topics—the study of animal minds in general and the animal morality debate in particular. It's also a tad longer than our usual fare, but I promised its packed with useful frameworks, provocative findings, and a bunch of open questions. I think it also picks up steam as we go—so be sure to stick with it, through to the second half. Alright folks, as always, thanks so much for listening. And be sure to send us your guest and topic ideas, your glowing reviews, and your crotchety comments. You can reach us on Twitter or by email at manymindspodcast@gmail.com. Now for my conversation with Dr. Susana Monsó and Dr. Kristin Andrews. Enjoy!   A transcript of this episode will be available soon.   Notes and links 5:00 – An essay by Dr. Andrews & Dr. Monsó in Aeon magazine, about how rats deserve ethical protections. 7:30 – A popular article about findings that vervet monkeys socially learn food preferences. The original research paper is here. 9:10 – A popular article on the findings that rats can learn to play hide-and-seek. 22:00 – Dr. Andrews' most recent book is How to Study Animal Minds. Her earlier book, The Animal Mind, is now out in a second edition. 24:00 – Morgan's Canon has been widely discussed and criticized in recent decades (see here, here, and here). 27:00 – A paper by Dr. Andrews on the role of folk psychology in animal cognition research. 33:00 – A paper by Dr. Andrews discussing the idea of “anthropectomy.” 34:00 – The paper by Dan Dennett that makes the distinction between “romantics” and “killjoys.” 35:20 – Dr. Monsó's recent book (in Spanish) translates as Schrödinger's Opossum. See also: her essay in Aeon about the phenomenon of “playing dead” and what it tells us about predator cognition; and her recent philosophical papers on the same topic (here, here). 49:30 – See the recent chapter by Dr. Monsó & Dr. Andrews on “animal moral psychologies.” See also a paper by Dr. Monsó and colleagues, ‘Animal morality: What it means and why it matters.' 51:30 – A classic article by Frans de Waal, ‘Putting the altruism back into altruism.' 53:40 – An “appreciation and update” to Tinbergen's four questions. 58:00 – For a review of some of the “rat empathy” studies, see the “animal moral psychologies” chapter by Dr. Monsó & Dr. Andrews. This line of work began with a paper by Bartal and colleagues in 2011. A skeptical take can be found here. 1:01 – A popular article on how chimpanzees pass the “marshmallow test.” 1:04:00 – A paper on (the apparent absence of) “third-party punishment” in chimpanzees. 1:06:00 – A recent paper using thermography to gauge whether marmosets understand each other's “conversations.” 1:08:00 – One of the now-famous “ape suit” studies by Chris Krupenye and colleagues. 1:11:30 – A recent paper by Dr. Andrews on the possibility of animal social norms. 1:17:00 – A recent paper by Dr. Monsó on “how the study of touch can inform the animal morality debate.” 1:21:00 – A recent paper by Filip Mattens on touch—and the “vigilance” function of touch in particular. 1:25:20 – A video of “eye-poking” in capuchins, which Susan Perry has studied. 1:28:00 – On the WEIRD issue, see our essay on first decade of the acronym.   Dr. Andrews recommends: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Dr. Andrews & Jacob Beck ‘Gricean communication, language development, and animal minds,' by Richard Moore Chimpanzee Memoirs, edited by Stephen Ross* & Lydia Hopper Dr. Monsó recommends: The Animal Cognition entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Mind of a Bee, Lars Chittka (forthcoming) An Immense World, Ed Yong (forthcoming) You can read more about Dr. Andrews' work at her website and follow her on Twitter. You can read more about Dr. Monsó's work at her website and follow her on Twitter. * Sadly, shortly after this episode was recorded, Stephen Ross died unexpectedly. Read an obituary here.   Many Minds is a project of the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute (DISI) (https://disi.org), which is made possible by a generous grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation to UCLA. It is hosted and produced by Kensy Cooperrider, with help from assistant producer Cecilia Padilla. Creative support is provided by DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by Ben Oldroyd (https://www.mayhilldesigns.co.uk/). Our transcripts are created by Sarah Dopierala (https://sarahdopierala.wordpress.com/). You can subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you like to listen to podcasts. We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com. For updates about the show, visit our website (https://disi.org/manyminds/), or follow us on Twitter: @ManyMindsPod.

Oktopoden sind intelligente Tiere, sie erinnern sich an Menschen und an früher erlittene Schmerzen. Die Autorin Sy Montgomery ist davon überzeugt, dass die Meeresbewohner Gefühle haben.

In this episode, Kristin Andrews, Sarah Brosnan, and Susana Monsó explore whether non-human animals can be moral

Are non-human animals conscious? Do non-human animal minds have concepts, intelligence, memory, intentionality, ethics, and social behavior? Kristin Andrews, professor of philosophy, author, and pioneering researcher in moral cognition, discusses non-human animal consciousness and the ethical problems of using non-human animals, like rats, as research subjects. To celebrate the newly released Second Edition of Kristin’s seminal textbook, The Animal Mind, we dive deep into philosophical inquiry on animals and consciousness—how and what animals think, what skills they possess, what moral and social structures they create and live by, and throughout our conversation she tackles the minefield of ethical questions about animal rights and using animals in scientific and medical research. Kristin also candidly describes how she conquered obstacles most women face navigating and succeeding in the largely male-dominated world of academic philosophy. This episode will broaden your perspective on our animal brothers and sisters, and how closely related we truly are.https://kristinandrews.org/   

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter SubscribeStar: https://www.subscribestar.com/the-dissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT Anchor (podcast): https://anchor.fm/thedissenter Dr. Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University (Toronto), where she also helps coordinate the Cognitive Science program and the Toronto Area Animal Cognition Discussion Group. Dr. Andrews is on the board of directors of the Borneo Orangutan Society Canada, a member of the College of the Royal Society of Canada, and the author of several books on social minds, animal minds, and ethics. In this episode, we talk about how to properly study animal minds, and also issues regarding animal ethics. We start by discussing how difficult it is to study non-human animals' behavior and minds, and Dr. Andrews presents the calibration method. We also discuss how we can use folk psychology as a starting point. We talk about the flaws with anthropomorphism and anthropectomy. We then get into the issue of theory of mind, and how to deal with consciousness in animal cognitive studies. Dr. Andrews also refers to recent exciting research that points to the possibility of plants also having consciousness and minds. Finally, we get into animal ethics, and discuss specifically issues related to how we can determine if there are other animals that also are moral agents, and how to study moral normativity in non-human animals. We end up by talking a bit about veganism. -- Follow Dr. Andrews' work: Faculty page: http://bit.ly/35XXWPp Personal website: http://bit.ly/331Hbl4 Articles page: http://bit.ly/2YeRzV7 PhilPeople page: http://bit.ly/2RflOdl ResearchGate profile: http://bit.ly/2LipRSo Amazon page: https://amzn.to/35QK9Ky -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, PER HELGE LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, ANTÓNIO CUNHA, JERRY MULLER, FRANCIS FORDE, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, YEVHEN BODRENKO, ADAM BJERRE, AIRES ALMEIDA, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, BO WINEGARD, VEGA GIDEY, CRAIG HEALY, OLAF ALEX, PHILIP KURIAN, JONATHAN VISSER, DAVID DIAS, ANJAN KATTA, JAKOB KLINKBY, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, PAULINA BARREN, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ARTHUR KOH, AND ZOOP! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, ROSEY, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, ILEWELLYN OSBORNE, IAN GILLIGAN, AND SERGIU CONDREANU! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCER, MICHAL RUSIECKI!

PERSONHOOD, LANGUAGE, BELIEF, 'CORRECTNESS' THROUGH HUMAN LENS.

This week on Knowing Animals I am joined by Dr. Jeff Sebo. Jeff is Clinical Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies and Director of the Animal Studies M.A. Program at New York University. We discuss his new book ‘Chimpanzee Rights’ which is published by Routledge. Jeff’s co-authors are: Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G. K. D. Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, John Taylor, Syd Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicks, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis and David Peña-Guzmán. This episode of Knowing Animals is brought to you by AASA. AASA is the Australasian Animal Studies Association. You can find AASA on Facebook here: https://www.facebook.com/AASA-Australasian-Animal-Studies-Association-480316142116752/. Join AASA today!    

Kristin Andrews is the creative designer at Kreative Blends (@kreativeblends) has a true passion for being creative. She's a self-taught Calligraphy Artist, who enjoys spending time with her MANY Tombow Dual Brush Pens along with an assortment of others. Born and raised in the Chicago area, she loves meeting new calligra-FRIENDS and other artists/designers.  Just show her to the nearest cafe, she'll bring her Rhodia Dot Pad and Tombow markers and make herself right at home! Aside from her passion of lettering, Kristin has an extensive digital marketing background that also includes a Master of Science in Digital Marketing from Full Sail University. She has worked with companies such as PepsiCo, redbox, and Scientific Games - just to name a few. Lastly, but certainly not least, She's a wife and mother of 3 beautiful children. There isn’t a day that goes by where her passion doesn’t include them. EVERYTHING that she does, she does for them!   Follow her creatives on IG: kreativeblends.

Philosophy of Animal Minds Part 2 - Associate Professor Kristin Andrews discusses if it is possible for chimpanzees and rats to have empathy, and if chimpanzees reason about belief, also how animal cognition differs from human cognition.

Philosophy of Animal Minds Part 1- Associate Professor Kristin Andrews discusses why within the field of philosophy, ever since ancient times there has been an interest in animal minds however in the last few decades animal minds has became become a major topic, and also explains about animals and language of thought.

The ability to figure out the mental lives of others – what they want, what they believe, what they know — is basic to our relationships. Sherlock Holmes exemplified this ability by accurately simulating the thought processes of suspects in order to solve mysterious crimes. But folk psychology is not restricted to genius detectives. We all use it: to predict what a friend will feel when we cancel a date, to explain why a child in a playground is crying, to deceive someone else by saying less than the whole story. Its very ubiquity explains why it is called folk psychology. But how in fact does folk psychology work? On standard views in philosophy and psychology, folk psychology just is the practice of ascribing or attributing beliefs and desires to people for explaining and predicting their behavior. A folk psychologist is someone who has this “theory of mind”. In her new book, Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT Press, 2012), Kristin Andrews, associate professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, argues that the standard view is far too narrow a construal of what's going on. It leaves out a wide variety of other mechanisms we use to understand the mental lives of others, and a wide variety of other reasons we have for engaging in this social competence. Moreover, what's necessary to be a folk psychologist is not a sophisticated metacognitive ability for ascribing beliefs, but an ability to sort the world into agents and non-agents – an ability that greatly expands the class of creatures that can be folk psychologists. Andrews draws on empirical work in psychology and ethology, including her own field work observing wild primates, to critique the standard view and ground her alternative pluralistic view. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The ability to figure out the mental lives of others – what they want, what they believe, what they know — is basic to our relationships. Sherlock Holmes exemplified this ability by accurately simulating the thought processes of suspects in order to solve mysterious crimes. But folk psychology is not restricted to genius detectives. We all use it: to predict what a friend will feel when we cancel a date, to explain why a child in a playground is crying, to deceive someone else by saying less than the whole story. Its very ubiquity explains why it is called folk psychology. But how in fact does folk psychology work? On standard views in philosophy and psychology, folk psychology just is the practice of ascribing or attributing beliefs and desires to people for explaining and predicting their behavior. A folk psychologist is someone who has this “theory of mind”. In her new book, Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT Press, 2012), Kristin Andrews, associate professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, argues that the standard view is far too narrow a construal of what’s going on. It leaves out a wide variety of other mechanisms we use to understand the mental lives of others, and a wide variety of other reasons we have for engaging in this social competence. Moreover, what’s necessary to be a folk psychologist is not a sophisticated metacognitive ability for ascribing beliefs, but an ability to sort the world into agents and non-agents – an ability that greatly expands the class of creatures that can be folk psychologists. Andrews draws on empirical work in psychology and ethology, including her own field work observing wild primates, to critique the standard view and ground her alternative pluralistic view. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The ability to figure out the mental lives of others – what they want, what they believe, what they know — is basic to our relationships. Sherlock Holmes exemplified this ability by accurately simulating the thought processes of suspects in order to solve mysterious crimes. But folk psychology is not restricted to genius detectives. We all use it: to predict what a friend will feel when we cancel a date, to explain why a child in a playground is crying, to deceive someone else by saying less than the whole story. Its very ubiquity explains why it is called folk psychology. But how in fact does folk psychology work? On standard views in philosophy and psychology, folk psychology just is the practice of ascribing or attributing beliefs and desires to people for explaining and predicting their behavior. A folk psychologist is someone who has this “theory of mind”. In her new book, Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT Press, 2012), Kristin Andrews, associate professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, argues that the standard view is far too narrow a construal of what's going on. It leaves out a wide variety of other mechanisms we use to understand the mental lives of others, and a wide variety of other reasons we have for engaging in this social competence. Moreover, what's necessary to be a folk psychologist is not a sophisticated metacognitive ability for ascribing beliefs, but an ability to sort the world into agents and non-agents – an ability that greatly expands the class of creatures that can be folk psychologists. Andrews draws on empirical work in psychology and ethology, including her own field work observing wild primates, to critique the standard view and ground her alternative pluralistic view. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

