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Riccardo Cosentino takes an ongoing LinkedIn debate with Ian Heptinstall live in this episode of Navigating Major Programmes for a fascinating conversation with one common goal: to elevate major programmes. The pair discuss the use of reference class forecasting, the predominance of strategic misrepresentation, and optimism bias during project estimation—both drawing on their practical and academic experiences to substantiate their points. “One of my concerns, if we think the problem with projects is that our estimates are too light and the answer is to increase the estimates, is that it is a vicious spiral. That just means expected costs will go up and up and up over time. If we separate the three elements of time, and think maybe we missed the target, not because the target was impossible, but our methods of execution were such that it made it very hard to achieve the target. That actually gives us an opening for a virtuous cycle because there are, so called, black swans that show that the same estimates are achievable and can be done reliably. ” –   Ian Heptinstall   Ian Heptinstall combines over 35 years of industry experience with academic expertise, to bring a unique perspective to CapEx & Construction Project Management and Procurement & Supply Chain. As an Associate Professor at the University of Birmingham, Ian focuses on practical methodologies like Theory of Constraints (TOC), critical chain, and collaborative procurement, which he advocates for practically improving performance in various industries. Key Takeaways:The importance of focusing on execution and preparation over quality of estimations  Tipping the Iron Law on its head with collaborative contracting, IPD and alliance contracting  Reference class forecasting in project management: advantages and limitationsImpact of strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias; the political influence on project estimates and management  If you enjoyed this episode, make sure and give us a five star rating and leave us a review on iTunes, Podcast Addict, Podchaser or Castbox. The conversation doesn't stop here—connect and converse with our LinkedIn community: Follow Ian Heptinstall on LinkedInFollow Navigating Major Programmes on LinkedInFollow Riccardo Cosentino on LinkedInRead Riccardo's latest at wwww.riccardocosentino.com Transcript:Riccardo Cosentino  0:05  You're listening to Navigating Major Programmes, a podcast that aims to elevate the conversations happening in the infrastructure industry and inspire you to have a more efficient approach within it. I'm your host, Riccardo Cosentino. I bring over 20 years of Major Programme Management experience. Most recently, I graduated from Oxford University Saïd Business School, which shook my belief when it comes to navigating major programmes. Now it's time to shake yours. Join me in each episode as I press the industry experts about the complexity of Major Programme Management, emerging digital trends and the critical leadership required to approach these multibillion-dollar projects. Let's see where the conversation takes us.   Riccardo Cosentino  0:53  Hello, everyone, and welcome to a new episode of Navigating Major Programmes. I'm here today with Ian Heptinstall, who is Associate Professor in Programme and Project Management at the University of Birmingham and he's joining me today from Birmingham, I assume. How are you doing, Ian?   Ian Heptinstall  1:09  Hi, Riccardo. Not quite Birmingham, I live in Cheshire. So I'm closer to Manchester or Liverpool than Birmingham.   Riccardo Cosentino  1:15  Okay.   Ian Heptinstall  1:16  But fortunately, most of my students aren't at Birmingham either, they're all over the world. Riccardo Cosentino  1:21  And I mean, maybe just for the audience, you and I connected a few times on LinkedIn exchanging views, exchanging comments on various posts on various topics. And so I think we finally, I think you finally prompted that we could have a more productive conversation on the podcast rather than on comments on LinkedIn, which is always helpful, but probably not the most conducive way of having a conversation. And so why don't you tell us a little bit about yourself?   Ian Heptinstall  1:48  Exactly, thank you, Riccardo. I am Ian Heptinstall. I'm a late career academic, I've been working in academia at the University of Birmingham now for five years, primarily in a teaching role, although I've started to add some research elements to that. And I currently teach on an MSc program that's delivered to part-time students who study by distance learning. So my students are working in project organizations on projects all around the world. And they want to add to that master's level insight. And as we were chatting too before, our focus in the UK is that at master's level, the key component of that is critical thinking, critical analysis, critical thinking, understanding the evidence behind ideas. But before I joined academia, I had 35 years or so in practical experience. I qualified as an engineer. I started working in the chemical industry in the mid-80s, mostly in project-related roles, either managing small projects or manufacturing facilities, and managing larger projects, being a technical expert, often supporting projects. That was back in the days when project owners had a self-delivery capability, so they had their own engineering organizations. Interestingly, in the 90s, the company I worked for was known as ICI, which doesn't really exist anymore. But it was the third largest chemical company in the world, so-called bellwether of the U.K. business environment and the U.K. stock market. But during the 90s, it was one of the many organizations that started to sort of what Professor Stuart Reid calls "hollowing out," that in-house capability of employees was reduced with a view to what we can but that service in as and when we needed it. And actually, in the late 90s and early 2000s, client organizations could buy that in because the contractors and consultancies had ex-employees there who had got that 20 years of experience of how to think like a project owner and what impact that had on managing the project through its own lifecycle. So that gave me the chance to see projects from the owner's perspective and a supplier's perspective. Later in the 90s, I was involved in one of the first collaborative contracted project alliances in the U.K. that wasn't in the oil and gas industry. And now, I don't understand why all project procurement is not done collaboratively using project alliances. But that's not the topic for tonight's discussion.  Riccardo Cosentino  5:08  Yeah, that's another podcast. That's another long podcast. You and I exchanged on this a few times.   Ian Heptinstall  5:14  Yeah, definitely.   Riccardo Cosentino  5:17  So what are we talking about today, then? Ian Heptinstall  5:20  We, as you said, we had some chats on LinkedIn about the ideas of the use of reference class forecasting, the predominance of strategic misrepresentation, optimism bias during project estimation, all wrapped up into what I've started calling the optimistic estimate hypothesis. In the debts, a proposed way that project environments work. The idea being because the data shows that most estimates, sorry, most projects fail to achieve their targets, Flyvbjerg made famous as the Iron Law of projects, was the Iron Law of mega project management, but became projects, that is about over time, over budget, under benefits, over and over again. And I think there's a significantly strong range of data that says a large proportion of projects fail to hit their own targets. So my argument wasn't with that conclusion. What I'm calling the optimistic estimate hypothesis says the reason for that is that the targets themselves were always impossible to achieve. And because they're impossible to achieve, that's why we never hit them. And therefore, the solution to that is to stop impossible targets being associated with projects when they get approved. And then the proposed intervention is using a technique known as reference class forecasting or a variation of reference class forecasting. So not always based on absolute values but relative percentage performance, which is another concern of the implementation of the method. It basically says, let's make sure that the target is at least compatible to targets we've had in the past. And on face value, I've got no issue with that. If, like me, you've come up from fairly mature project management and engineering environments, one of the estimating methods that has always been used is based on past performance. Riccardo Cosentino  7:56  Benchmarking.   Ian Heptinstall  7:57  Yeah. It's not performance benchmarking in the true sense of the term, it's taking your own data and seeing how compatible it is. Parametric estimating is a method, so long as you've got the feedback cycles from actuals that keep your estimating databases up to date. Now maybe tying into the observation about the hollowing out of project-owning organizations, maybe that feedback loop of capturing actuals and feeding it back into estimating data was broken. I don't know, you're probably more closely associated with that than I am. Professional estimators should not be naive of real estimating data in the past. I can't see it just as being biased from professional estimators. Amateur estimators, I can understand how they would be naive and miss things, but not professionals. Riccardo Cosentino  9:02  Look, I'm a big subscriber of your theory. I am 100% in agreement with you. In fact, I think your theory or thesis has got a lot of strength and in fact.   Ian Heptinstall  9:21  Can we clarify which one because I don't think the optimistic estimate hypothesis is valid. I'm just describing what it is. We're here for me to fix some holes in it.   Riccardo Cosentino  9:31  So, I actually think it's, I think it's actually very valid. And the reason I think it's very valid, because in my experience, I have always looked at a project, you know I've 25 years experience in this industry, and I always wondered from a purely technical standpoint, if you had unlimited access to data or if you have a lot of data and you have a lot of experience and you have a lot of experienced individuals, you can approximate an estimate. However, historically, or my experience was that all of the projects I worked on were over budget, all of them. So I could not understand how very capable, very intelligent human beings, with great experience could not estimate a closer to the actual. Because statistically speaking, I mean, if it was random, it will be 50/50. Right? You know, sometimes.   Ian Heptinstall  10:33  Why? There's many phenomena in the world that are not normally distributed. So why would we expect it if it was really random? But I don't think it is random? I think it's (inaudible). Riccardo Cosentino  10:48  I don't think it is random either. But that's what I'm saying. It's like, if it was random, it would be 50/50. Right? So if he was really, if it was impossible to estimate something, or really, really, really difficult to estimate something, then it will be a random outcome, which will be a 50/50. But that's not a problem we have because the majority of the projects are over budget, right? It's not, or at least the mega project. Let me define it a bit, a bit better, it's not really the mega project that I have experience with.   Ian Heptinstall  11:25  Shall I give you a mega project that smashed the reference class?   Riccardo Cosentino  11:31  Yes.   Ian Heptinstall  11:33  Anyone who travels a lot long distances will know Embraer who work along with Bombardier, make the sort of medium-sized passenger jets, with Boeing and Airbus on the much bigger jet. The reference class for designing, developing and bringing to operations a new passenger jet was between 80 and 100 months. And in the new jets that have been produced the century since the turn of the millennium, many have estimated six years, but they've all taken about eight years. Embraer estimated five years and completed the project seven weeks early. So had they planned and achieved to the reference class, they'd have brought the second generation E-jets, the E2 jets to market just before COVID struck. As it is now, the E2 jets have had, for them, record sales performance and one of the most efficient in their class on the market at the moment. So they didn't follow the reference class. And it's extremely complex to about a four to $5 billion project. Riccardo Cosentino  13:08  And I don't, okay, I think, I think, I don't, I think we were saying, I think I was trying to explain why I believe that the, how do you call it, the optimism estimate hypothesis, because it resonates with, why it resonates with me is because I think there is something systemic in the way the estimates are put together. I couldn't put my finger to it before I started reading, got myself educated on the topic. And that sounds a fairly rational explanation that, you know, strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias play a role in that. The reference class forecasting, I think I need to clarify, because I would never make an estimate out of a reference class forecaste. Like, that's not how you estimate things. And I think when you don't have the certainty, when you're talking about things where you making assumptions, you're never going to be 100% correct. So the way, personally, I think you have to do it and this is done in other industry, you triangulate, you know, you start from a bottom up, then you do a top down and then you start layering on qualitative factors and then at the end, you make a decision on what number to pick, but it's a decision based on on multiple parameters. And to me, reference forecasts, you know, I give the example many times about the mergers and acquisition industry, right? In M&A, you start with the discounted cash flow, lets you bottom up estimate of how much your company's worth and then, but whenever you do a DCF you need to make assumptions you know, you got to predict what the revenue growth over the next five years is going to be, blah, blah, blah. And so those assumptions might or might not be right. So you have one data point, then you have another data point, which is your reference class forecast. So in the finance industry, it's going to comps ratio, comps analysis, where you're looking at similar companies. You're looking at how much they're worth on the stock market and you trying to draw similarity. And that's your second data point that will be different from your bottom up. It'd be your top, right? So now you got two data points on trying to identify what a company is worth, and the worth of a company is very subjective as well. So then you got to layer in your qualitative analysis. So to me, yeah, I'm not here to debate the reference class forecast. It is an estimating tool. I'm here to debate that there is optimism bias and the risk strategic measure representation. And so what do we do about that? Ian Heptinstall  15:56  I agree that those things exist. The optimism bias, I'm not sure. I'm still still thinking about that bit. Because if you, in reading the literature, a strong link is made to the work of Kahneman and Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's introduction of the term optimism bias and estimates. And what's interesting is if you look at, Kahneman use as an example that he was involved in developing a new educational course and textbook in Israel, and when you read it through, the bad with retrospect estimates were from the non-experts, the expert in the room knew it would take seven years and had the reference class in their head. But they were not, you know, they were in a support role. So actually, the expert estimate was quite good. It was the amateur estimate that was deemed to be optimistic. But when thinking about that, it seemed to me that when we're talking about time and money, either spent or estimated, they, an estimate will have three components. The first component is what it is feasible to do with it. The perfect position. Then there's another set of factors that relate to things outside your control, outside influences, unknowable risks and things that could emerge that have an impact on how long something will take. But there are two separate components. There's actually a third component particularly relevant when we're talking about projects, and that the whole collection of, of managerial practices of how we go about doing the thing, so that the time that we estimate and the time that it takes, I like to see us having at least those three major components. Now, the "iron law of projects" tells us that the total time estimate was less than it actually took us. I think we get much more insight, if we think okay, well, which of those three components had the biggest role to play? Was it, it being feasible or unfeasible? Was the estimate that bad it was physically impossible to do? Were there things that were unreasonable that professionals to have known about in advance? Were there the black swans, so to speak? And if there were, at least that explains to us where the issue arose? Or was it how we go about managing and implementing our projects? Are they inherently inefficient? Are they the reason that we struggle so much to deliver to our estimates? So, I'm questioning is it the feasibility of the estimate that's wrong? Or is it how we've gone about doing it? Because in the field of construction capital projects, the methods around the world are fairly consistent. You know, where I've done my straw polls over my career, I see great levels of similarity. People often, "How do you know so much because you've never been to our country before?" Colombia, you're not that different. How do you know African oil and gas industry? I've had the same conversations. Because I've said you're not as different as you think you are. But I think that third element is where the differences arise. Now, an analogy that I often use is if we think about the winning a marathon, world class athletes have no problem running a marathon in two and a half hours. Now, if I estimate that I will run my first ever marathon in two and a half hours, that estimate is not unfeasible. It's very unlikely. But it's unlikely because of the managerial aspects. Will I put the time and effort into the training? Will I do the preparation? Will I drink less and eat better food? Will I? So it's how I go about preparing for the marathon. One of my concerns if we think the problem with projects is our estimates are too light, and the answer is to increase the estimates, that's a vicious spiral. That just means expected costs will go up and up and up over time. If we separate the three elements of time and think maybe we missed the target, not because the target was impossible, but our methods of execution was such that it made it very hard to achieve the target, that actually gives us an opening for a virtuous cycle because there are so-called black swans that show that the same estimates are achievable and can be done reliably. We touched upon the area of collaborative contracting, IBD, project alliancing. This project from hundreds of real-life projects that have tipped the iron law on its head, you probably know, well know the Walker Hartley and Mills paper from 2013 from Australia, they had, 4% of projects went over budget, and about 20% went over time. So 90% were on or under budget 75% were on or under time. And all they changed was how the projects was procured. Riccardo Cosentino  22:13  So you're not going to get an argument from me on on that topic because I do believe, I, you know, another hypothesis, I do believe that collaboration is the answer when you're dealing with complex projects. However, just going back challenging a little bit on the is it the estimate was not feasible to begin with, is it actually the execution, if we increase the budgets to begin with, are we just to even cover the poor execution. I'm paraphrasing what you're saying. But, having said that, well, yeah, and this, this is more on the, you know, when you are dealing with lump sum, turnkey contracts rather than Alliance contract, where ultimately, a client comes up with an estimate, right, they have their own estimate, they have a budget, and especially for public sector clients, those budget are, even are fully disclosed and known in ballparks. And now you have a contractor trying to win the work. And, I think we talked about this, before we came online is you know, the contractor knows that in order to win the contract will have to be near or below the client estimate. And so now, the optimism bias, the strategic misrepresentation is perpetuated in the bidding process by the contractors because they need to secure the work. Right? So in in an environment where you have lump sum turnkey fixed price, I do think it matters to start with the right budget, because that dictates the behaviors of the parties in the following steps.   Ian Heptinstall  23:57  But what is the right budget? If you want a budget that is very feasible to be achieved? If people work in a particular way, yes. But then you risk just wasting lots of money because a fixed price lump sum contract is that what it will cost you whether it's needed or not. And yeah, if there weren't these high-risk pressures on the participants to sort of play games, hide things, not be totally open and honest. And one of my concerns with the idea of strategic misrepresentation and the term deception, these people are being deceptive, no, they're playing by the rules of the game that are set in. Now, as Eli Goldratt once said, "Tell me how you measure me, and I'll tell you how I will behave. If you measure me in a dumb way, don't complain about my behavior." And I think that's what we're observing in many of the practices in the construction sector where owners are using processes and then they're complaining when they don't win, or change the rules of the game or the approach they take is to get better at this adversarial aggressive game. So we see projects where the most experienced, the most capable and the most highly-salaried individuals are those trying to control and police the contractual loopholes and administrating and nail everything down, and the lawyers, the commercial managers, the senior (inaudible). Yep. A fortune is being spent on people who are not thinking about   Riccardo Cosentino  26:00  Solving problems. Ian Heptinstall  26:01  How do we get this hospital built quickly? How do we get this hospital built so that it's open and treating people 18 months sooner than we have in the past? Or that we can have 20 more beds, or that we can free up some money to employ so many more healthcare practitioners? It's focusing on the skills on the wrong thing. And actually, I think the industry is going to have a big problem if we get our way and collaborative contracting becomes the norm. What are we going to do with the hundreds of thousands of professionally qualified contract police? That's what a lot of people do. Riccardo Cosentino  26:46  Ian, again, I'm not gonna argue with you, because on that you and I agree, 100, like, to me, I think you said it and I always say it, like, there are resources on projects that add no value or solving problems for the success of the project. And so redirecting the the effort to those results, or redirecting those resources, to more meaningful, yeah, as I said, a lawyer, you know, a claim against the client does not make concrete being poured faster, you know? A schedule analysis in order to substantiate a claim does not make concrete being poured faster. Ian Heptinstall  27:29  And actually, the the issue with that is I think that the skills and the capability to manage the detail flow of work so that concrete is poured faster and worked on sooner, that sort of logistics flow management capability is also petrifying. Now, projects that are getting into techniques and methods like lean construction, are starting to work on that, or project production management are starting to bring in some of those skills and knowledge of how to how to manage the flow of work. But it's suddenly become a niche rather, whereas it should really be core. And the core skill is actually contract administering and locking up (inaudible).   Riccardo Cosentino  28:23  No value add, right? There is no value add to the ultimate goal, which is building infrastructure.   Ian Heptinstall  28:29  Back to the strategic misrepresentation, maybe. Riccardo Cosentino  28:30  No, I actually wanted to probe you on this, because I've had a few people in the past challenging me, and you and I have exchanged messages on this topic. But you know, one of the big criticism, and this is a small parenthesis because this is not what we're talking about today, but like the cost certainty, right? You know, I have people telling me, well, you know, if you don't have a fixed price contract, you don't have cost certainty. Ian Heptinstall  28:58  And they have got evidence that the contracted price is the final price. I have not seen that evidence. And whenever I ask experienced practitioners, they say none of the final price is always more than the tender price. So if you want cost certainty, put so much padding in there that everybody can fill their boots. But if you're in the public sector, that's almost malfeasance. Yeah, just just wasting taxpayers money just so that you can have an easy life. That's not what a professional job should be about, in my view. And I think the important point in there is focusing on reliability. Are you hitting our targets? The only thing that we can do is we take the target as sort of wherever it comes from that's the important thing and we've just got to match it. What about absolute value?  Why are we not focusing on what is the absolute value? Yeah, but by the reliability school of thinking, it's better if your company makes $10 million a year, having targeted $10 million, that's actually better than making $15 million of profit in the year, because your target was 18. The 15 is rubbish, because you were 18% underneath your target, it's much better to have 100% reliability even if the profit is lower. I don't buy that. There is a role for a stretch target. The idea of smart has caused a lot of damage to performance improvement. Now, if you're looking to strive to continuously improve the performance, you don't want to put too much pressure on the individual if they miss what they're trying to achieve. Now you need to be able to manage in different ways. You need to be able to, the accountability is about how somebody goes about doing the job. Not the trivial, easy to measure accountability of numbers on a spreadsheet. I don't need to know how they're doing the job, I just need to look at some numbers. Well, if you want a simple career, become an arm's length investor or go buy a casino in Las Vegas. Because then you don't care about the individual gamblers and who makes or less. You're managing by the average statistics of the organization. On project, we want to be the individual who knows what to do. We need to be striving for what is it we do to deliver a P-10 project? Not let's make our life easy, and plan for P-90. And that's my other concern about if we blame the estimate, we're taking the focus off our leverage improvements or improvement, our leverage opportunities for improvement rather, those are how we go about doing projects. And I actually believe that if we focus first on absolute performance, reliability will get better. Yeah, that I don't whether you play golf, I (inaudible). Riccardo Cosentino  32:45  Unsuccessfully. Yes. Ian Heptinstall  32:47  My son is very good at playing golf. And he's got a very low handicap, certainly much lower than mine. And his focus, the focus of low handicap golfers is getting better at golf. Their focus is absolute performance. And you know what comes with it? They're much more reliable, their variability of play also goes down. But if you focus on just playing to your handicap, yeah, you will do some very different things. And you might, you might play to your handicap, but you won't do very good rounds of golf. And I think on project, we should be focusing on how can we make your project performance significantly better? Yeah, I think if I was still operating in large, mega projects, I'd be frustrated that the Starrett Brothers and Eken could build the Empire State Building and formed it in 10 days in 1929 when we can't do anything like that today, and I don't believe it's because we have safety rules these days. It's nowhere near as simple as that. If the industry had started to perform like other industries have, the Ford was making the Model T around that time, yet cars are just as affordable these days, but you get much, much, much more for your money. Construction projects cost more and take longer.   Riccardo Cosentino  34:31  Yeah, I take your point. I mean, you know, absolutely, I mean, we should be focusing on measuring performance and focusing on the performance because ultimately, that's the stuff that gets things built. It's not, an initial estimate is not what gets things built. But unfortunately, stakeholders and shareholders focus on it.   Ian Heptinstall  34:57  They want to make more money. If you've only got a business, the idea of risk comes with any entrepreneurship and business. They know all their forecasts or estimates. Yeah, if sales come in on forecasts, somebody's been playing with the numbers. Yeah, nobody can see the future. So where do you think that comes from? Riccardo Cosentino  35:23  Again, I think cooperation and public, especially public company, by any corporation, has to deliver, has to provide indication of future performance.   Ian Heptinstall  35:37  Yeah. Let me give you an example. Because my other set of black swans that disprove the optimistic estimate hypothesis, so I've mentioned all the data on collaboratively contracted budgets, so all done. All projects are not overspending. It is possible to deliver and achieve the estimates. There's no evidence on those projects that the estimates have been done in any different way. And if they have, then that approach has helped avoid optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Which surely must also be a good thing. But one of my other set, and this is the Embraer example that I used earlier on, that's an example that have used the critical chain of both scheduling and execution management, which is, needs a collaborative team. But exploits that collaboration to identify issues much earlier on and overcome them. So it focuses on that doing the work. Even though from one perspective, it's just a way of scheduling and reporting. If it's done well, it helps to introduce a much higher frequency, a higher cadence of reporting and decision making at a much lower level. That is what achieves more efficient performance. So on critical chain, critical chain, scheduling and execution projects, hit their project-level commitments, very, very regularly. I know many organizations and I have talked to people in many organizations who have sort of moved from 20% projects on time in full to 95-100% in all sorts of project domains, simply from changing how they're scheduing and managing execution. They've also increased productivity as well. But if we're just looking, the reliability has gone up at the project level. What hasn't changed is the ability to predict how long individual tasks take. So that's the sort of strange dilemma, the individual tasks are nowhere near as predictable and reliable. But the overall project is, and I think if you're striving for reliable project level, cost and time is quite feasible, I think. I think it's quite feasible to live it. But if you pass the same mindset down at the detail levels of projects and try and get each individual task and activity to give an estimate, turn it into a commitment will hold you to accountable for it, that actually drives the behaviors that makes the project level achievement much worse. Riccardo Cosentino  38:56  Yeah and why is that? Ian Heptinstall  38:59  I think its inherent in the behavior of complex systems. Because the future is unknowable. And we all know that estimate is a fancy professional name for guests. So the important thing when you're working is to work efficiently and flag up issues that can have a consequence to the rest of the project as soon as you notice them without giving the boy who cried wolf signals that sort of says I've got a problem when it's not a real problem. And methods like critical chain, try and sort of do that damping. So individual tasks that are just taking a bit longer than normal the project to accommodate because we know that some projects, some tasks will have problems and some will go smoothly. But in advance we don't know which. So methods like critical chain and the costing equivalent for collaborative contracting, let's not worry about it. Because if we don't make those estimates into commitments, they will average each other out. That's one of the ironies of organizations that use Monte Carlo simulation to try and sort of aggregate up the numbers and produce and use the central limit theorem to get overall probability distributions at the project level. Because the the basic method of sorry, the basic algorithm for Monte Carlo assumes that the pluses balance the minuses. That's built into the maths. The trouble is, behaviorally, the managerial behaviors inhibit that, because the task estimates are commitment, what tends to happen is tasks get completed, on the due date or later. It's the managerial behaviors that inhibit a project or task saying ours finished three weeks early, the next task can start earlier. But that plus and minus is built into the maths of Monte Carlo. So when critics say well, Monte Carlo analysis is inaccurate, because the numbers never look like the analysis, and you know, a P-80, we never, we don't have 80% of the cases coming in, under or on that number. So the method must be wrong. Or actually, maybe it's giving us some insight into our managerial practices, or inhibiting the sort of pluses and the minuses. So I think that's what critical chain builds in. It allows and encourages the Task Managers to, so long as they're working in a focused way and they're reporting regularly, if it takes longer, it takes longer, because we know, there'll be other tasks in the project that go shorter than expected. And because we've removed the managerial obstacles to reporting admitting an early finish, nobody's going to come back and said, You must have added your estimate. We will reduce all of your other future estimates. We'll say, great, well done. Look who's with you. So in effect, you're embracing the inherent uncertainty, so that the central limit theorem will apply. And so that the project actually gets a tighter normal distribution. So the reason we don't get that in reality, in more common conventions, is that the management practices inhibit the pluses and the minuses averaging out. That's one hypothesis. That's the underpinning thinking.   Riccardo Cosentino  43:05  So if we link that back to the initial, at the beginning, you were talking about the three element of the hypothesis, right? Is a project over budget because of the inherent lack of feasibility of the initial estimate, poor, at the other spectrum, is the poor management, sorry the management practices we're not running these jobs properly and that's why we're late and over budget. And what was the middle one? The middle one was   Ian Heptinstall  43:34  Those are the true black swans and unknowable risks that come along with that, you know, they, that the the ground conditions on your chosen route, really were bad. Yeah, whether you do lots of geotechnical surveys before or after that is still at risk. Riccardo Cosentino  43:57  So your, one of your hypothesis, if I'm not mistaken, is that if we focus on the unfeasibility of the estimate, if we assume that is the unfeasibility of the estimate that is creating the delays we were hiding, that allows us to hide the true reasons why the project is going bad. Ian Heptinstall  44:20  Yeah, and it   Riccardo Cosentino  44:21  It could be the black swans or it could be poor performance.   Ian Heptinstall  44:24  Yeah, it hides it and it stops us focusing on getting our performance well. So yeah, back to my marathon running analogy. I had someone looked at some data from the London Marathon. So the P-90 duration for winning the marathon is six hours 15 minutes. And if I planned for the P-90, six hours 15, and managed to achieve it, great but no big thing counts a great winner. And to be honest, I will be dissatisfied myself. Because I know if you've, if you've put some time and effort in, it's quite feasible for average humans to hit the P-25 or the P-10 number. So it's not it's not the estimate, it's how we go about doing it. That's, that's my main concern. We've lost, we're blaming the estimate, and we're losing focus on execution. And there's so much actual strategic opportunity for executing differently. I, once we get the estimate, right, we turn the handle, turn the handle, churn out the railway easy.   Riccardo Cosentino  45:47  Okay, so now, the comments on LinkedIn are not very conducive to understand each other's points. So I think that's the conclusion I draw. And I agree with you, I 100% agree with you. My only note is that I also tried, the reason I'm a big defender of optimism bias, which is human representation is for very similar reason to yours, but I'm coming from a different perspective. You know, I am so fed up of seeing, especially in large, mega projects, sponsored by the public sector, they end up becoming political, in Canada will be a hockey puck, a political party, right? They just get tossed around. And, you know, there's a new government and an old government and you know, there's a blame game that happens. And the blame games is always around project over budget and late, right? And there is never a recognition of, you know, there's, the management of the project was very poor and that's why he's over budget. Well, you don't actually know that, Mr. Politician, or Miss Politician, you don't know that. You just, you're using that situation to your political to create political advantage. And so to me, I find that it's also disingenuous, right? It's both sides of the coin, it's two sides of the same coin, right? Where, you know, estimate could be used not to focus on the performance, but that performance being good or bad? Because a lot of time, my experience is that project leaders get blamed for project being late. And the analysis is never done why was the project late? And there's never an analysis around was it ran properly and you had a bad estimate? Or did you have a good estimate and and they were ran badly? I think I agree with you that the conversation should be about the project performance, always should be about the project performance. And I would, I, sometimes, you need a proper estimate to have a proper conversation. Ian Heptinstall  48:01  Oh, yes, you, you definitely need to have a decent estimate that in the same way, that the iron law of projects doesn't prove that the management was bad, it doesn't prove that the estimate was bad, either.   Riccardo Cosentino  48:16  Absolutely. Ian Heptinstall  48:17  You need to scratch below the surface. That's my concern about the optimistic estimate hypothesis is it's being used in many environments as the explanation for the iron law. And therefore we focus on the estimate. And there's promotion of reference class forecasting, which good estimates are always based on the reference class anyway. And if they're not, there's something sort of structurally strategic wrong with the organization that's delivering the projects. And that will touch upon your comment there regarding that. Where's the analysis being done? Where's the evidence being gathered from an individual project and fed back so that future projects at least don't suffer from those particular issues and problems? How's that being built in? When I started, we had such a system, this so-called double loop feedback, so that project managers on a project, the guidance was reasonably well up to date, whether it was estimates, methodologies, checklists, they were kept up to date. If you don't have that, it's very difficult for organizations to manage and continuously improve their performance. But, having said that, I see these so many execution, efficiency opportunities that I'm not sure why that's where we don't start. Yeah, there's some opportunities in that I've mentioned and discussed that there's also the idea, which also has a very strong evidence base, that projects that move into execution, before sufficient preparation has been done, the extensive data from IPA, Independent Project Analysis and the CII, Construction Industry Institute, in the U.S. Yeah, that sort of 30-year-old data, a strong correlation between the degree of preparation before execution is commenced. But how many projects today, the politicians want to talk, they talk about shovels up, get shovels on the ground. I want some shovel-ready projects. Okay. But that does mean we've spent seven to 10% of the capital value to get them to shovel-ready state. No, you can't do that. I know one of the Canadian public sector bodies has that, oh that's done on out of operating expenses. And we don't want you to spend more than 2% of the capital value, getting it to a final business case. Well, that's bonkers. Because as soon as the business case is approved, somebody's going to rush into execution. And that's going to be wasteful.   Riccardo Cosentino  51:35  Absolutely. Absolutely. Ian Heptinstall  51:37  So I think, once we've sorted those things out, then we can start using the once we've crossed the execution and the preparation things off the list, then we can start looking at the quality of the estimates, I think.   Riccardo Cosentino  51:54  I mean, as project practitioners, I mean, researchers in the U.K., I mean, there is, unfortunately, sometimes we discuss and discuss these topics with a certain amount of preassumptions in, there are some things that I assumed are understood, right? And so my starting point is always I assume that we have capable contractors and capable supply chain. So that's typically the starting point for my analysis, which is not always true, but that I want to, I always try to start from there. So if you start from there, then obviously I've already solved that problem. And then now I want to focus on the strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias in the estimate process, right? Because my starting assumption is that we have a capable supply chain. Ian Heptinstall  52:55  Let me give you just one example from my own experience, when I worked at a contractor. We had a probably one of our largest clients, we had a strategic relationship with actually the project owner that we did all the building services work on their projects, and they had dozens of projects every year. When we estimated, and interestingly, we put an estimate for the building services together when the conceptual design was put together. And this, although our pricing was through an agreed mechanism, this particular client had a fixed-price approach, I want to go to a main contractor, but your work will be sort of given to them on a platter, they will be told to use you etc. But we want single point of contact. That meant that when we estimated the amount of man-hours we put in on a job, it ranged from x to 2x. Simply dependent upon who we were working alongside. And that was not just competence. It wasn't even at the level of the company. Yet the people who came and the way they managed the worksite could double the demand on our resources. And that that's a significant impact. And strangely, it was the same number that I had when I was buying spray dryers in the chemical industry 20 years earlier. And one of the global manufacturers told me yeah, depending who the client is, some clients take two times the demand on our engineering hours than others with the questions they asked. They're all competent. So there's enormous differences with how you put competent people together. You can't just assume a team forms like putting a hockey team together.   Riccardo Cosentino  55:01  I said, I made that assumption and never said it was the correct assumption. But, you know, I need to simplify certain things in order to have certain conversation. But yeah, you're right. I mean, it's not the right assumption. Ian Heptinstall  55:15  And it's a common one. And the, particularly, if you tie it with this assumption that a competitive market force will drive innovation within your supply base. It may do but it won't necessarily, particularly since main contractors are basically, variable cost organizations. They're not high-fixed cost. They're not major upfront investment that they react and increase temporarily, their variable costs only after they've won a contract. I'm not sure that that sort of market will drive innovation, you, you just need to be similar or slightly better than your fellow competitors. You don't need to be world-class, you just need to beat the other guy or gal in the room. Riccardo Cosentino  56:12  That's the bear story, right? We have that. Ian Heptinstall  56:15  That's it. That's exactly the bear story. And I think there's many from back in my procurement days, there's many examples where owners facilitating supply-side innovation, drove significant improvements. But if they just sat there and waited for responses to tenders, nothing would have changed. They the whole topic of so-called reverse marketing, where it's the customer who encourages suppliers to enter new supply markets, or to work in different ways. It's a known technique that I wish I saw more of it amongst major project owners in the construction space. Riccardo Cosentino  57:07  Look, I mean, I might not have time to unpack this, but like, and it goes back to your alliance contract, right? I mean, that the reason and it's a very crude description, and you're probably gonna cringe the way I say it. But you know, when you have alliance contracting, especially the public sector clients have to be at the table, right? Now, the cost overruns are no longer somebody else's problem. They're our collective problem. And so you need to come to the table. So the, you know, for the contractor, it basically removes the unproductive resource, legal and commercial resources. And so now you have all of the resources, just focusing on problems. On the public sector, you actually create skin in the game, where now you don't longer have a command and control posture, because you have transmitted fixed price risk to somebody else, you're at the table, you need to contribute to problem solving, and you need to help, like you said, innovation. But that only happens if you have the legal and the right legal commercial framework that is associated with alliance, in my mind. I don't think you can achieve that through any other, because any other commercial contractual method, because the behaviors that those frameworks create, are not conducive to collaboration and innovation. Because exactly what you said, I mean, a contractor, a contractor will do what a contractor will do. Like it's a variable cost organization, they're not going to invest in R&D because the next project might not need the R&D you just developed for this project. And an owner wants to, as you said, there was an all-knowing how to most of the owners worldwide. And now the owner organization doesn't actually have the resources and the capability to be at the table, to be the informed or capable owner that is needed to run these projects. Ian Heptinstall  59:10  They got to have some of it. Because I think that input depends on what the project is about. I'd like to start thinking about the inherent project and forget who employs the people that you need in your project team. So doing a project is a team sport. And you need people around that table with the sort of operating experience for what the asset will be used for. And you need that mix of expertise. And very often the owner organization is the obvious place to provide that kind of expertise. Now, I'm less convinced that the owner has to be the one with the team facilitation syncronization skill. I think that depends on the individual you've got. And that can come from any, ideally, any one of the participants. And if you're short there, you might have to bring in an additional individual or party to manage that synchronization. But that could that could come from any of them, not necessarily the owner. But which is, you know, thinking lifecycle cost, an understanding of needs, regulatory environment, the political environment, those sorts of changes will probably come from the owner. So their representatives, there's a lot of value they can add, rather than being arm's length, and hoping that the, your contractors will sort that out by themselves is, as one of my friends would say that you're taking hopium. Riccardo Cosentino  1:01:01  The command and control posture right, I think you call it arm's length, I call it command and control posture. Anyway, I'm conscious of time. (Inaudible) Yeah, I mean, this has been a fascinating conversation that I want to thank you for, for joining me, thank you for suggesting that we do this. And honestly, I'd love to maybe, on another episode, to pick up the collaborative contracting versus lump sum debate, right? Because it's a very live debate right now in where I am in Canada, even in the U.S. a little bit. But Canada, or we are certainly now starting to enter the collaborative space and you can see, yeah, I love to have a conversation with you about that on another episode.   Ian Heptinstall  1:01:57  That sounds like a plan, Riccardo we'll work on it. Riccardo Cosentino  1:02:01  Great. Okay. Ian, on that note, again, thank you for joining me, and I look forward to further exchanges, both on another episode or on LinkedIn. Ian Heptinstall  1:02:14  Thanks, for the opportunity. And yes, this gets around the 125 or 1250 character limit of LinkedIn. Riccardo Cosentino  1:02:23  Absolutely. Ian Heptinstall  1:02:24  Thanks for the opportunity. I've enjoyed it. Thank you. Riccardo Cosentino  1:02:26  Thank you. Bye now.   Riccardo Cosentino  1:02:29  That's it for this episode of Navigating Major Programmes. I hope you found today's conversation as informative or provoking as I did. If you enjoyed this conversation, please consider subscribing and leaving a review. I would also like to personally invite you to continue the conversation by joining me on my personal LinkedIn at Riccardo Cosentino. Listening to the next episode, we will continue to explore the latest trends and challenges in major programme management. Our next in-depth conversation promises to continue to dive into topics such as leadership risk management and the impact of emerging technology in infrastructure. It's a conversation you're not going to want to miss. Thanks for listening to Navigating Major Programmes and I look forward to keeping the conversation going. Music: "A New Tomorrow" by Chordial Music. Licensed through PremiumBeat.DISCLAIMER: The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the hosts and guests on this podcast do not necessarily represent or reflect the official policy, opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints of Disenyo.co LLC and its employees.

O Episódio #100 chegou! E eu não poderia estar mais feliz com essa marca que representa um grande esforço e uma grande dedicação a trazer temas relevantes para discussão na área de gestão de projetos! E VOCÊ faz parte disso! Então vem comigo nesse papo sobre o CII! E o melhor: mais uma vez temos um profissional brasileiro em uma posição de liderança em uma entidade tão relevante para os projetos de Engenharia e Construção no mundo! O CII, Construction Industry Institute é uma organização sem fins lucrativos situada na Universidade do Texas, Estados Unidos. O objetivo do consórcio é reunir empresas e diferentes da área da construção, a fim de idear boas práticas e normas para a indústria. E para comemoramos a marcante data de 100 episódios, eu falo com Daniel Oliveira, Interim Director of Operations no Construction Industry Institute (CII). Daniel, que já trabalha no instituto há algum tempo, fala sobre as transformações impulsionadas pela organização, e também, o que esperar do mercado de projetos de capital nos próximos anos. Para conhecer um pouco mais sobre o CII, acesse: https://www.construction-institute.org/ Esse Podcast tem o apoio de Teams Ideas by Prosperi (https://www.teamsideas.com/). Tem curtido o nosso conteúdo? Que tal tornar-se membro do Capital Projects Podcast, apoiando o canal? Assim, podemos continuar crescendo e ajudando tantos profissionais da Gestão de Projetos! Acesse o link e confira os planos: https://lnkd.in/d8QQ6twk Acompanhe também as minhas redes: @andre_choma e https://linktr.ee/andrechoma Produção: Estúdios Voz – www.vozeconteudo.com.br - @estudiosvoz #capitalprojectspodcast #andrechoma #podcast #capitalprojects #projetos #CII #constructionindustryinstitute #frontendplanning #FEP #awp #advancedworkpackaging #projectmanagement #megaprojetos #megaprojects #frontendloading #FEL #PMO

Did you know that 65% of mega projects fail? This is according to a 2015 study done by the Construction Industry Institute. A more recent study done by the University College of London in 2020 said that 70% of mega-construction projects lead to failure. Those are alarming results, especially considering the millions of dollars in resources that are tied up in these projects. As our construction projects get larger and larger, the complexity and number of issues that can arise increases as well. In today's episode of The Lead With Trust Show, Sue offers some insights into finding success with mega projects, outlined in, "Mega Project Success Factors 2022" an ongoing project she has developed to help manage the seemingly unmanageable. During the episode, Sue provides some background on the Mega Projects Success Factors concept, which she first began nearly two decades ago. It's been updated many times since, most recently with a group of mega project teams in the late 2000s. She outlines some of the patterns she and her team have seen emerge from numerous failed projects in the past, such as the Denver International Airport, the Hong Kong Airport project, the Boston artery or 'Big Dig,' and the San Francisco Bay Bridge. She also reveals why mega project failures are rarely caused by a single factor. Most often it's many smaller issues that compound upon each other and create a cascading event that sinks a project. Join Sue for this fascinating discussion about mega projects and how you can ensure their success with effective partnering. If you have any questions or suggestions for Sue, feel free to reach out via email. Enjoy! What You'll Learn in this Show: Background on the Mega Project Success Factors concept, which she first began nearly two decades ago. Some of the patterns she and her team have seen emerge from their own successful projects and numerous other projects, such as the Denver International Airport, the Hong Kong Airport project, the ‘Big Dig,' and the San Francisco Bay Bridge. Why mega project failures rarely have a single cause that can be easily identified. And so much more... Resources: https://partneringinstitute.org/ (The Partnering Institute) http://sudyco.com/join (Lead with Trust Newsletter) https://sudyco.com/lead-with-trust46/ (Mega Project Success Factors 2022) Sue's Email: suedyer@sudyco.com

Supply-chain challenges are certainly nothing new, but they've grown increasingly complicated over the last few years. Today we discuss how you as a contractor can approach these challenges whether you're working on a local and global scale.   We get several helpful supply-chain insights from our guest Ernie Maschner. Ernie has been an influential presence in the construction industry for more than 30 years. He now works as a VP with Victaulic, a manufacturer of engineered couplings and valves. Ernie is also involved with a few industry organizations that seek to address global supply chain issues.    Here are a few of the things we touch on in our conversation: The importance of communicating with all supply-chain parties as early as possible Industry organizations that seek to help contractors navigate today's supply chain challenges - Ernie refers to these three: The Construction Industry Institute, The Design Build Institute of America, The Water Collaborative Delivery Association  How human, political, and social dynamics affect the supply chain - For example: Why does the availability of asphalt in Brazil follow a two-year cycle? Ernie learned the answer while working on projects related to the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. How some progressive contractors write up contracts that allow for the increasing unpredictability of markets  A $50 billion (yes, billion) modular construction project in Kazakhstan that involved modules the size of small hotels The cultural factors that affect people's attitudes toward prefabrication and modular construction  Ernie's megaphone message: We need to work together in a fair way. Collaborative project delivery produces better results in the end. Find Ernie Online: Website - LinkedIn Find Us Online: LinkedIn - Instagram - Facebook - Eddie's LinkedIn - Tyler's LinkedIn If you enjoy the podcast, please rate us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to us! Thanks for listening! See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Mark Konchar learned how to collaborate, growing up playing hockey.  He is one of the PhD's that Victor Sanvido turned out of Penn State that has so influenced our community.  He and Victor collaborated on an early Design Build Study sponsored by the Construction Industry Institute.  He's a co-author of Change Your Space, Change Your Culture with Rex Miller and others.  Mark served as chair of the Board of the Lean Construction Institute and was Balfour Beatty's Chief Innovation Officer for a decade.  Now a senior vice president in charge of BB's rail unit, he's helping develop that much needed aspect of infrastructure.  And he's a hockey coach for his kid's team and, btw, in the Penn State Hockey Hall of Fame.  Enjoy an hour with Mark Konchar.Watch on Youtube.

Creating transformational change in an industry is a massive undertaking, and I applaud the Construction Industry Institute, CII, and its leader, Stephen Mulva, for the role they have played in driving change in capital program delivery. We are the industry that "builds the world" but research shows that 41% of the cost of any construction project is waste. I had the great pleasure of working with Stephen back in 2017 to help create a Manifest for Change for the industry which provides the overarching vision for OS2, a research initiative to drive sweeping change.

Can you imagine a major construction site that requires no cranes? Or one that requires no people? Or completely eliminates the permitting process? Check out our conversation with Fernanda Leite, Associate Professor at the Cockrell School of Engineering at UT Austin who is helping to lead the Construction Industry Institute's (CII) Technology Path to the Future. Fernanda explains the process behind a unique collaborative methodology to solve this initiative exists to inspire organizations within the capital projects industry to successfully transform to new technology paradigms. The industry tends to focus most of its innovation attention and budgets on short term or incremental change. By focusing on what will be required to deliver capital projects three decades in the future, this report illustrates the need for radically different technologies.

Can you imagine a major construction site that requires no cranes? Or one that requires no people? Or completely eliminates the permitting process? Check out our conversation with Fernanda Leite, Associate Professor at the Cockrell School of Engineering at UT Austin who is helping to lead the Construction Industry Institute’s (CII) Technology Path to the Future. Fernanda explains the process behind a unique collaborative methodology to solve this initiative exists to inspire organizations within the capital projects industry to successfully transform to new technology paradigms. The industry tends to focus most of its innovation attention and budgets on short term or incremental change. By focusing on what will be required to deliver capital projects three decades in the future, this report illustrates the need for radically different technologies.

Our guest today is Mr. Stewart White of Kiewit. He is the Director of Advanced Work Packaging and is here to tell us all about what advanced work packaging (AWP) really is. According to the Construction Industry Institute (CII) website - AWP is a planned, executable process that encompasses the work on an EPC project, beginning with initial planning and continuing through detailed design and construction execution. AWP provides the framework for productive and progressive construction and presumes the existence of a construction execution plan. Stewart is a busy man and a true champion for the industry. In addition to his role at Kiewit, Stewart is also an active member of the the Construction Industry Institute where he serves on various teams and committees such as: · AWP CBA – Leadership Team · AWP Education & Outreach Subcommittee · Knowledge Management Committee – Co-Chair · Downstream and Chemicals Committee He is also a AWP Conference Board Member, Texas A&M Construction Industry Advisory Council, University of Houston Industry Advisory Board, and a University of Houston Construction Management - Adjunct Professor. It is an honor to have Stewart on the show. Enjoy! Stewart’s LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/stewart-white-controls/ Construction Industry Institute - https://www.construction-institute.org/ University of Houston Construction Management - https://www.uh.edu/technology/departments/cm/

Infrastructure projects and operating assets are frequently impacted by regulatory risks. On this episode of the Built Revolution podcast, we spoke to members of the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Power Utilities and Infrastructure Research Team PUI-01, Identifying and Evaluating the Impact of Regulations throughout the Project Life Cycle, on their work and the resources they developed to address this recurring problem. The resources they produced can help electric utilities and infrastructure owners proactively identify, anticipate, and mitigate the impacts of constantly changing regulatory requirements throughout the capital asset lifecycle.For more information, visit: https://www.construction-institute.org/resources/knowledgebase/knowledge-areas/general-cii-information/topics/rt-pui-01

On this episode of the Built Revolution podcast, we spoke to the members of the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Virtual Reality in Construction Research Team. The team conducted Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR) user tests on design review and planning tasks, observing both novice and expert participants. The researchers measured and analyzed several indicators of user performance of a control and test groups that included detecting design errors, judging the scope of work, assigning an installation sequence for each installation work package, and remembering the scope of work. The test results clearly demonstrated that IVR enhanced the users' ability to perform the review tasks. Participants in the IVR (treatment) group scored 21.86% to 142.92% higher than the desktop (control) group. For more information, visit: https://www.construction-institute.org/resources/knowledgebase/knowledge-areas/construction-technology/topics/rt-tc-02#presentation386

On this episode of the Built Revolution podcast we discuss how member organizations of the Construction Industry Institute (CII) leverage best practice research and benefit from participation on CII committees. Walt Ennaco, who serves as the Director for the Smithsonian Office of Planning, Design & Construction and chair of the CII Facilities and Healthcare Committee tells us about the impacts of CII on his teams and programs.

Barry Schrock from Chemours and Connie McLaughlin from KBR talk about a recent project involving the implementation of iPad's in the field. Barry and Connie share insightful lessons learned on how to drive innovation from the top down and build broad field support for implementation.

Storytelling is a hot topic in management today, and the Built Revolution was thrilled to welcome Gabrielle Dolan, author of "Stories for Work: The Essential Guide to Business Storytelling", to the show. Gabrielle shares tips for how storytelling helps build authentic leadership by giving us all a tool to share our human side at work, and how this important skill builds trust and employee commitment.

Ever had a great idea but nobody would listen? Advocating for ideas is an important skill in this era of change and the need for innovation in our industry. The Built Revolution welcomed University of Texas Professor John Daly, who together with CII Executive Stephen Mulva and Continuum Advisory Group Principal Gretchen Gagel, discussed the art of building support for your amazing ideas.

Unfortunately, Howard Ashcraft can't make you a martini via the podcast, but he can answer a lot of your common questions about Integrated Project Delivery contracting and how to truly change the way you collaborate with your partners. In this episode of the Built Revolution, Kelcey sits down with Howard (Partner with Hanson Bridgett) to talk about transforming the construction industry through better contracting and true collaboration. A few resources to learn more:AIA CC Working Definition of IPD (free!)Integrated Project Delivery: An Action Guide for Leaders (free!)Integrating Project Delivery (Howard's book is available on Amazon - pricing varies by format)

Kelcey Henderson speaks with Ryan Maibach, President of Barton Malow, about innovation and driving efficiency through people and relationships. Ryan discusses Barton Malow's innovation framework, as well as re-imagining and re-imaging the construction industry. In the future, our industry will be able to offer both consistency of experience and certainty of outcome. To get there, will require calling into question the entire contract structure and all of the boxes and lines we've drawn in the past.

Kyle Majchrowski's LinkedIn profile says he has a passion for recognizing reality with others, and bringing folks together to collectively improve our reality. Eight years ago, he and a few colleagues created a forum to discuss common challenges in construction across various industries in a really innovative way. On this episode of the Built Revolution, Kyle (Senior Project Executive with Banner Health) shares his passion for people. We also talk about driving change in the industry and explore new metrics, such as the "average daily number of smiles." For more on the Improving Capital Projects Symposium, check out rippleintent.org

Tom Chermack, noted author, scholar and consultant, talks about scenario planning and its application to the construction industry. In today's world of velocity and disruption, scenario planning is a critical tool to help organizations "think the unthinkable" and prepare themselves to react to changes in the business environment faster than their competitors. Tom's insights on scenario planning, as a global thought leader on the topic, are spot on.

In 2015, General Motors made the decision to sole-source a $1B construction program with Barton Malow, effectively breaking the mold for how GM engages with their construction partners. A team of leaders from both organizations made the decision to strategically invest in the development of a high-performing integrated team across four geographically disparate project sites. During this podcast, Mike Mayra, Global Construction Group Manager for General Motors, and Bruce Rysztak, Vice President for Barton Malow, share some of the outstanding results achieved on the three-year program. We discuss what enabled that success as well as some of the lessons they learned along the way.

Episode 2 of the Built Revolution continues our conversation with initial podcast guest Stephen Mulva, Director of the Construction Industry Institute. Please enjoy our conversation as Stephen shares some of his thoughts on how the Construction Industry can transform itself…or be transformed from the outside.

Episode 2 of the Built Revolution continues our conversation with initial podcast guest Stephen Mulva, Director of the Construction Industry Institute. Please enjoy our conversation as Stephen shares some of his thoughts on how the Construction Industry can transform itself...or be transformed from the outside.

Continuum Advisory Group is proud to announce the first installment of “The Built Revolution Podcast”. Our initial guest on the podcast is Stephen Mulva, Director of the Construction Industry Institute. Please enjoy our conversation as Stephen shares some of his thoughts on how the Construction Industry can transform itself…or be transformed from the outside.

Continuum Advisory Group is proud to announce the first installment of "The Built Revolution Podcast". Our initial guest on the podcast is Stephen Mulva, Director of the Construction Industry Institute. Please enjoy our conversation as Stephen shares some of his thoughts on how the Construction Industry can transform itself...or be transformed from the outside.

Jiukun Dai, a lecturer in the department of Civil Engineering, discusses the different educational technologies he uses in his Construction Industry Institute seminar. By utilizing videoconferencing, lecture capture and other collaboration tools, he is able to extend the reach of his course beyond the University of Texas at Austin, to include other universities and institutions across the country, and around the world.

Jiukun Dai, a lecturer in the department of Civil Engineering, discusses the different educational technologies he uses in his Construction Industry Institute seminar. By utilizing videoconferencing, lecture capture and other collaboration tools, he is able to extend the reach of his course beyond the University of Texas at Austin, to include other universities and institutions across the country, and around the world.