Podcasts about Senda

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Welcome to episode 259of Sports Management Podcast. Today's guest is Santiago Halty, Founder and CEO of Senda Athletics, one of the world's leading Fair Trade-certified football brands. From launching ethically manufactured footballs to seeing Senda products on football's biggest stage, Santiago shares the remarkable journey of building a purpose-driven sports brand while competing against industry giants. In this episode, we spoke about: Building a Fair Trade football brand from scratch Competing against Nike and adidas through niche innovation How Senda reached the FIFA World Cup Why purpose and performance can coexist in sports business The Vózinha story Time Stamps 00:00 Welcome Santiago Halty 00:19 The Vision Behind Senda 01:45 Why Fair Trade Matters 02:27 Competing Against Nike & adidas 03:42 Winning Through Futsal 04:45 Building a FIFA-Quality Ball 06:14 World Cup Success Story 08:02 Becoming the Official Match Ball 09:39 The Innovation Behind Senda Boots 12:21 The Story of Vózinha 18:14 Raising Investment for Growth 19:42 The Future of Senda 21:07 Becoming a Top 10 Football Brand 22:11 Messi's Last World Cup? 23:26 What's Next for Senda?   Follow Sports Management Podcast on social media Instagram Twitter LinkedIn YouTube www.sportsmanagementpodcast.com

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Grupo SENDA ha abierto el plazo de presentación de candidaturas para la XVII edición de los Premios SENDA. Unos galardones que reconocen la labor de profesionales, entidades, empresas y administraciones que trabajan para mejorar la calidad de vida de las personas mayores y avanzar en el desarrollo del sector sociosanitario.Escuchar audio

Link Wray como punto de partida para una selección de rock’n’roll, rockabilly, rhythm’n’blues, garage, high-energy o pub rock… Guitarras afiladas y toneladas de actitud.Playlist;LINK WRAY and HIS WRAY MEN “Jack the Ripper” (1958)VINCE TAYLOR and HIS PLAYBOYS “Brand New Cadillac” (1958)JOHNNY KIDD and THE PIRATES “Please Don't Touch” (1959)THE JOHNNY BURNETTE TRIO “Honey Hush” (1956)THE KINKS “Long tall shorty” (1964)THE DOWNLINWERS SECT “One Ugly Child” (1964)THE PRETTY THINGS “Midnight to six man” (1965)THE MONKS “Complication” (1966)THE SEEDS “Nobody spoil my fun” (1967)THE PAUL BUTTERFIELD BLUES BAND “I got my mojo workin’” (1965)THE STOOGES “Down on the street” (1970)THE FLAMIN’ GROOVIES “Teenage Head” (1971)MC5 “Tonight” (1970)NEW YORK DOLLS “Jet Boy” (1973)DR. FEELGOOD “Back in the Night” (1975)THE HAMMERSMITH GORILLAS “You really got me” (974)THE VIBRATORS “We vibrate” (1976)THE INMATES “Dirty Water” (1978)THE CRAMPS “Human fly” (1979)Escuchar audio

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Aí sim! "Para quem não sabe para onde vai, qualquer caminho serve". Mas será que se chega, realmente, a algum lugar? Será que é possível avançar na Senda sem ter definições de objetivos, parâmetros e valores? Nós somos da opinião que um caminhante que não tem um norte definido, está perdido. Mais do que isso até: se você não tem valores claros, limites estabelecidos, fundamentos & tabus, então não há conexão real com nenhuma tradição - ou seja: você está vagando, sozinho, por uma trilha não mapeada, ou que você simplesmente não respeita as demarcações. Quando tratamos de corrupção espiritual falamos de quem se perdeu na trilha. Não só de quem pegou um atalho perigoso, mas de quem caiu do desfiladeiro, afundou no lodo, morreu desidratado ou foi perseguido por feras e nunca mais foi visto. Mas falamos também de quem andou pelo vale das sombras da morte e pode ter conseguido voltar, com uma ou outra história para contar. E, corruptos por corruptos, não são só os humanos que estão desviados. Mas vem com a gente que em boa companhia a gente avança com maior lepidez e regozijo! Dá o play! Próximas Lives (Páginas Abertas): Páginas Abertas #54 – 09/07 às 20:00 [A Noite Escura da Alma - Ordálios & Desafios na Senda Iniciática] Envie seu relato!

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

In this episode of FAIR Talks, Becca sits down with Santiago Halty, Founder & CEO of Senda Athletics, alongside Sian Brown from Fair Trade USA, to explore what it looks like to build a football brand differently. Together, they discuss Santiago's journey, what Fair Trade certification looks like in practice, the challenge of building an ethical sports brand, and Senda's launch of the world's first Fair Trade Certified football cleats as the World Cup kicks off. Plus, find out which professional players will be stepping onto the pitch wearing them. Learn more about Senda: Senda Athletics The World's First and Only Fair Trade Certified Soccer Cleats Feature in The Athletic (from The New York Times Company)

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! Acceso anticipado para Fans - ✨ ¡Atención, nostálgicos de pupitre, mochila y libros forrados con Aironfix! ✨ ✨ Acceso anticipado exclusivo para nuestros mecenas ✨ Este episodio está disponible una semana antes para quienes han decidido apoyar NosTALKgicos Empedernidos a través de los Apoyos de iVoox. Antes de nada, ¡gracias de corazón a los mecenas que ya se han sumado! Vuestra ayuda nos permite seguir reuniéndonos frente al micro, mantener vivo este pequeño rincón de nostalgia y cubrir los gastos de la plataforma. ☕ ️ Si te gusta lo que hacemos y te apetece echarnos una mano, puedes convertirte en mecenas desde solo 1,99 € al mes, una pequeña ayuda que nos permite seguir dándole a la lengua en cada programa. Además, tendrás varias ventajas: Escuchar cada episodio una semana antes que nadie. Disfrutar de todos nuestros programas sin publicidad de iVoox. Y, sobre todo, ayudarnos a que este proyecto siga sonando cada mes. Y si ahora mismo no puedes apoyarnos o simplemente prefieres seguir escuchándonos como siempre, no pasa absolutamente nada: estar al otro lado, compartir el programa o recomendárselo a alguien ya es una ayuda enorme para nosotros. ❤️ Este episodio se abrirá para todo el mundo el VIERNES 12 de JUNIO a las 18:00 horas. Gracias por estar siempre al otro lado de las ondas. Hubo una época maravillosa en la que aprender a leer era casi como descubrir magia. Bastaba abrir uno de aquellos libros para viajar a mundos imposibles, conocer personajes inolvidables… o sufrir intentando leer en voz alta sin trabarse en mitad de la clase . ¿Quién no recuerda aquellos míticos Micho, Senda o Antos llenos de dibujos, sílabas y frases que aún hoy siguen grabadas en nuestra memoria? ¿O los eternos Cuadernos Rubio, que aparecían cada verano como si fueran el jefe final de las vacaciones? ✍️ Y qué decir de aquellas enormes enciclopedias del salón , auténticos monumentos al saber que parecían contener todos los secretos del universo… aunque luego tardáramos media hora en encontrar la letra correcta. También hablaremos de los tebeos que devorábamos en el recreo: Mortadelo y Filemón, Zipi y Zape, Don Miki… de las revistas que esperábamos cada semana en el kiosco ️ y de aquellas colecciones inolvidables como Barco de Vapor, Gran Angular, El Duende Verde, Los Cinco o Elige tu propia aventura, con las que aprendimos que se podía viajar muy lejos… sin salir de la cama. ️ En este nuevo episodio de NosTALKgicos Empedernidos abrimos la vieja biblioteca de los recuerdos para regresar a aquellas primeras lecturas que marcaron nuestra infancia y adolescencia. Y preparaos porque volveremos a: Forrar libros con Aironfix y dejar siempre una burbuja imposible de quitar ️ Hacer Cuadernos Rubio mientras sonaba la tele de fondo Leer en voz alta en clase rezando para que no tocara tu párrafo Intercambiar tebeos en el recreo como si fueran cromos de oro ️ Leer bajo las sábanas con una linterna porque “mañana hay cole” ️ Bajar al kiosco a por la TP, la Hobby Consolas o la Súper Pop Descubrir el mundo gracias a aquellas enciclopedias gigantes que ocupaban media pared del salón Todo ello acompañado de nostalgia, humor, anécdotas y muchas risas junto a Juanjo Castro, Ricardo Jiménez “Ricky” y Francisco Rodríguez “Paquito” ️ Y tú… ¿qué libro recuerdas con más cariño? ¿Cuál fue ese tebeo que acabó más sobado que la agenda del colegio? ✨ NosTALKgicos Empedernidos… porque antes de internet también sabíamos viajar muy lejos… pasando simplemente una página. Síguenos en redes: Facebook: facebook.com/nostalkgicos.empedernidos Twitter/X: @nostalkgicos Instagram: instagram.com/nostalkgicos ▶️ YouTube: Canal de NosTALKgicos Empedernidos Participa con nosotros: Tus comentarios y notas de voz al Teléfono del Oyente Nostálgico (WhatsApp o Telegram): 722 747 959 Correo electrónico: nostalkgicos@gmail.comEscucha este episodio completo y accede a todo el contenido exclusivo de NosTALKgicos Empedernidos. Descubre antes que nadie los nuevos episodios, y participa en la comunidad exclusiva de oyentes en https://go.ivoox.com/sq/572946

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

With this recast we skip back less than a year to a practical episode with Rhiannon Gogh. Rhiannon is a SEND finance expert, mum to a boy with complex autism, trainer, presenter and award winning Financial Advisor. Rhiannon talks us through all the things we need to think about (even if it's difficult!) and helps explain terms like trustees, with informed, positive and helpful advice.  You can find more about Rhiannon and her work at Carers Academy and SENDA. Rhiannon's Book is available for order Planning With Love: A Guide to Wills and Trusts for Parents of Children With Special Needs Thanks to the lovely folk at Jiraffe for sponsoring this week's episode. You can find more about them and their work here.  We'd love to hear from you – we love sharing stories, we love hearing how things are going, the good, the bad, the snotty-crying ugly.  You can leave a message with us in a number of ways:  • Firstly you can leave a message using speakpipe here: SpeakpipeTSWU  (Please note calls need to be limited to 90 seconds)  • You can send us a voice note from your phone or even just an email to  tswupodcast@gmail.com    Whatever way you choose to get in touch, we really want to hear your thoughts, views, musings, rants and confessions (we love a confession!)  Thanks for listening and being a part of our podcast community -It would make our day if you could like, follow and review the podcast wherever you listen.  We're so happy that The Skies We're Under is a free, independent podcast. Any sponsorship received is used to cover the costs of the production of episodes and compensate our valuable guests for their time. The hosts provide their time and efforts for free. T Follow us on Instagram @BornatRightTime. Head to www.bornattherighttime.com to find a parent workshop or CPD-certified training for practitioners in communication, collaboration and personalised care with parents/carers.  ‘The Skies We're Under' continues to go from strength to strength with almost 130 episodes already. There's still so much to discuss and share with our wonderful listeners, the families of people with complex disabilities and the many practitioners that support us. Moving forward we need your help to keep producing new episodes. You or your organisation can sponsor a season or advertise within an episode. Email us to find out more: tswupodcast@gmail.com   

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Bienvenidos a FailAgain, una newsletter / podcast sobre crear contenido con cabeza.Llevo semanas tocando workflows, probando agentes, compartiendo skills, ajustando sistemas.Cuando reviso los últimos contenidos que he publicado y me pregunto si esto está ayudando de verdad a la gente que me lee, la respuesta sincera es: probablemente no.Toca reset.Te recomiendo que escuches la versión extendida en formato pódcast de este contenido.Cuando llevas creando un tiempo pasa algo curioso: dejas de mirar el contenido y empiezas a mirar todo lo que hay alrededor.La herramienta. El editor. El framework. La IA nueva. Un formato que parece interesante. Una creatividad con no sé qué modelo.Y tienes la sensación de que avanzas, porque tu setup mola más cada semana. Tu Notion está cada vez más vitaminado. El agente ahora tiene memoria, skills, automatizaciones y seguramente una personalidad más estable que la mía un jueves por la tarde.Pero todo esto solo sirve para alejarte de lo único que importa: que cuando alguien al otro lado te lea, te escuche o te vea, lo que estás haciendo le sirva para algo.Por eso cada cierto tiempo hay que volver a casa.No es reinventarse. Es recordar qué estás haciendo y por qué.Yo he decidido revisar estos cuatro fundamentos una vez por trimestre. Si alguno está flojo, sé que antes de publicar nada nuevo me toca parar y volver a los básicos.1. Audiencia: ¿a quién le estás hablando hoy?Es lo primero que se desenfoca. Empiezas con una persona concreta en la cabeza y, a base de querer llegar a más gente o abarcar más, terminas hablándole a “creadores” en general. O a “emprendedores”. O, en el peor de los casos, a todo el mundo y a nadie.La señal de alarma es cuando te cuesta cada vez más decidir si una idea encaja o no en tu proyecto. Como todo vale, ya no tienes nada que filtrar.Para mí esto se traduce en una frase concreta. Yo no escribo para “creadores de contenido” porque ahí ya estoy difuminando demasiado. Escribo para creadores que están empezando o que llevan un tiempo y sienten que necesitan un cambio de chip. Gente que está arrancando o gente que dice “uy, creo que necesito hacer algo diferente”. No es lo mismo escribir para una categoría que escribir para una persona a la que puedes imaginarte con un cabreo, una frustración, dudando o procrastinando.2. Tema: ¿sigues siendo específico?Esto lo viví yo hace unos meses y lo conté en El factor nicho. Mi temática era “creación de contenido”, sonaba bien, pero era demasiado amplia. Tan amplia que en realidad no era referencia en nada concreto.Cuando tu tema es demasiado grande pasa algo puñetero: puedes hablar de todo, pero tu audiencia puede no interesarle nada. Si alguien entra a tu feed, puede no entrar en ninguna publicación porque le parece todo demasiado obvio o demasiado general.Lo vas a ver clarísimo cuando te sientes a planificar tus próximas publicaciones y no sepas sobre qué escribir. Y no es por falta de ideas, es porque ninguna encaja claramente en tu proyecto.La pregunta: ponte delante de un papel y apunta 10 ideas para las próximas semanas. Si te bloqueas en la tercera, tu tema se ha vuelto vago, le falta definición… o simplemente ya no te interesa tanto. Las dos opciones son importantes y conviene mirarlas a la cara.3. Voz: ¿sigues sonando como tú?Aquí es donde más problemas tenemos prácticamente todos. Estamos creando contenido apoyados muy fuerte en IA, y la IA cada vez nos va ganando más terreno.Al principio le pides un par de párrafos, te los da limpios, los pegas con dos retoques y piensas “luego lo ajusto”. Pero nunca terminas de ajustarlo, porque suenan bien y encajan con el resto. Y poco a poco ese contenido que antes era 100% tuyo empieza a sonar como si lo hubiera escrito cualquier otra persona con acceso a la misma herramienta.Esto es algo que en la formación de Más Listo que la IA que imparto con Víctor Millán trabajamos mucho: usar IA, sí, pero siendo tú quien lleva el mando, las riendas y la voz. Porque lo que te devuelve la IA está correcto, está ordenado, suena profesional… pero no es del todo tuyo.Tenemos previsto hacer un directo muy potente pronto, inscríbete aquí para poder asistir:Te pongo un ejemplo concreto: en el primer borrador de esta misma publicación, la IA me propuso un hook con la frase “la pregunta incómoda”. Nadie usa esa expresión. Yo la he usado en el pasado y era pura IA, se nota a kilómetros. Este tipo de cosas hay que limarlas, porque en el conjunto del contenido se tiene que percibir tu voz y mantenerse para las siguientes piezas.4. Sistema: ¿tu ecosistema sigue trabajando para ti?A lo largo de los meses te alejas de la estrategia inicial que dibujaste un día súper lúcido delante de Notion: “publicaré aquí para que me descubran, aquí para generar confianza, y construyo una lista de correo”. Y luego la realidad: no puedo publicar en YouTube, no tengo tiempo, no tengo capacidad para la edición. Pequeñas o grandes grietas que, si se quedan ahí, van resquebrajando la pieza completa.Te lo cuento con un caso real, el mío de ahora. Tengo los canales montados como los preparé en su día. Pero YouTube, que era mi canal de descubrimiento, lleva tiempo sin actividad. ¿Qué implicación tiene? Que donde antes tenía entre 100 y 150 altas mensuales de nuevos emails llegando desde YouTube, ahora son 20 o 30. Menudo salto.Y eso afecta a todo lo que viene detrás. La monetización con anunciantes se basa en los números de la newsletter. La capacidad de impactar con la formación o con Factoría Creativa también. Siempre va a haber bajas, gente a la que no le interesan los contenidos o que se cansa, y eso hay que reponerlo con suscriptores nuevos. Si la estrategia se rompe, el proyecto se va apagando aunque tú no lo notes hasta meses después.Y una más, por encima de las cuatro¿Por qué sigues aquí?Si eres capaz de responder con una justificación que te haga sentir bien, adelante. Si la respuesta es “porque toca”, “porque empecé y ya no puedo parar” o “porque ya tengo todo montado”, esas son excusas para no admitir que estás cansado de lo que haces.Yo mismo paré hace unos meses por varios motivos, y al retomar el proyecto estas preguntas aparecen siempre. Y son sanas. Mejor responderlas que arrastrarlas.Cómo aplicar esto sin volverse locoMi recomendación es que hagas este reset cada tres o cuatro meses. Más a menudo se vuelve obsesivo y no te das tiempo a fallar, aprender ni avanzar. Empiezas a cuestionarlo todo y no dejas que las cosas maduren.Es una revisión sencilla. Piensa en tu audiencia. Piensa en tu tema. Reflexiona sobre tu voz teniendo en cuenta cuánto te apoyas en IA. Y chequea tus canales para ver si tu estrategia se está desplegando como pensaste.Una semana para reflexionar y poner a prueba el estado del proyecto. Si te encuentras en una situación parecida a la mía, respóndeme a este email y dime cuál de los cuatro pilares tienes más flojo y cómo vas a solucionarlo.Un abrazote muy grande,GuillermoP.D. Si quieres hacer este reset acompañado, con feedback directo sobre tu proyecto y junto a otros creadores que están en el mismo punto que tú, eso es exactamente lo que hacemos en Factoría Creativa This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.guitermo.com/subscribe

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

«Volver a la senda» es el llamado urgente de Dios a través del profeta Jeremías en el famoso versículo 6:16. El Señor dice: «Paraos en los caminos, y mirad, y preguntad por las sendas antiguas, cuál es el camino bueno, andad por él, y hallaréis descanso para vuestras almas». Pero el pueblo responde: «No andaremos». La imagen es poderosa: en medio de la confusión y el peligro, Dios invita a detenerse, examinar las direcciones, preguntar por las sendas que Él ya ha bendecido en el pasado —el camino de la fe, la obediencia, la justicia— y volver a él. La promesa es descanso para el alma, una paz que el mundo no puede dar. Hoy, como entonces, muchos prefieren caminos nuevos que parecen más emocionantes, pero solo el camino antiguo conduce a la verdadera paz. Volver a la senda es un acto de humildad y sabiduría. Banda sonora: Drop the Tapes - Biblioteca de audio de YouTube Donaciones local: https://iglesiadeciudadreal.es/donaciones Web: http://iglesiadeciudadreal.es/ Podcast: http://www.ivoox.com/podcast-iglesia-. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPq8l9Q7KcX7j6iOGDPP_zg x (antes Twitter): https://x.com/home?lang=es Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/IglesiaCristianaEvangelicaDeCiudadReal Nota informativa: En todos nuestros videos se pueden traducir los SUBTÍTULOS a cualquier idioma. Ir a configuración y elegir idioma de subtitulo. 26/04/2026 - PREDICACIÓN DE LA TARDE - SERIE LA ENCRUCIJADA DEL PROFETA Jeremías 6:16-17 Reina-Valera 1960 16 Así dijo Jehová: Paraos en los caminos, y mirad, y preguntad por las sendas antiguas, cuál sea el buen camino, y andad por él, y hallaréis descanso para vuestra alma. Mas dijeron: No andaremos. 17 Puse también sobre vosotros atalayas, que dijesen: Escuchad al sonido de la trompeta. Y dijeron ellos: No escucharemos. © Sociedad Bíblica de España

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Programa Viagem Espiritual com Wagner BorgesRadio Vibe Mundial Fm 95.7 – 9/abr//2026***-LIVRO DO PROFESSOR WAGNER BORGES: https://amzn.to/4cJMrxE– @CortesWagnerBorges– @canaldiegoroque?https://diegoroque.com/– Livros gratuitos para ler online e/ou baixar: http://www.ippb.org.br/multimidia/liv…– Textos Periódicos: http://www.ippb.org.br/textos/textos-…

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Reflexões sobre o capítulo 19 - “Na senda renovadora” do livro “Confia e Segue”, pelo Espírito Emmanuel, psicografia de Francisco Cândido Xavier.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Show us how you remove combat from a published adventure! Phil and Senda talk how about what to balance, what you made need to consider, and some different approaches depending on why you want less MORE

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Acompaña en la mesa de ESPN Radio Formula a Heriberto Murrieta, Ciro Procuna y John Sutcliffe hablar sobre la jornada 9 de la Liga MX, la NFL y muchas cosas más sobre el mundo del deporte. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Show us how you deal with creep in your games! No, not creepy people — scope creep, or slow changes in expectations, or forgetting your session 0 conversations etc. Phil and Senda manage not to MORE

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

Senda de Amor Atlanta una Iglesia para toda la familia.

Protagonistas, análisis y reacciones del triunfo del Atlético de Madrid ante el RCD Espanyol por 4-2. Además, los miembros de 'El Sanedrín' desgranan todas las claves de la derrota del Real Madrid ante Osasuna por 2-.1 Por último, entrevista a Alessio Lisci, técnico del conjunto navarro.

Protagonistas, análisis y reacciones del triunfo del Atlético de Madrid ante el RCD Espanyol por 4-2. Además, los miembros de 'El Sanedrín' desgranan todas las claves de la derrota del Real Madrid ante Osasuna por 2-.1 Por último, entrevista a Alessio Lisci, técnico del conjunto navarro.

Show us what you do when you thought the campaign was over…but you all want more! Phil and Senda talk extending a campaign from a TV series perspective, and some things to check in on MORE

Show us how you manage your game docs! Phil and Senda talk platforms and information storage so that we can confidently answer the question “Where do you keep your rules of the table?” Bamboo Lounge MORE

Senda de Amor Atlanta una iglesia para toda la familia.

A fines de 1996, un grupo de treinta y cuatro universitarios del estado de Washington en los Estados Unidos se internó en la selva amazónica del Ecuador donde los estaban esperando los Huaorani, conocidos también como los aucas. Éstos, por medio de su embajador extraoficial Esteban Saint, los habían invitado a que fueran a verlos para conocer su modo de vivir. Esteban mismo los acompañó hasta el fin del camino, y luego se los entregó a tres de los Huaorani para que les sirvieran de guías en plena selva. Antes de volver a encontrarse con Esteban, de quien dependían como intérprete, caminaron en un solo día trece horas continuas por un sendero marcado con señales que los indígenas reconocían. El día siguiente abordaron canoas río abajo hasta llegar a un campamento selvático. Para entonces ya habían pasado tres días y medio de andar juntos. A la puesta del sol estaban sentados a la orilla del río. La luna apenas comenzaba a asomarse sobre las copas de los árboles. Una de las jóvenes le dijo a Esteban: —Todo lo que hemos leído acerca de los Huaorani es que son una tribu extremadamente violenta. ¿Será que éstos que nos acompañan son parientes lejanos de aquéllos? —No, son estos mismos —le contestó Esteban—. ¿Por qué no le preguntas a uno de ellos dónde está su padre a ver qué te dice? La incrédula joven escogió a una de las mujeres de la tribu, y ésta, valiéndose de Esteban como intérprete, contestó que hacía mucho tiempo que su padre había muerto atravesado con una lanza. Acto seguido, una de las indígenas más apacibles señaló a un hombre al otro lado del círculo, y declaró: —Él mató a mi padre, a mi madre, a mi hermano mayor, y a otros más de mi familia. Por si eso fuera poco, Daua apuntó a Quimo, que estaba enfrente de ella, y reveló: —Él mató a mi padre y a mi madre, y a mis dos hermanos mayores. A mi mamá la atravesó con una lanza mientras ella amamantaba a mi hermanita en una hamaca. ¡Y siguió mencionando a otros hasta completar diecisiete miembros de su familia a los que él había matado! —¿Cómo es posible que ahora viva en paz con un hombre que mató a toda su familia? —inquirieron los jóvenes, pasmados. Finalmente Esteban tomó del brazo al mismo indígena, el que se llamaba Quimo, y anunció: —¡Él también mató a mi padre! Una de las jóvenes, alarmada, preguntó: —Señor Saint, ¿acaso no corremos peligro aquí? A fin de tranquilizarla, Esteban le dijo a Daua: —Esta joven quiere saber si después de dormirse, seguirá con vida. Daua y los demás Huaorani se rieron a carcajadas, y por fin Daua se puso seria y respondió: —Si nosotros no anduviéramos en el sendero de Dios, no volverías a despertar después de dormirte. Y añadió: —Ahora vivimos felizmente al andar en el sendero de Dios. —¿Cómo es que ahora vives felizmente y con paz, cuando antes vivías tan mal? —le preguntó Esteban. Durante las dos horas siguientes aquella analfabeta les echó un discurso a esos universitarios sobre el poder transformador de Dios. Al terminar, los miró como si fuera la abuela de cada uno, y les dijo: —Escúchenme bien. En esta vida hay muchas sendas, pero hay una sola en la que Dios ha dejado marcadas las señales que conducen a su hogar. Si ustedes salen de aquí sin seguir la senda de Dios, jamás nos volveremos a ver; pero si viven como deben y siguen esa senda, entonces estaremos juntos con Dios algún día.1 Carlos ReyUn Mensaje a la Concienciawww.conciencia.net 1 Grabación en casete de Esteban Saint, orador en la Trigésima Reunión Plenaria de los Socios del Instituto Lingüístico de Verano, Lancaster, PA, EE.UU., 14 junio 1997.

