Podcasts about pinella

This week we have the recap from an entertaining member guest tournament including a night out with our hero. Marcus has some ailments on the golf course and we have a brilliant story from Lou Piniella on George Steinbrenner. Be sure to subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials to keep up to date at @lifeontheloop9 --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/life-on-the-loop/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/life-on-the-loop/support

To download the transcript CLICK HERE This is part one of my chat with wine writer and now part time winemaker Chris Boiling. You can find his work in Decanter or other online wine magazines. And more recently, a wine newsletter called Canopy, which you can find on the International Wine Challenge website. We will be talking about the wines of Slovenia because Chris has bought a home with a small vineyard there and it has inspired all kinds of wine projects. On the famous wine site jancisrobinson.com, you may have seen him chronicling his winemaking disasters in a column called Diary of a Dream. For this reason we will be touching on some winemaking techniques and some mistakes Chris has made on the way. We will look at some interesting grape varieties like Laški Rizling, Refošk, and Rebula. You'll learn about some indigenous varieties of Slovenia alongside the three main wine regions of this country, and I'll be trying Chris's very unique and interesting Pinot Gris. If you want to skip ahead: 1.58: Why did Chris decided to buy a vineyard in Slovenia? 5.21: Slovenian wine getting the fame it deserves and it's neighbours 6.45: The wine region Podravje 8.25: Documenting Chris' winemaking journey on Jancis Robinsons website, called The Diary of a Dream 12.01: The grape variety Laški Rizling and discussing Chris' Pinot Gris and the winemaking process 18.54: Tasting Chris' Pinot Gris 25.22: Food pairings for Orange wines/Skin contact wines 27.15: Furmint in Slovenia and it's differences from Hungary 30.29: The wine region Primorska and Ribolla Gialla 33.31: The red wine Teran and Refosc 35.25: The third and final wine region Posavska 36.03: The wine Cviček 37.31: Indigenous varieties Zelen, Pinella, Ranina and Ranfol 38.59: Movia, a winery that you need to know about And if the podcast isn't enough.... Fancy watching some videos on my youtube channel: Eat Sleep Wine Repeat Or come say hi at www.eatsleepwinerepeat.co.uk Or contact me on Instagram @eatsleep_winerepeat or on email: janina@eatsleepwinerepeat.co.uk Until next time, Cheers to you!

Richard Epstein is our returning guest. Richard is an American legal scholar known for his writings on torts, contracts, property rights, law and economics, classical liberalism, and libertarianism. He is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law and director of the Classical Liberal Institute at New York University, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution In this episode we talked about: Historical Perspective of  Land Use and Regulation Government Real Estate Agencies Inflationary and Interest rates Environment Macroeconomic Outlook ​​Jesse (0s): Welcome to the Working Capital Real Estate Podcast. My name's Jessica Galley, and on this show we discuss all things real estate with investors and experts in a variety of industries that impact real estate. Whether you're looking at your first investment or raising your first fund, join me and let's build that portfolio one square foot at a time. Richard is an American legal scholar known for his writing on torts, contracts, property rights, law and economics, classical liberalism and libertarianism. He is the Lawrence, a Tish professor of law at nyu, and the director of the university's Classical Liberal Institute.   Richard, it's great to have you back on. How you doing?   Richard (39s): It's always great to be here, Jesse.   Jesse (41s): Well, we're gonna have a bit of a, a crash course here in in property rights land use regulation, and kind of talk about how we got to where we, we are right now in, in the US in Canada as it as it relates to property rights. And it'll be topical for anybody interested in real estate, real estate investing development law. And you know, if you're ever interested to see why certain investment firms pick different states or pick different countries, you know, we'll, we'll touch on the intricacies and differences between how some of these laws develop.   But Richard, why don't we, why don't we start from the beginning? You talked about a historical perspective when it comes to land use and regulation, so I'll leave it with you here.   Richard (1m 29s): Okay, look, well the first thing to note is that when densities and real estate densities are very, very low, there's very little reason to have any kind of land use regulation. Land use regulation is a function of having large numbers of people within relatively close levels. One way to try to regulate this is from the private law of nuisance dealing with offensive smells and so forth. And that certainly is a part of the system. But when you're dealing with modern zoning laws, it turns out it's a relatively unimportant part of the system unless you're dealing with certain kind of very difficult industrial manufacturing areas.   But if you're going to the sort of the city life, the, the story really begins in 1916 when in New York City they realize that if you put up certain kinds of large buildings, the equitable building, what it's gonna do is gonna block light in other parts of town. And so the question was, are you willing to suffer that and let people build as they will, or do you think that you could kind of regulate densities and distances? And the initial New York statute was designed to deal with exactly that. And so they put up kinds of restrictions and they were relatively modest, but nonetheless they were there.   The one that was put into place in Washington was a high limitation. And in 1909 the Supreme Court said it's okay for you to do that. There's some kind of average reciprocity of advantage in everybody having the same kind of stuff. And so it's also another effort to sort of attack the light interest one way or another. And zoning of that particular sort was a relatively modest affair. I think the entire zoning book was, you know, 20 pages or something of that sort. But the movement got Abe boost from a very strange location in the United States.   And that strange location was a Department of Commerce where the Secretary of Commerce was none other than Herbert Hoover, later known for his other kinds of deeds. And what he did is he called together a national conference of local people trying to explain why it was that a general kind of zoning law was something that ought to be put into place throughout the United States. And federal government at that time had no power to regulate zoning within cities today in the United States. And in principle has that power, but it is virtually never exercised.   But what Hoover did was to persuade all of these towns and all these governments that they should put together a zoning package which is much more comprehensive than the ones that they had before. The theory behind this stuff was how you organize land uses as opposed to blocking light. And the notion of a zone actually quite literally meant this. We put in this zone, we put manufacturing in that zone, we put commercial in this other zone, we put in apartment houses, this other zone we put in single family homes.   And the theory was that if you have each zone with a pure type of, what would happen is you would prevent all sorts of nasty kinds of interactions between people and everybody would be better off. It turns out that this is a colossal blunder in the way in which you organize because what it does is it gets you uniform zones within use. It prevents incompatible uses from taking place, but it also prevents compatible uses from taking place. And so if you wanna get a sense of how, for example, real estate is organized in a more or less voluntary market, take any city, whether it's Toronto or New York and just go vertical.   And at the bottom what you do is you see a series of real estate stores, mainly commercial one way or another in New York. And probably in many other places, the escalator in these real estate stores goes down, not up because what you do is you have a lot of space below ground that doesn't change the profile, the building above ground. And so you do that. And then above that what you do is you probably have some degree of office space, which is a different kind of use. And above that you start having hotels in one kind of amenities.   And then above that what you do is you probably have some residential units and on the top you have some fancy club where everybody could look out at fine dining or a conference center. So you get four or five different uses stacked with one another. If you change the order, you would realize that this is not a random phenomenon, it's the way of maximizing value. A traditional zoning statute makes that extremely difficult. And so when Jane Jacobs wrote her famous book in 1961, she was always against single use areas because she said, if you're alive during the day, you're gonna be dead at night.   Or if you're alive at night, you're gonna be dead during the day. If you have the right kind of mix, you can have a steady flow of people in and out of the city and get greater utilization of your public resources. So the zoning system essentially made this mistake. And the case that demonstrated this was a case called Ewa cited in 1926, which was the same year that Hoover called his particular meeting in Washington. And what was the UK case about? It was about an industrial site between the nickel white railroad and some fancy highway on the south.   And what happened was a unified plot, and it was ideal for a major plant of one kind or another, but the city fathers decided that they were gonna change the way that this thing operated. And so what they did is they created zones going from top to bottom in that area and there was a zone that was designed to be manufacturing and then there was a commercial zone and there was a certain kind of residential zone and then a over the apartment house and a play zone. And what happened is you start looking at this stuff, you realize that having divided this thing, the loss and value is necessarily enormous.   You had a single owner of this patent and as you know Jesse, one of the fundamental theorem of real estate is if you have a single owner, every time you decide to do something on behalf of one of your potential buyers of renters, you're gonna hurt somebody else. So your constant job is to try to figure out how it is that you maximize the net value of all the uses that you sell, taking into account direct and indirect benefits like views and so forth. And sure enough, if you start looking the way these things go, you never see any of these things where the rental units are buried down below and the parking spaces are above.   The whole thing is organized in a way to sort of maximize access on the one hand and views on the other hand. And people really know how to do that and they're experts in excuse. So what you're doing is you're taking away the actual owner who's all the right incentives. He can only maximize his values if he maximizes that of his buyers and renters and and putting in place a government organization. And what it did in zoning, excuse me, what that did in zoning is it knocked out 75 or 85% of the total value by creating artificial barriers, discontinuities of one sort or another.   And it goes to the Supreme Court and the question is, is this thing constitution? Well, it was argued that it was a taking of one kind or another cause you saw the huge value. But the Supreme Court in a sublimely stupid opinion by a conservative judge known as Sutherland, a decent man, but a terrible judge on this stuff said, well, you know, you gotta have zoning laws because you have to have traffic regulations of one form or another. So what he was doing was talking about this areas where these units were already divided and you had to coordinate them and saying, that's the rule that we have when we already have a coordinated unit.   And so what you do is you know, for certainty that you've got a huge loss in net value. And the net question as a social thinker is, is there gonna be some external benefit that justifies the losses that you're imposing? And then you look around and you say, well, is it gonna be the fact that you're gonna prevent nuisances? Well, you could do that by saying you can't admit slope. And in fact, if it's a large part of land ly, every landowner wants a little bit of setback from the street, right, in order to give themselves a little bit more flexibility.   And so they have a garden or they have some kind of a statute in front of the place and so forth. And so there's gonna be zero probability of nuisances against neighbors. But on the other hand, you shut this thing down as a con industrial site, there are gonna be a lot of people who live in the neighborhood who now will not be able to get jobs. So if you're trying to figure out what the net effect of construction is, the standard zoning model is every time you build something here, it's gonna have a negative effect everywhere else. The more accurate situation is there a few uses that you have to ban and you can do that.   But most of the interactions that are gonna take place within the nearby neighborhood are gonna be positive. And so you put into place a system which essentially is doomed to fail from the start. And then the question is, what about constitutional attacks on? And what you always have to say about something like the Euclid decision is the moment you sustain the constitutionality of what must be the dumbest plan imaginable for land use planning, you're never gonna be able to attack anything else because every other program's gonna be less stupid than the one that you have here, even though they're plenty dumb.   And so essentially in the United States and in Canada, I believe there was no serious challenge to zoning ordinances that took place for the next 50 or 60 years. The system essentially went on autopilot and the positive externalities would be taken into account in some cases politically but never legally. So one of the things you mentioned, you can interrupt me at any time, is how do different towns respond to this stuff? Well, it's a very funny game. I'll tell you just a little anecdote is we wanted to build a house in Michigan at a time when the area was somewhat depressed and there was a zoning ordinance that was administered by the local government on behalf of the state and they were desperate to get our house in there.   Why is that? Because in the usual exurban communities, they have two tiers of taxes. They have low taxes for people who live there full-time and high taxes for com, people who live there for the summers or the weekends or whatever. And they were desperate to get those revenues. So our architect goes out and presents his plan and this is what the host of the situation said, this is 35 years ago, but it's the same story. I said, Mr Grun, would you like to go first? You came a long way. Now what's going on is they really wanted that stuff.   And there are many towns in the United States where zoning has done in exactly that way. So that what happens is if you have the equid frame of mind in Ohio, it gets taken over in New York, it then spreads to building permits and other situations like that. And so essentially to construct something in New York City is about as difficult as breaking into a bank cuz nobody wants you to come. You go to Texas, it takes, you know, two weeks to get a building permit as opposed to three years to get a building permit, the land use review processes, is your building gonna fall down?   Will you let us know? Is your building going to have no access to the street? Will you let us know? So essentially what they worry about is a little bit about massing. They worry a lot about safety construction floors and so forth. And the very important issue of how you coordinate entrances and exit from a large building onto a complicated city set of griefs. And those are all the things that you really have to worry about. But what goes on inside the box is something for which in general it is very unwise zoning board to take hold of.   But you take a place like New York, it's not only zoning, it's handicapped regulation. So somebody will tell you how wide the hallways have to be in order to accommodate a wheelchair that you don't need of a bill that's no longer made, which will reduce the value of your house by 20% every time you try to do a renovation. So the thing to understand is every community is not so stupid as to try to take advantage of the full powers of the zoning law, but you can easily find configurations where local politics are such that the dumbest of the dumbest get to the top of the roof.   And if you wanna find a place in which that's likely to happen, you go to San Francisco, you go to New York, not so much Chicago, although they have a terrible mayor and so forth, it's essentially major progressive communities tend to be most insistent and what they do is they drive people away with their stupidity.   Jesse (13m 46s): So Richard, the, this kind of, it reminds me a bit of this common misconception between freedom and license and the, I guess we could back up and say from, from a standpoint, I don't think I, if you are extremely lez fair in disposition that you think that there's no limits on on, you know, what you can do with your property, but, but there is seems to be a certain balance. So there are certain externalities that are easy to control and, and others that are different. For instance, you know, the law of trespassing, it's very obvious but the, you know, the externality of environmental issues or you know, smell emanating front property.   So I, I'm curious to, to know that for instance, I live in downtown Toronto. If I'm walking down the street, as much as I don't like to be the nimbyism not in my backyard type of person, when there's certain condos put up in certain sight lines where there was one sun is there's no longer sun, we, we certainly lose something as a community the way that we go about ameliorating that or or dealing with it is, is not efficient. And it reminds me a bit of a book by Charles Murray, I think it was by the people and it was talking about like what you're talking about a lot of regulations that you know, say you have a commercial building and the steps need to be this many inches and have these, these spindles and and realize it doesn't apply to a certain case.   So, so where's the balance when it comes to the ability for you to have efficiencies and be able to have that quick turnaround time like in some of the southern states as opposed to not, not limiting other rights that are external to say your   Richard (15m 21s): Property. Now look, as I mentioned to you, light is one of these very difficult issues as is density. And the point about light and views is everybody knows that you attach an enormous positive value to their use. And so for example, if you have in New York an apartment on Central Park West that looks over the park, it's gonna be worth $40 percent more than a unit in the same building and that looks down the street that another street. So these things are extremely valuable and so the question then is how do you manage to preserve them?   And it turns out I think the only thing that you can say is that in plan unit developments, these things are gonna be naturally taken to account for the reasons that I mentioned at the outset. The developer who denies somebody of view in order to give somebody else a lot of space, he may lose more money on the view apartment than he will gain on the space apartment. So he'll do something else. When it comes to uncoordinated development, it's an absolutely killer and one of the kinds of regulations that have been sustained and it's one for which I have a little bit of sympathy, I'm not sure exactly how hard a setback regulation.   So the same time they put Euclid into place, they said you could require everybody to set back 10 feet from their neighbor, 10 feet from the floor. Now is this a good or a bad idea? Well it really depends. So let me give you the Epstein situation circa 1950. I grew up in a duplex, not a duplex, it's a semi attached house. We had a neighbor on one side with a common party wall and it was open on the other side. And essentially this was a kind of an effort to sort of create that sort of compromise that you want to have, you reduce the density a little bit by having that common wall and so forth but you kept the openness by making sure that every two units instead of every single unit has some setback or partition from the guy behind you.   And and I think trying to put zoning ordinances like that into place is not going to give rise to a huge thing. And there's a simple way to try to test this out. The zoning ordinances that I mentioned in equi were ordinances that resulted in a loss of value, easily measurable because of the market value of the land of 80%. Now you put a setback regulation in on a large unit owned by a common developer and you ask yourself how much is gonna be the reduction in value if any from this situation?   And remember the people who live in the houses, houses are the people who walk on the public streets and probably it's gonna be the case that the sort of setback regulations you're talking about will have relatively modest effect on property values and positive effects on neighborhood amenities. And so they should be upheld is being some kind of constitutional, the reason why this is so difficult is I suppose you have a part which is 25 feet wide, having a setback on that is gonna be very, very difficult than the width. But if you have one of 40 feet you can start to do it.   So the sizes make a difference, the ratios make a difference, which means that it's extremely difficult when you're doing these things that kind of figure out the way in which they go. One of the things I do when I teach land use, however it is kind of interesting is you wanna see how a constructive zoning situation did the case book. I had my friend Bob Eon and Vicki Beam with the editors at the time, they had a proposed plan for development with entrance entrances on various streets and configurations within the law.   And then they, that was before they spoke to the planning bureau and then what happened? They show the same thing after you look at the planning bureau and I'm very happy to say this was a positive story. The revised plan was much better than the original plan by any standard that you could ought to do better access in the right places, better internal configuration on the roads and so forth. So what it does so is that planning should not be regarded necessarily as an evil to send all evil, but it has to be done with a set of incentives where it is that the people who are designing these particular program are trying to maximize the value of the unit development, not trying to destroy it.   And so, so much depends when you go into a government as to whether they're the welcoming kind of government or whether they're just people or outright hostile. Now this has huge implications for constitutional law. If you have government which is responsive and reliable, giving in their reign is almost a wonderful thing cuz they're doing good things and they'll do 'em better. But if you have a terrible government and giving it its reign, they're gonna take advantage of you and wipe out private values. Well when you plan your law, you have no idea in the same state or in the same county whether the local zoning boards are gonna be the good guys of the bad guy.   And how do you then put together a set of rules to deal with people who are so fundamentally different than the way in which they approach land use? That's the fundamental challenge. And essentially the way I think you do it is you start off worrying about the bad guys and what you say is the kind of test that we're gonna put into place is that which talks about overall diminution and value taking into account all the members of the community. And then if you take that over and you look to the good guys, they'll pass that test.   The bad guys won't. So that overall will make a difference. Let me give you an illustration. Okay, nice one. I think having to do, not so much with urban planning but with beach fund planning and as you know as a real estate guy, beach funds are very sensitive because the value of the land is so much determined by access to the public road. Everything changes. When you're in most parts of the world you tend to have squareish lots or when in beachfront company tend to have bowling alleys, very narrow cuff to give as many people possible, some degree of frontage with respect to the beach and so forth, right?   Well one of the things that you have when you face the beach is you have an erosion risk. And once you realize that the maximum private values come from having relatively narrow and deep plus you realize that there's no way that individual owners in an uncoordinated fashion are going to be able to stop their erosion risk. Your parts are too small, you build a wall on your thing and it simply destroys the guy to the left of you and the right of you. So you need to do is have a common wall if you're gonna be able to do this at all.   And then the question is how do you put this into place? And here's a scheme called stop the beach nourishment was the name of the case decided by Justice Scalia who came out with the right result having no idea what the actual logic of the scheme was. So these guys realized they had an erosion risk, they realized they had a collective action problem because there was no way any single owner alone could make his press situation better without making his neighbors worse. And if you're trying to figure out how you're put together a wall that's gonna have to deal with say 40 or 15 homes, a single continuous wall's gonna be much better than a HighSpot a little one.   So they did is they said we're gonna require that, but they made a deal and the deal was what you have to do when we put this wall up is give up the rights that you have to exclusivity on the seawood side of that wall. So what was once a private piece of land above the high watermark now became collected, okay, you lost something. But on the other hand we're gonna give you two things in exchange. One, we're gonna protect your house and that's worth the law. And two, we're gonna make sure that nobody builds on the seawood side of the wall so that your views are protected on the one hand and your access to the beach are protected on the other.   So you look at this kind of scheme and you say, are these people entitled to compensation? Well you'd have to be a little bit nuts to think. So if it turns out when you're taken into account the cost of construction and all the other net benefits, the value of every piece on the breach goes up by 10%, right? At that point, compensation is not what you want. It's what we call technically implicit in-kind compensation. That is the nature of the project itself imposes reciprocal obligations on people. Each of them have to pay X, each of them get y Y is greater than X.   So if you have NX N Y minus nx, it's a greater gain still. So it works. Now is this always gonna work? No, Jesse, life is unkind to us. If the units are heterogeneous, it turns out it's harder to get common projects that work. So think of the beachfront in which some guys on a rocket, he doesn't care about the erosion risk given where he's located. Or some people have bigger houses, some people have a small narrow part. When you have heterogeneity, it's harder to make the thing work.   And so what do you have to do? There's an institution with the odd name of owl, T O W E L T Y. What you do in effect is you start making side payments so that those people who are given burdens that are greater than their benefits receive cash payments from the other. And if they could make the cash payments and still come out net winners, what you've done is you've taken an unequal distribution of good fortune that is somehow need the protection and some don't. And the side payments allow you to equalize the benefits so that everybody in this particular area get the same rate of return from common project.   And I think you, you've worked real estate, right? Yep. And you understand that in certain cases where you make global improvements with local disadvantages, you have to have implicit transfer payments or explicit one, if it's a common unit development, it comes out in the pricing. If it turns out they're separate units, it has to be an explicit make and you can do all of that stuff. But the key thing to understand when you're doing land use regulation, given the adjacencies, you can't say that what goes on in one plot of land is irrelevant to what goes on the next.   What you try to do is to put into a project that satisfies two conditions. One, overall all values of all the unit owners and so forth of property owners are increased. And B, you are going to give a uniform rate of return because if you don't do that, then the following will take place. We have a development and 60% of the percent of the people game a hundred percent and 40% of the people lose 50%. If you don't have transfer payments, you're gonna have a Holy War taking place because the losers are gonna do everything they can to bottle that up.   And as you know, generally speaking on this conflict, a simple majority is not enough to prevail over determined resistance. That's just the way committees and organizations struck. It's a multiple stage project in order to put legislation through and the veto guys that all they have to do is to shut down one of the gates. Whereas the pro guys, all they have to do is to keep every gate open, which is a much harder tan. So given that fundamental asymmetry the correct solution of transfer payments so is to make it that foolish for people to object if the side payments will leave them better off than they were before.   And so that's how you have to start thinking about managing various kinds of real estate projects. And that's why it is at the zoning model so utterly rigid because the other thing that it does, it doesn't allow the subsequent contractual variation.   Speaker 3 (26m 34s): So   Jesse (26m 35s): That's, yeah, it's fascinating to, to see cuz we, we deal with different, like we were mentioning before, different provinces or different states and you just have obviously varying sets of, of norms, varying sets of laws for regulation. I wanna get your take on something that was recently passed or pushed forth in, in the Canadian context. I think every country in some aspect, I know in the states and in Canada we're, we're affordable housing is constantly talked about. And the question of how do we deal with affordable housing, you know, depending on your political disposition you'll have a different tool or different, you know, different view.   You know, obviously I'm biased in the commercial and residential real estate space that we think, I think a lot of the regulations really hamper us and and limit the supply. Now, I'm not sure if you're aware of this, but recently something called the prohibition on purchase of residential properties by Non Canadians Act was was passed and it was basically it, it's a two year moratorium on foreign individuals buying property in the states. Now if you really look at the actual details of it, you realize that people in MySpace and the commercial real estate space aren't really affected because it's limited to I think three or four or less units.   I think it's four or less units. So you know, the large companies buying properties or multi-residential or commercial pro larger commercial properties. But I'm curious of your view of how, you know, you see a government agency, C M H C, the Canadian Morgan Housing Corporation as our equivalent of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, you see them past this with the talk about how we're gonna increase affordable housing and, and we're gonna address supply con issues by, you know, banning, you know, foreign individuals from, from buying it.   And I feel like that's, that's kind of doing it as backwards, you know, we're, we're not looking at the actual source of what the issue is. So I'd like to get your take on that. I know we didn't chat about it before.   Richard (28m 29s): Hope swings the eternal on this stuff. I am a fierce opponent for the most part of a firm of affordable action affordable housing programs. But let me explain why this is not just a sort of a terrible situation. There are two ways in which you could try to expand the housing for the port. One of them is you could reduce the various regulatory obstacles that stand in the path of constructing that or two, what you could try to do is to force a subsidy on somebody else so that people are going to pay only a fraction of the price that the housing that they occupy is going to cost.   And very, the first thing you used to do is you always start with the first. If there are a series of barriers to entry that you could remove, what it does is it will lower cost, lower administrative expenses and increase the availability of units so that you will start with the housing program just by getting rid of the obstacles. Let me give you an example. Many places, so like New York City have rent control. What rent control does is it means that people have large houses when they had children keep their large houses when the children have gone away.   And so there's nothing more common than in New York City to have a 2,500 square foot units with one person living in them if you had no rent control system subsidy kind of right? Well what happened is that woman would sell her house to a family of four. So what you would be able to do just by getting rid of the rent control restrictions would prevent residential mobility is increase the supply of housing without changing a single thing in the external world by making sure that units are fully occupied up to their rational level.   And so that's the kind of thing that you want to start with. Always get rid of the crazy restrictions before you put something else into place. And we know that there are many kinds of odd restrictions on zoning, how many units you could vote in a given area. The neighbors are always trying to Beto these kinds of things and if they succeed, you're gonna s cut down the supply. The liberal progressive view on this is we keep all of this stuff in place, we have a housing shortage, what we then do is we decide that we're gonna subsidize housing. This is what Governor HOK is trying to do in New York State in a lame brain program where she thinks she can force every single community in town to get some state money in order to build the housing that she would like to be built in the places where she wants to build them.   These programs of coercion never worked and they're costly. So you're talking about affordable housing, they're two ways you can do it. One way, the honorable way is to put it on the public budget. You say, we happen to believe that it's important to have poor people in the community, it's going to cost us a thousand dollars a unit per month to get them here and they can only afford to pay $600. So what we are gonna do is we're gonna appropriate money from the public treasury $400 a month for each of the units that we want to create.   And there will then be political decisions as to how far you want to go with this program. And my view, the moment you put this on balance on the balance sheet for the public, what you will see is a huge diminution in the desire to do this. And this will create greater pressures to increase housing by reducing barriers to entry, which is exactly what you want. So you want to do is if in fact you're going to have a public subsidy, make it outta general revenues. But local communities don't like general revenues. So what they try to do is they try to put it on the developers, right?   And so you get the following kind of scheme. All developer, if you wish to build three market rate units of housing, you have to build one affordable unit. And what you do is you take your excess rents from the market rate housing and use that to support the other housing. And we the public have to pay nothing about it. Well it turns out, of course there is no free lunch on this situation. The first thing you're gonna have to do is you're gonna have to raise the the rents or the sales prices on the unaffordable market rate units above what they were.   If you assume that the demand is constant regardless of the price, then you live in a world that I do not understand. So what's gonna happen is the market rate housing is gonna be above market rates. You're gonna see essentially a kind of price control system put into place a form of monopolization and you're not gonna be able to sell as many of those. And if you can't sell as many of those, you're not gonna be able to sell as many of the affordable units. And so what happens is you put this thing, the total stock is going to start to go down in the availability.   Then of course what happens is the people are being forced to pay this stuff, they're gonna try to fight one way or another in order to cheat on this. So you're gonna have to have excessive monitoring on the way in which it goes. Then on the other side, the moment you have affordable housing, it turns out you have affordable housing criteria. And so to give you a kind of a simple illustration, suppose you assume that the affordable housing unit at $600 a month as opposed to a thousand dollars a month must go to a family that earns under $40,000 a year.   So you elect family in at $40,000 a year and then it turns out in the second year the spouse goes to work and total family income is $48,000, not $40,000. Well one of the two things could happen, either the second job is kept off the books so that what happens is the person don't move but they violate the criteria. And once one person does it, everybody does it. So after a while it's just subsidized housing, but you're not gonna be able to keep your target population or what you can do under these circumstances say, all right, we're gonna throw you out of this affordable housing unit, which isn't gonna do anybody any good cuz then you have all the costs of trying to find another tenant to fill it in.   Or what you can do is you say, okay, well we'll do is you now got $48,000 for this thing, we're gonna raise you by 10% and so forth. But somebody has to figure out what those increments are and then you're gonna have to calculate them on an annual basis and you're gonna have to do this for 50,000 units inside a very large town. It becomes a completed administrative nightmare. And so it's just very, very difficult to kind of put these programs into place and yet the more difficult it becomes, the more insistent people are creating them.   And so what happens is you get this kind of situation where you get a lot of cheating at the bottom and real restriction to elite people at the top. And then you have to know what are you gonna do with the rest of the zoning system. So it's just another piece and a messy kind of puzzle. If you want to give subsidies to people, the only way that really works is to give them a subsidy of them and say if you spend $500 on a unit a month, we will give you a 10% increment over that.   So you could get $600 and sure enough the landlords will be aware of that. Then what will happen is the price that you bid will have to be a little bit higher because they're gonna try to take some of the subsidy for themselves. It's very, very difficult to run cross subsidies in a housing market and that's what they're trying to do in Canada. And when you said the last point you mentioned, oh you can't sell to Americans, right? Well who's that gonna hurt amongst other people? Canadians, right? Because the Canadians who want to sell their property are now gonna be forced to take a lower price for what's going on.   If you'll let the Americans in, you're gonna get more on the real estate taxes and so forth gonna increase the general vibrancy of the community and you can now start to afford to open up new housing. And so you don't wanna put these models in place which assume we have to keep the bad guys from out because there's a static source of housing, there's a total fixed amount of supply that you can't increase if you know that people wanna come in, the appropriate thing to do is to build more unit and that means to relax these units. Canada last I looked, is a big country, right?   It has what, 35, 40 million people, right? Well I mean I think that you can figure out a way to find some plot of lands to build additional units so as to accommodate virtually everybody. But what happens is all the people in favor of affordable housing and subsidy have no idea of the resiliency or the sense of how markets work. And they don't have any idea as to how the eminent domain and the regulatory power should be done. Remember, I'm trying to figure out what you do with regulation. I didn't say you could build anything you want anywhere you want to do it.   There are certain kinds of minimum constraints, but the constraints that I'm talking about, you know, on structural integrity, parking places, access to streets and so forth is about 10% of what they're doing today. But it's the 10% that is most valuable and it turns out it's the 10% that it's least controversial. And so it turns out that you do all of that stuff, which is fine, but all the other stuff that you do is largely a mistake.   Jesse (37m 20s): So a couple points first of all that it kind of reminds me of the, if, if anybody hasn't read Capitalism and Freedom by Milton Friedman, I think it's a, it's a great tax and the the cutoff example you use, I think was how he described his negative income tax of if there are transfer payments, you know, you don't just have a cutoff where people now start try to game the system. And the piece I'm curious about, you mentioned the honorable way to do it and, and I guess the dishonorable way in the honorable way situation there where you have a, a certain amount from the public purse that, that you appropriate to provide to people for affordable housing.   You, you find whatever, whatever test or criteria that that you know, that is needed, what is the mechanism? You mentioned giving them subsidies, but would there be a situation where you have a, you have a developer, they're building X amount of units, the government says this amount has to be affordable, however, the the c the rent, the, the payment will be a payment directly from, you know, whatever a Canadian agency or are you saying put it directly into the hands as a subsidy for rent so that it can only be used in one fashion from the prospective tenant?   Or are you saying give them cash?   Richard (38m 34s): Well this is the way way I would do it. You wanna get units at a subsidy, what the government does. You take a private developer and it says we are gonna rent this unit from you for X dollars and you're gonna give us permission to rent it to Subedit to somebody else for X minus Y and we will pay that difference cause we're gonna have to pay you the rent and then we'll collect less and the rest will take from the public purse. You could do it. Justice Scalia actually talked about that in a case called Pinella as a potential way of dealing with it.   But what it does in effect is it means that you can't hide behind various indirect loses and tie in arrangements of one kind or another. You put it on the public budget and once you put it on the public budget, there's gonna be a public debate as to how it ought to be done. And so, strangely enough, using a taking wall makes democratic processes more true because otherwise what you do is now imagine what the discourse is gonna be like on rent control or an affordable housing where you know that you, if you get a political majority, your majority can force some vulner minority to have a net loss in order to stay in business, right?   So you have to have this heavy tax and so the de deliberative process will work, this follows all the progressives in on in New York or in oil Toronto will come together and say, how much can we extract from landlord my way of rent control and not drive them completely out of business? And I said, well you know, we got a lot of working room here. And of course they always miscalculate because generally if you're a progressive, you underestimate the, the violence of response, the dramatic nature of response to regulation. You assume people are gonna be relatively indifferent when in fact they're gonna be furiously backed.   So what you do is you get a deliberative process, which is designed to say how can a 70% majority really stick it to a 30% minority? But if on the other hand you do it the way I'm talking about it through the public trust, there's no way that any group can hide a general revenue tax is gonna hit them all. So now they're going to have to ask whether they think this is important enough to them to support it. And since they're paying the money, they're gonna be a lot more reluctance since Margaret Thatcher's old jokes, she says, you know, socialism last so long as you haven't run out of other people's money.   And that's exactly what people are kind of trying to do with this system. So, but you have to understand about affordable housing, rent control projects and so forth. There are all various reasons of price control schemes and the simple price control scheme is just a cap. And what happens is you discover at the cap and a price control scheme, there are lots of buyers and there are very few sellers. You have a systematic shortage. And then you're gonna have to figure out what kind of political intrigue is going to figure out who are gonna be the lucky winners amongst the shortages.   