Podcasts about Inspector general

Nigeria President, Others Mourn Ex Police Boss Solomon Ehigiator Arasehttps://osazuwaakonedo.news/nigeria-president-others-mourn-ex-police-boss-solomon-ehigiator-arase/01/09/2025/#Nigeria Police Force #Owan #Arase #Igp #Police ©September 1st, 2025 ®September 1, 2025 5:02 pm Solomon Ehigiator Arase may be the true definition of the popular saying that “Police Is Your Friend” if only you are a good character police officer, the former Inspector General of Police, Solomon Ehigiator Arase apparently validated the aforesaid statement to be true when his death was announced on Sunday August 31st 2025, the death sparked uncommon good words of condolences from many Nigerians, unlike before, millions of Nigerians make negative comments against dead top government officials, but in the case of Arase, millions of Nigerians took to their social media pages and comment sections to say good things about the IGP that policed the Nigeria states between April 2015 and June 2016, even human rights activists that always talk negative about the Nigeria Police Force like Barrister Adeyanju Deji, was among the earliest mourners on Sunday to be at the residence of the late IGP to pay a condolence visit with a tribute, saying; “May the soul of former IGP Solomon Arase rest in peace, In my about 20 years of knowing him, he helped us get freedom for many student union leaders and comrades who were unlawfully detained, As IGP and after his retirement, we remained close and continued to seek his help whenever citizens' rights were abused”, we also observed that many serving and retired police officers like DCP Olumuyiwa Adejobi had took to their personal social media accounts to tell the world how good Solomon Ehigiator Arase was, during and after service, this, a Nigerian citizen by name Oluwaseun Odutayo took to the Nigeria Police Force Facebook comment section and said; “Hope the current IGP and all other AIGPs and DIGPs and all Nigeria Police Force officers are online and reading comments?, Hopefully we would get something like this to be written for them too when their own time comes”. #OsazuwaAkonedoBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/osazuwaakonedo--4980924/support.

Anthony D'Esposito, Former Congressman & Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor nominee, calls into the show to discuss his anticipated role as the Inspector General of the Labor Department under President Trump. The conversation covers D'Esposito's thoughts on President Trump's policies to make cities safer, contrasting them with the approaches of Democratic leaders. The discussion also touches on local politics in Nassau County, including key political races and the efforts to maintain safety and combat progressive agendas. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A Treasury Department watchdog is conducting an audit to see if IRS employees are reporting to the office as often as they claim. President Donald Trump ordered federal employees to return to the office full time soon after taking office himself, but some IRS employees say they're working in unsuitable conditions. Federal News Network's Jory Heckman has more on all of this.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In the second hour of The Rita Cosby Show, Rita talks with the Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor Nominee, Anthony D'Esposito on how Democrats have already weaponized the Minneapolis shooting to target Republicans. She also talks about the shooter's vile manifesto. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Rita talks with the Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor Nominee, Anthony D'Esposito on how Democrats have weaponized the Minneapolis shooting to target Republicans. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

August 26, 2025 City Club event description: Speaker Inspector General Deborah WitzburgDeborah Witzburg serves as Inspector General for the City of Chicago, having been appointed to her first term in April 2022. Previously, she served as the City's Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety, overseeing independent, objective evaluations and reviews of Chicago's police and police […]

Getting to the heart of what's important in Baltimore County is always our goal with Councilman David Marks, who returns to discuss some key local issues, including the controversy and upheaval surrounding the role of the Inspector General. The post Councilman David Marks discusses future of Baltimore County and Inspector General role with Nestor first appeared on Baltimore Positive WNST.

Chicago's Inspector General urges City Council to police bad behavior. Democratic legislators return to Texas for a redistricting vote. Former Northwestern football coach reaches settlement with the university. Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul files more lawsuits against the Trump administration and politicians push for Southwest side communities to be declared disaster areas after flooding. Reset dives into these and other top local stories with City Cast Chicago executive producer Simone Alicea, FOX 32 political correspondent Paris Schutz and WBEZ education reporter Sarah Karp. For a full archive of Reset interviews, head over to wbez.org/reset.

By Adam Turteltaub There's a lot new going on in healthcare enforcement, and, at the same, there's a lot that hasn't changed, reports Greg Demske (LinkedIn), partner at Goodwin Proctor and, formerly, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General at HHS. While the US Department of Justice has changed its priorities in areas such as anticorruption, if you look at what they and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at Health and Human Services have been doing, he observes, the long-time bipartisan effort to stop fraud in healthcare is continuing. Yet, there are some significant changes.  At CMS a major shift has occurred when it comes to Medicare Advantage.  In the past there were audits of fifty plans a year, but now the goal is to audit all six hundred or so annually.  Backing that up is an expansion in the number of coders from 40 to 2000.  This has huge implications both for the plans and providers. Meantime the Department of Justice and HHS have created a False Claims Act Working group to further their efforts. Then, of course, there are qui tam claims, which hit a record high in 2024, and we have dispositions in the courts as well. So what should compliance teams do?  He recommends keeping a close eye on what the government is saying to ensure your program is staying ahead of the curve. And, of course, you should listen to this podcast to gain more of his insights from private practice and over 16 years at HHS.

The Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Christian Tetteh Yohuno, has warned that the Police will not tolerate any form of violence during the upcoming Akwatia by-election on September 2.

Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Christian Tetteh Yohuno, has confirmed that eight people have been arrested in connection with the recent violent incidents recorded during the Ablekuma North by-election.

Inspector General of Police, Christian Tetteh Yohuno, has engaged political parties on security preparations ahead of the Akwatia by-election. Tensions have been building in the lead-up to the September 2 poll, especially following incidents recorded during the Ablekuma North re-run.

The release of the Office of Inspector General's report on Jeffrey Epstein's death was marked by a delay so drawn out that it raised more questions than it answered. Epstein died in August 2019, yet the OIG report—supposedly the definitive account of the failures at the Metropolitan Correctional Center—did not surface until mid-2023. That nearly four-year gap created an atmosphere of suspicion, where the public was left to speculate in the absence of transparency. For a case of such magnitude, involving one of the most notorious prisoners in U.S. custody, the government's inability—or unwillingness—to produce timely findings came across as stonewalling rather than due diligence. Each year that ticked by without answers only deepened the impression that the investigation was less about accountability and more about managing fallout.Critics have argued that the slow pace betrayed the very purpose of oversight. The OIG is meant to reassure the public that even the federal system can police itself, but when it takes nearly half a decade to confirm “errors” that were obvious within days of Epstein's death—broken cameras, sleeping guards, falsified logs—the credibility of the process collapses. Instead of restoring confidence, the delay reinforced the perception that the system was dragging its feet, hoping the public's outrage would fade. By the time the report finally arrived, many saw it as an afterthought: a bureaucratic box checked too late to matter, more a shield for officials than a search for truth.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Jeffrey Epstein Death: Justice Department Still Hasn't Released Report (businessinsider.com)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

The Honorable Cheryl L. Mason was confirmed by the Senate as the inspector general of the VA on July 31, 2025, and shortly after being sworn in, took up her leadership of the VA OIG on August 4. IG Mason previously served as the chairman of the Board of Veterans' Appeals at VA. For more information on IG Mason, see her bio. In July 2025, the VA OIG published 18 reports that included 101 recommendations. Report topics included a review of VBA's planning and implementation of the Military Sexual Trauma Operations Center and its governance structure for processing these types of claims. Another healthcare inspection examined deficiencies in care at the Batavia Community Living Center that contributed to a resident's death at the VA Western New York Healthcare System in Buffalo.  On Capitol Hill, Shawn Steele, director of the human capital and operations division for the Office of Audits and Evaluations, testified on July 22 at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee (HVAC). His testimony focused on the OIG's findings in a recent report on deficiencies in VA's oversight of recruitment, retention, and relocation incentive payments. VA OIG investigative efforts contributed to the indictment of 11 members of a transnational criminal organization who submitted billions in fraudulent claims to federal and private health insurance programs for durable medical equipment that was never prescribed or issued to the beneficiaries. In addition, a veteran pleaded guilty in Florida to VA disability compensation benefits fraud as the result of a proactive investigation. The loss to VA is about $1.1 million. Related Reports: Implementation of a Military Sexual Trauma Operations Center Resulted in Minimal Change Despite Planned Intent to Improve Claims-Processing Accuracy Deficiencies in Care at the Batavia Community Living Center Contributed to a Resident's Death at the VA Western New York Healthcare System in Buffalo Failures Related to the Care and Discharge of a Patient and Leaders' Response at the VA New Mexico Healthcare System in Albuquerque

Last time we spoke about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege, characterized by an aerial campaign called "Starvation" that crippled its industrial capabilities. As resources dwindled and chaos reigned, the Allies intensified their firebombing efforts, targeting major cities. By July, Japan was on the brink of collapse, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, where over 140,000 lives were altered or lost in a blinding flash. As the nation reeled from the destruction, the Japanese leadership was torn between surrender and continuing the fight. They faced not just the threat of American bombs, but also a Soviet invasion looming on the horizon. Days after Hiroshima, the atomic bomb "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, resulting in catastrophic casualties and extensive industrial losses. This attack further devastated an already weakened Japan, leaving the Emperor and his government grappling with the dire consequences. This episode is the Invasion of Manchuria Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    August 9 stands as a catastrophic day in Japanese history. On this day, the nation faced the devastating impact of a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, along with the relentless Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Admiral Ivan Yumashev's Pacific Fleet moved to disrupt Japan's maritime communications in the Sea of Japan and provide support for offensive operations. At the same time, Soviet air forces targeted cities across Northeast Asia, striking both Manchuria and North Korea, as well as Japanese convoys in the Sea of Japan. General Twinning led a diversionary B-29 raid on Amagasaki, followed by a significant attack involving 108 aircraft on the rail yards at Marifu. In addition, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet launched more strikes against airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, where U.S. intelligence suspected a large Japanese air fleet and commando force was preparing for a desperate mission to Okinawa. Japanese paratroopers were gearing up for a new mission, codenamed Ken-go, but this time their target wasn't Okinawa. Similar to the earlier May 24 Raid on Yontan Airfield, Lieutenant General Sugawara Michio's Giretsu Kuteitai, also known as the “Heroic Paratroopers,” set their sights on the B-29 complex in the Mariana Islands for nighttime suicide raids. This operation marked the second planned assault on bases within the Mariana Islands, specifically aimed at destroying B-29 bombers. The plan involved deploying 60 transport aircraft to deliver 900 commandos during the nights of August 19 to 23. Around 300 personnel from Lieutenant Commander Daiji Yamaoka's 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force initiated preparations at the end of June. Originally established for submarine-delivered raids on U.S.-held islands, these forces were now adapted to be flown in 30 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' twin-engine bombers, which had the necessary range for an unrefueled, one-way trip to the Marianas. The raid was initially scheduled for July 24. However, ten days earlier, U.S. carrier-based warplanes had attacked Misawa naval air base on Honshu Island, damaging or destroying many of the operation's bombers. Consequently, the raid was postponed to August 19, with the addition of 30 transport planes and 300 paratroopers from the army's 1st Raiding Regiment. Ultimately, however, on August 15, Japan surrendered, and Operation Ken-go was cancelled. Meanwhile, Admiral Shafroth's Bombardment Group unleashed heavy damage on the Kamaishi steel mill. The day after, to assist the Soviets, Halsey ordered additional airstrikes on northern Japanese airfields, causing extensive destruction. However, these were not isolated incidents; they were part of a sustained air-sea siege that had been intensifying for several months. The Allied blockade of Japan had severely impacted food imports, and industrial activity had nearly ground to a halt due to the ongoing blockade and bombings. By this point, six of Japan's ten largest cities had been completely destroyed, and over sixty smaller cities had been reduced to ashes from relentless incendiary raids. This scenario was a powerful manifestation of War Plan Orange in action. More critically, with the reality of Hiroshima's destruction echoing loudly, the Japanese government now grappled with the impending threat of complete annihilation, a grim reality they had never faced before in this war. Though they had recognized their defeat with the loss of Saipan and the initial Yawata raid, the stubborn resolve of the Japanese leadership had pushed them to prolong the conflict for an agonizing 14 months, clinging to the hope of a different outcome. Many now believed that peace was the only path to survival for the Japanese nation. As the crisis intensified, Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet engaged in heated discussions. He sought to persuade War Minister General Anami Korechika and Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu Yoshijiro to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 9. However, Suzuki and the militants could only agree that if there were any surrender, then it should ensure that the "national polity" or imperial family would continue in any postwar settlement. Anami and Umezu pushed for further, more favourable conditions. First, Japan would demobilize and disarm any IJA or IJN forces overseas. Second, Japanese courts would prosecute any war criminals. Third, after surrender the Allies would not occupy Japan. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, agreed with Anami and Umezu. To break this deadlock, it became necessary to involve the Emperor directly. Around 2:00 AM on August 10, the cabinet convened with Emperor Hirohito, who ultimately agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration and ordered an end to all military efforts, initiating the surrender process. Faced with no viable alternatives, all present reached a unanimous agreement. That morning, the Japanese government, through Swedish and Swiss intermediaries, sent an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating one condition: there would be no change to Japan's government structure, with Hirohito retaining his title as Emperor and sovereign ruler. Months afte the war Hirohito said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.” Simultaneously, a new military campaign was underway, and several units of General Yamada's Kwantung Army were unexpectedly caught off-guard in Manchuria. In response, he implemented emergency measures and ordered commands to proceed with their plans for delaying operations. Upon learning of the Soviet declaration of war and the subsequent invasion led by Marshal Vasilevsky's Far East Command, Tokyo decided to place General Kozuki's 17th Area Army under the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, they instructed General Okamura Yasuji's China Expeditionary Army to transfer one army headquarters, along with six divisions and six brigades, to support this effort. As directed by Tokyo, the primary objective of the Kwantung Army was to defend Japanese territory in Korea. However, by the end of the first day of conflict, several border observation units had been completely destroyed while attempting to defend their positions. In the east, Lieutenant General Shimizu Noritsune's 5th Army, supported by the reinforced 128th Division, was confronting the main assault by Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front. To the south, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku's 3rd Army was engaged in defending against multiple penetrations along the border. In the northern sector, the 134th Division at Chiamussu was withdrawing towards Fangcheng, as planned, while flames engulfed Japanese houses in the city. General Uemura's 4th Army was preparing to face what they expected to be the main assault from General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front. Meanwhile, the 119th Division had already departed Hailar for Wunoerh, leaving only the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade behind. To the west, Lieutenant General Hongo Yoshio's 44th Army was confronting the formidable armored spearhead of Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front. Southwest of their position, the 108th Division was redeploying to the Chinhsien area. On August 10, the offensive led by Vasilevsky continued, as Colonel General Ivan Managarov's 53rd Army began crossing the border behind the now distant 6th Guards Tank Army. Recognizing that the 44th Army was not prepared to engage the overwhelming enemy armor in guerrilla warfare across the expansive terrain of western Manchuria, General Ushiroku made the independent decision to order Hongo to retreat to the Dairen-Hsinking line. This was where Lieutenant General Iida Shojiro's 30th Army was already establishing defensive positions. This decision contradicted Yamada's main strategy, which called for delaying the enemy advance at the borders.  Faced with what they deemed an illegal order, the Kwantung Army Headquarters convened an urgent staff conference. During this meeting, several opinions emerged: a sudden shift from established plans would likely create confusion; any attempt to counterattack after a withdrawal would likely fail if the enemy advanced quickly; and abandoning forward airfields prematurely would enable the enemy to advance unimpeded. To most participants, General Ushiroku's decision seemed to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the overall operational direction of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. However, since the 44th Army had already begun its withdrawal as ordered by General Ushiroku, Kwantung Army Headquarters was left with a fait accompli. Thus, they felt compelled to uphold the decision of the Third Area Army Commander, which was subsequently approved by General Yamada. Meanwhile, General Pliyev's cavalry-mechanized units advanced rapidly toward Kalgan and Dolonnor, reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. General Danilov's 17th Army also continued to encounter weak resistance, covering an additional 40 kilometers. General Lyudnikov's 39th Army bypassed the encircled 107th Division in the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions. Here, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved toward Solun and Tepossi, while the 113th Rifle Corps advanced southeast toward Wangyemiao. The 94th Rifle Corps had to divert southward to support the 124th Rifle Division. In the east, General Luchinsky's 36th Army launched ongoing attacks against Hailar, with the 2nd Rifle Corps bypassing it to the east. Meanwhile, General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army reorganized its right-wing column and began crossing the Grand Khingan Mountains during the night, with both columns entering the central Manchurian plain by August 11. To the east, Meretskov continued his offensive. The 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps of General Krylov's 5th Army advanced swiftly west and south, ultimately securing Machiacho, Laotsaiying, Suiyang, and Suifenho. This maneuver widened the zone of penetration to 75 kilometers and forced the 126th and 135th Divisions to withdraw their main forces to Yehho. In support, General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army to the north broke through into open terrain, pushing rapidly westward to occupy parts of the cities of Pamientung and Lishuchen, along with their vital bridges across the Muleng River. Further south, General Chistyakov's 25th Army captured Tungning and successfully reduced its fortified region. Units in that area also secured Tumentzu, Hunchun, and Wuchiatzu. Lastly, General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army continued its operations far to the north. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region seized Hutou and initiated a movement west along the railroad toward Hulin, while the 363rd and 66th Rifle Divisions pressed on with their advance northwestward. In northern Manchuria, General Purkayev continued his main assault, with General Mamonov's 15th Army reconnoitering key enemy strongholds south of the Amur River. After successfully crossing the river, the 34th Rifle Division and the 203rd Tank Brigade occupied Lopei and advanced through Fenghsiang to bypass the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, leaving a force behind to reduce it. Meanwhile, the 361st Rifle Division captured Tungchiang, and the 388th Rifle Division secured Chienchingkou, preparing for an advance toward Fuchin. In support of these operations, General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps cleared Japanese forces from the Jaoho Fortified Region, while General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army was preparing to launch its offensive the following morning. On August 11, forward units landed at Heiho, Aihun, and Holomoching under the cover of artillery fire, quickly establishing a beachhead as additional forces crossed the Amur. However, due to a lack of crossing equipment, it took five days to transport all units across the river. Consequently, Teryokhin had to commit his forces piecemeal against the 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade. This was not the only new offensive operation initiated by Purkayev on this day. A new target had emerged: South Sakhalin, known as Karafuto to the Japanese. As per Vasilevsky's plans, Major-General Leonty Cheremisov's 16th Army was deployed on North Sakhalin and along the mainland coast of the Tatar Strait, stretching from Sovetskaya Gavan to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. If the invasion of Manchuria continued to progress favorably, this force was set to attack the Japanese-controlled portion of the island alongside the Northern Pacific Flotilla, commanded by Vice-Admiral Vladimir Andreyev, which was prepared to conduct amphibious operations against Esutoru and Maoka on the island's west coast. Opposing the Soviet forces, General Higuchi of the 5th Area Army positioned Lieutenant General Mineki Toichiro's 88th Division in the southern part of South Sakhalin, with only the 125th Regiment stationed to the north. Sakhalin shared many characteristics with several of the Manchukuoan border areas, presenting challenging terrain for mechanized warfare. The only viable invasion route south from the border at the 50th Parallel followed the Poronay River, located more or less in the center of the island. This river flows southward, flanked to the east and west by forested mountain ranges, as well as countless swamps and bogs. Both sides recognized the strategic importance of this potential invasion route and constructed extensive fortification networks. The Japanese fortifications were collectively known as the Koton, or Haramitog, fortified region. These defenses were built in three interlinked layers, with their western flanks anchored in the mountain range and eastern flanks in the wooded, swampy river valley. The permanent defenses spanned approximately 12 kilometers in frontage and extended up to 30 kilometers in depth, containing over 350 bunkers, pillboxes, artillery positions, and similar fortifications. These were protected by an elaborate network of infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and barbed wire. The heavy forest and brush made it challenging to locate these defenses. While enough vegetation had been cleared to allow for effective defensive fire, sufficient cover remained to obscure them from an attacking force. Consequently, the 16th Army would confront these formidable defenses without the advantage of surprise. At daybreak on August 9, reports emerged that the Soviet Army had unexpectedly invaded Manchuria from multiple directions. By 8:00 AM, telegraph lines were cut near Handa, a village located at the center of the Russo-Japanese border in Sakhalin. An excellent military road connected Handa to Kamishikuks, a region known as the Central Military Road area. At the same time, reports indicated that enemy forces were attacking the observation posts in this area. On August 10,  observation posts were forced to withdraw as the Soviet Army gradually advanced toward our main position in the Happo Mountains, situated about 10 kilometers south of the border. That evening, it was reported that the 125th Infantry had engaged in a skirmish, during which the Isunisawa Platoon, fighting near the Handa River bridge for over five hours, was wiped out. On that same day, the commander of the Fifth Area Army declared that not only had the Army engaged Soviet forces, but civilians in the area, including office workers and laborers, had also joined the battle in a desperate attempt to halt the advancing Soviet Army. By August 13, the National Volunteer Combat Teams were summoned. The recruitment of these volunteer combat teams from the general populace was unique to the Sakhalin campaign, aimed at creating the appearance of military readiness to deter the Soviet advance. Additionally, the 125th Regiment executed demolitions while retreating to establish stronger defensive positions on the western flank of Happo Mountain, northwest of Furuton. Given the unexpectedly favorable developments in Manchuria, the invasion of South Sakhalin was authorized on August 10. General Yumashev further directed Vice-Admiral Andreyev's naval forces to commence attacks on both South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Major General Georgii Dziuba's air forces joined the effort, conducting reconnaissance flights over key Japanese ports that revealed Toro and Esutoru were almost entirely unprotected. In the early hours of August 11, the 56th Rifle Corps crossed the border and began its main advance along the central military road but encountered resistance at Handa, where around 100 defenders held them up for an entire day. Back in northern Manchuria, the 5th Rifle Corps embarked on a challenging march southwest toward Paoching, while Mamonov launched a bombing raid followed by an attack on Fuchin, which ultimately fell after a coordinated tank-infantry assault. Concurrently, the 4th Army headquarters and the bulk of the 149th Division received orders to retreat from Tsitsihar to Harbin. To the south, the 112th Fortified Region and the 6th Field Fortified Region crossed the Muleng River south of Mishan during the night. In the following days, they collaborated with units from the 35th Army to secure the Mishan Fortified Region. More importantly, the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps successfully secured Pamientung and Lishuchen, initiating a pursuit of withdrawing Japanese forces to the west and southwest. On August 11, the 5th Army advance continued, with reinforced forward detachments of the 65th and 72nd Rifle Corps reaching the Muleng River and preparing for an advance on Mutanchiang. At this juncture, Meretskov reassessed the situation and determined that his best opportunity for successful exploitation in the front zone lay within the 25th Army area. Consequently, he attached the 17th and 88th Rifle Corps to this command and placed the 10th Mechanized Corps in army reserve. This allowed the 17th and 39th Rifle Corps to commence a coordinated advance toward Wangching, Tumen, Tunhua, and Kirin. Looking west, Pliyev's units continued to encounter minimal resistance. The 17th Army was finally nearing the western foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The lead brigade of the 5th Guards Tank Corps reached Lupei, while the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps completed its crossing of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The 39th Army maintained its holding operations against the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions, coupled with main advances toward Solun and Wangyemiao. The 2nd Rifle Corps and the 205th Tank Brigade advanced along the railroad to Yakoshih. The 94th Rifle Division, supported by air and artillery, launched an assault and captured the southwestern portion of Hailar city before being reinforced by the entire 86th Rifle Corps. Meanwhile, the Soviet operational group on the right flank of the 36th Army broke through Japanese resistance at Manchouli, moving eastward along the rail line to join the Soviet forces besieging Hailar. As the Soviet armored units in the west made an unexpectedly swift advance, they were anticipated to reach Hsinking by August 15. On this same day, Yamada decided to relocate his headquarters to Tunghua. Additionally, during the night, a small naval force successfully conducted an assault landing at Yuki in North Korea, securing the port unopposed on August 12. Simultaneously, the 393rd Rifle Division pushed south into North Korea, quickly reaching Yuki before continuing toward Rashin. There, another small naval force landed on August 12, facing minimal resistance except for artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 25th Army advanced up to 40 kilometers in its main march southwest, prompting the commitment of the 10th Mechanized Corps to exploit further toward Wangching and beyond. The 5th Army had to eliminate a strong enemy position east of Taimakou before it could resume its advance to Mutanchiang. The 1st Red Banner Army pressed forward relentlessly, with the 26th Rifle Corps successfully bypassing Tzuhsingtun to advance on Hsientung, cutting the Linkou-Mutanchiang railroad line. The 363rd Rifle Division occupied Mishan while the 264th Rifle Division secured Hulin. The 171st Tank Brigade began a challenging advance southwest toward Chiamussu as the 15th Army reduced the Fuchin fortified region. Forward detachments of the 2nd Red Banner Army engaged Japanese advanced positions south of Holomoching and north of Aihun. After reducing Handa, the 56th Rifle Corps commenced an advance toward Furuton, although it faced delays from small enemy forces. Furthermore, in western Manchuria, Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian formations and the 17th Army continued their advance through Inner Mongolia largely unopposed for the next two days. Throughout 12 and 13 August on the Trans-Baikal Front's right flank, the Soviet-Mongolian formations of General Pliyev swept across the Inner Mongolian deserts towards Dolonnor and Kalgan at a rate of ninety to one hundred kilometers a day, rudely shunting aside local cavalry forces. Pliyev's principal concern was providing his forces in the vast desert wastes sufficient food, fuel, fodder, and water. The 6th Guards Tank Army had to temporarily halt its advance as the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps reached Tuchuan. This pause was necessary due to severe fuel shortages, requiring an increase in fuel supplies before the offensive could resume. This situation allowed Ushiroku to withdraw the 63rd and 117th Divisions before they could be engaged. However, the 107th Division was less fortunate, as it was attacked by the 5th Guards Rifle Corps on the road to Solun. On the northern flank, the 36th Army continued its siege of the Hailar fortifications while the 2nd Rifle Corps seized Yakoshih and advanced up to Wunoerh. That day, Japan also received the initial Allied response to its surrender offer, penned by Secretary of State James Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments. A critic of the Japanese imperial system, Byrnes insisted on an unconditional surrender but remained ambiguous regarding the future of the imperial family's position. The response included a statement that Japan's future form of government should be “established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Thus, even though the Soviet and Chinese governments aimed for the abolition of the imperial system, the Japanese could choose to retain their emperor, and likely would. Meanwhile, Secretary Stimson urged President Truman to accept the peace offer immediately, believing that, without an organized surrender supported by the emperor, U.S. forces would face “a score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas” across China and Southeast Asia. He cautioned that without the immediate capitulation of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, rogue military commanders might continue to resist. Retaining Hirohito would also aid Allied efforts to achieve a swift and orderly reconstruction while maintaining a compliant populace. The Japanese cabinet deliberated over the Allied response, with Anami and Suzuki, among other key military figures, arguing for its rejection unless an explicit guarantee for the imperial system was provided. Ultimately, however, Foreign Minister Togo and Marquess Kido Koichi succeeded in persuading Suzuki to support the acceptance of Byrnes' reply. Meanwhile, President Truman issued instructions prohibiting any further atomic weapons from being dropped on Japan without his approval, and he later ordered a complete halt to all bombings. Despite this, Halsey's 3rd Fleet remained in the area, preparing to launch additional strikes. Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 37 unfortunately had to retire at this point, though a token force was integrated into Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 to ensure British support until the end.  The Olympic timetable had called for Third Fleet to retire to Eniwetok and Manus in mid-August, but late on the night of August 10 Missouri intercepted a cryptic radio transmission: “Through the Swiss government, Japan has stated that she is willing to accept Allied surrender ultimatum at Potsdam, provided they can keep their Emperor.” Halsey had long predicted an early Japanese collapse, and had accordingly kept his logistic pipeline full. The following morning, August 11, flagships Missouri and King George V refueled simultaneously alongside oiler USS Sabine. Halsey recalled, “I went across to the ‘Cagey Five' as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice Admiral Rawlings.” Although Japan teetered near collapse, TF-37 lacked its own fast oilers and would have to retire immediately. With Nimitz's permission Halsey offered to sustain a token British force with Third Fleet so that the Royal Navy would be in “at the death.” Rawlings enthusiastically accepted. After replenishment, King George V, Indefatigable, Gambia, Newfoundland, and ten destroyers were re-designated TG-38.5 and absorbed into McCain's TF-38. The rest of TF-37, under Vian, reluctantly retired for Manus. In a truly desultory attack the following day, August 12, a single Japanese plane penetrated Buckner Bay, Okinawa undetected and torpedoed TF-95's just-arrived battleship Pennsylvania. Twenty Americans were killed, while Oldendorf and nine others were wounded. Back off Honshu, Halsey canceled August 12 strikes due to a typhoon. Late that night Third Fleet intercepted a confusing and ambiguous radio bulletin announcing that Japan had, with qualifications, accepted Allied terms. After a heated staff conference Halsey decided that, without firmer information, the following day's strikes were still on. Nevertheless, the prolonged negotiations were causing the Third Fleet considerable logistical problems; Halsey recalled, “Our galleys were reduced to serving dehydrated carrot salad. If the war was over, we could provision on the spot; if it was not, we would have to retire, reprovision, and return.” That night, a group of officers led by Major Hatanaka Kenji and Colonel Arao Okikatsu approached Anami, seeking his backing for a coup d'état to prevent Japan's surrender. Anami refused, leaving Hatanaka's conspirators to attempt the coup on their own. At the recommendation of American psychological operations experts, B-29 bombers spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan detailing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response. In stark contrast, that same day, McCain's newly Anglo-American TF-38 launched 1,167 sorties against Tokyo, expending 372 tons of bombs and 2,175 rockets. Only seven planes and one pilot were lost, none to combat. Airborne opposition was virtually nil, as Lieutenant-General Kanetoshi Kondo, commander of Tokyo's defending 10th Hiko Shidan, “failed to urge his men to press the attack to the utmost, because it seemed absurd to incur additional losses with the war obviously lost and its termination due in a matter of days.”  Simultaneously, Suzuki's cabinet debated their reply to the Allied response late into the night but remained deadlocked. Back in Manchuria, on August 13, the 6th Guards Tank Army resumed its offensive by pushing reconnaissance units toward Tungliao and Taonan. The 39th Army continued its assault on Japanese units at Halung-Arshaan, while the 5th Guards Rifle Corps attacked and captured Solun. To the north, as the battle for Hailar raged on, the 2nd Rifle Corps engaged the determined 119th Division for control of the Grand Khingan passes west of Pokotu, achieving little progress over the next two days. Looking east, the 2nd Red Banner Army gathered sufficient forces to resume its offensive, successfully penetrating the defenses of the 123rd Division at Shenwutan and Chiko. They destroyed small Japanese outposts at Huma and Santaoka, further pushing the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade toward the main fortified region at Aihun. Additionally, the 15th Army reduced the fortified positions at Fuchin, while the 171st Tank Brigade continued its advance toward Chiamussu. To the south, the 66th Rifle Division finally occupied Tungan, cutting the highway and railroad to Hutou. Meanwhile, the 59th Rifle Corps reached and secured Linkou before turning south toward Mutanchiang. Advance elements of the 26th Rifle Corps attacked and occupied the railroad station at Hualin, though they could not secure crossing sites over the Mutan River due to the fierce resistance of a single battalion. During the night, heavy Japanese counterattacks forced Soviet forces back to a hill northeast of Hualin. More importantly, while the 45th Rifle Corps continued to reduce remaining Japanese strongpoints in the Volynsk, Suifenho, and Lumintai centers of resistance, the bulk of the 5th Army advanced 30 kilometers along the road and rail line, successfully approaching the outer fortifications of Mutanchiang by nightfall. Even farther south, the 25th Army pushed southwestward, with its three formations sharing a single road along the military rail line through the mountainous, heavily wooded area from Laoheishan to Heitosai. In South Sakhalin, the 56th Rifle Corps launched a siege attack against Furuton. However, the fierce resistance of the 125th Regiment successfully repelled Soviet assaults for the next three days. On the same day, in preparation for an amphibious invasion of Toro, two naval patrol craft reconnoitered Esutoru. Additionally, Meretskov approved the Seishin Operation in North Korea, leading to another small naval force landing successfully at Chongjin that afternoon. Soon after, they faced a strong Japanese counterattack, which drove the landing force out of the port and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. The following morning, a naval infantry battalion was landed to retake Chongjin, but Japanese reinforcements from the Nanam Divisional District Unit arrived to contest the port. As the Russians were pushed back again, Yumashev decided to embark the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade for a third assault scheduled for August 15. To the north, the 393rd Rifle Division advanced south along the coast, reaching Kwangjuryong by August 14. Concurrently, after breaking through the 128th Division's main defenses at Lotzukou, the 25th Army reached Heitosai and prepared to launch its main attack against Murakami's 3rd Army. The 5th Army struck the right flank of Shimizu's 5th Army at Ssutaoling and in the hills southeast of Mutanchiang, while the 1st Red Banner Army attacked the northern and eastern flanks of the city and the railroad station at Yehho on the eastern bank of the Mutan River. The 35th Army began a rapid advance toward Poli and Linkou, encountering negligible opposition. Meanwhile, the 5th Rifle Corps reached Paoching, drove off its garrison, and continued marching toward Poli. In addition, the 15th Army finally reduced the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, opening a more direct advance route toward Chiamussu. Meanwhile, the 2nd Red Banner Army succeeded in breaking through the outer Japanese defenses to besiege the Sunwu Fortified Region and surround the Aihun Fortified Region. To the west, the 36th Army continued to encounter strong resistance at Hailar and Wunoerh. The 5th Guards Rifle Corps initiated a southeastward pursuit along the railroad toward Wangyemiao, eventually catching elements of the 107th Division at Tepossi, while also engaging Japanese units retreating from the Wuchakou area. The forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan after a march hindered by wet weather and Japanese kamikaze attacks. The 17th Army captured Taopanshin, and Pliyev's left column overcame a small Manchurian cavalry force, entering Dolonnor at the east end of the pass across the southern Grand Khingan Mountains. Back in the Pacific, the Allies grew restless as they awaited a Japanese response, ultimately interpreting the silence as a non-acceptance of the imposed peace terms. Consequently, Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity. More than 400 B-29 bombers launched daylight attacks, while over 300 conducted night raids, culminating in what would become the largest and longest bombing raid of the Pacific War. Furthermore, Truman began planning to drop a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. However, before he could proceed, Emperor Hirohito met with the most senior Army and Navy officers in the early hours of August 14, convincing them to cooperate in ending the war. The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes for an unconditional surrender. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material related to war crimes and the war responsibilities of the nation's highest leaders. Shortly after concluding the conference, a group of senior army officers, including Anami, gathered in a nearby room and signed an agreement to execute the Emperor's order of surrender. This decision would significantly impede any attempts to incite a coup in Tokyo. During this meeting, General Kawabe Torashirō, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, proposed that the senior officers present should each sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender, "The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." An agreement was ultimately signed by each of the most important officers present, including Minister of War Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, commander of the 1st General Army Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime, commander of the 2nd General Army Field Marshal Hata Shunroku and Inspector-General of Military Training Doihara Kenji. When Umezu voiced concern about air units causing trouble, Vice Minister of War Wakamatsu Tadaichi took the agreement next door to the Air General Army headquarters, where its commander Kawabe Masakazu, the brother of Torashirō also signed. The document would serve to seriously impede any attempt to incite a coup in Tokyo. Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry transmitted orders to its embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender, which were received in Washington at 02:49 on August 14. Anticipating difficulties with senior commanders on distant war fronts, three princes of the Imperial Family, who held military commissions, were dispatched to deliver the news personally. By 19:00, the text of the Imperial Rescript on surrender was finalized, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and presented to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with assistance from an NHK recording crew, made a gramophone record of himself reading the rescript. At long last, Japan had admitted defeat.  However at around 21:30 on 14 August, the conspirators led by Hatanaka set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. But Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Shiizaki Jirō, convinced the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, Colonel Haga Toyojirō, of their cause, by telling him (falsely) that Generals Anami and Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of Tanaka Shizuichi, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order. Originally, Hatanaka hoped that simply occupying the palace and showing the beginnings of a rebellion would inspire the rest of the Army to rise up against the move to surrender. This notion guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. Hatanaka, Shiizaki, Ida, and Captain Shigetarō Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori to ask him to join the coup. Mori was in a meeting with his brother-in-law Michinori Shiraishi. The cooperation of Mori, who was the commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, was vital. When Mori refused to side with Hatanaka, Hatanaka killed him, fearing Mori would order the Guards to stop the rebellion. Uehara killed Shiraishi. These were the only two murders of the night. Hatanaka then used General Mori's official stamp to authorize Imperial Guards Division Strategic Order No. 584, a false set of orders created by his co-conspirators, which would greatly increase the strength of the forces occupying the Imperial Palace and Imperial Household Ministry, and "protecting" the Emperor. The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for the recordings of the surrender speech, failing to locate them amid a blackout caused by American bombings. Around the same time, another group of Hatanaka's rebels, led by Captain Takeo Sasaki, targeted Prime Minister Suzuki's office with the intent to kill him. When they found it empty, they opened fire with machine guns, devastating the office, and then set the building ablaze before departing for Suzuki's home. Fortunately, Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief secretary to Suzuki's Cabinet, had warned Suzuki, enabling him to escape just minutes before the assassins arrived. After setting fire to Suzuki's residence, the rebels then proceeded to the estate of Kiichirō Hiranuma, aiming to assassinate him as well. Hiranuma managed to escape through a side gate, but the rebels torched his house too. In the aftermath, Suzuki spent the remainder of August under police protection, sleeping in a different bed each night to avoid detection. Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to confront him and urged him to surrender. As Hatanaka saw his plan collapse around him, he pleaded with Tatsuhiko Takashima, the Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, for airtime on NHK radio to explain his intentions to the Japanese people. His request was denied. Meanwhile, Colonel Haga, commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, learned that the Army did not support Hatanaka's rebellion and ordered him to vacate the palace grounds. Just before 05:00, while his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to the NHK studios, desperately trying to secure airtime to convey his actions. However, slightly over an hour later, after receiving a phone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally conceded defeat. He gathered his officers and left the NHK studio, feeling the weight of his failed coup. At dawn, General Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded, so he went there to confront the rebellious officers. He berated them for acting against the spirit of the Japanese army and ultimately convinced them to return to their barracks. By 08:00 on August 15, the rebellion was entirely dismantled. Although they had held the palace grounds for much of the night, they ultimately failed to find the recordings. After his failed coup, Hatanaka took his own life before witnessing Japan's surrender. While TF-38 refueled on August 14, Halsey signaled McCain, stating, “I intend to strike the same general target area on the fifteenth.” McCain informed TF-38, “Our orders to strike indicate the enemy may have dropped an unacceptable joker into the surrender terms. This war could last many months longer. We cannot afford to relax. Now is the time to pour it on.” In fact, the Western Allies had sunk their last Japanese ships of the war that day, when submarines USS Torsk (SS-423) and USS Spikefish (SS-404) torpedoed I-373 and two small escort ships in the East China Sea, resulting in the death of 112 Japanese sailors. The following morning, August 15, the Third Fleet launched its first strike of 103 aircraft at 04:15 hours. At 06:14, just as the first strike was returning and the second strike was five minutes from the target, Halsey was ordered by Nimitz, “Air attack will be suspended. Acknowledge.” Shortly afterward, an officer burst in, waving a transcript—President Truman's official peace announcement. Halsey erupted with exuberance, “pounding the shoulders of everyone within reach.” He recalled, “My first thought at the great news was, ‘Victory!' My second was, ‘God be thanked, I'll never have to order another man out to die.'” However, within minutes, four retiring Hancock Hellcats were attacked by seven Japanese fighters, resulting in the Hellcats shooting down four without loss. Over Tokorazawa airfield, northwest of Tokyo, 20 IJAAF Ki-84 “Franks” ambushed six VF-88 Hellcats from Yorktown. The Hellcats managed to shoot down nine Franks but lost four of their own, along with their pilots. Rawlings' dawn strikes were intercepted by about 12 Zeros. Escorting Seafires shot down eight Zeros but lost one, while an Avenger downed a ninth Zero. Tragically, seven TF-38 flyers never returned. During the morning, Halsey launched his last strike of the war, but was soon ordered by Admiral Nimitz to suspend all air attacks. At 12:00, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, reading the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, was finally broadcast. The war was over… or was it really? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet debated surrender, the Emperor Hirohito finally accepted the Potsdam Declaration, conditionally ensuring the imperial family's continuity. However, conspirators attempted a coup to prevent the surrender, ultimately failing. By August 15, Japan officially surrendered, marking the end of the Pacific War.

Anthony D'Esposito, Former Congressman & Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor nominee, joins Sid to discuss the delay in his confirmation as Inspector General of the Department of Labor, blaming Senate obstruction, particularly from Chuck Schumer. He expects progress in early September when the Senate reconvenes. The conversation shifts to redistricting and election law changes in New York, which D'Esposito criticizes as Democratic attempts to rig the system by shifting local elections to even years to boost turnout. He emphasizes the GOP's focus on retaining and expanding their local majorities in Nassau County, highlighting candidates like Bruce Blakeman and Ann Donnelly. On the topic of Trump pardoning George Santos, D'Esposito strongly disagrees, stating Santos is solely responsible for his actions. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Anthony D'Esposito, Former Congressman & Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor nominee, joins Sid to discuss the delay in his confirmation as Inspector General of the Department of Labor, blaming Senate obstruction, particularly from Chuck Schumer. He expects progress in early September, when the Senate reconvenes. The conversation shifts to redistricting and election law changes in New York, which D'Esposito criticizes as Democratic attempts to rig the system by shifting local elections to even years to boost turnout. He emphasizes the GOP's focus on retaining and expanding their local majorities in Nassau County, highlighting candidates like Bruce Blakeman and Ann Donnelly. On the topic of Trump pardoning George Santos, D'Esposito strongly disagrees, stating Santos is solely responsible for his actions. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Anthony D'Esposito, Former Congressman & Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor nominee, joins Sid to discuss the delay in his confirmation as Inspector General of the Department of Labor, blaming Senate obstruction, particularly from Chuck Schumer. He expects progress in early September when the Senate reconvenes. The conversation shifts to redistricting and election law changes in New York, which D'Esposito criticizes as Democratic attempts to rig the system by shifting local elections to even years to boost turnout. He emphasizes the GOP's focus on retaining and expanding their local majorities in Nassau County, highlighting candidates like Bruce Blakeman and Ann Donnelly. On the topic of Trump pardoning George Santos, D'Esposito strongly disagrees, stating Santos is solely responsible for his actions. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Newt talks with Andrew Levin, Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, about his recent policy brief, “The Federal Reserve Should Welcome the Appointment of an Independent Inspector General.” They discuss the controversial $3 billion dollar renovation project at the Federal Reserve Building, highlighting the ballooning costs and luxurious upgrades such as glass atriums and rooftop gardens. Levin argues for increased accountability, suggesting the appointment of an independent Inspector General and greater Congressional oversight. He emphasizes the need for transparency and reform within the Federal Reserve, comparing its practices to other central banks and federal agencies. They also discuss the Fed's monetary policy, its independence, and the lack of dissent among its board members, calling for a shift in culture and leadership. Levin proposes practical reforms, including integrating the Fed's budget into the federal budget process and appointing a presidentially confirmed Inspector General to ensure accountability and transparency.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In the second hour of The Rita Cosby Show, Rita discusses Zohran Mamdani's comments on defunding the police as well as the latest on the fabricated Russia hoax against President Trump. She is joined by Anthony D'Esposito , Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor Nominee to break these topics down. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Rita is joined by Anthony D'Esposito, the Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor Nominee. They discuss Zohran Mamdani's anti-police stance as well as how the Russia hoax was conceived to undermine President Trump. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We've covered the US Agency for International Development, or USAID, pretty consistently on Statecraft, since our first interview on PEPFAR, the flagship anti-AIDS program, in 2023. When DOGE came to USAID, I was extremely critical of the cuts to lifesaving aid, and the abrupt, pointlessly harmful ways in which they were enacted. In March, I wrote, “The DOGE team has axed the most effective and efficient programs at USAID, and forced out the chief economist, who was brought in to oversee a more aggressive push toward efficiency.”Today, we're talking to that forced-out chief economist, Dean Karlan. Dean spent two and a half years at the helm of the first-ever Office of the Chief Economist at USAID. In that role, he tried to help USAID get better value from its foreign aid spending. His office shifted $1.7 billion of spending towards programs with stronger evidence of effectiveness. He explains how he achieved this, building a start-up within a massive bureaucracy. I should note that Dean is one of the titans of development economics, leading some of the most important initiatives in the field (I won't list them, but see here for details), and I think there's a plausible case he deserves a Nobel.Throughout this conversation, Dean makes a point much better than I could: the status quo at USAID needed a lot of improvement. The same political mechanisms that get foreign aid funded by Congress also created major vulnerabilities for foreign aid, vulnerabilities that DOGE seized on. Dean believes foreign aid is hugely valuable, a good thing for us to spend our time, money, and resources on. But there's a lot USAID could do differently to make its marginal dollar spent more efficient.DOGE could have made USAID much more accountable and efficient by listening to people like Dean, and reformers of foreign aid should think carefully about Dean's criticisms of USAID, and his points for how to make foreign aid not just resilient but politically popular in the long term.We discuss* What does the Chief Economist do?* Why does 170% percent of USAID funds come already earmarked by Congress?* Why is evaluating program effectiveness institutionally difficult?* Why don't we just do cash transfers for everything?* Why institutions like USAID have trouble prioritizing* Should USAID get rid of gender/environment/fairness in procurement rules?* Did it rely too much on a small group of contractors?* What's changed in development economics over the last 20 years?* Should USAID spend more on governance and less on other forms of aid? * How DOGE killed USAID — and how to bring it back better* Is depoliticizing foreign aid even possible?* Did USAID build “soft power” for the United States?This is a long conversation: you can jump to a specific section with the index above. If you just want to hear about Dean's experience with DOGE, you can click here or go to the 45-minute mark in the audio. And if you want my abbreviated summary of the conversation, see these two Twitter threads. But I think the full conversation is enlightening, especially if you want to understand the American foreign aid system. Thanks to Harry Fletcher-Wood for his judicious edits.Our past coverage of USAIDDean, I'm curious about the limits of your authority. What can the Chief Economist of USAID do? What can they make people do?There had never been an Office of the Chief Economist before. In a sense, I was running a startup, within a 13,000-employee agency that had fairly baked-in, decentralized processes for doing things.Congress would say, "This is how much to spend on this sector and these countries." What you actually fund was decided by missions in the individual countries. It was exciting to have that purview across the world and across many areas, not just economic development, but also education, social protection, agriculture. But the reality is, we were running a consulting unit within USAID, trying to advise others on how to use evidence more effectively in order to maximize impact for every dollar spent.We were able to make some institutional changes, focused on basically a two-pronged strategy. One, what are the institutional enablers — the rules and the processes for how things get done — that are changeable? And two, let's get our hands dirty working with the budget holders who say, "I would love to use the evidence that's out there, please help guide us to be more effective with what we're doing."There were a lot of willing and eager people within USAID. We did not lack support to make that happen. We never would've achieved anything, had there not been an eager workforce who heard our mission and knocked on our door to say, "Please come help us do that."What do you mean when you say USAID has decentralized processes for doing things?Earmarks and directives come down from Congress. [Some are] about sector: $1 billion dollars to spend on primary school education to improve children's learning outcomes, for instance. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [See our interview with former PEPFAR lead Mark Dybul] is one of the biggest earmarks to spend money specifically on specific diseases. Then there's directives that come down about how to allocate across countries.Those are two conversations I have very little engagement on, because some of that comes from Congress. It's a very complicated, intertwined set of constraints that are then adhered to and allocated to the different countries. Then what ends up happening is — this is the decentralized part — you might be a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) working in a country, your focus is education, and you're given a budget for that year from the earmark for education and told, "Go spend $80 million on a new award in education." You're working to figure out, “How should we spend that?” There might be some technical support from headquarters, but ultimately, you're responsible for making those decisions. Part of our role was to help guide those FSOs towards programs that had more evidence of effectiveness.Could you talk more about these earmarks? There's a popular perception that USAID decides what it wants to fund. But these big categories of humanitarian aid, or health, or governance, are all decided in Congress. Often it's specific congressmen or congresswomen who really want particular pet projects to be funded.That's right. And the number that I heard is that something in the ballpark of 150-170% of USAID funds were earmarked. That might sound horrible, but it's not.How is that possible?Congress double-dips, in a sense: we have two different demands. You must spend money on these two things. If the same dollar can satisfy both, that was completely legitimate. There was no hiding of that fact. It's all public record, and it all comes from congressional acts that create these earmarks. There's nothing hidden underneath the hood.Will you give me examples of double earmarking in practice? What kinds of goals could you satisfy with the same dollar?There's an earmark for Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) to do research, and an earmark for education. If DIV is going to fund an evaluation of something in the education space, there's a possibility that that can satisfy a dual earmark requirement. That's the kind of thing that would happen. One is an earmark for a process: “Do really careful, rigorous evaluations of interventions, so that we learn more about what works and what doesn't." And another is, "Here's money that has to be spent on education." That would be an example of a double dip on an earmark.And within those categories, the job of Chief Economist was to help USAID optimize the funding? If you're spending $2 billion on education, “Let's be as effective with that money as possible.”That's exactly right. We had two teams, Evidence Use and Evidence Generation. It was exactly what it sounds like. If there was an earmark for $1 billion dollars on education, the Evidence Use team worked to do systematic analysis: “What is the best evidence out there for what works for education for primary school learning outcomes?” Then, “How can we map that evidence to the kinds of things that USAID funds? What are the kinds of questions that need to be figured out?”It's not a cookie-cutter answer. A systematic review doesn't say, "Here's the intervention. Now just roll it out everywhere." We had to work with the missions — with people who know the local area — to understand, “What is the local context? How do you appropriately adapt this program in a procurement and contextualize it to that country, so that you can hire people to use that evidence?”Our Evidence Generation team was trying to identify knowledge gaps where the agency could lead in producing more knowledge about what works and what doesn't. If there was something innovative that USAID was funding, we were huge advocates of, "Great, let's contribute to the global public good of knowledge, so that we can learn more in the future about what to do, and so others can learn from us. So let's do good, careful evaluations."Being able to demonstrate what good came of an intervention also serves the purpose of accountability. But I've never been a fan of doing really rigorous evaluations just for the sake of accountability. It could discourage innovation and risk-taking, because if you fail, you'd be seen as a failure, rather than as a win for learning that an idea people thought was reasonable didn't turn out to work. It also probably leads to overspending on research, rather than doing programs. If you're doing something just for accountability purposes, you're better off with audits. "Did you actually deliver the program that you said you would deliver, or not?"Awards over $100 million dollars did go through the front office of USAID for approval. We added a process — it was actually a revamped old process — where they stopped off in my office. We were able to provide guidance on the cost-effectiveness of proposals that would then be factored into the decision on whether to proceed. When I was first trying to understand Project 2025, because we saw that as a blueprint for what changes to expect, one of the changes they proposed was actually that process. I remember thinking to myself, "We just did that. Hopefully this change that they had in mind when they wrote that was what we actually put in place." But I thought of it as a healthy process that had an impact, not just on that one award, but also in helping set an example for smaller awards of, “This is how to be more evidence-based in what you're doing.”[Further reading: Here's a position paper Karlan's office at USAID put out in 2024 on how USAID should evaluate cost-effectiveness.]You've also argued that USAID should take into account more research that has already been done on global development and humanitarian aid. Your ideal wouldn't be for USAID to do really rigorous research on every single thing it does. You can get a lot better just by incorporating things that other people have learned.That's absolutely right. I can say this as a researcher: to no one's surprise, it's more bureaucratic to work with the government as a research funder than it is to work with foundations and nimble NGOs. If I want to evaluate a particular program, and you give me a choice of who the funder should be, the only reason I would choose government is if it had a faster on-ramp to policy by being inside.The people who are setting policy should not be putting more weight on evidence that they paid for. In fact, one of the slogans that I often used at USAID is, "Evidence doesn't care who pays for it." We shouldn't be, as an agency, putting more weight on the things that we evaluated vs. things that others evaluated without us, and that we can learn from, mimic, replicate, and scale.We — and the we here is everyone, researchers and policymakers — put too much weight on individual studies, in a horrible way. The first to publish on something gets more accolades than the second, third and fourth. That's not healthy when it comes to policy. If we put too much weight on our own evidence, we end up putting too much weight on individual studies we happen to do. That's not healthy either.That was one of the big pieces of culture change that we tried to push internally at USAID. We had this one slide that we used repeatedly that showed the plethora of evidence out there in the world compared to 20 years ago. A lot more studies are now usable. You can aggregate that evidence and form much better policies.You had political support to innovate that not everybody going into government has. On the other hand, USAID is a big, bureaucratic entity. There are all kinds of cross-pressures against being super-effective per dollar spent. In doing culture change, what kinds of roadblocks did you run into internally?We had a lot of support and political cover, in the sense that the political appointees — I was not a political appointee — were huge fans. But political appointees under Republicans have also been huge fans of what we were doing. Disagreements are more about what to do and what causes to choose. But the basic idea of being effective with your dollars to push your policy agenda is something that cuts across both sides.In the days leading up to the inauguration, we were expecting to continue the work we were doing. Being more cost-effective was something some of the people who were coming in were huge advocates for. They did make progress under Trump I in pushing USAID in that direction. We saw ourselves as able to help further that goal. Obviously, that's not the way it played out, but there isn't really anything political about being more cost-effective.We'll come back to that, but I do want to talk about the 2.5 years you spent in the Biden administration. USAID is full of people with all kinds of incentives, including some folks who were fully on board and supportive. What kinds of challenges did you have in trying to change the culture to be more focused on evidence and effectiveness?There was a fairly large contingent of people who welcomed us, were eager, understood the space that we were coming from and the things that we wanted, and greeted us with open arms. There's no way we would've accomplished what we accomplished without that. We had a bean counter within the Office of the Chief Economist of moving about $1.7 billion towards programs that were more effective or had strong evaluations. That would've been $0 had there not been some individuals who were already eager and just didn't have the path for doing it.People can see economists as people who are going to come in negative and a bit dismal — the dismal science, so to speak. I got into economics for a positive reason. We tried as often as possible to show that with an economic lens, we can help people achieve their goals better, period. We would say repeatedly to people, "We're not here to actually make the difficult choices: to say whether health, education, or food security is the better use of money. We're here to accept your goal and help you achieve more of it for your dollar spent.” We always send a very disarming message: we're there simply to help people achieve their goals and to illuminate the trade-offs that naturally exist.Within USAID, you have a consensus-type organization. When you have 10 people sitting around a room trying to decide how to spend money towards a common goal, if you don't crystallize the trade-offs between the various ideas being put forward, you end up seeing a consensus built: that everybody gets a piece of the pie. Our way of trying to shift the culture is to take those moments and say, "Wait a second. All 10 might be good ideas relative to doing nothing, but they can't all be good relative to each other. We all share a common goal, so let's be clear about the trade-offs between these different programs. Let's identify the ones that are actually getting you the most bang for your buck."Can you give me an example of what those trade-offs might be in a given sector?Sure. Let's take social protection, what we would call the Humanitarian Nexus development space. It might be working in a refugee area — not dealing with the immediate crisis, but one, two, five, or ten years later — trying to help bring the refugees into a more stable environment and into economic activities. Sometimes, you would see some cash or food provided to households. The programs would all have the common goal of helping to build a sustainable livelihood for households, so that they can be more integrated into the local economy. There might be programs providing water, financial instruments like savings vehicles, and supporting vocational education. It'd be a myriad of things, all on this focused goal of income-generating activity for the households to make them more stable in the long run.Often, those kinds of programs doing 10 different things did not actually lead to an observable impact over five years. But a more focused approach has gone through evaluations: cash transfers. That's a good example where “reducing” doesn't always mean reduce your programs just to one thing, but there is this default option of starting with a base case: “What does a cash transfer generate?"And to clarify for people who don't follow development economics, the cash transfer is just, “What if we gave people money?”Sometimes it is just that. Sometimes it's thinking strategically, “Maybe we should do it as a lump sum so that it goes into investments. Maybe we should do it with a planning exercise to make those investments.” Let's just call it “cash-plus,” or “cash-with-a-little-plus,” then variations of that nature. There's a different model, maybe call it, “cash-plus-plus,” called the graduation model. That has gone through about 30 randomized trials, showing pretty striking impacts on long-run income-generating activity for households. At its core is a cash transfer, usually along with some training about income-generating activity — ideally one that is producing and exporting in some way, even a local export to the capital — and access to some form of savings. In some cases, that's an informal savings group, with a community that comes and saves together. In some cases, it's mobile money that's the core. It's a much simpler program, and it's easier to do it at scale. It has generated considerable, measured, repeatedly positive impacts, but not always. There's a lot more that needs to be learned about how to do it more effectively.[Further reading: Here's another position paper from Karlan's team at USAID on benchmarking against cash transfers.]One of your recurring refrains is, “If we're not sure that these other ideas have an impact, let's benchmark: would a cash-transfer model likely give us more bang for our buck than this panoply of other programs that we're trying to run?”The idea of having a benchmark is a great approach in general. You should always be able to beat X. X might be different in different contexts. In a lot of cases, cash is the right benchmark.Go back to education. What's your benchmark for improving learning outcomes for a primary school? Cash transfer is not the right benchmark. The evidence that cash transfers will single-handedly move the needle on learning outcomes is not that strong. On the other hand, a couple of different programs — one called Teaching at the Right Level, another called structured pedagogy — have proven repeatedly to generate very strong impacts at a fairly modest cost. In education, those should be the benchmark. If you want to innovate, great, innovate. But your goal is to beat those. If you can beat them consistently, you become the benchmark. That's a great process for the long run. It's very much part of our thinking about what the future of foreign aid should look like: to be structured around that benchmark.Let's go back to those roundtables you described, where you're trying to figure out what the intervention should be for a group of refugees in a foreign country. What were the responses when you'd say, “Look, if we're all pulling in the same direction, we have to toss out the three worst ideas”?One of the challenges is the psychology of ethics. There's probably a word for this, but one of the objections we would often get was about the scale of a program for an individual. Someone would argue, "But this won't work unless you do this one extra thing." That extra thing might be providing water to the household, along with a cash transfer for income-generating activity, financial support, and bank accounts. Another objection would be that, "You also have to provide consumption and food up to a certain level."These are things that individually might be good, relative to nothing, or maybe even relative to other water approaches or cash transfers. But if you're focused on whether to satisfy the household's food needs, or provide half of what's needed — if all you're thinking about is the trade-off between full and half — you immediately jump to this idea that, "No, we have to go full. That's what's needed to help this household." But if you go to half, you can help more people. There's an actual trade-off: 10,000 people will receive nothing because you're giving more to the people in your program.The same is true for nutritional supplements. Should you provide 2,000 calories a day, or 1,000 calories a day to more people? It's a very difficult conversation on the psychology of ethics. There's this idea that people in a program are sacrosanct, and you must do everything you can for them. But that ignores all the people who are not being reached at all.I would find myself in conversations where that's exactly the way I would try to put it. I would say, "Okay, wait, we have the 2,000,000 people that are eligible for this program in this context. Our program is only going to reach 250,000. That's the reality. Now, let's talk about how many people we're willing to leave untouched and unhelped whatsoever." That was, at least to me, the right way to frame this question. Do you go very intense for fewer people or broader support for more people?Did that help these roundtables reach consensus, or at least have a better sense of what things are trading off against each other?I definitely saw movement for some. I wouldn't say it was uniform, and these are difficult conversations. But there was a lot of appetite for this recognition that, as big as USAID was, it was still small, relative to the problems being approached. There were a lot of people in any given crisis who were being left unhelped. The minute you're able to help people focus more on those big numbers, as daunting as they are, I would see more openness to looking at the evidence to figure out how to do the most good with the resources we have?” We must recognize these inherent trade-offs, whether we like it or not.Back in 2023, you talked to Dylan Matthews at Vox — it's a great interview — about how it's hard to push people to measure cost-effectiveness, when it means adding another step to a big, complicated bureaucratic process of getting aid out the door. You said,"There are also bandwidth issues. There's a lot of competing demands. Some of these demands relate to important issues on gender environment, fairness in the procurement process. These add steps to the process that need to be adhered to. What you end up with is a lot of overworked people. And then you're saying, ‘Here's one more thing to do.'”Looking back, what do you think of those demands on, say, fairness in the procurement process?Given that we're going to be facing a new environment, there probably are some steps in the process that — hopefully, when things are put back in place in some form — someone can be thinking more carefully about. It's easier to put in a cleaner process that avoids some of these hiccups when you start with a blank slate.Having said that, it's also going to be fewer people to dole out less money. There's definitely a challenge that we're going to be facing as a country, to push out money in an effective way with many fewer people for oversight. I don't think it would be accurate to say we achieved this goal yet, but my goal was to make it so that adding cost-effectiveness was actually a negative-cost addition to the process. [We wanted] to do it in a way that successfully recognized that it wasn't a cookie-cutter solution from up top for every country. But [our goal was that] the work to contextualize in a country actually simplified the process for whoever's putting together the procurement docs and deciding what to put in them. I stand by that belief that if it's done well, we can make this a negative-cost process change.I just want to push a little bit. Would you be supportive of a USAID procurement and contracting process that stripped out a bunch of these requirements about gender, environment, or fairness in contracting? Would that make USAID a more effective institution?Some of those types of things did serve an important purpose for some areas and not others. The tricky thing is, how do you set up a process to decide when to do it, when not? There's definitely cases where you would see an environmental review of something that really had absolutely nothing to do with the environment. It was just a cog in the process, but you have to have a process for deciding the process. I don't know enough about the legislation that was put in place on each of these to say, “Was there a better way of deciding when to do them, when not to do them?” That is not something that I was involved in in a direct way. "Let's think about redoing how we introduce gender in our procurement process" was never put on the table.On gender, there's a fair amount of evidence in different contexts that says the way of dealing with a gender inequity is not to just take the same old program and say, "We're now going to do this for women." You need to understand something more about the local context. If all you do is take programs and say, "Add a gender component," you end up with a lot of false attribution, and you don't end up being effective at the very thing that the person [leading the program] cares to do.In that Vox interview, your host says, "USAID relies heavily on a small number of well-connected contractors to deliver most aid, while other groups are often deterred from even applying by the process's complexity." He goes on to say that the use of rigorous evaluation methods like randomized controlled trials is the exception, not the norm.On Statecraft, we talked to Kyle Newkirk, who ran USAID procurement in Afghanistan in the late 2000s, about the small set of well-connected contractors that took most of the contracts in Afghanistan. Often, there was very little oversight from USAID, either because it was hard to get out to those locations in a war-torn environment, or because the system of accountability wasn't built there. Did you talk to people about lessons learned from USAID operating in Afghanistan?No. I mean, only to the following extent: The lesson learned there, as I understand it, wasn't so much about the choice on what intervention to fund, it was procurement: the local politics and engagement with the governments or lack thereof. And dealing with the challenge of doing work in a context like that, where there's more risk of fraud and issues of that nature.Our emphasis was about the design of programs to say, “What are you actually going to try to fund?” Dealing with whether there's fraud in the execution would fall more under the Inspector General and other units. That's not an area that we engaged in when we would do evaluation.This actually gets to a key difference between impact evaluations and accountability. It's one of the areas where we see a lot of loosey-goosey language in the media reporting and Twitter. My office focused on impact evaluation. What changed in the world because of this intervention, that wouldn't otherwise have changed? By “change in the world,” we are making a causal statement. That's setting up things like randomized controlled trials to find out, “What was the impact of this program?” It does provide some accountability, but it really should be done to look forward, in order to know, “Does this help achieve the goals we have in mind?” If so, let's learn that, and replicate it, scale it, do it again.If you're going to deliver books to schools, medicine to health clinics, or cash to people, and you're concerned about fraud, then you need to audit that process and see, “Did the books get to the schools, the medicine to the people, the cash to the people?” You don't need to ask, "Did the medicine solve the disease?" There's been studies already. There's a reason that medicine was being prescribed. Once it's proven to be an effective drug, you don't run randomized trials for decades to learn what you already know. If it's the prescribed drug, you just prescribe the drug, and do accountability exercises to make sure that the drugs are getting into the right hands and there isn't theft or corruption along the way.I think it's a very intuitive thing. There's a confusion that often takes place in social science, in economic or education interventions. They somehow forget that once we know that a certain program generates a certain positive impact, we no longer need to track continuously to find out what happens. Instead, we just need to do accountability to make sure that the program is being delivered as it was designed, tested, and shown to work.There are all these criticisms — from the waste, fraud, and corruption perspective — of USAID working with a couple of big contractors. USAID works largely through these big development organizations like Chemonics. Would USAID dollars be more effective if it worked through a larger base of contractors?I don't think we know. There's probably a few different operating models that can deliver the same basic intervention. We need to focus on, ”What actually are we doing on the ground? What is it that we want the recipients of the program to receive, hear, or do?” and then think backwards from there: "Who's the right implementer for this?" If there's an implementer who is much more expensive for delivering the same product, let's find someone who's more cost-effective.It's helpful to break cost-effective programming into two things: the intervention itself and what benefits it accrues, and the cost for delivering that. Sometimes the improvement is not about the intervention, it's about the delivery model. Maybe that's what you're saying: “These players were too few, too large, and they had a grab on the market, so that they were able to charge too much money to deliver something that others were equally able to do at lower cost." If that's the case, that says, "We should reform our procurement process,” because the reason you would see that happen is they were really good at complying with requirements that came at USAID from Congress. You had an overworked workforce [within USAID] that had to comply with all these requirements. If you had a bid between two groups, one of which repeatedly delivered on the paperwork to get a good performance evaluation, and a new group that doesn't have that track record, who are you going to choose? That's how we ended up where we are.My understanding of the history is that it comes from a push from Republicans in the ‘80s, from [Senator] Jesse Helms, to outsource USAID efforts to contractors. So this is not a left-leaning thing. I wouldn't say it is right-leaning either. It was just a decision made decades ago. You combine that with the bureaucratic requirements of working with USAID, and you end up with a few firms and nonprofits skilled at dealing with it.It's definitely my impression that at various points in American history, different partisans are calling for insourcing or for outsourcing. But definitely, I think you're right that the NGO cluster around USAID does spring up out of a Republican push in the eighties.We talked to John Kamensky recently, who was on Al Gore's predecessor to DOGE in the ‘90s.I listened to this, yeah.I'm glad to hear it! I'm thinking of it because they also pushed to cut the workforce in the mid-90s and outsource federal functions.Earlier, you mentioned a slide that showed what we've learned in the field of development economics over the past 20 years. Will you narrate that slide for me?Let me do two slides for you. The slide that I was picturing was a count of randomized controlled trials in development that shows a fairly exponential growth. The movement started in the mid-to-late 1990s, but really took off in the 2000s. Even just in the past 10 years, it's seen a considerable increase. There's about 4-5,000 randomized controlled trials evaluating various programs of the kind USAID funds.That doesn't tell you the substance of what was learned. Here's an example of substance, which is cash transfers: probably the most studied intervention out there. We have a meta-analysis that counted 115 studies. That's where you start having a preponderance of evidence to be able to say something concrete. There's some variation: you get different results in different places; targeting and ways of doing it vary. A good systematic analysis can help tease out what we can say, not just about the effect of cash, but also how to do it and what to expect, depending on how it's done. Fifteen years ago, when we saw the first few come out, you just had, "Oh, that's interesting. But it's a couple of studies, how do you form policy around that?” With 115, we can say so much more.What else have we learned about development that USAID operators in the year 2000 would not have been able to act upon?Think about the development process in two steps. One is choosing good interventions; the other is implementing them well. The study of implementation is historically underdone. The challenge that we face — this is an area I was hoping USAID could make inroads on — was, studying a new intervention might be of high reward from an academic perspective. But it's a lot less interesting to an academic to do much more granular work to say, "That was an interesting program that created these groups [of aid recipients]; now let's do some further knock-on research to find out whether those groups should be made of four, six, or ten people.” It's going to have a lower reward for the researcher, but it's incredibly important.It's equivalent to the color of the envelope in direct marketing. You might run tests — if this were old-style direct marketing — as to whether the envelope should be blue or red. You might find that blue works better. Great, but that's not interesting to an academic. But if you run 50 of these, on a myriad of topics about how to implement better, you end up with a collection of knowledge that is moving the needle on how to achieve more impact per dollar.That collection is not just important for policy: it also helps us learn more about the development process and the bottlenecks for implementing good programs. As we're seeing more digital platforms and data being used, [refining implementation] is more possible compared to 20 years ago, where most of the research was at the intervention level: does this intervention work? That's an exciting transition. It's also a path to seeing how foreign aid can help in individual contexts, [as we] work with local governments to integrate evidence into their operations and be more efficient with their own resources.There's an argument I've seen a lot recently: we under-invest in governance relative to other foreign aid goals. If we care about economic growth and humanitarian outcomes, we should spend a lot more on supporting local governance. What do you make of that claim?I agree with it actually, but there's a big difference between recognizing the problem and seeing what the tool is to address it. It's one thing to say, “Politics matters, institutions matter.” There's lots of evidence to support that, including the recent Nobel Prize. It's another beast to say, “This particular intervention will improve institutions and governance.”The challenge is, “What do we do about this? What is working to improve this? What is resilient to the political process?” The minute you get into those kinds of questions, it's the other end of the spectrum from a cash transfer. A cash transfer has a kind of universality: Not to say you're going to get the same impact everywhere, but it's a bit easier to think about the design of a program. You have fewer parameters to decide. When you think about efforts to improve governance, you need bespoke thinking in every single place.As you point out, it's something of a meme to say “institutions matter” and to leave it at that, but the devil is in all of those details.In my younger years — I feel old saying that — I used to do a lot of work on financial inclusion, and financial literacy was always my go-to example. On a household level, it's really easy to show a correlation: people who are more financially literate make better financial decisions and have more wealth, etc. It's much harder to say, “How do you move the needle on financial literacy in a way that actually helps people make better decisions, absorb shocks better, build investment better, save better?” It's easy to show that the correlation is there. It's much harder to say this program, here, will actually move the needle. That same exact problem is much more complicated when thinking about governance and institutions.Let's talk about USAID as it stands today. You left USAID when it became clear to you that a lot of the work you were doing was not of interest to the people now running it. How did the agency end up so disconnected from a political base of support? There's still plenty of people who support USAID and would like it to be reinstated, but it was at least vulnerable enough to be tipped over by DOGE in a matter of weeks. How did that happen?I don't know that I would agree with the premise. I'm not sure that public support of foreign aid actually changed, I'd be curious to see that. I think aid has always been misunderstood. There are public opinion polls that show people thought 25% of the US budget was spent on foreign aid. One said, "What, do you think it should be?" People said 10%. The right answer is about 0.6%. You could say fine, people are bad at statistics, but those numbers are pretty dauntingly off. I don't know that that's changed. I heard numbers like that years ago.I think there was a vulnerability to an effort that doesn't create a visible impact to people's lives in America, the way that Social Security, Medicare, and roads do. Foreign aid just doesn't have that luxury. I think it's always been vulnerable. It has always had some bipartisan support, because of the understanding of the bigger picture and the soft power that's gained from it. And the recognition that we are a nation built on the idea of generosity and being good to others. That was always there, but it required Congress to step in and say, "Let's go spend this money on foreign aid." I don't think that changed. What changed was that you ended up with an administration that just did not share those values.There's this issue in foreign aid: Congress picks its priorities, but those priorities are not a ranked list of what Congress cares about. It's the combination of different interests and pressures in Congress that generates the list of things USAID is going to fund.You could say doing it that way is necessary to build buy-in from a bunch of different political interests for the work of foreign aid. On the other hand, maybe the emergent list from that process is not the things that are most important to fund. And clearly, that congressional buy-in wasn't enough to protect USAID from DOGE or from other political pressures.How should people who care about foreign aid reason about building a version of USAID that's more effective and less vulnerable at the same time?Fair question. Look, I have thoughts, but by no means do I think of myself as the most knowledgeable person to say, here's the answer in the way forward. One reality is, even if Congress did object, they didn't have a mechanism in place to actually object. They can control the power of the purse the next round, but we're probably going to be facing a constitutional crisis over the Impoundment Act, to see if the executive branch can impound money that Congress spent. We'll see how this plays out. Aside from taking that to court, all Congress could do was complain.I would like what comes back to have two things done that will help, but they don't make foreign aid immune. One is to be more evidence-based, because then attacks on being ineffective are less strong. But the reality is, some of the attacks on its “effectiveness,” and the examples used, had nothing to do with poorly-chosen interventions. There was a slipperiness of language, calling something that they don't like “fraud” and “waste” because they didn't like its purpose. That is very different than saying, “We actually agreed on the purpose of something, but then you implemented it in such a bad way that there was fraud and waste.” There were really no examples given of that second part. So I don't know that being more evidence-based will actually protect it, given that that wasn't the way it was really genuinely taken down.The second is some boundaries. There is a core set of activities that have bipartisan support. How do we structure a foreign aid that is just focused on that? We need to find a way to put the things that are more controversial — whether it's the left or right that wants it — in a separate bucket. Let the team that wins the election turn that off and on as they wish, without adulterating the core part that has bipartisan support. That's the key question: can we set up a process that partitions those, so that they don't have that vulnerability? [I wrote about this problem earlier this year.]My counter-example is PEPFAR, which had a broad base of bipartisan support. PEPFAR consistently got long-term reauthorizations from Congress, I think precisely because of the dynamic you're talking about: It was a focused, specific intervention that folks all over the political spectrum could get behind and save lives. But in government programs, if something has a big base of support, you have an incentive to stuff your pet partisan issues in there, for the same reason that “must-pass” bills get stuffed with everybody's little thing. [In 2024, before DOGE, PEPFAR's original Republican co-sponsor came out against a long-term reauthorization, on the grounds that the Biden administration was using the program to promote abortion. Congress reauthorized PEPFAR for only one year, and that reauthorization lapsed in 2025.]You want to carve out the things that are truly bipartisan. But does that idea have a timer attached? What if, on a long enough timeline, everything becomes politicized?There are economic theorems about the nature of a repeated game. You can get many different equilibria in the long run. I'd like to think there's a world in which that is the answer. But we have seen an erosion of other things, like the filibuster regarding judges. Each team makes a little move in some direction, and then you change the equilibrium. We always have that risk. The goal is, how can you establish something where that doesn't happen?It might be that what's happened is helpful, in an unintended way, to build equilibrium in the future that keeps things focused on the bipartisan aspect. Whether it's the left or the right that wants to do something that they know the other side will object to, they hold back and say, "Maybe we shouldn't do that. Because when we do, the whole thing gets blown up."Let's imagine you're back at USAID a couple of years from now, with a broader latitude to organize our foreign aid apparatus around impact and effectiveness. What other things might we want to do — beyond measuring programs and keeping trade-offs in mind — if we really wanted to focus on effectiveness? Would we do fewer interventions and do them at larger scale?I think we would do fewer things simpler and bigger, but I also think we need to recognize that even at our biggest, we were tiny compared to the budget of the local government. If we can do more to use our money to help them be more effective with their money, that's the biggest win to go for. That starts looking a lot like things Mark Green was putting in place [as administrator of USAID] under Trump I, under the Journey to Self-Reliance [a reorganization of USAID to help countries address development challenges themselves].Sometimes that's done in the context of, "Let's do that for five or ten years, and then we can stop giving aid to that country." That was the way the Millennium Challenge Corporation talked about their country selection initially. Eventually, they stopped doing that, because they realized that that was never happening. I think that's okay. As much as we might help make some changes, even if we succeed in helping the poorest country in the world use their resources better, they're still going to be poor. We're still going to be rich. There's still maybe going to be the poorest, because if we do that in the 10 poorest countries and they all move up, maybe the 11th becomes the poorest, and then we can work there. I don't think getting off of aid is necessarily the objective.But if that was clearly the right answer, that's a huge win if we've done that by helping to prove the institutions and governance of that country so that it is rolling out better policies, helping its people better, and collecting their own tax revenue. If we can have an eye on that, then that's a huge win for foreign aid in general.How are we supposed to be measuring the impact of soft power? I think that's a term that's not now much in vogue in DC.There's no one answer to how to measure soft power. It's described as the influence that we gain in the world in terms of geopolitics, everything from treaties and the United Nations to access to markets; trade policy, labor policy. The basic idea of soft power manifests itself in all those different ways.It's a more extreme version of the challenge of measuring the impact of cash transfers. You want to measure the impact of a pill that is intended to deal with disease: you measure the disease, and you have a direct measure. You want to measure the impact of cash: you have to measure a lot of different things, because you don't know how people are going to use the cash. Soft power is even further down the spectrum: you don't know exactly how aid is helping build our partnership with a country's people and leaders. How is that going to manifest itself in the future? That becomes that much harder to do.Having said that, there's academic studies that document everything from attitudes about America to votes at the United Nations that follow aid, and things of that nature. But it's not like there's one core set: that's part of what makes it a challenge.I will put my cards on the table here: I have been skeptical of the idea that USAID is a really valuable tool for American soft power, for maintaining American hegemony, etc. It seems much easier to defend USAID by simply saying that it does excellent humanitarian work, and that's valuable. The national security argument for USAID seems harder to substantiate.I think we agree on this. You have such a wide set of things to look at, it's not hard to imagine a bias from a researcher might lead to selection of outcomes, and of the context. It's not a well-defined enough concept to be able to say, "It worked 20% of the time, and it did not in these, and the net average…" Average over what? Even though there's good case studies that show various paths where it has mattered, there's case studies that show it doesn't.I also get nervous about an entire system that's built around [attempts to measure soft power]. It turns foreign aid into too much of a transactional process, instead of a relationship that is built on the Golden Rule, “There's people in this country that we can actually help.” Sure, there's this hope that it'll help further our national interests. But if they're suffering from drought and famine, and we can provide support and save some lives, or we can do longer term developments and save tomorrow's lives, we ought to do that. That is a good thing for our country to do.Yet the conversation does often come back to this question of soft power. The problem with transactional is you get exactly what you contract on: nothing more, nothing less. There's too many unknowns here, when we're dealing with country-level interactions, and engagements between countries. It needs to be about relationships, and that means supporting even if there isn't a contract that itemizes the exact quid pro quo we are getting for something.I want to talk about what you observed in the administration change and the DOGE-ing of USAID. I think plenty of observers looked at this in the beginning and thought, “It's high time that a lot of these institutions were cleaned up and that someone took a hard look at how we spend money there.”There was not really any looking at any of the impact of anything. That was never in the cards. There was a 90-day review that was supposed to be done, but there were no questions asked, there was no data being collected. There was nothing whatsoever being looked at that had anything to do with, “Was this award actually accomplishing what it set out to accomplish?” There was no process in which they made those kinds of evaluations on what's actually working.You can see this very clearly when you think about what their bean counter was at DOGE: the spending that they cut. It's like me saying, "I'm going to do something beneficial for my household by stopping all expenditures on food." But we were getting something for that. Maybe we could have bought more cheaply, switched grocery stores, made a change there that got us the same food for less money. That would be a positive change. But you can't cut all your food expenditures, call that a saving, and then not have anything to eat. That's just bad math, bad economics.But that's exactly what they were doing. Throughout the entire government, that bean counter never once said, “benefits foregone.” It was always just “lowered spending.” Some of that probably did actually have a net loss, maybe it was $100 million spent on something that only created $10 million of benefits to Americans. That's a $90 million gain. But it was recorded as $100 million. And the point is, they never once looked at what benefits were being generated from the spending. What was being asked, within USAID, had nothing to do with what was actually being accomplished by any of the money that was being spent. It was never even asked.How do you think about risky bets in a place like USAID? It would be nice for USAID to take lots of high-risk, high-reward bets, and to be willing to spend money that will be “wasted” in the pursuit of high-impact interventions. But that approach is hard for government programs, politically, because the misses are much more salient than the successes.This is a very real issue. I saw this the very first time I did any sort of briefing with Congress when I was Chief Economist. The question came at me, "Why doesn't USAID show us more failures?" I remember thinking to myself, "Are you willing to promise that when they show the failure, you won't punish them for the failure — that you'll reward them for documenting and learning from the failure and not doing it again?" That's a very difficult nut to crack.There's an important distinction to make. You can have a portfolio of evidence generation, some things work and some don't, that can collectively contribute towards knowledge and scaling of effective programs. USAID actually had something like this called Development Innovation Ventures (DIV), and was in an earmark from Congress. It was so good that they raised money from the effective altruist community to further augment their pot of money. This was strong because a lot of it was not evaluating USAID interventions. It was just funding a portfolio of evidence generation about what works, implemented by other parties. The failures aren't as devastating, because you're showing a failure of some other party: it wasn't USAID money paying for an intervention. That was a strong model for how USAID can take on some risks and do some evidence generation that is immune to the issue you just described.If you're going to do evaluations of USAID money, the issue is very real. My overly simplistic view is that a lot of what USAID does should not be getting a highly rigorous impact evaluation. USAID should be rolling out, simple and at scale, things that have already been shown elsewhere. Let the innovation take place pre-USAID, funded elsewhere, maybe by DIV. Let smaller and more nimble nonprofits be the innovators and the documenters of what works. Then, USAID can adopt the things that are more effective and be more immune to this issue.So yeah, there is a world that is not first-best where USAID does the things that have strong evidence already. When it comes to actual innovation, where we do need to take risks that things won't work, let that be done in a way that may be supported by USAID, but partitioned away.I'm looking at a chart of USAID program funding in Fiscal Year 2022: the three big buckets are humanitarian, health, and governance, all on the order of $10–12 billion. Way down at the bottom, there's $500 million for “economic growth.” What's in that bucket that USAID funds, and should that piece of the pie chart be larger?I do think that should be larger, but it depends on how you define it. I don't say that just because I'm an economist. It goes back to the comment earlier about things that we can do to help improve local governance, and how they're using their resources. The kinds of things that might be funded would be efforts to work with local government to improve their ability to collect taxes. Or to set up efficient regulations for the banking industry, so it can grow and provide access to credit and savings. These are things that can help move the needle on macroeconomic outcomes. With that, you have more resources. That helps health and education, you have these downstream impacts. As you pointed out, the earmark on that was tiny. It did not have quite the same heartstring tug. But the logical link is huge and strong: if you strengthen the local government's financial stability, the benefits very much accrue to the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Social Protection, etc.Fighting your way out of poverty through growth is unambiguously good. You can look at many countries around the world that have grown economically, and through that, reduced poverty. But it's one thing to say that growth will alleviate poverty. It's another to say, "Here's aid money that will trigger growth." If we knew how to do that, we would've done it long ago, in a snap.Last question. Let's say it's a clean slate at USAID in a couple years, and you have wide latitude to do things your way. I want the Dean Karlan vision for the future of USAID.It needs to have, at the high level, a recognition that the Golden Rule is an important principle that guides our thinking on foreign aid and that we want to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Being generous as a people is something that we pride ourselves in, our nation represents us as people, so we shouldn't be in any way shy to use foreign aid to further that aspiration of being a generous nation.The actual way of delivering aid, I would say, three things. Simpler. Let's focus on the evidence of what works, but recognize the boundaries of that evidence and how to contextualize it. There is a strong need to understand what it means to be simpler, and how to identify what that means in specific countries and contexts.The second is about leveraging local government, and working more to recognize that, as big as we may be, we're still going to be tiny relative to local government. If we can do more to improve how local government is using its resources, we've won.The third is about finding common ground. There's a lot. That's one of the reasons why I've started working on a consortium with Republicans and Democrats. The things I care about are generally non-partisan. The goal is to take the aspirations that foreign aid has — about improving health, education, economic outcomes, food security, agricultural productivity, jobs, trade, whatever the case is — and how do we use the evidence that's out there to move the needle as much as we can towards those goals? A lot of topics have common ground. How do we set up a foreign aid system that stays true to the common ground? I'd like to think it's not that hard. That's what I think would be great to see happen. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub

You'd expect the Department of Veterans Affairs to lead on accessibility, given the community it serves. But a recent report from the VA's Office of Inspector General found that just four out of 30 sampled IT systems met federal accessibility standards under Section 508. The findings raise serious questions—not just for the VA, but for every agency building digital tools for the public. Joining me with the details on what went wrong, and how the department is working to get it right is Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations, Daniel Morris See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Emil Bove, Trump's former criminal defense lawyer, has a second whistleblower that's filed a complaint with the DOJ Office of Inspector General, claiming that Bove promoted DOJ attorneys to disobey federal court orders related to the removal without due process of migrants. Michael Popok also calls out the obscene practice of the DOJ lobbying the public to support Bove for what is supposed to be an “independent” federal judge lifetime appointment, reminding everyone that Bove will be “Trump's Judge” if confirmed this week. Cook Unity: Go to https://cookunity.com/LEGALAF or enter code LEGALAF before checkout for 50% OFF your first week! Remember to subscribe to ALL the MeidasTouch Network Podcasts: MeidasTouch: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/meidastouch-podcast Legal AF: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/legal-af MissTrial: https://meidasnews.com/tag/miss-trial The PoliticsGirl Podcast: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-politicsgirl-podcast The Influence Continuum: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-influence-continuum-with-dr-steven-hassan Mea Culpa with Michael Cohen: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/mea-culpa-with-michael-cohen The Weekend Show: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-weekend-show Burn the Boats: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/burn-the-boats Majority 54: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/majority-54 Political Beatdown: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/political-beatdown On Democracy with FP Wellman: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/on-democracy-with-fpwellman Uncovered: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/maga-uncovered Coalition of the Sane: https://meidasnews.com/tag/coalition-of-the-sane Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

July 28, 2025 - We learn about some of the complaints to the state's gambling regulator received by the state Inspector General's Office in 2024 and consider some of the controversies they're reviewing in 2025. Our guest is Ryan Hayward, chief of staff for the New York IG's Office.

Deborah Witzburg, Chicago Inspector General, joins Lisa Dent to discuss recent findings of widespread PPP loan fraud involving city employees and residents. The investigation uncovered that bus drivers, police officers, and others falsely claimed to run small businesses in order to receive pandemic relief funds.

The U.S. Postal Service is facing a paradox: mail volume is projected to decline by as much as 41% by 2035, yet the number of delivery addresses grows by more than a million each year. A new report from the USPS Office of Inspector General outlines several scenarios for the future of mail—and none of them are easy. Here to explore the operational and financial challenges ahead, the impact of electronic diversion, and what innovations might help the Postal Service remain affordable, reliable, and relevant in a digital-first world is Research Analyst with the USPS Officer of Inspector General, David Neu.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Over nine months from March 2023 through January of 2204, bad actors diverted nearly eight million dollars of payments from legitimate grantees through the Health and Human Services grant payment system. The HHS Office of Inspector General investigated, and is out with a new report documenting the root causes and corrective actions to prevent future fraud. Here with the details is the Assistant Inspector General for the Office of Audit Services at the Department of Health and Human Services, Tamara Lilly.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Shortly after City Council passed legislation strengthening her office, Inspector General Deborah Witzburg announced she would not seek reappointment to a second term. Host Jacoby Cochran and executive producer Simone Alicea talk about the sometimes contentious history of the Chicago inspector general's office. They also discuss extreme heat heading our way and some Chicago movies you'd like to add to our list. Want some more City Cast Chicago news? Then make sure to sign up for our Hey Chicago newsletter.  Follow us @citycastchicago You can also text us or leave a voicemail at: 773 780-0246 Learn more about the sponsors of this July 22 episode: Babbel – Get up to 60% off at Babbel.com/CITYCAST Framebridge Become a member of City Cast Chicago. Interested in advertising with City Cast? Find more info HERE 

This limited-scope audit evaluated the outcomes of the Kansas Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) investigations and audits from calendar years 2021 through 2024, with a focus on financial recoveries and prosecutorial results. The OIG is an independent entity within the Kansas Attorney General's Office and is tasked with increasing accountability and oversight of Kansas medical (and other) assistance programs through audits, reviews, and investigations. To assess the impact of OIG's work, we examined summary data on 280 investigations initiated during the review period, consulted relevant district court records, and conducted follow-up interviews with OIG officials. Our analysis found that 2 of the 280 investigations have led to prosecutions, which have resulted in the recovery of less than $1,000 to date. Additional legal actions may be possible given the number of still open investigations. We also reviewed all 9 audits and reviews OIG published between 2021 and 2024. Of these, we confirmed the recovery of $1.3 million documented in 1 report.

The Department of State is trying to reorganize itself while also adopting the functions of USAID and evaluating all foreign assistance programs. Any one of those is a big project on its own. Taking them on simultaneously presents serious challenges. State's own Office of the Inspector General recently reported on how well the effort is going. Here with more details is the Acting Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Stat Arne Baker. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this explosive segment, hosts Tara and Lee break down newly revealed evidence showing that the FBI under James Comey concealed proof of Hillary Clinton's criminal mishandling of classified information while simultaneously launching the unsubstantiated Russia collusion investigation into Donald Trump. Citing reporting from John Solomon at Just the News and Inspector General findings buried for eight years, they outline how top intelligence officials, including John Brennan and James Clapper, knowingly advanced false narratives that helped shape elections and fuel geopolitical conflict. They argue this coordinated deception not only corrupted U.S. democracy but also escalated tensions leading to the war in Ukraine. The hosts call for a special prosecutor, declassification of critical documents, and prosecution of those responsible to finally break what they describe as a long-running conspiracy to rig elections and mislead the American people.

Each month, the VA Office of Inspector General publishes highlights of our oversight reports, congressional testimony, and investigative work. In June 2025, the VA OIG published nine reports that included 81 recommendations. Report topics varied from an evaluation of VA's governance of recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives awarded for VHA positions to mental health inspections of the VA Salem Healthcare System in Virginia and the VA Philadelphia Healthcare System in Pennsylvania.  On Capitol Hill, Jennifer McDonald, PhD, director of the Community Care Division for the Office of Audits and Evaluations, testified on June 11 before the House Veterans' Affairs' Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Her testimony focused on the impact of VHA's pause in using its Program Integrity Tool—a system that consolidates community care payment data that is used, in part, to determine if veterans or their private insurance companies should be billed for care that is not connected to injuries or conditions related to their military service. She also highlighted the OIG's work that identified deficiencies in how VA plans, implements, and remediates identified weaknesses in information technology modernization efforts.  VA OIG investigative efforts resulted in the conviction of a chief executive officer of a healthcare software company for a billion-dollar fraud conspiracy. Meanwhile, VA OIG investigative efforts in Louisiana led to the sentencing of two individuals for fraudulently obtaining federal pandemic relief loans.  Related Reports: Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives for VHA Positions Need Improved Oversight Mental Health Inspection of the VA Salem Healthcare System in Virginia Mental Health Inspection of the VA Philadelphia Healthcare System in Pennsylvania

1. Otro golpe a los planes energéticos del gobierno. Junta de control fiscal detiene contrato de gas natural por 15 años para New Fortress 2. El “Big, beautiful bill” de Trump podría hacer más difícil estudiar medicina 3. Fondo de $750 millones para adelantar proyectos de reconstrucción, caducó sin utilizarse 4. A pesar de que gobernadora dijo que había más dinero para los municipios en este presupuesto, comienzan a recortar servicios, entre ellos, amas de llave 5. ¿Cuáles serán las consecuencias de que Wanda Vázquez se declare culpable? 6. Oficina de Inspector General investiga bonos que dio la expresidenta de la CEE para ella y otros empleados 7. Señales de desaceleración económica 8. Janet Parra habla sobre traslado del fiscal Yamil Juarbe 9. Otro tribunal federal detiene orden ejecutiva de Trump para limitar la ciudadanía por nacimiento 10. Jueves de películas y streaming con Gabriela Acevedo GándaraSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Deborah Witzburg, Chicago Inspector General, joins Lisa Dent to discuss her belief that the Chicago City Council must protect her position from political influence. An ordinance that is set to be voted on by the ethics committee next week, Witzburg explains, would align Chicago with the rest of the country on effective independent oversight.

​Chapter 4, Part 1 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death delves into the custody and care provided to Epstein during his incarceration at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. This section scrutinizes the protocols and procedures followed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff, highlighting significant lapses in adhering to established guidelines. The report identifies critical failures, such as inadequate monitoring, improper cell assignments, and insufficient communication among staff, which collectively contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.The OIG's investigation reveals that Epstein was left alone in his cell despite protocols requiring a cellmate for inmates with his profile. Additionally, mandatory 30-minute checks were not performed consistently, with some staff members reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence. These systemic failures underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the BOP to prevent similar incidents in the future.to contact  me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

​Chapter 4, Part 1 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death delves into the custody and care provided to Epstein during his incarceration at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. This section scrutinizes the protocols and procedures followed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff, highlighting significant lapses in adhering to established guidelines. The report identifies critical failures, such as inadequate monitoring, improper cell assignments, and insufficient communication among staff, which collectively contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.The OIG's investigation reveals that Epstein was left alone in his cell despite protocols requiring a cellmate for inmates with his profile. Additionally, mandatory 30-minute checks were not performed consistently, with some staff members reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence. These systemic failures underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the BOP to prevent similar incidents in the future.to contact  me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

​Chapter 4, Part 1 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death delves into the custody and care provided to Epstein during his incarceration at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. This section scrutinizes the protocols and procedures followed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff, highlighting significant lapses in adhering to established guidelines. The report identifies critical failures, such as inadequate monitoring, improper cell assignments, and insufficient communication among staff, which collectively contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.The OIG's investigation reveals that Epstein was left alone in his cell despite protocols requiring a cellmate for inmates with his profile. Additionally, mandatory 30-minute checks were not performed consistently, with some staff members reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence. These systemic failures underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the BOP to prevent similar incidents in the future.to contact  me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

​Chapter 3 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death provides a detailed timeline of events leading up to his suicide on August 10, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. The chapter highlights several critical lapses in protocol and staff performance. Notably, it details how Epstein's cellmate was transferred out on August 9, leaving him alone despite a standing requirement for him to have a cellmate due to his recent suicide attempt. Additionally, the report reveals that correctional officers failed to perform mandatory 30-minute checks on Epstein during the overnight hours, with some officers reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence.The OIG report further examines the condition of Epstein's cell and the circumstances of his death. It notes that surveillance cameras outside Epstein's cell malfunctioned on the night of his death, resulting in a lack of video evidence to clarify the events leading up to his suicide. The report also discusses the findings of the autopsy, which concluded that Epstein's injuries were consistent with suicide by hanging, with no signs of defensive wounds or struggle. These findings underscore the systemic failures at MCC, including inadequate staffing, poor management oversight, and failure to adhere to established protocols, all of which contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)

​Chapter 4, Part 1 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death delves into the custody and care provided to Epstein during his incarceration at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. This section scrutinizes the protocols and procedures followed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff, highlighting significant lapses in adhering to established guidelines. The report identifies critical failures, such as inadequate monitoring, improper cell assignments, and insufficient communication among staff, which collectively contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.The OIG's investigation reveals that Epstein was left alone in his cell despite protocols requiring a cellmate for inmates with his profile. Additionally, mandatory 30-minute checks were not performed consistently, with some staff members reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence. These systemic failures underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the BOP to prevent similar incidents in the future.to contact  me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

Anthony D'Esposito, Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor Nominee, calls in to dive into a NYC Mayoral poll from today showing Democratic nominee Zohran Mamdani leading with 35%, followed by Andrew Cuomo at 25%, and Eric Adams in last place with 11%. Anthony critiques Eric Adams' chances, backing Curtis Sliwa's campaign for Mayor, and rebuffing claims that supporting Sliwa would be detrimental to the city's Jewish community. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

​Chapter 3 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death provides a detailed timeline of events leading up to his suicide on August 10, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. The chapter highlights several critical lapses in protocol and staff performance. Notably, it details how Epstein's cellmate was transferred out on August 9, leaving him alone despite a standing requirement for him to have a cellmate due to his recent suicide attempt. Additionally, the report reveals that correctional officers failed to perform mandatory 30-minute checks on Epstein during the overnight hours, with some officers reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence.The OIG report further examines the condition of Epstein's cell and the circumstances of his death. It notes that surveillance cameras outside Epstein's cell malfunctioned on the night of his death, resulting in a lack of video evidence to clarify the events leading up to his suicide. The report also discusses the findings of the autopsy, which concluded that Epstein's injuries were consistent with suicide by hanging, with no signs of defensive wounds or struggle. These findings underscore the systemic failures at MCC, including inadequate staffing, poor management oversight, and failure to adhere to established protocols, all of which contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

​Chapter 4, Part 1 of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report on Jeffrey Epstein's death delves into the custody and care provided to Epstein during his incarceration at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York. This section scrutinizes the protocols and procedures followed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff, highlighting significant lapses in adhering to established guidelines. The report identifies critical failures, such as inadequate monitoring, improper cell assignments, and insufficient communication among staff, which collectively contributed to the environment that allowed Epstein's suicide to occur.The OIG's investigation reveals that Epstein was left alone in his cell despite protocols requiring a cellmate for inmates with his profile. Additionally, mandatory 30-minute checks were not performed consistently, with some staff members reportedly sleeping during their shifts and falsifying records to cover up their negligence. These systemic failures underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the BOP to prevent similar incidents in the future.to contact  me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

A Mexican drug cartel spies on the FBI using traffic cameras and spyware — because "ubiquitous technical surveillance” is no longer just for dystopian thrillers. Graham digs into a chilling new US Justice Department report that shows how surveillance tech was weaponised to deadly effect.Meanwhile, Carole checks the rear-view mirror on the driverless car industry. Whatever happened to those million Tesla robotaxis Elon Musk promised by 2020? Spoiler: they're here — sort of — but they sometimes drive into oncoming traffic.Plus: Leighton House, heatwave survival gadgets, and an unflushable toilet situation (not what you think).All this and more is discussed in the latest edition of the "Smashing Security" podcast by cybersecurity veterans Graham Cluley and Carole Theriault.Warning: This podcast may contain nuts, adult themes, and rude language.Episode links:Mexican drug cartel hacker spied on FBI official's phone to track and kill informants, report says - TechCrunch.Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Mitigate the Effects of Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance - US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General.Tesla driver tells police he was using 'self-drive' system when his car hit a parked police vehicle - AP News.‘Lidar is lame': why Elon Musk's vision for a self-driving Tesla taxi faltered - The Guardian.Tesla invited influencers to test its robotaxi. Here's what they had to say - USA Today Europe.Elon Musk Hails 'Successful' Tesla Robotaxis Launch in Austin Amid Reported Glitches - eWEEK.A Fatal Tesla Crash Shows the Limits of Full Self-Driving - Bloomberg.The Arab Hall at Leighton House.Spandau Ballet's “Gold” - shot at Leighton House!Shark FlexBreeze Fan With InstaCool Mist Attachment - Shark.Smashing Security merchandise (t-shirts, mugs, stickers and stuff)Sponsored by:Vanta– Expand the scope of your security program with market-leading compliance automation… while saving time and money. Smashing Security listeners get $1000 off!Trelica by 1Password- Access Governance for every SaaS app.

The Office of Management and Budget has issued its version of guidance on annual artificial intelligence use case reporting within agencies, outlining a similar process to the previous administration, albeit slimmer. That guidance obtained by FedScoop is dated June 27 and has been shared internally in the federal government but hasn't been made public. It's accompanied by a document breaking down the questions in the various fields. The move suggests that despite the Trump White House's markedly different tone on AI, some details may not look so different. Despite President Donald Trump's criticism of President Joe Biden's handling of AI, including the immediate rescission of his AI executive order, the updated process will ask agencies to provide much of the same information, including the stage of development, whether it was developed in-house or purchased, and whether the use case involves personally identifiable information maintained by the agency, among other categories. Ultimately, it sets a compilation deadline of Nov. 4 and a publication deadline of Dec. 2, maintaining a similar schedule to the previous year. The General Services Administration mandated in June that all multiple award schedule contract holders will be required to report transactional data beginning in fiscal 2026, expanding a pilot that the agency launched nearly a decade ago. However, GSA's Office of the Inspector General takes objection to that decision to institutionalize the transactional data reporting (TDR) pilot because it says the agency “has never effectively implemented TDR and has never made it functional,” according to a new report. GSA's Federal Acquisition Service launched the TDR pilot in 2016, asking contractors in select product lines to share data on government purchases with the intent of driving better buying decisions. In fiscal 2024, the agency expanded the TDR pilot program to encompass 67 categories of products — what GSA refers to as special item numbers (SINs). But along the way, the program has struggled with data quality issues, limited usage in pricing decisions and a lack of competitive pricing actions, the IG points out in the new report. “Ultimately, the TDR pilot has been in effect within the MAS program for 9 years and has yet to accomplish its intended purpose,” it states. The Daily Scoop Podcast is available every Monday-Friday afternoon. If you want to hear more of the latest from Washington, subscribe to The Daily Scoop Podcast  on Apple Podcasts, Soundcloud, Spotify and YouTube.

#UPR #doge #puertorico La coordinadora de eficiencia de PR, Veronica Farraiuoli, presenta un primer informe que parece un resumen de otro que trajo en mayo la Oficina del Inspector General sobre reglamentos en las agencias públicas. | Sale del closet Zayira Jordán y dice que si pero no al cierre de Recintos. | Gobierno se propone apelar decisión de Jueza Federal aquí sobre identificación de género no binario en el Certificado de Nacimiento. | Trump, ¿está dispuesto a sacar del país a todo aquél que no esté de acuerdo con sus políticas? ¡Conéctate, comenta y comparte! #periodismoindependiente #periodismoinvestigativo #periodismodigital

By Adam Turteltaub In November 2024, the Office of Inspector General at Health and Human Services  released its Nursing Facility: Industry Segment-Specific Compliance Program Guidance. The document is part of an effort to modernize how HHS OIG is communicating to industry and providing information about risks, how to mitigate them and best practices for compliance programs. Jillian Willis (LinkedIn/Firm Page) and Melissa Scott (LinkedIn/Firm Page) of Nelson Mullins explain that the new guidance contains four main sections: quality of care and quality of life, Medicare and Medicaid billing requirements, Federal anti-kickback statute and other risk areas such as physician self-referral, HIPAA and related-party transactions. It shares best practices. Notably, the guidance, complements other guidance out there, including the Department of Justice's. And, in addition to focusing compliance efforts, it can be helpful for promoting operational efficiency. Listen in and then spend some time reading the Nursing Facility: Industry Segment-Specific Compliance Program Guidance. Listen now The Compliance Perspectives Podcast is sponsored by Athennian, a leading provider of entity management and governance software. Get started at www.athennian.com.

Now-fired career Department of Justice lawyer Erez Reuveni has sent a letter to the Inspector General, the Office of Special Counsel, and the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees outlining Emil Bove's alleged defiance of court orders in three due process cases.The Supreme Court rules from the shadow docket and without explanation that a lower court's order barring deportation to third countries without due process is on indefinite hold.Two separate hearings involving Mr. Abrego led his civil attorneys to ask his criminal defense team to keep him in prison pending a hearing in Maryland on a motion to block his removal from the country.Emil Bove faced questions about DoJ Lawyer Erez Reuveni's whistleblower complaint alleging Bove instructed him and other DoJ lawyers to ignore court orders.Plus listener questions…Do you have questions for the pod?  Follow AG Substack|MuellershewroteBlueSky|@muellershewroteAndrew McCabe isn't on social media, but you can buy his book The ThreatThe Threat: How the FBI Protects America in the Age of Terror and TrumpWe would like to know more about our listeners. Please participate in this brief surveyListener Survey and CommentsThis Show is Available Ad-Free And Early For Patreon and Supercast Supporters at the Justice Enforcers level and above:https://dailybeans.supercast.techOrhttps://patreon.com/thedailybeansOr when you subscribe on Apple Podcastshttps://apple.co/3YNpW3P

Anthony D'Esposito, former Congressman and Inspector General for the United States Department of Labor nominee, joins Sid live in-studio to touch on his nomination by President Trump as the Inspector General for the Labor Department, sharing an optimistic timeline for his eventual confirmation. D'Esposito also comments on the political landscape following recent local elections, including the unexpected primary win of candidate Zohran Mamdani over Andrew Cuomo in the Democrat Primary for NYC Mayor. He discusses the Republican strategy moving forward in that race, particularly in the idea of supporting Eric Adams over Curtis Sliwa as the Republican ticket in the general election. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Andy Levin is an advisor to many central banks around the world and professor of economics at Dartmouth College. Andy returns to the show for a special bonus episode to discuss his pervious appearance and accompanying policy brief where he calls for an independent inspector general at the Federal Reserve. Check out the transcript for this week's episode, now with links. Recorded on June 10th, 2025 Subscribe to David's Substack: Macroeconomic Policy Nexus Follow David Beckworth on X: @DavidBeckworth Follow the show on X: @Macro_Musings Join the new Macro Musings Discord server! Join the Macro Musings mailing list! Check out our Macro Musings merch! Subscribe to David's new BTS YouTube Channel  Timestamps: (00:00:00) – Intro (00:01:48) – Federal Reserve and an Independent Inspector General (00:06:50) – Palace of Versailles on the Mall (00:16:20) – Accountability of the Fed (00:19:21) – Outro