Podcasts about marianas

As Marines advanced across Saipan, the naval battle for the Marianas reached a critical turning point. On June 19, despite dominating enemy aircraft in the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," American ships faced Japanese coastal artillery and nighttime air raids. Meanwhile, Admiral Spruance launched a daring, long-range strike against retreating Japanese carriers, dealing devastating blows but suffering heavy aircraft losses. On Saipan itself, fierce ground fighting continued, with Marines battling stubborn Japanese defenses across rugged terrain, while rising tension between Marine and Army commanders foreshadowed controversial command decisions ahead. ************* Visit HistoryoftheMarineCorps.com to subscribe to our newsletter, explore episode notes and images, and see our references. Follow us on social media for updates and bonus content: Facebook and Twitter (@marinehistory) and Instagram (@historyofthemarines). Visit AudibleTrial.com/marinehistory for a free audiobook and a 30-day trial.

Fuimos invitados por los Servidores de la Madre a participar en su retiro de Formación y Oración de hoy, 13 de mayo de 2025, a compartir el tema «Sobre las Apariciones Marianas».Aclaramos lo que era una revelación privada, lo que la Iglesia enseña al respecto, cuáles son las condiciones que debe tener la doctrina de la aparición y la actitud del vidente, y presentamos algunas apariciones aprobadas por la Iglesia. Al final, invitamos a ser de la virgen Santísima, pero ser ejemplo de Ella, a ser imitadores suyos y motivo de esperanza para otros.

El 13 de mayo... a lo mejor estando el mundo como está, no nos venía mal una aparición mariana que nos hiciese despreocuparnos un poquito.Entre capítulo y capítulo de Bacteriófagos os podéis mantener al día en cgdoval.es donde también encontraréis diferentes formas de apoyar a esta podcaster.

Across the Pacific, Marines had fought fiercely to gain strategic positions that put Tokyo within reach. But the road had been costly, each step paid for in blood, sweat, and sacrifice. Now, all eyes were on the Marianas, a critical chain of islands that would determine the next phase of the war.  This episode dives into the complex planning and intense buildup to the Saipan invasion. We'll walk through the strategic debates between military leaders whose decisions shaped the Pacific campaign. We'll see how reconnaissance shortfalls and underestimated enemy strength set the stage for one of the toughest fights Marines had yet encountered.  Most importantly, we'll join the Marines themselves, landing under merciless artillery fire, facing relentless resistance, and overcoming chaotic conditions to gain a fragile foothold. Their determination amid confusion and heavy losses highlights why Saipan remains one of the Corps' defining moments. ************* Visit HistoryoftheMarineCorps.com to subscribe to our newsletter, explore episode notes and images, and see our references. Follow us on social media for updates and bonus content: Facebook and Twitter (@marinehistory) and Instagram (@historyofthemarines). Visit AudibleTrial.com/marinehistory for a free audiobook and a 30-day trial.

En este programa les tenemos preparados temas muy interesantes ¡No se lo pierdan! Alexis Ayala, Sergio Mayer y Darío Yazbek nos cuentan todo sobre la docuserie “Solo para Mujeres” Nuestro amigo y colaborador Stivi de Tv, nos trae las mejores recomendaciones de cine y series. Adelaida Harrison nos revela qué aporta y qué le frustra a la personalidad 9 del eneagrama en una relación. Alessandra Rosaldo y Mariana Sánchez-Williams nos presentan “Entre Hermanas”, un podcast donde hablan de vida real, salud, bienestar y complicidad familiar. Esto y más aquí en Tamara con Luz.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Sugestão de algumas orações breves a Nossa Senhora

Los ministros dan su punto de vista sobre el apagón y los debates energéticos (y de defensa) que ha suscitado y además comentan algunas de las noticias más importantes de ciencia y tecnología de la semana. Por ejemplo, el final de la construcción de los componentes de ITER, el proyecto internacional (Rusia, China, Estados Unidos y Europa) de fusión que podría (para 2033) proporcionar energía potencialmente limpia e inagotable. También hay novedades en el mundo de Jeff Bezos, que acaba de enviar 27 satélites al espacio para proporcionar servicios de internet y competir con el Starlinik de Elon Musk, que tiene más de 4.000. Nuño compenta que Ozempic también servirá para tratar el hígado graso, que afecta a 1 de cada 3 adultos, y  comenta lo que supone que se hayan encontrado miles de toneladas de plásticos en la fosa de las Marianas, y Jaime explica que los efectos más nocivos de la revolución tecnológica sobre el trabajo no tienen tanto que ver con la cantidad (cuánto se crea, cuánto se destruye) sino con su calidad: se ha precarizado muchísimo. 

Entre las recomendaciones comenzamos con dos primeras novelas cortas, "El junco rebelde", de la autora rusa Nina Berberova: el día después de la invasión de Polonia por el ejército alemán, dos amantes se separan: uno irá París y otro a Estocolmo. Por otro lado, "La Hijastra", de la autora Caroline Blackwood, una historia más oscura y gótica."La vida en miniatura", de la autora Mariana Sández, es otra de las recomendaciones del día. En este caso, la protagonista, Dorothea Dodds, lleva 59 años viviendo a las sombra de su hermano y cuida de sus padres, pero un día junto a su prima decide cambiar su destino. "El libro de las hermanas", de la autora Amélie Nothomb, trata de la vida de Tristane, hija de unos padres atrapados en la burbuja de una pasión mutua en la que no hay espacio para ella, que lleva una vida vacía de amor. "El país de los otros", de la autora Leïla Slimani, nos cuenta cómo la protagonista, Mathilde, una joven alsaciana, se enamora de Amín Belhach, combatiente marroquí en el ejército francés durante la II Guerra Mundial. Tras la Liberación, el matrimonio viaja a Marruecos. Ella se siente sola y aislada en el campo, con su marido y sus dos hijos, padece la desconfianza que inspira como extranjera.Y por último, "El loco de Dios en el fin del mundo", del autor Javier Cercas. Se puede definir esta obra con la siguiente frase del autor: "Soy ateo. Soy anticlerical. Soy un laicista militante, un racionalista contumaz, un impío riguroso. Pero aquí me tienen, volando en dirección a Mongolia con el anciano vicario de Cristo en la Tierra, dispuesto a interrogarle sobre la resurrección de la carne y la vida eterna."

Mais de meio século depois da publicação do livro que abalou a ditadura portuguesa, “Novas Cartas Portuguesas”, de Maria Isabel Barreno, Maria Teresa Horta e Maria Velho da Costa, há uma nova edição em francês. “Nouvelles Lettres Portugaises” é uma tradução de Ilda Mendes dos Santos e Agnès Levécot e espera fazer redescobrir a intemporalidade de uma obra que foi revolucionária. A RFI conversou com Agnès Levécot neste programa. “Eu acho que, naquela altura, em Portugal, não era nada estranho que este livro tivesse esse efeito de bomba”, contava à RFI, há um pouco mais de um ano, Maria Teresa Horta, uma das autoras das “Novas Cartas Portuguesas”, que nos recebeu, em sua casa, em Lisboa, nas vésperas dos 50 anos da Revolução dos Cravos e que nos deixou em Fevereiro de 2025, aos 87 anos.A obra de Maria Teresa Horta, Maria Isabel Barreno e Maria Velho da Costa, publicada em 1972, foi uma revolução literária e feminista que denunciou ao mundo o regime fascista português, o colonialismo, o racismo, o machismo, a violência sobre as mulheres, ao mesmo tempo que subvertiam as noções de autoria e de género na literatura.A ditadura do Estado Novo considerou o livro como “insanavelmente pornográfico e atentatório da moral pública”, abrindo um processo judicial contra as escritoras que ficaram ameaçadas com uma pena entre seis meses a dois anos de prisão. Seguiu-se uma onda de solidariedade internacional e o livro chegou a todo o mundo, incluindo a França, onde em 1974 é publicada a tradução de Monique Wittig e Evelyne Le Garrec.Mais de meio século depois, e perante uma edição há muito esgotada, surge agora nova tradução, “Nouvelles Lettres Portugaises”, de Ilda Mendes dos Santos e Agnès Levécot, editado pela Ypsilon, que chega às livrarias francesas a 7 de Maio e que é apresentada esta sexta-feira, 25 de Abril, em Paris.Fomos conversar com Agnès Levécot para perceber “o que podem [ainda] as palavras” das Três Marias.“Essa é uma pergunta complicada porque as próprias escritoras, as três, no fim do livro, ainda fazem a pergunta. Realmente um dos aspectos literários desta obra é o questionamento do acto da escrita e até ao fim, nas últimas cartas, elas continuam a pôr a questão ‘o que podem as palavras?' Quanto a nós, como tradutoras, chegámos à conclusão também que todos os aspectos políticos e históricos que são denunciados nas cartas continuam actuais. Esse é o problema. A questão do colonialismo continua actual. A questão da repressão continua. A questão feminista também. Estamos a ver, no mundo actual, um retrocesso em relação a esse aspecto. Portanto, continua completamente actual”, explica Agnès Levécot.Em plena ditadura, “Novas Cartas Portuguesas” era uma obra literária inédita que esbatia noções de autoria e de género e que era assinada colectivamente por três autoras que escreviam, sem tabus, sobre o corpo, o desejo, mas também sobre a violência de que eram vítimas as mulheres. Denunciavam, ainda, a guerra colonial, a pobreza, a emigração, a violação sexual, o incesto, o aborto clandestino. O livro era, assim, um perigo para o regime repressivo, retrógrado e fascista português. Pouco após o seu lançamento, em 1972, os exemplares foram recolhidos pela censura e o Estado português movia um processo judicial contra as “Três Marias”. Perante as ameaças de prisão e a tentativa de silenciamento das autoras, nasce um movimento de solidariedade internacional. Meses depois de ter sido publicado, em 1972, o livro chega às mãos da escritora francesa Christiane Rochefort e, através dela, ao grupo feminista Movimento de Libertação das Mulheres. Seguem-se várias acções de luta, nomeadamente em França, e que envolvem nomes como Simone de Beauvoir e Marguerite Duras. Há distribuição de panfletos, recolha de assinaturas para um abaixo-assinado entregue na Embaixada de Portugal em Paris e uma procissão de velas diante da Catedral de Notre-Dame. Outro momento emblemático é a leitura-espectáculo “La Nuit des Femmes”, a 21 de Outubro de 1973, no Palais de Chaillot, em Paris, que deu origem ao documentário “Les Trois Portugaises”, de Delphine Seyrig (1974).“Monique Wittig e Evelyne Le Garrec pegaram no texto e fizeram uma primeira tradução que foi publicada em 1974. Entretanto, tinha havido excertos traduzidos para artigos e espectáculos porque houve uma série de espectáculos e movimentações de apoio às Três Marias quando estavam no julgamento. Houve uma noite que ficou muito famosa que foi ‘La Nuit des Femmes' em que leram alguns excertos”, relembra Agnès Levécot, sublinhando que “o aspecto literário quase não foi abordado na altura”.O aspecto literário é precisamente “uma coisa fora do comum”, acrescenta a especialista em literatura lusófona. Três mulheres escrevem colectivamente uma obra literária e política, depois de terem publicado livros que não agradaram à ditadura patriarcal portuguesa. Maria Velho da Costa e Maria Isabel Barreno tinham lançado, em anos anteriores, livros que denunciavam a opressão e a secundarização da mulher: Maina Mendes (1969) e Os Legítimos Superiores (1970). Em 1971, Maria Teresa Horta também publicava Minha Senhora de Mim e escrevia abertamente sobre o desejo, algo considerado escandaloso pelos fascistas.“São três mulheres que já eram escritoras, que já tinham publicado obras bastante feministas, que se juntaram e decidiram escrever um livro a três. Começaram a reunir-se todas as semanas num restaurante em Lisboa. Todas as semanas traziam um texto que elas tinham escrito e trocavam ideias a propósito dos textos, mas não os modificavam. A certa altura, começaram a pensar na figura de Mariana Alcoforado, a religiosa portuguesa, e começaram a escrever cartas. Globalmente, são chamadas cartas, mas não são só cartas, tem vários géneros: poesia, ensaios, supostos artigos de jornal, textos teóricos... Elas escreveram cartas a uma Mariana, mas são as descendentes de Mariana, ou seja, as várias Marianas que vieram depois. Portanto, têm cartas de vários séculos a acompanhar o percurso de uma suposta Mariana”, acrescenta Agnès Levécot.No posfácio de “Nouvelles Lettres Portugaises”, Agnès Levecot e Ilda Mendes dos Santos recordam, justamente, a importância da figura de Mariana Alcoforado, suposta autora das “Cartas Portuguesas”, de 1669, “apresentada por alguns como o arquétipo da mulher portuguesa” e a partir da qual “as Três Marias trabalham a questão da autoridade e do poder, o exercício da violência e da dominação, assim como, o poder da palavra”.Agnès Levecot, que já tinha participado no livroNovas Caras Portuguesas entre Portugal e o Mundo, que foi publicado depois de uma pesquisa internacional sobre a recepção das "Novas Cartas Portuguesas" no mundo, foi convidada por llda Mendes dos Santos para se juntar a ela na tarefa de traduzir a obra. “As principais dificuldades estavam no facto de serem textos completamente diferentes do ponto de vista do género, da tonalidade, da língua usada. Portanto, temos textos a imitar o estilo do século XVII ou XVIII, e aí a Ilda teve um papel muito importante porque ela trabalha muito sobre esses séculos. Foi sobretudo adaptar-se, tentar encontrar um estilo para cada momento e cada época. Depois, nós íamos oferecer uma tradução francesa a franceses e forçosamente tínhamos que encontrar uma maneira de passar certos elementos históricos, geográficos, políticos para o público francês perceber, porque são textos que estão muito impregnados de referências intertextuais portuguesas e internacionais de textos muito conhecidos e outros muito menos conhecidos, mas bem conhecidos dos portugueses. Referências políticas, nomes também, ou seja, elementos que nos levaram a acrescentar 200 e tal notas no fim do livro”, acrescenta.“Nouvelles Lettres Portugaises” chega às livrarias francesas a 7 de Maio e é apresentada esta sexta-feira, 25 de Abril, na livraria Les Nouveautés, em Paris. Uma data simbólica para Agnès Levécot que estava em Portugal no 25 de Abril de 1974 e ainda guarda, em casa, um cravo desses tempos revolucionários que marcariam, para sempre, o seu percurso pessoal e profissional.

Send us a textIn 2022, Fanachu put out a call for Chamorus living outside of the Marianas to share their reflections and experiences in the diaspora. Dozens of artists, writers, musicians and performers responded and in 2023 we released an online zine titled "Voices of the Chamoru Diaspora" edited by Amara Rose San Agustin. For this episode of Fanachu, four of the 40 who were included in the zine joined for a virtual launch episode to discuss both their experiences as diasporic Chamorus and their particular submissions. Appearing as guests on this episode were Isa Gagarin, Ed Sablan, Aren Kerr and Connie Santos. You can download a copy of the zine at this link. This episode first premiered on March 22, 2023 and was hosted by Amara Rose San AgustinThe audio for this episode is produced by Tåsi Chargualaf and includes the song "Kantan Chamorro" by Gus and Doll.Support the show

El Documental analiza la evolución del imperio colonial español en América y la idea de la emancipación surgida en la última de sus colonias americanas: Cuba. Desde 1868 comienzan las guerras coloniales contra la metrópoli, sufriendo España una enorme sangría económica y unas pérdidas humanas cercanas a los 100.000 hombres. Los EE.UU. ofrecen varias veces a España la posibilidad de comprar la isla de Cuba (como habían hecho con Alaska), pero el Gobierno español las rechaza. El panorama político internacional, difícil y delicado en ese momento, junto con el asunto de la voladura del Acorazado Maine en aguas de La Habana, deciden a los EE.UU. por la intervención militar, declarando la guerra a España. Durante los 113 días que dura esta fase final de la guerra (hispano-cubana-norteamericana), los EE.UU. despliegan una enorme actividad política y militar, invadiendo la isla y destruyendo las escuadras españolas de Cavite y Santiago de Cuba, momento que la historia recoge con el sobrenombre de “El Desastre del 98”. La firma del Tratado de Paz hace perder a España su soberanía en los territorios de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, el archipiélago de las Marianas y las islas Filipinas. Cuba comienza el siglo XX estrenando República, pero sometida económica y políticamente a los EE.UU., que se afianza como potencia mundial

Last time we spoke about the Visayas Offensive. In March 1945, the Pacific War raged on. On Iwo Jima, the US Marines, after intense fighting and heavy casualties, declared the island secured. Meanwhile, in northern Luzon, General Clarkson's division advanced towards Baguio, facing fierce Japanese resistance, while General Mullins pushed through Balete Pass. The Japanese army, grappling with severe supply shortages, was forced to evacuate Baguio. In the Visayas, General Eichelberger's forces targeted the Sulu Archipelago and Central Visayan Islands, securing key airfields. The 40th Division landed on Panay, capturing Iloilo, and launched an assault on northern Negros. On Cebu, the Americal Division landed near Talisay, encountering mines but minimal resistance, and secured Cebu City. By April, Allied forces had made strategic advances across the Philippines, overcoming Japanese resistance and establishing crucial airfields. This episode is the Invasion of okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We have come to the grand final battlefield at last, that of Okinawa. Of course battles are raging in all sorts of other theaters like New Guinea, China, Burma, etc. However as you might imagine its becoming impossible given the week by week format to cover all of this in single episodes. So we are going to hardcore focus on Okinawa for awhile, we will circle back to the other theaters to catch up. Seriously it was the only logical way to do this and honestly in retrospect I wish the entire podcast was campaign by campaign instead of week by week. But I am a mere podcaster following the youtube series of this. But if you want to hear a campaign by campaign series, over at Echoes of War me and my cohost Gaurav are beginning to roll them out. The first series will be the entire Malayan Campaign, and I think after that I might try to do the Philippines. Regardless lets jump into the invasion of Okinawa. As previously noted, the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 3 designated Okinawa as the final target for invasion, following the establishment of air and naval bases in Luzon and Iwo Jima. Capturing this crucial island would bring the conflict to Japan's doorstep, disrupt the enemy's air communications through the Ryukyu Islands, and flank their maritime routes to the south. Consequently, from these newly established air and naval bases in the Ryukyus, American forces would be able to launch attacks on Japan's main islands and implement a more rigorous sea and air blockade, isolating them from Japanese territories to the south. This made it imperative for the Japanese Empire to maintain control over Okinawa and the Ryukyus. To this end, the 32nd Army, led by Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao, was formed there by late March 1944. Initially, it comprised four companies and one artillery regiment stationed at Amami Oshima; five companies and one artillery regiment at Nakagusuku Bay; four companies and one artillery regiment at Iriomote Island; along with various garrison units from the 19th Air District in Okinawa.  Under Operation Tei-Go, the Ryukyus and Formosa were to form a long zone of interprotective air bases. These bases were expected to defeat any American sea or air forces sent into the region. To avoid destruction from the air, each base was to consist of a cluster of airfields, such that if one were damaged others could be used immediately. Military and civilian crews were promptly set to work building the numerous fields. 13 base clusters had to be created, stretching in a line from Tachiarai in the northern Ryukyus to Pingting on Formosa in the south. The only remaining tasks for ground forces were the defense of these facilities and their support anchorages and the unenviable work of building the fields. Much of the energy of 32nd Army would be absorbed building these air facilities. This was more difficult since 32nd Army had only two bulldozers and one earth roller. Japan had produced dozers in small numbers at its Komatsu plant since 1943, but few had reached the front. Since soldiers were thus obliged to use shovels, hoes, straw baskets, and horse-drawn wagons, construction was slow. Moreover, because of enemy submarine raiders, it was impossible for the Japanese to deliver the large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and anti-aircraft guns needed to operate the bases. Even more seriously, the planes themselves were not available. Between April and June, the 32nd Army received reinforcements, including the 44th and 45th Independent Mixed Brigades, the 21st Independent Mixed Regiment, and the 27th Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, among other air garrison units. From these forces, Watanabe chose to send the 45th Brigade to establish bases on Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island, while the 21st Regiment was tasked with setting up a base on Tokunoshima. On June 27, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Corps (approx. 4100 men) boarded the Toyama Maru and began the voyage to Okinawa. The 44th Brigade HQ, Artillery and Engineer Units meanwhile boarded other vessels of the Taka-412 convoy. Two days later, while the convoy was sailing east of Tokunoshima, the submarine Sturgeon successfully sank the Toyama Maru with two torpedoes, therefore inflicting the loss of 3724 men and much heavy equipment. Because of this, the 1st Corps had to be deactivated.  Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese Empire rapidly deployed significant ground forces to the 32nd Army, including the 9th, 24th, 28th, and 62nd Divisions, as well as the 59th, 60th, and 64th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 27th Tank Regiment. Additionally, the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was airlifted to bolster the beleaguered 44th Brigade, which was reorganizing its 2nd Corps with local recruits. The 32nd Army Staff wished to use as much of the indigenous population as it could in direct support of the war effort, so on January 1 1945 it ordered total mobilization. All Okinawan males aged 18 to 45 were obliged to enter the Japanese service. 39000 were drafted, of whom 15000 were used as nonuniformed laborers and 24000 as rear-echelon troops called the Home Guard (Boeitai). Many of the Boeitai replaced sea based battalions and rear-area supply units that had been reorganized and equipped for frontline duty. In addition to these, 1500 of the senior boys of the middle schools on Okinawa were organized into Iron and Blood Volunteer Units and assigned to frontline duty. Some of these students had been tried out in the signal service in the autumn of 1944 with good results, so the program was expanded. Since the fall of 1944, 600 senior students of the girls' middle schools also had been given training in the medical service. While most of these troops were sent to strengthen the main defenses at Okinawa, a large portion of the 28th Division was actually assigned to reinforce the garrisons on the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands. The 36th Regiment was dispatched to support the Daito Islands, the entire 45th Brigade was moved to garrison Ishigaki and the rest of the Yaeyamas, the 59th Brigade was tasked with defending Irabu Island, the 60th Brigade was sent to reinforce Miyako Island, and the 64th Brigade was deployed to the Amami Islands. On August 9, Lieutenant-General Ushijima Mitsuru took command of the 32nd Army. His initial strategy was to occupy all of Okinawa with a strong force and eliminate any invading troops at their landing sites. As fierce fighting began at Leyte, intensive training for the troops commenced, including divisional maneuvers at potential American landing points, artillery bombardments of beachheads, and nighttime assaults on bridges. However, on November 13, Tokyo decided to send the elite 9th Division to Formosa to prepare for a movement to the Philippines that ultimately did not occur. The unexpected withdrawal of the 32nd Army's best division disrupted Ushijima's operational plans. Ironically, this situation improved combat efficiency, as it compelled the army to achieve more with fewer resources. Ushijima chose to concentrate most of his forces in the mountainous and easily defensible Shimajiri area, located in the southern part of the island. This strategic location allowed the Japanese to maintain control over Naha port and target the northern airfields with artillery. Similar to the situation in Iwo Jima, this decision marked a departure from the previously favored strategy of a "decisive battle," opting instead for a war of attrition that had proven effective at Peleliu and Iwo Jima. As a result, Ushijima positioned Lieutenant-General Amamiya Tatsumi's reinforced 24th Division at the southern end of the island, Lieutenant-General Hongo Yoshio's reinforced 62nd Division along the central isthmus, Major-General Suzuki Shigeji's reinforced 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on the Hagushi plain, and Colonel Udo Takehiko's Kunigami Detachment, consisting of two battalions from the 2nd Corps, in northern Okinawa. These troop placements were successfully implemented in December; however, concerns arose that the 32nd Army was spread too thin to effectively counter the anticipated enemy invasion. Consequently, on January 15, Ushijima decided to move the 44th Brigade from the Hagushi plain southward to overlap with the 62nd Division's area on the east, significantly shortening the Japanese front. Additionally, one battalion from the Kunigami Detachment was sent to defend Iejima and its crucial airbase, which necessitated the rest of the unit to consolidate its positions and strengthen defenses on Yaedake Mountain in the Motobu Peninsula. Ushijima also had the support of the brigade-sized 5th Artillery Group, led by Lieutenant-General Wada Kosuke; the 21st Field Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps; the 11th Shipping Group, which included several shipping engineer regiments and sea-raiding battalions; the 19th Air District overseeing various aviation service units; and Rear-Admiral Ota Minoru's Okinawa Naval Base Force, which comprised nearly 9,000 personnel stationed at the Oroku Naval Air Base near Naha. Ushijima had nearly 100,000 troops at his command, with 29,000 assigned to specialized units for anti-aircraft, sea-raiding, and airfield operations. Anticipating the nature of the impending conflict, these well-staffed service units were reorganized for ground combat. The 19th Air District transformed into the 1st Specially Established Regiment, responsible for defending the Yontan and Kadena airfields it had recently constructed and maintained. Most of the service personnel were integrated into the new 1st Specially Established Brigade in the Naha-Yonabaru area, while the sea-raiding base battalions became independent infantry units. Additionally, the remainder of the 11th Shipping Group was restructured into the 2nd Specially Established Brigade on the southwestern part of Okinawa. This reorganization, completed on March 21, bolstered ground combat strength by 14,000 men, leaving only 10,500 of the 67,000 Army personnel in specialized roles. To protect themselves, the Japanese began constructing robust fortifications, tunnels, and cave systems to shield against anticipated enemy bombardments.  Work on the caves was begun with great vigor. "Confidence in victory will be born from strong fortifications" was the soldiers' slogan. The caves meant personal shelter from the fierce bombardments that were sure to come, and they also offered a shimmering hope of victory. The combination was irresistible, and units began to work passionately on their own caves. Enthusiasm was essential because of the great toil it took to create the caves. Just as 32nd Army had only two bulldozers to make airfields, it had no mechanized tunneling equipment at all. Besides lacking cutting equipment, 32nd Army also lacked construction materials. It had no cement, no ironware, and no dynamite. The units had to rely entirely on wooden beams that they obtained themselves to shore up their shafts. This was not necessarily easy because there were no forests in the south of the island where the troops were now stationed. Pine forests were abundant in the mountainous north, however, so each unit was assigned its own lumbering district in the north. Several hundred men from each division were detailed as its lumbering squad. The problem remained, however, of how to move the several million logs that were needed over the 40 or so miles from the forests to the forts. With no railroads and the use of trucks limited by a shortage of gasoline, the solution was for each unit to cut its own logs, then transport them in small native boats called sabenis. The divisions acquired 70 of these, which then plied the waters steadily from north to south. In January 1945, however, the Leyte-based B-24s that began flying over daily for reconnaissance also began strafing the boats. So the waterborne delivery of logs had to be switched from day to night, greatly lowering efficiency. Ushijima aimed to prolong the fight from these positions and decided to destroy the indefensible Yontan and Kadena airfields to prevent their use by the enemy, effectively ending the ineffective air defense strategy initially devised by Tokyo. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were preparing for Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. Given the expectation that the capture of Iwo Jima and recent air assaults on Japan would concentrate enemy air power around the Empire's core, which would respond aggressively to any attacks on Okinawa, the Americans needed to first neutralize or eliminate enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa to achieve air superiority over their objective. As a result, all available carrier-based and land-based air forces were tasked with this operation, including Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, General Kenney's Far East Air Forces, Admiral Hoover's Central Pacific Forward Area, and General Arnold's 20th Air Force. From the 20th Air Force, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command was assigned to attack Okinawa before moving on to Kyushu and other vulnerable locations in the home islands. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Roger Ramey's 20th Bomber Command, supported by General Chennault's 14th Air Force, focused on neutralizing Formosa. Aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Area were also set to conduct searches and continuous strikes against Formosa as soon as conditions on Luzon allowed. Additionally, the British carriers of Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings' Task Force 57 were tasked with neutralizing air installations on the Sakishima Group in the ten days leading up to the landings. Once air superiority was achieved, Spruance's 5th Fleet was to land Lieutenant-General Simon Buckner's 10th Army, which included Major-General John Hodge's 24th Corps and Major-General Roy Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps. The 24th Corps comprised the 7th and 96th Divisions, while the 3rd Amphibious Corps included the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. As the Commanding General of Expeditionary Troops, Buckner also oversaw the 27th and 77th Divisions and the 2nd Marine Division for special operations and reserve purposes. Furthermore, the 81st Division was held in area reserve. In total, Buckner commanded a force of 183,000 troops, with 116,000 designated for the initial landings. The plan called for Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division to first secure amphibious bases in the Kerama Islands on March 26, with one battalion further securing Keisejima five days later to establish a field artillery group there. On April 1, following a demonstration by the 2nd Marine Division in southern Okinawa, the main landings were set to take place. The 24th Corps and the 3rd Amphibious Corps would land simultaneously on the west coast beaches north and south of Hagushi. After landing, both corps were to quickly advance across the island, capturing the airfields in their designated areas before securing all of southern and central Okinawa. Subsequently, Buckner's forces were to invade and secure Iejima and northern Okinawa. Once this was achieved, there were tentative plans to launch an invasion of Kikaijima with the 1st Marine Division and Miyako Island with the 5th Amphibious Corps. For the invasion, Spruance relied on a Covering Force under his command, along with Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force. This force included Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force, which comprised minesweepers, UDTs, and escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Morton Deyo's Gunfire and Covering Force, consisting of ten battleships and eight heavy cruisers; Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Northern Attack Force, responsible for landing the 3rd Amphibious Corps; and Rear-Admiral John Hall's Southern Attack Force, tasked with landing the 24th Corps. Similar to Iwo Jima, Okinawa had endured multiple air attacks since October 1944 as part of the preliminary operations for the landings on Leyte, Luzon, and Iwo Jima that we previously discussed. These operations also included air strikes aimed at neutralizing Japanese air power on Formosa. Throughout February and March, Mitscher's carriers and LeMay's B-29s brought the conflict back to the Japanese home islands with a series of strikes that caused significant damage and instilled fear in the population. On March 1, Task Force 58 launched the first strike of the month against the Ryukyus, targeting Amami, Minami, Kume, Tokuno, and Okino, as well as Okinawa. This operation resulted in the destruction of 41 planes, the sinking of eleven vessels, damage to five others, and significant harm to island facilities. In between the main assaults on Japan, the superfortresses frequently targeted key sites in the Ryukyus, leading the beleaguered Japanese forces to refer to these missions as the "regular run." Throughout March, aircraft from the Southwest Pacific and the Marianas conducted nearly daily operations over the Ryukyus and surrounding waters, searching for Japanese shipping and contributing to the isolation of Okinawa by sinking cargo ships, luggers, and other vessels, while American submarines intensified the blockade around the Ryukyus. Meanwhile, after completing extensive training and rehearsals, Task Forces 51 and 55 gathered at Leyte, Task Force 53 assembled in the Guadalcanal-Russells area, and the rest of the 5th Fleet convened at Ulithi. On March 12, Reifsneider's convoy, carrying the 3rd Amphibious Corps, was the first to depart, successfully reaching Ulithi nine days later. On March 18, the tractor group transporting the 77th Division began its journey from Leyte to the Kerama Islands. On the same day, Mitscher's carriers targeted 45 airfields in Kyushu, claiming the destruction of 102 Japanese planes, damaging or destroying 275 on the ground, sinking six vessels, and damaging three more. In response, Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet launched a counterattack against the carriers Enterprise, Intrepid, and Yorktown, inflicting minor damage while losing 33 aircraft. The next morning, after locating the majority of the Combined Fleet at Kure, Mitscher dispatched 436 aircraft to target naval installations and shore facilities in the Inland Sea. At 06:50 three C6N Saiun “Myrt” recon planes discovered Task Force 58, and by 07:00 Captain Genda Minoru's elite, handpicked 343rd Kokutai had scrambled 63 advanced Kawasaki N1K2-J “George” Shiden-Kai fighters from Shikoku to intercept the Americans. Minutes later, Genda's powerful Shiden-Kais “waded into the Hellcats and Corsairs as if the clock had been turned back to 1942.” Soon the 343rd Kokutai was engaged in a wild maelstrom with 80 US fighters, including VF-17 and VBF-17 Hellcats from Hornet and VMF-112 Corsairs from Bennington. For once the Japanese broke about even, losing 24 fighters and one scout plane to the Americans' 14 fighters and 11 bombers. Nevertheless, Genda's expert but outnumbered 343rd Kokutai proved unable to blunt the American onslaught. Despite facing a formidable intercepting force, they managed to inflict damage on 18 Japanese warships, including the battleships Yamato, Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna, as well as six aircraft carriers. Additionally, one incomplete submarine was destroyed, 97 enemy planes were shot down, and 225 were either destroyed or damaged at Japanese airfields. In response, Ugaki launched a kamikaze counterattack that successfully struck the carriers Wasp and Franklin, causing significant damage and forcing Franklin to head to Pearl Harbor immediately. As Task Force 58 slowly withdrew the afternoon of March 20, a damaged Zero crashed destroyer Halsey Powell, killing 12 and wounding 29. Shortly afterwards friendly anti-aircraft fire started fires aboard Enterprise. At 23:00 eight Japanese torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the carriers, while three overnight snoopers were splashed by anti-aircraft fire. Between March 17 and March 20 Ugaki had committed 193 aircraft to battle and lost 161. On March 21 Ugaki dispatched a 48-plane strike, including 16 G4M “Betty” bombers, carrying the very first Ohka (“Cherry Blossom”) suicide missiles. However the combat air patrol (CAP) of 150 Hellcats and Corsairs repulsed them. Franklin, Wasp, and Enterprise, all damaged, steamed to Ulithi as a reorganized Task Group 58.2. Except for April 8–17, when Task Group-58.2 was briefly reestablished, Task Force 58 strength would remain at three Task Groups throughout Iceberg's duration. Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet was meanwhile effectively incapacitated for several weeks, but Ugaki nevertheless reported five carriers, two battleships, and three cruisers sunk, which IGHQ found scarcely credible. Meanwhile, the Mine Flotilla departed Ulithi on March 19, followed two days later by the rest of Task Force 52 and Task Force 54 to support the Kerama operation. On March 23, to prepare for the imminent minesweeping operations of Iceberg, Task Force 58 conducted extensive bombing raids on all known installations in Okinawa, resulting in significant damage and the sinking of 24 vessels and damage to three others over the following five days. Furthermore, Admiral Lee's battleships traversed the cleared area and opened fire on Okinawa, sinking an additional two vessels. With this naval and air support, Blandy's minesweepers and UDTs successfully cleared the route for Rear-Admiral Ingolf Kiland's Western Islands Attack Group by nightfall on March 25. Their primary opposition in the following two days consisted of a series of kamikaze attacks, which caused damage to the battleship Nevada, light cruiser Biloxi, four destroyers, two destroyer minelayers, one minesweeper, and two transports, while the destroyer Halligan was sunk by mines. The next morning, supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft, Bruce initiated his first landings. The 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment landed on the southern beaches of Aka Island, facing sporadic resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 306th Regiment landed unopposed on Geruma Island, which was quickly secured. The 2nd Battalion, 306th Regiment achieved even faster success at Hokaji Island, while the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment invaded Zamami Island with light resistance. The 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment encountered minor opposition as it took Yakabi Island. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion scouted Keisejima and found no enemy presence. After encountering some resistance, the units on Aka and Zamami pushed back the enemy garrisons, securing two-thirds of Aka by nightfall and successfully repelling a strong counterattack on Zamami that night. Simultaneously, Deyo's warships and Blandy's carriers began bombarding the demonstration beaches, while minesweepers cleared progressively larger areas around Okinawa, although the minesweeper Skylark was sunk by mines. By March 27, the remaining enemy forces on Aka and Zamami were finally eliminated, and a company took Amuro Island without opposition. Additionally, a company from the 307th moved to Kuba Island, which was quickly secured. At the same time, Bruce continued his main landings, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 306th Regiment landing on the west coast of Tokashiki Island, facing minimal opposition. As the two battalions advanced north along narrow trails toward Tokashiki town, the 3rd Battalion landed to secure the southern part of the island. On March 28, they reached the town, clearing the entire island and concluding the Kerama operation.  In Kerama, "Island Chain between Happiness and Good," the Japanese tradition of self-destruction emerged horribly in the last acts of soldiers and civilians trapped in the hills. Camping for the night of March 28 a mile from the north tip of Tokashiki, troops of the 306th heard explosions and screams of pain in the distance. In the morning they found a small valley littered with more than 150 dead and dying Japanese, most of them civilians. Fathers had systematically throttled each member of their families and then disemboweled themselves with knives or hand grenades. Under one blanket lay a father, two small children, a grandfather, and a grandmother, all strangled by cloth ropes. Soldiers and medics did what they could. The natives, who had been told that the invading "barbarians" would kill and rape, watched with amazement as the Americans provided food and medical care; an old man who had killed his daughter wept in bitter remorse. Only a minority of the Japanese, however, were suicides. Most civilians straggled into American positions, worn and dirty. In all, the 77th took 1,195 civilian and 121 military prisoners. This operation resulted in the deaths of 530 Japanese soldiers, 121 captured, and the neutralization of over 350 suicide boats, with American losses totaling 31 killed and 81 wounded. While this initial operation was underway, the tractor groups of the Southern and Northern Attack Forces left their staging areas in Luzon and Ulithi on March 25, followed by the rest of Spruance's fleet two days later. On March 26 and 27, Rawlings' Task Force 57 conducted a series of strikes on the Sakishima Islands, primarily targeting Miyako. Meanwhile, after a 250-plane raid on the Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya on March 24, LeMay sent 165 B-29s from the 73rd and 314th Bombardment Wings to attack the Kyushu airfields on March 27, facing minimal resistance as they caused significant damage to the Tachiarai Army Airfield, the Oita Naval Airfield, and the Omura aircraft plant. Other bombers from the 313th Bombardment Wing laid aerial mines in the Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese responded with a raid on Spruance's naval units using aircraft and suicide boats on the night of March 28, resulting in one LCM being destroyed and one cargo ship damaged. On March 29, Mitscher launched another strike against Kyushu, but poor weather conditions led to only minor damage, with 12 vessels sunk and one damaged. By this point, the “largest assault sweep operation ever executed” had cleared the Hagushi beach approaches in 75 sweeps, with minesweepers clearing 3,000 square miles of coastal waters. The following morning, as Task Force 58 once again targeted Okinawa, Deyo's ten battleships and eleven cruisers advanced to bombard Okinawa's defenses and demolish coastal seawalls with increased intensity. At the same time, the 314th sent 12 planes to attack the Mitsubishi engine works in Nagoya overnight. The next day, LeMay dispatched 152 B-29s for his second assault on Kyushu, completely destroying the Tachiarai machine works and heavily damaging the Omura airstrip. On March 31, back in Okinawa, the final underwater demolition operation off the Hagushi beaches was underway while the 420th Field Artillery Group was successfully positioned on Keisejima, prompting a strong reaction from Ushijima's artillery. That morning, a Ki-43 fighter crashed into Admiral Spruance's flagship, the Indianapolis, resulting in the deaths of nine crew members and severely damaging a shaft, which ultimately compelled Spruance to transfer his flag to the battleship New Mexico. Meanwhile, the frogmen completed their last demolition operations at Hagushi, and the final preliminary bombardment of Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands was executed successfully. By the end of the month, over 13,000 large-caliber shells had been fired in the shore bombardment, and approximately 3,095 sorties had been conducted against the Ryukyus. However, effective Japanese concealment prevented significant damage to Ushijima's defenses. As night fell, a vast fleet of transports, cargo ships, landing craft, and warships navigated the final miles of their long journey, successfully meeting off the Hagushi beaches in the East China Sea before dawn on April 1. While Turner's forces prepared for the landing, a fire support group consisting of 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats began the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches at 05:30, firing a total of 44,825 rounds of shells, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells. In response, the Japanese launched some scattered kamikaze attacks on the convoys, successfully hitting the transport Hinsdale and LST 884. At 07:45, carrier planes from Task Force 58 and Blandy's carriers targeted the beaches and nearby trenches with napalm. Fifteen minutes later, the first wave of amphibious tanks advanced toward the shore at four knots, followed closely by five to seven waves of assault troops in amphibious tractors. Alongside the primary landings, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division staged a feigned landing on the southeast coast of Okinawa, near Minatoga, aiming to distract the enemy's reserves in that region. Meanwhile, on the main front, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats and artillery fire from Keisejima, a nearly continuous line of landing craft advanced toward the beaches at 08:20. Encountering no resistance, the first waves began to land on their designated beaches at 08:30, with additional troops following closely behind. Within an hour, Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps had successfully landed the assault elements of the 6th and 1st Marine Divisions north of the Bishi River, while Hodge's 24th Corps disembarked the 7th and 96th Divisions to the south of the river. The lack of significant opposition, coupled with the rapid disintegration of the untrained 5473 airfield service troops of the 1st Specially Established Regiment under heavy air and artillery bombardment, created a sense of foreboding among the men, prompting them to scout the area cautiously. As before, the enemy's primary response consisted of kamikaze attacks on naval units, resulting in damage to the battleships West Virginia and Tennessee, the British carrier Indefatigable, destroyers Prichett and Vammen, the British destroyer Ulster, the destroyer minelayer Adams, and four other vessels. Returning to Okinawa, after ensuring they were not walking into a trap, the troops began advancing inland while tanks and other support units were brought to the beaches. In the north, Major-General Lemuel Shepherd's 6th Marine Division deployed Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines on the isolated Green Beaches and Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines on the Red Beaches near Yontan Airfield. The 4th Marines advanced toward Yontan, encountering only scattered resistance, and quickly secured the objective east of the airfield by 13:00. Meanwhile, Schneider's 3rd Battalion moved through Hanza without opposition, but the 2nd Battalion's progress was hindered as it needed to protect its exposed flank, prompting the 22nd Marines to quickly commit its reserve battalion to maintain their momentum. To the south, Major-General Pedro Del Valle's 1st Marine Division landed Colonel Edward Snedeker's 7th Marines on the Blue Beaches and Colonel John Griebel's 5th Marines on the Yellow Beaches just north of the Bishi River. By 09:45, the 7th Marines on the left had advanced through the village of Sobe, their primary objective, while the 5th Marines were positioned 1,000 yards inland. At this point, it was decided to land the reserve battalions of both regiments, along with Colonel Kenneth Chappell's 1st Marines. With forces arranged in depth and reserves positioned to the right and left, Del Valle's units continued to advance steadily over the rolling terrain as the 11th and 15th Marines artillery units were also being landed. At 13:30, the 4th Marines resumed their advance, facing light resistance on the left but becoming overextended on the right while trying to maintain contact with the 7th Marines. As a result, Shapley landed his reserve battalion to fill this gap, while Shepherd also deployed his reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, to secure the critical northern flank, allowing the 22nd Marines to keep advancing eastward. Meanwhile, further south, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division disembarked Colonel Frank Pachler's 17th Regiment on the Purple Beaches just south of the Bishi River and Colonel John Finn's 32nd Regiment on the Orange Beaches in front of Kadena Airfield. Both regiments quickly ascended the gentle hills at the landing sites and began advancing eastward. By 10:00, the 27th Regiment had patrols at Kadena Airfield, which was discovered to be empty; by 10:30, the front line was crossing the airstrip. Moments later, it advanced 200 yards beyond, heading towards Cholon. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment secured the southwestern edge of Kadena and continued along the road to Kozo. To the south, Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landed Colonel Michael Halloran's 381st Regiment on the White Beaches in front of Sunabe and Colonel Edwin May's 383rd Regiment on the Brown Beaches at the extreme southern flank. Both regiments moved eastward with the same ease as the other units that day, making significant progress towards Momobaru in the north and successfully capturing Chatan in the south. Additionally, all divisional artillery of the 24th Corps landed early; Hodge's reserve regiments and battalions were successfully brought ashore, and by nightfall, direct-support battalions were in position. By the end of the day, over 60,000 men had landed, suffering only 28 dead, 27 missing, and 104 wounded, thereby establishing a beachhead 15,000 yards long and up to 5,000 yards deep in some areas. Shepherd's Marines paused for the night along a line stretching from Irammiya to the division boundary south of Makibaru, which the 1st Marine Division extended further south to Kadena. Meanwhile, the 7th Division advanced nearly three miles inland, destroying several pillboxes but losing three tanks to mines. The 96th Division secured positions along the river south of Chatan, on the elevated ground northwest of Futema, in the outskirts of Momobaru, and in the hills to the northwest and southwest of Shido. Although there were gaps in the lines in several areas, they were filled by reserve units or weaponry before nightfall. Thus, the Battle of Okinawa, seen by most as the final climactic battle of the Pacific War has only just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Gandalf the White once said “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” The battle of Okinawa will become the bloodiest campaign America has ever fought. The soul crushing journey has just begun as the Americans end the last stand of the Japanese in the Pacific War.

Send us a textThe majority of the Chamoru people in the world today are unable to speak their native language. To help keep the language a living part of our community, it is imperative that we do away with the stigma of not being able to speak Chamoru and instead focus on normalizing the everyday learning of Chamoru. For this episode of Fanachu, a group of active learners of the Chamoru language from the Marianas and the diaspora shared their experiences.Appearing as guests on this episode were Jessie Neal, Tristan Quintanilla, Davina Cruz-Armstrong and Janai Limtiaco. This episode first premiered on March 15, 2023 and was hosted by Michael Lujan Bevacqua. The audio for this episode is produced by Tåsi Chargualaf and includes the song "Typhoon Karen" by The Charfauros Brothers. Support the show

Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! TLM-Z-35db-Rx12 - 1415- Las apariciones marianas de Fátima, el Milagro del Sol y los tres Secretos de Fátima. Universo de Misterios tiene reservado el derecho de admisión y publicación de comentarios. Generalmente, los comentarios anónimos no serán publicados. Contacto con Universo de Misterios: universodemisteriospodcast@gmail.com Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

1/2: /#OCEANIA: AMERICAN SAMOA, GUAM, NORTHERN MARIANAS AT RISK. CLEO PASKAL, FDD. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/testimonies/2025/03/05/examining-the-office-of-insular-affairs-role-in-fostering-prosperity-in-the-pacific-territories-and-addressing-external-threats-to-peace-and-security/ 1810 COOK DEATH

