Podcasts about Hezbollah

We discuss many issues dealing with Lebanon including the plight of the Lebanese Jews, Lebanese sovereignty (from outside influences), Hezbollah, Lebanese politics including political assassinations including that of Ronnie's father, Dr. Mohamad Chatah (former Lebanese ambassador to the United States and Minister of Finance of Lebanon). Documentary on Dr. Chatah's assassination: https://youtu.be/nrp5SaNHpJA Website dedicated to Dr. Mohamad Chatah: http://mohamadchatah.com Ronnie's opening musical slice is from Nino Rota's The Godfather Waltz.   [Title of the movie is "Bint el Hares" and not "Bint el Aariss" as pointed out by one of my Twitter followers Ziad Baroudi (@ramblingteacher).] _______________________________________ This chat was posted originally on Ora.tv back in 2016 and on my YouTube channel on May 5, 2016 as THE SAAD TRUTH_167: https://youtu.be/gq7vsqUuByU _______________________________________ If you appreciate my work and would like to support it: https://subscribestar.com/the-saad-truth https://patreon.com/GadSaad https://paypal.me/GadSaad _______________________________________ The Parasitic Mind: How Infectious Ideas Are Killing Common Sense (paperback edition) was released on October 5, 2021. Order your copy now. https://www.amazon.com/Parasitic-Mind-Infectious-Killing-Common/dp/162157959X/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= https://www.amazon.ca/Parasitic-Mind-Infectious-Killing-Common/dp/162157959X https://www.amazon.co.uk/Parasitic-Mind-Infectious-Killing-Common/dp/162157959X _______________________________________ Please visit my website gadsaad.com, and sign up for alerts. If you appreciate my content, click on the "Support My Work" button. I count on my fans to support my efforts. You can donate via Patreon, PayPal, and/or SubscribeStar. _______________________________________ Dr. Gad Saad is a professor, evolutionary behavioral scientist, and author who pioneered the use of evolutionary psychology in marketing and consumer behavior. In addition to his scientific work, Dr. Saad is a leading public intellectual who often writes and speaks about idea pathogens that are destroying logic, science, reason, and common sense. _______________________________________  

West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy is Now Open! 8am-9am PT/ 11am-Noon ET for our especially special Daily Specials, Smothered Benedict Wednesdays!Starting off in the Bistro Cafe, defense attorney Kevin Gough was pressed why he made it so “intensely personal” about dirtying up the victim, Ahmaud Arbery?On the rest of the menu, many environmentalists back Biden's move to tap the US oil reserve; the Justice Department filed a lawsuit seeking to block a major US sugar manufacturer from acquiring its rival, arguing the deal would harm competition; and, a federal jury has held that CVS, Walgreens and Walmart pharmacies recklessly distributed massive amounts of pain pills in two Ohio counties.After the break, we move to the Chef's Table where Australia intends to add the far-right extremist group The Base, and the entirety of the Lebanese group Hezbollah, to its list of outlawed terrorist organizations; and, Belarus banned the nation's oldest newspaper as extremist.All that and more, on West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy with Chef de Cuisine Justice Putnam.Bon Appétit!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"To those of us who believe that all of life is sacred every crumb of bread and sip of wine is a Eucharist, a remembrance, a call to awareness of holiness right where we are. I want all of the holiness of the Eucharist to spill out beyond church walls, out of the hands of priests and into the regular streets and sidewalks, into the hands of regular, grubby people like you and me, onto our tables, in our kitchens and dining rooms and backyards.” -- Shauna Niequist "Bread and Wine: A Love Letter to Life Around the Table with Recipes"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Show Notes & Links: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2021/11/24/2066009/-West-Coast-Cookbook-amp-Speakeasy-Daily-Special-Smothered-Benedict-Wednesdays

Extreme right-wing group "The Base" and the entirety of Hezbollah - a Shia Islamist Militant group - will be listed as terrorist organisations.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Israel prepares to defeat its enemy, protect civilians on both sides in next war against Hezbollah; plus, a look inside Syria with Dave Eubank; and Tower of David Museum digs into ancient past, prepares for tourists' return to Old City treasure.

Shane Stranahan, co-host of Fault Lines, joins us to discuss US foreign policy. A recent study shows that the US and its allies are causing a worldwide decay of democracies through attacks on voting rights, judicial independence, and freedom of the press. According to the report, "36% of all democratic "backsliding" has happened in the U.S. and U.S.-aligned countries, including Turkey, Hungary, and Israel."Jim Kavanagh, writer at thepolemicist.net and CounterPunch, joins us to discuss Julian Assange. Two unannounced inspections at Belmarsh Prison in London revealed that the embattled publisher is living in unbearable conditions. The inspections found that the deplorable conditions are not compatible with an inmate maintaining a reasonable state of mental health and that precautions to prevent self-harm are almost nonexistent.Nick Davies, peace activist and author of "Blood on Our Hands: The American Invasion of Iraq," joins us to discuss the Pentagon budget. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) has said that the US needs to get its priorities straight as he plans for a no vote on the latest military budget. Also, retired US Army Major Danny Sjursen argues that the US empire is pinching pennies for its citizens and opening the financial floodgates for the military-industrial complex.K.J. Noh, peace activist, writer, and teacher, joins us to discuss China. President Xi Jinping has identified 3 basic principles and 4 priorities for the Asian world power. After he met with Biden, the Chinese leader made it clear that the US must turn his words of moderation into action. Scott Ritter, former UN weapon inspector in Iraq, joins us to discuss the likelihood of the US joining in a military engagement to support the Neo-Nazi government of Ukraine and/or the island of Taiwan. Patrick Lawrence argues that the people of the US would not be willing to accept the losses involved in such acts of folly and that the US government is well aware of that reality.John Burris, civil rights attorney, joins us to discuss two major US court cases. The jury continues to deliberate on the Kyle Rittenhouse case, and the European Union is calling on Oklahoma to commute the execution of Julius Jones. A petition for the commutation of Jones's execution has garnered over 6 million signatures.James Carey, editor/co-owner at Geopoliticsalert.com, joins us to discuss Israel. In a move that some observers view as propaganda, Israeli security personnel are drilling for a potential "dirty bomb" attack ostensibly by Hezbollah. Also, Defense Minister Benny Gantz continues to ramp up hawkish rhetoric against Iran as he claims that Israel is ready to go to war with the Islamic Republic.Ricardo Vaz, political analyst and editor at VenezuelAnalysis.com, joins us to discuss Venezuela. The US State Department is again condemning the Venezuelan elections before they occur. Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro lambasted the regime change neocons, stating that “It is shameful how the Department of State intends to interfere in the internal affairs of Venezuela.”

Le 26 octobre, l'armée israélienne a annoncé l'ouverture de la frontière entre l'État hébreu et le Liban, à l'occasion de la récolte des olives. Selon le communiqué israélien, ce geste avait pour but de venir en aide aux habitants du pays du cèdre, frappés par une crise économique sans précédent.  Aux abords du village de Bleeda, la récolte des olives touche à sa fin. Dans cette zone où des échanges de tirs entre l'armée israélienne et le Hezbollah ont régulièrement lieu, rien ne semble ces jours-ci pouvoir détourner les agriculteurs de leur travail. Au-dessus de leurs têtes pourtant, des drones israéliens survolent régulièrement le périmètre et au sol, de nombreuses patrouilles de casques bleues en charge de maintenir la paix à la frontière sillonnent les champs d'oliviers. « Ici, c'est la ligne bleue. Là, c'est Le Liban, et là, c'est la Palestine occupée. La route juste en bas d'ici, c'est Israël ? « Oui… Enfin non ! C'est la Palestine, pas Israël ! », nous dit Monsieur Ghazi qui travaille pour la municipalité de ce village, en partie située sur un territoire disputé. Avec lui, nous traversons la ligne de démarcation tracée par l'ONU en 2000, après le retrait des forces israéliennes qui occupaient le Sud Liban. Théoriquement, nous sommes donc en Israël. Mais le mur qui sépare les deux pays se trouve en fait quelques centaines de mètres plus bas et celui-là reste infranchissable. Pour monsieur Ghazi, la déclaration de l'État hébreu, qui affirme que les paysans de son village peuvent cette année franchir la frontière pour récolter leurs olives, relève de la propagande : « Où sont les points de passage ? Les frontières sont fermées. Regardez par vous-même : vous voyez quelque chose d'ouvert, vous ? Un endroit où l'on peut traverser ? C'est juste de la communication pour les médias, rien de plus. S'ils ouvraient vraiment, nous irions de l'autre côté récupérer nos terres ! » ► À lire aussi : À la frontière libano-israélienne, la récolte des olives échappe aux crises « Nous circulons librement » Selon lui, comme selon un responsable de la force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban que nous avons contacté, l'armée israélienne joue sur les mots : les paysans travaillent bien des deux côtés de la ligne bleue qui fait office de frontière, mais cette tolérance n'a rien d'exceptionnel : « Quand c'est la saison des olives, comme durant le reste de l'année, nous circulons librement. Personne ne peut nous en empêcher », déclare Monsieur Ghazi. En revanche, les agriculteurs assurent ici que personne n'a été autorisé à franchir le mur en contre-bas. L'un d'entre eux, Tarrab, ironise de la déclaration de l'armée israélienne : « Les Israéliens sont trop bons ! C'est fou comme ils nous aiment ! Ils se préoccupent tellement du bien-être des Libanais que quand nous travaillons ici, dans nos champs, ils tirent en l'air pour nous effrayer. » Ce fermier admet cependant n'avoir fait face à aucune intimidation de la part des forces israéliennes depuis le début de la récolte des olives, mais il assure que les terres situées de l'autre côté du mur dont il revendique la propriété sont cette année, comme les précédentes, restées inaccessibles.

This week we talk about Beirut, Hezbollah, and France. We also discuss proxy conflicts, fossil fuel wealth, and government incompetence. Support the show: patreon.com/letsknowthings & letsknowthings.com/support Show notes/transcript: letsknowthings.com Check out my other shows & publications: understandary.com

The UN's Climate Change Conference in Glasgow is being billed as the most important conference in history, aimed at saving humanity—but plenty of evidence shows that isn't the real agenda at all. New Pentagon assessments say that China is preparing to quadruple its nuclear arsenal in an effort to rival or surpass America's power. Europe is facing an energy crisis, and Russia is making it worse by pausing natural gas exports, pressuring European regulators to allow gas to begin flowing through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We also talk about developments in Ethiopia's civil war, a mainstream German political party rethinking the way they choose leaders, Poland aiming to double its armed forces, Saudi Arabia punishing Lebanon for Hezbollah having too much power, and the source behind the Steele dossier that launched the Russia collusion hoax finally being indicted. Links [00:39] UN Climate Change Conference (12 minutes) “Blackout: Your Energy Supplies and Your Rights Are Fading Fast” “Why You Need to Watch This Summit” “What the Paris Climate Agreement Was Really About” [12:22] China's Nuclear Advances (7 minutes) Nuclear Armageddon Is ‘At the Door' [19:48] Ethiopia's Civil War (8 minutes) “Is Ethiopia's Civil War in End-Time Prophecy?” Libya and Ethiopia in Prophecy [28:09] CDU Rethinks Leader Selection Process (6 minutes) “Europe Is About to Be Hijacked” [34:12] Russia Cuts Gas to Europe (6 minutes) “The Crimean Crisis Is Reshaping Europe!” [39:47] Poland Building Its Army (5 minutes) “Poland Aims to Double Its Armed Forces” May-June 2014 Trumpet issue [44:47] Saudi Arabia Punishes Lebanon (7 minutes) “Why We Told You to Watch Lebanon” [51:45] Durham Investigation Indictment (3 minutes) “Treason in America and Britain”

What happens when the Queen of England dies? Queen Elizabeth is 95 years old and has had some health concerns lately. Her death would close a chapter of British history, symbolizing and likely hastening the passing of the Anglo-American age. U.S. President Joe Biden plans to spend some $65 billion on government-owned Internet networks. What happens when the government has control over that kind of technology? Concern in France over immigration and the loss of cultural identity has increased the popularity of a mainstream right leader who is challenging French President Emmanuel Macron and could reshape politics in this pillar European nation. Civil war is simmering in Lebanon after clashes between Hezbollah and Christian Lebanese forces. We also talk about a prophecy of what will happen to the British throne. Links [02:22] British Royal Family (16 minutes) “The Fall of the British Royal Family” [18:12] Government-Owned Internet Networks (13 minutes) “Joe Biden Plans to Spend Billions on Government-Owned Internet Networks” [31:08] French Politics (10 minutes) “Macron's Challenge From the Right” The King of the South Jerusalem in Prophecy [41:12] Lebanon Unrest (10 minutes) “Civil War Is Simmering in Lebanon” [51:21] LAST WORD: Prophecy of the British Throne (6 minutes) The New Throne of David

There are now 100,000 trained and ready fighters in Hezbollah, according to its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. This week, we explore: what is Hezbollah? What is its history, and its relationship with Israel? And how worried should we be? ~~~~ Learn more about Unpacked: https://jewishunpacked.com/about/ Visit Unpacked on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/unpacked See more about the Lebanon War: https://jewishunpacked.com/sabra-and-shatila-what-happened-and-why-it-matters/ ~~~~ Sources https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/Iranian-View-of-Israel/387085/ https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/the-amia-daia-bombing-terror-in-argentina   https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/hezbollah   https://www.ajc.org/news/ajc-praises-germanys-ban-of-all-hezbollah-activities   https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2.pdf   https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2019-03-08/will-hezbollahs-rise-be-its-downfall   https://unpacked.education/israel-and-iran-from-allies-to-archenemies/   https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/beirut-barracks-blown-up   https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-energy-envoy-to-visit-lebanon-will-discuss-maritime-border-talks-with-israel/   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-mediator-hochstein-says-lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-need-be-quick-al-hadath-2021-10-21/   https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/lebanon-touts-new-opportunity-for-maritime-border-talks-with-israel-682682   https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-a-change-hezbollahs-boast-of-100000-fighters-is-not-aimed-at-israel/   https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-has-hezbollah-become-too-big-to-fail-1.10316189    ~~~~ Unpacked is a division of OpenDor Media  

The Lebanese Government is being taken over by Hezbollah. Samy Gemayel, President of Lebanon's Kataeb Party, resigned from Parliament following the Port of Beirut bombing and has been leading the sovereign opposition to the corruption in his government. Gemayal and his wife are in the United States on a tour to build international relationships and support for his party. We were honored to have the opportunity to sit down with him to discuss the conditions in Lebanon and the necessity of a strong American presence in the world.  Follow:  'Kelna Ayleh' (Facebook / Instagram Donate: isupportlebanon.com  Visit: kelna3ayleh.org for more information

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 15-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish world, from Sunday through Thursday. Editor-in-chief David Horovitz and military correspondent Judah Ari Gross are on today's podcast, hosted by Raoul Wootliff. On today's show, we start with a look at the week-long IDF national exercise beginning today, testing response to massive barrages of rockets, precision missiles, and multiple chemical attacks. We assess the recent allegations of hacking by Iran against Israel -- and by Israel against Iran. We take a look at the Glasgow climate conference which begins today and which prime minister Naftali Bennett is flying to this evening. And finally, we hear from Horovitz about his recent trip to the UK where he got to see Van Gogh's 'Wheatstacks' and what is claimed to be the world's oldest constantly used synagogue. Discussed articles include: Learning from May war, IDF simulates battle with Hezbollah amid domestic strife Most Iran gas stations still offline three days after cyberattack Iran official blames Israel, US for cyberattack that crippled gas stations Suspected Iranian hackers publish user information from Israeli LGBT site PM: Israeli tech must pivot from making cool apps to fighting climate change Israel joins growing number of countries pledging to be carbon neutral by 2050 The day I got to see Van Gogh's Nazi-seized ‘Wheatstacks,' from both sides Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on iTunes, Spotify, PlayerFM, Google Play, or wherever you get your podcasts. PHOTO: Police officers clash with Arab Israeli rioters in Ramle in central Israel, on May 10, 2021.(Yossi Aloni/Flash90) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Photo:  Hezbollah does fundraising among Shi'a in Africa, including from innocents who don't know where the funds will go; and it also makes significant income from blood diamonds, incl from SIerra Leone. Here: the famous Star of Sierra Leone Hezbollah in Africa. Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1 https://eeradicalization.com/hezbollah-and-irans-radicalization-efforts-in-africa/

The US Treasury Department on Thursday imposed sanctions on two top Lebanese contractors and a lawmaker close to Hezbollah over alleged large-scale corruption that undermined the rule of law in Lebanon. This decision comes amid an unprecedented economic crisis in Lebanon. It also comes as Hezbollah attempts to expand its influence over Lebanon, seeking control over the powerful Finance and Public Works ministries as the country is negotiating for a recovery package form the IMF and looking to rebuild the port of Beirut. Paul Gadalla joins The Greek Current to discuss this latest move by the US, Hezbollah's power play in Lebanon, and look at the port of Beirut, which has received offers from a number of countries, including France, China, and Turkey, to reconstruct the demolished port.Paul Gadalla is a former Beirut-based journalist and Middle East Analyst who focuses on the Eastern Mediterranean and religious minorities. His work has been published in a number of outlets including Kathimerini, The National Interest, and is also a contributor to the Middle East Institute. Read Paul Gadalla's latest piece for the Middle East Institute here: Why Hezbollah wanted the Ministries of Finance and Public WorksYou can read the articles we discuss on our podcast here: U.S. sanctions two Lebanese businessmen and a member of parliamentGermany's Merkel due in post-crisis Greece on 2-day visitMerkel in Athens for final visitGreece marks WWII entry anniversary with military parade

Jim Kavanagh, writer at thepolemicist.net and CounterPunch, joins us to discuss Julian Assange. In his latest article, Robert Koehler argues that Julian Assange's work at WikiLeaks is a threat to the ability of the US empire to hide the realities of war. Koehler says that the abstraction of war that is presented to the citizens of the empire has been upset by WikiLeaks data that helps the public see and feel the true death and destruction that is perpetrated in their names.Jack Rasmus, professor in economics and politics at St. Mary's College in California, joins us to discuss US economic policy. Democrats are racing to complete a deal on President Biden's economic initiatives before the President leaves for his next foreign tour. One of the stickiest issues is a progressive proposal for a billionaire's tax that would raise a significant amount of revenue from the nation's oligarchs. KJ Noh, peace activist, writer and teacher, joins us to discuss China. Russia and China have set a new military precedent by stepping up military cooperation in the naval realm. The Eurasian powers set out on October 17th for their first-ever joint military patrols involving ten warships. The Russian defense ministry announced that the patrols were intended to "maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."Tunde Osazua, on the Africa Team of the Black Alliance for Peace (BAP) and coordinator of BAP's "U.S. Out of Africa" Network, joins us to discuss Sudan. Sudan's coup leader allegedly advised US envoy Jeffrey Feltman that he was planning a military takeover of the African nation one day before the planned coup was carried out. Meanwhile, the leader of the coup delivered a televised speech with several talking points that seemed odd and obviously at odds with reality.Laith Marouf, broadcaster and journalist based in Beirut, joins us to discuss the Middle East. Hezbollah leaders have announced that they have 100,000 fighters at their disposal in what appears to be a show of force against the US-backed Lebanese Forces party. Also, US officials are making it clear that they intend to continue the illegal occupation of the Syrian oil fieldsDr. Yolandra Hancock, board-certified pediatrician and obesity medicine specialist, joins us to discuss covid. An FDA advisory committee voted 17-0 with one abstention to back giving the Pfizer vaccine to children ages 5-11. The advice is not binding, but it is expected that the agency will grant emergency authorization in the coming weeks.Scott Ritter, former UN weapon inspector in Iraq, joins us to discuss NATO. His latest op-eds address both NATO and the US attempt at catching Russia and China in the field of hypersonic missile technology. Ritter argues that "Unable to find a reason for being, the alliance has decided to manufacture endless crises with Russia in hopes of engendering a new Cold War."Professor Danny Shaw, author, activist and professor of Latin American studies, joins us to discuss Cuba. The US empire is on the move again in Cuba as plans for a November Maidan-style protest movement are casually announced. US officials have taken to social media to announce their plans.

Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at CFR, leads a conversation on geopolitics in the Middle East.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you want to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's topic is geopolitics in the Middle East. Our speaker was supposed to be Sanam Vakil, but she had a family emergency. So we're delighted to have our very own Steven Cook here to discuss this important topic. Dr. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of several books, including False Dawn; The Struggle for Egypt, which won the 2012 Gold Medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling But Not Governing. And he's working on yet another book entitled The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. So keep an eye out for that in the next year or so. He's a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and contributor and commentator on a bunch of other outlets. Prior to coming to CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. So, Dr. Cook, thank you for being with us. I thought you could just—I'm going to give you a soft question here, to talk about the geopolitical relations among state and nonstate actors in the Middle East. And you can take that in whatever direction you would like. COOK: Well, thanks so much, Irina. It's a great pleasure to be with you. Good afternoon to everybody who's out there who's on an afternoon time zone, good morning to those who may still be in the evening, and good evening to those who may be somewhere where it's the evening. It's very nice to be with you. As Irina mentioned, and as I'm sure it's plenty evident, I am not Sanam Vakil, but I'm happy to step in for her and offer my thoughts on the geopolitics of the Middle East. It's a small topic. That question that Irina asked was something that I certainly could handle effectively in fifteen to twenty minutes. But before I get into the details of what's going on in the region, I thought I would offer some just general comments about the United States in the Middle East. Because, as it turns out, I had the opportunity last night to join a very small group of analysts with a very senior U.S. government official to talk precisely about the United States in the Middle East. And it was a very, very interesting conversation, because despite the fact that there has been numerous news reporting and analytic pieces about how the United States is deemphasizing the Middle East, this official made it very, very clear that that was practically impossible at this time. And this was, I think, a reasonable position to take. There has been a lot recently, in the last recent years, about withdrawing from the region, from retrenchment from the region, reducing from the region, realignment from the region. All those things actually mean different things. But analysts have essentially used them to mean that the United States should deprioritize the Middle East. And it seems to me that the problem in the Middle East has not necessarily been the fact that we are there and that we have goals there. It's that the goals in the region and the resources Washington uses to achieve those goals need to be realigned to address things that are actually important to the United States. In one sense that sound eminently reasonable. We have goals, we have resources to meet those goals, and we should devote them to—and if we can't, we should reassess what our goals are or go out and find new resources. That sounds eminently reasonable. But that's not the way Washington has worked over the course of the last few decades when it comes to the Middle East. In many ways, the United States has been overly ambitious. And it has led to a number of significant failures in the region. In an era when everything and anything is a vital interest, then nothing really is. And this seems to be the source of our trouble. For example, when we get into trying to fix the politics of other countries, we're headed down the wrong road. And I don't think that there's been enough real debate in Washington or, quite frankly, in the country about what's important in the Middle East, and why we're there, and what we're trying to achieve in the Middle East. In part, this new book that I'm writing called the End of Ambition, which, as Irina pointed out, will be out hopefully in either late 2022 or early 2023, tries to answer some of these questions. There is a way for the United States to be constructive in the Middle East, but what we've done over the course of the last twenty years has made that task much, much harder. And it leads us, in part, to this kind of geostrategic picture or puzzle that I'm about to lay out for you. So let me get into some of the details. And I'm obviously not going to take you from Morocco all the way to Iran, although I could if I had much, much more time because there's a lot going on in a lot of places. But not all of those places are of critical importance to the United States. So I'll start and I'll pick and choose from that very, very large piece of geography. First point: There have been some efforts to deescalate in a region that was in the middle of or on the verge of multiple conflicts. There has been a dialogue between the Saudis and the Iranians, under the auspices of the Iraqis, of all people. According to the Saudis this hasn't yielded very much, but they are continuing the conversation. One of the ways to assess the success or failure of a meeting is the fact that there's going to be another meeting. And there are going to be other meetings between senior Iranian and Saudi officials. I think that that's good. Egyptians and Turks are talking. Some of you who don't follow these issues as closely may not remember that Turkey and Egypt came close to trading blows over Libya last summer. And they pulled back as a result of concerted diplomacy on the part of the European Union, as well as the Egyptian ability to actually surge a lot of force to its western border. Those two countries are also talking, in part under the auspices of the Iraqis. Emiratis and Iranians are talking. That channel opened up in 2019 after the Iranians attacked a very significant—two very significant oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, sort of scaring the Emiratis, especially since the Trump administration did not respond in ways that the Emiratis or the Saudis had been expecting. The Qataris and the Egyptians have repaired their relations. The Arab world, for better or for worse, is moving to reintegrate Syria into is ranks. Not long after King Abdullah of Jordan was in the United States, he and Bashar al-Assad shared a phone call to talk about the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria and to talk about, among other things, tourism to the two countries. The hope is that this de-escalation, or hope for de-escalation coming from this dialogue, will have a salutary effect on conflicts in Yemen, in Syria, in Libya, and Iraq. Thus far, it hasn't in Yemen, in particular. It hasn't in Syria. But in Libya and Iraq, there have been some improvements to the situation. All of this remains quite fragile. These talks can be—can break off at any time under any circumstances. Broader-scale violence can return to Libya at any time. And the Iraqi government still doesn't control its own territory. Its sovereignty is compromised, not just by Iran but also by Turkey. But the fact that a region that was wound so tight and that seemed poised to even deepen existing conflicts and new ones to break out, for all of these different parties to be talking—some at the behest of the United States, some entirely of their own volition—is, I think, a relatively positive sign. You can't find anyone who's more—let's put it this way, who's darker about developments in the Middle East than me. And I see some positive signs coming from this dialogue. Iran, the second big issue on the agenda. Just a few hours ago, the Iranians indicated that they're ready to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. This is sort of a typical Iranian negotiating tactic, to push issues to the brink and then to pull back and demonstrate some pragmatism so that people will thank for them for their pragmatism. This agreement to go back to the negotiating table keeps them on decent terms with the Europeans. It builds on goodwill that they have developed as a result of their talks with Saudi Arabia. And it puts Israel somewhat on the defensive, or at least in an awkward position with the Biden administration, which has very much wanted to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. What comes out of these negotiations is extremely hard to predict. This is a new government in Iran. It is certainly a harder line than its predecessor. Some analysts believe that precisely because it is a hardline government it can do the negotiation. But we'll just have to see. All the while this has been going on, the Iranians have been proceeding with their nuclear development, and Israel is continuing its shadow campaign against the Iranians in Syria, sometimes in Iraq, in Iran itself. Although, there's no definitive proof, yesterday Iranian gas stations, of all things, were taken offline. There's some suspicion that this was the Israelis showing the Iranians just how far and deep they are into Iranian computer systems. It remains unclear how the Iranians will retaliate. Previously they have directed their efforts to Israeli-linked shipping in and around the Gulf of Oman. Its conventional responses up until this point have been largely ineffective. The Israelis have been carrying on a fairly sophisticated air campaign against the Iranians in Syria, and the Iranians have not been able to mount any kind of effective response. Of course, this is all against the backdrop of the fact that the Iranians do have the ability to hold much of the Israeli population hostage via Hezbollah and its thousands of rockets and missiles. So you can see how this is quite worrying, and an ongoing concern for everybody in the region, as the Israelis and Iranians take part in this confrontation. Let me just continue along the line of the Israelis for a moment and talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict, something that has not been high on the agenda of the Biden administration, it hasn't been high on the agenda of many countries in the region. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, there have been some significant developments. The normalization as a result of the Abraham Accords continues apace. Recently in the Emirates there was a meeting of ministers from Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan. This is the first kind of face-to-face meeting of government officials from all of these countries. Now, certainly the Israelis and the Emiratis have been meeting quite regularly, and the Israelis and the Bahrainis have been meeting quite regularly. But these were broader meetings of Cabinet officials from all of the Abraham Accords countries coming together in the United Arab Emirates for talks. Rather extraordinary. Something that thirteen months—in August 2020 was unimaginable, and today is something that doesn't really make—it doesn't really make the headlines. The Saudis are actually supportive of the normalization process, but they're not yet willing to take that step. And they're not willing to take that step because of the Palestinian issue. And it remains a sticking point. On that issue, there was a lot of discussion after the formation of a new Israeli government last June under the leadership, first, of Naftali Bennett, who will then hand the prime ministership over to his partner, Yair Lapid, who are from different parties. That this was an Israeli government that could do some good when it comes to the Palestinian arena, that it was pragmatic, that it would do things that would improve the lives of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, and seek greater cooperation with both the United States and the Palestinian authority toward that end. And that may in fact turn out to be the case. This government has taken a number of steps in that direction, including family reunification, so that if a Palestinian on the West Bank who is married to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the Palestinian in the West Bank can live with the family in Israel. And a number of other things. But it should also be clear to everybody that despite a kind of change in tone from the Israeli prime ministry, there's not that much of a change in terms of policy. In fact, in many ways Prime Minister Bennett is to the right of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. And Yair Lapid, who comes from a centrist party, is really only centrist in terms of Israeli politics. He is—in any other circumstances would be a kind of right of center politician. And I'll just point out that in recent days the Israeli government has declared six Palestinian NGOs—long-time NGOs—terrorist organizations, approved three thousand new housing units in the West Bank, and worked very, very hard to prevent the United States from opening a consulate in East Jerusalem to serve the Palestinians. That consulate had been there for many, many, many years. And it was closed under the Trump administration when the U.S. Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration would like to reopen that consulate. And the Israeli government is adamantly opposed. In the end, undoubtably Arab governments are coming to terms with Israel, even beyond the Abraham Accords countries. Egypt's flag carrier, Egyptair, announced flights to Tel Aviv. This is the first time since 1979. You could—you could fly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, something that I've done many, many times. If you were in Egypt, you'd have to go and find an office that would sell you a ticket to something called Air Sinai, that did not have regular flights. Only had flights vaguely whenever, sometimes. It was an Egyptair plane, stripped of its livery, staffed by Egyptair pilots and staff, stripped of anything that said Egyptair. Now, suddenly Egyptair is flying direct flights to Tel Aviv. And El-Al, Israel's national airline, and possibly one other, will be flying directly to Cairo. And there is—and that there is talk of economic cooperation. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm al-Sheikh not long ago. That was the first meeting of Israeli leaders—first public meeting of Israeli leaders and Egyptian leaders in ten years. So there does seem to be an openness on the part of Arab governments to Israel. As far as populations in these countries, they don't yet seem to be ready for normalization, although there has been some traffic between Israel and the UAE, with Emiratis coming to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and so on and so forth. But there are very, very few Emiratis. And there are a lot of Egyptians. So as positive as that all is, this is—this has not been a kind of broad acceptance among the population in the Arab world for Israel's legitimate existence. And the kind of issue du jour, great-power competition. This is on everybody's lips in Washington, D.C.—great-power competition, great-power competition. And certainly, the Middle East is likely to be an arena of great-power competition. It has always been an arena of great-power competition. For the first time in more than two decades, the United States has competitors in the region. And let me start with Russia, because there's been so much discussion of China, but Russia is the one that has been actively engaged militarily in the region in a number of places. Vladimir Putin has parlayed his rescue of Hafez al-Assad into influence in the region, in an arc that stretches from NATO ally Turkey, all the way down through the Levant and through Damascus, then even stretching to Jerusalem where Israeli governments and the Russian government have cooperated and coordinated in Syria, into Cairo, and then into at least the eastern portion of Libya, where the Russians have supported a Qaddafist general named Khalifa Haftar, who used to be an employee of the CIA, in his bid for power in Libya. And he has done so by providing weaponry to Haftar, as well as mercenaries to fight and support him. That episode may very well be over, although there's every reason to believe that Haftar is trying to rearm himself and carry on the conflict should the process—should the political process in Libya break down. Russia has sold more weapons to Egypt in the last few years than at any other time since the early 1970s. They have a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. It's not clear what that actually means, but that defense agreement was signed not that long after the United States' rather chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which clearly unnerved governments in the Middle East. So Russia is active, it's influential, its militarily engaged, and it is seeking to advance its interests throughout the region. I'll point out that its presence in North Africa is not necessarily so much about North Africa, but it's also about Europe. Its bid in Libya is important because its ally controls the eastern portion of Libya, where most of Libya's light, sweet crude oil is located. And that is the largest—the most significant reserves of oil in all of Africa. So it's important as an energy play for the Russians to control parts of North Africa, and right on Russia's—right on Europe's front doorstep. China. China's the largest investor and single largest trading partner with most of the region. And it's not just energy related. We know how dependent China is on oil from the Gulf, but it's made big investments in Algeria, in Egypt, the UAE, and in Iran. The agreement with Iran, a twenty-five-year agreement, coming at a time when the Iranians were under significant pressure from the United States, was regarded by many in Washington as an effort on the part of the Chinese to undercut the United States, and undercut U.S. policy in the region. I think it was, in part, that. I think it was also in part the fact that China is dependent in part on Iranian oil and did not want the regime there to collapse, posing a potential energy crisis for China and the rest of the world. It seems clear to me, at least, that the Chinese do not want to supplant the United States in the region. I don't think they look at the region in that way. And if they did, they probably learned the lesson of the United States of the last twenty-five years, which has gotten itself wrapped around the axle on a variety of issues that were unnecessary and sapped the power of the United States. So they don't want to get more deeply involved in the region. They don't want to take sides in conflicts. They don't want to take sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't take sides in the conflict between the United States and Iran, or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They want to benefit from the region, whether through investment or through extraction, and the security umbrella that the United States provides in the region. I'm not necessarily so sure that that security umbrella needs to be so expensive and so extensive for the United States to achieve its goals. But nevertheless, and for the time being at least, we will be providing that security umbrella in the region, from which the Chinese will benefit. I think, just to close on this issue of great-power competition. And because of time, I'm leaving out another big player, or emerging player in the region, which is India. I'm happy to talk about that in Q&A. But my last point is that, going back to the United States, countries in the region and leaders in the region are predisposed towards the United States. The problem is, is that they are very well-aware of the political polarization in this country. They're very well-aware of the political dysfunction in this country. They're very well-aware of the incompetence that came with the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, or any number of disasters that have unfolded here in the United States. And it doesn't look, from where they sit in Abu Dhabi, in Cairo, in Riyadh, and in other places, that the United States has staying power, the will to lead, and the interest in remaining in the Middle East. And thus, they have turned to alternatives. Those alternatives are not the same as the United States, but they do provide something. I mean, particularly when it comes to the Chinese it is investment, it's economic advantages, without the kind of trouble that comes with the United States. Trouble from the perspective of leaders, so that they don't have to worry about human rights when they deal with the Chinese, because the Chinese aren't interested in human rights. But nevertheless, they remain disclosed toward the United States and want to work with the United States. They just don't know whether we're going to be there over the long term, given what is going on in the United States. I'll stop there. And I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Steven, that was fantastic. Thank you very much. We're going to now to all of you for your questions. So the first raised hand comes from Jonas Truneh. And I don't think I pronounced that correctly, so you can correct me. Q: Yeah, no, that's right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Cook, for your talk. I'm from UCL, University College London, in London. COOK: So it is—(off mic). Q: Indeed, it is. Yeah. That's right. COOK: Great. Q: So you touched on it there somewhat particularly with great-power competition, but so my question is related to the current energy logic in the Middle East. The Obama administration perhaps thought that the shale revolution allowed a de-prioritization, if I'm allowed to use that word, of the Middle East. And that was partly related to the pivot to Asia. So essentially does the U.S. still regard itself as the primary guarantor of energy security in the Persian Gulf? And if so, would the greatest beneficiary, as I think you indicated, would that not be China? And is that a case of perverse incentives? Is there much the U.S. can do about it? COOK: Well, it depends on who you ask, right? And it's a great question. I think that the—one of the things that—one of the ways in which the Obama administration sought to deprioritize and leave the region was through the shale revolution. I mean, the one piece of advice that he did take from one of his opponents in 2002—2008, which was to drill, baby, drill. And the United States did. I would not say that this is something that is specific to the Obama administration. If you go back to speeches of presidents way back—but I won't even go that far back. I'll go to George W. Bush in 2005 State of the Union addressed, talked all about energy independence from the Middle East. This may not actually be in much less the foreseeable future, but in really—in a longer-term perspective, it may be harder to do. But it is politically appealing. The reason why I say it depends on who you ask, I think that there are officials in the United States who say: Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed. But when the Iranians attacked those two oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, that temporarily took off 50 percent of supply off the markets—good thing the Saudis have a lot stored away—the United States didn't really respond. The president of the United States said: I'm waiting for a call from Riyadh. That forty years of stated American policy was, like, it did not exist. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine suddenly didn't exist. And the entirety of the American foreign policy community shrugged their shoulders and said: We're not going to war on behalf of MBS. I don't think we would have been going to war on behalf of MBS. We would have been ensuring the free flow of energy supplies out of the region, which is something that we have been committed to doing since President Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, and then President Reagan added his corollary to it. I think that there are a number of quite perverse incentives associated with this. And I think that you're right. The question is whether the competition from China outweighs our—I'm talking about “our”—the United States' compelling interest in a healthy global economy. And to the extent that our partners in Asia, whether it's India, South Korea, Japan, and our important trading partner in China, are dependent upon energy resources from the Gulf, and we don't trust anybody to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, it's going to be on us to do it. So we are kind of hammered between that desire to have a healthy global economy as being—and being very wary of the Chinese. And the Chinese, I think, are abundantly aware of it, and have sought to take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, which got an up-vote, from Charles Ammon, who is at Pennsylvania State University. And I think this goes to what you were building on with the great-power competition: What interests does India have in the Middle East? And how is it increasing its involvement in the region? COOK: So India is—imports 60 percent of its oil from the region. Fully 20 percent of it from Saudi Arabia, another 20 percent of it from Iran, and then the other 20 percent from other sources. So that's one thing. That's one reason why India is interested in the Middle East. Second, there are millions and millions of Indians who work in the Middle East. The Gulf region is a region that basically could not run without South Asian expatriate labor, most of which comes from India—on everything. Third, India has made considerable headway with countries like the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, in counterextremism cooperation. This has come at the expense of Pakistan, but as relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and relations between Pakistan and the UAE soured in recent years, the Indians have been able to take advantage of that. And Indian leaders have hammered away at the common interest that India and leaders in the region have in terms of countering violent extremism. And then finally, India and Israel have quite an extraordinary relationship, both in the tech field as well as in the defense area. Israel is a supplier to India. And the two of them are part of a kind of global network of high-tech powerhouse that have either, you know, a wealth of startups or very significant investment from the major tech players in the world. Israel—Microsoft just announced a huge expansion in Israel. And Israeli engineers and Indian engineers collaborate on a variety of projects for these big tech companies. So there's a kind of multifaceted Indian interest in the region, and the region's interest in India. What India lacks that the Chinese have is a lot more capacity. They don't have the kind of wherewithal to bring investment and trade in the region in the other direction. But nevertheless, it's a much more important player than it was in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: How do you envision the future of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia politics for the next thirty years? Ethiopia controls the Nile dam projects. And could this dispute lead to a war? And what is the progress with the U.S. in mediating the talks between the three countries? COOK: Thank you. FASKIANOS: And that is coming from the King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. COOK: Fabulous. So that's more than the evening. It's actually nighttime there. I think that the question of the great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is really an important one, and it's something that has not gotten as much attention as it should. And for those of you who are not familiar, in short the Ethiopians have been building a massive dam on the Blue Nile, which is a tributary to the Nile. And that if—when competed, threatens the water supply to Egypt, a country of 110 million people that doesn't get a lot of rainfall. Ethiopia, of course, wants to dam the Nile in order to produce hydroelectric power for its own development, something that Egypt did when it dammed the Nile River to build the Aswan High Dam, and crated Lake Nasser behind it. The Egyptians are very, very concerned. This is an existential issue for them. And there have been on and off negotiations, but the negotiations aren't really about the issues. They're talks about talks about talks. And they haven't gotten—they haven't gotten very far. Now, the Egyptians have been supported by the Sudanese government, after the Sudanese government had been somewhat aligned with the Ethiopian government. The Trump administration put itself squarely behind the Egyptian government, but Ethiopia's also an important partner of the United States in the Horn of Africa. The Egyptians have gone about signing defense cooperation agreements with a variety of countries around Ethiopia's borders. And of course, Ethiopia is engaged in essentially what's a civil war. This is a very, very difficult and complicated situation. Thus far, there doesn't seem to be an easy solution the problem. Now, here's the rub, if you talk to engineers, if you talk to people who study water, if you talk to people who know about dams and the flow of water, the resolution to the problem is actually not that hard to get to. The problem is that the politics and nationalism have been engaged on both sides of the issue, making it much, much more difficult to negotiate an equitable solution to the problem. The Egyptians have said in the past that they don't really have an intention of using force, despite the fact of this being an existential issue. But there's been somewhat of a shift in their language on the issue. Which recently they've said if red lines were crossed, they may be forced to intervene. Intervene how? What are those red lines? They haven't been willing to define them, which should make everybody nervous. The good news is that Biden administration has appointed an envoy to deal with issues in the Horn of Africa, who has been working very hard to try to resolve the conflict. I think the problem here however is that Ethiopia, now distracted by a conflict in the Tigray region, nationalism is running high there, has been—I don't want to use the word impervious—but not as interested in finding a negotiated solution to the problem than it might have otherwise been in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Bob Pauly, who's a professor of international development at the University of Southern Mississippi. It got three up-votes. What would you identify as the most significant likely short and longer-term effects of Turkey's present domestic economic and political challenges on President Erdogan's strategy and policy approaches to the Middle East, and why? COOK: Oh, well, that is a very, very long answer to a very, very interesting question. Let's see what happens in 2023. President Erdogan is facing reelection. His goal all along has been to reelected on the one hundredth anniversary of the republic, and to demonstrate how much he has transformed Turkey in the image of the Justice and Development Party, and moved it away from the institutions of the republic. Erdogan may not make it to 2023. I don't want to pedal in conspiracy theories or anything like that, but he doesn't look well. There are large numbers of videos that have surfaced of him having difficulties, including one famous one from this past summer when he was offering a Ramadan greeting on Turkish television to supporters of the Justice and Development Party, and he seemed to fade out and slur his words. This is coupled with reports trickling out of Ankara about the lengths to which the inner circle has gone to shield real health concerns about Erdogan from the public. It's hard to really diagnose someone from more than six thousand miles away, but I think it's a scenario that policymakers in Washington need to think seriously about. What happens if Erdogan is incapacitated or dies before 2023? That's one piece. The second piece is, well, what if he makes it and he's reelected? And I think in any reasonable observer sitting around at the end of 2021 looking forward to 2023 would say two things: One, you really can't predict Turkish politics this far out, but if Turkish elections were held today and they were free and fair, the Justice and Development Party would get below 30 percent. Still more than everybody else. And Erdogan would have a real fight on his hands to get reelected, which he probably would be. His approaches to his domestic challenges and his approaches to the region are really based on what his current political calculations are at any given moment. So his needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean was a function of the fact that he needed to shore up his nationalist base. Now that he finds himself quite isolated in the world, the Turks have made overtures to Israel, to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia. They're virtually chasing the Egyptians around the Eastern Mediterranean to repair their relationship. Because without repairing these relationships the kind of investment that is necessary to try to help revive the Turkish economy—which has been on the skids for a number of years—is going to be—is going to be more difficult. There's also another piece of this, which is the Middle East is a rather lucrative arms market. And during the AKP era, the Turks have had a significant amount of success further developing their defense industrial base, to the point that now their drones are coveted. Now one of the reasons for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is that the United States will not sell Saudi Arabia the drones it wants, for fear that they will use them in Yemen. And the Saudis are looking for drones elsewhere. That's either China or Turkey. And Turkey's seem to work really, really well, based on experience in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. So what—Turkish foreign policy towards the region has become really dependent upon what Erdogan's particularly political needs are. There's no strategic approach to the region. There is a vision of Turkey as a leader of the region, of a great power in its own right, as a leader of the Muslim world, as a Mediterranean power as well. But that's nothing new. Turkish Islamists have been talking about these things for quite some time. I think it's important that there's been some de-escalation. I don't think that all of these countries now love each other, but they see the wisdom of pulling back from—pulling back from the brink. I don't see Turkey's position changing dramatically in terms of its kind of reintegration into the broader region before 2023, at the least. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's go next to, raised hand, to Caleb Sanner. And you need to unmute yourself. Q: Hello, my name is Caleb. I'm from the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. So, Dr. Cook, you had mentioned in passing how China has been involved economically in North Africa. And my question would be, how is the U.S. taking that? And what are we doing, in a sense, to kind of counter that? I know it's not a military advancement in terms of that, but I've seen what it has been doing to their economies—North Africa's economies. And, yeah, what's the U.S. stance on that? COOK: Well, I think the United States is somewhat detached from this question of North Africa. North Africa's long been a—with the exception of Egypt, of course. And Egypt, you know, is not really North Africa. Egypt is something in and of itself. That China is investing heavily in Egypt. And the Egyptian position is: Please don't ask us to choose between you and the Chinese, because we're not going to make that choice. We think investment from all of these places is good for—is good for Egypt. And the other places where China is investing, and that's mostly in Algeria, the United States really doesn't have close ties to Algeria. There was a tightening of the relationship after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, recognizing that the Algerians—extremist groups in Algerian that had been waging war against the state there over the course of the 1990s were part and parcel of this new phenomenon of global jihad. And so there has been a security relationship there. There has been some kind of big infrastructure kind of investment in that country, with big companies that build big things, like GE and others, involved in Algeria. But the United States isn't helping to develop ports or industrial parks or critical infrastructure like bridges and airports in the same way that the Chinese have been doing throughout the region. And in Algeria, as well as in Egypt, the Chinese are building a fairly significant industrial center in the Suez Canal zone, of all places. And the United States simply doesn't have an answer to it, other than to tell our traditional partners in the region, don't do it. But unless we show up with something to offer them, I'm afraid that Chinese investment is going to be too attractive for countries that are in need of this kind of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to a written question from Kenneth Mayers, who is at St. Francis College in Brooklyn. In your opinion, what would a strategic vision based on a far-sighted understanding of both resources and U.S. goals—with regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms and values such as human rights—look like in the Middle East and North Africa? COOK: Well, it's a great question. And I'm tempted to say you're going to have to read the last third of my new book in order to get the—in order to get the answer. I think but let me start with something mentioned about norms and values. I think that one of the things that has plagued American foreign policy over the course of not just the last twenty years, but in the post-World War II era all the way up through the present day, you see it very, very clearly with President Biden, is that trying to incorporate American values and norms into our approach to the region has been extraordinarily difficult. And what we have a history of doing is the thing that is strategically tenable, but morally suspect. So what I would say is, I mean, just look at what's happened recently. The president of the United States studiously avoided placing a telephone call to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Egyptians, as many know, have a terrible record on human rights, particularly since President Sisi came to power. Arrests of tens of thousands of people in the country, the torture of many, many people, the killings of people. And the president during his campaign said that he was going to give no blank checks to dictators, including to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And then what happened in May? What happened in May was that fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas and others in the Gaza Strip, a brutal eleven-day conflict. And Egypt stepped up and provided a way out of the conflict through its good offices. And that prompted the United States to—the president of the United States—to have two phone calls in those eleven days with the Egyptian leader. And now the United States is talking about Egypt as a constructive partner that's helping to stabilize the region. Sure, the administration suspended $130 million of Egypt's annual—$130 million Egypt's annual allotment of $1.3 billion. But that is not a lot. Egypt got most of—most of its military aid. As I said, strategically tenable, morally suspect. I'm not quite sure how we get out of that. But what I do know, and I'll give you a little bit of a preview of the last third of the book—but I really do want you to buy it when it's done—is that the traditional interests of the United States in the Middle East are changing. And I go through a kind of quasi, long, somewhat tortured—but very, very interesting—discussion of the origins of our interests, and how they are changing, and how we can tell they are changing. And that is to say that the free flow of energy resources may not be as important to the United States in the next twenty-five years as it was over the course of the previous fifty or sixty years. That helping to ensure Israeli security, which has been axiomatic for the United States, eh, I'd say since the 1960s, really, may not be as important as Israel develops its diplomatic relations with its neighbors, that has a GDP per capita that's on par with the U.K., and France, and other partners in Europe, a country that clearly can take care of itself, that is a driver of technology and innovation around the globe. And that may no longer require America's military dominance in the region. So what is that we want to be doing? How can we be constructive? And I think the answers are in things that we hadn't really thought of too systematically in the past. What are the things that we're willing to invest in an defend going forward? Things like climate change, things like migration, things like pandemic disease. These are things that we've talked about, but that we've never been willing to invest in the kind of the resources. Now there are parts of the Middle East that during the summer months are in-habitable. That's going to produce waves of people looking for places to live that are inhabitable. What do we do about that? Does that destabilize the Indian subcontinent? Does it destabilize Europe? Does it destabilize North Africa? These are all questions that we haven't yet answered. But to the extent that we want to invest in, defend and sacrifice for things like climate, and we want to address the issue—related issue of migration, and we want to deal with the issue of disease and other of these kind of functional global issues in the Middle East is better not just for us and Middle Easterners, but also in terms of our strategic—our great-power competition in the region. These are not things that the Chinese and the Russians are terribly interested in, despite the fact that the Chinese may tell you they are. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Ahmuan Williams, with a raised hand, at the University of Oklahoma. COOK: Oklahoma. Q: Hi. And thank you for being here. You kind of talked about the stabilization of northern Africa and the Middle East. And just a few days ago the Sudanese government—and they still haven't helped capture the parliamentarian there—have recycled back into a military—somewhat of military rule. And it's been since 2005 since the end of their last civil war, which claimed millions of innocent civilians through starvation and strife and, you know, the lack of being able to get humanitarian aid. There was also a huge refugee crisis there, a lot of people who evacuated Sudan. How's that going to impact the Middle East and the American take to Middle East and northern Africa policy, especially now that the Security Council is now considering this and is trying to determine what we should do? COOK: It's a great question. And I think that, first, let's be clear. There was a coup d'état in Sudan. The military overthrew a transitional government on the eve of having to hand over the government to civilians. And they didn't like it. There's been tension that's been brewing in Sudan for some time. Actually, an American envoy, our envoy to East Africa and Africa more generally, a guy named Jeff Feltman, was in Khartoum, trying to kind of calm the tension, to get the two sides together, and working to avert a coup. And the day after he left, the military moved. That's not—that doesn't reflect the fact that the United States gave a blessing for the military to overthrow this government. I think what it does, though, and it's something that I think we all need to keep in mind, it demonstrates the limits of American power in a variety of places around the world. That we don't have all the power in the world to prevent things from happening when people, like the leaders of the Sudanese military, believe that they have existential issues that are at stake. Now, what's worry about destabilization in Sudan is, as you point out, there was a civil war there, there was the creation of a new country there, potential for—if things got really out of hand—refugee flows into Egypt, from Egypt across the Sanai Peninsula into Israel. One of the things people are unaware of is the large number of Sudanese or Eritreans and other Africans who have sought refuge in Israel, which has created significant economic and social strains in that country. So it's a big deal. Thus far, it seems we don't—that the U.S. government doesn't know exactly what's happening there. There are protesters in the streets demanding democracy. It's very unclear what the military is going to do. And it's very unclear what our regional allies and how they view what's happening. What Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, what Saudi Arabia, what Israel—which Sudan is an Abraham Accords country now—what they are doing. How they view the coup as positive or negative will likely impact how effective the United States can be in trying to manage this situation. But I suspect that we're just going to have to accommodate ourselves to whatever outcome the Sudanese people and the Sudanese military come to, because I don't think we have a lot of—we don't have a lot of tools there to make everybody behave. FASKIANOS: OK. So I'm going to take the next question from Elena Murphy, who is a junior at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. And she's a diplomatic intern at the Kurdistan Regional Government's Representation in the United States. COOK: That's cool. FASKIANOS: That's very cool. So as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional hegemony has affected Erdogan's domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors policy? COOK: Great. Can I see that? Because that's a long question. FASKIANOS: Yeah, it's a long question. It's got an up-vote. Third one down. COOK: Third one down. Elena, as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism—I'm sorry, I'm going to have to read it again. How much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional has affected Erdogan's both domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors? OK. Great. So let us set aside the term “neo-Ottomanism” for now. Because neo-Ottomanism actually—it does mean something, but people have often used the term neo-Ottomanism to describe policies of the Turkish government under President Erdogan that they don't like. And so let's just talk about the way in which the Turkish government under President Erdogan views the region and views what Turkey's rightful place should be. And I think the Ottomanism piece is important, because the kind of intellectual framework which the Justice and Development Party, which is Erdogan's party, views the world, sees Turkey as—first of all, it sees the Turkish Republic as a not-so-legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. That from their perspective, the natural order of things would have been the continuation of the empire in some form or another. And as a result, they believe that Turkey's natural place is a place of leadership in the region for a long time. Even before the Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, Turkey's earlier generation of Islamists used to savage the Turkish leadership for its desire to be part of the West, by saying that this was kind of unnatural, that they were just merely aping the West, and the West was never actually going to accept Turkey. Which is probably true. But I think that the Justice and Development Party, after a period of wanting to become closer to the West, has turned its attention towards the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world more generally. And in that, it sees itself, the Turks see themselves as the natural leaders in the region. They believe they have a cultural affinity to the region as a result of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and they very much can play this role of leader. They see themselves as one of the kind of few real countries in the region, along with Egypt and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the rest are sort of ephemeral. Needless to say, big countries in the Arab world—like Egypt, like Saudi Arabia—don't welcome the idea of Turkey as a leader of the region. They recognize Turkey as a very big and important country, but not a leader of the region. And this is part of that friction that Turkey has experienced with its neighbors, after an earlier iteration of Turkish foreign policy, in which—one of the earliest iterations of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which was called no problems with neighbors. In which Turkey, regardless of the character of the regimes, wanted to have good relations with its neighbors. It could trade with those neighbors. And make everybody—in the process, Turkey could be a driver of economic development in the region, and everybody can be basically wealthy and happy. And it didn't really work out that way, for a variety of reasons that we don't have enough time for. Let's leave it at the fact that Turkey under Erdogan—and a view that is shared by many—that Turkey should be a leader of the region. And I suspect that if Erdogan were to die, if he were unable to stand for election, if the opposition were to win, that there would still be elements of this desire to be a regional leader in a new Turkish foreign policy. FASKIANOS: Steven, thank you very much. This was really terrific. We appreciate your stepping in at the eleventh hour, taking time away from your book. For all of you— COOK: I'm still not Sanam. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) I know, but you were an awesome replacement. So you can follow Steven Cook on Twitter at @stevenacook. As I said at the beginning too, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine. So you can read his work there, as well as, of course, on CFR.org, all of the commentary, analysis, op-eds, congressional testimony are there for free. So I hope you will follow him and look after his next book. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday November 3, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. In the meantime, I encourage you to follow us, @CFR_Academic, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. And stay well, stay safe, and thank you, again. COOK: Bye, everyone. FASKIANOS: Bye. (END)

0:00 Intro 5:01 Fatherhood 10:45 Reflection 31:16 Maturity 40:34 2005 & 2009 54:43 March 14 1:06:32 Sectarianism 1:17:21 Militia 1:40:02 Internal Structure 1:44:18 Diaspora We're with Hussein El Achi for Episode 281 of The Beirut Banyan. Click to watch: https://youtu.be/HS-EVvzEeoA We discuss all that is Minteshreen, reflections on two years past the October 17 uprising and comparisons with earlier protest movements. Our conversation includes last week's tragic events in Tayyouneh, differences between current clashes and the civil war years and disagreements on the use of the word 'militia' to describe local parties aside from Hezbollah. We also talk about Minteshreen's internal structure and the important role of the diaspora in next year's parliamentary elections. Hussein El Achi is the secretary general of Minteshreen. Check our Minteshreen's recently launched website: www.minteshreen.com Help support The Beirut Banyan by contributing via PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/walkbeirut Or donating through our Patreon page: https://www.patreon.com/thebeirutbanyan Subscribe to our podcast from your preferred platform. Follow us on Facebook, Instagram & Twitter: @thebeirutbanyan And check out our website: www.ronniechatah.com Music by Marc Codsi. Animation & illustration by Sana Chaaban.

Photo:  US Airfare, OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS . CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow David Grantham #Unbound. The complete, forty-minute interview, April 5, 2021. Consequences: An Intelligence Officer's War; Paperback – November 11, 2020. by David Grantham  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Consequences-Intelligence-Officers-David-Grantham/dp/098440631X/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= “Very little has been written on the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations efforts in the global war on terror. Consequences by David Grantham provides a unique and fascinating window into the nuts and bolts of OSI counterintelligence operations. You won't be disappointed.”– Fred Burton, author of Beirut Rules: The Murder of a CIA Station Chief and Hezbollah's War Against America    In 2020, ISIS followers are being encouraged to use COVID-19 to sicken Westerners. An ISIS supporter attacked a Naval base in Corpus Christi, Texas. Iran and the United States exchanged blows in Iraq. We are still living in the long shadow of the Iraq War. In 2006, David Grantham was fresh out of college and serving as a counterintelligence officer with the elite and secretive Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Iraq was veering toward civil war. The U.S. military desperately needed better on-the-ground intelligence to turn the tide. Grantham found himself in Kuwait and Afghanistan, then at Iraq's infamous American prison, Camp Bucca. Not only was Bucca the breeding ground for the Islamic State, it was in southern Iraq, where America's deadly fight with Iran was an open secret. Consequences is both a riveting, behind-the-scenes look at intelligence operations at the height of the Iraq war, and a charming and sobering story of one man's journey through the pleasures and consequences that come with wartime intelligence.

En el Líbano surgen amenazantes las diferencias sectarias entre el movimiento proiraní Hezbollah y las nacionalistas Fuerzas Libanesas. Los recuerdos son tan espeluznantes que la gran mayoría de libaneses quiere impedir lo que muchos temen pueda volver a desatarse: otra sangrienta guerra civil. Escucha el nuevo episodio de José Levy en “Desafíos Globales”. Para conocer sobre cómo CNN protege la privacidad de su audiencia, visite CNN.com/privacidad

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lebanon on the brink. Will Israel's northern neighbor fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed proxy Hezbollah? Plus, Israel shows what your next restaurant delivery might look like; and a relic from Middle Ages surfaces from the Mediterranean Sea.

The murder of Gabby Petito, and the ensuing search for her boyfriend/ person of interest Brian Laundrie has captivated the entire country. But to get a closer look into the FBI's case, as well as the recent discovery of remains believed to be that of Laundrie, it's always best to talk to someone who knows more than a little about the process, which is why we talked to former FBI Assistant Director, Chris Swecker. Swecker served in the FBI for 24 years. He served as the FBI's on-scene Commander in Iraq, and later served as Special Agent in Charge of North Carolina Operations, where he managed the capture of the Eric Rudolph after the Centenial Olympic Park bombing, and dismantling a Hezbollah terrorist cell. He's also appeared on CNN, CNBC and Fox News....and this morning he talked to us. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hezbollah and its political allies have intensified Lebanon's political crisis and paralyzed the new government by trying to push the cabinet to dismiss Tarek Bitar, the judge in charge of investigating the 2020 Beirut blast. Last week, on October 14, clashes erupted in Lebanon's capital city over the probe into the explosion of Beirut's port, with deadly shootings taking place at a demonstration organized by Hezbollah and its ally the Amal movement. The incidents were described in reports as being reminiscent of moments from the bloody 1975-90 Lebanese Civil War. Steven Howard joins The Greek Current to discuss this latest incident, what's at stake for Lebanon, and look at what steps Washington can take to support the country.Steven Howard is the Director of Policy and Outreach for the American Task Force on Lebanon, a leadership organization of Americans of Lebanese descent.Read Steven Howard's latest piece in Providence Magazine here: Firefight on Beirut Streets Is a Warning to US and LebanonYou can read the articles we discuss on our podcast here: Hezbollah's campaign against Beirut blast judge paralyses Lebanon's governmentHezbollah brag of 100,000-strong force aimed at foes at homeEU says Turkey still 'backsliding' on reforms, gloomy on membership chancesAfter critical EU report, Turkey's bid to join bloc remains at a 'standstill'

Shurat HaDin Law Center undertakes civil actions against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PLO, The Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, Egypt, North Korea, UBS, and the Lebanese Canadian Bank. The cases, being tried in Israeli, American, Canadian and European jurisdictions, allow the victims of terrorism to fight back. The Definitive Rap 20OCT2021 - PODCAST

In this episode of By Any Means Necessary, hosts Sean Blackmon and Jacquie Luqman are joined by Kevin Bradshaw, Vice President of Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union (BCTGM) Local 252G in Memphis, Tennessee to discuss the Kellogg's strike and the corporate greed that sparked the strike, the conditions that Kellogg's workers faced as the company has raked in record profits during the pandemic, and the heightened importance of union membership amid the resurgence of workers struggles in different industries and places.In the second segment, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Rania Khalek, journalist with Breakthrough News and co-host of the Unauthorized Disclosure podcast to discuss the recent violence in Beirut sparked by US-supported and Saudi-funded right-wing Lebanese Forces who opened fire on an unarmed Hezbollah protest, the whitewashing of the conflict and the Lebanese Forces in the corporate media, the ever-present threat of sectarian violence built into the Lebanese political system, and the imperialist efforts to keep the Middle East weak.In the third segment, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Justin Williams, co-host of Red Spin Sports to discuss the resignation of Las Vegas Raiders coach Jon Gruden and the fallout of the investigation into the Washington Football Team, what remains to be revealed in the thousands of emails that have not been released, the vindication of Colin Kaepernick's criticism of the NFL's culture around race, the over-the-top jingoism and support for imperialism in sports, and Major League Baseball's insistence on spotlighting white players over players of color.Later in the show, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Maximillian Alvarez, Editor in Chief of the Real News Network and and host of the podcast “Working People" to discuss the great resignation and the conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic that have contributed to mass resignations and labor demonstrations, the baseless claims that the capitalist class has deployed in an effort to misdirect the blame for labor shortages, the record profits that companies are earning while trying to squeeze more production out of workers for little pay and benefits and raising prices on consumers, and how an organized working class movement can channel the energy of this moment.

In this segment of By Any Means Necessary, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Rania Khalek, journalist with Breakthrough News and co-host of the Unauthorized Disclosure podcast to discuss the recent violence in Beirut sparked by US-supported and Saudi-funded right-wing Lebanese Forces who opened fire on an unarmed Hezbollah protest, the whitewashing of the conflict and the Lebanese Forces in the corporate media, the ever-present threat of sectarian violence built into the Lebanese political system, and the imperialist efforts to keep the Middle East weak.

Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz resigned on Saturday over corruption charges, intensifying the leadership void in Europe and raising questions about the viability of European democracy. Hezbollah's protests over the investigation of the Beirut blast quickly turned deadly, sparking fears of the potential for renewed civil war in Lebanon. Japan's new ruling party has pledged to double its military spending, adding to ongoing dramatic arms procurement among Asian nations. As the Taliban proves itself incapable of governing Afghanistan, America is entering bizarre negotiations with the Taliban to provide humanitarian aid to help the suffering Afghans. We also talk about the severity of disrupted global supply chains, an Islamic terrorist attack in Norway with a bow and arrow, more evidence of China's massive theft of American intellectual property, and Donald Trump telling Republicans not to vote in the next election. Links [00:38] Kurz Resigns (13 minutes) “Crises Sweep Away Europe's Leaders—Temporarily” KEY OF DAVID: “Antiochus Rises in Europe” [13:22] Beirut Violence (7 minutes) “Why We Told You to Watch Lebanon” [21:49] Japan's Military Spending (7 minutes) TRENDS: “Why the Trumpet Watches Japan's March Toward Militarism” Russia and China in Prophecy [28:28] Global Supply Chains (7 minutes) [35:46] America and the Taliban (6 minutes) “This Isn't Incompetence. This Is Treason!” [41:44] Terrorist Attack in Norway (5 minutes) KEY OF DAVID: “Antiochus Rises in Europe” [46:55] China's Theft (4 minutes) “China Steals U.S. Trade Secrets—and Fulfills Bible Prophecy” [50:35] Trump's Message to Republicans (4 minutes) “What Will Happen After Trump Regains Power”

Six people have died in the Lebanese capital after violence at a demonstration organised by the Shia group, Hezbollah. They and their allies were protesting against the judicial investigation into the devastating blast last year at Beirut's port. Our correspondent unpicks the complex politics involved; we also hear from Tatiana, who lost her father in the explosion. Also on the programme: police in Norway say they're treating as an act of terrorism an attack with a bow and arrow by a Muslim convert that left five people dead; and what YOU can do to help reduce the growing mountain of electronic waste. (Image: people evacuate a casualty after gunfire erupted in Beirut, Lebanon October 14, 2021 / Credit: REUTERS/Aziz Taher)

Gunfire erupted on the streets of Beirut on Thursday, killing six people. The violence erupted when armed supporters of Shiite militant and political groups, Hezbollah and Amal, marched through a Christian neighborhood in protests against the judge presiding over the August blast investigation. And police say a bow-and-arrow attack in Norway Wednesday night in which a man is suspected of killing five people appears to be an "act of terror.” It's the worst attack in Norway since Anders Breivik, the far-right extremist who killed 77 people in 2011. Plus, The World remembers Irish musician Paddy Moloney, master of the uilleann pipes, slide whistle and penny whistle, and co-founder of the Chieftains.

Photo:    South Korean aid convoy entering North Korea through the Demilitarized Zone, 1998 "Ju-cheh means: how to be a successful shakedown artist" --J Bolton "In the twilight years of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice de-listed North Korea from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list, even though Pyongyang was, according to the Congressional Research Service, in deep with the Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah. Rice succumbed to a common second term pattern and threw a Hail Mary pass to change Bush's foreign policy legacy, but like many desperate last minute moves, hers ended in failure."  —Michael Rubin Millennial South Korea pushes back at Kim shake-downs. @JoshRogin https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/north-korea-promotes-new-five-year-military-plan-amid-heightening-tensions-with-seoul

Photo:  A United States Marine asks a local woman about weapons in Fallujah, Iraq CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow David Grantham #Unbound. The complete, forty-minute interview, April 5, 2021. Consequences: An Intelligence Officer's War; Paperback – November 11, 2020. by David Grantham https://www.amazon.com/Consequences-Intelligence-Officers-David-Grantham/dp/098440631X/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= “Very little has been written on the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations efforts in the global war on terror. Consequences by David Grantham provides a unique and fascinating window into the nuts and bolts of OSI counterintelligence operations. You won't be disappointed.”– Fred Burton, author of Beirut Rules: The Murder of a CIA Station Chief and Hezbollah's War Against America    In 2020, ISIS followers are being encouraged to use COVID-19 to sicken Westerners. An ISIS supporter attacked a Naval base in Corpus Christi, Texas. Iran and the United States exchanged blows in Iraq. We are still living in the long shadow of the Iraq War. In 2006, David Grantham was fresh out of college and serving as a counterintelligence officer with the elite and secretive Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Iraq was veering toward civil war. The U.S. military desperately needed better on-the-ground intelligence to turn the tide. Grantham found himself in Kuwait and Afghanistan, then at Iraq's infamous American prison, Camp Bucca. Not only was Bucca the breeding ground for the Islamic State, it was in southern Iraq, where America's deadly fight with Iran was an open secret. Consequences is both a riveting, behind-the-scenes look at intelligence operations at the height of the Iraq war, and a charming and sobering story of one man's journey through the pleasures and consequences that come with wartime intelligence.