The ability to figure out the mental lives of others – what they want, what they believe, what they know — is basic to our relationships. Sherlock Holmes exemplified this ability by accurately simulating the thought processes of suspects in order to solve mysterious crimes. But folk psychology is not restricted to genius detectives. We all use it: to predict what a friend will feel when we cancel a date, to explain why a child in a playground is crying, to deceive someone else by saying less than the whole story. Its very ubiquity explains why it is called folk psychology. But how in fact does folk psychology work? On standard views in philosophy and psychology, folk psychology just is the practice of ascribing or attributing beliefs and desires to people for explaining and predicting their behavior. A folk psychologist is someone who has this “theory of mind”. In her new book, Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT Press, 2012), Kristin Andrews, associate professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, argues that the standard view is far too narrow a construal of what’s going on. It leaves out a wide variety of other mechanisms we use to understand the mental lives of others, and a wide variety of other reasons we have for engaging in this social competence. Moreover, what’s necessary to be a folk psychologist is not a sophisticated metacognitive ability for ascribing beliefs, but an ability to sort the world into agents and non-agents – an ability that greatly expands the class of creatures that can be folk psychologists. Andrews draws on empirical work in psychology and ethology, including her own field work observing wild primates, to critique the standard view and ground her alternative pluralistic view. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The ability to figure out the mental lives of others – what they want, what they believe, what they know — is basic to our relationships. Sherlock Holmes exemplified this ability by accurately simulating the thought processes of suspects in order to solve mysterious crimes. But folk psychology is not restricted to genius detectives. We all use it: to predict what a friend will feel when we cancel a date, to explain why a child in a playground is crying, to deceive someone else by saying less than the whole story. Its very ubiquity explains why it is called folk psychology. But how in fact does folk psychology work? On standard views in philosophy and psychology, folk psychology just is the practice of ascribing or attributing beliefs and desires to people for explaining and predicting their behavior. A folk psychologist is someone who has this “theory of mind”. In her new book, Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT Press, 2012), Kristin Andrews, associate professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, argues that the standard view is far too narrow a construal of what’s going on. It leaves out a wide variety of other mechanisms we use to understand the mental lives of others, and a wide variety of other reasons we have for engaging in this social competence. Moreover, what’s necessary to be a folk psychologist is not a sophisticated metacognitive ability for ascribing beliefs, but an ability to sort the world into agents and non-agents – an ability that greatly expands the class of creatures that can be folk psychologists. Andrews draws on empirical work in psychology and ethology, including her own field work observing wild primates, to critique the standard view and ground her alternative pluralistic view. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices