Podcasts about vietnamization

* Guest: Lowell Nelson - CampaignForLiberty.org, RonPaulInstitute.org * Remember: "that the freedoms, rights, peace, and safety of Americans are in spite of their government's military adventures, not because of them." * The Vietnamization of Ukraine - Ron Paul. * Ukraine is fighting an unwinnable war - Look at history. Look at the Iraq War, the attacks on Syria and Libya, and the 20 years in Afghanistan. Would we call those successes? No! Russia and China are powerful. The war hawks are toying with WWIII and nuclear devastation. "Russia of today is a country that can fight back and can project military power all the way to the source, which means the United States." * "Neocons and warmongers lie constantly. They will do whatever it takes to get their wars and sadly we do not have an independent media in the US to challenge them on their lies. Our media is so closely tied to the military-industrial complex that it is also a stakeholder in war profits, so they aren't about to rock the boat." * The Real War - David Pyne, dpyne.substack.com * Today is the day, now is the time, to press your US Representatives to stop funding Ukraine, and to stop fighting. They are listening to people now more than ever because of the upcoming Primary elections (the Primary Election in Utah is on June 25). Extract from these candidates a promise to urge Ukraine to do a peace agreement with Russia. Let's end this conflict today! * The Tyranny of the Majority - Andrew Napolitano. * The passage of the 17th Amendment in 1913 crippled the US Senate tremendously because the states were no longer represented in Congress. Senators were elected by a popular vote after 1913. So now we simply have two chambers of "The People" instead of one for "The People" and one for "The States." * James Madison gave a speech in February of 1791, which is now known as the famous Bank Speech. He eloquently argued "against legislation chartering a national bank because the authority to create a bank was not only not present in the Constitution but also was retained by the states and reserved to them by the 10th Amendment. * Please vote for Phil Lyman for governor, Frank Mylaw for Attorney General, Tina Cannon for Auditor, Trent Staggs for US Senate, and Mike Kennedy for CD 3. Encourage your friends and neighbors to do likewise. * ADHD: Ritalin, Cocaine, and the Torture of Children - Gary D. Barnett, LewRockwell.com * Memorial Day - Laurence Vance, LewRockwell.com * Those in the military who have died in the last 75 years have died in the service of the US regime--not in the service of our country. They have done the bidding of a hegemonic administration intent on policing the world for profit--not in defending our liberty here in America. * Yes, let's honor those who have fallen in defense of liberty. But let's not confuse US military action around the world for the last 75 years with the defense of liberty.

Weekly Update --- The Vietnamization Of Ukraine by Ron Paul Liberty Report

Listen to phone calls between President Richard Nixon, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover & CIA Director Richard Helms. President Nixon and Director Hoover discuss the murder of two police officers in New York City, the Pentagon Papers, and more.  CIA Director Helms and President Nixon speak about Vietnamization, the Soviet Union, and his eventual move to being the U.S. Ambassador to Iran.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Listen to phone calls between President Richard Nixon, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover & CIA Director Richard Helms. President Nixon and Director Hoover discuss the murder of two police officers in New York City, the Pentagon Papers, and more.  CIA Director Helms and President Nixon speak about Vietnamization, the Soviet Union, and his eventual move to being the U.S. Ambassador to Iran.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the fourth episode of our series on Vietnam, Danny and Derek speak with Sean Fear, lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds, about the early period of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's reign, Richard M. Nixon's "Vietnamization" strategy and the war's expansion to Laos and Cambodia, the American anti-war movement, and North Vietnam's position after the failure of the Tet Offensive. Become a patron today! www.patreon.com/americanprestige

In early February '71, with pressure building at home to complete the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, Nixon puts his Vietnamization program to a crucial and very public test. With the world watching, the South Vietnamese army launches an invasion into Laos, where they will engage a formidable North Vietnamese force. US air power will support the South, but for the first time they will be on their own on the ground. The test is a debacle: facing superior military forces, the South Vietnamese sustain heavy casualties and are quickly compelled to withdraw. Nixon and Kissinger spin the defeat as best they can, but privately, it is a moment of reckoning: after six years of war, South Vietnam shows little sign of being able to sustain the war without continuing US help. Through the spring, opposition to the war grows and spreads beyond the traditional leftist and student base. In April, Senator William Fulbright's powerful Foreign Relations Committee hears testimony from a young vet by the name of John Kerry, representing a new force – Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Clearly, the tide is turning. Faced with a grim reality, Nixon and Kissinger recognize they must find a way to prop up South Vietnam at least long enough to avoid having it collapse before the '72 election, now only a year away.

"Yemen war: Joe Biden ends support for operations in foreign policy reset," reports the BBC. "Trump: US will be out of Afghanistan by Christmas 2020," cheered Military Times. "Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Northern Syria," the New York Times told us.   For decades, the United States has very often appeared to have "ended" wars that do not, in fact, end at all. Open-ended jargon like "residual counter terror forces," "Vietnamization," "military advisors," along with deliberately ambiguous timetables, process criticisms––all are used to confuse the average media consumer.   America's politicians know the American public broadly dislikes war and empire––and thus wants to see it restrained––but these same politicians don't really want to end wars so they have a frequent PR problem: How do you make it look like you’re ending a war or occupation without really doing so?   To solve this conundrum, American political leaders have perfected the art of fake-ending a war. Which is to say, announcing a war is going to end, typically around election time, only to––once the headlines make a big splash––backtrack, obfuscate, claim the "situation on the ground has changed" or the military involvement will only be in a "limited" or "defensive" capacity, shuffle troops around or find other thin pretexts to continue the war or occupation.   In this episode, we discuss the United States' history of fake-ending wars, who these pronouncements are meant to please, why troops levels are often impossible to know, and why so many of our so-called "wars" are not really wars at all, but military occupations that are never really meant to end.   Our guest is Shireen Al-Adeimi, assistant professor at Michigan State University.

The purpose of our twenty-first class is to explore how and why the United States government chose to enter the quagmire of problems in Vietnam and then to outline the key stages in the fighting as well as the major diplomatic efforts in the Vietnam War. How and why did U.S. foreign policymakers perceive that a serious Cold War problem was developing in Southeast Asia? How exactly did the gradual build-up of forces occur? Students should focus on the challenge posed by the Viet Cong, the growing turmoil in South Vietnam, the Diem assassination, the U.S. anti-war movement, and the Tet offensive. Did Lyndon Johnson make their war into our war? Students should use the lecture and readings to come to their own opinions on the key decisions made by U.S. foreign policymakers: bombing campaigns, Vietnamization, stalemated peace talks, the crescendo of American peace activism at home, the ‘Peace with Honor' equation, and promises and lies by U.S. officials. Finally, the class should consider how defeat and withdrawal was handled, with what domestic and international repercussions? What was the importance of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger as foreign policymakers active in one way or another in the Vietnam conflict? What, in particular, are they remembered for? Did they have foreign policy triumphs? Flaws?

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On November 3, 1969 Richard M. Nixon addressed the nation in what would come to be known as “The Silent Majority Speech”. In 32 minutes, the president promoted his plan for a “Vietnamization” of the war and called upon “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his plan “to end the war in a way that we could win the peace”. Arguing against the immediate cessation of hostilities, Nixon warned of a Communist bloodbath should American troops leave too quickly. Hypocritically, he spoke of peace as he made plans for a massive expansion of the murderous American air campaigns, which would include the criminal bombardment of neutral Cambodia. While he asked for unity, the term “silent majority” stood in sharp contrast to Nixon calling anti-war activists on campus “bums” and the range of racist terms he used for African Americans, Jews, and the LatinX community. In The 'Silent Majority' Speech: Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Origins of the New Right (Routledge, 2019), Scott Laderman argues that this speech was part of Nixon’s rhetorical strategy of using divisive “dog whistle” terms such as “law and order” to cover up his racist appeals to the white working class. According to Laderman the speech was a historical turning point in American political history, opening the way for the Lee Atwaters and Donald Trumps to come. While he shows how this foreign policy speech can work as a prism to understand the later years of the American War in Vietnam, aka the Second Indochina War, Laderman further demonstrate that this speech was an important moment in American domestic politics as it signaled the creation of the New Right. Scott Laderman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth – home of the best surfing in the upper Midwest. Michael G. Vann is a professor of world history at California State University, Sacramento. A specialist in imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, he is the author of The Great Hanoi Rat Hunt: Empires, Disease, and Modernity in French Colonial Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2018). When he’s not quietly reading or happily talking about new books with smart people, Mike can be found surfing in Santa Cruz, California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) was a highly classified, multi-service United States special operations unit which conducted covert unconventional warfare operations prior to and during the Vietnam War. Established on 24 January 1964, the unit conducted strategic reconnaissance missions in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Laos, and Cambodia; carried out the capture of enemy prisoners, rescued downed pilots, conducted rescue operations to retrieve prisoners of war throughout Southeast Asia, and conducted clandestine agent team activities and psychological operations. The unit participated in most of the significant campaigns of the Vietnam War, including the Gulf of Tonkin incident which precipitated increased American involvement, Operation Steel Tiger, Operation Tiger Hound, the Tet Offensive, Operation Commando Hunt, the Cambodian Campaign, Operation Lam Son 719, and the Easter Offensive. The unit was downsized and renamed Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 on 1 May 1972, to support the transfer of its work to the Strategic Technical Directorate of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam – part of the Vietnamization effort. Contact: https://twitter.com/jamesonstravels https://www.instagram.com/jamesons.travels https://jamesonstravels.com/ Podcast -https://anchor.fm/jamesonstravels Blog: https://jamesonstravels.com/ Discord: https://discord.gg/MsmaCyj Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/jamesonstravels Support the channel: *  Patreon - https://www.patreon.com/jamesonstravels *  Paypal - https://Paypal.me/jamesonstravels *  Channel Shirts: https://teespring.com/stores/jamesons-travels *  Free Trial - AudioBook by Audible - https://amzn.to/2YrR4Jp *  Free Trial - Prime Video - https://amzn.to/35dELlA *  Free Trial - https://www.epidemicsound.com/referral/6uiakp/ *  Ebay - https://tinyurl.com/ycnfkqjd *  Ecamm - https://www.ecamm.com/mac/ecammlive/?fp_ref=jamesonstravels *  Cigar of the Day - https://tinyurl.com/y8z6hraa Amazon Affiliate Link - https://amzn.to/3gVnlzq DISCLAIMER: I participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for us to earn fees by linking to Amazon.com and affiliated sites. Links included in this description might be affiliate links. If you purchase a product or service with the links that I provide I may receive a small commission. There is no additional charge to you! Thank you for supporting Jameson's Travels. *Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use. No copyright infringement intended. ALL RIGHTS BELONG TO THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/jamesonstravels/support

In this episode we conclude our series on Vietnam. We consider Richard Nixon's policy of Vietnamization (or "De-Americanization") and the events leading up to Nixon announcing the end of American involvement in Vietnam on 23 January 1973. Nixon was very focused on US foreign policy and we see him visit the Soviet Union and China. Did these visits help bring the war to an end? What about the years following the withdrawal of the United States? Nixon is replaced by Gerald Ford after the Watergate Scandal and we see North Vietnam conquering the South: effectively a victory for the Communist North. How did the South (and the US) lose the Vietnam War? We've drawn extensively on the work of Geoffrey C War and Ken Burns ("The Vietnam War"), as well as Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing ("The Cold War"). We've also consulted Odd Arne Westad's book "The Cold War: A World History."Support the show (https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=Q8KGSAT37YCPA&source=url)

In this episode, I talk about Richard Nixon's presidency.  The Sexual Revolution, welfare, environmentalism, school busing and affirmative action, and Vietnamization all get a shoutout.  And of course, I discuss how the Watergate scandal led to the downfall of Nixon and explosive revelations about the federal government that shook people's faith and helped strengthen the nascent conservative movement.

The year (and summer) of 1969, through the eyes of a young high school boy, that’s the topic of this weekend’s program. In the summer of 1969, your host was already a high school student. In the summer of 1969, we had seen the moon landing. In the summer of 1969, the Woodstock Festival was held in Upstate New York. Earlier, in January of 1969, Richard Nixon had been inaugurated the 37th President of the United States, on a campaign promise of the "Vietnamization" of the ongoing Vietnam war Southeast Asia. Many young men wondered if they would be drafted, and what the future would look like. 1969 was also the year Children's Television Workshop introduced Sesame Street, and the Federal Communications Commission bans all cigarette advertising on television and radio in the United States. In the summer of 1969, Bob had completed his first year of High School. Like many young people of that time, he wondered what his place would be in this ever-changing world. On this weekend’s show, we begin a series on the world, just a half-century ago, and how the events of that time still influences us today. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/your-weekend-show/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/your-weekend-show/support

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Returns of War: South Vietnam and the Price of Refugee Memory (New York University Press, 2018), Long T. Bui examines the complicated relationship between the Vietnamese diasporic community and its home country, the former South Vietnam. Central to Bui’s argument is his use of Richard Nixon’s definition of Vietnamization as a way to frame the postwar afterlives of South Vietnamese refugees, their descendants, and those remaining in Vietnam today. While Nixon used this term as a military strategy to pull the U.S. military out of Vietnam, Vietnamization for Bui is a way to highlight how this Cold War term continues to function as an ideology and a discourse in the Vietnamese American community. Bui utilizes an interdisciplinary approach that includes discourse analysis, interviews, archival research, and personal narrative, in tackling questions of memory, loss, national identity, sovereignty, and agency. This book is both a critical investigation and a tribute to the refugee community that is a legacy of the Vietnam War. Laura Ha Reizman is a PhD candidate in Asian Languages & Cultures at UCLA. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chapter 2, Enlisted History - Section 2D,The Air War Expands, Vietnamization, Humanitarian Airlift, and Post-Vietnam Conflicts

By the spring of 1972, the Vietnam War - in which my U.S. Army brother and I both served - was supposed to be "winding down." President Richard Nixon's commitment to "Vietnamization" - training, equipping & "supporting" the South Vietnamese government & military - was well underway. In February 1972, the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne - the last U.S. ground combat division in The Republic of Vietnam - headed home. By March 1972, U.S. combat troop levels "in country" had dropped from a high of 500,000 American Soldiers & Marines in 1969 to just two Army brigades guarding fixed installations and a few thousand U.S. "advisors" embedded with South Vietnamese forces. With President Nixon facing re-election - and making overtures to Beijing & Moscow - North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap convinced the Politburo in Hanoi that the spring of 1972 was the "perfect time" to strike a devastating blow against the U.S. supported government in Saigon. Giap chose noon, Thursday, 30 March - the eve of Good Friday and Easter weekend and the holiest of holidays for Christians in South Vietnam - as "H-Hour." His intent was to make this assault an even greater propaganda victory than "Tet 1968." He nearly succeeded. Tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles poured across the Demilitarized Zone and raced toward a strategic bridge U.S. Navy "Seabees" had built over the Cua Viet River near the town of Dong Ha, less than 8 miles south of the DMZ. It was there that a battalion of Vietnamese Marines and a handful of American advisors were all that stood in the way of the enemy. Among them - U.S. Marine Captain John Ripley - was determined to keep the North Vietnamese Army from crossing the river. The raw courage and personal resolve he showed has become legend in the annals of American military history. To make this riveting documentary, our War Stories team returned to Vietnam with my dear departed Marine friend, Colonel John Ripley. We retraced the epic battle & walked ground we both defended when we served in 3rd Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment. You'll also meet the South Vietnamese Marine Battalion Commander - Major Nguyen Binh - whose men fought to the death beside Captain Ripley in Dong Ha during the Easter '72 offensive. If you're not moved by the accounts of the eyewitness participants in this bloody fight, seek immediate medical attention. Your heart may have already stopped. That's an order!

U.S. forces invade a distant country in order to disarm an international threat to American security. They fight well, and win every major battle decisively. They become occupiers, and find themselves engaged in a low-level guerrilla war against a determined though shadowy enemy. The American-backed government has a tenuous hold on power, and it is unclear whether it can survive without significant U.S. military aid. Nevertheless, the American political climate favors rapid withdrawal.  The U.S. forces are ordered to prepare the country’s military to take over “major combat operations.” The results of these efforts are mixed. No one seems to know what will happen in the country, but one thing is sure: the Americans are leaving. That was the situation in Vietnam in 1970; so too is it the situation in Iraq today. Thus there could be no more timely moment to revisit Lt. Col. James Willbanks’ (ret.) outstanding Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University of Kansas, 2004; reissue, 2008). Lt. Col. Willbanks is uniquely positioned to tell the tale. He is an excellent historian with a gift for plainspoken, even-handed analysis. But not only that: he was also there. Lt. Col. Willbanks served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese forces during the era of “Vietnamization” in the early 1970s. In Abandoning Vietnam, Willbanks shows just how the Nixon administration’s plan to win “peace with honor” won neither. There are lessons here. Let us hope that whomever is charged with the unenviable task of extricating the U.S. from Iraq will heed them. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

U.S. forces invade a distant country in order to disarm an international threat to American security. They fight well, and win every major battle decisively. They become occupiers, and find themselves engaged in a low-level guerrilla war against a determined though shadowy enemy. The American-backed government has a tenuous hold on power, and it is unclear whether it can survive without significant U.S. military aid. Nevertheless, the American political climate favors rapid withdrawal.  The U.S. forces are ordered to prepare the country’s military to take over “major combat operations.” The results of these efforts are mixed. No one seems to know what will happen in the country, but one thing is sure: the Americans are leaving. That was the situation in Vietnam in 1970; so too is it the situation in Iraq today. Thus there could be no more timely moment to revisit Lt. Col. James Willbanks’ (ret.) outstanding Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University of Kansas, 2004; reissue, 2008). Lt. Col. Willbanks is uniquely positioned to tell the tale. He is an excellent historian with a gift for plainspoken, even-handed analysis. But not only that: he was also there. Lt. Col. Willbanks served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese forces during the era of “Vietnamization” in the early 1970s. In Abandoning Vietnam, Willbanks shows just how the Nixon administration’s plan to win “peace with honor” won neither. There are lessons here. Let us hope that whomever is charged with the unenviable task of extricating the U.S. from Iraq will heed them. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

U.S. forces invade a distant country in order to disarm an international threat to American security. They fight well, and win every major battle decisively. They become occupiers, and find themselves engaged in a low-level guerrilla war against a determined though shadowy enemy. The American-backed government has a tenuous hold on power, and it is unclear whether it can survive without significant U.S. military aid. Nevertheless, the American political climate favors rapid withdrawal.  The U.S. forces are ordered to prepare the country’s military to take over “major combat operations.” The results of these efforts are mixed. No one seems to know what will happen in the country, but one thing is sure: the Americans are leaving. That was the situation in Vietnam in 1970; so too is it the situation in Iraq today. Thus there could be no more timely moment to revisit Lt. Col. James Willbanks’ (ret.) outstanding Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University of Kansas, 2004; reissue, 2008). Lt. Col. Willbanks is uniquely positioned to tell the tale. He is an excellent historian with a gift for plainspoken, even-handed analysis. But not only that: he was also there. Lt. Col. Willbanks served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese forces during the era of “Vietnamization” in the early 1970s. In Abandoning Vietnam, Willbanks shows just how the Nixon administration’s plan to win “peace with honor” won neither. There are lessons here. Let us hope that whomever is charged with the unenviable task of extricating the U.S. from Iraq will heed them. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

U.S. forces invade a distant country in order to disarm an international threat to American security. They fight well, and win every major battle decisively. They become occupiers, and find themselves engaged in a low-level guerrilla war against a determined though shadowy enemy. The American-backed government has a tenuous hold on power, and it is unclear whether it can survive without significant U.S. military aid. Nevertheless, the American political climate favors rapid withdrawal.  The U.S. forces are ordered to prepare the country’s military to take over “major combat operations.” The results of these efforts are mixed. No one seems to know what will happen in the country, but one thing is sure: the Americans are leaving. That was the situation in Vietnam in 1970; so too is it the situation in Iraq today. Thus there could be no more timely moment to revisit Lt. Col. James Willbanks’ (ret.) outstanding Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University of Kansas, 2004; reissue, 2008). Lt. Col. Willbanks is uniquely positioned to tell the tale. He is an excellent historian with a gift for plainspoken, even-handed analysis. But not only that: he was also there. Lt. Col. Willbanks served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese forces during the era of “Vietnamization” in the early 1970s. In Abandoning Vietnam, Willbanks shows just how the Nixon administration’s plan to win “peace with honor” won neither. There are lessons here. Let us hope that whomever is charged with the unenviable task of extricating the U.S. from Iraq will heed them. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

U.S. forces invade a distant country in order to disarm an international threat to American security. They fight well, and win every major battle decisively. They become occupiers, and find themselves engaged in a low-level guerrilla war against a determined though shadowy enemy. The American-backed government has a tenuous hold on power, and it is unclear whether it can survive without significant U.S. military aid. Nevertheless, the American political climate favors rapid withdrawal.  The U.S. forces are ordered to prepare the country’s military to take over “major combat operations.” The results of these efforts are mixed. No one seems to know what will happen in the country, but one thing is sure: the Americans are leaving. That was the situation in Vietnam in 1970; so too is it the situation in Iraq today. Thus there could be no more timely moment to revisit Lt. Col. James Willbanks’ (ret.) outstanding Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University of Kansas, 2004; reissue, 2008). Lt. Col. Willbanks is uniquely positioned to tell the tale. He is an excellent historian with a gift for plainspoken, even-handed analysis. But not only that: he was also there. Lt. Col. Willbanks served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese forces during the era of “Vietnamization” in the early 1970s. In Abandoning Vietnam, Willbanks shows just how the Nixon administration’s plan to win “peace with honor” won neither. There are lessons here. Let us hope that whomever is charged with the unenviable task of extricating the U.S. from Iraq will heed them. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices