Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies

Timothy O'Connor (Indiana) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series. Abstract: The correlated terms "emergence" and "reduction" are used in several ways in contemporary discussions ranging from complex systems theory to philosophy of mind, a fact that engenders confusion or talking at cross purposes. I try to bring greater clarity to this discussion by reflecting on John Conway's cellular automaton The Game of Life and simple variations on it. We may think of such variants as toy models of our own world that, owing to their simplicity, enable us to see quite clearly, in general terms, two importantly distinct ways (“weak” and “strong”) in which organized macroscopic phenomena might emerge from underlying microphysical processes. Strong emergence is of greater significance to metaphysics and philosophy of mind; it is also commonly deemed implausible. I close by suggesting that typical reasons for this evidential judgement are unconvincing.

John Dupré (Exeter) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series Abstract: This talk will explore the implications for a metaphysics of powers of the replacement of a substance ontology with a process ontology. I take a process to be an entity that must be active in some way to exist and I argue that processes are more fundamental than things: things are temporary and partial stabilisations in a flux of process. Can the activities that sustain processes be understood as the exercise of powers? Can the interactions between processes be treated similarly as the exercises of powers by processes?

Neil Williams (Buffalo University) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series Abstract; The typical understanding of powers—according to which they have their effects necessarily—has recently come under attack. The threat of imagined counterfactual scenarios (wherein the power is exercised but the characteristic manifestation does not ensue) has led some to question the traditional picture, and prompted others to give it up entirely. But this defection has been too hasty: that exercising powers produce their manifestations necessarily ranks highly among the most attractive features of the powers metaphysic, and should not be discarded lightly. Moreover, the arguments against necessity are founded upon assumptions that the friend of powers is at liberty to reject. I show how the anti-necessitarian arguments can be avoided, and thus how necessity can be restored.

Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (Lund University) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series Abstract: In this talk I will elaborate on the naturalist theory of causation that I first presented in ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ (2002). In the course of presenting the view I will elucidate in what sense the account (i) presents causation as a necessary process of production without appeal to ceteris paribus clauses, (ii) explains the connection between causation and counterfactuals without appeal to a possible worlds ontology, (iii) does not suffer from the problem of action at a temporal distance, (iv) can exclude the possibility of interference and prevention, (v) is compatible with the way the natural sciences describe material reality (within the framework of classical science), and indeed explains why material reality—as described by science—is a causal reality. I will also indicate, more sketchily, how this causal account allows us to think of the persistence of compound entities as being a thoroughly causal affair, and thus provide a causal account of composition and grounding. Finally, I will discuss whether account depicts persistent compounds as both substances and processes.

Stephen French (Leeds) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies series. Abstract: 'Recent defences of dispositionalism and powers based accounts have appealed to the way properties such as charge and spin are treated in physics. However, I shall argue that on closer analysis, modern physics does not supply the level of support that is typically adduced. Adjusting these accounts to bring them more into line with the way physics treats such properties takes them closer to certain structuralist views and I shall explore the - sometimes wafer thin - differences between these alternative approaches to properties. In conclusion I shall suggest that adopting an appropriate stance towards 'reading' theories in physics does away with dispositions and powers as seated in fundamental objects in favour of modally informed structure.'

Alastair Wilson, Birmingham, gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies series Abstract: Jonathan Schaffer has recently defended the doctrine of quidditism against an epistemological challenge, claiming that the challenge amounts to nothing more than ‘external-world scepticism writ small’. I disagree with this assessment. The cases are significantly disanalogous, and quiddistic scepticism is much harder to avoid than external-world scepticism. Ultimately, the epistemological challenge is indecisive: quidditists can live with the sceptical conclusion. But there is a stronger anti-quidditist argument in the vicinity. Following John Hawthorne, I show how the epistemological challenge can be reformulated as an argument from theoretical parsimony. I argue that whether the parsimony argument is decisive depends on wider issues in the metaphysics of modality: different accounts of modality yield different verdicts about parsimony. The upshot is that we cannot expect to make progress in the quidditism debate while remaining neutral on the nature of modality.

Nick Jones, University of Birmingham, gives a talk in which he appeal to an examination of the explanatory role of ordinary macroscopic objects to argue that some of them are metaphysically fundamental.

Henry Mendell (California State) gives a talk for the Power Structualism in Ancient Ontologies series Abstract: Historians in the twentieth century argued about whether Aristotle presents a general theory of dynamics in Physics VII 5 or merely presents examples from ordinary experience, which he then applies abstractly to arguments about the unmoved mover and general issues about the balance of elements in the sublunary realm. Recently the pendulum of opinion has swayed towards taking Aristotle's account more robustly as a general theory of dynamics, but more can be said. I shall argue that one reason why the debate arose was because both sides have seen the examples in the context of Greek style mathematics, where we expect generalized principles and theorems, often couched in a modern, anachronistic representation. I suggest that the dynamics come from an older mathematical tradition, which we associate with Babylon and Egypt and which, I believe, was ordinary Greek mathematical practice even in the fourth century BCE. Mathematicians present their work as problems, given such and such, here is how to calculate such and such. It is also characteristic of a problem and the procedure for its solution that actual numbers are used. We find both in Aristotle's presentation. Aristotle's rules are stated in the form of conditionals with actual numbers. So the rules have the form: if mover A moves moved B in time D over distance G, then one may vary A, B, D, and G in the following ways, e.g. 1/2 B over 2 D. The initial conditions in the antecedent, in effect, implicitly set the parameters for the variations in the consequent, as given by example. In this way, the procedures are general over all dynamic problems set up conditionally. Aristotle proceeds to set boundaries on the consequent. However, the text that we have at this point, regardless of variations in the textual tradition, is mathematically bizarre. Whether this is Aristotle's error or an early error in the transmission of the text, the anomaly contributes to the evidence that Aristotle is actually borrowing his examples from an earlier work on dynamics that was written in the problem tradition.

Don Morison (Rice) gives a talk for the Power Structualism in Ancient Ontology series. Abstract: 'The happiness of the city (the eudaimonia of the polis) is a central concept in Aristotle’s political philosophy. For example, in NE I, 2, Aristotle says that the ultimate end of human action is the good of the city. At the beginning of his discussion of the ideal regime in Politics VII, 1, he says that the happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly”. Chapter 2 of book VII is devoted to the question whether the happiness of the individual and the happiness of the city are the same or different. The aim of this paper will be to argue that Aristotle uses the term “the happiness of the city”, he means it not metaphorically, but literally: he intends to predicate a genuine property, eudaimonia, of a genuine subject, the polis. I will then explore some of the philosophical implications of this concept. The realist view that I will defend agrees that the polis is not a substance. The polis is not animate, in the strict sense that it does not have a soul. However the polis is alive: it has a “life”. (Both bios and zoe). It is an organic being in the sense that it has functional parts. And it has states of character and makes decisions that are not reducible to the characters and decisions of its citizens. Individual citizens have their own intrinsic value, which is largely but not entirely independent of the city in which they live. On the other hand, the city as such has intrinsic value that is not reducible to the value of its individual citizens. The value of citizens to the city is partly instrumental, but also partly intrinsic: the life of the city includes the lives of its citizens. Aristotle’s political philosophy employs two crucial holistic conceptions of value: (1) the good or happiness of the city; and (2) the common good. What is the relationship between these two concepts? I shall argue that the “good of the city” and the “common good” are distinct notions. This is an uncomfortable result.

Thomas Sattig (Tübingen) gives a talk for the Power Structualism in Ancient Ontologies series. Abstract: 'Pluralists about material objects believe that distinct material objects can coincide at a time—that they can exactly occupy the same spatial region and be constituted by the same matter at that time. Pluralism is often accepted for reasons of common sense. It seems obvious, for example, that there could be a piece of paper and a paper airplane made from the latter, such that the piece of paper exists before the paper plane is created or exists after the paper plane is destroyed. The artifacts in this scenario would appear to be distinct objects that coincide at various times. My aim is to argue that folk-inspired pluralism faces a serious problem concerning determinism. The actual world is deterministic just in case there is only one way in which it can evolve that is compatible with the actual laws of nature. If determinism about the actual world fails, we expect it to fail for reasons of physics. Yet certain of the common-sense cases of distinct, coinciding objects accepted by pluralists seem to show that the actual world is indeterministic on mundane, a priori grounds. It should not be that easy to establish indeterminism.'

Mark Sinclair (Manchester Metropolitan) gives a talk for the Power Structualism in Ancient Ontologies series In Getting Causes from Powers, Steven Mumford and Rani Lil Anjum have argued that all dispositions are to be thought as tendencies or inclinations; that such tendencies or inclinations have a sui generis modality, irreducible to traditional ideas of necessity or possibility; and that we have direct experience of such inclinations in our subjective experience of agency. In this paper, I critically assess these arguments in the light of 19th-century French philosophy. I turn to the work of Pierre Maine de Biran and Félix Ravaisson in order to develop the claim that a particular and irreducible modality of dispositions is indeed available to us in subjective experience – but in the particular phenomena of habit rather than within agency in general. Ravaisson’s 1838 De l’habitude provides a phenomenology of habit as inclination and a metaphysics that makes the phenomenological fact of inclination intelligible; and both this phenomenology and this metaphysics, I contend, have much to teach contemporary work in the metaphysics of powers.

Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies series. Abstract 'I will examine the conditions of possibility and the nature of metaphysical “knowledge”: 1) as compared with other types (mathematical, physical, ethical, philosophical knowledge; 2) from the point of view of its methods (conceptual analysis, thought experiments, empirical intuitions, a posteriori inferences, economy of research); 3) in relation to other traditional models of knowledge itself (justified true beliefs, reliabilism, or various virtue epistemology based strategies). Relying on the views I have defended in Le Doute en Question, Le Ciment des Choses or more recently, in La connaissance métaphysique, I will argue that metaphysical “knowledge” can indeed be achieved, provided 1) it relies on conceptual analysis and on the continuous massaging of our folk intuitions, 2) it trusts the a posteriori results of science without indulging into some kind of naturalized or scientistic metaphysics, and 3) it still aims, within the framework of a basically pragmatist and realistic strategy of knowledge viewed as inquiry, at the fixation of true beliefs and at the determination of the real nature of properties and things. In so doing, we should be able to avoid both excessive boldness and excessive humility.'

Nick Denyer (Cambridge) gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series Abstract: Stilpo engaged triumphantly in repartee with the great dialectician Diodorus Cronus, with the celebrated courtesan Glycera, with the king Demetrius Poliorcetes, and even with Poseidon and the Mother of the Gods. He also put his talents to use in devising consolatory arguments, to fortify us in the face of exile, bereavement, and unchaste daughters. In this talk, I will attempt to bring together the different aspects of Stilpo's intellectual activities: the guiding thread will be domination by superiority in argument. Those who wish to read up in advance will find the sources for Stilpo collected in two editions: Klaus Döring, Die Megariker (Amsterdam, 1972) 46-51, and Gabriele Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (Naples, 1990) i.449-468

Christopher Gill (Exeter) gives a talk on Marcus Aurelius' Meditations and asks How Stoic are They? Abstract: In this paper I address the longstanding question whether the Meditations present orthodox Stoic philosophy or a personal or eclectic selection of themes. In approaching this question I stress the importance of taking into account what seems to be Marcus’ core project in the Meditations (namely, promoting his own ethical self-development) and also of taking full note of the themes which recur most commonly in the work before focusing on the more exceptional and puzzling features. I suggest that Marcus’ core project in the work and many specific points made in the Meditations reflect key standard ideas in Stoic ethics, especially the distinctive account of development as oikeiōsis (Marcus, like us, seems especially familiar with Cicero’s presentations of this in de Finibus 3.17-22, 62-8). As in many other Stoic writings, the significance of the interface of ethics with logic/dialectic or physics is stressed by Marcus; standard themes that are evoked repeatedly include the ideal of wisdom as ‘dialectical virtue’ (D.L. 7.46-8 = LS 31 B) and the definition of the goal of life as bringing your daimōn into line with the rational direction of the whole (D.L. 7.88 = LS 63C(3-4)). Within this interface area, certainly, there are some unexpected motifs, including rather Platonic-looking mind-body dualism and (at least in a few cases) seemingly inappropriate use of the ‘providence or atoms’ disjunction. However, the best explanation for these features is, I think, premature or over-hasty moralisation within a fundamentally Stoic framework, rather than philosophical amateurishness or eclecticism.

Steve Makin, (Sheffield) gives a talk for the Power Structualism in Ancient Ontologies podcast series Abstract: Aristotle emphasises the role of habituation in our acquiring moral virtues, as well as other abilities. I discuss an independently engaging problem concerning the acquisition of abilities through practice, formulated in the context of Aristotle’s account of virtue development. The problem consists in a tension between two plausible claims, one [A] concerning what is required for an agent to be acting on a decision, the other [B] concerning the view a novice should have of whether they could ever possible be making the decisions required for moral development. I recommend a solution: the self-blind novice response. That solution implies that self-blindness should be pervasive among Aristotelian moral developers. And that implication is confirmed by the fact that the necessarily rare state of self-aware expertise is an important part of the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity.

Richard Sorabji gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontolgies podcast series

Stephen Butterfill gives a talk on philosophy and collective agency and other people's minds When friends walk together, they typically exercise collective agency. By contrast, two strangers walking side by side exercise parallel but merely individual agency. This and other contrasts invite the question, What distinguishes collective agency from parallel but merely individual agency? To answer this question, philosophers standardly appeal to a special kind of intention or structure of intention, knowledge or commitment often called ‘collective intention’. The idea is that exercises of collective agency stand to collective intention much as exercises of ordinary, individual agency stand to ordinary, individual intention. In this talk I shall use this parallel between individual and collective intention to argue that some forms of collective agency are grounded in representations and processes more primitive than those associated with collective intention. Collective agency is not always a matter of what we intend: sometimes it constitutively involves certain structures of motor representation. One consequence is concerns a role for collective agency in explaining knowledge of others’ minds. Reflection on what is involved in sharing a smile suggests that there is a route to knowledge of others’ mental states that is neither straightforwardly perceptual nor inferential but hinges on interaction

Mika Perala gives a talk on Aristotle's philosophy Aristotle states in the De Memoria et Reminiscentia that we have memories of individuals such as Koriscus. In line with this, he assumes in many contexts (e.g. logical and ethical) that we can make singular propositions on the basis of such perceptual states. However, commentators have been puzzled about whether singular propositions (and thoughts) can be given an adequate account in Aristotle’s psychological theory. The purpose of this paper is to argue that Aristotle’s account of thought admits of two kinds of singular thought: thought about an individual as an instance of a kind (‘This F is G’) and thought simply about an individual ‘a’, without the sortal concept F (‘a is G’). The difference between the two is that whereas the former requires knowledge of the kind (i.e. F) into which the singular item falls, or at least some sortal grasp of the individual in question such as through experience or the testimony of a knowledgeable person, the latter is simply based on, but cannot be identified with, sense perception, memory, phantasy or some other way of gaining non-sortal information about the individual. The view opposed is the Thomistic line of interpretation that, in Aristotle’s view, singular thought is to be understood as some sort of general thought, indirect or reflexive: general thought applied to a singular item given by a phantasm. The Thomistic view makes singular thought merely accidental and fails to give an adequate account of singular truth-claims.

Louise Fiona Richardson gives a talk on philosophy and perception It is beyond dispute that the senses interact. In this paper I will consider the way in which such interaction constrains thought about the senses, and in particular, thought about how they are distinguished from one another. I will consider two views of what it is to have a sense. On the first view, senses are systems. On the second, they are capacities. I will argue that on each view, the occurrence of different forms of multimodal perception rules out some views of how the senses are distinguished. The occurrence of perception not restricted to one sense does not, however, make it impossible to distinguish between the senses, either as systems or capacities. Neither does it make that distinction otiose. And whilst there is an explanatory penalty to be paid if one seeks to explain perception only one sense at a time, I will argue that given a plausible, defensible view of how to count perceptual experiences at a time, interaction between the senses does not show that it is illegitimate to talk of perceptual experiences belonging to one modality, at least whilst thinking of senses as capacities.

Jerome Dokic gives a talk on common sense and philosophy One of the functions of the common sense in Aristotle’s theory of perception is apparently to monitor the activity of our sensory modalities, and to make us aware that we see, hear, touch, taste, etc. However, the status of the common sense as a “second-order” perception, and its relationship to “first-order” perception (seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, etc.) remains to be clarified. On the one hand, numerous examples (involving perceptual certainty and uncertainty, perception of silence, darkness, and more generally absences) show that second order perception cannot be reduced to first-order perception. On the other hand, second-order perception can hardly be conceived as a form of meta-representational awareness, whether perceptual or theory-based. In this presentation, I shall suggest that the monitoring function of the common sense is best understood in relation with contemporary cognitive science research on meta-cognition. Common sense is a meta-perceptual ability which is distinct from both object level sensory perception and meta-representational knowledge about our senses.

Howard Robinson gives a talk on philosophy and the role of the intellect Abstract: First, I will consider Jaworski’s interesting recent attempt to defend hylomorphism, understood as the irreducible and the causal efficacy of structure. I shall reject this as unsuccessful, then try to see where this leaves us. I shall develop what I’ll dub the ‘radically dualist’ option, according to which the fundamental physical level and the mind are the only fundamental levels. This will involve looking at different interpretations of the question ‘are there any Fs?’ – roughly, the realist and conceptualist interpretations. I shall then look at how this relates to the Aristotelian/Wigginsian treatment of our common-sense ontology, especially the reality of biological entities

Anna Marmodoro gives a talk on Aristotle and his philosophy Aristotle draws a distinction between qualities that are perceptible via a single sense only, the special sensibles, and qualities that are perceptible by more than one sense at once, the common sensibles. What are the ontology and the epistemology of the common sensibles, in light of Aristotle’s assumption that each sense organ is sensitive to only its own special sensibles? Does the problem of common sensibles give us reasons for giving up a ‘separatist’ view of sense experiences? Or rather can it be solved by postulating extra perceptual powers for the senses? Are more ‘parsimonious’ options viable? In this paper I engage with these and related questions, which have attracted the interest of Aristotelian scholars (Gregoric 2007, Johansen 2012) and philosophers of the mind (Tye 2007) alike. I offer my own reading of Aristotle’s account and examine its philosophical viability.

Rory Madden, Lecturer in Philosophy at University College London, gives a talk about animate organisms for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies Project. Rory argues - against prevailing opinion in the contemporary personal identity debate - that intuitive verdicts about cerebrum-transplant and brain-in-a-vat cases are consistent with the thesis that we are fundamentally biological organisms of a certain kind.

Professor Richard Sorabji, Wolfson College Oxford, gives a talk on freedom and responsibility as part of the series 'Talks on Powers, Structures and Relations in Ancient Philosophy'.

Peter Simons, Professor of Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin, gives a talk as part of the series 'Metaphysics of Powers, Causation and Persons'. A process ontology (Heraclitus, Whitehead, Rescher) takes spatiotemporally extended events and processes as primary entities, enduring things as secondary. A factored ontology (Empedocles, Aristotle, Ingarden) investigates the non-entities in virtue of which there is categorial diversity in the world. Their combination purports to be a grounded universal ontological framework. As such it has not only to account for appearances but also to offer satisfactory solutions to known metaphysical difficulties such as the nature of causation, the status of spacetime, the regularity of the universe, the role of structure, and the emergence of mind. This talk will outline such an ontology and consider how far it does and can meet such desiderata.

Mechanisms are at centre-stage right now in philosophy of science, especially in discussions of causal explanation and causal inference. For instance Jon Williamson and Frederica Russo argue that experimental and correlational evidence is not enough, evidence for the generating mechanism is required as well for solid causal inference. Nancy Cartwright endorses their view in this talk.

John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St Louis, gives a talk on Cartesian Transubstantiation. According to the received view of the metaphysics of the Eucharist endorsed by the Catholic Church after the thirteenth century, sacramental bread and wine are 'converted' into Christ's body and blood (this is transubstantiation), but the accidents of the bread and wine remain on the altar inhering in no substance. Such a view is difficult to square with Aristotelian physics, but much more difficult to reconcile with the physics of Descartes. Two ill-fated attempts by Descartes to provide an account of transubstantiation consistent with his conception of the material universe are discussed in the context of a broader discussion of related metaphysical issues.

Professor Jim Hankinson, University of Texas at Austin, gives a talk for the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies project.

Jeff Brower, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University, gives a talk explaining the key differences between Aristotelian and more contemporary theories of relations.

A talk from Galen Strawson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas. Structure considered just as such is an abstract, purely logico-mathematically characterisable phenomenon. It appears to follow that if a structure is concretely realised then it must be concretely realised by something that isn't itself just a matter of structure. So there must be more to concrete reality than structure. It's arguable, however, that a thing's structural nature must completely fix its non-structural nature in any world to which the notion of structure is generally applicable. Is this correct? If it is, what follows? Is Max Newman right when he says that 'it seems necessary to give up the 'structure-quality' division of knowledge in its strict form'.

John Sellars, Wolfson College, Oxford, gives a talk as part of the series "Marcus Aurelius: Philosophical, Historical, and Literary Perspectives".

Michael Griffin, Assistant Professor in Philosophy at University of British Columbia, gives a talk as part of the series "Marcus Aurelius: Philosophical, Historical, and Literary Perspectives".

Mark Edwards, Christ Church College, Oxford, discusses religion in the age of Marcus Aurelius as part of the series "Marcus Aurelius: Philosophical, Historical, and Literary Perspectives".

Professor Christopher Gill, University of Exeter, meditates on Marcus Aurelius as part of the series, "Marcus Aurelius: Philosophical, Historical, and Literary Perspectives".

In this talk Anna Marmodoro, Corpus Christi, Oxford, explore the view that Empedocles' world is both dynamic and changeless, and investigate the metaphysical account that Empedocles gives for such a world.

A talk given by Professor Oliver Primavesi, Ludwig-Maximilians Universitat, from the series on Empedocles' Metaphysics.

A talk about Empedoclean Superorganisms from Professor David Sedley, Christ's College, Cambridge, from the series on Empedocles' Metaphysics.

A talk from Professor Catherine Rowett, University of East Anglia, from a series on Empedocles' Metaphysics.

John shows how recognising that the Empedoclean roots - fire, water, earth, and air - are subject to forms of generation and destruction consistent with his rejection into nothing. This makes for improved understanding of the difficult verses at Physika 1.234-6 (31B17.3-5 D-K), the block of text in which they occur, and Empedocles' element theory more generally.

Patricia Curd takes the problem of structure to cover both of these questions: (1) How is it that the cosmos is an organized system of diverse entities? (2) Why does this system maintain regularity over long periods of time?

Mauro Dorato (University of Rome) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London.

John Heil (Washington University in St. Louis) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London. On the received view of causation, causal relations are a distinctive species of external relation. This paper explores the implications of adopting a conception of causation according to which causal relations are understood as manifestings of reciprocal powers. On such a conception, causation would most naturally be seen as a kind of internal relation, a relation founded on non-relational features of its relata. The consequences of such a view for familiar conceptions of natural necessity are assessed.

Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London. Many contingent facts concern objects standing in relationships by accident, prominent among these being spatiotemporal relationships, often taken as the paradigm of externality in relations. Yet the ontological basis for these facts is elusive. Closer ontological scrutiny reveals an underlying tissue of internal relationships leaving only modest scope for real, irreducible and basic external relations. In this paper we will examine the interwoven ontological origins of spatiotemporal relations, causal coincidence and contingency, in an effort to determine the extent to which the world is irreducibly relational.

Stephen Mumford (Nottingham University) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London. Co-written by Sebastian Briceno.

Maureen Donnelly (SUNY at Buffalo) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London. In some relational claims- e.g., 'Abelard loves Eloise'-the order of the individual terms determines what relational fact is posited in the claim. In other relational claims- 'Abelard is next to Eloise' the order of the terms seems irrelevant to the underlying relational fact. Whereas there seems to be only one possible fact involving Abelard and Eloise in the relation at issue in the latter claim, there seem to be two possible relational facts involving Abelard and Eloise in the relation at issue in the former claim. I assume that there must be some difference among relations which explains why (and how) some, but not all, relations may return distinct relational facts when combined with fixed relata. I take positionalism to be the view that each argument place of a relational predicate is associated with a particular position or role. On this view, the argument place occupied by a term in a relational claim determines what role its referent plays in the corresponding relational fact. A relation R may generate distinct relational facts involving the same relata if fixed objects may play different roles in R-facts. In this paper, I develop a version of positionalism which assumes that certain properties and relations are instantiated only relative a particular object. I show how object-relative properties can explain differences in relational facts involving the same relata and answer objections to positionalism raised by Fine and MacBride.

Jonathan Lowe (University of Durham) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held on 3rd-5th October 2012 in University of London.

Jim Hankinson (University of Texas at Austin) gives a talk for the Causing Health and Disease: Medical Powers in Classical and Late Antiquit conference, held at Corpus Christi College on 21st-22 September 2012. The notion of a power, a dunamis, does a great deal of work in Galen. He believes that the basic functioning of the body is realized through four principal powers, of attraction, adhesion, alteration and excretion, although these come in a variety of different forms. These in turn are outgrowths of the fundamental physical powers of the basic qualities Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry. At the other end of the scale there are the psychological dunameis, such as the powers of calculation and of memory. As in Aristotle, the concept of a dunamis is tightly linked with that of an energeia; but these are not simply logical abstractions. Rather the natural energeiai are the basic functional activities of the animal body and its parts, and as health consists in proper functioning, so disease is defined as 'damage to one of the natural energeiai of the body'; and these activities are damaged when something interferes with its related dunamis. Thus dunamis is at the very heart of Galen's physiology and nosology; and it also plays a fundamental role in his pharmacology and theory of temperament. Here Hankinson tries to make sense of the apparently very different things Galen says regarding them. For example, he says that they do not inhabit our bodies as we do our houses; that is, presumably, they are not substantial or hypostasized. Equally he is perfectly clear that they are relational items: a power is a power for affecting something determinate in some determinate way. They are also said to be efficient causes. But it is not clear how these different strands fit together. In this paper Hankinson seeks to answer the basic question: What, for Galen, are powers, and how are they to be properly individuated?

Brooke Holmes (Princeton University) gives a talk for the Causing Health and Disease: Medical Powers in Classical and Late Antiquit conference, held at Corpus Christi College on 21st-22 September 2012. One of Galen's basic philosophical commitments is to the Platonic idea of the Demiurge. No other explanation of the intelligent organization of living beings, he argues, is remotely plausible. But how is the rational design of the Demiurge actually realized in matter, not just at the moment of creation but over the course of an organism's life? In this paper, Holmes examines Galen's treatment of what he calls the natural faculties (physikai dynameis) as the vehicles of immanent intelligence of living beings, paying particular attention to the relationship of the treatise On the Natural Faculties to other later works, such as On My Own Opinions and On the Formation of the Fetus. Holmes is primarily interested in cases where the concept of the natural faculties is strained, such as the moment of conception and at the boundary between animate and inanimate beings. By focusing on these occasions, we can pose the question: How much intelligence does the concept of dynamis sustain in Galen?

Hans-Georg Moeller (University College Cork), gives a talk for the Causing Health and Disease: Medical Powers in Classical and Late Antiquit conference, held at Corpus Christi College on 21st-22 September 2012. This paper explores the semantically ambiguous distinctions health/sickness and strength/weakness in ancient Daoist texts. He introduces and discusses several images in the Daodejing (Laozi) and allegories in the Zhuangzi which illustrate the often paradoxical reversals of these qualities, and then outline their philosophical significance

Philip van der Ejik gives a talk for the Causing Health and Disease: Medical Powers in Classical and Late Antiquit conference, held at Corpus Christi College on 21st-22 September 2012. Greek medicine was, from the very beginnings, preoccupied with causal explanation and with theoretical reflection on causation as such. One area where the quest for causes and the question of causal efficacy was particularly pressing was that of the dunameis of substances, i.e. the powers of foods, drinks, drugs and other therapeutic measures to bring about changes in the body of the organism to which they were administered. How can these powers be determined and identified? What is their ontological status, considering that they do not always work? How are efficacy and inefficacy explained? This paper will focus on three medical thinkers who have addressed these questions: the author of the Hippocratic work On Regimen (5th-4th century BCE); Diocles of Carystus (4th century BCE); and Galen of Pergamum (2nd century CE).

Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held at Senate House, University of London on 3rd-5th October 2012.