2/2: OCEANIA: AMERICAN SAMOA, GUAM, NORTHERN MARIANAS AT RISK. CLEO PASKAL, FDD. 1909

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

Who lives at the bottom of the Mariana trench? Scientists have finally revealed the Mariana Trench mystery. Take a look at the deepest creature ever caught there! TIMESTAMPS The Mariana Trench is the deepest area 0:45 The deepest-living fish in the world 2:40 “Ethereal snailfish” 3:12 A mysterious metallic sound 3:38 Deep sea cucumber 5:50 The deep sea anglerfish 6:20 The barreleye fish 7:13 The Champagne Vent 8:05 The 4-inch amoeba 8:35 SUMMARY The Mariana Trench is the deepest area you can find on Earth. Although almost everybody has heard the name, we have shockingly little data about this dark underwater place in the western Pacific Ocean. It's a monumental task mapping the seafloor and taking pictures when the water pressure at the bottom is more than 1,000 times greater than that at the surface! The Mariana Trench houses the deepest parts of our planet. Music: The Cave of Poetry by Savfk (  / savfk  ) is licensed under a Creative Commons license (https://www.youtube.com/redirect?redi.... Savfk YouTube channel:    / @savfkmusic   Location of the Mariana Trench: By I, Kmusser, CC BY 2.5 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Cut-out from original shown below: By By Masaki Miya et al. - Evolutionary history of anglerfishes (Teleostei: Lophiiformes): a mitogenomic perspective. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2010, 10:58 doi:10.1186/1471-2148- 10-58, CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Pseudoliparis swirei (Scorpaeniformes: Liparidae), hadal snailfish from the Mariana Trench: By Gerringer M. E., Linley T. D., Jamieson A. J., Goetze E., Drazen J. C. - Gerringer M. E., Linley T. D., Jamieson A. J., Goetze E., Drazen J. C. (2017). Pseudoliparis swirei sp. nov.: A newly-discovered hadal snailfish (Scorpaeniformes: Liparidae) from the Mariana Trench. Zootaxa, 4358 (1):161—177. doi:10.11646/zootaxa.4358.1.7, CC BY 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Subscribe to Bright Side : https://goo.gl/rQTJZz ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our Social Media: Facebook:   / brightside   Instagram:   / brightgram   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For more videos and articles visit: http://www.brightside.me/ Location of the Mariana Trench: By I, Kmusser, CC BY 2.5 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Deepest Depth in the Trench (Map view of the bathymetry of southern Mariana Trench area): By University of New Hampshire, http://ccom.unh.edu/theme/law-sea/mar... Pseudoliparis swirei (Scorpaeniformes: Liparidae), hadal snailfish from the Mariana Trench: By Gerringer M. E., Linley T. D., Jamieson A. J., Goetze E., Drazen J. C. - Gerringer M. E., Linley T. D., Jamieson A. J., Goetze E., Drazen J. C. (2017). Pseudoliparis swirei sp. nov.: A newly-discovered hadal snailfish (Scorpaeniformes: Liparidae) from the Mariana Trench. Zootaxa, 4358 (1): 161—177. doi:10.11646/zootaxa.4358.1.7, CC BY 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Cut-out from original shown below: By By Masaki Miya et al. - Evolutionary history of anglerfishes (Teleostei: Lophiiformes): a mitogenomic perspective. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2010, 10:58 doi:10.1186/1471-2148-10-58, CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/..., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index... Deep-sea Holothurian: By NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, 2016 Deepwater Exploration of the Marianas, http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/okeanos... Researchers solve mystery of deep-sea fish with tubular eyes and transparent head (The barreleye (Macropinna microstoma): By Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute (MBARI), https://www.mbari.org/barreleye-fish-... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Mariana Sánchez Dávalos tenía un futuro prometedor en la medicina, pero su sueño terminó abruptamente en el poblado de Nueva Palestina, Ocosingo. A sus 24 años, fue enviada a realizar su servicio social, sin imaginar que su estancia se convertiría en una pesadilla. Desde su llegada, un hombre comenzó a acosarla, siguiéndola desde las sombras y haciéndola sentir en peligro constante. Mariana pidió ayuda, pero sus denuncias fueron ignoradas. Con miedo, angustia y sin opciones, la joven intentó resistir la pesadilla que vivía a diario. Las autoridades y su universidad no hicieron nada por protegerla, dándole solo días de descanso sin goce de sueldo. El 28 de enero de 2021, la historia de Mariana terminó de la peor manera. ¿Pudo haberse evitado su trágico final? Distribuido por Genuina Media

Exactly a month into his new term, President Donald Trump's latest major pick, Kash Patel, has been appointed as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation after a grueling confirmation in the US Senate. Tulsi Gabbard had earlier been confirmed as the Director of National Intelligence. Both these are positive from India's point of view: they signal that the sinister Deep State may well be reined in, after decades of anti-India activism on its part.Over the last week or two, there have been revelations after revelations of bad faith on the part of the disgraced US establishment, most notably in the shadowy USAID agency, which, it appears, was the absolute “Heart of Darkness” of the Deep State, neck-deep in covert operations, election interference, and general mayhem all over the world, and certainly in India.Trump himself emphasized that $21 million in covert funds had gone towards affecting election outcomes in India. Presumably the reduced majority Modi got in 2024 could be traced back to this. Fortress AmericaThe general contours of Trump's foreign policy are beginning to emerge. I predicted a month ago, before Trump had taken over, in ‘Greenland, Canada, Panama: Chronicles of a Foreign Policy Foretold', that Western Europe, and the United Kingdom in particular, would find themselves treated as irrelevant to the new order to come. That has happened.In fact, things have gone beyond what I anticipated. In a nutshell, Trump is downgrading the Atlantic, and his focus will be on the Americas, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Which, from a historical perspective, makes sense: the world's economic center of gravity is moving towards Asia; trade flows in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are increasingly more important than in the Atlantic; and a few centuries of European domination are pretty much over.Sorry Europe, Atlanticism is at an endTo put it bluntly, the vanity that Europe is a ‘continent' is now being exposed as hollow: to be precise, it is merely an appendage, an outpost, to vast Asia. Europe is at best a subcontinent, like India is; it should probably be renamed as ‘Northwest Asia'. The saga of ‘Guns, Germs and Steel' post the Industrial Revolution is winding down rapidly. There is some schadenfreude in that the UK becomes even more irrelevant: just a small, rainy island off NW Asia.The Putin-Trump dialog suggests that Ukraine, and even NATO, are now superfluous. Atlanticism has been a constant in US foreign policy, mostly pushed by two forces:* Eastern European-origin State Department officials who have inherited a blood-feud with Russia from their ancestors, eg. Brzezinski, Albright, Nuland, Blinken, Vindman* an ancient intra-Christian schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and (for a change) an alliance of Roman Catholics and Western Protestants like Lutherans, Anglicans and Calvinists.It is time that the Americans realized they've been turned into cats'-paws by these forces, and turned their backs on these ancient animosities, which have almost no relevance today. In fact one could argue that a NATO-Russian alliance is the right solution in the medium term, because otherwise both could become puppets of China. Bringing the Ukraine war to an end is a start.The general tone of the Trump White House implies a Fortress America. In practice, this seems to mean that instead of being Globocop, the US focuses on a) the Americas, North and South, b) the Pacific Ocean, d) the Indian Ocean, in that order.A new Monroe Doctrine in the AmericasThe attention being paid to Canada and Mexico over and above the tariffs issues suggests that there is a plan to create a stronger and more unified North American entity; the noises about “Canada the 51st state” and “Gulf of America” suggest that maybe a new NAFTA-style agreement could be inked, especially now that the warming Arctic Ocean makes the thawing tundra of Canada more appealing.It is true that there is no immediate thrust for a Monroe Doctrine-style exclusive US ‘sphere of influence' in South America, but I suspect it is coming. Already, there have been positive vibes between Trump and Argentina's Milei, and Salvador's Bukele: the former for his DOGE-style chainsaw-wielding that's showing results, and the latter for his strong law enforcement.The Island Chains and other red lines in the PacificIn the Pacific, there has been pushback against China's moves on the Panama Canal: there are two Hong-Kong-based entities (read proxies of the Chinese government) controlling ports around it: Balboa on the Pacific side, and Cristobal on the Atlantic side.On the other hand, there is increasing global support (with the judicious use of Chinese carrots such as BRI) for the annexation of Taiwan by China, including, if necessary, by force. A Lowy Institute study (“Five One Chinas: The Contest to Define Taiwan”) suggests that some 119 UN member states accept the official Chinese position on ‘reunification'. Only 40 countries are not on board with China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.It is very likely that there will be a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan, within the next two years. It is said that Xi Jinping has given a timeframe of 2027 for all this. It will be interesting to see how many states that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine will condemn China's future attack on Taiwan. Chances are that many will be strategically silent.Japan, Australia, South Korea and other friends of the US will have a hard time keeping the peace in the Pacific. The “Three Island Chains” act as increasingly critical red lines to contain an aggressive China. In fact, the Asia Maritime Initiative is speaking of five island chains (“China's Reach Has Grown, So Should the Island Chains”), including those in the Indian Ocean (remember the “String of Pearls” intended to tighten around India's throat).The three island chains: 1. Taiwan, Japan, Philippines; 2. Guam, Marianas; 3. Hawaii(Source: China is making waves in the Pacific, Alexandra Tirziu, Jan 2024 https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-pacific-conflict/)Meanwhile, in a show of aggression far from its shores, three Chinese warships indulged in “live firing” in international waters between Australia and New Zealand, and commercial aircraft were warned to keep away. This is a warning to Australia, which, thanks to AUKUS foolishness, cancelled French submarines and now await British submarines… in the 2040s.The increasing relevance of the Indian Ocean and the Middle EastMuch of the world's trade, including 75% of global maritime trade and 50% of its daily oil shipments, go through the Indian Ocean.The main issues will be the control of the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, and the alternative routes being explored by China via the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, possible use of Coco Islands and other Myanmarese ports including Sittwe and (a bit of a stretch for China) access to Chittagong. There are also troublesome pirates, including Houthis, that make for perilous journeys leading to the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.Interestingly, the US is making moves in the Indian Ocean that will support both the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) and I2U2, the India-Israel-UAE-US economic partnership. IMEC is the old Spice Route, revivified.There is also the proposed Ben-Gurion Canal through the Negev Desert in Israel that would benefit Saudi Arabia as well (its futuristic NEOM city is nearby), and this would be made feasible by Trump's proposed transformation of Gaza. It would be an alternative to Suez.Following up on the Abraham Accords, Trump 2.0 would like to bring the Gaza war to an end, and create an environment in the Middle East where Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE et al will form a counter and a buffer to the machinations of Iran and Turkey.The Indo-US joint communique is a statement of intentIt is in this global context that we need to analyze the joint communique between the US and India after the Trump-Modi summit. Both nations will be attempting to advance their own strategic doctrines. The US would like India to become a non-treaty ally. India would like to keep its multi-alignment policy going, along with Atmanirbharatha. These may make any bilateral progress a little rough but some give and take will work.There are a few specific areas of interest:* Defense* There is an effort by the US to wean India away from its dependency on Russia for weapons. The most evident carrot here is the F-35 advanced fighter jet, which has now been offered to India for the first time, along with other conventional weapons such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stryker infantry combat vehicles, as well as the P8i Poseidon anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and various drones* The P8i is already in service in India, and it would help keep an eye on the southern Bay of Bengal with its proximity to China's submarine pen on Hainan Island* The F-35 raises some questions. In the Bangalore Air Show it was pitted against the Russian Su-57, which is a lot less expensive. Also, the F-35 needs extraordinary levels of maintenance for its ‘stealth' coating. Finally, should India invest in building its own AMCA 5th-generation fighter jet rather than buying?* Even though there will be co-production agreements, the US is a whimsical supplier (remember Tarapur), and there will be little transfer of technology, so military procurement and cooperation must be carefully thought through by India* Trade and Investment* The goal is to reach $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, which would involve a doubling from current levels ($200 billion in 2023). Besides, the Trump doctrine of reciprocal tariffs and zero trade imbalance may make some of this difficult* Indian firms are planning to invest $7.35 billion in the US* Energy* India will now get access to US civil nuclear technology, but there's a small twist: the clauses invoking civil liability for nuclear damage will be deleted. This is reminiscent of Pfizer's covid-era contract with developing countries: Pfizer was assured of indemnity (with the local governments being liable) in case of injury or death caused by its vaccine. This sounds like a bad idea* India will increase its purchases of US oil and natural gas. This is a win-win: it will increase US imports to India, thus reducing the trade deficit, and India will be assured of additional supplies* Technology and Innovation* A whole raft of actions have been proposed, including a tie-up between the US National Science Foundation and the Anusandhan National Research Foundation in India, a program called TRUST, another called INDUS innovation, and one in the area of space collaboration, titled NISAR* Multilateral Cooperation* The Quad, IMEC and I2U2 figured in communique, but also something called the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture. I note this nomenclature progress with approval: there used to be the Asia-Pacific, then it was the Indo-Pacific, and now the Indian Ocean is being singled out* In the area of counter-terrorism, the communique explicitly named Pakistani entities such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba, among others. This is a welcome change from the shadow-boxing indulged in by the Biden administration and others, whereby Pakistani terrorists were treated as ‘assets'* The extradition of Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian now in a Los Angeles jail, to India for investigation into his role supporting David Headley, in the 26/11/2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, is a welcome sign, after the curious Biden exertions in the Pannun case* People to people links* Indian parents are spending $8 billion a year to support 300,000 Indian students in the US. This amounts to a sort of ‘foreign aid', and also incidentally supplies a lot of especially STEM graduates to the US economy* Facilitating visas, which have become frustratingly difficult for Indian business and leisure travelers to the US. Last year, the wait for just a visa interview was 452 days in Chennai (as compared to 15 days in Beijing), which probably was the result ot the Biden State Department ‘punishing' India for refusing to toe their Ukraine sanctions line* The legal movement of students and professionals between the two countries is to be eased.Overall, this is a statement of intent: both Modi and Trump are laying their cards on the table, and they will both (as they should) bargain hard to benefit their own nations. But India is no longer being treated as a pariah as it was since the Pokhran blasts, the denial of cryogenic rocket engines (via, yes, the Biden Amendment), and so on.As Trump moves towards the inevitable multipolar world, he does not wish to leave Asia to eager hegemon China; as he wishes to move the US out of military entanglements in far-off places (for which he expects Europe and others to bear the burden of their own defense), it is natural for him to want India to punch its weight in Asia.A mutually beneficial relationship free of the supercilious lectures by previous Democratic administrations (eg Daleep Singh on Ukraine sanctions, and he was, ironically enough, the great-grand-nephew of Dalip Singh Saund) would be welcome from the Indian point of view. Having a counterweight to China, and a G3 instead of a G2, would likewise be useful from the US point of view. Thus, there are glimpses of a possible win-win situation.2222 words, 22-02-2025 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

Por FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/Nemesis-Radio-1550831935166728/ Podcast de NEMESIS RADIO: http://www.ivoox.com/podcast-podcast-nemesis-radio_sq_f1133446_1.html CANAL MISTERIOS DE IVOOX: https://www.ivoox.com/escuchar-canal-misterios-ivoox_nq_2594_1.html Canal misterios de Ivoox: https://www.facebook.com/canalmisteriosdeIvoox/ YOU TUBE: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7PD6Knea7eWw88rLp0vR0w E-MAIL: nemesisradiomurcia@gmail.com Por Internet a través de nuestras webs: frecuenciamurcia.es -Esta noche tendremos con nosotros al profesor de universidad y Periodista, Lluís Pastor, hablaremos con él de sus investigaciones en la comunicación con difuntos, antesala de su libro “Los Mismos Muertos Vuelven” -Con nuestra compañera, Ana Theysser, nos adentraremos en “LA PUERTA OCULTA”, para que nos hable de esos seres que “Son Oscuros y Tienen los Ojos Rojos” -En HISTORIAS, CUENTOS Y LEYENDAS, será nuestro compañero Antonio Pérez, quien nos cuente la historia o leyenda, titulada “Un Faraón en Cartagena” -Y terminaremos con nuestro DEBATE, con nuestros contertulios Paco Coloma, Salvador Sandoval, Ana Theysser y Paco Torres, debatiremos sobre un interesante tema, “Las Misteriosas Apariciones Marianas” “El camino es largo y está a punto de comenzar… Compinches de la noche, poneos cómodos, agudizad las orejas que empezamos…” (NEMESIS RADIO NO SE HACE RESPONSABLE DE LOS COMENTARIOS DE LOS CONTERTULIOS E INVITADOS QUE PARTICIPAN EN DICHO PROGRAMA) DIRIGEN Y PRESENTAN ANTONIO PÉREZ Y JOSÉ ANTº MARTÍNEZ

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  1/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 Tokyo https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 Tokyo https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 TOKYO https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 FUKUYAMA https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR? 6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1944 https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1944 WICHITA B-29 https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 TOKYO https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

El director de El Colegio Invisible, Lorenzo Fernández Bueno, continúa su conversación con nuestro compañero Miguel Pedrero, cuya visión sobre el asunto de las apariciones marianas es muy diferente a lo que habitualmente se plantea…

Por FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/Nemesis-Radio-1550831935166728/ Podcast de NEMESIS RADIO: http://www.ivoox.com/podcast-podcast-nemesis-radio_sq_f1133446_1.html CANAL MISTERIOS DE IVOOX: https://www.ivoox.com/escuchar-canal-misterios-ivoox_nq_2594_1.html Canal misterios de Ivoox: https://www.facebook.com/canalmisteriosdeIvoox/ YOU TUBE: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7PD6Knea7eWw88rLp0vR0w E-MAIL: nemesisradiomurcia@gmail.com Por Internet a través de nuestras webs: frecuenciamurcia.es -Esta noche tendremos con nosotros al profesor de universidad y Periodista, Lluís Pastor, hablaremos con él de sus investigaciones en la comunicación con difuntos, antesala de su libro “Los Mismos Muertos Vuelven” -Con nuestra compañera, Ana Theysser, nos adentraremos en “LA PUERTA OCULTA”, para que nos hable de esos seres que “Son Oscuros y Tienen los Ojos Rojos” -En HISTORIAS, CUENTOS Y LEYENDAS, será nuestro compañero Antonio Pérez, quien nos cuente la historia o leyenda, titulada “Un Faraón en Cartagena” -Y terminaremos con nuestro DEBATE, con nuestros contertulios Paco Coloma, Salvador Sandoval, Ana Theysser y Paco Torres, debatiremos sobre un interesante tema, “Las Misteriosas Apariciones Marianas” “El camino es largo y está a punto de comenzar… Compinches de la noche, poneos cómodos, agudizad las orejas que empezamos…” (NEMESIS RADIO NO SE HACE RESPONSABLE DE LOS COMENTARIOS DE LOS CONTERTULIOS E INVITADOS QUE PARTICIPAN EN DICHO PROGRAMA) DIRIGEN Y PRESENTAN ANTONIO PÉREZ Y JOSÉ ANTº MARTÍNEZ

El director de El Colegio Invisible, Lorenzo Fernández Bueno, conversa con nuestro compañero Miguel Pedrero sobre este interesante asunto, siendo consciente de que la visión de Pedrero sobre este tema es amplia y muy diferente…

Fe hecha canción es el programa de EWTN Radio Católica Mundial que promociona la música de los grupos y cantantes católicos del mundo hispano. Desde el Estudio 3 de Radio Católica Mundial, Douglas Archer comparte con ustedes una hora cargada de canciones, incluyendo las últimas novedades y estrenos, y de vez en cuando con algún invitado que canta o toca en directo.

Dirige y presenta Juan Carlos Baruque Hernández Sumario del programa JUAN MIGUEL MARSELLA CRISÓTOMO Con Juan Miguel hablaremos de fantasmas, apariciones espectrales, experiencias con el más allá, viajes astrales, contactos ufológicos, encuentros con los conocidos grises y un sinfín de situaciones, vivencias y circunstancias extraordinarias, vividas por personas de todo el mundo, y a las que nadie ha sido capaz de dar explicación científica alguna. LUIS MERINO Con Luis haremos una de esas rutas inglesas a las que nos tiene acostumbrado para conocer algunas de las increíbles historias del llamado condado tranquilo. GABRIEL WÜLDENMAR ORTIZ Gabriel nos hablará de las falsas apariciones marianas. Nuestra Web: https://mundoinsolitoradio.es Contacta: +34 687 39 80 12 - Solo WhatsApp mundoinsolitoradio@hotmail.com Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Last time we spoke about the Mandalay Offensive. In the midst of intense warfare, General Krueger positioned his troops strategically to bolster the assault at Rosario. As the American forces repelled counterattacks and advanced, they faced fierce Japanese resistance, particularly at Binalonan and Hill 600. Despite heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained ground, clearing key areas and preparing for further offensives. Meanwhile, Japanese defenses were fortified but weakened by shortages. As battles raged, both sides braced for decisive confrontations in the ongoing struggle for control of Luzon. In a fierce battle across the hills of Luzon, the 103rd Regiment aimed to secure key positions but faced heavy resistance, capturing Hill 800 by nightfall. The 172nd Regiment achieved surprise at Hill 900, while other regiments advanced under relentless fire. Meanwhile, in Burma, the British-Indian forces captured Shwebo, pushing deeper against Japanese defenses. The Mars Task Force disrupted supply lines, leading to a Japanese retreat. Amidst the chaos, both sides suffered heavy losses, marking a pivotal moment in the campaign. This episode is the Return to Bataan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of January, as previously noted on Luzon, the 43rd Division had secured most of the Rosario region and Route 3 from Pozorrubio to the crucial junction with Route 11. The 25th Division had successfully eliminated the Shigemi Detachment at San Manuel, while the 6th Division had cleared the Cabaruan Hills and established outposts between Balungao and Guimba. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps had advanced to Clark Field, where it was engaged in a fierce battle with the Kembu Group. By January 27, the 40th Division had breached General Tsukada's northern defensive line, and the 37th Division had fortified Mabalacat, Angeles, and Runway No. 1 in preparation for the final push toward Manila. On that same day, General Krueger received significant reinforcements, with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment at Lingayen Gulf. He planned to gather the cavalry division at Guimba to launch a coordinated advance toward the capital along the eastern side of the Central Plains via Route 5. After returning the reserve 35th Regiment to General Mullins, Krueger intended to deploy the 32nd Division, minus the 126th Regiment in Army Reserve, to the San Manuel-Asingan area. This would allow the 25th and 6th Divisions to narrow their fronts and continue south and southeast toward the Licab-Lupao line with reduced risk of exposing the 1st Corps' flank. Additionally, this strategy would enable the 37th Division to resume its advance toward Manila. However, General Griswold wanted to push Tsukada's forces further into the Zambales Mountains first, directing General Beightler to assault the enemy's southern defensive line centered around Fort Stotsenburg, while only the 148th Regiment and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along Route 3 to San Fernando. On January 28, the attack commenced as planned, with the 129th Regiment advancing westward through Runway No. 2, but it was quickly halted by the formidable forward defenses of the Eguchi Detachment. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, reconnaissance units from the 37th Division successfully secured the San Fernando bridges intact. To the north of the Bamban River, the 160th Regiment faced unexpectedly light resistance as it moved along its ridge line to capture open-crested Hill 620, although it would later encounter stronger opposition when it reached the main defenses of the Takaya Detachment. At the same time, General Patrick began gathering the 1st and 20th Regiments at Guimba and Victoria, while the 6th Reconnaissance Troop advanced toward Cabanatuan, where they identified a significant Japanese concentration. Further north, the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed to barrio Gonzales, while the 27th Regiment moved overland and successfully dislodged a Japanese outpost from barrio Pemienta. Meanwhile, MacArthur was planning a secondary landing on the Zambales coast of Luzon, assigning Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps, which included the 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, to land at San Antonio and quickly advance across the base of Bataan to prevent any significant Japanese retreat into the peninsula. He also aimed to divert the Kembu Group's attention to relieve some pressure on the 14th Corps. However, General Yamashita had no intention of retreating to Bataan and had only dispatched Colonel Nagayoshi Sanenobu's 39th Regiment to defend the peninsula and the Kembu Group's right flank. On January 26, Hall's 11th Corps had departed Leyte Island aboard vessels from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, heading directly to Luzon for the San Antonio landing, codenamed Operation Mike 7. The convoy reached its destination on the morning of January 29. After receiving reports from Filipino guerrillas indicating that there were no Japanese forces in the landing area, Struble decided to cancel the planned pre-assault bombardment. Instead, he ordered Hall's four regiments to land simultaneously across a nearly six-mile stretch of coastline from San Antonio. Upon landing, the 151st Regiment secured San Felipe and San Antonio, while the 149th Regiment quickly moved inland to capture the San Marcelino Airstrip. However, they discovered that guerrillas led by Captain Ramon Magsaysay had already taken control of the airstrip three days prior. Before nightfall, the 34th Regiment and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop advanced south along Route 7 to the northern shore of Subic Bay. To the east, the 160th Regiment made significant progress, advancing nearly two miles southwest and breaching a stronghold at the center of the Takaya Detachment. The 129th Regiment also managed to penetrate enemy defenses into Fort Stotsenburg but was halted at barrio Tacondo by six tanks from the Yanagimoto Detachment. Despite this setback, the inability of the Japanese counterattacks to reclaim lost territory compelled Tsukada to order the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments to retreat to their main line of resistance. Meanwhile, further north, units from the 1st and 20th Regiments successfully captured Licab and Talavera, cutting off the road between Cabanatuan and Muñoz. The 27th Regiment engaged a small tank-artillery force from the 2nd Tank Division that had become trapped along the highway between Gonzales and Pemienta.  With the rapid advances of the 6th and 25th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division main strength in the Tayug-Triangle Hill area was in danger of being cut off from its sole remaining escape route into the northern bastion via San Jose and Highway 5. To meet the new situation, General Iwanaka was directed to pull back all remaining division strength from the Tayug-Umingan and Triangle Hill sectors with the exception of small outpost forces to be left at Gonzales and Umingan to delay an enemy advance from the northwest. The division was instead to concentrate the bulk of its forces in a triangular-shaped area bounded by Lupao, Muñoz and Rizal. These new dispositions had barely been effected when enemy elements swept around the outpost force at Gonzales and cut its withdrawal route to Umingan, forcing the detachment to withdraw through the hills after destroying most of its tanks and all of its mechanized artillery. From 20:00 on the 29th until 04:30 the next morning the force tried unsuccessfully to break through the Pemienta perimeter, against a sharp enemy. By the time the action had ended the 27th Regiment had killed 125 Japanese and had destroyed 8 tanks, 8 artillery prime movers, 4 tractors, 8 105-mm howitzers and 5 trucks, while only losing about 15 men killed and 45 wounded. Only four tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. The next day, the 27th Regiment began positioning itself to attack Umingan from the north and northwest, while the 35th Regiment started preparations for a holding attack from the west and southwest. In an effort to avert the mass execution of prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci led a contingent of approximately 233 men, composed of Filipino guerrillas, soldiers from the Alamo Scouts, and Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion. They traversed 30 miles cross-country between January 28 and 30 to liberate 522 weakened prisoners during the night. Most of the prisoners had vacated the camp by 2010 hours. Rangers and guerrillas had to carry most, piggy-backing them or making hasty litters from rifles and shirts. It was 2 miles to the Pampanga River, where carts waited to take them to Platero to be treated, fed, and organized. Many were still in shock and had not yet fully understood that they were free. At 2040 hours, Capt Prince was at the Pampanga River supervising the loading of stumbling prisoners into 25 carts as Rangers and prisoners trickled in. The rest of the Scouts established an ambush at the crossing site. At 2045 hours, one hour after the raid was launched, Prince fired the third red flare and departed for Balangkare. The loaded carabao carts were ordered on their way to Balangkare at 2145 hours.  Meanwhile Major Robert Lapham's guerrilla forces provided cover for their escape, successfully returning them to Allied lines on January 31. During this operation, around 270 Japanese soldiers were killed at the camp, with an additional 900 casualties along the Cabu River. Over 270 Japanese lay dead or dying in the smoldering camp; most of the wounded dying by dawn as no aid was forthcoming. Japanese bodies were literally stacked at the Cabu bridge and scores more littered the riverside woods. The 359th Battalion had ceased to exist. In the morning, battalion commander Capt Oyanu was still alive, but most of his officers were dead. Only 255 men of 1,200 survived and most were wounded.   In contrast, the Americans suffered only 2 fatalities and 7 wounded, along with 12 wounded Filipinos and 2 dead prisoners. Fortunately, the anticipated retaliation against the Filipino population did not occur, as the Japanese retreated from the area within a day of the raid, while the 20th Regiment secured the road junction barrio of Baloc and began advancing toward Muñoz. On January 30, Griswold continued his vigorous offensive against Clark Field; the 129th Regiment cleared the hills near Dolores and took control of the abandoned Fort Stotsenburg area, while the 160th Regiment made only 500 yards of progress against the determined Takaya Detachment. The 108th Regiment finally captured Hill 5 and Thrall Hill. Further south, patrols from the 37th Division reached within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River, and on Bataan, the 34th Regiment took Olongapo after a fierce skirmish, while the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment captured Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. At the same time, MacArthur was strategizing another secondary landing on Luzon, this time utilizing General Swing's 11th Airborne Division to assault Nasugbu, located 45 miles southwest of Manila. With this operation, MacArthur aimed to initiate a southern advance toward Manila while simultaneously hindering Japanese forces in southern Luzon from moving north to challenge Krueger's main offensive. General Eichelberger intended to deploy the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments and advance them approximately twenty miles along Route 17 to Tagaytay Ridge. There, the 511th Parachute Regiment would conduct an airdrop to secure the ridge for the ground troops and capture adjacent sections of Route 17 before the Japanese could regroup to defend the highway. In opposition, General Yokoyama had assigned only the Fuji Force to defend the area south of Manila. This force, centered around Colonel Fujishige Masatoshi's reinforced 17th Regiment, had only deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment in the Tagaytay Ridge region, with a small outpost at Nasugbu and its main defenses positioned on Mounts Cariliao and Batulao. At this stage, Yokoyama was nearing completion of the organization of the diverse Shimbu Group forces east of Manila into a cohesive combat task force. To the north, near Ipo, he had stationed the Kawashima Force, which was composed of the 82nd Brigade and the 31st Regiment. To the south, the main contingent of the former Manila Defense Force had been relocated from the Philippine capital and renamed the Kobayashi Force, guarding the Wawa-Montalban area. However, the departure of General Tsuda's 105th Division to the northern stronghold had created a significant gap in the Shimbu Group's defenses. Although Yokoyama intended to address this vulnerability with the Noguchi Detachment, Major-General Noguchi Susumu's troops were still in the midst of a lengthy march from the Bicol Peninsula by the end of January. As a temporary solution, the Okita Detachment, a composite force consisting of five battalions centered around the 186th Independent Battalion, and the Kuromiya Detachment, a three-battalion unit based on the 181st Independent Battalion, were deployed in the Bosoboso-Antipolo region. Meanwhile, the Kogure Detachment, organized around the 1st Surface Raiding Base Force, was stationed at Lamon Bay. Manila was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, which included approximately 13,700 naval personnel from the 31st Special Base Force responsible for defending the islands of Manila Bay and the capital, along with some Army reinforcements. On January 27, Swing's 11th Airborne Division departed from Leyte Island aboard ships from Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2, heading directly to Nasugbu Bay to carry out Operation Mike 6. Following an uneventful journey and a brief preliminary bombardment on January 31, the 188th Glider Regiment successfully landed with minimal resistance and quickly advanced inland toward the Palico River, aiming for the section of Route 17 that leads to Tagaytay Ridge. Pleased with the initial landing, Swing subsequently deployed the 187th Glider Regiment and the division artillery, which began to relieve the rear elements of the 188th by midday. At the same time, the majority of the 188th secured the Palico bridge and crossed the river to reach Route 17. Further north, under pressure from MacArthur and Krueger, the 148th Regiment successfully crossed the Pampanga River and captured Calumpit, just as Beightler was dispatching the 145th Regiment along Route 3 to assist in the advance toward Manila. At Clark Field, the 108th Regiment was patrolling forward, while the 160th Regiment faced challenges in breaking through enemy defenses. Meanwhile, the 129th Regiment launched an attack on the main positions of the Eguchi Detachment at Top of the World hill, successfully securing its steep, grassy southern and southeastern slopes. On Bataan, General Jones sent the 152nd Regiment to travel through Olongapo and advance east along Route 7, while the 149th Regiment moved east toward Dinalupihan via a challenging trail located about 1,200 yards north of the highway. By the end of January, the 32nd Division had successfully taken control of the recently vacated Tayug area. The 6th and 25th Divisions reorganized in preparation for their final push towards San Jose, and the 1st Cavalry Division gathered at Guimba. The World War II brigade structure of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's dismounted 1st Cavalry Division differed greatly from that of the triangular infantry division of the period. Instead of three infantry regiments the 1st Cavalry Division had four cavalry regiments--the 5th and 12th in the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 7th and 8th in the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Each regiment had two cavalry squadrons, each smaller than an infantry battalion, as opposed to the three battalions of an infantry regiment. Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troop armed with 81-mm. mortars, .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns, and bazookas, but there was no heavy weapons troop within each squadron. The cavalry regiments lacked the antitank and cannon companies of an infantry regiment. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was composed of one 75-mm. howitzer battalion, three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons, an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion. Reinforcing combat and service attachments brought the division's strength up to nearly 15,000 men, somewhat less than the strength of the reinforced 37th Division at the same time. On paper, each of the four cavalry regiments numbered 1,750 men--in contrast to the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment--but none of the 1st Cavalry Division's regiments was up to strength. The division had received few replacements since entering combat on Leyte in October, and it had come to Luzon after very little rest from its arduous campaign through Leyte's mountains. The 1st Cavalry division was ready to advance towards Cabanatuan as General Mudge dispatched two reinforced motorized squadrons. On February 1, the Flying Columns, led by General Chase, crossed the Pampanga River and began their southern march with minimal resistance. As a result, Cabanatuan and Gapan were quickly captured, although some opposition was encountered south of the Peñaranda River. Meanwhile, the 188th Glider Regiment continued its advance towards Tagaytay Ridge, facing heavy enemy fire from Mount Cariliao but still managing to secure the important Mount Aiming. The 148th Regiment swiftly moved down Route 3 and captured Malolos with little resistance. However, the 152nd Regiment faced increasingly strong resistance at ZigZag Pass. While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon, few pieces of ground combine to the same degree both roughness and dense jungle. Route 7 twists violently through the pass, following a line of least terrain resistance that wild pigs must originally have established. The jungle flora in the region is so thick that one can step 5 yards off the highway and not be able to see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or trenches; at particularly advantageous points they had constructed strongpoints centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All the defenses were well camouflaged, for rich jungle foliage covered most positions, indicating that many had been prepared with great care and had been constructed well before Colonel Nagayoshi's 39th Regiment had reached the area in December. Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food and ammunition for a prolonged stand, and he also possessed numerous mortars and machine-guns. His artillery, however, was inadequate for the task at hand and he lacked certain types of medical supplies, especially malaria preventatives and cures. He had so scattered his mortars and artillery in order to protect them against American artillery and air strikes that his troops would often have difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his defensive line was scarcely 2000 yards wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering his whole position susceptible to vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On the other hand, he had good troops, well-prepared positions, and excellent defensive terrain. The 129th Regiment secured the summit of Top of the World hill, effectively ensuring Clark Field's protection from all but long-range artillery fire. The 20th Regiment launched its initial attack on Muñoz, which was thwarted by Colonel Ida Kumpei's tanks fortified as pillboxes. Additionally, the 27th Regiment attempted to advance towards Umingan but was unable to break through, while elements of the 35th Regiment bypassed this area and occupied barrio San Roque. February 2 mirrored the previous day in the San Jose sector, as the 20th and 27th Regiments continued their battle against the determined Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, Mullins dispatched the 35th Regiment in a two-pronged maneuver towards Umingan, successfully clearing most of the town by noon. In an effort to recover lost time, Mullins then directed the 35th toward Lupao in the afternoon, but its leading battalion was ultimately halted by intense Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. With their forward units stalled at Muñoz and Lupao, Patrick and Mullins resorted to flanking tactics. Accordingly, Patrick sent the 1st Regiment along the Talavera River to attack San Jose from the southeast, while the 63rd Regiment attempted to bypass Muñoz to the east and rejoin Route 5 north of the town. In turn, Mullins ordered the 161st Regiment to move cross-country to positions on Route 99 south of Lupao, then advance to Route 8 between San Isidro and San Jose while the 35th surrounded and cleared Lupao. However, on this day, the 105th Division successfully evacuated San Jose along with its stockpiled ammunition, regrouping north at Puncan and rendering the entire San Jose offensive ineffective. Simultaneously, Chase's Flying Columns passed through Gapan and entered Sabang, fording the Angat River to launch two simultaneous advances to the south and east. The 148th Regiment secured Plaridel after a brief but fierce skirmish, while the 152nd Regiment faced setbacks in the ZigZag Pass due to nighttime Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire. The 149th Regiment became disoriented and had to return to Olongapo, and the 188th Glider Regiment managed to break through to barrio Aga amidst heavy resistance, while the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment moved forward to begin the assault toward Tagaytay. On February 3, Swing's glider infantry launched an assault on the western end of Tagaytay, while paratroopers from the 511th Parachute Regiment began to drop along the ridge in a rather scattered manner. The first echelon of the 511th, about 915 in all, had come to Tagaytay Ridge aboard 48 C-47 aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Group. The planes had flown north from Mindoro to approach Tagaytay Ridge from the northeast in order to avoid fire from Japanese anti-aircraft weapons west of the drop zone. The first 18 planes, carrying about 345 troops, dropped over the assigned area. At this juncture, planes from succeeding flights were nearly 6 miles and 3 minutes behind the lead aircraft. About 08:20 one of these later planes dumped out a couple of bundles of supplies. Taking this as a signal that they were over the proper drop zone, 'troopers of the succeeding 30 planes began jumping. Aircraft pilots, realizing they had not yet reached the proper point, attempted to halt the jumping, but the 511th's jump-masters continued sending the paratroopers out. Most of them landed almost 5 miles east-northeast of the assigned drop zone. A second group of 51 C-47s began approaching the drop area about 12:10. Some 80 men from the first 5 aircraft of this group landed in the proper place. The rest started out of their planes when they saw on the ground the collapsed chutes of the first misplaced jump. In the end, only 425 men landed on the assigned drop zone; the others, about 1325 in all, made scattered landings 4.5 to 6 miles to the east and northeast. The 11th Airborne Division, blaming the 317th Troop Carrier Group for the premature dropping, reported that the "true reason was the refusal of the Air Force to cooperate in a combined training program for Airborne and Air Force troops." In any event, it appears that some lack of jump discipline within the 511th contributed to the scattered, premature jumping. Fortunately for them, they encountered minimal resistance as they secured the unoccupied ridge. To the north, the 148th Regiment continued its advance southward, facing delays at several tidal streams that were unbridged and unfordable, but managed to reach a point two miles south of Marilao by day's end. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry's Flying Column destroyed a Japanese outpost at Angat and moved through the guerrilla-held Norzagaray before crossing the Santa Maria River to join the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column, which had already progressed to Talipapa and was nearing the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment successfully eliminated the remaining enemy pockets at Umingan; the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment, advancing over elevated terrain northeast of Lupao, established a position on Route 8 approximately 1500 yards southeast of Lupao, while the rest of the regiment continued to launch unsuccessful frontal assaults on the town. The 20th Regiment managed to overrun a few Japanese strongholds at Muñoz but was unable to break through. On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved in on the northwest, but could not reach Route 99 in its sector. The 3d Battalion pushed across that road at the southwest corner of Muñoz, but gained only half a block into the main section of the town. The 1st Battalion, on the south side of Muñoz, made negligible progress. By dusk, the 20th Infantry had overrun a few Japanese strongpoints, but in order to hold its gains had had to destroy completely and physically occupy every position it had reached so far. Muñoz, General Patrick had begun to realize, was going to be a costly, hard, and time-consuming nut to crack. The 20th Infantry had not yet closed with the main Japanese defenses, but had spent most of the last three days pinned down by Japanese artillery, tank, and machine gun fire. Only by hugging the ground and taking advantage of the little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded had the regiment kept its casualties down to 15 men killed and 90 wounded. Meanwhile the 63rd Regiment successfully bypassed Muñoz and advanced up Route 5 toward Caanawan; and the 1st Regiment similarly advanced along the San Jose-Rizal road, assembling at two points 1000 yards south and 1500 yards east of San Jose. Now, however, it is time to leave Luzon and head toward the Central Pacific. Following the successful capture of the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 Superfortress air bases on these islands, the Allies were finally able to conclude Operation Matterhorn and cease using bases in China and India for conducting raids on the Japanese mainland and other targets in East Asia. Between June 5, 1944, and January 17, 1945, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command executed a total of 29 combat missions, inflicting significant damage on key military installations in southern Japan, Manchuria, Formosa, and Indochina, with a total loss of 73 B-29s. Meanwhile, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, reinforced by the 313th Bombardment Wing, struggled to achieve similar outcomes in both daylight precision bombing and area incendiary bombing, with the first three missions of January yielding the same disappointing results as those in December and November.  On January 3rd, Norstad's incendiary test mission was run on 3 January, when ninety-seven B-29's got off for Nagoya. Each plane carried a mixed load of bombs -14 x 350-pound M18 IB clusters fuzed to open at 8,000 feet and one 420-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 1,000 feet below releasing altitude. What with aborts and planes straying from course, only fifty-seven bombed the urban area designated as primary target, most of them releasing visually though cloud cover was rated as 6/10. Some fires were started but there was no holocaust. Smoke rising to 20,000 feet combined with cloud to make observation of results impossible for the attackers. As a test, then, the mission was inconclusive. To the citizens of Nagoya, who were better informed than intelligence officers of 21st Bomber Command, the damage seemed slight. On January 9th, having satisfied Norstad's requirement, the command returned to its program of precision bombing against aircraft factories. Performance for the most part was of a piece with what had gone before. On 9 January 1945 seventy-two B-29's were sent against Musashino near Tokyo. High winds broke up the formations so that only eighteen planes were able to bomb the target; twenty-four bombs, widely scattered in the plant area, destroyed one warehouse and damaged two others-a slight return for the effort expended and the six B-29's lost. On January 14th, at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works at Nagoya on the 14th, precision bombing was again less than precise. Seventy-three B-29's were airborne and forty bombed, getting four GP's-one ton-into the No. 5 Works area and damaging three buildings. Frustrated by this, Hansell increasingly blamed his crews for the unsatisfactory outcomes. Remarkably, he would only achieve his first fully successful B-29 attack on his final mission of the war. The target for the January 19 strike was virgin, a plant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company located 2 miles northwest of Akashi, a village on the Inland Sea some 12 miles west of Kobe. The Akashi works housed Kawasaki's general headquarters and one of the company's two large production units, which built the twin-engine fighters Nick and Randy and engines for Tony, Oscar and Frank fighters. Smaller than Nakajima and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki in 1944 delivered 17% of Japan's combat airframes and 12% of its combat engines. Against Akashi, Hansell sent 77 B-29s, plus 3 others in a diversionary strike. With good weather, 62 bulled it through to the Kawasaki factory, dumped 155 tons of GPs, and then returned with no losses. Interpreting strike photos, intelligence officers estimated that 38% of the roofed area showed major damage. This was an understatement. Every important building in both the engine and airframe branches had been hit and production was cut by 90%. Indeed, the Kawasaki Company liquidated the combined plant and dispersed the machine tools, which had suffered only slightly, to other sites. The Akashi shops were given temporary repairs at the cost of 226 tons of critical materials and over 9000000 yen, but the installation was used thereafter only for limited assembly jobs. It is a pity that the full results of this mission could not have been known to Hansell. His first completely successful B-29 attack, Akashi seemed to epitomize the doctrines of precision bombardment he had championed-and it was his last strike of the war. Unaware of this success, Hansell was replaced the following day as head of the 21st Bomber Command by the determined LeMay, who immediately suggested a shift to firebombing Japan's major cities at low altitude during nighttime, marking a stark departure from Hansell's previous strategies. However, the only obstacle in the flight path was Iwo Jima, which could alert the Japanese to an impending raid and still had operational airfields capable of launching intercepting fighters. These airfields had also been used for sporadic air assaults on the Marianas, although few attacks were actually carried out in January. Capturing Iwo Jima would resolve these issues, and Admiral Nimitz aimed to establish emergency landing facilities for B-29s based in Saipan, as well as a base for their fighter escorts targeting Japan. Consequently, he decided to proceed with the invasion, codenamed Operation Detachment. After this operation, Nimitz planned to invade Okinawa to secure and develop a robust air and naval base for the assault on the Japanese home islands, which we will discuss further later. For the Iwo Jima operation, Admiral Spruance was once again given overall command of the "big blue fleet," which was re-designated as the 5th Fleet. Under his command, Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner led Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, responsible for landing Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops. Turner was supported by Rear-Admiral William Blandy's Task Force 52, the Amphibious Support Force, which included ten escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Harry Hill's Task Force 53, comprising all transports and landing craft; Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers' Task Force 54, which had six battleships and five cruisers for shore bombardment; and Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Force. For the amphibious invasion, Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would deploy the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, planning to land the 4th and 5th Divisions side by side with two regiments each along the two-mile stretch of beach between Mount Suribachi and the East Boat Basin on the island's southeast coast. Smith and Schmidt also decided to limit corps artillery to two battalions of 155mm howitzers, organized as the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, due to the limited space available for emplacements on the island. After landing, Major-General Clifton Cates' 4th Marine Division would take control of the Motoyama Plateau and its airfields, while also capturing the O-1 Line on the corps' right flank. Meanwhile, Major-General Keller Rockey's 5th Marine Division would secure the Mount Suribachi region before advancing northeast to capture the O-1 Line on the corps' left flank. They would then push forward across the island until Iwo Jima was fully secured. At the same time, Major-General Graves Erskine's 3rd Marine Division would remain in reserve, with only its 21st Marine Regiment deployed as the corps reserve. To aid in this effort, the 7th Air Force, under Generals Harmon and Hale, had been consistently targeting Iwo Jima's facilities since August 1944. Following intense attacks in December, which included bombardments by Rear-Admiral Allan Smith's 5th Cruiser Division against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima were again struck on January 5, but the next bombardment wouldn't occur until January 25.  A fighter sweep by 28 P-38s opened the attack at 0945; 62 B-29s bombed at 1100 and 102 B-24s at noon; Crudiv 5 (Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith), comprising heavy cruisers Chester, Pensecola and Salt Lake City with six destroyers, arrived off Iwo at 1330 and opened bombardment at 1347. "Hoke" Smith approached the island from the west, rounded Mount Suribachi and then reversed track in a half-circle. Unfortunately the sky was so heavily overcast as to force the planes to bomb by radar and to hamper ships' spotting. Surface visibility was good enough to enable the island to be well covered by a naval bombardment, which lasted for 70 minutes and expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch and 5334 rounds of 5-inch shell. The bombers dropped 814 tons of bombs. Photographs, taken three days later, showed that both airfields on Iwo were wholly or in part operational, but no more enemy air raids hit the Marianas until Christmas Day. The job of keeping Iwo airfields neutralized was now turned over to B-24s of VII A.A.F. Between 8 December 1944 and 15 February 1945 they flew at least one strike daily over the island. The day before Christmas, Rear Admiral Smith's heavy cruisers, together with five destroyers, delivered a second bombardment, coordinated with a B-24 strike. This strike was slightly more eventful than the initial one in December, but even less effective. The bombardment, which expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch, provoked return fire from a 6-inch coast defense battery (designated "Kitty" on the target maps) in the northeast part of the island, but "Kitty's" claws managed to strike no closer than 200 yards. As proof of the slight damage inflicted by this bombardment, the Japanese were able to pay a vicious return visit to Saipan on Christmas Eve, a raid of 25 planes which destroyed one B-29 and damaged three more beyond repair. Crudiv 5 returned 27 December for a repeat performance, lighter than the others; and a fourth bombardment was set up for 5 January 1945. While fighter planes and B-24s hit Iwo Jima the same cruisers and six destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima, 145 northward, and the slightly nearer Haha Jima. Their hope was to catch a convoy bringing Japanese supplies to these islands, whence they were forwarded to Iwo by small craft at night. Destroyer Fanning, steaming ahead of the group as radar picket, encountered at 0206 a surface target, later identified as LSV-102, which she sank. At 0700 Admiral Smith's group opened a one hour and 49 minutes' bombardment of Chichi Jima. During it, destroyer David W. Taylor suffered an underwater explosion, probably from a mine, which flooded her forward magazine. The Haha Jima bombardment by Salt Lake City and two destroyers lasted for an hour. Crudiv 5 then pounded Iwo Jima for another hour and three quarters. The reply was negligible, and a few aircraft which made passes at the cruisers were easily driven off. Starting on the last day of January and continuing for two weeks, 7th Air Force aircraft bombed the island day and night, occasionally joined by LeMay's Superfortresses. For ten weeks, Iwo Jima faced near-daily bombardments from land-based aircraft, with nearly 6,800 tons of bombs dropped. Additionally, there were five naval bombardments that fired 203 rounds of 16-inch shells, 6,472 rounds of 8-inch shells, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shells. Under normal circumstances, such a heavy and sustained bombardment would have been more than enough to devastate an island of that size. However, the Japanese managed to restore the airfields on Iwo Jima just hours after each attack and continued to strengthen their defenses on the island. Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi Tadamichi to oversee the defenses of the Bonin Islands, renaming the Ogasawara District Group as the 109th Division. Kuribayashi stationed Major-General Tachibana Yoshio's 1st Mixed Brigade and most of Colonel Iida Yusuke's 17th Independent Mixed Regiment on Chichi Jima, along with several other units across the islands. He accurately predicted that Iwo Jima would be the target for an Allied landing and took measures to make it virtually indestructible. To this end, he coordinated with Major-General Senda Sadasue's 2nd Mixed Brigade, Colonel Ikeda Masuo's 145th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Nishi Takeishi's severely weakened 26th Tank Regiment, which had sustained heavy losses from American submarines at sea. Additionally, Major Fujiwara Tamachi's 3rd Battalion of the 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a robust artillery unit led by Colonel Kaido Chosaku were included in the defense. Rear-Admiral Ichimaru Toshinosuke also provided a significant naval garrison on the island, centered around the 27th Air Flotilla, bringing Kuribayashi's total forces to approximately 21,060 men, far exceeding the American estimate of 13,000. Aware that the beaches would be vulnerable to enemy naval and air assaults, Kuribayashi opted to strengthen the Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Plateau areas. The Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector, its heavily fortified positions bristling with weapons of all types, ranging from casemated coast-defense guns and artillery to automatic weapons emplaced in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus connecting Suribachi to the rest of the island was lightly held by infantry, but heavily defended by enfilade fire from artillery, rockets, and mortars emplaced on both the high ground in the south (Suribachi area) and the northern portion of the island. The main defense line was a belt of mutually supporting positions organized in depth, running generally northwest-southeast across the island. It stretched from the cliffs north of the western beaches south to include Airfield Number 2; then, turning eastward through Minami, terminated at the rugged coast north of the eastern beaches. Pillboxes, blockhouses, bunkers, and dug-in tanks strengthened the defenses in the naturally formidable terrain everywhere throughout this belt. The second defense line generally bisected the remaining area in the northern portion of the island. It began several hundred yards below Kitano Point on the northwest coast, cut through Airfield Number 3 and the Motoyama area in the center, and terminated between Tachiiwa Point and the East Boat Basin on the eastern coast. Man-made emplacements were not as numerous in this second line, but natural caves and other covered positions afforded by the fantastically rugged terrain were skillfully organized for the defense. The beaches would be lightly defended but would receive fire support from the elevated positions. A substantial reserve force, including tanks, was also prepared to counterattack and push the Americans back into the sea if they managed to establish a foothold. In a shift from traditional Japanese defensive strategies, Kuribayashi moved away from full-scale counterattacks and suicidal banzai charges, instead instructing his troops to hold their mutually supportive positions to the last and to carry out small unit counterattacks at cutoff points. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allied forces continued their advance through Luzon, battling Japanese defenses, liberating prisoners, and securing key locations, paving the way for a final push toward Manila. Meanwhile, on Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi was preparing for a final stand, hoping beyond hope to make the Americans pay so dearly they might end the war.

Aclaración: Este episodio se elaboró a partir de diferentes grabaciones de Gustavo Fernández en su programa de radio AM, en LT14 Radio General Urquiza de Paraná (Entre Ríos, Argentina), en algún momento entre agosto de 1988 y junio de 1994. Hemos quitado la música original por cuestiones de derechos de autor. No contiene publicidad. Reflexiones sobre la Nueva Era, la religión y el fundamentalismo. Las sanaciones de La Virgen. "Las Apariciones Marianas" de Salvador Freixedo. Peleas entre creyentes. El mensaje de la Virgen. La gente no quiere que se le diga la verdad sino que se confirme su opinión. Relacionados: Al Filo de la Realidad N° 433: Apariciones Marianas y OVNIs https://alfilodelarealidad.com/afr-no-433-apariciones-marianas-y-ovnis/ Más texto, audio y video sobre los temas del Misterio: https://alfilodelarealidad.com/ Plataforma de cursos: https://miscursosvirtuales.net * * * Programa de Afiliados * * * iVoox comparte con AFR un pequeño porcentaje si usas uno de estos enlaces: * Disfruta de la experiencia iVoox sin publicidad, con toda la potencia de volumen, sincronización de dispositivos y listas inteligentes ilimitadas: Premium anual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=68e3ae6b7ef213805d8afeeea434a491 Premium mensual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=7b7cf4c4707a5032e0c9cd0040e23919 * La mejor selección de podcasts en exclusiva con iVoox Plus Más de 50.000 episodios exclusivos y nuevos contenidos cada día. ¡Suscríbete y apoya a tus podcasters favoritos! Plus https://www.ivoox.vip/plus?affiliate-code=258b8436556f5fabae31df4e91558f48 Más sobre el mundo del Misterio en alfilodelarealidad.com

Aclaración: Este episodio se elaboró a partir de diferentes grabaciones de Gustavo Fernández en su programa de radio AM, en LT14 Radio General Urquiza de Paraná (Entre Ríos, Argentina), en algún momento entre agosto de 1988 y junio de 1994. Hemos quitado la música original por cuestiones de derechos de autor. No contiene publicidad. ¿Están relacionadas las Apariciones de la Virgen con el fenómeno OVNI? ¿Qué es lo que vieron los testigos realmente? ¿Hay una "inteligencia" que se adapta al marco cultural del testigo? ¿Por qué ocurren? García y el caso del avistamiento masivo en Chascomús. Luján (Argentina). Itatí (Argentina). Cusco (Perú). Guadalupe (México). Arquetipos religiosos. ¿Qué dicen Freud y Jung sobre la religiosidad? Diferencias entre ilusión y alucinación. El poder de la mente: tulpas, ideoplastias, egrégoros. ¿Qué piensa Salvador Freixedo? ¿Qué similitudes hay entre el Fenómeno OVNI y las Apariciones Marianas? ¿Por qué se manifiestan como Ángeles y a veces como demonios? ¿Qué es lo que buscan? Relacionados: Más texto, audio y video sobre los temas del Misterio: https://alfilodelarealidad.com/ Plataforma de cursos: https://miscursosvirtuales.net * * * Programa de Afiliados * * * iVoox comparte con AFR un pequeño porcentaje si usas uno de estos enlaces: * Disfruta de la experiencia iVoox sin publicidad, con toda la potencia de volumen, sincronización de dispositivos y listas inteligentes ilimitadas: Premium anual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=68e3ae6b7ef213805d8afeeea434a491 Premium mensual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=7b7cf4c4707a5032e0c9cd0040e23919 * La mejor selección de podcasts en exclusiva con iVoox Plus Más de 50.000 episodios exclusivos y nuevos contenidos cada día. ¡Suscríbete y apoya a tus podcasters favoritos! Plus https://www.ivoox.vip/plus?affiliate-code=258b8436556f5fabae31df4e91558f48 Más sobre el mundo del Misterio en alfilodelarealidad.com

Last time we spoke about the Aitape-Wewak Campaign. General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro, establishing airfields to support operations on Luzon. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Krueger's 6th Army poised to capture Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla forces on Luzon provided crucial intelligence. As plans for the Luzon invasion solidified, General Yamashita prepared defenses, predicting an assault between January 10 and 20. Despite dwindling resources, he aimed to delay the enemy's advance. Meanwhile, Allied forces readied for a swift amphibious attack to secure Manila and restore the Philippine government. In December, Australian forces established outposts at Yasile and Yambes, successfully repelling Japanese attacks. After fierce clashes, they advanced 40 miles along the coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bolstered defenses in Saipan and launched bombing raids on Japanese facilities, achieving mixed results. Despite heavy losses, they began to impact Japanese production capabilities. As the month ended, the Japanese launched a final assault on the Marianas, but the Allies continued their strategic advances, setting the stage for future operations. This episode is the Invasion of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with the plans for Operation Mike 1 being finished. General Swift's 1st Corps was ready to land on the eastern beaches of Lingayen Gulf, while General Griswold's 14th Corps prepared to go ashore on the western beaches. Additionally, successful diversionary operations had been conducted on Mindoro, and Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 executed several moderately successful strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands in early January. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps elements staging at New Britain completed loading on 10 December; those mounting at Bougainville finished two days later. On the 17th all groups of the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused at Huon Gulf, eastern New Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault. General Griswold felt that the 37th Division's rehearsal was satisfactory but had much fault to find with the 40th Division, remarking upon a "general failure to observe the spirit of the rehearsal." As a result, further training was conducted at Manus Island in the Admiralties, where the convoy reassembled on 22 December. On December 27, Admiral Wilkinson dispatched his LSTs and LSMs, followed by the remainder of Task Force 79 four days later. On the same day, Admiral Barbey's convoy, which included Major-General Leonard Wing's 43rd Division, loaded at Aitape before proceeding to Sansapor to load Major-General Edwin Patrick's 6th Division. Task Force 78 departed Sansapor on December 30, heading to a rendezvous point with other elements of Admiral Kinkaid's Luzon Attack Force. By January 4, all components of Task Force 77 had successfully gathered at Leyte Gulf, with MacArthur personally boarding the light cruiser Boise. Kinkaid's minesweepers, Admiral Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, and most of Admiral Durgin's escort carriers had already left the gulf on January 2 to conduct preliminary operations off Luzon. By January 6, the rest of the Luzon Attack Force began moving toward Lingayen Gulf, led by Admiral Berkey's light cruisers. As Mindoro-based aircraft significantly increased the intensity of their assaults during the last week of December—sinking seven transports and two escorts, and destroying over 140 aircraft. General Yamashita's tense and expectant forces were still racing against time to complete,their battle preparations when the first warnings came that the enemy was again on the move. At 1322 on 2 January, a naval lookout post on Surigao Strait reported that a long train of about 80 enemy ships, screened by destroyers, was moving through the strait into the Mindanao Sea. Other reports which followed immediately warned that large numbers of invasion craft were gathered in the Leyte, Palau and Marianas areas, and that enemy submarines had appeared in force off the west coast of Luzon. At first it was thought that the enemy convoy was merely a reinforcement and resupply group destined for Mindoro. On 3 January, however, developments began to point more conclusively toward a full-scale amphibious operation against Luzon. In the afternoon, just as the initially sighted enemy group passed into the Sulu Sea, a large enemy naval task force, including 12 escort carriers, four battleships and eight cruisers, was reported following in its wake through Surigao Strait. Another delayed report stated that an enemy transport convoy of 90 ships, under strong naval escort, had been spotted the previous day northwest of Palau, heading in the direction of Leyte Gulf. General Yamashita grew concerned that a large-scale amphibious operation against Luzon was imminent. Consequently, he decided to relocate his headquarters to Baguio. These concerns were validated in early January when Japanese lookouts spotted Kinkaid's warships and transports approaching the island. In response, General Tominaga ordered aggressive kamikaze attacks on the Allied vessels, with a major assault on January 4 causing severe damage to the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, which ultimately had to be scuttled. The following day, Japanese attacks persisted, damaging two escort carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, among other ships. In retaliation, Durgin's carrier aircraft launched strikes on Manila Bay, successfully sinking the destroyer Momi and damaging the Hinoki. On January 6, McCain's carriers joined the effort, with American pilots tasked with targeting air facilities at Manila and Clark Field. Despite adverse weather conditions limiting the effectiveness of the strike, they succeeded in sinking one transport and six oilers, as well as destroying 32 Japanese aircraft. Meanwhile, as Oldendorf's warships commenced their bombardment and minesweeping operations, kamikaze attacks continued. The destroyer minesweeper USS Long (DD-209/DMS-12) missed the attack on Pearl Harbor by about two days, but then immediately started anti-submarine patrols and escort missions. Its long trajectory in the Pacific War saw it make escort runs to Midway, Palmyra and Canton; participate in the invasions of Amchitka, Attu and Kiska in Alaskan waters; escort reinforcements to Roi and Namur in the Marshalls; participate in the invasions of the Admiralties, Hollandia, Saipan and Palau; and be one of the first vessels to enter into Leyte Gulf back in October. During the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, Long began mine sweeps on January 6, evading and firing upon Japanese aircraft as she carried out her intricate mission. Shortly after noon, beginning her second run, Long spotted two Zeros heading for her. Long went to 25 knots and opened fire, but a kamikaze crashed into her portside below the bridge about 1 foot above the waterline. With fires and explosions amidships, Long lost power and internal communications, and was unable to fight fires forward. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Stanley Caplan, fearing an explosion in the forward magazine, gave permission for men trapped on the forecastle to leave the ship; but through a misunderstanding the crew abandoned ship. Later that afternoon a second plane attacked Long and exploded at the same spot, destroying the bridge and breaking the ship's back. Long finally capsized and sank the following morning. Alongside the Long, battleships California and New Mexico, along with the cruisers Columbia, Australia, and Louisville, five destroyers, another minesweeper, and one transport were damaged. Admiral Oldendorf was worried with good reason. Previously, kamikaze operations against his ships and those of other naval commands, though dangerous, had generally been executed by relatively untrained pilots who had taken few precautions to avoid detection and anti-aircraft fire and who often appeared to be flying partially damaged, lightly armored planes carrying little ordnance. In January the kamikazes had been operating in a far different manner. There was now a definite program of kamikaze operations, for the vast majority of the perhaps 100 Japanese aircraft that had attacked the forces under Admiral Oldendorf's command since January 2 had at least attempted kamikaze crashes. In addition, the pilots seemed to be more skilled. They took every advantage of radar-blanketing terrain, especially in the Lingayen Gulf area, and flew toward target ships at extremely low altitudes, thus helping to avoid both radar and visual detection. Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid anti-aircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target. Finally, many of the kamikaze planes were heavily armored and armed. The Allies had expected great results from the relatively new proximity fuze for shipboard 5-inch antiaircraft weapons, but the Japanese planes usually appeared so suddenly and took such violent evasive action that 5-inch batteries could seldom track properly. The employment of the expensive special ammunition was, therefore, generally useless, and was sometimes even dangerous to friendly ships. Having missed approaching kamikazes by such distances that fuzes were not activated, shells sometimes sailed on to explode on or near Allied vessels, thereby causing some damage and many casualties.  Concerned about the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and recognizing that achieving air superiority did not prevent the enemy's suicide planes, Oldendorf opted for a psychological strategy. He ordered the minesweeper and bombardment groups to persist with their operations, even while sustaining damage, to convince the Japanese that their suicide missions were failing. Kinkaid shared these concerns and requested the cessation of all diversionary air operations to concentrate the main air offensive on Luzon. As a result, Admiral Halsey's carrier-based aircraft and General Kenney's ground forces were tasked with neutralizing all Japanese airfields in Luzon, supported by Durgin's escort carriers. On January 7, McCain's strikes on Luzon and Oldendorf's bombardment of the Lingayen beaches continued, while underwater demolition teams entered the gulf to undertake the dangerous mission of dismantling beach obstacles. Again contrary to expectations, no beach obstacles were found. The "frog men" encountered only a little rifle and machine gun fire, and the few beach defenses they observed appeared to be unoccupied. Their tasks and those of hydrographic ships were completed on the 8th. In retaliation, 20 to 25 kamikazes targeted various segments of the Luzon Attack Force, managing to sink two minesweepers and damage one LST. That night, Kinkaid's destroyers successfully sank the Hinoki off Manila Bay. However, on January 8, the 3rd Fleet units began advancing towards Formosa, as MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz suspected that the kamikazes were launching from there. Without Halsey's additional air support, the Japanese suicide planes once again attacked the Luzon Attack Force, this time damaging the cruiser Australia and the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Kardashan Bay, as well as inflicting damage on an LSI, an LST, and an APA. Due to significant losses, by the end of the day, the 2nd Air Fleet and the 1st Combined Base Air Force headquarters were disbanded. The 1st Air Fleet received orders to withdraw to Formosa for reorganization, while the severely weakened units of the 4th Air Army were set to continue limited attack operations for a short time until a final evacuation could be carried out. Returning on the morning of the 8th to resume bombardment about 08:00, one section again hit the Lingayen area. About ten minutes later a destroyer standing close inshore and a spotting plane from a battleship reported that Filipinos were forming a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags, in the town of Lingayen. The fire was shifted to more westerly targets while leaflets were quickly prepared instructing the Filipinos to clear the area. A spotting plane dropped the leaflets and the paraders dispersed. Bombardment started again as soon as the area seemed vacated. The reasons for resuming the bombardment of Lingayen and its environs in the face of this friendly demonstration ashore are unknown, especially since neither underwater demolition teams nor spotting planes had discovered any signs of Japanese activity in the area. The town, at least, seemed safely in the hands of the Filipinos. The most obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, having indicated that strong defenses would be encountered in the area, made it incumbent upon Admiral Oldendorf to continue the bombardment whether he wanted to or not. Too much was at stake to take a chance. The Filipinos in the Lingayen area could hardly have been pleased as they saw their homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed by what to them must have seemed an unnecessary bombardment. It seems a tribute both to the Filipinos and to the prewar administration of the United States in the islands--as well as a severe and obvious indictment of Japanese occupation policies--that the people of the Philippines took such adversities in their stride, not permitting personal resentments to overcome judgment and loyalty. Throughout the rest of 8 January, bombardment of the landing beach areas continued without incident. Practically no military installations or targets were found in the Lingayen town and airstrip area, and relatively few were discovered in the San Fabian region. The San Fabian bombardment vessels ran out of targets by 1530 and moved back up the gulf to strike the San Fernando area for another forty-five minutes, completing the task that the Japanese kamikazes had interrupted on the 6th. The Lingayen area ships had long since ceased their firing for the day. Thus ended preliminary bombardment operations. The heavy bombardment of the San Fernando sector on the 6th aroused great anxiety in General Yamashita's headquarters. An enemy landing in that sector would fall north of the main positions of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and create serious danger of a thrust toward Baguio over the Bauang-Naguilian Highway. The only means of meeting this potential threat was to change the planned employment of the 19th Division. The division was still in the San Fernando-Naguilian area due to postponement of its scheduled movement inland, and intense enemy air activity over the whole Lingayen area made it improbable that it could move in any case. Consequently, on 7 January, the Area Army ordered the division to assume responsibility for the defense of the sector north of a line running through Santiago, Magungunay, Mt. Bilbil, and Asin. Its main strength was to be concentrated between Naguilian and Baguio. With preliminary operations finished, Kinkaid's amphibious attack convoys arrived at the entrance to Lingayen Gulf around 04:00 on January 9. As the amphibious ships began landing operations, the fire support vessels of Admirals Barbey and Wilkinson positioned themselves for final pre-assault bombardment. In support of these efforts, McCain struck Formosa, destroying 47 Japanese aircraft, sinking seven ships, and damaging eleven others. Throughout the week, the fast carriers conducted a total of 3,030 offensive sorties, dropping approximately 700 tons of bombs at the cost of 86 aircraft. Pleased with the results of the anti-kamikaze operation, Nimitz finally permitted Halsey to launch a major raid into the South China Sea, codenamed Operation Gratitude. Meanwhile, back in Luzon, the pre-assault bombardment commenced at 07:00, gradually shifting fire from the landing beaches to the flanks of the assault area. At 09:00, the first amphibious vehicles began their approach from a departure line about 4,500 yards offshore, while rocket-armed landing craft and aircraft bombarded the beaches. The landing beaches of the 14th Corps were located across the middle of Lingayen Gulf's southern shores and centered on Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds of the capitol of Pangasinan Province. In peacetime one would have considered the shore line a beautiful swimming beach, a magnificent strand of firm sand stretching eastward almost 9 miles from the mouth of the Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan. The east bank of the Dagupan, which enters the gulf midway between Lingayen and San Fabian, delineated the boundary between the 14th and the 1st Corps, and bridges over the Dagupan were expected to provide the first easy means of contact between the two corps. Since there was a gap of over 6 miles between the 1st Corps' westernmost beaches and the 14th Corps' easternmost, it was imperative that the Dagupan crossings be seized without delay. Planners anticipated that inasmuch as 1st Corps troops would be a mile or so closer to the river at the moment of landing they would be the first to reach the bridges, but it was 14th Corps' responsibility to relieve 1st Corps at the crossings as soon as possible. The 37th Division was to drive toward the Dagupan, while the 40th Division would make a quick thrust west and northwest to Port Sual and Alaminos. Port Sual, located at the southwestern corner of Lingayen Gulf, and at the western extremity of the Army Beachhead Line, possessed some importance as the site of minor port facilities. Alaminos, about twelve miles northwest of Port Sual, lay inland on the Bolinao Peninsula. Early capture of road junctions at Alaminos would help forestall Japanese attempts to organize counterattacks against the 6th Army's right flank. In contrast, the beaches assigned to the 1st Corps were more widely spaced. The units of the 6th Division were scheduled to land on the Blue Beaches, located midway between the Dagupan River mouth and that of the Bued River. The 103rd Regiment was to land on White Beach 3 at San Fabian, while the 169th Regiment would land on White Beach 2, nearly two miles to the northeast. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment was set to land on the nearby White Beach 3. Fortunately for the American forces, they encountered minimal resistance as the initial waves approached the shore, facing only some challenges from the ebb tide. Shortly after 09:30, the 1st and 20th Regiments landed on the Blue Beaches, with the 1st Regiment quickly securing the mouth of the Bued River and advancing three miles inland to Mangaldan, while the 20th Regiment moved toward Dagupan. Meanwhile, Wing's regiments landed on their designated beaches to the northeast but faced harassment from snipers, artillery, and mortar fire from Lieutenant General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division. However, the assault waves of the 14th Corps moved more slowly than expected, reaching the western beaches only by 09:40. The 185th Regiment captured Orange Beach, the 160th Regiment took Green Beach, the 148th Regiment secured Yellow Beach, and the 129th Regiment landed unopposed on Crimson Beach. After landing on the beaches, the 1st Battalion of the 185th Regiment marched to the Agno River's mouth. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop established a roadblock on the main road, just three miles east of Port Sual. The 2nd Battalion of the 185th Regiment advanced directly inland through Lingayen, successfully crossing the Calmay River and an east-west segment of the Agno River. Similarly, the 160th Regiment crossed the Calmay and assembled nearly four miles inland. The reserve 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment landed at Lingayen, while the 148th Regiment moved straight inland, crossing both the Calmay and Dagupan Rivers toward San Carlos. The 129th Regiment entered Dagupan and crossed the Patan River to reach Calasiao, with its 3rd Battalion eventually extending the line to connect with the 148th. By the end of the day, Griswold had established a beachhead stretching northwestward from Calasiao for nearly twenty miles to the outpost near Port Sual. At the same time, Wing's units encountered the most significant resistance from three tiers of ridges that overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east.  The 43rd Division had the most hazardous and difficult S-day tasks. On the division's left low hills lay scarcely three-quarters of a mile inland from WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Stretching northward, and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs eastern shore, a first line of low, grass-covered hills formed a somewhat broken ridge line, the seaward slopes of which grew steeper as the hills proceeded north along the coast. Beyond this first range, which averaged less than 250 feet in height, lay another, more irregular north-south ridge that rose to 350 feet. Still further east--a little over three miles inland--was yet a third steep-sided, grass-covered ridge line, this one averaging around 600 feet high. The three tiers of ridges overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east. They provided the Japanese with natural defensive terrain, excellent observation, good positions from which to deliver direct fire on the beaches, and cover behind which there was protection from the essentially flat trajectory of naval support fires. Moreover, the ridges were close to assembly areas further inland that could provide large Japanese forces with cover and concealment. In a single night the Japanese could move considerable strength from these assembly points into the tiers of hills to launch a counterattack against the 6th Army's left. While the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment advanced toward Hill 247, the 169th Regiment moved eastward, successfully reaching Binday and extending its lines north along the gentle slopes leading to Hill 470. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment quickly secured the barrios of Mabilao and Alacan, ultimately capturing Hill 247 despite scattered resistance. As small arms and mortar fire intensified, combat patrols advanced toward Hill 385, coinciding with the remainder of the 172nd coming ashore. Finally, the 103rd Regiment took control of San Fabian without facing any opposition and then advanced generally south and southeast toward Hill 200, halting just north of San Jacinto by the end of the day. While the assault units of the 1st Corps successfully landed by dusk on January 9, Swift's advance was not as deep as Griswold's, leaving several dangerous gaps between his units. Throughout the day, the Japanese launched sporadic kamikaze attacks on the Luzon Attack Force, causing significant damage to the battleship Mississippi, hitting the cruisers Columbia and Australia again, and damaging one destroyer escort. Meanwhile, friendly anti-aircraft fire resulted in numerous casualties aboard the battleship Colorado. In response to the enemy landings, Yamashita decided to deploy the 2nd Tank Division to the Agno River line near Tayug, where the armored units were to execute a counterattack from the northern flank if the enemy overextended. He also sent five battalions under Lieutenant-General Tsuda Yoshitake to secure the Cabanatuan area, ordered Lieutenant-General Okamoto Yasuyuki's 10th Division to position elements in the Triangle Hill and Tayug sectors to counter a potential enemy advance from Lingayen toward San Jose, stationed the majority of the 11th Independent Regiment at Bongabong, and directed the Noguchi Detachment to move from Bicol to the Manila area. During the night, the 12th Surface Raiding Regiment, based at Port Sual, attempted to disrupt further enemy landings with a full-scale suicide boat attack on ships near the beachhead. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the small explosive-laden boats approached undetected but only succeeded in sinking one LCI and damaging eight other vessels. In other areas, increased guerrilla activities and Allied airstrikes in northern Luzon had nearly stopped the Japanese from collecting and transporting vital food supplies to the critical defense zones within the Baguio-Mankayan-Bambang triangle. This disruption would hinder the 14th Area Army's capacity to conduct a prolonged defensive campaign. Although plans for a desperate, full-scale counteroffensive were developed, Yamashita decisively rejected this strategy, instead ordering the 2nd Tank Division to cancel its intended counterattack and regroup at Lupao, approximately eight miles northwest of San Jose. Meanwhile, on January 10, Griswold's forces continued their advance inland: the 185th Regiment moved west toward Port Sual; the 160th Regiment progressed southward about eight miles; the 148th Regiment quickly advanced to San Carlos; and the 129th Regiment pushed forward to Malasiqui, where the 14th Corps faced enemy resistance for the first time since the landing. Additionally, the reserve 108th and 145th Regiments successfully landed on the Lingayen beaches. To the north, the 6th Division shifted generally south and southeast, covering about four miles across flat, dry, open farmland, and by nightfall, it secured a front of approximately seven miles from west to east. As they continued northeast, the 103rd Regiment expanded its front, with its 2nd Battalion advancing toward Manaoag while the other two battalions moved to the area northwest of Hill 200. Lastly, the 169th and 172nd Regiments encountered the most intense resistance thus far, providing an early glimpse of the challenges that would impede the 43rd Division for the upcoming month. The 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment, supported by close artillery and mortar fire, engaged in combat along the steep, grassy slopes of Hill 470, ultimately capturing the summit by nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment advanced across the Bued River toward Hills 355 and 318, but halted near the river due to heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. To the north, the 172nd Regiment cleared Hill 385 and then moved toward Hills 351 and 580, gradually advancing along the southern section of the third ridge line, which was located inland from the beaches. Additionally, its 1st Battalion progressed two miles along the graveled coastal road and conducted patrols along the ridge crest. By nightfall, Krueger had determined that the 6th Army Reserve should be deployed in the 1st Corps' area, as outlined in the pre-assault plans, due to the significant resistance faced by the 43rd Division. He suspected that the apparent lack of enemy resistance to the west was a trap, designed to lure the 6th Army into overextending its lines, making its flanks susceptible to a counterattack from the east. Fortunately for the Americans, Tominaga's kamikaze attacks began to diminish in the days following the landing, with an attack on January 10 resulting in damage only to the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson and one transport ship. The next day, the 43rd Division continued to face challenges in Luzon. The Japanese mortar and artillery fire along the 172nd's eastern front was so severe that Wing decided to shift the regiment's attack direction from east to north, resulting in minimal progress as they redeployed to strike toward Hills 351 and 580 from Hill 470. Additionally, the reserve 158th Regiment was landed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 172nd Regiment, on the coastal road. Looking southeast, the 169th Regiment nearly encircled Hill 318. However, despite receiving maximum support from Durgin's carrier aircraft, naval gunfire, and division artillery, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese forces, who had entrenched themselves in the hillside. Meanwhile, Griswold's advance inland to secure the Army Beachhead Line continued to progress well on January 11. On the 11th the 185th Infantry patrolled and consolidated its positions on the west flank, suffered no casualties, killed 5 Japanese, and captured another. Early in the morning a Chevrolet sedan of 1940 or 1941 vintage, occupied by two Japanese, came calmly down the coast road from the direction of Port Sual. Obviously unaware that Company C, 185th Infantry, maintained a roadblock on the highway, the Japanese practically ran into the American outpost before they realized their situation. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, both Japanese were dead, and Company C had acquired some luxurious transportation. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment reached Aguilar, a road junction already held by Filipino guerrillas. The 108th Regiment closely followed the 160th, and the 148th Regiment established a line from Dumpay westward for four miles to Bacnar, with patrols extending further south to Urbiztondo and Bayambang. By the end of the day, the 14th Corps had either occupied or outposted nearly all the territory within the Army Beachhead Line in its sector. However, with Swift's units unable to keep up with the advance southward, Griswold faced the risk of exposing his eastern flank if he continued to push forward. Therefore, the 1st Corps needed reinforcement to prevent widening the gap along the corps boundary. As a result, the reserve 63rd Regiment and the 13th Armored Group were deployed in the San Fabian area, while the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had landed at Blue Beaches the previous day, moved to the Dagupan area. Additionally, Major-General Charles Mullins' 25th Division began to assemble between the Agoi and Patalan Rivers. Despite these developments, casualties had been significantly lower than expected, with 55 men killed and around 185 wounded, primarily from the 43rd Division. Japanese casualties in ground operations were also relatively low, with American estimates suggesting between 150 and 200 Japanese killed. Meanwhile, Task Force 38 made its way into the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on January 10, accompanied by the refueling group. Although poor weather conditions thwarted a scheduled refueling on that day, Task Force 38 was completely fueled by noon on January 11 and prepared to carry out Halsey's ambitious raid. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Allied forces prepared for a major assault on Luzon, kamikaze attacks intensified, leading to fierce battles and unexpected challenges, but Filipino resilience shone through despite devastation. On the shores of Lingayen Gulf, American forces launched a strategic landing, facing minimal resistance, but soon encountered fierce Japanese counterattacks as they advanced inland.

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

Las apariciones marianas advierten sobre catástrofes inminentes: ¿estás ignorando las señales del cielo?. Atrevete a descubrir lo que se esconde detrás del misterio de estas manifestaciones.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945 B-29 CRASH SURVIVOR

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1946

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:  4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945 B-29

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1941 ARIZONA AFTER ATTACK

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. OCTOBER 1941 PEARL HARBOR

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   1/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1941

Emissions from anesthesia are one of the largest sources of greenhouse gases from hospitals. This anesthesiologist wants to change that. And, a cultural anthropologist discusses the Mariana Islands' long history of colonization and why demilitarization matters for climate progress.A Major Source Of Greenhouse Gases In Hospitals? AnesthesiaDid you know that some of the gases used in anesthesia are strong greenhouse gases? A few years ago, Seattle Children's Hospital analyzed its carbon footprint and found that the gases used in anesthesia made up about 7% of the hospital's total emissions, right behind emissions from heating and power and those from commuting.Faced with this problem, Dr. Elizabeth Hansen, a pediatric anesthesiologist at Seattle Children's, took matters into her own hands and slashed the operating room's emissions. She now helps other hospitals do the same with Project Spruce.Guest host Anna Rothschild talks with Dr. Hansen about how and why she took on the problem.Militarization And Environmental Injustice In The Mariana IslandsLet's take a trip to the Northern Mariana Islands, a string of islands in the Pacific just north of Guam. The islands were sites of major battles during World War II and were captured by the United States in 1944. The US established a military presence across the territory—including building the world's largest air force base at the time, on an island called Tinian.The US military never left, and in the 1980s, the Northern Mariana Islands became a US territory. A few years ago, the Pentagon proposed building a bombing range on an island called Pagan, but residents of the islands pushed back.Dr. Isa Arriola is a cultural anthropologist at Concordia University in Montreal and co-founder of the organization Our Common Wealth 670, based in Saipan, the capital of the Northern Mariana Islands. She's fought back against the militarization of her home islands, and she talks with guest host Anna Rothschild about how the military presence has affected the people and environment of the Marianas, and why demilitarization needs to be part of climate action.Transcripts for each segment will be available after the show airs on sciencefriday.com. Subscribe to this podcast. Plus, to stay updated on all things science, sign up for Science Friday's newsletters.