Podcast appearances and mentions of morton thiokol

When neuroscientists scanned the brains of people going along with a group, they expected to find lying. What they found instead was something far stranger. The group wasn't changing people's answers. It was changing what they actually saw. We'll get to that study in a minute. But first, I want you to remember the last time you were in a meeting, and you knew something was wrong. The numbers didn't add up. The risk was being underestimated. And someone needed to say it. Then the most senior person in the room spoke first: "I think this is exactly what we need." Heads nodded. Finance agreed. Marketing agreed. The consultant agreed. And by the time it was your turn, you heard yourself saying, "I have some minor concerns, but overall I think it's solid." You're not alone. Research shows that roughly half of employees stay silent at work rather than voice a concern. And among those who stayed quiet, 40% estimated they wasted 2 weeks or more replaying what they didn't say. Two weeks. Mentally rehearsing the point they should have made in a meeting that's already over. That silence isn't a character flaw. It's your neurology working against you. And today I'm going to show you exactly why it happens and how to stop it.  It starts with what was happening inside your head during that meeting you just remembered. Why Your Brain Surrenders to the Group Most people know about the Asch conformity experiments from the 1950s. People were asked to match line lengths, and seventy-five percent went along with answers that were obviously wrong. That result gets cited everywhere. But the more important study came fifty years later, and it revealed something the Asch experiment never could. In 2005, neuroscientist Gregory Berns at Emory University put people inside an MRI machine and ran a similar conformity task, this time with three-dimensional shape rotation. Like Asch, he planted actors who gave wrong answers. But unlike Asch, he could watch what was happening inside people's brains while the conformity was occurring. Berns expected the MRI to show activity in the prefrontal cortex, the brain's decision-making center, when people went along with wrong answers. That would mean they were knowingly lying to fit in. Just a social calculation. That's not what the scans showed. People who conformed showed no increased activity in decision-making regions. Instead, the activity showed up in the parts of the brain that handle visual and spatial perception, the occipital and parietal areas. The group wasn't changing people's answers. It was changing what they actually saw. Their brains were rewriting their experience to match the room. And the people who resisted the group? Their scans told a different story. Heightened activity in the amygdala, the brain's threat detection center. The same circuitry that fires when you encounter physical danger lit up when someone disagreed with the group. Berns put it plainly. The fear of social isolation activates the same neural machinery as the fear of genuine threats to survival. When you caved in that meeting, your neurology wasn't malfunctioning. It was doing exactly what it was designed to do. Keep you safe inside the tribe. This is why what I call mindjacking works so well. Algorithms manufacture social proof by showing you what's trending, what your friends liked, and what similar people chose. Your wiring responds the same way it does at the conference table. You're fighting your own threat-detection system every time you try to hold an independent position within a group. You can't turn off the wiring. But you can learn to catch it in the act. And that starts with one critical distinction. The First Skill: Separating Updating from Caving Sometimes the people around you know something you don't. Changing your mind in a group isn't always a surrender. Sometimes it's the smartest move in the room. The real skill is knowing which one just happened. You can test this in real time. When you feel your position shifting in a group, ask yourself three questions. First: Did someone introduce information I didn't have before? If the CFO reveals a data point that genuinely changes the calculus, updating your view isn't a weakness. It's intelligence. That's new evidence. Second: Can I articulate why I changed my mind, in specific terms? If you can say, "I shifted because of the margin data in Q3 that I hadn't seen," that's a real update. If you can only say, "I don't know, everyone seemed to think it was fine," that's capitulation. Third: Would I have reached this same conclusion alone, with the same information? This is the killer question. If the answer is no, and you only arrived at this position because others were already there, you haven't updated. You've surrendered. Getting this wrong is costly. And not just the one time. When you capitulate and call it updating, you train yourself to stop trusting your own analysis. Do it enough times, and you won't even bother preparing, because you already know you're going to defer. That's how capable people slowly become passengers in rooms where they should be driving. Capture those three questions somewhere you'll see them. They're your real-time check on whether you're being open-minded or spineless. Those questions work when you're already in the meeting and the pressure is live. But what if you could protect your thinking before the pressure even starts? The Pre-Meeting Lock-In The most important thing you can do to protect your independent thinking doesn't happen during the meeting. It happens before. I call it the Pre-Meeting Lock-In, and it takes less than two minutes. Before any meeting where a decision will be made, write down three things:  Your position  Two or three key reasons supporting it What would it take to change your mind Put it on paper. Put it in a note on your phone. Just get it out of your head and into a form you can reference. Why does this work? Because once the discussion starts, your mind is going to quietly edit your memories of what you believed. You'll start thinking, "Well, I wasn't really sure about that point anyway." Your pre-meeting notes are an anchor against that self-deception. They're a record of what you actually thought before the social pressure arrived. You want to see what happens when someone has the analysis but doesn't lock it in?  The night before the Challenger launch in January 1986, engineer Roger Boisjoly and his team at Morton Thiokol had the data. They knew the O-ring seals were dangerous in cold weather. They'd written memos. They'd run the numbers. They recommended against launching. But when NASA pushed back hard on the teleconference, Thiokol management called an off-line caucus and excluded the engineers from the room. When the call resumed, management reversed the recommendation. Boisjoly had the analysis. His managers had heard it. But under pressure from their biggest customer, the conclusion got edited in real time. Boisjoly later described it as an unethical forum driven by what he called "intense customer intimidation." He fought like hell, but the room won. That's the most extreme version of the problem. Life and death. But the mechanics are the same in every conference room. The analysis exists. The pressure arrives. And without something anchoring you to what you actually concluded, the room rewrites the story. There's a bonus effect to the Lock-In, too. When you've documented what it would take to change your mind, you've given yourself permission to be genuinely open. You're not being stubborn for the sake of it. You're saying, "Show me evidence that meets this threshold, and I'll update." That's intellectual honesty with a backbone. But you can know exactly what you think and still fail if you can't get anyone else to hear it. How to Dissent and Actually Be Heard Most dissent fails not because it's wrong, but because it's delivered badly.  Blurting out "I think this is a mistake" when the group is already aligned feels like an attack. People get defensive. Your point gets ignored, not because it lacked merit, but because your delivery threatened the group's cohesion. You triggered the same threat response in them that you've been learning to manage in yourself. Charlan Nemeth, a psychologist at UC Berkeley, has studied dissent for decades. You'd expect her research to show that dissent helps groups when the dissenter is right. When someone spots a flaw that everyone else missed. That makes intuitive sense. But that's not what she found. Nemeth discovered that when someone voices a genuine minority opinion, the entire group thinks more carefully. They consider more information, examine more alternatives, and reach better conclusions. And the group benefits even when the dissenter turns out to be wrong. Even when you're wrong, the act of dissenting makes the group smarter. Your disagreement forces everyone out of autopilot. Decades of research by Moscovici supports this. Minority voices don't just influence people in the moment. They shift perception afterward, in private, long after the meeting ends. That's the good news. The catch is in how the dissent happens. Nemeth tested what happens when dissent is assigned rather than authentic, when someone plays devil's advocate because they were told to. It doesn't produce the same effect. Groups can tell when disagreement is performative. The cognitive benefits only show up when the dissent is authentic. When someone actually believes what they're saying. That means the goal isn't just to voice disagreement. It's to voice it in a way that people can actually receive. And the hardest version of this isn't when you have a minor concern about an otherwise good plan. It's when the whole direction is wrong, and finding something to praise would be dishonest. In those moments, the move is to separate the people from the position. "I respect the work that went into this, and I know this isn't what anyone wants to hear, but I think we're solving the wrong problem." You're honoring the effort while challenging the direction. You're not attacking the tribe. You're trying to save it from a bad bet. When the stakes are lower, and you do see genuine merit, you can lead with that. "The market timing argument is strong, and I want to make sure we've stress-tested one thing before we commit." Same principle. You're working with their wiring instead of against it. Either way, your dissent has value beyond being right. Remember that. It's worth holding onto when your amygdala is screaming at you to stay quiet. Everything so far has assumed you're in a room with other people. Your amygdala can't tell the difference between a conference table and a phone screen. The Rooms You Can't See You're not just in meetings. You're in invisible rooms all day long. And most of the time, you don't even know you've walked into one. Every time you scroll past a post with ten thousand likes and think, "I guess that's the right take." Every time you read three articles with the same conclusion and stop questioning it. Every time an algorithm shows you what similar people chose, and you choose it too. Those are rooms full of nodding heads. And your amygdala responds to them the same way it responds to the conference table. Think about the last time you researched a major purchase. You probably started with some idea of what you wanted. Then you read reviews. Then you checked what was trending. Then you asked friends. By the time you decided, how much of that decision was yours? How much of it was the room? Or think about how you form opinions on topics you haven't studied deeply. You read a few articles. They mostly agree. You adopt the consensus. That feels like research. But Berns' scans tell us what's actually happening. Your brain isn't independently weighing the evidence. It's detecting a consensus and rewriting your perception to match. The same process that happens at the conference table is happening every time you open your phone. Mindjacking doesn't need to override your thinking. It just needs to make sure you never finish thinking for yourself before the crowd's answer arrives. And once it arrives, your neurology does the rest. The group doesn't just influence your answer; it shapes it. It rewrites your perception. The Lock-In works for these invisible rooms, too. Before you research a major purchase, write down what you actually want and what you're willing to pay. Before you dive into reviews and opinions, commit your criteria to paper. Before you ask friends what they think about a decision you've already analyzed, record your conclusion. Give yourself the same protection from algorithmic conformity that you'd want before walking into a boardroom. The skill isn't being contrarian. It's being first. First, to your own conclusion, before the room, any room, gets a vote. This is your challenge for the week. Think of one meeting you have coming up where a decision will be made. Before you walk in, open your notes app and type three lines. Line one: what you think. Line two: why. Line three: what would change your mind. That's it. Then sit in that meeting and watch what happens to your thinking when the room pushes back. I think you'll surprise yourself. What if the person you can't resist isn't your boss, your colleagues, or the algorithm? What if it's you? What happens when the decision you need to make threatens something deeper, when being wrong would mean something unbearable about who you are? That's where we're headed next. Closing If this episode gave you something useful, hit that subscribe button. I'm building a complete thinking toolkit here in the Thinking 101 series. If you got value today, share it with someone who could use it, especially anyone heading into a big meeting this week. Drop a comment and tell me: what's the hardest group you've ever had to disagree with? I read every comment and reply. Thanks for watching, and I'll see you in the next episode. Endnotes/References "roughly half of employees stay silent at work rather than voice a concern" / "forty percent estimated they wasted two weeks or more": VitalSmarts, Costly Conversations: Why The Way Employees Communicate Will Make or Break Your Bottom Line (Provo, UT: VitalSmarts, December 2016). In a study of 1,025 employees, 70 percent reported instances where they or others failed to speak up effectively when a peer did not pull their weight. Half wasted seven days or more avoiding crucial conversations. Forty percent estimated they wasted two weeks or more ruminating about the problem. A 2021 follow-up study by Crucial Learning (formerly VitalSmarts) of 1,100 people found the rumination figure had risen to 43 percent. The script's "roughly half" is drawn from the VitalSmarts finding that the majority of the workforce reported conversation failures, with half losing seven or more days to avoidance behaviors. Primary source: https://www.vitalsmarts.com/press/2016/12/costly-conversations-why-the-way-employees-communicate-will-make-or-break-your-bottom-line/. Follow-up study: https://cruciallearning.com/press/costly-conversations-how-lack-of-communication-is-costing-organizations-thousands-in-revenue/ "the Asch conformity experiments from the 1950s": Solomon E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in Groups, Leadership and Men, ed. Harold Guetzkow (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), 177–190. The expanded report was published as Solomon E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority," Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70, no. 9 (1956): 1–70. Asch conducted the line-judgment experiments at Swarthmore College. Participants judged which of three comparison lines matched a standard line, with confederates unanimously giving incorrect answers on critical trials. Across conditions, approximately 75 percent of participants conformed at least once, and the mean conformity rate was approximately one-third of critical trials. Group sizes varied across experiments, typically with 6–8 confederates and one real participant. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1952-00803-001 "neuroscientist Gregory Berns at Emory University put people inside an MRI machine": Gregory S. Berns, Jonathan Chappelow, Caroline F. Zink, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Megan E. Martin-Skurski, and Jim Richards, "Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation," Biological Psychiatry 58, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 245–253. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2005.04.012. The study used functional magnetic resonance imaging with a mental rotation task. Participants (n=32, ages 19–41) judged whether three-dimensional shapes were rotated versions of each other while four confederates provided answers. Conformity was associated with functional changes in the occipital-parietal network (visual and spatial perception regions), not the prefrontal cortex. Independence was associated with heightened activity in the right amygdala and right caudate nucleus, regions linked to emotional salience and threat detection. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15978553/ "The group wasn't changing people's answers. It was changing what they actually saw": Berns et al., "Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity," 245–253. The researchers isolated the specifically social element of conformity by comparing brain activation when wrong answers came from a group of people versus when they came from computers. Conformity to group-sourced wrong answers produced greater activation bilaterally in visual cortex and right intraparietal sulcus, overlapping the baseline mental rotation network. Berns interpreted this as evidence that social conformity operates at a perceptual level rather than merely at a decision-making level. Full text PDF: https://pdodds.w3.uvm.edu/files/papers/others/2005/berns2005.pdf "Heightened activity in the amygdala": Berns et al., "Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity," 245–253. Participants who gave independent (correct) answers when the group was wrong showed significantly increased activation in the right amygdala and right caudate nucleus. The amygdala is associated with processing emotionally salient stimuli and threats. Berns described these findings as "consistent with the assumptions of social norm theory about the behavioral saliency of standing alone." The script's characterization that "the fear of social isolation activates the same neural machinery as the fear of genuine threats to survival" is an accessible paraphrase of this finding, consistent with the broader social pain literature (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), though Berns' paper does not use that exact language. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15978553/ "engineer Roger Boisjoly and his team at Morton Thiokol had the data": Roger M. Boisjoly, "Ethical Decisions — Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster" (paper presented at the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Annual Meeting, December 13–18, 1987). First presented as a talk at MIT in January 1987. Boisjoly, a specialist in O-ring seals and rocket joints at Morton Thiokol, documented how engineers recommended against the January 28, 1986 launch based on concerns about O-ring performance in cold temperatures. During the pre-launch teleconference, Thiokol management called an off-line caucus, excluded the engineers, and reversed the no-launch recommendation under pressure from NASA. Boisjoly described the forum as constituting "the unethical decision-making forum" driven by customer pressure. He was awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The Online Ethics Center at the National Academy of Engineering hosts Boisjoly's full account: https://onlineethics.org/cases/ethical-decisions-morton-thiokol-and-space-shuttle-challenger-disaster-introduction. See also Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8, no. 4 (April 1989): 217–230. doi:10.1007/BF00383335. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00383335 "Nemeth discovered that when someone voices a genuine minority opinion, the entire group thinks more carefully": Charlan J. Nemeth, In Defense of Troublemakers: The Power of Dissent in Life and Business (New York: Basic Books, 2018). Nemeth's research program at UC Berkeley, spanning four decades, demonstrated that exposure to minority dissent stimulates divergent thinking, broader information search, consideration of more alternatives, and higher-quality group decisions. The finding that dissent improves group performance even when the dissenter turns out to be wrong is documented across multiple studies. See also Charlan J. Nemeth, "Minority Influence Theory," IRLE Working Paper No. 218-10 (Berkeley: Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, May 2010). https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1pz676t7 "Decades of research by Moscovici": Serge Moscovici, Elisabeth Lage, and Martine Naffrechoux, "Influence of a Consistent Minority on the Responses of a Majority in a Color Perception Task," Sociometry 32, no. 4 (December 1969): 365–380. In the original experiment, participants viewed blue slides while two confederates consistently called them green. The consistent minority condition produced a shift in approximately 8 percent of majority judgments toward the minority position, and roughly one-third of participants conformed at least once. In the inconsistent minority condition, the effect was negligible (approximately 1.25 percent). The script's claim that "minority voices don't just influence people in the moment — they shift perception afterward, in private" draws on Moscovici's subsequent conversion theory and research on the delayed and private effects of minority influence, including afterimage studies showing genuine perceptual shifts. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2786541 "Nemeth tested what happens when dissent is assigned rather than authentic": Charlan J. Nemeth, Joanie B. Connell, John D. Rogers, and Keith S. Brown, "Improving Decision Making by Means of Dissent," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31, no. 1 (2001): 48–58. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02481.x. Groups deliberated a personal injury case under three conditions: authentic dissent (a genuine minority viewpoint), assigned devil's advocate (a member told to argue the opposing side), and no dissent. Authentic dissent was superior in stimulating consideration of opposing positions, original thought, and direct attitude change. The devil's advocate condition did not produce the same cognitive benefits, suggesting that groups detect and discount performative disagreement. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02481.x. See also Charlan Nemeth, Keith Brown, and John Rogers, "Devil's Advocate versus Authentic Dissent: Stimulating Quantity and Quality," European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. 6 (2001): 707–720. doi:10.1002/ejsp.58.

In the tense hours leading up to the Challenger launch, engineers and managers at NASA and its contractor Morton Thiokol heatedly argue over whether to move forward, despite freezing temperatures that threaten to compromise the rocket boosters' O-Rings. Be the first to know about Wondery's newest podcasts, curated recommendations, and more! Sign up now at https://wondery.fm/wonderynewsletterListen to American Scandal on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. Experience all episodes ad-free and be the first to binge the newest season. Unlock exclusive early access by joining Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial today by visiting wondery.com/links/american-scandal/ now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

As NASA struggles to keep its ambitious launch schedule on track, engineers at contractor Morton Thiokol raise concerns about a key component of the space shuttle's rocket boosters: O-Rings, which are designed to prevent fuel leaks. Amid this tension, the Teacher in Space program captivates the nation after Christa McAuliffe is selected, raising public interest in the launch. Be the first to know about Wondery's newest podcasts, curated recommendations, and more! Sign up now at https://wondery.fm/wonderynewsletterListen to American Scandal on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. Experience all episodes ad-free and be the first to binge the newest season. Unlock exclusive early access by joining Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial today by visiting wondery.com/links/american-scandal/ now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

On this week's Aftermath Rewind, Rebecca Delgado Smith talks with director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project for the engineering contractor Morton Thiokol at the time of the Challenger disaster, Allan McDonald, and what he says might change the verdict.Learn more about the Challenger Disaster by reading Allan Mcdonald's book, Truth, Lies and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.Join our Patreon!We have merch!Join our Discord!Tell us who you think is to blame at http://thealarmistpodcast.comEmail us at thealarmistpodcast@gmail.comFollow us on Instagram @thealarmistpodcastFollow us on Twitter @alarmistThe Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/alarmist. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

NOUVEAU - Abonnez-vous à Minuit+ pour profiter de Catastrophes - Histoires Vraies et de milliers d'autres histoires sans publicité, d'épisodes en avant-première et en intégralité. Vous aurez accès sans publicité à des dizaines de programmes passionnants comme Crimes - Histoires Vraies, Espions - Histoires Vraies ou encore Paranormal - Histoires Vraies.

Matt sits down with acclaimed author and journalist Adam Higginbotham to discuss his latest book, "Challenger: A True Story of Heroism and Disaster on the Edge of Space." This definitive account of the tragic space shuttle Challenger disaster takes us on a journey from the Apollo program through the investigation that followed the catastrophe. Adam shares the meticulous research to reveal the untold story of what really happened and why. We delve into the internal discussions between NASA and Morton Thiokol executives, the heroic efforts of whistleblowers, and the profound impact this disaster had on space exploration and public perception. Adam's masterful storytelling brings to life the human drama, fascinating science, and shocking political infighting that defined this pivotal moment in history. Whether you're a space enthusiast, a history buff, or simply curious about the Challenger disaster, this episode promises to be both enlightening and unforgettable. www.linktr.ee/Interplanetary Hosts: Matt Russell Music: Matt Russell / Iam7 Twitter @interplanetypod

Allan McDonald: Truth, Lies, and O-Rings Allan J. McDonald retired as vice president and technical director for advanced technology programs at ATK Thiokol Propulsion in 2001. He was the director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project at the time of the Challenger accident and, later, vice president of engineering for space operations during the redesign and requalification of the solid rocket motors. Al passed away in 2021. Al was the one person who officially refused to sign off on Challenger's launch on January 28, 1986. His concerns for the launch conditions were ultimately overridden by his boss. He would eventually testify to the Rogers Commission which had major implications for their findings. Later in life, he spoke to audiences all over the world on ethics and decision-making. He's the author with James Hansen of Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster*. In this conversation, Al shared the details of the conversation between NASA and Morton Thiokol the evening prior to the launch. He also detailed what happened after the accident and his extraordinary decision to interrupt NASA's testimony to the Rogers Commission. He also shared a key message on why it still matters, all these years later. Key Points As director of the solid rocket motor project, Al McDonald refused to sign off on the launch, concerned that launch weather conditions were unsafe. Despite almost perfectly predicting the accident, Al himself was initially unconvinced that the solid rocket motors were the cause, believing the shuttle would have exploded on the pad had that been the case. When it appeared that NASA officials weren't being fully transparent about the events leading up to the accident, Al interrupted their testimony to the Rogers Commission, a move he fully expected would end his career. Al was effectively demoted after his testimony. Congress ultimately intervened with a law that would have ended his organization's government contract, unless they reinstated his prior position. He's the only individual in American history to be restored to his job by an act of Congress. It's your responsibility as a professional to have an opinion and to speak up. Don't assume that other people will always do their job. Resources Mentioned Remembering Allan McDonald: He Refused To Approve Challenger Launch, Exposed Cover-Up by NPR Major Malfunction: Revisiting Challenger by The New York Times Related Episodes How to Deal with Opponents and Adversaries, with Peter Block(episode 328) The Way to Make Better Decisions, with Annie Duke (episode 499) The Way Out of Major Conflict, with Amanda Ripley (episode 529) Discover More Activate your free membership for full access to the entire library of interviews since 2011, searchable by topic. To accelerate your learning, uncover more inside Coaching for Leaders Plus.