All right? And who's gonna be left out to drive? This is a terribly unstable system, but that's what you're doing. And as you mentioned where ways to do that, you could find minority groups and you could exclude them. You could take people who don't live in the community and exclude them. And so just to give you the sort of the political dynamic in any large city, there's always a strong constituency for rent control cuz these are sitting tenants who now think that they could get a subsidy in New York City or in Toronto. We're not talking trivial numbers.   No, oftentimes the difference between a rent controlled price and a market price in that very small part of the market, which is unregulated, could be a difference of four or five fold per square foot as you well know, right? And so   Jesse (42m 6s): I can give you just a, it's just a quick one that just we, a property we're dealing with today, the market rent is $4,300 or sorry, the, the, yeah market rent is $4,300. The, the on the books rent right now in, in a, you know, rent controlled AR area is, I think it's 1,650. So yeah, you know we're now   Richard (42m 26s): It's two half, right? Yeah. And you know, in some places it's higher in New York City it's actually larger than that because what they did is they put the stabilization cap in at $2,500. So essentially a 22,000 square foot unit that's controlled in New York City's $2,500, the same unit on the open market is 10 to $12,000, right? So it's a five or six fold difference. So let's just assume it's a thousand dollars a month, right? That's $12,000 a year, that's a trivial amount.   And then you have to capitalize as a hundred thousand dollars subsidy. If you're talking about these larger numbers, it gets close to a half a million dollars in that transfers to people they'll fight very hard for. So then somebody said, I remember this well if there's a short is what we have to put as a maximum cap on the sales price of homes. Now this is different, the landlords are people you're willing to screw, but the voters that you have are these homeowners and you're not gonna be able to win a lot of election if you tell a given homeowner your house is worth 3 million. But we like the rent control model when you sell at the maximum that you could ask for is $1,800 and then all of a sudden, amazingly you've got 1500 people standing on your front door, he is trying to bid for the property below that, somebody's gonna try to sneak you a few extra dollars to put it his way.   So we don't have sales control, we do have rent control, but the basic maximum about this is supply and demand aqui brace. Whereas all price control systems create chronic shortages, which lead to chronic intrigue, affordable housing is essentially a price control system which is much more complicated than the simple rule, but it's gonna create all the same kinds of distortions and more why? More because it gives you more room to wiggle and giggle. And what happens is when people start making private accommodations for their own benefit, what it always does is reduce the total amount of social welfare and that can take place.   And what happens is you give it to take the progressive mind in New York City and you see the complete failure. They don't talk about deregulation or destabilization very often. They say, oh we gotta have another set of restrictions, another set of taxes and another set of subsidy. And then they wonder, well why are all the people leaving this state? Now I don't think this has happened in Canada, right? I mean cuz I don't think you have anything close to the disparities that you have in the United States, but let's be very clear about this.   New York state has the largest percentage of people leaving the state each and every day. California is next. You are talking about hundreds of thousands of people abandoning the state in a given year. I mean, it's gotten to the point where it's that large. And then you ask yourself, well what are you going to try to do in order to keep them here? And we know this, we're gonna have more affordable housing, higher taxes, greater subsidies, more pro-union benefits. So you want to increase the cost of housing, just require everything to be done by union construction firms and so forth.   And so more people are gonna leave, right? And then you have the same cycle over and over again. Some people will not learn that essentially the exit, right? Is a constraint on what you can do. People don't like to leave their homes in order for you to get somebody to leave their friends and their neighbors. You have to create massive dislocations and the political system to override the local benefits that you have by just being in a community with your friends and family. And that's exactly what's happening.   California lost a half a million people I think in the course of a year. Well it's a 40 million people state. So it's 2%, you do this for five years, however, it's all of a sudden, hey you really have completely rewritten the map of the United States unless you can control the exit rights. And so you know what they're trying to do, of course you're aware of this. They're trying to control exit rights. Now how are they trying to do that? They try to impose wealth taxes, crazy system. And they say, if you leave the state in order to avoid the wealth tax, we're going to impose an exit tax on you equal to the wealth tax that we would've imposed upon you if you had stayed.   And that's the sign, that's what East Germany did to keep people. And that's what these countries are trying to make themselves   Jesse (46m 40s): Like. So Richard, I I know that's, it's fascinating. I think we could talk, we could talk for another half an hour on that point alone. I think we talked, chatted a little bit about it on the last time that you were on, but we got up five minutes here and it's not a lot of time, but I'd be, it'd be remiss me not to ask you about, you know, with your work and, and writings on, on law and economics, our current inflationary and interest rate environment. I know it's a broad topic, but I would like to get your take on not necessarily what has happened in the last 12 months.   Obviously we use historical aspects as a way to look at the future. You know, we can say that feds acted too late, feds acted improperly. But what I'm curious about is what your view is on the next short to midterm. How we, how we, where we go from, from here and how you think this will unfold or it ought to unfold.   Richard (47m 33s): Look, I mean it, it's quite clear that we kept interest rates artificially low for a very long period of time. And it's like everything else you say, ah, this is going to stimulate investment. But on the other hand, you now have people who are living off their retirement savings and the interest rates have been cut by two-thirds under this situation. And so they are really kind of hurting. So it turns out manipulation of interest rates are like wealth transfers from one group to another. And in general, the winners always get less by way of profit than the losers do because the uncertainty means that the whole game is going to be bad.   So the first thing you have to do when you think about this stuff is to figure out how you stabilize this and take it out of politics. One of the reasons why the gold standard actually worked, not withstanding the fact that it seems highly improbable to do so, is it's a lot more difficult to manipulate the supply of gold than it is to manipulate the supply of paper, right? And so what it did is it created a natural degree of stability and then people could adjust to that situation. The current situation, when you have this uncertainty, it means that every financial transaction has an additional degree of risk associated with it.   Cuz you don't know whether the dollars that you're gonna get tomorrow are gonna relate in some particular way to the dollars that you're spending today. So the stability point is, I think the first thing that you want The, the second thing I think that one wants to recognize is that inflation is not just a monetary phenomenon. It is too many dollars tasting too few goods, right? And well, you can screw this equation up in two ways. One is you could create too many dollars, which is running the printing press to the point where the money starts to come out in a pandemic.   There may be a lot of dollars out there, but there's not gonna be a lot of activity. So the velocity of money will be slow, which means that the increase in the quantity of money is not going to show itself immediately. But the moment the velocity of money starts to speed up and the quantity of money starts to speed up, then you got a problem. But on the other side, it's chasing too few goods. You can have a system on direct regulation of the production of goods that favors it or destroys it. If you increase overall productivity, you're gonna reduce inflationary pressures because what's gonna happen is you have more dollars chasing more goods and the more goods offset, the more dollars on the other side.   What you see in the United States, I think more so than in Canada, is this relentless effort to shut down production through a system of transfer payment. So this kind of exacerbates the overall problem, and it's something of course, which the Fed cannot solve or any monetary problem can solve because the determinants of overall goods production are going to be industrial organization. They're gonna be labor laws, they're gonna be zoning laws, they're gonna be taxes and tariffs on imports and experts, all exports, all of which fall outside of the purview of the Fed.   It's not that the Fed is irrelevant, it has a huge role to play on one side of this equation, but it has no role to play on the other. You see somebody like Joe Biden, I mean, you know, he is generally regarded as one of the dumber people ever to take in public office that widely known but not widely spoken today. But you know, every time he sees something, if it's a good move, it's because government has done it. If it's a bad move, it's because greed has taken play. He has no idea that changes in market conditions could lead to changes in prices.   And that changes in prices that reflect scarcity are generally a good thing. Because if you raise the price, the people will stay on the market the longest of those that get the net profit, largest net profit out of the use of goods. It's not great that you have to cut things down, but better to do it that way than by some government allocation scheme, which is the only question that you start to add. And so what you do is you get these constant drumbeat of people on top of the market. And one of the things that happened is if you look for example, at a Congress which has lost its way, or a government in Canada that loses its way, even the threat of regulation will have very bad effects on the operation of A, so if somebody says there's a 20% chance that there's gonna be a windfall profits taxed on oil in the next year or so, it is going to skew investment in consumption systems all the way down the line, even if it never passes.   And the reason why you like constitutional prohibitions against certain kinds of fools errands like this is very simple. What it does is it gets that element of risk outta the situation. So the ideal theory of constitutionalism is you put into a constitutional, those constraints that make sense in good times are bad, but you don't try to constitutionalized those restrictions that will work on one set of times. But not only. So for example, on taxation, there is no way you wanna put in a rule that says you cannot tax more than 22% of the economy and put it into the government in wartime or crisis.   You may need more money than that. But what you can do is to say, look, when we do this taxes, we are going to do it through a flat tax, and that means that everybody's gonna go up or down at the same ratio. That constraint doesn't stop you on the revenue side, right? But what it does is it does a great deal to stop the partisan fighting where one group is strong enough to impose specialized taxes on another or to get disproportionate gain. So the theory of pro-rata benefits off of common investment was the exact same theory I talked about was stop the beach renourishment, right?   Hmm. Have hydrogen as people, and you're trying to get uniform rates of return by side payments and so forth. Well, with taxes, you don't have to worry about those complications. You keep the system flat and that you then do is just change the rate. But of course, course the progressives have exactly the opposite situation. They're trying to figure out how to get 90% of the money outta 1% of the people. And so you take a state like California and tech was good last year, and they get huge surpluses from these rich folks. The tech business seems to be fairly bad this year, right?   Google's laying off people, everybody's laying off people, and all of a sudden they run enormous deficits. Well, that's what's going to happen to you if you don't use a more robust tax. A flat tax is much more stable when you're starting to deal with differences and conditions and so forth, which is one of the political economy reasons why you want it. If you listen to people like a manual size, and Elizabeth Warren, all they're interested in is shoveling money from people they don't like the people they do like, and they seem utterly oblivious to the whole question about growth and political stability.   And so this is a great tragedy that's taking place right now. The movement of getting rid of the standard limitations on the income tax, the realization requirement, the net increase in wealth requirement and so forth, is likely to take hold in some places. There'll be a huge constitutional battle over it. I think much of it will fail, but some of it might succeed. And what happens is just what I mentioned, every, every state that wants to impose a wealth tax, wants to impose an exit tax as well.   And that's East German, the sign of a socialist. The government is a prohibit exit because they know they don't have enough to offer you to keep you here in a voluntary.   Jesse (54m 59s): And on that ominous note, my guest today has been Richard a Epstein. Richard, thanks again for being part of Working Capital.   Richard (55m 6s): Great.   Jesse (55m 13s): Thank you so much for listening to Working Capital, the Real Estate Podcast. I'm your host, Jesse for Galley. If you like the episode, head on to iTunes and leave us a five star review and share on social media. It really helps us out. If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to me on Instagram, Jesse for galley, F R A G A L E. Have a good one. Take care.

Nesse episódio, trocamos um papo com Isabella Pinella sobre paixão, gratidão e aprendizado. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/saquei/message

Preocupadas com a quantidade de fake news sobre saúde que circula pela Internet, sete médicas se uniram no início de 2021 para criar um site com informações confiáveis, baseadas em pesquisas científicas e em suas próprias experiências profissionais. Nascia assim o Panacea - Vida e Saúde, que reúne não apenas textos sobre saúde, mas também reflexões pessoais das colunistas, amigas desde os tempos da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de São Paulo. Confira nesse episódio do Podcast Aptare um papo inspirador com as dras Marcia Araújo, Silvia Pinella e Renata DiFrancesco sobre informação em saúde, cuidado, reinvenção e envelhecimento. Para saber mais: panacea.med.br

Larry Bowa 5x All Star, Gold Glove winner, World Series Champion, 3rd Base Coach and Manager comes in to chat with J.B. about his days playing in Philadelphia, working for great managers Pinella, Torre, and Francona. How difficult it is to be a umpire in 2020 and the changes the game is under going. Also a great Bob Gibson story

In 1969, Major League Baseball expanded to four cities: San Diego, Montreal, Kansas City and Seattle. Montreal moved to Washington and became the Nationals and Seattle moved as well. Yes, there was a team in Seattle before the Mariners – the Seattle Pilots. The Pilots played in Seattle for just one season – 1969 – and at the end of spring training, 1970, they were officially sold and relocated to Milwaukee. But that one year in Seattle was a most interesting time. The Pilots were/are a study in what not to do when trying to establish a new team in a new city. Ownership of the team was not committed, the Stadium was ancient and not meant to host Major League Baseball, many of Seattle’s politicians and residents did not want a team and, getting back to the stadium, finding a location was utter chaos. The team itself was a typical expansion team going 64-98 in its first season. But they had a few players who people thought they could build around: Tommy Harper, Tommy Davis, Lou Pinella and Mike Hegan. But, before the season started, Pinella was traded to Kansas City where he went on to win Rookie of the Year. That trade of Pinella for John Geinar and Steve Whitaker proved to be one of the most lopsided trades in franchise history, and it was orchestrated by Seattle’s GM Marvin Milkes, who also thought the team was much better that it was and talked about the Pilots finishing as high as third. That was a problem too as he did everything he could to help the team play better ball. Well, that backfired as the Pilots had a revolving door of players and according to Bill Mullins, author of the book, “Becoming Big League, Seattle, the Pilots, and Stadium Politics,” and who is our guest on this episode of Sports’ Forgotten Heroes, Seattleites regarded the Pilots as nothing more than a glorified minor league team because of the constant player movement, just like a minor league team. Join Bill Mullins now on Sports’ Forgotten Heroes as we take a look back at the fascinating story of the Seattle Pilots. Links: Sports' Forgotten Heroes website Sports' Forgotten Heroes Patreon Page Sports' Forgotten Heroes twitter ©2019 Sports' Forgotten Heroes

He has been nicknamed "Sweet Lou," both for his swing as a major league hitter and, facetiously, to describe his demeanor as a player and manager.Piniella grew up in West Tampa, Florida. His Austrian grandparents immigrated to Florida from Asturias, Spain. As a child, he played PONY League Baseball alongside Tony La Russa.Lou Piniella played for the Kansas City Royals from 1969-73, and was the American League's AL Rookie of the Year in 1969. He was the first player to come to bat in Royals history. On April 8 of their first season, he led off the bottom of the 1st and doubled to left field, then scored on an RBI single by Jerry Adair.After the Royals, Pinella was a member of the New York Yankees for 11 seasons, where they won five AL East titles (1976-78, 1980 and 1981), four AL pennants (1976-78 and 1981), and two World Series championships (1977-78). After centerfielder Mickey Rivers was traded, during the 1979 season, Piniella became the Yankees leadoff hitter. One of the more underrated players of the 1970s (he made just one all star team), he compiled 1705 lifetime hits despite not playing full time for just under half of his career.After retiring as a player, Piniella managed the Yankees from 1986 to 1987 and for most of 1988 before briefly serving as the club's general manager for the rest of the 1988 and 1989 seasons. Piniella managed the Cincinnati Reds between 1990 and 1992, a tenure that included winning the 1990 World Series against the heavily-favored Oakland Athletics.From 1993-2002, he managed the Seattle Mariners, winning the AL Manager of the Year Award in 1995, and again in 2001 when he led the Mariners to a record-tying 116 wins. They lost their chance to go to the World Series when they were beat by the Yankees in the ALCS. Smarter Podcasts.com, Delivering Sound Advice.

Yulieski Gourriel es agente libre. Baltimore y Boston juegan por el primer lugar. Las votaciones preliminares de la Liga Americana para el juego de estrellas varios Latinoamericanos están de líderes. Entrevistas con Beltrán, Castro, Pinella, Rodríguez y Duncan hechas por Julio Chino Pérez. El Mundo de las Grandes ahora en podcast con Kevin Cabral y Felix DeJesus

podcast della puntata dell'11 aprile 2014. Cecco Bellosi ci racconta Pinella, l'autista della banda di Vallnzasca.

podcast della puntata dell'11 aprile 2014. Cecco Bellosi ci racconta Pinella, l'autista della banda di Vallnzasca.

Phone Dialing, Out Of Gas, Shoe Mill, Deer Louse, BIG THING, Ball Talk, Shaq, Olympics Slang, Pinella, Arm Wrestling, FFL, World Of Crazy, Angry Wife, Florida Peeing, Eating Glasses, Male Model, Port Angeles, ANDY WOOD, Bridgetown Comedy Festival, Helium Club, Andy Loves John Mayer

We'll discuss the Cubs Series against the Diamondback and look ahead PLUS MLB news and discussion

We'll discuss the Cubs Series against the Diamondback and look ahead PLUS MLB news and discussion

We'll discuss the MELTDOWN of the Cubs. The Pinella Incident, Zambrano/Barrett, and look for some hope to turn it around

We'll discuss the MELTDOWN of the Cubs. The Pinella Incident, Zambrano/Barrett, and look for some hope to turn it around