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Last time we spoke about the Japanese Victory over Changkufeng. Japan's generals hatched a plan: strike at night, seize the peak, then bargain if need be. Colonel Sato, steady as a compass, chose Nakano's brave 75th Regiment, selecting five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to lead the charge. Ahead, scouts and engineers threaded a fragile path through darkness, while distant Soviet tanks rumbled like distant thunder. At 2:15 a.m., wire breached and soldiers slipped over the slope. The crest resisted with brutal tenacity, grenades flashed, machine guns spit fire, and leaders fell. Yet by 5:15 a.m. dawn painted the hill in pale light, and Japanese hands grasped the summit. The dawn assault on nearby Hill 52 and the Shachaofeng corridor followed, with Takeshita's and Matsunobe's units threading through fog, fire, and shifting trenches. Narukawa's howitzers answered the dawn with measured fury, silencing the Soviets' early artillery as Japanese infantry pressed forward. By daybreak, the Russians were driven back, their lines frayed and retreating toward Khasan. The price was steep: dozens of officers dead or injured, and a crescent of smoke and memory left etched on every face.    #181 The Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After admitting the loss of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng by dawn on 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique the next day asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division… after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Some hours after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars rushed to the scene and drove out the invaders. Japanese losses amounted to 400 men; Soviet losses were 13 killed and 55 wounded. On Soviet soil, the Japanese abandoned five cannons, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet reconnaissance pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack… Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier,which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders." By 1 August, Russian ground forces were deployed and the Soviet Air Force took action. Soviet aircraft appeared at 24:30 to reconnoiter. Soon after, more than ten planes flew in formation, launching strikes against forward units. Eight sorties, light bombers and fighters, roughly 120–150 aircraft in flights of two or three dozen, bombed and strafed. Raids were conducted by as many as 30 planes, though no Soviet losses were reported. The Russians also hit targets on the Korean side of the Tumen. The 75th Regiment judged that the Soviet Air Force sought only to intimidate. Russian planes dropped several dozen bombs on the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck; damage was limited to the railway, producing an impression of severity that was misleading. The lack of air cover troubled the troops most. Japanese casualties on 1 August were modest: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. However the three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine-gun and 7,000 rifle rounds that day. The appearance of Soviet air power at Changkufeng drew anxious international attention. Shanghai reports electrified observers, who anticipated that major Russo-Japanese hostilities would transform the China campaign overnight. Some observers were openly dismayed, foreseeing a prolongation of the mainland war with potential benefits to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to downplay the situation. Officers in Hsinking told correspondents that the raids, while serious, represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was reportedly attempting to compensate for losses at Changkufeng and other disputed positions, but aside from the bombings, the frontier remained quiet. If the Russians were serious, observers noted, they would have bombed the vital Unggi railway bridge, which remained untouched; raids focused on minor bridges, with limited damage. In Tokyo, foreign observers believed the appearance of about 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea signaled an extension of the incidents and that the Japanese government was taking urgent measures. Military leaders decided not to escalate but prepared for emergencies. The Korea Army Headquarters denied Soviet bombing of Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. Regarding retaliation, an American correspondent reported that the Japanese military had no intention of bombing Russian territory. Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts remained ground-based on both sides. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces stood between the lake and Paksikori, while the main forces, with numerous gun sites, were concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Changkufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures." Korea Army Headquarters assessed the situation as of the evening of 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare the necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu."  At 20:45 on the 31st, the 19th Division received a detailed message from the Hunchun garrison commander describing his northward deployments. Suetaka was heartened; he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30–31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka issued instructions from Kyonghun at 8:15 on the 31st via K. Sato: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was instructed not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counterassaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited." Suetaka was finally armed with formal authority, received at 22:05 on 1 August. He did not delay in implementing it. At 23:00 he ordered the immediate rail movement of strong reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters, as well as four infantry battalions and the remaining mountain artillery battalion. Thus, Suetaka could deploy forward not only the forces he had requested but also a brigade-level organization to assume control of the now sizeable combat elements massed at the front for "maneuvers." Earlier that afternoon he had already moved his division's message center forward to the Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly posted at least one staff officer there so that the center could function as the division's combat headquarters. An additional matter of explosive potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters; Nakamura intended only ground cover. At the front, Japanese units spent most of their time consolidating their hard-won positions. By 3 on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces with vehicles was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to a special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng." From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were rebuilding in the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed immediately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to grow apprehensive about a dawn counterattack on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. The second of August was marked by continuation of Soviet air attacks and the anticipated Russian counteroffensive. According to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabarovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at about 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was reported in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st. Hirahara, commanding the battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day's end approaching, he reinforced the defenses further and ordered the battalion medical officer to establish a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 15:00 Soviet artillery began firing at forward areas, especially gun positions; the bombardments were described as severe. Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition, firing only at worthwhile, short-range targets. Main Russian ground actions focused on the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not Changkufeng. In line with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were moved by 8:00 from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery pounded the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; observing the enemy became difficult. Russian planes engaged at 9:00 fighters, then bombers, to soften defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed firepower southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks advanced through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine-gun platoons at Hill 52 attacked the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them. By 10:00 the Russians had advanced with heavy weapons to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara moved with the engineers and battalion guns to the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took command, and prepared an assault. Initially, Soviet troops advanced in formation, but after cresting a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Heavily armed, they drew within 700 meters, with artillery and heavy machine guns providing coverage. By 10:00 Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns across the Tumen to unleash a barrage against Hill 52's front. For about half an hour, the battery fired. By 10:30, the Soviet advance grew listless. Believing the moment ripe, Hirahara deployed his men to charge the foe's right wing, ordering rapid movement with caution against eastern flank fire. On the heights north of Hill 52, Inagaki watched the struggle; with the telephone out and the situation urgent, he brought up firepower on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, along with the battalion guns, he moved out at noon, making contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 14:00, where the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians, losing momentum, were checked by Japanese heavy weapons and by mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion advanced onto the high ground north of Hill 52 around noon. By 15:00, two enemy companies began to fall back, climbing the western slopes of Hill 29 as the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 16:00, Suetaka observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite heat and rain, front-line troops showed fatigue but remained vigilant. Between 11:00 and 16;00, Sato inspected the lines and directed defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After a poor initial performance, the Russians awaited reinforcements before attempting another assault on Hill 52. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 15:00 50 tanks massed east of Maanshan. Around 17:00, the Russians began moving south along the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced along the Tumen hills, led by armor. Hirahara anticipated an assault at twilight, especially after 18:00, when nine bombers struck Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 17:00 several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from Hill 29. Convinced of an imminent Soviet strike, Takeshita ordered the defense to conceal its efforts and to annihilate the foe with point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. He sought to instill confidence that hostile infantry could not reach the positions. Before 19:00, the enemy battalions came within effective range, and Japan opened with all available firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank alight; the remaining tanks were stopped. Support came from Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Changkufeng. The Russian advance was checked. By nightfall, Soviet elements had displaced heavy weapons about 400 meters from Japanese positions. As early as 16:00, Suetaka ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita at 7:30 that there would be a night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after allowing them to close to 40–50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and pressed close between 8 and 9 p.m. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force targeted Takeshita; all ten Russian heavy machine guns engaged that side. Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians pressed within 30 meters, shouted "Hurrah! Hurrah!" and hurled grenades before advancing a further 15 meters. The Japanese repelled the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. Soviet illuminating shells were fired to enable closer approaches within 100 meters. Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted the forces massed in the dead space before the works. While the Hill 52 night attack collapsed, other Russian units, smaller in strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left that the Japanese had not yet occupied that morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range, and shouted but did not charge. By 22:00, the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard shouting to one another, and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held back 300–400 meters and began to dig in. Sato decided artillery should sweep the zone in front of Hill 52. At 21:30, he requested support, but the mountain guns could not open fire. Still, by 23:00, not a shadow of an enemy soldier remained on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on alert. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks crossed the Japanese-claimed border at 5:25 on 2 August and moved south to a position northwest of Shachaofeng. Around 7 Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one and a half to two infantry battalions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack. On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa notes 120-degree daytime heat and nighttime chill. Men endured damp clothes and mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, soldiers moved about; during the day they sought shade and camouflage with twigs and weeds. No defense existed against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the intense sun drained strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had only wild berries and dirty river water to eat. At 6:00 on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka exhorted his artillery to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage confirmed targets, and display firepower that is sniperlike—precise, concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka devised interdiction sectors for day and night attacks. At 10:30, the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to wither. Around 24:40, Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery moving into positions at the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a commander on horseback fled; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended the 3rd Battalion. Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Among the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Among the wounded, the 75th suffered nine and the 76th six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30–31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable portion of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were estimated at 200–250, including 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve enemy tanks had been captured, and five more knocked out on 1–2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and about 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives.  Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against Hill 52 on 2–3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 20:00 accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 18:30, reflecting Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, and was continuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks." Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten the solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were thinly held and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on prior permission before additional troops might cross the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and unsurprising solution was again to rely on his initiative and authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train the next morning at Seikaku, where they awaited orders eagerly.   K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. At 20:10 orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions, half of the total infantry reinforcements. Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 23:40 he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato quickly worked out details. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control. Japanese forces faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on 2 August. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 01:00 against one of his own companies, Matsunobe's southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 02:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 04:00 on 03 August. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 05:00 Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made ineffective strafing passes. By 06:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was pummeled during the three battles on 2 August. Taking advantage of night, the Russians had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 05:00 on 03 August, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700–800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 07:15 on 03 August. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind Crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 09:00 on 03 August, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 09:00, Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Changkufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11:00 the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Changkufeng. Between 06:00 and 07:40, the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 15:00 under cover of heavy weapons and artillery. At Hill 52, however, defense posed a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the mountain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 23:00 on 02 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 05:20 on 03 August, he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 06:00 amid heavy rain. By 07:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and northwest of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachaofeng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 15:30, the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 18:00, advised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 03–04 August passed with the units uneasy, striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses. Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suffered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammunition was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese War Ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 03 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to return to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Three-column headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border, 2 Claims Conflict, Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses, Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling claim that six Soviet divisions were in action seemed to have been supplied for external consumption by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Soviet artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On 03 August the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artillery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack. During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2–3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for attacking was "senseless"; once they started, they continued until an annihilating blow was dealt. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired without linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20–30 Russian tanks appeared during the counterattacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified." "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemies who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 03 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando, "although we did not advance even a step beyond the boundary." On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 02 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequently, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30–31 July, combined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their previous reversal, since large new corps are coming up." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the shadowed night, Japan's Sato chose Nakano's 75th to seize a peak, sending five captains and a rising Nakajima into darkness. At 2:15 a.m., they breached wires and climbed the slope; dawn lit a hard-won crest, then Hill 52 and Shachaofeng yielded to resolve and fire. The day wore on with brutal artillery, fluttering bombers, and relentless clashes. By August's edge, casualties mounted on both sides, yet Japanese regiments held fast, repelling night assaults with grit. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war.