In 1986, Allan McDonald was the head of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor program at Morton Thiokol, the company that built the rocket boosters for NASA's Challenger space shuttle. Allan warned NASA management that the Space Shuttle Challenger was at risk of exploding. They didn't listen and the world watched the disaster unfold on their TV screens. There's a fine balance between getting things done and getting them done the right way. Every business has deadlines, technical hurdles, and contractual pressures to consider. But what happens when you create an environment that prevents people from sharing ideas and concerns?James R. Hansen, author of Truth, Lies and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, tells Allan's story, and Jisha Dymond, OneTrust's Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, explains how NASA's workplace culture contributed to the disaster.

Allan J. McDonald, former director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project for Morton Thiokol, discusses the events surrounding the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger. Then the live coverage of the  Challenger Disaster January 28, 1986. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/art-mcdermott/support

In this highlight from Joe's interview with Dean Lane, CIO, IT Executive and Leader, Dean shares his annual process for ensuring that he is living the life he intends and not going through the motions like a "mouse on a wheel". Dean is currently Senior Vice President of Cyber Security at the Institute of World Politics. He has held Executive Leadership roles at Honeywell, E&Y, Morton Thiokol, AT&T Plantronics. Dean is also the Founder of the Office of the CIO. Dean served in the special forces - US Navy SEAL. Dean has authored three books: CIO Wisdom, CIO Perspectives, and The Chief Information Officer's Body of Knowledge.Prefer Video?https://youtu.be/CE-eUxg8A5QSupport the show (https://www.buymeacoffee.com/titansot)

Joe is joined by Dean Lane - CIO, IT Executive and Leader. Dean reviews his career journey and shares insights and practices to ensure clear identification of career and life goals, the importance of staying focused, executing your journey without being distracted by others success, advancing through doing good staff work, exercising patience, and building strong relationships. Dean is currently Senior Vice President of Cyber Security at the Institute of World Polictics. He has held Executive Leadership roles at Honeywell, E&Y, Morton Thiokol, AT&T Plantronics. Dean is also the Founder of the Office of the CIO. Dean served in the special forces - US Navy SEAL. Dean has authored three books: CIO Wisdom, CIO Perspectives, and The Chief Information Officer's Body of Knowledge.Watch the video version on Youtube:https://youtu.be/8elfp2e9lVoSupport the show (https://www.buymeacoffee.com/titansot)

On this week's Aftermath, Rebecca Delgado Smith talks with director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project for the engineering contractor Morton Thiokol at the time of the Challenger disaster, Allan McDonald, and what he says might change the verdict.Learn more about the Challenger Disaster by reading Allan Mcdonald's book, Truth, Lies and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster. Tell us who you think is to blame at http://thealarmistpodcast.comEmail us at thealarmistpodcast@gmail.comFollow us on Instagram @thealarmistpodcastFollow us on Twitter @alarmistTheCall the Earios hotline! 844-370-8643 Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/alarmist. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

IT HAPPENED TODAY • 1909: Alice Huyler Ramsey, a 22-year-old housewife and mother from Hackensack, New Jersey, became the first woman to drive across the United States. With three female companions, none of whom could drive a car, for fifty-nine days she drove a Maxwell automobile the 3,800 miles from Manhattan, New York, to San Francisco, California. • 1915: Les Paul was born in Waukesha, Wisconsin. In the 1940s and '50s he transformed popular music by inventing the modern solid-body electric guitar. • 1980: Comedian Richard Pryor suffered near-fatal burns at his home when a mixture of “free-base” cocaine exploded. • 1986: The Rogers Commission released its report on the Challenger disaster, criticizing NASA and rocket-builder Morton Thiokol for management problems leading to the explosion that claimed the lives of seven astronauts. • 1994: In North Yorkshire, England, car thieves stole British Home Secretary Michael Howard's bulletproof car while he was a attending a meeting of police chiefs. The car was found later minus all four wheels. • 2011: In Riyadh, Saudia Arabia, six women were arrested for practicing driving in an empty car lot. SPECIAL EVENTS • Call Your Doctor Day • Donald Duck Day • Pet Memorial Day • Strawberry-Rhubarb Pie Day NUMBER FOR THE DAY 6.8: Miles down to the lowest point on Earth, Challenger Deep at the bottom of the western Pacific Ocean. NEWS ATTACK! - Health researchers say an average cinnamon pastry can have as much fat as two pork chops with mashed potatoes. - A woman in California stole an ambulance and then totaled it. - A treasure chest full of gold, jewelry and other valuables worth $1 million was found in the Rocky Mountains, according to the man who hid it there more than a decade ago. Art dealer and author Forrest Fenn confirmed that “the search is over” in an announcement on his website. - A monkey in Kenya fell onto a transformer at the main electrical plant and knocked out power for nearly four hours. Fortunately, the monkey survived. - Father's Day is a couple of weeks away.] - Hotels are trying to lure back customers by emphasizing how clean they are, offering gift cards and other freebies. - A worker at an Amazon warehouse in Wales is asking customers to check their packages for the engagement ring that fell off her finger at work. - While the whole world is following the social distancing norms New Zealand has lifted all restrictions. Border controls will still remain and people coming from other countries will be tested. - Dunkin' locations are still serving their loyal customers and are now getting ready for re-opening in certain areas. In response, Dunkin' franchises are looking to hire 25,000 new employees to fulfill entry-level positions as well as managerial spots. - According to an online study, women have fashion on the brain 91 times in a given day — that's more than four times the amount that men think about sex. - Police in Holland confiscated the car and driver's license of a man caught speeding who said he was just trying to dry his car after he had washed it. Water Cooler Question The average American eats 50 of these a year. (Bananas) https://www.lowtreestudios.com (https://www.lowtreestudios.com) https://www.patreon.com/theweeklydose (https://www.patreon.com/theweeklydose) 

On a cold January morning in 1986, NASA launched the Space Shuttle Challenger, despite warnings against doing so by many individuals including Allan McDonald. The fiery destruction of Challenger on live television moments after launch remains an indelible image in the nation's collective memory. In Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, McDonald, a skilled engineer and executive, relives the tragedy from where he stood at Launch Control Center. As he fought to draw attention to the real reasons behind the disaster, he was the only one targeted for retribution by both NASA and his employer, Morton Thiokol, Inc., makers of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. Please Subscribe to our Youtube Channel!! Thank you for your support and please share our videos!!

On show #6, Justin talks NASA and the shuttle program with Rick Boisjoly, brother of Roger Boisjoly, who worked for Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) for the Space Shuttle program. Join me and Rick Boisjoly as we discuss his brother, Roger Boisjoly. Roger was one of the only men with enough compassion and strength to try to stop the launch of the ill-fated Challenger launch in 1986. Hear the chilling story of this whistleblower who is a champion to anyone who believes that ethics matter. Roger Mark Boisjoly (/boʊʒəˈleɪ/ boh-zhə-LAY;[2] April 25, 1938 – January 6, 2012) was an American mechanical engineer, fluid dynamicist, and an aerodynamicist. He is best known for having raised strenuous objections to the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger the day before the loss of the spacecraft and its crew in January 1986. Boisjoly correctly predicted, based on earlier flight data, that the O-rings on the rocket boosters would fail if the shuttle launched in cold weather. To find out more info about Roger, find him at the following: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Boisjoly #NASA #spaceshuttle #ChallengerDisaster #ORings #solidrocketboosters #space To get in touch with Justin, drop us a line at: PHONE: 1-866-269-6155 EMAIl: feedback@radiothatdoesntsuck.com

On 28 January 1986, people watched in horror as Challenger, one of America's four space shuttles, erupted into a ball of flames just over a minute after lift off, killing everyone on board. Sue MacGregor looks back on one of Nasa's darkest tragedies with Scobee Rodgers, the widow of Challenger space shuttle commander Richard "Dick" Scobee; Steve Nesbitt, Nasa chief commentator; astronaut Norman Thagard; and Allan McDonald, former Morton Thiokol director of the Space Shuttle Rocket Booster Project.

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when the NASA Space Shuttle orbiter Challenger (OV-099) (mission STS-51-L) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members, which included five NASA astronauts and two Payload Specialists. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39 EST (16:39 UTC). Disintegration of the vehicle began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The O-ring was not designed to fly under unusually cold conditions as in this launch. Its failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it sealed, allowing pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft field joint attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter. The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were eventually recovered from the ocean floor after a lengthy search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the death of the crew is unknown; several crew members are known to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The shuttle had no escape system, and the impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable. The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the shuttle program and the formation of the Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by United States President Ronald Reagan to investigate the accident. The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident, with the agency violating its own safety rules. NASA managers had known since 1977 that contractor Morton Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings, but they had failed to address this problem properly. They also disregarded warnings (an example of "go fever") from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning, and failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors. As a result of the disaster, the Air Force decided to cancel its plans to use the Shuttle for classified military satellite launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, deciding to use the Titan IV instead. Approximately 17 percent of Americans witnessed the launch live because of the presence of Payload Specialist Christa McAuliffe, who would have been the first teacher in space. Media coverage of the accident was extensive: one study reported that 85 percent of Americans surveyed had heard the news within an hour of the accident. The Challenger disaster has been used as a case study in many discussions of engineering safety and workplace ethics.

Obituary of a Morton-Thiokol engineer who warned NASA that the shiuttle would blow up if they launched in cold weather.

Obituary of a Morton-Thiokol engineer who warned NASA that the shiuttle would blow up if they launched in cold weather.

Richard Cook is a former federal government analyst who was one of the key figures in the investigation of the space shuttle Challenger disaster. In 1985, he went to work for NASA as the lead resource analyst for the space shuttle solid rocket boosters, external tank, and Centaur upper stage. Cook’s first assignment led to his writing a memo on engineers’ concerns that flaws with the solid rocket booster O-ring seals could cause the shuttle to blow up. In 1986, after the Challenger disaster, he disrupted a NASA cover-up when he provided his memo, along with other documents on the hazards of the O-rings, to the New York Times. His disclosures paved the way for revelations by engineers from Morton Thiokol, Inc., about how they opposed the launch of Challenger the night before lift-off. Called to testify before the Presidential Commission at an internationally televised public hearing, Cook stood his ground when his experience and competence were challenged. He continued to contribute to the investigation during interviews with Commission staff and the NASA Office of Inspector General and in meetings with Senator Ernest Hollings, who was trying to raise issues before the Senate on whether there had been White House pressure to launch Challenger. In addition to extensive interviews with the media after the disaster, Cook published articles in the Washington Post, Washington Monthly, Space and Security News, and the Houston Post; gave a press conference with the Institute of Space and Security Studies, where he said that the Presidential Commission had been created to cover-up the role of the White House in the launch decision; and wrote a report which he submitted to the U.S. Justice Department with a request for a new investigation. In 1991, he was the recipient of the Cavallo Foundation Award for Moral Courage in Business and Government, sharing the award with Roger Boisjoly of Morton Thiokol. Before joining NASA, Cook worked as an analyst for the U.S. Civil Service Commission, where he received extensive training in federal government operations. He then worked for the Food and Drug Administration and next served in the Jimmy Carter White House under Esther Peterson, special assistant to the president for consumer affairs. He also taught history at the Field School, a private high school in Washington, D.C. Cook left NASA to become an analyst with the U.S. Treasury Department in 1986. There he developed and taught training courses on policy analysis and led project teams on financial policy and organizational restructuring. He authored Challenger Revealed- An Insider’s Account of How the Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy of the Space Age in 2006. He retired from the federal government in January 2007 and works today as a writer, lecturer, and consultant. His website is richardccook.com. Cook graduated with honors from the College of William and Mary, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He resides in College Park, Maryland. One of his areas of interest has been the monetary system and he has written a series of articles about the current financial crisis including- Extraordinary Times, Intentional Collapse, and Takedown of the U.S.A., Has the Battle for America Begun?, and An Emergency Program of Monetary Reform for the United States. He spoke recently on Will We See the End of the Empire in Our Time? at the Building a New World Conference". His forthcoming book is entitled We Hold These Truths: The Hope of Monetary Reform and he can be contacted regarding the book at economicsanity@gmail.com. Richard spoke about the current crisis we're in, particularly what is not reported in the press or widely understood by the public about money creation, debt, and credit and the financial shenanigans that are impoverishing the country. He also oferred his ideas for monetary reform, including the abolition of the Federal Reserve, national control over the creation of credit and a citizen's dividend. DownloadRichard C. Cook's website is: http://www.richardccook.comSource: We The People Radio Network (WTPRN)Aired: 6/03/08 12:00 AMThis podcast is an aggregate of audio files freely available online. Please visit the original source and subscribe to the host website.